As a special administrative region of China, China’s ratifications of the United Nations Convention against Corruption and the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime apply to Hong Kong. Separately, Hong Kong has been a member of the Financial Action Task Force since 1991.
Hong Kong’s primary law enforcement agency responsible for preventing corruption, the Independent Commission against Corruption (ICAC), is a member of various international anti-corruption bodies, including the International Association of Anti-Corruption Authorities, the APEC Anti-Corruption and Transparency Experts Working Group, the ADB/OECD Anti-Corruption Initiative for Asia-Pacific and the Economic Crime Agencies Network.
The Prevention of Bribery Ordinance (Cap 201) (POBO) is the primary anti-corruption legislation in Hong Kong. It regulates corrupt conduct in both the public and private sectors. The main offences are set out in Part II of POBO. In addition to prohibiting the offering/giving or soliciting/receiving of bribes, POBO contains an unexplained wealth offence, prohibiting the chief executive or a “prescribed officer” (certain civil servants) from maintaining a standard of living or being in control of pecuniary resources or property disproportionate to their present or past official emoluments without satisfactory explanation.
There are also other anti-corruption provisions that apply to specific sectors. For instance:
In terms of regulatory consequences, failure by financial institutions licensed by the Hong Kong Monetary Authority (HKMA) or the Securities and Futures Commission (SFC) to comply with applicable anti-corruption requirements may result in breach of the relevant codes of conduct, leading to disciplinary action. For civil servants, the Civil Service Code prohibits the soliciting or accepting of any advantage or gift that would, or might reasonably be seen to, compromise their integrity or judgment or influence the discharge or non-discharge of their duties and responsibilities. Even where the solicitation or acceptance of an advantage or gift does not constitute a breach of POBO, a civil servant could still be liable to disciplinary action if such solicitation or acceptance has or could have led to a conflict between his or her private interest and official duties.
From a reporting perspective, the Organized and Serious Crimes Ordinance (Cap 455) (OSCO) requires any person who knows or suspects that any property represents any person’s proceeds of, or was used or is intended to be used in connection with, an indictable offence to report that knowledge or suspicion as soon as reasonably practicable. Financial institutions regulated by the HKMA and the SFC are also subject to self-reporting requirements under the Supervisory Policy Manual and the Code of Conduct for Persons Licensed by or Registered with the Securities and Futures Commission (the “SFC Code of Conduct”), respectively.
One of the ICAC’s missions is public education about corruption. In addition to advertisements, films and other public education materials, the ICAC has published, through the Corruption Prevention Advisory Service, a specialised unit in its Corruption Prevention Department, various sector-specific guides and tools for corruption prevention, including the following:
No key amendments have been made to POBO in 2024.
The term “bribe” is not defined in POBO, nor does it form part of the operative wording of any of the offences under POBO. Instead, POBO generally prohibits the offering, soliciting or acceptance of any “advantage” for the purpose of inducing someone to, or rewarding someone for, doing or not doing an act or showing favour or disfavour.
A person offering an advantage commits an offence even if the recipient did not in fact have the ability to deliver the benefit for which the advantage was given, as long as he or she, in offering the advantage, believed or suspected that the recipient had the ability to deliver the benefit. Similarly, a person accepting an advantage commits an offence even if he or she did not, in fact, have the ability to deliver the benefit for which the advantage was given, as long as he or she, in accepting the advantage, believed or suspected that the advantage was given for the purpose of securing a benefit.
Bribery of Public Officials
“Public servants”, as defined in POBO, include prescribed officers, employees of public bodies and non-honorary office holders, as well as other individuals involved in the conduct or management of the affairs of certain public bodies.
Prescribed officers are a class of public servants subject to more stringent requirements. Section 3 of POBO imposes a general prohibition on all prescribed officers, making it an offence for them to solicit or accept any advantage without permission from the chief executive. Contravention of this section does not require any corrupt motive. Prescribed officers include:
To soften the impact of Section 3, the chief executive has issued the Acceptance of Advantages (Chief Executive’s Permission) Notice, which gives prescribed officers general permission to accept advantages that fall outside the four restricted categories of gift, discount, loan of money and passage, as well as permission to accept advantages that fall within the restricted categories in limited circumstances.
With regard to public servants who are not prescribed officers, Section 4 of POBO imposes criminal liability on any public servant who, whether in Hong Kong or elsewhere, solicits or accepts without lawful authority or reasonable excuse any advantage as an inducement to, or a reward for or otherwise:
It is also an offence for any person, whether in Hong Kong or elsewhere, without lawful authority or reasonable excuse, to offer any advantage to the chief executive or any public servant as an inducement to – or a reward for or otherwise – the chief executive or public servant (as applicable) performing any of the Stipulated Acts.
The exception is where the recipient of the advantage is a public servant (not being a prescribed officer) who had written permission to solicit or accept the advantage, granted by the public body that employs them, prior to the advantage being offered, solicited or accepted or as soon as reasonably possible after offer or acceptance of the advantage.
There is no exception for “facilitation payments”, generally understood to mean payments made to secure or speed up performance by a public official of a duty that he or she was in any event obliged to perform unless the recipient is duly authorised to accept the payment.
Sections 5 to 8 of POBO set out other public sector offences. Under these sections, it is an offence if, without lawful authority or reasonable excuse:
Further, Section 10 of POBO makes it an offence for any person who is – or has been – the chief executive or a prescribed officer to maintain a standard of living or be in control of pecuniary resources or property above that which is commensurate with their present or past official emoluments, unless that person is able to provide a satisfactory explanation for the disparity.
Bribery Between Private Parties
Section 9 of POBO is the main provision therein that applies to private sector bribery. Under this section, it is an offence if, without lawful authority or reasonable excuse, any person offers any advantage to any agent, or any agent solicits or accepts any advantage, as an inducement to – or a reward for or otherwise – the agent performing or not performing any act, favouring or disfavouring any person or engaging in such conduct in relation to his or her principal’s affairs or business. The exception to this is where the agent has permission from the principal to solicit or accept the advantage, and the permission was given before the advantage was offered, solicited or accepted or as soon as reasonably possible after offer or acceptance of the advantage.
Due to its wide ambit, Section 9 also operates as a catch-all and can cover public sector conduct that falls outside Sections 3 to 8.
Hospitality Expenditures, Gifts and Promotional Expenditures
“Advantage” is very widely defined and includes:
POBO does not provide any de minimis defence. Hospitality expenditures, gifts and promotional expenditures are therefore likely to be regarded as advantages. However, “entertainment”, defined as “the provision of food or drink, for consumption on the occasion when it is provided, and of other entertainment connected with, provided at the same time as, such provisions”, is not regarded as an advantage under POBO. A frequent point of contention in relation to this exception is whether the entertainment offered was solely for consumption “on the occasion when it was provided”.
In light of the foregoing, offering, giving, soliciting or accepting gifts, travel, hospitality, etc is likely to contravene POBO unless:
Bribery of Foreign Public Officials
POBO does not contain any provision that specifically governs bribery of foreign public officials. Further, as a “public servant” is not defined in POBO to include foreign public officials, the provisions that apply to bribery of public officials in Hong Kong do not apply in the context of bribery of foreign public officials.
However, it was held by the Hong Kong Court of Final Appeal in B v Commissioner of the Independent Commission Against Corruption [2010] 3 HKC 118 that the definition of the term “agent” used in Section 9 of POBO is non-exhaustive and could cover foreign public officials. In these circumstances, Section 9 can apply to the bribery of foreign public officials, but only if “a substantial measure of the activities constituting a crime” takes place in Hong Kong, as (unlike Section 4) Section 9 does not expressly apply to acts done “whether in Hong Kong or elsewhere” and therefore does not have extraterritorial effect (HKSAR v Krieger [2014] 3 HKLRD 404).
As explained in 2.1 Bribery, the term “advantage” is adopted in all the relevant provisions in POBO. Whether any particular conduct constitutes an offence under these provisions depends on whether an advantage was offered, solicited or accepted. An advantage is widely defined as including “any other service or favour” and “the exercise or forbearance from the exercise of any right or any power or duty”, which is likely to cover any exercise of influence on decision-making. Therefore, influence-peddling for the purpose of obtaining a benefit from a public servant or private party in Hong Kong is likely to constitute an offence under POBO.
Influence-peddling for the purpose of obtaining a benefit from foreign public officials could constitute an offence under Section 9 of POBO, depending on whether the influence-peddling occurred in Hong Kong (see 2.1 Bribery, “Bribery of Foreign Public Officials”).
POBO does not contain any requirement for the retention of books and records. However, Section 9 of POBO includes a separate offence (Section 9(3)) prohibiting an agent from using any receipt, account or other document that contains any statement that is materially false, erroneous or defective with intent to deceive their principal.
Although not found in POBO, there are broad books and records requirements and offences elsewhere in Hong Kong law.
The Companies Ordinance (Cap 622) (CO) imposes various record-keeping obligations on Hong Kong companies. For instance, Section 373 of the CO imposes an obligation on Hong Kong companies to keep accounting records that are sufficient for the following purposes:
In particular, the accounting records must contain daily entries of all sums of money received and expended by the company – and the matters to which they relate – and a record of the company’s assets and liabilities.
Further, Section 51C of the Inland Revenue Ordinance (Cap 112) requires every person and company carrying on a trade, profession or business in Hong Kong to keep sufficient records of their income and expenditures for not less than seven years after completion of the relevant transaction, act or operation to enable the assessable profits of the trade, profession or business to be ascertained.
In addition, there is the offence of false accounting under Section 19 of the Theft Ordinance (Cap 210), which provides that a person who dishonestly, with a view to gain for themself or another or with intent to cause loss to another, (i) destroys, defaces, conceals or falsifies any account, record or document made or required for any accounting purpose; or (ii) in furnishing information for any purpose, produces or makes use of any account, record or document made or required for any accounting purpose that they know is or may be materially misleading, false or deceptive, shall be guilty of an offence.
There are no specific offences under POBO covering any act of misappropriation of public funds, unlawful taking of interest, embezzlement of public funds or favouritism by a public official. However, such acts may constitute theft under Sections 2 and 9 of the Theft Ordinance (Cap 210) if the public official dishonestly appropriates property belonging to another with the intention to permanently deprive the other of it.
A public official is also subject to the common law offence of misconduct in public office, which targets all forms of serious wilful misconduct by the public official in the course of or in relation to their public office, even if no bribery is involved. Such misconduct includes the situation where the public official uses their discretionary power improperly or shows favour to a particular contractor for personal interest.
Pursuant to Section 2(2) of POBO, a person offers, solicits or accepts an advantage if they themself, or “any other person acting on [their] behalf”, engage in the relevant conduct. Therefore, a person who offers, solicits or accepts an advantage through a third party or intermediary would still be exposed to liability under the bribery offences outlined in 2.1 Bribery. The intermediary, on the other hand, would only be liable if they aided, abetted, counselled or procured the offence, or conspired with the person who offered, gave, solicited or accepted the bribe.
Lobbying activities are not regulated by POBO.
Under Hong Kong law, criminal offences are triable either (i) on indictment or (ii) summarily.
Broadly speaking, summary offences are less serious than indictable offences (ie, offences that may or must be tried on indictment).
There is no limitation period for indictable offences. For offences that may only be prosecuted summarily, prosecution should generally be brought within six months from the time when the underlying events occurred. However, the time limit for summary prosecution of Section 3 of POBO is extended to two years from the time when the underlying events occurred. Further, in relation to the financial record-keeping offences referred to in 2.3 Financial Record-Keeping, the time limit for offences under the CO that can only be prosecuted summarily is extended to (i) within three years after the commission of the offence; and (ii) within 12 months after the date on which the supporting evidence came to the Secretary for Justice’s knowledge.
Section 4 of POBO, relating to the bribery of Hong Kong civil servants, is the only provision in the ordinance that has extraterritorial effect, as it imposes criminal liability regardless of whether the operative conduct takes place “in Hong Kong or elsewhere”. Thus, the offering of any advantage to a public servant, or the soliciting or accepting of such advantage by the public servant, as inducement or reward for doing or not doing an act or showing favour or disfavour is an offence under Section 4 of POBO, even if the offering, soliciting or accepting occurs outside Hong Kong.
On the other hand, although Section 9 of POBO does not have extraterritorial effect, as explained in 2.1 Bribery, bribery of a foreign public official can be caught by Section 9 in circumstances where “a substantial measure of the activities constituting a crime” takes place in Hong Kong.
A “person” is defined under Section 3 of the Interpretation and General Clauses Ordinance (Cap 1) as “any public body and any body of persons, corporate or unincorporate”. The bribery offences under POBO therefore apply to individuals and companies alike. However, in practice, it is rare for companies to be prosecuted for bribery offences. Therefore, although it is technically possible for a successor entity to be held liable for offences under POBO committed by the predecessor entity prior to a merger or acquisition, it is the individuals involved who are typically prosecuted.
For bribery offences under Sections 4 to 9 of POBO, it shall be a defence for the accused to show that they had lawful authority or reasonable excuse to offer, solicit or accept the advantage in question. Pursuant to Section 24 of POBO, the accused shall bear the burden of proving a defence of lawful authority or reasonable excuse. Further, specifically in relation to Sections 4 and 9 of POBO (dealing with bribery of civil servants and the catch-all offence), it shall also be a defence for the accused to show that they have written permission from the relevant public body or their principal (as applicable) to solicit or accept the advantage granted prior to it being offered, solicited or accepted or as soon as reasonably possible after its offer or acceptance.
For the bribery offence under Section 3 of POBO (dealing with prescribed officers), a common law defence of honest and reasonable mistake of fact is available such that a defendant will not be liable if they can show, on the balance of probabilities, that they honestly and reasonably, but mistakenly, believed that they had the general or special permission of the chief executive to accept the advantage in question.
For an offence under Section 10 of POBO (unexplained wealth), it is a defence for the accused to provide a satisfactory explanation as to how they were able to maintain the relevant standard of living or how the relevant pecuniary resources or property came under their control.
In relation to the obligation to keep accounting records pursuant to Section 373 of CO, a director of the company in question may be liable for failing to take all reasonable steps to secure compliance with such obligation, but it is a defence for the director to establish that they had reasonable grounds to, and did in fact, believe that a competent and reliable person was charged with the duty of ensuring compliance and was in a position to discharge that duty.
There are no exceptions to the defences outlined in 4.1 Defences.
POBO does not contain any de minimis exception. However, according to the Prosecution Code of the Department of Justice (the “Prosecution Code”) – which is a set of statements and instructions to guide prosecutors in conducting prosecutions – in deciding whether to prosecute, consideration will be given to factors such as “the seriousness of the offence” and “whether or not the offence is trivial”. Therefore, in practice, prosecution may not be brought for a bribery offence that involves a bribe of a very low or nominal level, but that is not to say this would never occur. In 2009, a director of a construction company was successfully prosecuted for bribing police officers with 15 boxes of mooncakes, a relatively low-value gift that is customarily given to relatives, friends and clients during the Mid-Autumn Festival in Hong Kong.
No sector or industry is exempt from the bribery offences under POBO. Further, Section 19 of POBO specifically states that it shall not be a defence for a bribery offence under POBO to show that the advantage in question is customary in any profession, trade, vocation or calling.
There is no safe harbour or amnesty programme for bribery offences under POBO based on self-reporting, adequate compliance procedures or remediation efforts. In practice, self-reporting and voluntary co-operation with the authorities are significant mitigating factors that could lead to a decision not to prosecute. If the decision is made to prosecute and the person is convicted, they could rely on such conduct in mitigation to seek a reduced sentence.
Further, pursuant to the Prosecution Code, in exceptional circumstances, a witness or informer may be granted immunity from prosecution. Ordinarily, this would require that the evidence given by the witness or informer be necessary to secure the conviction of a person with a higher level of involvement in the relevant offence (as compared with the witness or informer), and that such evidence is not available elsewhere.
Finally, Section 23 of POBO stipulates the circumstances in which a suspect of a corruption offence may be granted immunity from prosecution. Where a written request is made by the Secretary for Justice, the court may inform any person accused or suspected of a corruption offence that, if they give full and true evidence or are lawfully examined in such proceedings, they will not be prosecuted for the offence disclosed by their evidence.
For bribery offences under POBO, the following penalties apply.
Where a person has been convicted under Section 10 of POBO on the basis that they are in control of pecuniary resources or property disproportionate to their present or past official emoluments, they may, in addition to receiving the penalty referred to in the foregoing, be ordered to pay to the government – or be subject to an order for confiscation of – a sum not exceeding the amount of the pecuniary resources or the value of the property for which they do not have a satisfactory explanation.
Anyone convicted of a bribery offence under POBO may be prohibited for a period of up to seven years from taking up or continuing employment as either a professional, a self-employed businessperson or a manager of a corporation or public body (Section 33A of POBO).
Penalties for Non-bribery Offences Applicable to Public Servants
Where a public servant misappropriates or embezzles public funds or engages in any other conduct that constitutes theft under Sections 2 and 9 of the Theft Ordinance, they shall be liable on conviction to imprisonment for ten years.
A public servant who is convicted of the common law offence of misconduct in public office is liable to a maximum penalty of seven years’ imprisonment and a fine.
Penalties Under CO
In relation to the obligation to keep accounting records pursuant to Section 373 of CO:
Other Penalties
A person who, without reasonable excuse, fails to comply with the requirements of Section 51C of the Inland Revenue Ordinance to keep sufficient records of income and expenditure is liable on conviction to a maximum fine of HKD100,000. The Court may further order the person to perform the act that they failed to perform within a specified period of time.
The offence of false accounting under Section 19 of the Theft Ordinance is punishable on conviction upon indictment to imprisonment for up to ten years.
Regulatory Consequences
Where any person regulated by the SFC commits any of the foregoing offences, such person is likely to be regarded as having engaged in misconduct and/or to be viewed by the SFC as being not a fit and proper person to be – or to remain – a regulated person, which may result in the SFC taking the following disciplinary action:
When imposing a sentence on a person convicted of bribery or corruption under POBO, Hong Kong courts are generally guided by the following sentencing principles derived from case law.
There is no general legal duty to disclose or report known or suspected corruption or bribery to law enforcement bodies in Hong Kong. However, financial institutions and their directors, staff and auditors may be required under particular local legislation or regulations to disclose corrupt activities to the relevant regulators.
Further, under Section 25A of the OSCO, any person who knows or suspects that any property, in whole or in part, directly or indirectly represents any person’s proceeds of, or was used or is intended to be used in connection with, an indictable offence is required to report that knowledge or suspicion as soon as reasonably practicable to a police officer or the Customs and Excise Department. In practice, suspicious transaction reports (STRs) are made to the Joint Financial Intelligence Unit (JFIU), which is jointly run by the Hong Kong Police Force and the Customs and Excise Department. The timely making of an STR triggers a defence to money laundering. A person who makes an STR before dealing in the property in question with the consent of the JFIU, or who makes an STR voluntarily as soon as reasonable after dealing in the property, shall not be liable for the offence of dealing in criminal proceeds under Section 25 of the OSCO.
Self-disclosure of potential violations of anti-bribery and anti-corruption provisions are significant mitigating factors that could lead to a decision not to prosecute, or provide a basis for seeking a reduced sentence in mitigation if the person is prosecuted and convicted, as stated in 4.5 Safe Harbour or Amnesty Programme.
As stated in 6.1 Disclosure Obligations, there is no general legal duty to disclose or report known or suspected corruption or bribery to law enforcement bodies in Hong Kong, save that financial institutions and their directors, staff and auditors may be required under particular local legislation or regulations to disclose corrupt activities to the relevant regulators. Where an obligation to file an STR arises under Section 25A of OSCO, it should be submitted in writing to the JFIU.
In Hong Kong, there is no legislation that specifically protects whistle-blowers. However, Section 30A of POBO prevents any witness in civil and criminal proceedings from being compelled to disclose, or to answer any question that may lead to the discovery of, an informer’s name or address and also requires the redaction of any document in such proceedings that may lead to disclosure of the informer’s identity. In addition, ICAC informers whose personal safety or well-being might be at risk may receive witness protection under the Witness Protection Ordinance (Cap 564).
There is no statutory framework for rewarding whistle-blowers. However, self-reporting and co-operation with the authorities are mitigating factors that could result in a more lenient sentence after conviction. Although not guaranteed, this could also influence the prosecutor’s decision on whether to grant immunity from prosecution. For details, see 4.5 Safe Harbour or Amnesty Programme.
Bribery offences under POBO are prosecuted criminally, resulting, upon conviction, in the penalties outlined in 5.1 Penalties on Conviction.
The ICAC is the law enforcement agency responsible for preventing and investigating corruption in Hong Kong. Under the Independent Commission Against Corruption Ordinance (Cap 204) (ICACO) and POBO, the ICAC has wide-ranging powers to investigate corruption, including the following:
Following investigation, pursuant to Section 31(1) of POBO, the consent of the Secretary for Justice is required for prosecuting bribery offences under POBO.
The ICAC also works with other law enforcement agencies in Hong Kong to combat corruption in specific sectors. For instance, the ICAC signed a Memorandum of Understanding with the SFC in 2019 to strengthen their co-operation in combating illegal activities, including corruption, which damage the integrity of Hong Kong’s securities and futures markets. Such co-operation enables the ICAC to benefit from the investigative fruits of the other law enforcement agencies. This is particularly significant in the case of the SFC, as a person interviewed by the SFC for a suspected breach or contravention of the Securities and Futures Ordinance (Cap 571) does not have the right to remain silent. Although the use of the compelled information as evidence in criminal proceedings against the interviewee is prohibited, such evidence may be used against others, and use of information derived from the compelled information against the interviewee and others is also permitted.
The jurisdictional reach of the ICAC is defined by the scope of the bribery offences under POBO. For details, see 3.2 Geographical Reach of Applicable Legislation.
Mitigating factors, such as self-reporting and voluntary co-operation with the authorities, if significant, could lead to a decision by the ICAC or the Secretary for Justice not to prosecute. If the decision is made to prosecute, such conduct is likely to result in the court imposing a reduced sentence. On the other hand, aggravating factors such as repeated misconduct could lead to more severe penalties upon conviction. See also 5.2 Guidelines Applicable to the Assessment of Penalties.
Further, as stated in 4.5 Safe Harbour or Amnesty Programme, a witness or informer may under certain circumstances be granted immunity from prosecution.
Malpractice in football match-fixing and illegal gambling has been an area of focus of corruption investigations in recent years. Following operation “Green Grass”, which the ICAC commenced in May 2023 to neutralise a corruption syndicate that participated in football match-fixing and illegal gambling, the ICAC began another campaign (known as operation “Tenacity”) in May 2024, which involved the bribing of members of football clubs for match-fixing to facilitate syndicate members in profiting from illegal gambling on football games over the course of three seasons. In this operation, 12 individuals, including football players, coaches and betting agents, were arrested for allegedly having offered and accepted bribes for manipulating football players’ performances and match results, in violation of Section 9 of POBO. Investigations revealed that the players involved would receive a bribe that ranged from several thousand dollars to tens of thousands of dollars per match. The ICAC has laid charges against three of the arrestees, and the corruption investigation is ongoing.
Another major investigation concerned a bribery scam related to annual vehicle examinations. In Hong Kong, it is mandatory for private cars of six years or above to undergo an annual examination at a designated car testing centre appointed by the Transport Department. In June 2024, in an operation code-named “Gale”, the ICAC arrested a total of 20 people for, among other things, allegedly accepting bribes from owners of garages for falsifying annual vehicle examination results, thereby circumventing the examination procedures of the Transport Department. In the same operation, the ICAC executed search warrants at various premises and seized ten cars, which were subsequently re-examined by the Transport Department and found to have failed the annual vehicle examination. Among the persons arrested, three have been charged for conspiracy to forge certificates of roadworthiness for private cars and light goods vehicles.
In October 2024, the ICAC mounted further significant operations and arrested 148 individuals for alleged bribery and forgery over professional qualifications for construction and electrical works. The scam involved rendering assistance by corrupt means to those unqualified in obtaining professional certificates for operating excavators, or applying for electrical work certificates by corrupt means. See the Hong Kong Trends and Developments chapter in this guide for details.
Following an investigation jointly conducted by the ICAC and the SFC, the ICAC recently laid charges against three individuals, including a former manager of the Investment Products Department of the Securities and Futures Commission, and a senior government counsel of the Department of Justice, for conspiracy to commit misconduct in public office. The former manager of the SFC was alleged to have divulged confidential information concerning a rights issue of a real estate investment trust fund from January to February 2023 to two other individuals, who then made use of such information to conduct multiple derivatives transactions and obtained an aggregate profit exceeding HKD11 million. Part of the profits was shared with the former SFC manager. No plea has been taken, and the defendants were granted bail pending the next hearing on 26 March 2025. In the meantime, investigations are ongoing, and the SFC has announced that it is looking into potential violations under the Serious Fraud Office (SFO).
In a football match-fixing scam, the ICAC has laid charges against four individuals, including the head coach of a football club in the Hong Kong Premier League, for betting with or conspiracy to bet with a bookmaker. The four individuals pleaded not guilty to the charges and were released on bail pending trial, which is expected to last eight days, with a pre-trial review that is scheduled for 22 January 2025.
Following the arrest of 20 people in June 2024 in a corruption investigation concerning annual vehicle examinations, the ICAC has not issued further updates on the progress of the matter, save that the corruption inquiries are ongoing.
Similarly, no sanctions have been imposed on those who were arrested by the ICAC for fraudulent certification in the excavator and electrical industries, as the investigation is continuing. Given the concerns over the suspected illegal acts revealed in the ICAC investigation, the Labour Department has revoked 100 certificates for excavator operators concerned in the matter. See the Hong Kong Trends and Developments chapter in this guide for details.
POBO does not impose any statutory duty to set up a compliance programme to prevent corruption, and failure to prevent corruption is not a crime in Hong Kong.
However, financial institutions may be required under applicable regulations or codes of conduct to have in place adequate internal controls and resources to prevent corruption. For instance, any person regulated by the SFC is required to have internal control procedures and financial and operational capabilities that can be reasonably expected to protect its operations, clients and other licensed or registered persons from financial loss arising from theft, fraud and any other dishonest act, which would include corruption. Failure to comply may result in disciplinary action being taken against the regulated person.
Although POBO does not impose a statutory duty to set up a compliance programme, the ICAC nevertheless provides guidance on expectations and best practices for corruption prevention. Suggested measures include establishing a strong anti-corruption culture within the organisation, implementing robust internal control systems to include the adoption and enforcement of effective policies and procedures, providing training on corruption prevention and raising awareness and offering protection to whistle-blowers.
There is currently no legislation in Hong Kong that provides for compliance monitorship as a part of corporate resolutions. However, it is not uncommon for regulators such as the HKMA and the SFC to require regulated entities to appoint an external advisor to assess and enhance the effectiveness of its internal control system as part of the remedial actions imposed in disciplinary proceedings.
In February 2012, the Independent Review Committee for the Prevention and Handling of Potential Conflicts of Interests (IRC) was set up to conduct a review of the regulatory framework for the prevention and handling of potential conflicts of interests concerning the chief executive of Hong Kong, members of the executive council and politically appointed officials, and to make recommendations including appropriate changes to the regulatory regime.
In its report submitted to the Hong Kong government in May 2012, the IRC identified a major loophole in POBO in that the chief executive of Hong Kong was not subject to Section 3 (which criminalises the solicitation and acceptance of advantages by “prescribed officers” with the chief executive’s permission) and Section 8 (which criminalises the offering of advantages to public servants while having dealings with the government department or the public body in which the public servant is employed) of POBO.
The IRC, therefore, recommended that legislation be enacted to render it a criminal offence:
Following the IRC’s submission of its report in May 2012, efforts made to implement the suggested changes have failed to gain traction. Although the government confirmed in 2019 that “[it] [had] been actively following up on the IRC’s recommendations, with a view to enhancing the robustness of the system concerned to effectively prevent and properly deal with potential conflicts of interests involving public officials”, the comment made in 2020 by Mrs Carrie Lam, then chief executive of Hong Kong, that implementing the suggested changes might violate the constitutional position of the chief executive has cast doubt over the prospect of such changes being made. In 2021, Mrs Carrie Lam commented that she would not seek to extend the application of Sections 3 and 8 of POBO as soon as possible to cover the chief executive because it would hamper her ability to be accountable to the PRC government, and it would be against the constitutional position to subject the chief executive to POBO, which is supposed to be applied to other public officers. Since that time, no further update has been provided by the Hong Kong government on the proposed extension of the application of sections 3 and 8 of POBO.
Floor 21 AIA Central
No 1 Connaught Road Central
Hong Kong
+852 2160 9800
+852 2810 9828
Debevoise-media@debevoise.com www.debevoise.comIntroduction
Established on 15 February 1974, the Independent Commission Against Corruption (ICAC) has been steadfast in its mission to combat corruption through a comprehensive approach that encompasses law enforcement, prevention and education. This multifaceted strategy is designed to cultivate a robust culture of integrity throughout Hong Kong.
In this article, the authors will give an overview of recent actions taken by the ICAC in upholding Hong Kong’s reputation as a front runner in tackling corruption, which includes actively forging collaborations with different local and global regulatory agencies, addressing corruption in the construction industry in Hong Kong and shouldering the responsibility to train future leaders in integrity and ethics.
Collaborations
Hong Kong has witnessed an increase in collaborative operations between anti-corruption organisations in recent years, spearheaded by the ICAC, and this development appears likely to continue given its successes thus far. Take, for example, some of the significant joint operations that have occurred in the past 12 months, detailed in the following.
Insurance Authority and ICAC joint operation against suspected unlicensed sale of insurance policies
The Insurance Authority (IA) and ICAC’s first joint operation targeted corrupt conduct in the unlicensed sale of insurance policies. Search warrants were executed by the IA and ICAC on 10 and 11 April 2024 at four separate premises, which led to the arrest of multiple individuals including an individual broker and a referrer. The companies and individuals concerned were suspected of having engaged in, or having conspired with others to engage in, unlicensed regulated activities and the offence of using documents with intent to deceive. Breaches of the Code of Conduct for Licensed Insurance Brokers were also suspected to have been committed.
In the aftermath of this successful operation, the ICAC and IA reiterated their joint commitment to tackling corruption within the financial sector. The deputy commissioner of the ICAC remarked that “this joint operation showcases our common goal in upholding the integrity of the insurance industry”, while the head of market conduct at the IA looked to the future, explaining that “this close collaboration will continue not only through joint enforcement measures but also through industry training via the Hong Kong International Academy Against Corruption”.
ICAC, SFC and Macao Judiciary Police joint operation against suspected cross-boundary fraud and misconduct
The ICAC, the Securities and Futures Commission (SFC) and the Macao Judiciary Police mounted an operation code-named “Demarcation” on 19 and 20 August 2024 in relation to suspected cross-boundary fraud and misconduct. Senior executives of a listed company in Hong Kong were allegedly involved in fictitious transactions and false accounting totalling around HKD120 million. The investigation revealed that the chairman of the listed company, as well as other individuals linked to the company, had allegedly falsified business documents and the accounting records of the company’s subsidiaries in Hong Kong and Macao. As the operation concerned cross-boundary crimes, the Macao Judiciary Police subsequently launched an investigation into the relevant individuals’ suspected fraud offences, which took place in Macao.
Operation Demarcation is testimony to the growing collaboration between anti-corruption agencies. Following its completion, the ICAC deputy commissioner explained that “the joint operation fully demonstrates the close collaboration and determination of the two cities’ law enforcement agencies in tackling cross-boundary corruption and other crimes”, while the SFC executive director remarked that “the SFC will continue to work closely with the ICAC and other local and extraterritorial law enforcement agencies to maintain market integrity”.
Joint operations between the ICAC and the Competition Commission
The ICAC and theCompetition Commission (CC) conducted their first joint operation on 16 and 17 April 2024, which neutralised a syndicate engaging in corruption and tender-rigging in relation to building maintenance. This operation was followed later in the year by another joint operation code-named “Shotgun”, which took place on 21 and 22 August 2024.
In the first operation, the companies and individuals concerned were alleged to have engaged in corruption and anti-competitive activities, contravening the Prevention of Bribery Ordinance (POBO) and the First Conduct Rule of the Competition Ordinance. The ICAC arrested 20 individuals, including the mastermind and leadership members of the syndicate. Critically, the investigations arose from a corruption complaint in relation to building maintenance lodged with the ICAC by members of the public. The ICAC frequently stresses the importance of whistle-blowing and public engagement in anti-corruption; this investigation shows precisely why such actions are so valuable.
Operation “Shotgun”, meanwhile, concerned two separate but parallel investigations by the ICAC and the CC. The ICAC investigation targeted the renovation projects of two residential estates in Hong Kong Island in which corruption was suspected. At the same time, the investigation conducted by the CC concerned the renovation projects of 38 residential estates and buildings, and industrial buildings in Hong Kong Island, Kowloon and the New Territories. Both investigations are ongoing and are, once again, illustrative of the growing shift toward a collaborative approach amongst anti-corruption agencies in Hong Kong.
“Rocket Gun” and “Beacon Tower”
The ICAC apprehended a total of 148 individuals suspected of obtaining fraudulent work-related professional qualifications in two recent significant law enforcement operations code-named “Rocket Gun” and “Beacon Tower”. These arrests stemmed from allegations of falsifying employment documents and engaging in corrupt practices. The individuals arrested are accused of deceiving recognised training course providers (TCPs) associated with the Labour Department (LD) to acquire professional certificates for excavation work and misrepresenting their qualifications to the Electrical and Mechanical Services Department (EMSD) for electrical worker registrations.
Operation Rocket Gun: allegations of bribery and forgery in excavator certifications
Operation Rocket Gun resulted in the arrest of 111 individuals, including the ringleader, employees and owners of five engineering firms, staff from two TCPs and approximately 100 construction workers. ICAC officers executed search warrants at various locations and confiscated suspected falsified employment documents and other incriminating evidence.
According to the Factories and Industrial Undertakings (Loadshifting Machinery) Regulation, only individuals who hold valid certificates for operating excavators are authorised to do so. Violation of this regulation is a criminal offence and can lead to substantial fines for contractors or responsible individuals. The investigation was initiated following a complaint alleging that certain excavator operators and TCP staff had assisted inexperienced individuals to unlawfully obtain professional certificates.
Investigations revealed that the mastermind behind this operation was running an unrecognised training field and was recruiting workers lacking the necessary experience for unaccredited courses. This individual allegedly conspired with engineering firms to create proof of false employment, enabling these workers to apply for legitimate certification. Arrests made in the operation suggest that over 100 construction workers may have used fraudulent documents in their certification applications. All arrested individuals have been released on bail while the ICAC continues to investigate any additional corrupt activities linked to the certification process.
Operation Beacon Tower: allegations of bribery and forgery in electrical worker certifications
In a separate initiative dubbed “Beacon Tower”, 37 men were arrested, including a mastermind, the owners of four engineering firms and 32 electrical workers. ICAC officers conducted thorough searches at relevant homes and offices and seized suspected falsified documents for further examination.
Under the Electricity (Registration) Regulations, all electrical workers must register with the EMSD to obtain recognised qualifications. Applicants seeking Grade A certificates are required to have relevant training and a minimum of five years of experience, supported by documentation from registered professionals. Those who are ineligible to perform electrical work may face serious legal repercussions, including a fine and a maximum of six months’ imprisonment.
The investigation for Operation Beacon Tower arose out of a complaint alleging that some individuals had applied for Grade A electrical work certificates through corrupted means. It was revealed that the mastermind behind this operation had organised a paid training course and colluded with engineering firms to assist applicants in falsely claiming the necessary work experience.
As with Operation Rocket Gun, all arrested individuals in Operation Beacon Tower have been released on bail, and ongoing investigations aim to uncover any corruption linked to the issuance of electrical certificates.
Follow-up actions by regulatory bodies
In response to the ICAC’s investigation, both the LD and the EMSD have initiated their own investigations. The LD has expressed significant concern regarding illegal activities that allegedly facilitated unqualified individuals in enrolling in training courses for experienced operators of excavators. They have commenced an investigation to verify whether TCPs and their staff complied with the operating conditions required for mandatory safety training courses. The LD has made it clear that it will take decisive action if any violations are found.
In consequence of the ICAC’s arrest operation, the LD has annulled 100 certificates for excavator operators tied to the case and is reassessing the admission processes for TCPs, with a view to enhancing these mechanisms based on recommendations from the ICAC.
Similarly, the EMSD is investigating potential forgery related to the registration of Grade A electrical workers pursuant to the Electricity Ordinance. After uncovering that certain registrants may have acquired their registrations through improper means, the EMSD has voided their registrations because applicants must possess the requisite qualifications and documented work experience to be qualified as a Grade A electrical worker.
In light of these developments, the EMSD has reinforced its vetting and approval procedures. This includes deploying officers to verify applicants’ work experience directly at the issuing organisation’s office.
The construction industry has always been the private sector with the most corruption reports; therefore, combatting corruption within this industry will certainly remain among the ICAC’s top enforcement priorities in the future.
Hong Kong International Academy Against Corruption
The ICAC actively maintains close communication with the local and international community to facilitate the establishment of anti-corruption training programmes, activities and collaboration platforms. As part of its ongoing anti-graft efforts, the ICAC set up the Hong Kong International Academy Against Corruption (the “Academy”) on 21 February 2024.
The Academy’s mission is to offer systematic, professional and ongoing training for graft fighters and agencies worldwide, as well as to educate the local public and private sectors. It is expected that they will undertake four main areas of work, namely:
Being aware of the importance of international co-operation in combating corruption, the ICAC and the Academy and the International Association of Anti-Corruption Authorities (IAACA) would be expected to leverage their respective strengths – the ICAC’s abundant experience in anti-graft efforts for over five decades, the Academy’s platform for exchanges and training, as well as the IAACA’s global graft-fighting network, in order to form a powerful tripartite partnership.
A big part of the Academy’s focus will be to offer anti-corruption training courses for local and global graft fighters and to serve as an international research and exchange centre for anti-corruption experts. In February 2024, the Academy co-hosted an inaugural nine-day specialist course entitled “Professional Development Programme on Financial Investigation and Asset Recovery” with the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, which attracted graft fighters from over 20 jurisdictions, a record turnout for an ICAC course. Further, the Academy has signed memoranda with five esteemed universities in Mainland China, Macao and Hong Kong to promote anti-corruption research and talent exchange. It is expected that there will be more similar programmes on offer in future for participants to share the unique challenges of anti-graft work in their jurisdictions and exchange ideas for best practices and anti-corruption ideas.
The Academy is another milestone in Hong Kong’s unwavering efforts in leading international anti-graft collaboration and continuous development. Through ongoing training, research and experience-sharing – and fostering closer co-operation with international graft fighters – the Academy is set to become a pioneer in local and global anti-corruption initiatives, which will help reinforce Hong Kong’s status as a leading anti-corruption centre.
Banking Industry Integrity Charter with the HKMA and HKAB
Although not an operation, the ICAC also launched the Banking Industry Integrity Charter this year, a collaborative project with the Hong Kong Monetary Authority and Hong Kong Association of Banks. The Integrity Charter aims to combat and prevent corruption proactively, assist banks to enhance their integrity management system and continuously strengthen the corruption prevention awareness and capabilities of banks. The Integrity Charter will be mandatory for all licensed banks operating in Hong Kong. Some of the requirements under the Integrity Charter for participating banks are the promotion of a sound bank culture, the establishment of a code of conduct, the employment of an integrity officer to assist in implementing good governance and the provision of integrity training to staff, as well as the requirement to report suspected corruption, fraud and other illicit activities to the ICAC or other law enforcement agencies promptly.
Floor 21 AIA Central
No 1 Connaught Road Central
Hong Kong
+852 2160 9800
+852 2810 9828
Debevoise-media@debevoise.com www.debevoise.com