The Latest in Georgia Antitrust Litigation, Including Multi-District Litigation

Georgia’s antitrust framework: a constitutional and common law approach

Unlike many states, Georgia lacks a comprehensive antitrust enforcement framework modelled after the Sherman or Clayton Acts. Instead, Georgia’s antitrust framework is rooted in common law and the state’s constitution. Article III, Section VI, Paragraph V(c) of the Georgia Constitution declares that Georgia’s legislature, the General Assembly, shall not have the power to authorise any contract or agreement that has the effect of “lessening competition” or “encouraging a monopoly” – declaring such agreements unlawful and void.

While Georgia does have a statute, Official Code of Georgia Annotated (OCGA), Section 13-8-2, which declares unenforceable as contrary to public policy “[c]ontracts in general restraint of trade,” courts have held that this provision does not create a private right of action for damages. Instead, Georgia courts recognise a common law tort action for parties injured by conspiracies in restraint of trade. Because plaintiffs may not recover treble damages for violations under Georgia’s antitrust common law, plaintiffs filing suit in Georgia typically file under federal statutes that do provide for treble damages.

Georgia also lacks a “little FTC Act” resembling Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act, but the Georgia Fair Business Practices Act (FBPA) does prohibit “unfair or deceptive practices” in consumer transactions and is interpreted consistently with the FTC’s interpretation of Section 5(a). While Georgia’s FBPA is not a complete substitute for an antitrust statute, it has been used to address anticompetitive conduct affecting consumers, particularly deceptive business practices.

Judicial interpretation and federal influence

With limited state legislative guidance, Georgia courts sometimes borrow from federal antitrust cases – at least when those cases interpret a federal provision that is analogous to one of Georgia’s few statutes. For example, the Georgia Supreme Court has relied on federal case law to uphold and define the scope of Georgia’s criminal antitrust statute, which prohibits conspiracies in restraint of trade in transactions with the state or its subdivisions. (See, eg, State v Shepherd Constr. Co., 281 S.E.2d 151, 154 (Ga. 1981).)

Although early Georgia cases treated horizontal price-fixing agreements as per se illegal (see, eg, Employing Printers’ Club v Doctor Blosser Co., 50 S.E. 353 (Ga. 1905)), more recent cases have applied a rule of reason analysis to contracts in restraint of trade. (See, eg, Crosby v Hospital Authority, 873 F. Supp. 1568 (M.D. Ga. 1995), aff’d, 93 F.3d 1515 (11th Cir. 1996).) Under Georgia law, determining the reasonableness of a restraint of trade is a question of law to be decided by the judge, not the jury. (See Early v MiMedx Grp., 768 S.E.2d 823, 830 (Ga. Ct. App. 2015).) Ultimately, because of the extensive federal antitrust framework, however, there are relatively few Georgia law antitrust cases outside of the context of covenants not to compete. Instead, most antitrust cases, whether civil or criminal, are filed in the state’s federal courts under federal antitrust statutes.

A concrete example: USA v Evans Concrete, LLC et al.

Criminal antitrust cases are rare in Georgia, with only three having been filed by the DOJ since 2020. (US Department of Justice, Antitrust Division, Antitrust Case Filings (last visit 30 July 2025).) Even more rare are jury verdicts in such cases, but a guilty jury verdict was reached recently in the case of USA v Evans Concrete, LLC et al. in the Southern District of Georgia. (No. 4:20-cr-00081-RSB-BKE (11 July 2024).) The government charged four individuals and one company with violating Section 1 of the Sherman Act (15 US Code (USC), Section 1) by conspiring to fix prices, rig bids, and allocate markets for the sale of ready-mix concrete in commercial, residential, and public projects in the Savannah, Georgia area.

The government alleged that between 2010 and 2016, Greg Melton and his brother, John Melton, held managerial roles at rival ready-mix concrete companies in South Georgia. (Indictment at 2–6, USA v Evans Concrete, LLC et al., No. 4:20-cr-00081-RSB-BKE (S.D. Ga. 2 September 2020).) Greg, the division manager of concrete sales for Argos Concrete, a multinational concrete producer, had the authority to set prices for Argos within the company’s South Georgia division. John had similar pricing authority as the general manager of Elite Concrete LLC, a smaller South Georgia concrete company that was one of Argos’ direct competitors in the region. The two remaining individual defendants held similar managerial roles at other concrete competitors in the area, one of which was the defendant company, Evans Concrete, LLC.

Beginning in 2010, the government alleged that the Melton brothers and the remaining defendants began co-ordinating their bids on prospective projects, co-ordinating year-over-year price increases and price-increase letters to their customers, and allocating projects between themselves. (See generally Appellee’s Brief, USA v Melton, No. 24-13674 (11th Circuit, May 23, 2025).) For example, after the group decided that Greg Melton and Argos would win a bid for a large dining facility project at a nearby university, other defendants co-ordinated placing higher bids with the understanding that “we get some work, [you] get some work.” (Id. at 35.) Between 2010 and 2016, the price per cubic yard of concrete in the South Georgia region rose from approximately USD70 to the high 90s or low 100s of US dollars. (Id. at 39.)

While the other defendants pleaded guilty, the Melton brothers took their cases to trial in July 2024, and after a four-day trial, the jury found each brother guilty of violating Section 1 of the Sherman Act. In October 2024, the court sentenced John Melton to 26 months imprisonment and Greg Melton to 41 months imprisonment, with each to serve three years of supervised release thereafter.

John Melton has appealed his conviction to the 11th Circuit Court of Appeals, where the case remains pending. (See USA v Melton, No. 24-13674.) On appeal, Melton argues that most of the identified antitrust violations were unilateral conduct – which he performed out of a sense of fraternal duty – and did not constitute Sherman Act violations. (Brief of Appellant at 51–55, USA v Melton, No. 24-13674 (11th Circuit, 21 February 2025).) Melton also argues that the defendants’ co-ordination of their price-increase letters did not constitute a price-fixing agreement because each defendant actually had different prices, and the defendants’ concrete prices ultimately did not match what they had announced in their letters. (Id. at 55–58.) With appellate briefing now complete, the 11th Circuit could issue an opinion at any time.

Multi-district litigation (MDL) connectors

While many recognise Atlanta’s Hartsfield-Jackson International Airport as a major hub for layovers and connecting flights because of its location in the heart of the Southeastern United States, Georgia’s federal courts have recently played a similar role as an initial landing point for antitrust cases before they are transferred to MDL proceedings elsewhere in the country – including some significant MDLs.

Inform Inc. v Google LLC et al.

One such case is Inform Inc. v Google LLC et al., No. 1:19-cv-05362-JPB, originally filed in the Northern District of Georgia in November 2019. Inform – a Georgia-based digital media advertising company that competes directly with Google in the online advertising and online video advertising markets – alleged that Google, YouTube, and their parent company, Alphabet, violated Sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act and Section 3 of the Clayton Act by, among other things, acquiring advertising companies and online video platforms to grow their market share, bundling their products like Chrome, Google Search, and Android to maintain their market share, downgrading their competitors’ products on Google smartphones, and collecting and leveraging users’ data to expand their power. (See generally First Amended Complaint, Inform Inc. v Google LLC et al., No. 1:19-cv-05362-JPB (N.D. Ga. 9 October 2020).) Inform alleged that Google exercised monopolistic control of the online advertising market by owning 92% of the internet search market, 75% of the ad server market, and 49% of the total online advertising market. (Id. at 4–5.) Inform’s complaint was the first complaint filed against Google alleging that the company maintained a digital advertisement monopoly.

Google moved to dismiss Inform’s original complaint, which the court granted after finding the complaint was an impermissible “shotgun pleading.” With its original complaint dismissed without prejudice, Inform filed an amended complaint, which Google again moved to dismiss. This time, the court granted the motion and dismissed the amended complaint with prejudice, again as a shotgun pleading. On appeal, the 11th Circuit reversed the district court, thereby resurrecting the case. (Inform Inc. v Google LLC et al., No. 21-13289, 2022 WL 3703958 (11th Circuit, 26 August 2022).) While the 11th Circuit admitted that the amended complaint was lengthy and not a “paragon of clarity”, it found that the complaint “did not prevent the district court or the Google defendants from understanding the basis of Inform’s core antitrust claims for monopolisation offences, exclusive dealing, and tying.” (Id. at *4.) Finding that Inform’s amended complaint provided Google sufficient notice of the claims against it, the court remanded the case back to the Northern District of Georgia for further proceedings.

Several months after the 11th Circuit’s remand, the case was transferred to the Southern District of New York and consolidated for pretrial proceedings in the MDL captioned In re Google Digital Advertising Antitrust Litigation, MDL No. 3010. Inform filed a motion for partial summary judgment in June 2025, which remains pending before the Southern District of New York. (See Inform’s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, In re Google Digital Advertising Antitrust Litigation, No. 1:21-md-03010-PKC (S.D.N.Y. 20 June 2025).) In its motion, Inform argues that the issue of Google’s liability for maintaining a monopoly and for unlawful tying were already decided in an enforcement action filed in the Eastern District of Virginia by the DOJ and state attorneys general. (See USA v Google, LLC, No. 1:23-CV-00108-LMB-JFA (E.D. Va.).) In that case, which involved substantially similar allegations, Judge Leonie Brinkema issued a 115-page opinion after a three-week bench trial finding that Google had wilfully acquired and maintained monopoly power in both the publisher ad server and ad exchange markets and had illegally tied its publisher ad server to its ad exchange. (See USA v Google, LLC, No. 1:23-CV-00108-LMB-JFA, 2025 WL 1132012 (E.D. Va. 17 April 2025).) The court found that Google’s actions resulted in it acquiring a 91% market share of the worldwide publisher ad server market for open-web display advertising, as well as a share of the worldwide ad exchange market that was roughly nine times larger than the share held by its next-largest competitor. (Id. at *30–31.) If the Southern District of New York agrees that the issues of tying and monopolisation are now precluded from being re-litigated, the only issues left for Inform to prove would be causation and damages.

Haynes v Realpage, Inc.

Another case filed in Georgia federal court before being consolidated into an MDL proceeding elsewhere is Haynes v RealPage, Inc., filed in the Northern District of Georgia. (See No. 1:23-cv-03813-VMC (N.D. Ga.).) The plaintiff in Haynes filed a 214-page complaint alleging that RealPage orchestrated a nationwide price-fixing conspiracy in the multi-family rental housing market. (See generally Class Action Complaint, Haynes v RealPage, Inc., No. 1:23-cv-03813-VMC (N.D. Ga. 25 August 2023).) The plaintiff alleged that RealPage used its revenue management software to collect its users’ non-public occupancy and pricing data, leveraged that data to generate daily rental pricing recommendations, and then assigned “Pricing Advisors” to users to encourage them to adopt those pricing recommendations. (Id. at 3–13.) According to the plaintiff, this resulted in artificially inflated rent prices, increased vacancy rates, and restrained competition. (Id. at 6–17.)

Before responsive pleadings were filed, the United States Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation issued a conditional transfer order, transferring the Haynes case to the Middle District of Tennessee for consolidated pretrial proceedings with dozens of related actions. (See Conditional Transfer Order, Haynes, No. 1:23-cv-03813-VMC (N.D. Ga. 12 September 2023).) The MDL, which is captioned In re RealPage, Inc., Rental Software Antitrust Litigation (No. II), remains pending in the Middle District of Tennessee with discovery currently underway. (No. 3:23-md-03071.)

Shewmaker et al. v Yardi Systems Inc. et al.

While not consolidated into an MDL proceeding like the cases above, another unresolved antitrust class action originally filed in the Middle District of Georgia is Shewmaker et al. v Yardi Systems Inc. et al., No. 4:24-cv-00085-CDL (M.D. Ga.). The plaintiffs, renters of multi-family apartment units in Georgia and Colorado, sued 44 landlords and property management companies, as well as Yardi, a real estate technology company providing revenue management software to landlords and management companies. Similar to the RealPage matter, the plaintiffs alleged the existence of a nationwide “hub-and-spoke” conspiracy to fix and raise rental prices for multi-family housing in violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Act, with Yardi acting as the hub and the landlords as the spokes. (See generally First Amended Class Action Complaint, Shewmaker et al. v Yardi Systems Inc. et al., No. 4:24-cv-00085-CDL (M.D. Ga. 9 October 2024).)

Specifically, the plaintiffs alleged that landlords used Yardi’s RENTmaximizer software, which collected confidential rental pricing and occupancy data from its users. Yardi’s software, in turn, allegedly leveraged the landlords’ data to generate automated rent recommendations that were designed to maximise revenue by fixing prices among competitors. (Id.) Landlords were alleged to have then uniformly adopted the algorithmically calculated prices that RENTmaximizer recommended, allowing the landlords to increase their rental prices while de-prioritising competitive market measures like maintaining traditional occupancy rates. (Id. at 51.)

After the plaintiffs filed their amended complaint, the plaintiffs from a previously filed parallel class action in the Western District of Washington, Duffy et al. v Yardi Sys., Inc., filed a motion to intervene to seek dismissal or transfer of the Shewmaker action, and the Shewmaker plaintiffs voluntarily dismissed their amended complaint before the court ruled on that motion. (See generally Dkt. Nos. 277, 285, Shewmaker, No. 4:24-cv-00085-CDL (M.D. Ga.).) The Shewmaker plaintiffs subsequently refiled their complaint in the Western District of Washington, where the Shewmaker and Duffy cases were consolidated under the caption Duffy et al. v Yardi Sys., Inc., No. 2:23-cv-01391-RSL (W.D. Wa.). Phased discovery is now underway in the consolidated action, with phase one consisting of discovery related to the functions of Yardi’s revenue management software and phase two discovery, if necessary, to concentrate on the landlord defendants’ use of that software.

Conclusion

Unless the Georgia General Assembly unexpectedly creates a new framework of state antitrust laws, it should be expected that the federal courts in Georgia will continue presiding over the lion’s share of the state’s antitrust cases, with federal antitrust law being the focus of those cases. Only time will tell whether the cases that have recently been filed in Georgia’s federal courts and transferred to an MDL for consolidated pretrial proceedings will return to the state for trial, but no matter their final destination, the authors expect the outcomes of those cases to have far-reaching implications for the country’s developing legal standards governing algorithmic pricing and market dominance in newly emerging virtual markets. Those legal standards could, in turn, transform industry practices and decide the acceptable balance between technological innovation and fair competition.