Following years of heightened leverage levels in the US loan market, and in connection with the passage of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act post-2008 global financial crisis, US federal regulators issued Interagency Guidance on Leveraged Lending (the “Guidance”) in 2013.
The Guidance imposes certain requirements on regulated lenders and arrangers aimed at promoting sound risk management. Among other things, regulated lenders have to incorporate as part of their credit risk analysis a borrower’s ability to deleverage its capital structure during the term of the loan, and to avoid loans that exceed specified leverage levels. Consequently, less heavily regulated non-bank lenders and foreign financial institutions capitalised on this opportunity to increase their market share by providing higher leverage and riskier loans.
2024 represented a clear but tempered recovery of the leveraged loan markets, as inflation eased and rates fell modestly amidst a more positive macroeconomic outlook. 2025 began with optimism but quickly faced headwinds from new US protectionist measurements and ongoing geopolitical tensions. Expectations for further monetary easing have moderated as inflation risks persist. Technical imbalances remain, with strong investor demand for loans but a limited supply of new issuances, especially for M&A-driven deals.
Geopolitical risk remains elevated in 2025, driven by ongoing conflicts in the Middle East and persistent trade tensions between the USA and China. Additionally, evolving trade policies, particularly in the USA, have impacted the loan market. These factors have contributed to the slow recovery of loan volumes, which persists in 2025, described in 1.1 The Regulatory Environment and Economic Background, as well as the small M&A volume in North America. The total value of M&A deals in H1 2024 reached approximately USD975 billion, but in H1 2025, M&A volumes dropped by 9% compared to H1 2024, while deal values increased by 15% – ie, fewer deals with higher values.
With respect to US loan documentation, the continued uncertainty in the market has led to an ongoing focus on lender-protective provisions (including provisions intended to prevent future liability management transactions) which had been scaled back during the years prior to the last couple of years’ downturns. Global conflicts have also increased focus by lenders on representations and warranties and covenants relating to compliance with sanctions, anti-corruption and anti-money laundering laws.
Companies raising capital continue to access both the loan and high-yield bond markets, despite increased volatility in the first half of 2025. Most new issuances are for refinancings, with a trend toward shorter maturities and a preference for secured structures. The high-interest rate environment has made fixed-rate debt more attractive, but investors are increasingly requiring security in these instruments, as seen by the rise in secured high-yield bond issuances (about 44% of total high-yield bond issuances in 2024 and 42% through June 2025). Although overall high-yield bond issuance declined year-on-year in Q1 2025 in the USA and Europe, the share of secured bonds is increasing. Companies are also issuing shorter maturity instruments to reduce future redemption costs if rates fall. Covenant terms and protections in the leveraged loan market have continued their long-term convergence with those of the high-yield bond market, which is demonstrated clearly by the proliferation of “covenant-lite” term loans, which represented approximately 90% of all new-money first-lien leveraged loan issuances for 2025 as of July 2025.
Certain differences remain between leveraged loan and high-yield bond terms. Loans continue to provide weaker “call” protection in connection with voluntary prepayments. Additionally, in capital structures with both leveraged loans and bonds, lenders typically continue to drive the guaranty and collateral structure and control enforcement proceedings given the increased focus on collateral from a loan perspective.
Providers of leveraged loans continue to push to restrict investments in non-guarantor subsidiaries more often than investors of high-yield bonds. Additionally, many loans contain “most favoured nation” (MFN) protections that require an interest rate reset upon the issuance of certain higher-yielding debt, subject to carve-outs which traditionally limit the duration of the MFN and other limitations on MFN as specifically negotiated in the credit documentation.
Finally, some loan provisions are more permissive than those found in bonds, such as:
Private debt funds in North America have raised over USD650 billion since 2020, allowing alternative credit providers to gain significant market share in US loan markets. Direct lending (in which loans are made without a bank or other arranger acting as intermediary) has expanded rapidly, moving beyond the middle market to finance large, top-tier transactions. Direct lenders now provide anchor orders in syndicated deals, buy second-lien (or otherwise difficult to syndicate) tranches, and offer full financing solutions to large companies and private equity sponsors.
These lenders are often more flexible, offering higher leverage, committed delayed draw facilities, payment-in-kind interest, and capital for parts of the capital structure that are not readily available in the broadly syndicated market, such as preferred equity, holding company (structurally junior) loans or unitranche facilities. They also provide faster execution and greater certainty of terms, as there is no need to obtain ratings, no marketing process or modification of loan terms during syndication.
In 2023, private credit grew as broadly syndicated loan (BSL) activity slowed, with direct lenders offering flexible solutions. In 2024 and 2025, the BSL market rebounded with lower spreads but private credit remained robust and continued to attract deal flow, particularly in refinancings and M&A.
Due to competition among bank and non-bank lenders to lead financing transactions, documentation flexibility has increased. Private equity sponsors, as recurring customers in the syndicated and direct loan markets with increasing market sway, have been able to push for more aggressive terms in each subsequent transaction. Often, borrowers require lenders to rely on underwritten borrower-friendly loan documentation precedents to ensure that the terms of the new financing are at least as favourable to the borrower as its most recent financing (with “market flex” rights in syndicated financings to remove the most aggressive terms if necessary to achieve a successful syndication of the loan). To remain competitive, lenders have had to be increasingly selective about the terms they resist in negotiations, even regarding flex terms.
There has also been an increased focus from lenders on provisions aiming to protect lenders against liability management transactions (as further explained below).
Another recent US market trend is the growth of debt financings at the holdco level. Private equity sponsors’ desire to be more competitive in auction processes, and non-bank lenders (and in recent years, bank lenders) that are seeking to deploy additional capital at attractive returns, have contributed to such growth. Holdco financings often include a payment-in-kind interest construct which enables the opco structure to keep operating without the need to service additional cash interest and amortisation payments. The holdco loans or notes are structurally subordinated to any debt at the opco level and typically do not have recourse to the assets at the opco level. Therefore, the holdco lenders are typically not party to any intercreditor agreement with the opco lenders. Financing with similar features can be achieved through the issuance of preferred equity at the holdco level.
There is a growing trend in the US loan market to tether loan pricing to a borrower’s ability to achieve predetermined ESG or sustainability-linked objectives. Some borrowers perceive this tool as a way to both (i) enhance their sustainability profiles by integrating ESG-oriented goals that will appeal to investors and the public, and (ii) secure lowered interest rates and fees on their loans.
Borrowers, under pressure to prove their sustainability and ESG credentials, will often collaborate with a third-party sustainability structuring agent to develop precise ESG benchmarks that will be monitored throughout the loan. Interest rate margins and fees will ratchet up or down depending on performance against pre-set targets. Over time, these benchmarks frequently evolve to become more rigorous. Increasingly, materiality of the margin ratchets has been criticised by participants who question whether it is enough to motivate change.
In the USA, banks have the option of being chartered by a state government or the federal government under a so-called dual chartering system. Banks, which are chartered by state banking authorities, are primarily subject to the regulations of the relevant state authority and may also be regulated or supervised by the Federal Reserve and/or Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC). Banks chartered by the federal government on the other hand are subject to regulation by the Officer of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC) and are required to become members of the “Federal Reserve System”. Under federal law, federal and state banks are also required to obtain insurance from the FDIC protecting depositors.
Although alternative credit providers, direct lenders and other non-bank lenders are primarily subject to Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) rules and regulations, they may also be subject to regulation under the Investment Company Act (ICA) as an “investment company”. However, such lenders are often exempt from many of the ICA’s requirements and regulations.
In 2025, regulatory scrutiny of private credit is intensifying, with policymakers considering new disclosure and transparency requirements for private funds, especially as these lenders take on a larger share of lending traditionally dominated by banks.
Foreign lenders are subject to the (i) International Banking Act and (ii) the Foreign Bank Supervision Enhancement Act as well as regulated by the Federal Reserve, whose approval is necessary to establish foreign banking institutions in the US.
Also, foreign banking institutions are required to seek approval from the OCC or state banking supervisor to establish US branches and agencies.
In 2019, the Federal Reserve finalised new regulatory requirements for US subsidiaries of foreign banks. These provided relaxed capital and stress-testing requirements, while also imposing stricter liquidity requirements.
Under US law, regulations for foreign lenders related to granting security interests to, or providing guaranties in favour of, foreign lenders generally do not differ from regulations that apply to domestic lenders.
The USA does not currently impose any foreign currency exchange controls affecting the US loan market, unless a party is in a country that is subject to sanctions enforced by the Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) of the US Department of the Treasury. OFAC administers and enforces economic and trade sanctions based on US foreign policy and national security goals.
As of 2025, this framework remains unchanged; however, heightened geopolitical tensions and the potential for expanded sanctions regimes – particularly in response to ongoing global conflicts and shifting US foreign policy priorities – have led market participants to pay closer attention to OFAC developments. Lenders and borrowers are placing greater emphasis on compliance procedures and due diligence to ensure adherence to evolving sanctions lists, as enforcement activity and regulatory expectations continue to rise.
Loan agreements in the USA traditionally have negative covenants limiting the borrower’s use of loan proceeds to specified purposes as set forth in the loan agreement.
Furthermore, US law restricts the use of loan proceeds that are in violation of the margin-lending rules under Regulations T, U and X, which limit financings used to acquire or maintain certain types of publicly traded securities and other “margin” instruments if the loans are also secured by such securities or instruments.
In US syndicated loan financings, an administrative agent is appointed to act on behalf of the lending syndicate to administer the loan. Further, in some secured transactions, a separate and distinct collateral agent is appointed to coordinate collateral-related matters. When financings involve numerous series of debt securities or multiple lending groups sharing the same collateral, security interests are sometimes granted to collateral trustees or other “intercreditor” agents to act on behalf of all creditors, with the trust or intercreditor arrangements setting out the relative rights of the various creditor groups.
In the US loan market, lenders can transfer their interest under credit facilities to other market participants through assignments or participations. An assignment is the sale of all or part of a lender’s rights and obligations under a loan agreement, with the assignee replacing the assigning lender for the portion of commitments or loans assigned. As the new “lender of record”, the assignee benefits from all rights and remedies available to lenders thereunder and takes on the obligations of the lenders.
Assignments usually require the consent of the borrower, the administrative agent and – in the case of letter of credit and/or swingline subfacilities – the letter of credit issuers and the swingline banks. Loan agreements commonly provide for some limitations on borrowers’ consent rights during the continuation of any event of default – or, increasingly, only during the continuation of a payment or bankruptcy event of default.
Borrower consent is usually not required for assignments to another existing lender (or its affiliate or “approved fund”). Where borrower consent is required, a negative consent mechanism is common: if the borrower does not object within a set period (usually 5 to 15 business days), consent to assignment is deemed given. In some instances, this deemed consent only applies to assignments in respect of term loans but not revolving facilities. Negative consent and streamlined assignment processes are now common in most large, syndicated facilities, supporting liquidity and efficient secondary trading.
In contrast, participations involve a transfer of limited lender’s rights, which traditionally are focused on the right to receive payments on the loan and the right to direct voting on a limited set of “sacred rights”. The transferee becomes a “participant” in the loan but does not become a lender under the loan documentation and has no contractual privity with the borrower. Participations rarely require notice or borrower consent, but some borrowers have sought to include such requirements though lender resistance remains strong, and most agreements still provide broad flexibility for participations.
There is also a notable trend toward more detailed and expansive “disqualified institution” lists in loan agreements, reflecting borrowers’ heightened focus on controlling the composition of their lender group. These lists generally include the borrower’s competitors, certain undesirable financial institutions (such as vulture and distressed funds) and increasingly, institutions identified for regulatory, reputational, or sanctions-related reasons.
Borrowers and their affiliates (including private equity sponsors) are able to purchase loans in the US syndicated loan market, subject to customary requirements and restrictions. This practice remains prevalent, with borrowers and their affiliates continuing to use loan buy-backs as a tool for liability management, opportunistic trading, and capital structure optimisation.
In addition, private equity sponsors and their affiliates (other than borrowers and their subsidiaries) are typically allowed to make “open-market” purchases of loans from their portfolio companies on a non-pro-rata basis. These “open-market” purchases are also receiving heightened scrutiny in the context of certain “uptiering” transactions, where “open-market” purchases are used to justify the non-pro rata purchase of loans in the context of exchanging existing debt for new, priming debt. However, a recent ruling by the Fifth Circuit held that Serta’s 2020 uptier transaction was not a valid “open-market purchase” under its credit agreement. Once held by a borrower affiliate, these loans are normally subject to restrictions on (i) voting, (ii) participating in lender calls and meetings and (iii) receiving information provided solely to lenders.
Loans held by private equity sponsors and their affiliates are also subject to a cap of the aggregate principal amount of the applicable tranche of term loans, traditionally in the range of 25–30%. Bona fide debt fund affiliates of private equity sponsors that invest in loans and similar indebtedness in the ordinary course are usually excluded from these restrictions, but are still restricted from constituting more than 49.9% of votes in favour of amendments requiring the consent of the majority of lenders.
There is also increased attention to the definition and scope of “debt fund affiliates” and the mechanics for tracking and enforcing these caps, as the lender base continues to diversify with the growth of private credit, insurance company, and asset manager participants. Loan documentation is also evolving to address the treatment of loan purchases by non-traditional investors and to clarify the application of restrictions in the context of complex sponsor structures.
The USA does not have specific rules requiring “certain funds” for acquisition financing. Instead, financing commitments for public and private company acquisitions are typically subject to limited “SunGard” conditions due to the absence of a financing condition in most acquisition agreements, which generally include:
Given these dynamics, it is customary for buyers/borrowers and arrangers to execute commitment letters, including detailed term sheets that usually include the parties agreeing on precedent documentation, simultaneously with signing the acquisition agreement. This provides buyers with committed financing, subject to this customary “limited conditionality”.
Recently, some borrowers facing adverse economic conditions have looked to execute liability management transactions (LMT). The market has also seen a rise in litigation and creditor-on-creditor conflicts arising from aggressive LMT exercises, prompting further evolution in drafting and negotiation of credit agreements.
One example of such a transaction involves a borrower seeking the release of guarantors that are no longer wholly owned by the borrower (even if wholly owned by its other affiliates). Following such release, the released entities would more easily be able to incur additional indebtedness. Lenders have increasingly sought protection from this type of transaction by permitting the release of a guaranty only in certain circumstances (eg, the guarantor becomes non-wholly owned in a bona fide transaction involving a third party without the intent of releasing the guaranty as part of the transaction).
Another example is the use of multiple-step processes (where each step is permitted under the investment and disposition covenants) to move valuable IP and other assets from guarantors to non-guarantor entities, thereby automatically releasing the lenders’ security interest in such assets in the process. Lenders have, similarly, sought to limit or even completely eliminate this flexibility.
Borrowers have also increasingly used the amendment section to make updates to credit documentation to benefit majority lenders over minority lenders, such as allowing majority lenders subordinate existing debt in both right of payment and on the liens, for new debt which they provide. In response, lenders are now tightening amendment provisions to require any priming debt to be offered to all lenders pro rata. Lenders are focused on the “pro rata sharing” provisions as well as enhanced protections for minority lenders.
Some borrowers have also raised new secured debt outside the existing credit group, which is on-lent into the credit group on a secured basis, and is secured and guaranteed both by the existing credit group (on a pari passu basis with the existing debt), giving new lenders two secured claims against the existing credit group and increasing their pro rata share of potential recovery proceeds vis-à-vis the existing creditors. Lenders are pushing for stricter limits or bans on unrestricted subsidiaries holding debt or liens on any property of the borrower and the restricted group to prevent dilution of recovery in a distressed scenario.
Additionally, lenders are concerned about value leakage from the credit group through investments in unrestricted subsidiaries. Borrowers have moved valuable assets outside the reach of existing lenders to incur new, structurally senior debt secured by those assets and thereby undermining the collateral and credit support available to the original lender group. To address this, lenders are demanding tighter controls on investments in unrestricted subsidiaries, such as requiring such investments be made solely through specific baskets, prohibitions on the reallocation or reclassification of investment capacity to unrestricted subsidiaries, and aggregate caps on the value of assets that can be transferred.
Nationally chartered banks may not charge interest exceeding the greater of (i) the rate permitted by the state in which the bank is located or (ii) 1% above the discount rate on 90-day commercial paper in effect in the bank’s Federal Reserve district.
If the state where the bank is located does not prohibit usurious interest, banks may not charge interest exceeding the greater of 7% or 1% above the discount rate on 90-day commercial paper in effect in the bank’s Federal Reserve district. In general, federal law will pre-empt any state usury law that prohibits state-chartered banks from applying the same interest rate as a nationally chartered bank.
Under New York law, with certain exceptions, charging interest in excess of 16% constitutes civil usury, and charging interest in excess of 25% constitutes criminal usury. However, loans in excess of USD250,000 are exempt from the civil statute, but remain subject to the criminal statute. Loans in excess of USD2.5 million, which include nearly all broadly syndicated loans in the US, are exempt from both New York’s civil and criminal statutes.
There are no rules or laws in the USA that prohibit certain disclosure of financial contracts, but in credit documentation there is traditionally a confidentiality section that prohibits the lenders from disclosing the nature of the financing other than in pre-agreed situations.
The US tax rules contain a complex withholding regime that imposes, in certain circumstances, a withholding tax of up to 30% on payments of interest to non-US lenders. To encourage international lending to US borrowers, however, the rules contain various exemptions from this withholding tax. Under current law, the expectation is that lenders to a US obligor should generally be able to qualify for one or more of these exceptions, such that lenders are not subject to the withholding tax and obligors are not required to compensate lenders under a “gross up” provision in credit agreements. To benefit from these exemptions, however, lenders must provide certifications to borrowers or their agents, generally on tax forms published by the Internal Revenue Service (IRS), as discussed below. Parties to credit agreements with US obligors should ensure that such forms are appropriately addressed in loan documentation and furnished in practice.
This withholding tax regime may also apply to certain other payments and income arising from loans. If a loan is issued at a discount in excess of a de minimis amount (original issue discount, or OID), this discount is treated as interest income when paid, subject to the withholding tax. Certain fees may also be treated as OID for this purpose.
There are several exemptions from the withholding tax on interest. The most notable exemption availed by non-bank lenders is the portfolio interest exemption. In the case of banks and other lenders that do not qualify for the portfolio interest exemption, US tax treaties may eliminate withholding or reduce the rate. Finally, if non-US banks lend from their branch in the United States (a “US trade or business”), the withholding tax generally does not apply.
To qualify for one of these exemptions, non-US lenders are generally required to provide a US tax form to the borrower or agent – usually an IRS Form W-8BEN-E (for treaty benefits or the portfolio interest exemption) or IRS Form W-8ECI (if the interest is effectively connected with the non-US lender’s US trade or business). Additional certifications and forms are required in certain instances involving flow-through entities or intermediaries.
Another withholding regime that may apply to certain payments of interest and OID is the “backup withholding” regime, which generally applies to domestic payments (currently at a withholding rate of 24%) in circumstances where a US lender fails to provide certain information and certifications required for purposes of the US information reporting regime. Backup withholding is usually eliminated by the provision of an IRS Form W-9 and, if it is imposed, generally can be recovered in the form of a credit on the lender’s US tax return.
Principal payments and proceeds from a sale or other disposition of debt instruments are not subject to US withholding tax (except to the extent that such payments are treated as a payment of interest or OID). However, fee income that is not treated as OID may be subject to 30% withholding unless a treaty applies or the recipient is engaged in a US trade or business. The portfolio interest exemption may not apply to such fees because they may not be treated as interest for US tax purposes.
Finally, the Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act (FATCA) may impose a 30% US withholding tax on non-US banks and financial institutions (including hedge funds) that fail to comply with certain due diligence, reporting and withholding requirements. FATCA withholding tax applies to payments of US-source interest and fees, without any exemptions for portfolio interest or treaty benefits. Following the guidance issued by the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) and US Department of the Treasury in 2018, FATCA no longer applies to payments of gross proceeds from a sale or other disposition of debt instruments of US obligors. In the case of payments that are within FATCA’s purview, the recipient must generally certify its compliance with FATCA in order to avoid a punitive 30% withholding tax (on the same IRS W-8 forms described above).
Many countries have entered into agreements with the USA to implement FATCA (Intergovernmental Agreements, or IGAs), which may result in modified requirements that apply to financial institutions organised in such countries.
Under Section 956 of the Internal Revenue Code, if a foreign subsidiary of a US borrower that is a controlled foreign corporation (CFC) guarantees the debt of a US-related party (or if certain other types of credit support are provided, such as a pledge of the CFC’s assets or a pledge of more than two-thirds of the CFC’s voting stock), the CFC’s US shareholders could be subject to immediate US tax on a deemed dividend from the CFC.
Following regulatory changes published by the US Treasury and the IRS in 2019, US borrowers may obtain credit support from CFCs without incurring additional tax liability if certain conditions are met. However, despite these regulatory changes, the majority of loan documents today continue to maintain customary Section 956 carve-outs. This excludes CFCs from the guaranty requirements and limits pledges of first-tier subsidiary CFC equity interests to less than 65%.
Separately, non-US lenders should closely monitor their activities within the USA to determine whether such activities give rise to a US trade or business or a permanent establishment within the USA. If so, they could be subject to US taxation on a net income basis.
The primary tax concerns that arise for non-US lenders to US obligors are those summarised in 4.1 Withholding Tax; ie, withholding tax on interest, including FATCA withholding. To mitigate these concerns, it is important for non-US lenders and US obligors to ensure that appropriate tax forms are exchanged in order to establish any exemptions from these withholding regimes.
Although the US tax rules do not address non-money centre banks per se, the various regimes described in 4.1 Withholding Tax (including IRS tax forms, the portfolio interest exemption and FATCA) apply differently and impose different requirements based on the particular circumstances and business activities of the lender.
In the United States, secured financings typically require a collateral package consisting of substantially all assets of the borrowers and their subsidiaries, along with a pledge of the borrower’s equity interests by its direct parent – with negotiated exceptions, which typically excludes assets with burdensome perfection requirements and/or where a pledge would lead to expensive or other negative consequences for the borrowers which outweigh the benefit to the lenders. Typical exclusions include:
The creation of security interests for most categories of personal property is governed by the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC). The requirements for creating enforceable security interests with respect to personal property under Article 9 of the UCC are the following:
To create a security interest in assets not governed by the UCC (eg, real property and certain kinds of intellectual property), the parties will typically create separate collateral documents or mortgages pursuant to applicable legal requirements in the jurisdiction governing the property.
Lenders must perfect such security interest to obtain priority vis-à-vis other creditors. The relevant perfection requirements under Article 9 of the UCC depend on the asset type, but generally Article 9 of the UCC provides the following four methods of perfecting security interests in domestic personal property:
Perfection of security interests in federally registered copyrights (and, by custom, patents and trademarks) requires filing with the US Copyright Office (or the US Patent and Trademark Office), in accordance with federal law. Various state and federal laws govern perfection of security interests in motor vehicles, aircraft, ships and railcars, with separate registries and perfection steps. Mortgages in real property are perfected by recording such mortgages (or equivalent documents) with the local (usually county-level) recording office where the real property is located.
Article 9 of the UCC permits the granting of a floating lien in the form of an “all assets” pledge, which can include all personal property owned by the grantor. Further, there is no distinction between floating and fixed charges in the USA, so the granting of security interests over personal property normally covers both presently owned and later acquired assets. Importantly, however, “all assets” pledges apply only to personal property that is subject to the requirements of Article 9 of the UCC (with certain exceptions for asset types such as commercial tort claims, which must be described with more specificity). Other assets – such as real property and federally registered copyrights – cannot be subject to floating liens. For certain asset types, such as motor vehicles, creation of a security interest is governed by Article 9 of the UCC, but perfection is governed by state certificate of title laws, so perfection of security interests over such assets cannot be obtained by filing a UCC-1 financing statement.
In the USA, there are generally no limitations or restrictions on the provision of guaranties to related parties. However, to avoid a guaranty from being rendered unenforceable on the grounds of fraudulent conveyance, downstream, upstream and cross-stream guaranties should include a limit on the guaranteed amount and the guarantor must either receive adequate consideration or must not be rendered insolvent after giving effect to such guaranty. Customary limits contained in guaranties are designed to prevent the guarantor from being rendered insolvent. In addition, loan market participants often require borrowers and their subsidiaries to provide certifications as to their solvency at the time the loan and the guaranties thereof are made.
There are no US rules generally prohibiting a target company from guaranteeing or granting a security interest in its assets to provide credit support for a financing used to acquire its or any of its parent entities’ shares. However, guaranties and security interests provided by a target company are subject to the rules on fraudulent conveyance and, in certain cases, may be subject to regulatory schemes that make such a guaranty and/or security interest impracticable even if legal. Subject to such limitations, lenders will typically require guaranties and security interests to be provided by the target company – along with delivery of any certificated securities of the target company – as a condition to the closing of an acquisition financing subject to any limits that “Sungard” provisions impose.
Anti-assignment provisions in commercial contracts pose difficult issues for lenders in secured financings. A statutory override of anti-assignment provisions in contracts is generally available under the UCC but, if the restricted collateral is critical to the collateral package, lenders are likely to require such third party to consent to the pledge as a condition to the loan to prevent future enforcement uncertainties.
US loan documentation typically allows releases of the lenders’ security interest in collateral in connection with dispositions of such collateral which are permitted under the loan documentation. The release of all or substantially all of the collateral typically requires the consent of all lenders or, in some cases, a super majority thereof.
The UCC of the applicable jurisdiction governs the relative priority of security interests held by different creditors in the same assets of a grantor and is subject to the following rules:
In addition, the UCC allows certain categories of collateral to be perfected by multiple methods, with priority determined based on the “preferred” method, regardless of the above rules. With respect to investment property, securities accounts and certificated securities, perfection via “control” or possession has priority over perfection via filing a UCC-1 financing statement. Further, the UCC contains an exception for purchase money security interests under which a secured creditor with a purchase money security interest can obtain priority ahead of an earlier UCC-1 financing statement with respect to the purchased asset(s).
Lenders and borrowers are allowed to agree to modify the priority rules set out in the UCC and other relevant laws, by contract. The parties can also accomplish different lien priorities structurally.
Arrangements for lien subordination ordinarily provide that:
Structural subordination arises where obligations incurred or guaranteed solely by a borrower are effectively junior to obligations incurred or guaranteed by a subsidiary of the borrower, to the extent of that subsidiary’s assets. In any insolvency scenario, the subsidiary’s creditors have the right to be repaid by such subsidiary (or out of its assets) as direct obligations of such entity before creditors of the parent borrower – such subsidiary’s equity holder – are repaid. Where the parent borrower is primarily a “holding company” for the equity interests of its operating subsidiaries, creditors of an operating subsidiary will be paid in full in priority to the holding company’s creditors from assets of such subsidiary.
Mechanic’s liens arise when contractors, subcontractors or suppliers are unpaid for work performed or materials supplied. This lien is a security interest in the property. If the owner tries to sell the property, the debtor will have a secured interest in the portion of the proceeds needed to pay the debt.
Tax liens are placed against property by the local, state, or federal government, as authorised by statute, for delinquent taxes, including property, income, and estate taxes.
A judgment lien is any lien placed on the defendant’s assets as a result of a court judgment.
Possible structuring concerns will focus on properly conducting due diligence on any possible liens, including conducting searches and other disclosure requirements as set forth in the credit documentation.
Loan and security documentation generally provide a customary set of enforcement rights and remedies to secured parties, exercisable by such parties following the occurrence of a “default event” by an obligor.
From a statutory perspective, Article 9 of the UCC gives secured parties the right to proceed with several enforcement methods after a default event has been triggered by an obligor. These rights include:
However, to exercise such remedies under Article 9, secured parties also have an obligation to comply with certain statutory requirements. Such requirements are designed to protect obligors and generally provide that the time, place and/or manner of exercising such remedy must be commercially reasonable, that sufficient advance notice is provided to the relevant obligor and that certain other creditors who have an interest in the collateral are given adequate notice where such sale process involves a public sale or auction.
New York courts generally permit parties to a loan agreement to select a particular foreign law to govern their contract unless the choice of law conflicts with public policy or there is no reasonable basis for the parties to choose such law to govern their contract (ie, the law selected has no real relationship to the parties or the transaction), then the courts may decline to enforce the selected governing law.
In terms of conflict of laws rules, New York’s rules will generally uphold foreign forum selection clauses so long as the selected jurisdiction has a reasonable relationship to the transaction – more specifically, a significant portion of the agreement was negotiated, or the agreement was substantially performed, in such jurisdiction.
In cases involving foreign states, the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act will permit a waiver of immunity either explicitly or by implication.
Subject to certain conditions being observed (including due process requirements and reciprocity), New York courts will generally recognise and enforce the judgments of foreign courts. However, although uniform laws have been adopted by many US states, when recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments are concerned, there is still significant diversity between the states when dealing with procedural and substantive considerations.
A foreign lender’s ability to enforce its rights under a loan or security agreement will depend on the facts and circumstances of each case.
Automatically upon the filing of a petition to commence insolvency proceedings under the United States Bankruptcy Code, an “automatic” stay comes into effect, prohibiting perfection of interests, termination of contracts, and enforcement activities by creditors, with few exceptions. This stay prevents the proverbial creditor “race to the courthouse” and provides the debtor with a “breathing spell”, typically to organise a sale or a plan of reorganisation or liquidation.
Lenders’ enforcement rights are replaced with rights in the bankruptcy case, and lenders may seek repayment from sale proceeds or estate distributions, which may take a variety of forms, including payment of cash or equity, reinstatement of debt, and issuance of replacement obligations. In chapter 11, the reorganisation chapter of the Bankruptcy Code, individual creditors are entitled to recover the liquidation value of their claims regardless of how similar creditors placed in the same class vote. Classes of creditors may be bound to a plan when 2/3 in amount and more than 50% in number of the class approve. Class approval is not required; however, if the “cram down” standards are met, which generally prohibit distributions to junior creditors or equity where senior dissenting classes are impaired and require that secured creditors either receive their collateral, its proceeds or its "indubitable equivalent” value, or secured replacement notes. Chapter 7, the liquidation chapter of the Bankruptcy Code, has its own distribution rules.
Secured creditors also have the right to credit bid in a sale of their collateral, must consent to the use of cash collateral unless their security interest is “adequately protected”, and may seek adequate protection against diminution of the value of their collateral, or relief from the automatic stay for cause.
The Bankruptcy Code recognises certain rights of lien and payment priority, which are set out in broad strokes below.
First, secured creditors are paid from the value of their collateral, subject to estate claims for the costs of maintaining such collateral.
Then come administrative claims, priority claims, general unsecured claims (including deficiency claims of undersecured creditors) and equity, in that order.
Administrative claims include expenses of administering the estate, operating the business on a post-petition basis, and certain statutorily designated items (eg, claims for goods delivered within the twenty days before the petition date and claims arising from a failure of adequate protection).
“Priority” general unsecured claims include, among other things, certain taxes and employee claims. Administrative and priority claims must be paid under a plan (some priority claims can be paid over time), and certain priorities apply within these categories.
Case length depends on a variety of factors, with the most important being the level of advance planning and creditor agreement at the petition date.
In chapter 11 cases, if creditors are solicited on a “prepackaged” plan and certain notice periods are permitted to run prior to filing the case, a bankruptcy case can be as short as a day. More typically, prepackaged bankruptcies take 45-60 days from the petition date.
“Prearranged” plans, where requisite creditors have largely agreed to a plan framework but have not been solicited before the case is filed can also be expedited and completed within two to three months.
If a plan must be formulated after the filing, three to six months is more typical, and cases with more complex issues, litigation, and lack of consensual resolution can take significantly longer. There is no time limit for exiting bankruptcy, but the debtor may not maintain the exclusive right to file a plan for longer than 18 months after the petition date and/or the exclusive right to solicit a plan for more than 20 months after the petition date. Cases may also be dismissed or converted to liquidation, particularly where there is no prospect of reorganisation.
Chapter 11 effectively preserves going-concern value, and sizeable enterprises frequently reorganise successfully using this process. Additionally, there is a mature investor base specialised in acquiring distressed companies (or their debt or assets), which aids in supporting value. Companies that cannot reorganise may be liquidated under Chapter 7.
Where the borrower can obtain requisite consents, parties may restructure debt or other obligations without proceedings – eg, borrowers and issuers may seek to exchange or amend existing debt to allow for covenant relief, extended payment terms or payment relief, and sometimes simultaneously solicit consents for a pre-packaged bankruptcy to be filed if requisite consents are not obtained. Inducements can be offered as well, such as improvements in collateral, guaranties, or other terms. Some deals involve incumbent lenders providing additional capital or other concessions to participating lenders in exchange for improvements in their priority position relative to other lenders or by lending against separate collateral. The ability to effectuate such transactions without unanimous consent allows the architects of these transactions to propose coercive terms that leave non-participating lenders in a worse collateral, guaranty and/or covenant position, or to exclude some lenders from participating altogether.
When there are few secured creditors in the capital structure and no need to restructure operations, consensual or non-judicial foreclosures under Article 9 foreclosures of the UCC are relatively common. Some equity investors can also handle operational restructurings without the tools of bankruptcy.
Insolvency of an obligor creates risks of a change of control, degradation of the value of the obligors or their assets, and avoidance liability. In a bankruptcy, the company may be sold or transferred to creditors regardless of any constraints in loan documentation. In some scenarios, lenders, including secured lenders, may be given notes against the reorganised company. Additionally, lenders can be forced to accept virtually any distributional outcome that provides more than liquidation value if their class consents.
Any circumstance that further stresses the business, creates a forced-sale dynamic, or delays the process can diminish recoveries. Dilution by other creditors, including priming financing and related fees, additional equity financing provided under a rights offering and related fees (often in the form of rights to acquire equity at a discount), distributions to senior creditors under a low valuation, and necessary payments to other creditors, as well as the costs of the process, are all potential causes of lost value.
Finally, depending on the timing and circumstances of their loan, some lenders may be subject to risks of avoidance of rights transferred to them or obligations undertaken by the estate. The most typical of these is preference liability for transfers to unsecured or under-secured creditors within the 90 days preceding the case on account of antecedent debt. Fraudulent transfer liability generally arises in circumstances where a debtor is insolvent or inadequately capitalised and does not receive reasonably equivalent value for a transfer or obligation, or where the transfer is intended to hinder creditors.
Project finance remains widely used in the USA, especially in renewable energy, mining, and PPPs. However, there is growing use of “hybrid” project finance-corporate finance structures portfolios of projects, where multiple projects are grouped and secured together. In the renewables, portfolios of projects are frequently grouped into a single secured financing where all the assets of the group are pledged as collateral. In mining, alternative sources of funding such as streaming, royalty and/or prepay contracts are now common but a portion of the project funding typically is provided under a traditional project finance structure.
More US projects have been successfully procured as P3s, relying on a “user fee” or an “availability payment” model and utilised in transportation, social infrastructure, water/wastewater, energy (particularly at universities) and telecom/broadband sectors. While availability payment structures are most common, the influx of infrastructure funds and private equity are driving value creation through risk or commercialisation.
The Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act is expected to support P3s by authorising USD550 billion of new federal investments in infrastructure projects, renewing the TIFIA, RRIF and WIFIA loan programmes, doubling the cap on PAB issuance to surface transportation projects and directing the Secretary of Transportation to establish a programme to enhance public entities’ technical capacity to facilitate/evaluate P3s.
Project documents in US financings are often, but not required to be, governed by local law. Construction law is state-specific and therefore best practice often leads to the signature of construction contracts under local law. Project documents use a mix of submission to jurisdiction to local courts and arbitration to resolve disputes based on the characteristics of the project, bargaining power of the parties and other factors.
Various state and federal laws limit or prohibit non-resident foreign persons or entities controlled by such persons from acquiring US real property, or impose reporting requirements on foreign owners of US real estate. Many of these laws apply only to mineral resources or to agricultural property. Before acquiring real estate, a purchaser is advised to review the relevant federal laws that apply to the prospective purchaser and the type of property being acquired and to consult with counsel in the state in which the property is located for an understanding of the relevant state laws.
The main issue is whether the transaction will be a limited recourse deal or whether there will be a completion or other form of sponsor guaranty. This is particularly relevant in energy transition deals, such as hydrogen deals, where limited recourse financing may not be readily available. Another key issue when structuring the deal is to consider whether tax equity will be used to finance the project, as this will impact the terms of the project finance debt. The federal and state laws relevant to project companies vary depending on the sector. In the case of the energy industry, key federal statutes include the Federal Power Act, the Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act of 1978 (PURPA) and the Public Utility Holding Company Act of 2005 (PUHCA).
In their simplest form, project financings are provided by syndicates of commercial banks, often together with development financial institutions (DFIs) and export credit agencies (ECAs) for projects in emerging markets. These financings are structured as senior secured financings with a first lien on all project assets/equity with limited or no recourse to the project sponsors.
However, project financings are becoming increasingly complex multisource financings in which commercial banks and DFIs/ECA facilities combine with private equity, commodity traders, strategic investors (OEMs), governmental entities, project bonds, ESG and streaming/royalty company funding in the form of debt, prepaid forwards, leases, concessionary facilities, grants and hybrid debt/equity facilities, to name a few available investment instruments.
A key issue with US natural resource projects, particularly mining project, is the lengthy and challenging permitting process. A key consideration associated with downstream projects in the sector is the availability for the particular project of benefits afforded by the Inflation Reduction Act, whether in the form of tax credits, grants or concessionary loans. The availability of such benefits can significantly enhance the financial feasibility of a project.
The principal environmental laws include:
The principal health and safety law is the U.S. Occupational Safety and Health Act which is overseen by the Occupational Safety and Health Administration.
With the new US administration, there is heightened uncertainty regarding the direction of federal environmental policy. Market participants should monitor for changes in EPA enforcement priorities, as the administration may seek to adjust the balance between environmental regulation and economic growth, particularly in sectors such as energy, infrastructure, and manufacturing.
599 Lexington Avenue
New York, NY
10022-6069
United States of America
+1 212 848 4000
mosullivan@aoshearman.com www.aoshearman.comContinuing Evolution of Liability Management Transactions
Loan market participants have, over the past 12 months, continued to execute increasingly complex liability management exercises to address borrower needs for liquidity and operating runway. At the same time, loan documentation terms have continued to trend increasingly borrower-friendly on account of strong buy-side demand. An ongoing theme of the leveraged loan market has been lenders’ continuing efforts to appropriately balance the following competing considerations: on the one hand, offering market-competitive flexibility to borrowers on key economic and operational loan terms; and, on the other, maintaining discipline on fundamental documentation protections against aggressive liability management exercises. Lenders have managed these opposing considerations through both direct documentation protections – covenant restrictions targeting these exercises – as well as, more recently, arrangements with other lenders outside the four corners of the loan documentation, with the rise of so-called co-operation, or “co-op”, agreements the most prominent example of this over the past year.
Liability management transactions were historically based on two fundamental structures: uptiering transactions and drop-down financings. Borrowers and opportunistic lenders have, over the past few years, innovated both new forms of liability management transactions (eg, “double-dip” and “pari plus” facilities) as well as further refined existing structures in manners not contemplated (and, thus, not restricted) when the original loan documentation was initially executed. This article traces the continuing evolution of liability management transactions as well as the broader set of loan documentation provisions and other protections implicated by their most recent and novel structures.
Uptiering transactions
Uptiering transactions result from borrowers providing (new) lenders with claims against an existing collateral package that is contractually senior to the claims of existing creditors. This seniority is typically documented through the lien priority of the (new) lenders on the collateral provided to the existing creditors, but, in certain cases, is addressed via payment priority in the collateral proceeds waterfall. Participation in an uptiering transaction is usually offered by the borrower to all or a subset of existing lenders as an incentive to provide the new financing. These lenders, in turn, often exchange all or a portion of their existing (now junior) loans for the contractually senior debt. Such “debt-for-debt” exchanges of the existing loans are usually made at a discount to par (typically at or above the existing market price of the loans exchanged) and are characteristically accompanied by an “exit consent” from the participating lenders to effectuate not just the essential lien subordination of the pre-existing facility but also necessary (or otherwise desirable) amendments to the existing facility. This ability of borrowers to capture the “offer discount” of loans trading below par is a key reason – along with the need to approve lien subordination and other essential uptiering features – why uptiering transactions are most naturally consummated with existing creditors, since financing sources that are not existing creditors are not able to provide the borrower with the discount that is effected through the exchange or agree to the “exit consent” immediately prior to the exchange.
The primary benefits of these transactions for borrowers are the additional liquidity resulting from the new financing, the reduced overall debt burden arising from the deleveraging exchange (including the “discount capture”) and additional financial and negative covenant flexibility and extended maturities often provided for in the exit consent.
As a practical matter, these exchanges have generally relied on the “open-market purchase” right included in many credit facilities. The US Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, however, recently held that such open market purchases were required to be made on a recognised exchange, available to all lenders, which calls into question the efficacy of such exchanges and roll-ups. Loan market participants have responded in a variety of ways, including arrangements that ensure that all lenders are offered the right to participate in the purchase/exchange, often with some special incentives provided to a particular group of lenders.
Drop-down financings
Borrowers in drop-down financings, in contrast, identify assets that are readily separable from their business – often intellectual property – and transfer these assets to a subsidiary (most commonly an unrestricted subsidiary, which is a subsidiary of the borrower that is not subject to the covenants under a credit facility and, as a result, does not provide any credit support to the lenders) that does not provide credit support to the existing loans (“NewCo”). Upon transfer to NewCo, the transferred assets are automatically released from the existing collateral package and freely available to secure new indebtedness at NewCo. Drop-down financings often also include similar roll-up features permitting the lenders to exchange a portion of their existing loans at a discount to par for the new structurally senior (since the debt is at a subsidiary that does not guarantee the credit facility obligations) NewCo debt. The financing incurred by NewCo, when structured as an unrestricted subsidiary, is not subject to any limitations under the existing loan documentation, and the claims of the new creditors against NewCo and the transferred assets are structurally senior to any claims of the existing lenders on such assets.
A twist on this structure utilised a non-guarantor restricted subsidiary instead of an unrestricted subsidiary as the NewCo into which the intellectual property was transferred and the new debt incurred. A “non-guarantor restricted subsidiary” is a subsidiary of the borrower that is subject to the credit facility covenants but is not required to guarantee or otherwise pledge its assets as collateral for the facility. The most typical example is a “foreign subsidiary”, which in some cases may include a US-organised subsidiary that is itself a subsidiary of a non-US subsidiary of the borrower. The choice between a non-guarantor restricted subsidiary or an unrestricted subsidiary as the NewCo will be driven primarily by investment and indebtedness capacity in the existing loan documentation, as there are generally fewer restrictions on transfers of assets to non-guarantor restricted subsidiaries (than to unrestricted subsidiaries), but greater limitations on their ability to incur and secure new financing. In connection with structuring a drop-down financing with non-guarantor restricted subsidiaries, it is also critical to analyse the “further assurance” provisions of the credit facility to ensure that the applicable subsidiaries are, in fact, carved out from the guarantee and collateral requirements after giving effect to the incurrence of the financing.
Double-dip and pari plus facilities
A more recent innovative form of liability management transaction is the “double-dip” facility. Under this structure, borrowers provide (new) lenders with both (i) a lien on the collateral that secures the financing provided by existing lenders, on a pari passu basis with that existing financing and (ii) a lien on an intercompany claim against the loan parties that benefits from the same package. The typical approach for achieving this result is for (new) lenders to provide financing to an unrestricted subsidiary (an SPV) that, in turn, utilises the borrowings to make an intercompany loan to the borrower, which is secured on a pari passu basis with the existing facility. The double dip arises from the combination of (i) the SPV pledging the secured intercompany loan to the (new) lenders as collateral for the new loan and (ii) the borrower and other loan parties to the existing facility separately providing a guarantee of the SPV loan secured by the credit agreement collateral. Each of the direct guarantees and intercompany claims provides the lenders with separate sources of recovery from the loan parties and collateral, which is particularly powerful in a bankruptcy proceeding. While the double claim – and potential double recovery – resulting from a double-dip financing has not been tested by any published bankruptcy court decision, lenders under a double dip should have the right to file two independent proofs of claim, thereby potentially doubling their recovery against the debtors. For the avoidance of doubt, such recovery would not be expected to exceed 100% of the lenders’ claim.
A further recent enhancement of the double-dip structure is referred to as the “pari plus”, in which the SPV’s obligations to the (new) lenders are further supported by guarantees and collateral from subsidiaries – such as foreign subsidiaries – that do not otherwise guarantee the existing facility and are, therefore, incremental to (“plus”) the credit support applicable to the existing facility and its lenders. The SPV’s credit profile may be further enhanced through a drop-down of assets from the restricted group, illustrating the way in which parties will mix and match elements from different structures with the goal of achieving the optimal combination of benefits.
Protecting a lender’s position in the capital structure
Liability management transactions often result in the claims of existing lenders becoming contractually or structurally subordinated to – or benefiting from a weaker credit support package than – claims of other creditors, without, in many cases, these lenders even being offered an opportunity to participate. This outcome fundamentally conflicts with long-standing assumptions as to the general priority of senior secured creditors in the capital structure and equal treatment across lenders in a single facility. Borrowers, in contrast, view liability management transactions as an indispensable tool in providing flexibility to manage capital structures, especially in times of distress. Such flexibility should, at least in theory, also ultimately benefit lenders in the long run, since these transactions are meant to stabilise the underlying business and avoid a value-destructive bankruptcy filing.
To reconcile these competing interests, loan market transactions include negotiated provisions that impose limitations on borrowers’ ability to subordinate existing obligations and provide varying levels of protection against potential drop-down transactions. With each new variation of liability management transaction introduced to the market, lenders respond by reconsidering the effectiveness of existing protections and evaluating the scope and structure of new ones.
To engage in these discussions, it is critical to understand the loan documentation provisions implicated by liability management transactions. The covenants subject to the most detailed negotiation of appropriate protections include the following.
Investment limitations
The investments covenant is most relevant in drop-down financings as the basis on which a borrower’s assets are transferred to – “invested” in – an unrestricted subsidiary or non-guarantor restricted subsidiary to support the new structurally senior debt. Lenders have broadly eliminated certain of the more aggressive investments baskets, including the “trapdoor” provision permitting a non-loan party restricted subsidiary to invest, on an unlimited basis, investments received from a loan party. Lenders have more recently focused on aggregate investment capacity, ensuring both that there is a cap on investments by loan parties in non-loan parties and/or requiring that investments in unrestricted subsidiaries be made solely pursuant to a dedicated (and capped) investments basket. More tailored provisions seek to prohibit the movement of key assets, often material intellectual property or specific corporate “crown jewels”, outside of the restricted party (or, more recently, loan party) group, whether through investments, the designation of unrestricted subsidiaries or any other disposition or transfer. To the extent a borrower has multinational interests or aspirations that could be limited by these restrictions, the negotiations may require significant effort to restrict liability management exercises without curtailing the borrower’s ability to engage in important commercial activity, in a way that acknowledges the multi-year commitment by the parties.
Other limitations on unrestricted subsidiaries
Unrestricted subsidiaries provide borrowers with significant operating flexibility, as they are not subject to the covenants, events of default and other limitations included in loan documentation. As a result, the loan covenants generally restrict borrowers’ ability to capitalise or otherwise invest in such entities, subject to the agreed baskets. Borrowers may typically designate unrestricted subsidiaries subject solely to an event of default “blocker” and, increasingly rarely, a ratio test (though designation will typically be a deemed investment subject to available investment capacity). Rather than focus on the conditions to designating a subsidiary as an unrestricted subsidiary, loan participant focus has instead been on the amount and types of assets that can be contributed to, or owned by, the unrestricted subsidiary, and, more recently, the relationship of unrestricted subsidiaries with the restricted group. In particular, certain facilities prohibit an unrestricted subsidiary and its creditors from receiving a guarantee from, lien on assets of or other direct credit support from loan parties. Others limit the ability of an unrestricted subsidiary from holding debt issued by or to otherwise benefit from indirect credit support of the loan party group.
Sharing provisions and lien subordination
Secured loan documentation generally restricts modifications to pro rata sharing and payment waterfalls and the release of all or substantially all guarantees and collateral without the vote of all affected lenders. Consequently, many market participants were surprised that “uptiering transactions” – resulting in new lenders having contractually senior claims against existing credit parties that effectively extinguished the value of the collateral and guarantees provided to the existing lenders– could be effected with only a majority lender vote. Lenders have increasingly required, in response, that any subordination of lien priority on all or substantially all collateral require an “all-affected” lender vote, subject, in certain cases, to exceptions to such requirement for:
Release of guarantees
Subsidiaries of borrowers are generally released from their guarantee obligations upon ceasing to be wholly owned by the borrower. This permits borrowers, in practice, to trigger the release of guarantees (and collateral obligations) of valuable subsidiaries by selling or distributing minority interests in the entities. This release mechanism has been an area of continued focus by lenders, and various forms of protection have developed, including:
A supplemental approach to protection: the co-op agreement
Likely the most important development over the past year has been the increasing prevalence of co-operation (“co-op”) agreements amongst lenders intended to protect their loan positions from coercive transactions between the borrower and other (majority) lenders. Co-op agreements provide, in general, that no lender party will seek or agree to effectuate a liability management or similar transaction with the applicable borrower without providing such opportunity to the other lender parties. These arrangements may be used to enhance the defensive protections noted above, including not only through agreements to vote similarly when presented with a potentially coercive amendment, but also to refrain from side deals with the borrower or other creditors that would afford a particular co-op party an advantage over others. To maximise their effectiveness, lenders seek to enter into these arrangements early in a loan’s life cycle, well in advance of any actual distress, and to require that the obligations travel with the loan in any subsequent assignment or transfer. Although co-op agreements are most often viewed as an important defensive measure to avoid being on the wrong side of a required-lender amendment, given the evolution of so-called lender-on-lender violence, co-op agreements may also facilitate first-mover actions by the agreeing group. Borrowers have sought to include express language prohibiting (or, at least, materially limiting the effectiveness of) such co-op agreements in recent loan documentation and have also raised questions about the enforceability and possibly even the legality of such arrangements.
Looking forward – a continually evolving dynamic
Borrowers and lenders continue to evaluate and implement new variations on existing themes of liability management transactions. Weighed against the competitive backdrop of preserving existing portfolio investments and existing positions in the capital structure, participants in the leveraged finance market have come to recognise that liability management exercises can be a valuable tool for managing and protecting capital. As lender protections have evolved, so too have the structures for achieving these results, in many cases frustrating many once-fundamental expectations of lenders in the secured loan markets. While potential methods for lenders to foreclose each of the issues referred to in the article exist – materially tightening investment capacity in unrestricted and non-guarantor restricted subsidiaries; requiring an “all affected” lender consent to subordinate payment or collateral rights for senior secured term loans; restricting unrestricted subsidiaries’ liens on, guarantees from and direct and indirect claims against the loan party group and prohibiting non-pro rata loan purchases – the creativity of market participants in structuring these transactions and the negotiation between borrowers and lenders on appropriate protections and flexibility will, without doubt, continue in the years to come.
450 Lexington Avenue
New York
NY 10017
+1 212 450 4000
+1 212 701 5800
james.florack@davispolk.com www.davispolk.com/