New York does not by statute affirmatively delineate parental rights and powers. Nonetheless, “it is the natural right, as well as the legal duty, of a parent to care for, control and protect his child from potential harm, whatever the source” (Roe v Doe, 272 N.E.2d 567, 570 (NY 1971)). “Parents have a fundamental right to raise their children in the manner they choose, subject to the state’s ability to intervene to protect children in narrow circumstances” (Matter of Athena Y, 161 N.Y.S.3d 335, 337 (App Div 3d Dep’t 2021)). See also Matter of Hofbauer, 393 N.E.2d 1009, 1013 (NY 1979) – “every parent has a fundamental right to rear its child” – and Troxell v Granville, 530 US 57, 65 (2000) – “the interest of parents in the care, custody, and control of their children... is perhaps the oldest of the fundamental liberty interests recogni[s]ed by this court”.
Thus custodial parents may make decisions regarding – among other things – a child’s education, religious upbringing and training, and healthcare. They also have the right to discipline the child and promote the child’s welfare. In certain instances, parents are vicariously liable for destruction of property caused by children aged between ten and 18 years.
When parents fail to exercise their prerogatives, Section 1011 of the New York Family Court Act (FCA) permits the court to protect children from injury or mistreatment and safeguard their physical, mental and emotional well-being ‒ even over the objections of a parent.
Parents are responsible for the financial support of a child until age 21 ‒ see Section 413(1)(a) of the FCA (“the parents of a child under the age of twenty-one years are chargeable with the support of such child”). Section 240(1-b)(c)(2)-(3) of the NY Domestic Relations Law (DRL) and Section 413(1)(c)(2)-(3) of the FCA concern prorating obligation between parents. Additionally, Section 240(1-b)(c)(5) of the DRL and Section 413(1)(c)(5) of the FCA require parents to provide health insurance benefits.
New York does not impose requirements on a birth mother beyond those delineated in 1.1 Parental Responsibility. Both parents have the right to seek custody.
New York does not impose requirements on a father beyond those delineated in 1.1 Parental Responsibility. Both parents have the right to seek custody.
Where clear and convincing evidence demonstrates an agreement to conceive and raise a child together, the non-biological, non-adoptive partner has standing to seek custody ‒ even when the parties to a familial relationship are not married to each other.
See 1.1 Parental Responsibility. Both parents have the right to seek custody, regardless of whether or not they were married to each other at the point of the conception or birth of the child. Note that a child born of parents who at any time before or after the birth of the child are married to each other is presumed to be the legitimate child of the marriage.
As previously mentioned in the preceding sections, both parents have the right to seek custody. “Parents” is not exclusively defined as biological parents; parties to a familial relationship (even if not married), who agree to conceive and raise a child together, both have standing to seek custody (see 1.4 Requirements for Non-genetic Parents).
“A proper test for standing ensures equality for same-sex parents and provides the opportunity for their children to have the love and support of two committed parents” (Brooke SB v Elizabeth ACC, 61 N.E.3d, 498–99 (NY 2016)). See also Weichman v Weichman, 158 N.Y.S.3d 154, 156–57 (App Div 2d Dep’t 2021), which vacated a portion of an interlocutory judgment that barred a lesbian parent from “tak[ing] the child to a place or expos[ing] the child to an activity that violates rules, practices, traditions and culture of the child’s Orthodox Jewish Chasidic Faith”). KG v CH, 79 N.Y.S.3d 166, 174 (App Div 1st Dep’t 2018) found that Brooke SB v Elizabeth ACC’s requirement that a plan to conceive and raise a child together “be in effect at the time a child is identified does not add any heightened barrier for same-sex families”.
Similarly, adoption is available to individuals and cohabiting couples, both heterosexual and same sex – the procedures are no different. Section 110 of the DRL includes “any two unmarried adult intimate partners” on its list of persons permitted to adopt. The New York Governor’s Approval Memo of 17 September 2010 contains a “delineated list of those who may adopt” that “includes same-sex couples”. “By replacing references to ‘husband and wife’ [in prior statute] with the gender-neutral term ‘married couple’, this measure will help ensure that all married couples, regardless of their sexual orientation, have equal rights to adopt a child together” (Memo in Support, Chapter 509, 2010 NY Laws).
An adoption must be in the child’s best interests. Pursuant to Sections 112 and 115 of the DRL, a person who wants to become an adoptive parent must file a petition specifying ‒ inter alia – the following:
Both parents are guardians of their children ‒ with equal powers, rights and duties – and there is no prima facie right to sole custody of children in either parent. Under Article 3 of the Convention of 25 October 1980 on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction (the “1980 Hague Convention”), to which the USA is a party, the removal or retention of a child is unlawful if:
Thus, as a practical matter, the other parent’s consent is required to allow relocation.
Within the context of a matrimonial action, the issue of relocation can be resolved by trial pursuant to Section 240(1)(a) of the DRL. Outside a matrimonial action, the issue of relocation can be resolved by habeas corpus petition under Section 70 of the DRL or Section 651 of the FCA.
Relocation requires evaluation of “all the relevant facts and circumstances... with predominant emphasis being placed on what outcome is most likely to serve the best interests of the child... These factors include, but are certainly not limited to, each parent’s reasons for seeking or opposing the move, the quality of the relationships between the child and the custodial and non-custodial parents, the impact of the move on the quantity and quality of the child’s future contact with the non-custodial parent, the degree to which the custodial parent’s and child’s life may be enhanced economically, emotionally and educationally by the move, and the feasibility of preserving the relationship between the non-custodial parent and child through suitable visitation arrangements” (Tropea v Tropea, 665 N.E.2d 145, 150‒51 (NY 1996)). See the New York Trends and Developments chapter in this guide for further discussion.
The child’s wishes and feelings are not controlling but are entitled to great weight where the child’s age and maturity would make the child’s input particularly meaningful. See the New York Trends and Developments chapter in this guide for further discussion.
Generally, the older the child, the greater the weight the child’s wishes and feelings carry. Some recent examples include:
See the New York Trends and Developments chapter in this guide for further discussion.
In general, siblings should be kept together. However, the rule is not absolute and may be overcome where the best interests of each child lie in residing apart.
Loss of contact with the left-behind parent is a factor. See the New York Trends and Developments chapter in this guide for further discussion.
“The rights and needs of the children... must be accorded the greatest weight” (Tropea v Tropea, 665 N.E.2d 145, 150 (NY 1996)). See the New York Trends and Developments chapter in this guide for further discussion.
Grounds for opposition to relocation include:
See the New York Trends and Developments chapter in this guide for further discussion.
The parties may be required to pay their own attorney’s fees and, in some instances (where there is a financial disparity), those of the other party. Parties’ prior settlement agreements may also contain fee-shifting provisions, which are generally enforced. One or both parties may be required to pay the fees of an attorney or guardian ad litem for the child, as well as the fees of ancillary professionals such as forensic mental health evaluators.
The applicable statutes impose the following deadlines:
However, because of heavy court calendars in certain parts of New York, these deadlines are often not met.
The authorities do not favour either parent when determining the outcome of an application. Each application is decided on its own facts.
The answers provided throughout 2.3 Application to a State Authority for Permission to Relocate a Child do not change if the proposed move is not to a new country but, rather, within the USA.
Although kidnapping is a felony, Section 135.30 of the Penal Law provides that it is an affirmative defence if:
A “relative” is defined in Section 135.00 of the Penal Law as “a parent, ancestor, brother, sister, uncle or aunt”.
The defence “was designed to treat more leniently the tragic taking of a child by a relative, often a parent, because of a custody battle” (People v Brown, 702 N.Y.S.2d 739, 741 (App Div 4th Dep’t 2000)). The defence is not available, and the defendant would therefore be guilty, if the defendant’s conduct “is so obviously and unjustifiably dangerous or harmful to the child as to be inconsistent with the idea of lawful custody” (People v Leonard, 970 N.E.2d 856, 859 (NY 2012)). In People v Leonard, the defence was not available to the defendant father who – when confronted by police at the child’s home – held a knife to the child’s chest and throat and threatened to kill the child if the police came closer.
Under federal law, “whoever removes a child from the United States, or attempts to do so, or retains a child (who has been in the United States) outside the United States with intent to obstruct the lawful exercise of parental rights shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than three years, or both” (Section 1204(a) of Title 18 of the US Code). Pursuant to Section 1204(c) of Title 18 of the US Code, it is an affirmative defence if the defendant:
If the country to which the child has been removed is a party to the 1980 Hague Convention, or if the child is removed from another US state to New York State, a proceeding may be brought under the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act (UCCJEA). The UCCJEA is codified in New York at Sections 75 to 78-a of the DRL, which includes enforcement under the 1980 Hague Convention. The Hague Convention is codified in the USA at Sections 9001 to 9011 of Title 22 of the US Code. The UCCJEA is also available if the child has been removed to a country that is not a party to the 1980 Hague Convention.
The USA is a signatory to the 1980 Hague Convention.
This section is not applicable to the USA, which is a signatory to the 1980 Hague Convention.
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nwlobenthal@teitler.com www.teitler.comRecent New York State Relocation Cases
New York State courts will implement shared custody and access when it is both feasible (ie, the parties are capable of co-parenting with one another) and in a child’s best interest. Especially in the context of shared parenting arrangements, relocation “present[s] some of the knottiest and most disturbing problems that our courts are called upon to resolve” pitting the desire to move against the remaining parent’s “powerful desire to maintain frequent and regular contact with the child. Moreover, the court must weigh the paramount interests of the child, which may or may not be in irreconcilable conflict with those of one or both of the parents” – Tropea v Tropea, 665 N.E.2d 145, 148 (N.Y. 1996). Advances in travel, remote work and communication technology have not in the slightest ameliorated these difficulties.
The burden is on the parent seeking to relocate with the child to demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence either a “substantial change in circumstances” (if there has already been a custody determination) or that relocation is in the child’s best interests taking into account all of the relevant factors (if this is a de novo custody determination). The basic inquiry is whether the benefits of relocation outweigh the negative impact on the child’s relationship with the non-relocating parent, taking into account ameliorative steps such as altered but substantively equivalent time-sharing arrangements. The court will inquire into the quality of the parent-child relationships, the impact of the move on the quantity and quality of contact with the non-relocating parent, the degree to which the relocating parent’s and child’s lives may be enhanced economically, emotionally and educationally, and the feasibility and suitability of alternative access arrangements. The court will also attempt to ascertain the “real” motive of each parent for proposing/opposing relocation (in some cases, it is a permissible motivation to remarry or make a “fresh start”) considering among other things the credibility, character, temperament and sincerity of the parties. The court will also determine whether or not (and to what degree) the non-relocating parent is actually involved in the child’s life and makes full use of available parenting time. Finally, the court will be very interested in whether the relocating parent will in fact foster the child’s relationship with the non-relocating parent, or take unfair advantage of distance to engage in “negative gate-keeping”.
Appeal courts tend to defer to the trial courts on these issues and not disturb relocation decisions having a “sound and substantial” basis in the record.
Relocation determinations should generally be made only after a full hearing and inquiry into the facts and circumstances of the case, to protect the best interests of the children. See Janvier v Santana-Jackson, 199 N.Y.S.3d 665 (App. Div. 2d Dep’t 2023) remitting a relocation petition for hearing where the trial court had improperly issued an interim order while the trial was ongoing.
Child’s bond with each parent
The non-relocating parent’s continuing meaningful involvement in the child’s life may be achieved through methods such as a parenting schedule providing longer periods during school vacations and/or sharing the labour and financial burden of bringing the child and non-relocating parent together during the school term and/or through technology platforms such as FaceTime – all taking into consideration the age, needs and maturity of the child.
Representative recent cases include:
Stability versus potential enhancements to the status quo
Custodial stability, even with a “less than perfect” parent, is generally a plus. Thus, a proposed relocation should have a quality of permanency such that the child will not prematurely be asked to set down roots elsewhere frequently. Courts will inquire about a child’s ties to the current jurisdiction – through school, friends, doctors, care-providers, extra-curricular activities, family members (including other siblings) and other cultural and/or social connections – and how, if at all, such ties can be preserved and/or replicated.
The relocating parent must concretely show how the child will be integrated into the new community (school, activities, childcare and social engagement) and how the child will benefit (economically, emotionally and/or educationally). For example, relocation may:
Sometimes emotional and financial enhancement go hand-in-hand as, for example, when family and friends are available to provide childcare or where the relocating parent has more flexible work hours permitting more time to be spent with the child.
In what is a bit of a Catch-22 situation, however, until and unless leave to relocate is granted, the parent wishing to relocate may be unable to make these specific enhancements concrete (ie, applying to a specific school; consulting with a specific doctor). Similarly, one court rejected relocation premised in part on the relocating parent’s family’s willingness also to relocate to the same jurisdiction as being based on a wished-for resource, as opposed to a resource already present.
Representative recent cases include:
The child’s wishes
A child’s wishes or preferences may be considered by the court and given greater or lesser weight depending on age, maturity and other facts and circumstances. Wishes or preferences can be communicated through counsel for the child, through a forensic evaluator, or even by the court directly interviewing the child in chambers outside of the presence of the parties, with counsel of the child present. Children may sometimes express a desire to live with one parent, or to continue to attend (or to change) school. At the same time, and paradoxically, the relocating parent can be criticised for, or even barred from, informing the child (especially a young one) about even the possibility of relocation such that the child may not have a meaningful opportunity to express a preference for or against changing the status quo. To the extent the child does express a preference, the court is more likely to consider the wishes of a child of “advanced age” which, although not specifically defined, appears to encompass teenagers. Of course, children may change their mind over time, and preferences that may have been expressed in a former custody proceeding, if no longer current, will not be given much weight. However, children expressing their wishes is not the same as children deciding.
Representative recent cases include:
Distance
Geographical distance is not per se determinative. Even a small distance can unreasonably impede parental access where it would burden weekend access, if not render it impossible. Representative recent cases include:
Parties’ prior agreements
Where the pre-existing custodial relationship results from the prior agreement of the parties and has successfully been implemented over time, such prior agreement will be given significant deference as a recognition of the child’s best interests. Agreements containing a “radius clause” permitting and/or restricting relocation are particularly relevant.
Incidentally, during the COVID-19 pandemic, some parents made informal or temporary changes to pre-existing formal parenting arrangements and later argued that the pandemic situation warranted more permanent relocations. The courts have consistently enforced parties’ formal custodial arrangements as the pandemic has ebbed. During the COVID-19 pandemic, courts were mindful of not allowing parents to shoehorn temporary pandemic arrangements into more permanent ones.
Representative recent cases include:
Domestic violence and related issues
Proven domestic violence and/or abuse/neglect impact relocation. Representative recent cases include:
Conclusion
Relocation proceedings, as with all custody-related proceedings in New York State, ultimately turn on the particular facts and circumstances and the best interests of the child. While on its face relocation appears to conflict with shared parenting, courts must determine how, if at all, parenting can be (re)structured to preserve the non-relocating parent’s involvement if relocation is otherwise best for the child overall.
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