The current French legal framework governing class actions is set out in Law No 2025-391 of 30 April 2025 (commonly referred to as the “Law of 30 April 2025”), which simultaneously transposes Directive (EU) 2020/1828 on representative actions and introduces a comprehensive reform of the domestic regime applicable to group litigation.

Before this reform, class actions were first introduced into French law by the so-called Hamon Law of 2014 [Law n° 2014-344, 17 March 2014, about consumer Law], named after the Minister who sponsored the bill. The original regime was designed by the legislature as a narrowly tailored mechanism, initially limited to consumer-related claims.

Over time, France developed a total of seven sector-specific class action regimes, covering:

• consumer protection (from 2014);
• health and cosmetics;
• environmental protection;
• personal data;
• labour law;
• competition law (antitrust); and
• anti-discrimination (all from 2016).

Each of these regimes operated under distinct rules concerning standing, types of recoverable damage, and procedural requirements. This fragmented landscape led to legal uncertainty and hindered the effective use of collective redress.

The Law of 30 April 2025 replaces these disparate frameworks with a single, unified regime applicable to all class actions – except for a limited carve-out in the public health sector – and considerably broadens both the scope of potential claimants and the types of harm eligible for compensation.

Preparatory work for the 2025 reform began as early as 2019. A first draft bill was presented in the National Assembly on 15 September 2020, followed by a new government-submitted version on 31 October 2024. Prior to the initial draft, the Legal Affairs Committee of the National Assembly had commissioned a mission d’information – a temporary parliamentary body tasked with conducting research and public hearings to inform future legislation. The report issued by this mission, dated 11 June 2020, observed: “Despite the broadening of its scope, the track record of this new procedure has been disappointing: only 21 class actions have been brought since 2014, including 14 in the field of consumer protection, and no company has yet been held liable.” The report concluded by recommending a broader material scope for class actions and the unification of the existing sectoral regimes.

For the time being, the Law of 30 April 2025 is not intended to be codified in any of the existing legislative codes, except for the provisions introducing the civil fine, which are to be incorporated into the French Civil Code. In its opinion of 9 February 2023, the Conseil d’État (the highest French administrative court) noted that: “The provisions on class actions establish special procedural rules that apply to liability without in any way altering the substantive rules governing this area.” It further held that, since these provisions are not regulatory in nature, they could not be integrated into the Code of Civil Procedure.

Across the EU, the opt-in model remains the prevailing approach to class actions, largely due to civil law traditions that emphasise procedural formalism and individual autonomy. In countries such as France, Germany, and Sweden, affected individuals must actively join the group to benefit from the proceedings or claim compensation. This model is generally seen as more protective of individual rights but tends to lead to lower participation rates and a limited deterrent effect in practice.

By contrast, a few Member States – most notably the Netherlands and the United Kingdom (in competition law cases) – have adopted opt-out mechanisms, under which individuals are automatically included in the group unless they take steps to withdraw. These systems have demonstrated greater procedural efficiency and higher participation rates, enhancing the economic viability of collective actions and leading to a higher volume of claims and more frequent settlements.

The United States has implemented such a system and developed one of the most robust and frequently used class action systems globally, governed by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23. Several features contribute to the intensive use of class actions in the US, including:

• the availability of punitive damages;
• extensive pre-trial discovery mechanisms;
• contingency fee arrangements, which allow lawyers to be paid only if the case is successful;
• a lawyer-driven litigation model, incentivised by high potential rewards;
• judicial review and approval of settlements, offering a structured and enforceable resolution path.

While the US model has often been criticised for encouraging excessive litigation and strategic abuses, it remains an undeniably powerful tool for enforcing consumer, competition, and securities laws – and continues to shape comparative discussions about the future of collective redress mechanisms.

The transposition of Directive 2020/1828 has varied considerably across Member States, as outlined below.

• In jurisdictions that already had advanced collective redress mechanisms, only minimal changes were necessary. For example, Belgium transposed the Directive via the Act of 21 April 2024, which introduced no major changes to its existing framework, already largely aligned with the Directive.
• Other countries, like France, used the Directive as an opportunity to overhaul their entire class action regime, transitioning from a fragmented sectoral system to a unified framework.
• In Member States with little prior experience, the Directive prompted the creation of new legal tools. Germany, for instance, only introduced consumer class actions in 2018, making it one of the more recent adopters. This delay is partly attributable to the longstanding availability of declaratory actions, which allowed courts to rule on liability, such as affirming the existence of a defective product, thus enabling victims to bring individual damage claims. In that respect, the German system shares certain structural features with the French model.

However, in practice, some German consumer associations have operated under a quasi-commercial model, bringing claims on behalf of consumers in exchange for a success fee of 25% to 35% of the recovered amount. This practice has drawn substantial criticism, especially regarding transparency and potential conflicts of interest.

Preliminary assessments indicate that significant disparities remain across the EU in accessibility, admissibility criteria, and funding mechanisms, which could hinder the uniform implementation and enforcement of collective redress rights.

Law No 2025-391, effective from 2 May 2025, governs all class actions initiated from that date onward.

A transitional regime was put in place to facilitate its implementation. Specifically, for two years following its entry into force, entities wishing to initiate a class action may opt to proceed under the former legal framework. However, in order to request the imposition of a civil fine (a mechanism explained further below), the triggering event giving rise to the class action must have occurred after the new Law came into effect. Consequently, it is no longer the date on which proceedings are initiated that determines applicability, but rather the date of the underlying event giving rise to the action.

A Decree of 16 July 2025 designates specialised courts for class actions, and related provisions appear in the Judicial Organisation Code and Assurance Code for jurisdiction.

Under the prior regime, there were seven distinct regimes, each with varying conditions that could be restrictive. The reform is particularly transformative in consumer protection. For instance, article L. 623-1 of the French Consumer Code restricted class actions to breaches by professionals of their legal or contractual obligations in connection with the sale of goods or the provision of services, including matters related to property rentals. However, this scope was insufficiently inclusive. As such, it failed to cover claims brought by borrowers against banks that refused to modify borrowers’ insurance arrangements – conduct which, according to the Lyon Court of Appeal, did not fall within the definition of a service provision under the earlier text [Lyon Court of Appeal, 6 April 2023, n° 22/04864].

Since the Reform, there is no longer a specific legal regime for each field of law; accordingly, the regime governing class actions now applies uniformly across all areas of law without distinction.

Although Article 16 of the 2025 Law is situated within Chapter III, titled “Provisions Relating to Consumer Law”, the scope of the French class action regime has clearly been expanded beyond the confines of consumer-related disputes. The article expressly provides that individuals or legal entities placed in a similar situation may seek compensation for damages “regardless of their nature.”

This represents a significant expansion of the material scope compared to previous legal frameworks. A class action may now be initiated for any breach, whether legal or contractual, committed by:

• a professional acting in the course of their commercial or professional activity;
• a public legal entity, such as a governmental body or a local authority; or
• a private entity entrusted with the performance of a public service mission.

This expansion represents a significant departure from the earlier, sector-specific regimes, which limited class actions to narrowly defined legal fields and restricted compensation to certain types of loss, depending on the context. The new framework opens the door to class actions across a broader array of sectors previously excluded, such as transportation, energy, and financial services.

Class actions in France are now concentrated before a limited number of specialised judicial courts with exclusive jurisdiction. A Decree dated 16 July 2025 designated eight competent courts to hear class action cases:

• Bordeaux,
• Lille,
• Lyon,
• Marseille,
• Nancy,
• Paris,
• Rennes, and
• Fort-de-France.

Although the reform aimed to enhance access to class actions, it did not maintain the simplified procedure previously outlined in Articles L. 623-14 and L. 623-17 of the Consumer Code. This simplified route – designed for cases in which the group members were easily identifiable, such as when victims appeared in customer databases – has now been abolished. Today, a single procedural framework applies, allowing two distinct types of claims: actions seeking the cessation of unlawful conduct or actions seeking compensation for harm suffered.

Injunctive Relief

In class actions seeking injunctive relief, several key features apply:

• no proof of harm or intent is required;
• the pre-trial judge managing the case may order interim measures at the preliminary stage, provided that there is an imminent threat or a manifestly unlawful disturbance. These conditions are expected to be interpreted in line with the standard laid down in Article 835 of the French Code of Civil Procedure;
• publicity measures are mandatory to ensure that affected individuals are informed of the proceedings.

Although this type of action has not undergone major substantive changes, the 2025 reform explicitly clarifies two key principles:

• the claimant is not required to demonstrate harm suffered by group members, nor is there any need to prove intent or negligence on the part of the defendant; and
• any penalty payments (astreintes) imposed by the court are to be paid into a dedicated fund that finances future class actions.

Historically, injunctive relief was unavailable in consumer cases, as Article L. 623-1 of the Consumer Code permitted only claims for compensation. However, cessation actions can be especially effective in cases involving ongoing unlawful commercial practices, such as misleading advertisements. In these cases, stopping the harmful practice is often more urgent than seeking damages for past harm.

Compensation Actions: A Dual-Phase Model

Class actions seeking compensation follow a two-stage process:

• liability phase: the court rules on the defendant’s liability and establishes the eligibility criteria for group membership (affected consumers, employees, or investors); and
• compensation phase: eligible victims may join the group and seek redress based on the liability judgment.

France retains the opt-in model, whereby individuals must actively join the group. The window for opting in ranges from two months to five years, a significant extension compared to the previous regime’s two to six months (in consumer cases). This approach contrasts sharply with the opt-out system used in the United States, and reflects the French legal system’s emphasis on individual consent and procedural autonomy.

Under the EU Directive, Member States could choose between opt-in and opt-out models for compensation claims, but opt-out was excluded for injunctive actions. Article 8 of the Directive states: “For a qualified entity to seek a cessation measure, individual consumers shall not be required to express their wish to be represented by that entity.”

France’s retention of the opt-in system aligns with the core civil law principle that “nul ne plaide par procureur”: one cannot be a party to legal proceedings unless they have either expressly agreed to be represented or personally initiated the claim [source: H. Delage, H. Guignard, Réforme de l’action de groupe: analyse des modifications apportées à son régime, La Semaine Juridique – Entreprise et Affaires, n° 36, 4 September 2025, §26]. An opt-out model would have bound individuals to a judgment without their express consent.

Liability phase

In the first phase, the court assesses the alleged wrongdoing and applies the relevant general or special liability regimes. Class actions follow the same substantive rules as ordinary litigation.

However, the 2025 reform enhances the court’s role:

• it must define group membership criteria;
• identify the types of compensable harm; and
• either set the amount of compensation or outline the parameters for its assessment and the conditions under which compensation will be paid.

Unlike the previous regime, which limited compensation to harm deemed “capable of being compensated,” the court now has broader authority to define compensable loss.

In the first phase, the court also orders publicity measures, which is a departure from the former rule that required such publication only after the second phase and after the appeal deadline expired. The court decides the form and scope of publicity and sets the opt-in period, which is now extended to between two months and five years. This longer period is justified by the inclusion of more complex types of harm – such as bodily injuries, which may take considerable time to manifest – and ultimately enhances the protection of victims’ rights.

In addition, during this phase, the court may order the defendant to advance the costs of procedures that are not included in the claimant’s legal fees. This includes, for example, expenses related to managing compensation claims. The aim is to ensure that associations without significant liquidity can still pursue claims without bearing the financial burden of the second phase alone.

Compensation phase

Once liability has been established, the court defines the conditions under which individuals who join the group may apply for compensation.

Two models are available, as explained below.

1) Individual compensation procedure – Victims apply for compensation either:

• directly from the defendant; or
• via the claimant association, acting under a specific mandate of representation.

The defendant is then required to compensate each individual claimant within a timeframe determined by the court. If they fail to do so, the matter is referred back to the court for individual adjudication.

2) Collective liquidation procedure  – This model – not available in cases of bodily harm – involves a group-wide compensation settlement negotiated between the defendant and the qualified entity. It proceeds as follows:

• the court defines the harm and the parameters for assessing its value;
• the parties attempt to reach a global settlement within a court-imposed period (minimum of six months);
• the court reviews and approves the agreement (homologation); and if the terms are deemed unbalanced, the court may reject the agreement and give the parties an additional two months to renegotiate;
• if this second attempt fails, the court will determine the compensation itself; and
• for execution, the judgment requires opening a dedicated account with the Caisse des Dépôts et Consignations (a French public institution tasked with managing public funds), into which the compensation must be deposited.

A party engaging in dilatory or bad-faith conduct that obstructs settlement negotiations may be sanctioned with a civil fine of up to EUR50,000. This penalty applies equally to both claimants and defendants, which is a controversial aspect, as the financial impact is much lower for a large company than for a small association. As a result, this could encourage powerful defendants to abandon negotiations after conducting a cost-benefit analysis.

Ultimately, the collective settlement mechanism is designed to enhance procedural efficiency, avoid redundant litigation, and integrate mass dispute resolution principles into civil proceedings. It embodies a hybrid approach that combines civil procedure with mechanisms of collective redress to ensure access to justice.

Upon the introduction of class actions into France, the legislature intentionally limited the number of entities permitted to bring such claims, in an effort to prevent the perceived abuses associated with other legal systems, particularly the US model of class action litigation. Under the previous regime, standing was generally restricted to associations that had been officially registered for at least five years and whose statutes expressly provided for the defence of the interests at issue. The eligibility criteria varied by sector: for instance, only nationally recognised and government-approved consumer associations could bring class actions in consumer law, whereas in labour law, representative trade unions had standing to initiate proceedings.

The Law of 30 April 2025 introduces a more flexible and harmonised framework. Depending on the type of relief sought, both accredited and certain non-accredited associations may now be entitled to bring a class action. The criteria for obtaining accreditation have been unified under a single set of rules, thereby streamlining access to collective redress.

Accredited Associations

The principal actors under the new regime remain accredited non-profit associations. To obtain authorisation, such associations must meet the following requirements:

• operate on a non-profit basis;
• receive formal administrative authorisation, subject to the following conditions:
• demonstrate at least 12 months of effective and continuous public activity in defence of the relevant interests;
• include the defence of such interests in their governing statutes;
• not be subject to insolvency or collective proceedings at the time of application;
• remain independent from any entity with an economic interest in the litigation; and
• maintain operational transparency, notably by publishing information on their funding sources and governance structures.

Authorisation may be revoked by the relevant administrative authority if any of these conditions are no longer met.

While the reform expands the number of potential claimants, consumer protection associations accredited under the previous framework do not automatically qualify to act under the new system. To pursue new class actions, they must reapply for accreditation under the updated, harmonised rules. However, during a transitional period of two years following the entry into force of the new regime, such associations may continue to rely on their prior status and initiate proceedings under the former legal framework.

An open question remains regarding the identity of the administrative body responsible for granting the new authorisations. Under the previous system, jurisdiction was sector-specific: for example, the Ministry of Justice handled consumer law accreditations, while the Ministry for the Environment oversaw environmental claims. The new legislation appears to favour the designation of a single, centralised authority, though it remains to be seen which body will be assigned this role.

Non-Accredited Associations (for Injunctive Relief Only)

Associations that meet slightly less demanding criteria – namely, at least 24 months of effective public activity and statutory objectives aligned with the interests allegedly harmed – may bring class actions seeking only injunctive relief (the cessation of unlawful conduct). However, these associations lack standing to pursue compensatory damages, which may limit the practical significance of this extension in many cases.

Trade Unions and Sectoral Organisations

Representative trade unions continue to benefit from specific standing rights under the new regime.

They may initiate class actions:

• in matters concerning discrimination or data protection; and
• to address breaches by employers of legal or contractual obligations that have harmed a group of employees, or to seek cessation of such conduct.

In the agricultural and maritime sectors, professional organisations that meet comparable criteria may also bring class actions on behalf of their members.

Public Authorities and Cross-Border Entities

The public prosecutor (Ministère public) is now empowered to initiate a class action seeking injunctive relief and may also intervene in ongoing proceedings as an interested party. This enhanced role significantly strengthens public oversight and may prove particularly relevant in high-profile or sensitive cases.

In addition, entities designated by other EU Member States pursuant to Directive (EU) 2020/1828 (so-called “qualified entities”) are now permitted to bring class actions in France, whether for injunctive or compensatory relief. This includes the ability to initiate cross-border representative actions, thereby reinforcing the EU-wide framework for collective redress.

Taken together, these developments mark a profound transformation in the landscape of French class actions. The reform abandons the previous sector-specific approach in favour of a more inclusive model, opening access to collective redress mechanisms to any association that secures the necessary accreditation under unified criteria.

It remains to be seen how actively eligible associations will seize this opportunity and whether the administrative authority responsible for granting approvals will adopt a strict or more permissive approach to enforcing these new conditions.

France uses an opt-in model, where the court establishes criteria for group membership and sets the opt-in period. This time frame has now been significantly extended, ranging from two months to five years, to better accommodate complex harms, including bodily injuries.

There is no statutory numerical limit on class size. Notably, labour law class actions may also be initiated by individuals who are not current employees – including job applicants, interns, or participants in corporate training programs. These provisions reflect and expand upon the earlier framework found in Article L. 1134-9 of the French Labour Code.

Importantly, joining the group does not imply membership in the claimant association. Victims may mandate the association to act on their behalf without being considered members. This clarification is especially significant where the claimant is a trade union, as it preserves individuals’ freedom of association and avoids any assumption of political alignment. Indeed, an association’s administrative accreditation does not imply neutrality, and some victims might be reluctant to join claims if doing so automatically implies membership.

There is no specific procedure for joining further parties to a class action under French Law.

After the court’s liability judgment, the court defines the group, sets the inclusion criteria, and orders publicity of the decision so potential members are informed. The court also sets an opt-in window of between two months and five years, depending on the case. Individuals or legal entities that satisfy the court-set criteria must affirmatively opt in within that window, following the joining process specified in the judgment.

Under the unified French class action regime, judges have the authority to set the conduct and timetable of the proceedings in accordance with the procedural rules applicable to each competent court. For example, the time limits and rules governing first-instance case management, appeal deadlines (cour d’appel), and petitions to the Cour de cassation differ, and the court will calibrate the schedule accordingly (including the length of the opt-in period, publicity measures, and claims processing steps).

These proceedings often last significantly longer, even several years.

By way of exception, certain areas are subject to specialised procedures, as outlined below.

• In competition law, class actions can only be brought after a final infringement decision – for example, by the French Competition Authority or the European Commission. The action must be filed within five years of the decision becoming final. These provisions replicate those of the previous regime and apply specifically to infringements of Articles 101 and 102 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union.
• In labour law, a specific pre-action procedure must be followed. The claimant must first send a formal request to the employer to cease the breach and must wait a minimum of six months before commencing any legal proceedings. Once the employer receives this request, they are required to engage in discussions with employee representatives within one month.

In compensation cases, courts manage the calendar for liability, publicity, opt-in windows, and the collective liquidation timetable, including homologation steps and extensions when renegotiation is required. Courts can accelerate disposal by dismissing manifestly unfounded claims at the outset. They may order interim measures in injunctive actions.

Financing remains a central challenge in the effective implementation of class actions. Claimant associations must have access to sufficient resources not only to initiate proceedings, but also to see them through to completion. Their responsibility does not end with obtaining a favourable judgment; it continues until compensation is distributed to the victims. This long-term commitment requires significant financial resilience.

In addition to standard legal fees, the compensation phase may involve organising mediation procedures between the defendant and group members, especially in cases of collective liquidation. These mediation efforts are generally coordinated by the claimant association and can involve substantial logistical and financial commitments, particularly where the class includes a large number of victims.

Although the law allows the defendant to cover certain costs, such as an advance for expenses incurred during the damages phase, this remains uncertain at the beginning of litigation. Furthermore, if the action is unsuccessful and the defendant is not held liable, the association may be ordered to pay the opposing party’s legal fees under Article 700 of the Code of Civil Procedure. This financial risk acts as a significant deterrent, particularly for non-profit entities with limited reserves, and may dissuade them from pursuing class actions altogether.

In an effort to address this structural obstacle, the Law of 30 April 2025 formally introduces the possibility of third-party litigation funding. However, this mechanism is subject to strict safeguards designed to preserve the claimant’s independence and protect the integrity of the proceedings.

That said, a fundamental question arises: why would a third party finance such an action without holding a vested interest in the outcome? In practice, most funders are likely to expect a financial return, raising concerns that such arrangements might compromise the claimant association’s objectivity. More critically, there is a risk that third-party funding could be misused as a strategic tool to harm a competitor. One could easily imagine scenarios in which companies covertly finance class actions against rivals with the intent of destabilising their operations or damaging their reputation.

Aware of this risk, the legislature has imposed safeguards to prevent abuse. In particular, the law requires the avoidance of conflicts of interest. If a conflict is alleged, the court may require the association to produce evidence demonstrating the funder’s independence. Should the court find that the association fails to meet the required standard of independence, the consequences are severe: the class action must be declared inadmissible, and the court is obligated to refuse to homologate (approve) any settlement agreement reached between the parties.

These protections aim to strike a balance between enabling access to justice and ensuring procedural integrity, albeit they remain limited in scope. The law does not provide for ex ante certification or approval of third-party funders, nor does it impose disclosure obligations akin to those found in other jurisdictions.

Alternative funding models were not adopted, but they could have been considered. For example:

• in Poland, affected consumers may be required to contribute financially to the action;
• in the United States and Canada, contingency fee arrangements (where lawyers are paid only upon success and receive a share of the recovery) are widely used to fund collective litigation.

Although these models entail risks and ethical concerns, they represent viable options for reducing associations’ financial burden while preserving procedural efficiency.

The most distinctive feature of the French system appears to lie in its provision for a dedicated public fund to finance class actions. This fund is intended to be financed by the civil fine introduced in Article 1254 of the Civil Code (see Section 5). While this initiative represents a novel and potentially powerful tool for promoting access to justice, its operational details remain unclear. To date, the criteria for selecting eligible recipients and the conditions under which financial assistance will be granted have not been defined.

It therefore remains to be seen whether this fund will prove effective in practice and whether it can serve as a credible complement (or even an alternative) to private litigation funding mechanisms.

French procedure lacks US-style discovery. Associations largely bear the evidentiary burden, with judges empowered under Article 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure to request specific documents when their existence is known.

To help associations gather evidence, publicity measures for the procedures have been implemented. Publicity measures are designed to inform potential claimants. As under the Hamon Law, judges determine the publicity measures necessary to inform all individuals who may be entitled to compensation.

Furthermore, a public national register of class actions is now maintained by the Ministry of Justice. This register tracks ongoing proceedings, promotes transparency, and enables the public to monitor the progress and outcomes of representative actions.

Claimant associations (qualified entities) are under a legal obligation to inform the public of:

• the existence of the action;
• its procedural progress; and
• the final outcome, whether a judgment or a settlement.

This transparency requirement must also be fulfilled through publication on the association’s own website. It is enforceable by the judge, who may order additional measures to ensure public awareness. These obligations supplement the mandatory publicity measures already required by court orders during the course of proceedings.

Professional secrecy and trade secret protections remain robust under French and EU law; broader comparative discussion appears in the trends section.

Available Remedies and Increased Flexibility

The unified regime introduced by the 2025 reform provides a broad spectrum of remedies tailored to the objectives of the class action. These include:

• injunctive relief, allowing courts to order the cessation of unlawful conduct without requiring proof of harm or fault;
• compensation, covering all types of harm, “regardless of their nature” – including economic, moral, and physical damage – irrespective of the legal sector concerned; and
• restitution in kind, where appropriate, allowing the court to order specific performance or return of unlawfully obtained assets, excluding cases involving bodily injury.

This comprehensive remedial framework marks a decisive departure from the former, fragmented approach, in which each legal domain imposed its own limits on the types of damage that could be compensated (for instance, only economic loss in consumer law, or bodily injury in public health matters). The new regime removes such sector-based restrictions in favour of a more coherent and generous model, enabling greater access to justice and facilitating more meaningful redress for group harms.

Moreover, the range of compensable harm has been significantly expanded. In principle, all types of damage may now give rise to compensation, including:

• economic loss, such as overpricing, defective goods, or lost income (prior to the reform, economic losses, particularly consequential losses like foregone earnings, were generally not eligible for collective compensation);
• moral (non-pecuniary) damage, including violations of privacy or acts of discrimination. Under the prior regime, this category of harm could be addressed only in specific legal contexts (for instance, data protection law allowed for the compensation of moral damages, whereas consumer protection law did not); and
• physical injury, such as harm resulting from pharmaceuticals or exposure to hazardous substances.

One key exception remains in the field of public health. In this domain, standing is still restricted to cases involving breaches by producers, suppliers, or users of health-related products, as defined by Article L. 5311-1 of the French Public Health Code. This indicates that while the regime has been liberalised, certain limitations persist where public health is concerned.

Civil Fines and the Notion of “Profitable Wrongdoing” (Faute Lucrative)

One of the most innovative measures introduced by the 2025 reform is the establishment of a new civil penalty regime under Article 1254 of the French Civil Code, empowering civil and administrative courts to impose non-insurable fines for deliberate, profit-driven misconduct (faute lucrative).

This new mechanism – formalised under Article 1256 of the Civil Code, immediately following the general provisions on tort liability – is not limited to class actions. It is designed to apply more broadly, in any legal proceeding, provided that the Public Prosecutor or the Government initiates the action and that the statutory conditions are met.

The civil fine may be imposed where two criteria are fulfilled:

• the defendant deliberately committed a breach with the intention of obtaining an undue financial benefit or saving; and
• the misconduct caused harm to multiple individuals or legal entities placed in similar situations.

The original 2019 draft of the reform required the misconduct to rise to the level of a faute lourde (gross fault). However, in its final form, the law instead requires that the breach be deliberate – that is, the act must have been intentional, though it is not necessary to show that the defendant intended to cause harm [see E. Dreyer, La sanction de la faute lucrative par l’amende civile, Recueil Dalloz, 2017, p.1136, §§3-6]. This concept of intentional fault, well-rooted in French criminal law, was previously foreign to civil liability.

Notably, the benefit sought by the wrongdoer need not have been actually obtained. It suffices that the act was committed with a view to gaining an undue advantage. Claimants are therefore not required to prove that the objective was achieved.

In terms of amount, the fine must be proportionate to both:

• the seriousness of the fault, and
• the benefit obtained or intended.

The initial draft also required the fine to be proportionate to the wrongdoer’s financial capacity, but this third criterion was ultimately removed from the definition of faute lucrative. Nevertheless, it may still influence the judge’s discretion when determining the final amount.

The use of “and” rather than “or” in the proportionality test – requiring consideration of both the gravity of the fault and the benefit gained – may lead to difficulties in application. In most cases, the logic holds: the more serious the fault, the greater the benefit, and the higher the fine. But what happens if the fault is minor yet the profit is significant? Or if the fault is severe, but the gain is limited?

These ambiguities may give rise to interpretive challenges and will require careful judicial balancing, making the practical application of this provision an important point to watch in the coming years.

The maximum amount of the fine is calibrated according to the nature of the defendant:

• up to twice the undue gain for natural persons;
• up to five times the gain for legal entities.

Critically, only the Government or the Public Prosecutor may request the imposition of such a penalty, and the court must provide a detailed, reasoned judgment when doing so.

The revenue from the fine is directed to a specific public fund designed to support future class action lawsuits. This fund aims to improve access to justice by creating a positive feedback loop: the penalties for unlawful actions help finance additional enforcement efforts.

While the civil fine shares similarities with punitive damages, it is regrettable that the French legislator chose to diverge from the EU Directive, particularly from Recital 10 of Directive 2020/1828, which explicitly states:

“In order to prevent the misuse of representative actions, the award of punitive damages should be avoided.”

From a constitutional perspective, the civil fine may raise significant legal concerns. These include potential violations of the principle of proportionality of penalties and questions regarding compliance with the principle of legality of offences and penalties, due to the relative vagueness of the term faute lucrative and the discretionary nature of its application.

Although the Constitutional Council allowed the law to be enacted following a challenge by sixty members of Parliament, the ambiguity surrounding the definition and enforcement of the civil fine could lead to priority constitutional questions (question prioritaire de constitutionnalité) in its early judicial applications (Cons. Const., DC, 29 April 2025, n° 2025-879: JO, 2 May 2025).

The collective liquidation procedure provides a structured settlement pathway. The court defines the harm and valuation parameters, and the parties negotiate within a court-imposed period (a minimum of six months), after which the court decides on homologation. If the terms are unbalanced, a two-month renegotiation is ordered; failing that, the court sets compensation. Associations may coordinate mediation efforts in the second phase. Any homologated agreement has res judicata effect for members of the compensated group.

Judicial Oversight and Enforcement Mechanisms

Final judgments in class actions must include:

• a description of the class (the individuals or entities affected);
• the criteria for membership (who may join the group);
• the terms of redress (including the type and extent of compensation); and
• the publicity measures to inform eligible individuals of their rights.

The execution of the compensation phase may be carried out in one of several ways:

• directly by the defendant, when instructed by the court;
• by the claimant association, acting under a special mandate granted by group members; or
• by court-appointed judicial officers, such as commissaires de justice, when required.

Res Judicata, Limitation Periods and Substitution of Claims

The initiation of a class action – whether seeking cessation of unlawful conduct or compensation – interrupts the limitation period applicable to individual claims based on the same facts. From that point on, individual claims are suspended for the duration of the collective proceedings.

Once a judgment on liability is issued or a settlement agreement is homologated, the decision is binding on all members of the group who have received compensation.

Furthermore, judgments on liability and homologated settlements (court-approved agreements) have res judicata effect with respect to all group members whose harm has been compensated. This means that the legal findings in these judgments are binding and cannot be re-litigated by the same parties in connection with the same facts. However, group members who have been only partially compensated retain the right to pursue individual claims for the unrecovered portion of their losses. In the event that collective settlement negotiations fail, victims retain the right to initiate individual legal actions under common law for any losses not compensated through the class action mechanism.

This aligns with the French principle of full reparation (réparation intégrale du préjudice), which stipulates that victims should be restored, as much as possible, to the position they would have been in if the harm had not occurred, neither more nor less. Over-compensation and under-compensation are both contrary to this foundational principle.

The reform also confirms a well-established legal rule: any contractual clause that aims to prevent an individual from joining a class action is null and void.

Finally, the new regime allows class actions to be brought directly against the liable party’s insurer, regardless of the claim’s subject matter. This removes the earlier limitation that had confined direct actions to only certain legal areas.

Drivers behind the 2025 reform included unifying sectoral regimes, broadening standing and compensable harms, enhancing transparency, and facilitating cross-border enforcement as per the EU Directive. The reform also reflects a governance objective: to strengthen compliance incentives through effective private enforcement mechanisms.

The recent reform has altered a wide array of legal and procedural settings, reshaping both the incentives and the mechanics of collective redress. While its full effects will take time to materialise, stakeholders are watching closely to see whether these changes will translate into more frequent class actions and more successful outcomes, both in terms of recovery for claimants and deterrence for defendants.

The unification of procedures and expansion of recoverable harms signal a shift toward a more effective French regime, while the retention of opt-in and limited disclosure constrains scale and deterrence.

The introduction of third-party funding with safeguards addresses a structural financing bottleneck, while the civil fine for faute lucrative adds a punitive element with a funding feedback loop.

Cross-border capacity under Directive 2020/1828 positions France as a venue for EU-wide actions, particularly in digital, consumer, and financial services. However, the absence of enhanced evidence-gathering tools and the opt-in model may continue to limit participation rates and overall impact, making judicial practice and funding availability critical determinants of the reform’s real-world effectiveness.