Corporate M&A 2026 Comparisons

In 2025, the Austrian M&A market recorded 221 transactions with Austrian involvement, a 9.8% decrease from 245 in 2024. While the number of transactions declined, the transaction volume increased significantly. Total transaction volume amounted to EUR19.6 billion, marking an 18-year high and a 292% increase compared to the EUR5.0 billion recorded in the previous year. This sharp rise in transaction volume was mainly driven by three mega-deals, each exceeding EUR1 billion, which together accounted for approximately 90% of the total annual transaction volume. Unlike 2024, when no mega-deals were recorded, the Austrian M&A market therefore showed a clear improvement in this respect. At the same time, the overall level of market activity remains relatively subdued, as reflected in the lower transaction volume.

The number of outbound M&A transactions (where Austrian investors sought to acquire foreign targets or their shares) decreased to 77 (34.8%) in 2025 from 90 (36.7%) in 2024. Foreign investors acquiring Austrian targets accounted (inbound M&A transactions) for 105 deals (47.5% of total activity). While this was slightly lower than the 107 deals in 2024, the interest from abroad remained relatively constant. Inner-Austrian deal activity fell to 39 transactions (17.6%) from 48 in 2024.

Strategic investors remain the driving force of the Austrian M&A market, accounting for the vast majority of transactions. In 2025, 201 out of 221 transactions involved strategic investors, compared to 220 in 2024. The involvement of financial investors (private equity or venture capital firms) remained broadly stable overall and in fact declined slightly from 25 transactions (2024) to 20 transactions (2025). Accordingly, the upward trend observed in 2024 was brought to a halt in 2025. Therefore, private risk capital remains a niche phenomenon in Austria, accounting for just 10% of the total number of transactions.

In 2025, the trend of rising company insolvencies continued for the fourth consecutive year. A total of 6,809 companies filed for insolvency in Austria, representing an increase of approximately 4% compared to 6,522 cases in 2024. The sectors most affected were financial and other services, followed by trade and construction, with hospitality also recording a relatively high number of insolvencies. Compared to 2024, insolvencies increased slightly, though the year-on-year rise was relatively moderate.

High financing costs stemming from persistently high interest rates, elevated energy costs, geopolitical uncertainties and stricter regulatory requirements will continue to weigh on Austria’s market dynamics in 2026. Whether the M&A market will see a recovery in 2026 remains uncertain. Interest rate cuts, reduced regulations and a pro-business stance by the US government could support transactions, while significant capital reserves in the private equity sector (“dry powder”) could add further momentum. Despite the high transaction volume recorded in 2025, it remains to be seen whether this development will prove sustainable or is merely a one-off driven by a small number of exceptional transactions. Targeted measures in key industries could help restore investor confidence in the long term.

Additionally, ESG (environmental, social and governance) issues remain important, especially for institutional investors.

In terms of the number of transactions, the industrial sector was once again the most active industry with 66 deals (compared to 83 in 2024). It was followed by the TMT sector with 48 deals and the consumer products and retail sector with 37 deals.

Regarding disclosed transaction volume, there was a significant shift in the disclosed transaction volume in 2025, primarily driven by the three mega-deals. Life sciences and chemicals led the market with a volume of EUR8.9 billion, largely due to the Nova Chemicals mega-deal. Financial services followed closely with EUR8.4 billion, driven by major outbound acquisitions by Erste Group and VIG.

In Austria, private M&A is usually structured as a purchase of shares in the target company (a share deal) or of business assets (an asset deal). In the case of a share deal, the buyer directly acquires the shares in the target and (only) indirectly the target’s business. In an asset deal, the buyer acquires a business from a seller, meaning the assets and liabilities must be transferred from the seller to the buyer, subject to limitations (in particular, with respect to liabilities, the parties may further define the scope of the purchased assets).

Merger Control

As regards merger control, the relevant authorities are:

• the Federal Competition Authority (FCA), which receives Austrian merger control filings;
• the Federal Cartel Prosecutor (together with the FCA, the "Official Parties"); and
• the Higher Regional Court of Vienna, acting as the Cartel Court.

Phase II reviews are conducted by the Cartel Court, while the Supreme Court, acting as the “Supreme Cartel Court”, functions as the appellate court. Depending on the turnover thresholds, competence may pass to the European Commission.

Dependence on Industry/Target Type

Depending on the target entity’s industry, regulators such as the Financial Market Authority or E-Control (an authority that monitors the Austrian energy market) may supervise M&A activities and require additional notification obligations, approvals or “fit and proper” tests. Furthermore, M&A activities in certain industries critical to security and/or public order may require approval from the Austrian Federal Ministry for Economy, Energy and Tourism (Ministry) (see 2.3 Restrictions on Foreign Investments). Public takeovers of shares in Austrian-listed entities falling within the scope of the Austrian Takeover Act are regulated and supervised by the Austrian Takeover Commission.

Dependence on Asset Class

With regard to real estate, acquisitions may be subject to notification or approval by regional land transfer authorities (see 2.3 Restrictions on Foreign Investments).

Foreign Subsidies

The EU has enacted the Foreign Subsidies Regulation (Regulation (EU) 2022/2560), which, inter alia, requires prior clearance of certain M&A transactions by the European Commission.

Apart from restrictions that may be equally relevant for Austrian investors (eg, notification duties in cases of acquisition of certain share percentages in Austrian listed companies and approval/non-prohibition of the acquisition of certain qualified shareholdings in the financial sector), restrictions that may also have relevance to foreign investors mainly relate to real estate and certain industries that are critical for security and/or public order. Further restrictions may stem from anti-money laundering (AML) legislation and know-your-customer (KYC) requirements, as well as in relation to intended transactions with blacklisted/sanctioned foreign states and/or individuals.

FDI screening in Austria is addressed in detail in 2.6 National Security Review.

The main sources of provisions on antitrust and merger control are the Austrian Cartel Act 2005 and the Austrian Competition Act. Furthermore, the European Merger Control Regulation (EUMR; Council Regulation (EC) No 139/2004) is directly applicable in Austria. Depending on turnover thresholds, transactions of a certain size become subject to merger control clearance by the FCA or the European Commission.

The Austrian merger control regime is not applicable to transactions that have a “Community dimension” and thus fall within the scope of the EUMR. If a transaction falls within the scope of the EUMR, only the European Commission will be competent to review the transaction.

The Austrian merger control regime applies to the following concentrations:

• the acquisition of an undertaking or a substantial part thereof, by an undertaking, in particular by way of merger or transformation;
• the acquisition by an undertaking of rights in the business of another undertaking by means of operational lease or management agreements;
• the direct or indirect acquisition of shares in an undertaking by another undertaking if, as a result, the participation (both in equity or voting rights) held after the acquisition is or exceeds 25% or is or exceeds 50%, regardless of whether it confers control;
• the establishment of interlocking directorships, which requires that at least half of the members of the management or the supervisory boards of two or more undertakings are identical;
• the establishment of any other connection of undertakings that enables an undertaking to directly or indirectly exercise decisive influence over another undertaking.
• the establishment of a joint venture that fulfils all functions of an independent economic entity on a lasting basis.

The FCA must be notified of these concentrations if certain turnover thresholds are met (provided that no exemption applies). Furthermore, an additional threshold is linked to the turnover of the undertakings involved and the transaction value. For media concentrations, there are specific thresholds and rules.

Austrian merger procedures consist of two phases: Phase I is initiated with the payment of the notification fee (EUR6,000) and receipt of the merger notification. In Phase I, the Official Parties assess whether a concentration creates or strengthens a dominant position in the respective market. Phase I is statutorily limited to a four-week period but can be extended by two additional weeks upon the notifying party’s request. Phase II is initiated by a request of at least one Official party for an in-depth examination of the transaction. The Cartel Court may prohibit the transaction only within five months (extendable to six months upon request of the notifying party) after receipt of such a request or, where both Official Parties request examination, the first of both requests. The Cartel Court has to either reject the request in case the transaction is not subject to a notification requirement, prohibit the transaction (which is quite rare in practice) or declare that the transaction is not prohibited (which may be subject to conditions and/or obligations). Appeal proceedings before the Supreme Cartel Court can be initiated within four weeks from receipt of the Cartel Court’s decision.

An acquirer has to consider the following rules in particular.

Protection Against Dismissal

The Austrian employment law framework grants special status to certain groups of employees, such as pregnant women or disabled persons, apprentices and members of the works council. These groups typically enjoy increased protection concerning the termination of their contracts. In addition, older employees enjoy some protection against dismissal, particularly when it results in social hardship or otherwise substantially violates their justified interests.

Co-Determination

The Austrian Stock Corporation Act provides a two-tier board structure composed of the management and supervisory boards. In some instances, this structure also applies to limited liability companies. The management board is responsible for day-to-day business, while the supervisory board mainly monitors these activities and, in particular, resolves statutory and assigned matters.

If a works council is established, the Austrian Labour Constitution Act entitles employees to delegate one-third of the supervisory board’s members and the shareholders elect the remaining two-thirds (principle of one-third parity). Thus, employee representatives may gain insights, are entitled to the same level of information as shareholder delegates and, most notably, actively take part in important business decisions.

Acquired Rights

Since the implementation of the European Acquired Rights/Transfer of Undertakings Directive, the Employment Contract Law Adaptation Act states that the acquisition of a business unit (eg, by way of an asset deal) involves a mandatory automatic transfer of all employment contracts that are part of the affected business unit. Therefore, it is not possible to “pick and choose” employees and, consequently, the acquirer assumes the employment contracts as they exist at the time of the transfer (including all benefits, unsettled claims, holiday entitlements yet to be taken and severance pay entitlements).

In Austria, the legislation on FDI screening is based on the Federal Act on the Control of Foreign Direct Investments (Investment Control Act – ICA) at the national level, which has been in force since 25 July 2020.

The ICA only applies to foreign direct investments (FDI) into Austrian companies. Foreign direct investments include the direct/indirect acquisition of:

• an Austrian undertaking (eg, mergers);
• voting interests in such an undertaking;
• a controlling influence over such an undertaking; and
• the acquisition of control over significant assets of such an undertaking (eg, asset deals).

Austrian companies are those that have their seat or place of administration in Austria. This also applies to subsidiaries of the undertaking in question.

An investment is “foreign” if at least one acquirer does not have EU, EEA or Swiss nationality or Swiss nationality/headquarters or seat within the EU, EEA or Switzerland. Also, the chain of control up to the ultimate controlling shareholders of the acquirers and the beneficial owners has to be considered for the assessment. As a result, the BMAW interprets the term “foreign” very broadly and has repeatedly held that an investor is considered “foreign” as soon as any company in a chain of controlling companies is domiciled outside the EU or Switzerland.

The ICA applies to an investment in an undertaking active in a sector listed in the ICA’s Annex. Part 1 of the Annex lists the following “highly sensitive areas”. The (lower) 10% threshold applies to these areas, which are:

• defence equipment and defence technologies;
• operation of critical energy infrastructure;
• operation of critical digital infrastructure, in particular 5G infrastructure;
• water; and
• operating systems guaranteeing the data sovereignty of the Republic of Austria.

Part 2 of the Annex contains an extensive list of other areas which are critical for security and/or public order. The Ministry interprets the relevant sectors broadly.

A FDI clearance is not required if the Austrian target company is a microenterprise (eg, a start-up), with fewer than ten employees and an annual turnover or an annual balance sheet total of less than EUR2 million.

The request for approval must be filed without undue delay after the signing of the respective acquisition documents or the publication of the intention to file a bid. There are safeguards in place to enable the Ministry to commence proceedings even without a formal notification by the acquirer (including, inter alia, a prompt notification duty on the target once the target learns of the acquirer’s intention).

Where there is deemed to be a “serious threat” to the interests of public security and order, the approval may be subject to conditions (which are not specified in further detail). Prior to approval, an acquisition subject to the Foreign Investment Control Act must not be implemented (subject to substantial fines, including criminal sanctions). A transaction subject to a clearance requirement is not valid until the clearance is granted.

Court Decisions

Change in the case law on option contracts and laesio enormis

In a March 2023 decision, the Supreme Court departed from prior case law on option contracts and the application of the laesio enormis doctrine. The Supreme Court has clarified that the correct date to be taken into account when assessing the value ratio for potential claims under the leasio enormis doctrine is the date on which the option was granted, not the date on which it was exercised.

Transfer of shareholdings and suspension of shareholder rights in limited liability companies

In February 2024, the Supreme Court clarified the conditions for transferring shareholdings in limited liability companies and suspending shareholder rights. The Court confirmed that shareholder rights may be suspended under certain circumstances, particularly in cases of disputed ownership. The decision also emphasised the formal requirements for a valid transfer of shares.

International jurisdiction for claims against auditors

In September 2024, the Supreme Court addressed the issue of international jurisdiction in damage claims brought by an Austrian shareholder against a German-based auditor. The Court examined the applicability of the tort jurisdiction under Article 7(2) of the Brussels I Regulation (Recast) and the co-defendant jurisdiction under Article 8(1). The decision provides important guidance on determining the competent court in cross-border disputes involving professional liability.

ECJ decision on Illumina/Grail merger

In November 2024, the European Court of Justice ruled against the European Commission’s use of Article 22 of the EU Merger Regulation to review the Illumina/Grail transaction. The Court held that the Commission had exceeded its powers by accepting referrals from national competition authorities for mergers that did not meet EU or national notification thresholds. This decision significantly limits the Commission’s ability to scrutinise “killer acquisitions” involving high-value but low-revenue targets.

Validity of long-term share options

In September 2024, the Supreme Court confirmed that share purchase options in shareholders’ agreements are valid, even if long-term or indefinite and that excessive duration in non-consumer cases is reduced to a reasonable period. Such options are permissible if objectively justified and if the beneficiary cannot unilaterally trigger the exercise conditions. The Court further held that, under transfer restriction clauses in a limited liability company, shareholder approval may be granted implicitly, so that no separate resolution or additional company consent is required where all shareholders have already agreed to the transfer by granting the option.

Legal Developments

The Virtual Shareholder Meeting Act

The Austrian Virtual Shareholder Meeting Act, which came into force in July 2023, allows stock corporations and limited liability companies to conduct shareholder meetings in different forms, including virtual videoconferences and hybrid meetings. Under the Act, virtual meetings take one of two forms: “simple” or “moderated”, as explained below.

• Simple virtual meetings suit companies with a small number of shareholders, allowing all participants to speak freely at any time.
• Moderated virtual meetings are intended for companies with a larger shareholder base, where shareholders may only address the meeting after submitting a request through a chat function or by email.

The Act also sets out tailored provisions for publicly listed companies.

The EU Reorganisation Act

In August 2023, the EU Reorganisation Act was enacted, implementing the EU Mobility Directive (Directive (EU) 2019/2121). In addition to cross-border mergers, the EU Reorganisation Act now opens up various paths for cross-border conversions and cross-border demergers. Both “inbound” and “outbound” conversions and demergers are possible, whereas a cross-border demerger for incorporation purposes was not included.

The Company Law Amendment Act 2023

With the Company Law Amendment Act 2023, the minimum share capital of limited liability companies was reduced from EUR35,000 to EUR10,000 as of 1 January 2024. This also made the privileged limited liability company formation obsolete.

The Austrian Act on Flexible Capital Companies

With the enactment of the Austrian Act on Flexible Capital Companies, a new legal form of corporation (the flexible company) specially oriented towards the needs of start-ups was introduced. This new company form is a hybrid of a limited liability company and a stock corporation and also enables employees to participate in the company’s success by offering them equity interests (company value shares).

For flexible companies, the acquisition of their own shares is permissible, up to a maximum of one-third of the share capital. Furthermore, flexible capital-raising measures are possible, such as contingent capital increases to grant subscription rights or share options to employees and authorised capital for the issuance of new shares.

The Corporate Law Digitalisation Act 2023

The Corporate Law Digitalisation Act implemented Article 13i of the Company Law Digitisation Directive (Directive (EU) 2019/1151) and provides grounds for excluding a natural person from holding the position of managing director or a member of the management board. The new regulations entered into force on 1 January 2024 and affect:

• limited liability companies;
• flexible companies;
• stock corporations;
• Societas Europaea; and
• co-operatives.

As a result, a managing director (member of the management board, director, etc) may not have been convicted by a (domestic or foreign) court of certain white-collar crimes (ie, fraud, embezzlement, fraudulent insolvency practices, money laundering, etc). Disqualification from holding the position of managing director ends three years after the conviction becomes legally binding.

Ongoing efforts to regulate killer acquisitions

Despite the ECJ’s Illumina/Grail ruling, the European Commission remains committed to addressing killer acquisitions, where dominant companies acquire innovative start-ups to eliminate future competition. The Commission is now exploring alternative regulatory measures, including potential amendments to the EU Merger Regulation or revised guidelines for assessing merger control referrals. It remains to be seen whether legislative changes will be introduced to close the regulatory gap highlighted by the Illumina/Grail case.

The Austrian Takeover Act, which entered into force in 2018, has been amended to include a new section regulating offers to delist securities from the Official Market of the Vienna Stock Exchange.

Delisting offers are subject to the provisions governing mandatory offers in accordance with the derogations set out in the new Section 27e of the Takeover Act. Offer documentation must expressly indicate that the offer is a delisting offer. The delisting offer can be combined with a voluntary takeover offer to acquire a controlling interest or with a mandatory takeover offer.

The consideration offered under the delisting offer will be subject to two additional price floors. The consideration has to reach at least the following:

• the weighted average market price during the last five trading days prior to the day on which the intention to submit the delisting offer is announced; and
• if the weighted-average market price is clearly lower than the company’s actual value, the price must be set reasonably.

For the changes resulting from the ECJ ruling, see 3.1 Significant Court Decisions or Legal Developments.

A bidder can acquire an initial stake in the target company prior to launching an offer. Although pre-launch stakebuilding is generally permitted under Austrian takeover law, a shareholder must fulfil certain notification requirements if the thresholds described below are met or exceeded. As a consequence, stakebuilding involves the risk of generating publicity.

The Transparency Directive Amending Directive (2013/50/EU) introduced stricter disclosure requirements, including a reporting obligation regarding cash-settled equity swaps. This makes it harder to implement a creeping increase in control.

Under the Austrian Stock Exchange Act 2018, Section 130, any person directly or indirectly acquiring or selling shares in a company listed on a regulated market is required to inform the Austrian Financial Market Authority and the exchange operating company if their shares carrying voting rights reach, exceed or fall below the thresholds of 4%, 5%, 10%, 15%, 20%, 25%, 30%, 35%, 40%, 45%, 50%, 75% and 90%.

These material shareholding disclosure thresholds apply only to shareholders who are interested in a company with a registered office in Austria. The personal scope of the application includes individuals, legal entities, registered partnerships without legal personality and investment funds. The provision aims to ensure the functioning of the capital market and to provide a reliable basis for shareholders’ decisions about the acquisition and sale of shares.

The material shareholding disclosure thresholds mentioned in 4.2 Material Shareholding Disclosure Threshold are compulsory. However, the Austrian Stock Exchange Act 2018, Section 130, paragraph 1, makes it possible to include a threshold of 3% in a company’s articles of incorporation (in addition to the other thresholds in Section 130, paragraph 1).

As has already been demonstrated, the principle of equal treatment constitutes one of the Takeover Act’s central concerns. Financial matters to which the principle of equal treatment relates are regulated (in particular) by those provisions governing transactions in the target company’s equities, in addition to the relevant provisions governing mandatory offers. Consequently, equal financial treatment should be guaranteed, meaning that the Takeover Act prohibits transactions in equities at more favourable terms:

• during the offer phase (parallel transactions); and
• after the offer has ended.

However, these bans will not apply to credit institutions if certain conditions are met.

From the moment the offer is announced, from the moment the offer would have had to have been announced or from the moment the offer is filed with the Takeover Commission, the bidder and those parties acting in concert with the bidder must not issue any legally binding declarations aimed at the acquisition of equities in the target company at terms more favourable than those specified in the offer. Bidders will not violate this rule if they enhance the offer while conducting parallel transactions. This also applies to the acquisition of shares at terms no better than those set out in the offer. The Takeover Commission may also grant an exemption from the ban on parallel transactions if there is a good reason for doing so.

Dealings in derivatives are permitted in Austria.

Any financial instrument is subject to disclosure and/or filing and reporting obligations as specified (see 4.2 Material Shareholding Disclosure Threshold). There are no specific statutory competition rules covering derivatives, nor are there any for other financial instruments.

National merger control will, in principle, only be triggered if an option right is exercised to acquire shares – unless the option right itself has considerable and material influence over the target entity and its management.

Section 7 of the Austrian Takeover Act requires that the offer document include, inter alia, the terms of the offer and information about the bidder. In addition, details of the bidder’s intention regarding the future business operations of the target company and the extent to which it is affected by the offer of the bidder company must be disclosed. Furthermore, information regarding the continued employment of employees and management must also be provided.

In the event of a voluntary takeover offer to acquire control, the bidder’s intention will be obvious, as the offer aims to acquire a controlling interest in the target by exceeding the minimum acceptance threshold of 50% of the permanent voting shares. If, however, the material shareholding disclosure thresholds of Section 130 of the Austrian Stock Exchange Act 2018 are exceeded, the disclosed information does not have to include the bidder’s intention or the rationale behind the acquisition.

In the case of extended circumstances, not only the transaction’s realisation but also each intermediate step is subject to the principles of ad hoc disclosure in accordance with Article 17 of the Market Abuse Regulation (Regulation (EU) 596/2014). The existence of inside information can be assumed if either of the following criteria is fulfilled.

• The occurrence of the final result is:
1. sufficiently likely;
2. price-specific; and
3. price-relevant.
• The intermediate step:
1. has already occurred or its occurrence is sufficiently likely;
2. is price-specific; and
3. is price-relevant.

Intermediate steps that derive their price relevance from the final result are to be regarded as price-relevant if the occurrence of the final result can be expected.

Generally, the information is not precise enough to constitute inside information when the target is first approached or the negotiations commence. A non-binding letter constitutes an ad hoc notification obligation if it is price-specific and price-relevant. The question of how likely the final result will occur plays a crucial role in this respect. In general, the signing of definitive agreements triggers an obligation to issue an ad hoc notification.

The issuer is required to publish inside information without undue delay. Therefore, market practice regarding the regular timing of disclosure does not and should not differ from legal requirements to avoid consequences for violating the disclosure obligations.

During takeovers, due diligence is rather the exception than the rule. In such cases, the scope of due diligence can be limited to publicly available information about the target. Pursuant to the Austrian Stock Corporation Act, members of the management board of a stock corporation are exercising the diligence of a responsible and conscientious corporate executive when making business decisions if they do not allow themselves to be guided by extraneous interests and if it may be reasonably assumed based on adequate information that they are acting in the best interest of the company (Business Judgement Rule).

Defining the scope of the due diligence to be carried out is, in particular, a commercial decision based primarily on the Business Judgment Rule, knowledge of the relevant market and the target. When determining the scope of due diligence, it always comes down to the transaction’s relevance, with transaction volume playing a significant role. Due diligence can be conducted in a two-step process where:

• due diligence is carried out with certain restrictions; and
• comprehensive and unrestricted due diligence may be performed.

Generally, exclusivity is not often required in public transactions, while standstill obligations are the rule. Standstills provide an incentive to successfully conclude the envisaged transaction on the first attempt. Therefore, standstills prohibiting interested parties from acquiring or selling securities in the target company or the bidder from making another offer for a certain period, even after a takeover has failed, are regularly requested and, in most cases, constitute a legal consequence of the prohibition of insider dealing.

Exclusivity arrangements vary depending on the takeover structure and the underlying transaction. In general, exclusivity arrangements tend to be made in connection with negotiated deals rather than auction sales. Exclusivity arrangements restricting the future scope of management discretion are not generally allowed.

The bidder can unilaterally specify the terms and conditions of the agreement in its offer document. Individual recipients of the offer cannot negotiate or change the terms and conditions. The bidder makes a tender offer to all shareholders to conclude an agreement regarding the target company.

The Austrian Takeover Act assumes that a contract will only be concluded with respect to the offer aimed at the target company’s shareholders by means of the publication of the offer document if a declaration of acceptance is received. Essentially, a takeover offer fulfils the key requirements of a contract offer if its terms are adequately defined and it expresses the applicant’s willingness to enter into an agreement. Therefore, the terms and conditions of the tender offer are documented according to the described procedure.

In general, the timetable for M&A transactions may be subject to various drivers. The duration primarily depends on, inter alia:

• the target’s size;
• complexity of the transaction structure;
• organisation and co-operativeness of the parties;
• the industry the target company operates in; and
• regulatory aspects.

Public takeovers, which are governed by a strict regulatory framework including prescribed steps within a prescribed timeframe, usually take a minimum of three months and up to six months from the announcement of the offer to closing (excluding any time requirements for preparatory work). Private small- to medium-sized transactions structured as share or asset deals may typically be manageable from a minimum of three months to six months onwards. Particularly in the area of distressed M&A and small, simple transaction structures where no material due diligence of the target is performed, quite swift transactions (even below three months) are common.

The foregoing assumes no need for merger control clearance or other regulatory approval issues. For larger international M&A transactions, time periods may extend up to approximately 12 months or even 18 months from the first preparatory steps through to closing.

Essentially, the Takeover Act regulates public offers aimed at gaining or expanding control by acquiring shares issued by a stock corporation with its corporate seat in Austria and listed on a regulated market on the Vienna Stock Exchange. Furthermore, the Takeover Act also applies (partially) where only the requirement of a corporate seat or listing is fulfilled in Austria and the other requirement is fulfilled in another jurisdiction.

The Takeover Act distinguishes between three types of offers:

• mandatory offers;
• voluntary offers; and
• voluntary offers aimed at obtaining control.

Furthermore, the Takeover Act also foresees an offer to delist securities from the Official Market of the Vienna Stock Exchange. Such an offer is subject to the provisions governing mandatory offers, whereby certain modifications apply.

Mandatory Offers

Generally, the obligation to launch a mandatory offer is triggered if a bidder (be it an individual or parties acting in concert) seeks to acquire a controlling shareholding, which is defined by statute as a direct or indirect controlling interest of more than 30% of the voting stock. A shareholding that gives the holder between 26% and 30% of the voting rights must, however, be notified to the Takeover Commission. An exception to this rule applies in certain cases where an obligation to launch an offer would exist in principle due to the acquisition of a controlling interest. In the following cases, the Takeover Commission only needs to be notified:

• for a passive acquisition of a controlling interest (ie, where a controlling interest is obtained without any action having been taken by the acquirer, provided that the acquirer could not reasonably have expected to obtain control at the time at which ownership of the respective shares was acquired);
• for an acquisition of a controlling interest which does not enable the acquiring party to exert a decisive influence over the target; or
• in other defined exceptional situations (such as certain “creeping in” situations).

“Creeping-In”

The Takeover Act also addresses the issue of “creeping-in” acquisitions by shareholders. If a shareholder who holds a controlling interest – though not necessarily a majority of the voting rights – acquires at least an additional 3% of the voting rights (on a netted basis) within a single calendar year, such shareholder must notify the Takeover Commission. In such cases, a mandatory offer must be made, although in certain defined situations, simply notifying the Takeover Commission may suffice.

Based on experience, cash is the most common form of consideration, whereas offering shares is rather rare, as are combinations of the two. However, sellers occasionally explore alternative ways, such as the assumption of debt by a buyer, sometimes in combination with a cash payment. In deal environments or industries with high valuation uncertainty, closing accounts are commonly used and earn-out models are frequently discussed to bridge value gaps.

Regarding takeover transactions, mandatory offers always require cash consideration but may have a paper alternative in addition. The same applies to voluntary takeover offers aimed at obtaining control. Only purely voluntary offers (not aimed at obtaining control) may be in cash or securities.

In general, mandatory offers may not be conditional on acceptance or any internal approvals by the bidder. They may solely be subject to obtaining regulatory clearance (eg, merger control).

With regard to purely voluntary offers (ie, not aimed at obtaining control) and voluntary takeover offers aimed at obtaining control, the completion may be subject to objectively justified conditions, including:

• minimum or maximum acceptance thresholds;
• clearance by merger control and other regulatory authorities; or
• the absence of a material adverse change.

However, the fulfilment of a condition or a right to withdraw may not depend on the buyer’s discretion.

The Takeover Commission may declare an offer unlawful if conditions are unjustified, discretionary or not objectively determinable. As a result, the latter may prohibit its launch. Therefore, it is advisable to consult the competent authority prior to submitting an offer that includes conditions that are unusual, not precise enough or where their justification is not clearly evident.

Again, a distinction must be drawn between mandatory offers, voluntary offers aimed at obtaining control and purely voluntary offers.

• Mandatory offers may not be conditional on acceptance or any internal approvals by the bidder. They may be subject solely to obtaining regulatory clearance (eg, merger control).
• Voluntary offers aimed at obtaining control are subject to a statutory acceptance threshold of more than 50% of the voting rights (which may be combined with a higher minimum acceptance threshold in the offer).
• Purely voluntary offers may be made subject to any threshold of minimum acceptance.
• Subject to the above, thresholds are usually set at more than 50%, at 75% and sometimes also at 90% of the voting rights for the following reasons:
1. 50% plus one vote enables a shareholder to take majority decisions in the general meeting, in particular when electing members of the supervisory board, which in turn decides on the managing board’s composition, distribution of dividends and similar;
2. 75% of the votes (a qualified majority) enables a shareholder to amend almost all provisions of the articles of association and to implement most types of corporate restructurings (mergers, transformations, spin-offs, etc); and
3. 90% of the shareholding enables a shareholder to initiate a squeeze-out of minority shareholders (see 6.10 Squeeze-Out Mechanisms) with the aim of acquiring up to 100% ownership.

Regarding private transactions, it is legally possible to make completion of a signed SPA/APA conditional on the bidder obtaining financing (eg, by implementing a condition precedent stipulating (re)financing measures). However, such a contract structure is seldom accepted by the seller’s side and is therefore rarely seen in practice (except, for example, in small private real estate transactions).

In public takeovers, financing must be secured upfront (ie, a qualified independent expert must certify in advance that the bidder is able to finance the offer).

The principle of freedom of contract granted by Austrian law enables the parties to a transaction to seek any deal security measure, provided it does not violate moral principles (Sittenwidrigkeit). Purchasers frequently aim to negotiate a material adverse change (MAC) clause to protect themselves against unforeseen occurrences that may adversely affect the target. Such clauses may become increasingly important if the length of the interim period between signing and closing is dependent on governmental decisions for which a longer decision-making process may need to be factored in. In particular, the actual practice applied by authorities on foreign investment regulatory screening has impacted the length of interim periods for recent M&A transactions.

However, in situations where the Takeover Act applies, further limitations need to be observed.

Exclusivity Agreements

These are quite commonly sought after by a bidder from a core shareholder and should be legally feasible, particularly in a phase preceding a public tender, but arguably also during the tender process. Exclusivity arrangements with the target appear more problematic – particularly if the aim is to restrict management’s free business judgement in acting in the best interests of all shareholders. Therefore, no-talk arrangements (lock-ups) typically risk being too restrictive and thus void, while no-shop and market test provisions (if they just limit management to actively seeking other bidders) are arguably more likely to be upheld.

Break-Up Fees

Sometimes also called inducement fees, termination fees or drop-dead fees, these will conflict with the Takeover Act if the amounts involved are substantial, such that they de facto exclude or materially impede competing offers (in particular, if they are not limited to just compensating the bidder for their out-of-pocket costs but also have some penalty element).

Standstill Obligations

The Takeover Act already foresees these, containing statutory rules prohibiting the launch of a new or modified offer once the tender offer is published (with only very few exceptions) and a statutory waiting period in the event the offer is unsuccessful.

If a company’s shares are not held by a single shareholder but by two or more shareholders, it is very common to stipulate a governance structure among unaffiliated shareholders that goes beyond the protection and instruments afforded under statutory corporate law.

Typically, governance documents include a shareholders’ agreement, the articles of association and bylaws for the management board (and the supervisory board and/or advisory board, if any).

In general, governance documents frequently contain:

• rights to appoint and dismiss members of the supervisory and/or management board (and/or advisory board, if any);
• a catalogue of reserved matters with veto rights or qualified majorities;
• restrictions on dealings with shares (typically rights of first refusal, tag-along/drag-along rights and/or a lock-up);
• profit distribution, anti-dilution, escalation/deadlock clauses and exit/termination rights (including put and/or call option rights);
• reporting and access to information rights; or
• any combination of the above.

In addition, financing commitments to provide the company with further equity and/or shareholder loans are sometimes agreed on.

In Austria, shareholders may vote by proxy. However, certain formal requirements apply. Proxies should be issued in writing. A power of attorney in simple written form typically suffices for stock corporations.

Proxies relating to limited liability companies will, in certain cases, require notarised signatures and, if applicable, an apostille (or even super-legalisation). Depending on the subject of the vote/resolution, a general voting proxy may not always be sufficient.

The Austrian Minority Shareholders Squeeze-Out Act allows a majority shareholder holding, directly or indirectly, at least 90% of the shares to squeeze out the remaining minority shareholders. The consent of minority shareholders is not required and therefore, the respective shareholders may not block the procedure. However, they are entitled to adequate cash compensation, which, on request, is subject to a judicial review mechanism to determine the adequate amount. Moreover, the articles of association may state an exclusion of the squeeze-out right (opting out) or introduce a higher threshold.

A special regime applies to squeeze-outs effected within three months of completing a successful mandatory or voluntary takeover offer aimed at obtaining control (see Section 7 of the Squeeze-Out Act).

The shareholder structure of an Austrian listed company is typically composed of one or a few core shareholders holding large blocks of shares, whereas the percentage of free float shares is sometimes rather small. Therefore, it is not uncommon to approach a core shareholder first – if it makes sense strategically – and to privately negotiate and seek an irrevocable commitment by the shareholder to sell these shares before launching a public offer. There are good arguments supporting the validity of such commitments even within the context of a public tender process and arguably (while some grey areas exist), such an irrevocable commitment, if already made prior to the launch of a public tender offer, should also remain binding in the case of a competing offer.

Contractual provisions providing a way out for the principal shareholder before a tender process are rather unusual, although such a clause would appear to be legally permissible. Within a tender process, the Takeover Act gives shareholders who have already accepted a public tender offer the mandatory right to withdraw their acceptance in the event that a competing tender offer is launched (but a contractual right of exit will make sense for those commitments, which – as outlined above – would otherwise arguably remain binding in a subsequent tender process).

The bidder must disclose without undue delay its plan or intention to make an offer and it must inform the administrative bodies of the target company via press agencies and international news services:

• once its administrative bodies have decided to make an offer;
• if circumstances oblige the bidder to make an offer (eg, acquisition of control); or
• in the event of rumours and speculations or market distortion.

After the bidder makes their intention public, they must file an offer (including all relevant documentation) with the Takeover Commission within ten trading days or 20 trading days of acquiring a controlling interest.

Between the 12th and 15th trading day after the Takeover Commission is notified, the details of the offer must be published either in a nationwide Austrian newspaper or as a complimentary brochure that is provided to the public by the target company at its registered office and by the bodies entrusted with the task of paying the consideration.

Making a public offer triggers an obligation to produce a prospectus unless a prospectus exemption pursuant to the Prospectus Regulation (EU) 2017/112 or the Capital Market Act applies. The obligation to produce a prospectus gives investors the opportunity to gain greater knowledge of the risks involved. Before publishing the prospectus, the Austrian Financial Market Authority has to approve it.

The prospectus must comply with the provisions of the Capital Market Act and must be published at least one banking day in advance. It is deemed available to the public if it is published:

• on the electronic announcement and information platform of the Republic of Austria (EVI) or in a nationwide newspaper;
• on the issuer’s website;
• on the website of the regulated market to which admission to trading is being sought;
• on the website of the Financial Market Authority; or
• in a printed form to be made available free of charge to the public at the competent bodies of the market on which the securities are being admitted to trading.

The Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2021/528 sets out the minimum information required for documents to be published for a prospectus exemption in connection with a takeover by means of an exchange offer, a merger or a division.

Financial statements are to be included in the prospectus. Consolidated financial statements are prepared according to international financial reporting standards (IFRS), whereas others (on a standalone level) apply Austrian generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP). It is crucial that, even if the requirements regarding mandatory minimum contents are met, additional information may be needed to enable the investor to make a well-founded decision.

Parties to takeover proceedings are obligated to co-operate with the Takeover Commission by providing comprehensive information as necessary for the Takeover Commission to fulfil its duties. All relevant documents (eg, share purchase agreements and shareholders’ agreements) must be fully disclosed to the Takeover Commission. However, the bidder or the party obliged may disclose extracts from certain documents only if the bidder or the party obliged has an interest in keeping the information secret. There is no disclosure requirement vis-à-vis the recipients of the takeover offer.

A two-tier board system governs Austrian stock corporations. The members of both boards – the management board and supervisory board – are required to comply with the duty of care of a prudent business person and to act foremost in the company’s best interest. Additionally (but only of secondary importance), shareholders’, employees’ and public interests may be taken into consideration. In addition, Section 47a of the Austrian Stock Corporation Act establishes a general principle of equal treatment for all shareholders. Similar duties of care and loyalty towards the company apply to the managing directors of limited liability companies.

The Austrian Takeover Act also requires managing directors and members of the supervisory board to act in the interests of all shareholders, employees, creditors and the general public and to remain objective during the takeover procedure. As soon as the intention to launch a bid has been announced (respectively, the members of the boards have knowledge of the intention to launch a bid), the boards:

• must not prevent the public bid;
• must stay objective; and
• must respond to the bid by way of a statement.

Nevertheless, searching for a “white knight” to make a competing offer is permitted.

In Austria, it is not common for managing boards to establish special or ad hoc committees in business combinations or in cases of conflict of interest. Usually, conflicted members abstain from voting, do not participate in the meeting or are not granted access to information on those items in relation to which the conflict exists.

Depending on the corporate governance, directors’ conflicts of interest may also be addressed by an existing supervisory board that, among other things, serves as an intermediary between the managing board and the shareholders and represents the company in dealings with directors. At the supervisory board level, specific committees (eg, audit committees) may need to be established, depending on the size of the company.

In Austria, courts defer to the judgment of managing directors according to the Business Judgement Rule, which applies to any business decisions of board members regardless of the business situation. The Business Judgement Rule, as it is understood in Austria, establishes a “safe harbour” with regard to decisions of board members, provided that:

• a business decision is made;
• the board members act free from conflicts of interest;
• the decision is based on all information reasonably available; and
• board members had justifiably believed that the decision was in the best interest of the company.

A board member acting within the scope of the Business Judgement Rule is generally not liable to the company, its shareholders or other stakeholders.

However, the Business Judgement Rule will not help if the law explicitly sets up a more specific rule in certain situations. Violations of law, even if they were believed to be in the company’s best interest, cannot be justified under the Business Judgement Rule. More specific rules under the Takeover Act take precedence – eg directors must act in the interests of all shareholders, employees, creditors and the general public and must typically remain objective.

Directors of Austrian target companies sometimes turn to lawyers and other consultants seeking outside advice on business combination matters. Advice given to directors is often limited in scope and typically concerns aspects of employment law (eg, regarding employment contract issues) but also the conduct of a due diligence process (eg, regarding confidentiality/disclosure matters) or, more generally, the scope and limitations of the Business Judgment Rule and related aspects of careful management of a prudent business person.

In regulated industries, managing directors may request advice regarding statutory duties, such as ad hoc reporting obligations.

Public takeovers require independent experts (normally auditors) to be appointed to assess offers and provide opinions. Additionally, an expert appointed by the target company has to assess the obligatory statements of the target company’s managing board and supervisory board, in which they recommend whether or not to accept the offer.

Directors’ conflicts of interest may be addressed to a supervisory board that, among other things, acts as an intermediary between the managing board and the shareholders. In addition, shareholders may initiate special audits to review (potentially conflicted) business activities. However, in Austria, it is rare for conflicts between shareholders and the managing board to end up in court.

Conflicts among shareholders – which may arise from time to time – also do not often end up in court. Conflicts, if any, between majority and minority shareholders sometimes result in the legal challenge of majority resolutions filed by minority shareholders.

Both friendly and hostile takeovers are allowed under the Austrian Takeover Act. Nonetheless, friendly takeovers prevail in practice. Either way, one of the general principles of the Act requires the management board and the supervisory board of the target company to remain neutral in the interests of the shareholders and not, in any way, prevent the shareholders from deciding on the proposed takeover or from seeking to influence the decision of the shareholders.

In the event of a takeover offer, the administrative bodies of the target company (management board and supervisory board) must not take any measures which would likely deprive shareholders of the opportunity to make a free and informed decision about the offer. No measures must be taken that frustrate the outcome of the offer from the moment the bidder’s intention to launch an offer becomes known until publication of the results of the offer and, in the event that the offer is a success, until implementation of the offer.

However, measures that could frustrate the outcome of the (hostile) takeover are permissible if the target company’s shareholders’ meeting explicitly approves the measure in question. The Takeover Act mentions the issuance of securities that could prevent the bidder from acquiring control of the target company. The target company’s administrative bodies are also free to seek out competing bidders (“white knights”) without obtaining the consent of the shareholders’ meeting.

If an intention to make an offer has not yet been announced, the management board may implement defensive measures to protect against hostile takeovers. These measures can include imposing a limit on voting rights or establishing long-term contracts with management board members, provided they comply with applicable Austrian stock corporation law.

However, if the bidder’s intention to make an offer has already been announced, any defensive measures taken will require approval from the shareholders’ meeting. Such measures may include, among other actions:

• the inclusion of change-of-control clauses in certain contracts;
• the issuance of securities;
• the purchase or disposal of own shares;
• the disposal of important assets of the company; or
• significant changes concerning the company’s finance structure.

The Takeover Act does not provide specific duties for administrative bodies when enacting defensive measures. However, based on the rules of general Austrian stock corporation law, preventative measures taken by the management board must be in the interest of the target company. Should preventative measures be based on a resolution adopted by the shareholders’ meeting, such rules of general Austrian stock corporation law do not apply.

A baseless rejection of a takeover offer is not permitted, as it is not in the company’s best interests in most cases. After the offer document has been published, the management board (and the supervisory board) of the target company must prepare a statement regarding the takeover offer, encompassing an economic assessment of the offer price and a recommendation to the target company’s shareholders. The management board is at liberty to explain in its statement why a takeover offer should not be accepted and it ought to underscore its position by putting forward a counterplan for the future direction of the company and its corporate policy.

In general, litigation is not common in connection with M&A transactions in Austria. In practice, costs and the duration of proceedings are the two main deciding factors influencing whether parties initiate litigation proceedings or seek other ways to resolve a dispute, such as arbitration. The parties in small M&A deals tend to favour litigation. The main argument in favour of litigation is that the costs incurred with arbitration proceedings are usually higher, making litigation a more attractive means of settling disputes.

In the case of medium or large M&A deals with a multi-jurisdictional background, the parties mostly agree on arbitration to settle any arising disputes. Arbitration allows the parties involved to receive a swift decision on a dispute away from the public spotlight, compared to litigation proceedings, which sometimes drag on for years and are open to public scrutiny. Therefore, the parties to such transactions are often willing to bear the higher costs of arbitration.

Enforcement issues need to be considered in cross-border M&A transactions, as arbitral awards may be enforceable in some countries where state court judgments are not.

Disputes in connection with M&A deals occur at every stage of the transaction (pre-closing versus post-closing).

The majority of disputes occur after closing. Such disputes are often characterised by the buyer asserting claims regarding:

• representations and warranties provided by the seller;
• error on behalf of the buyer; or
• the calculation of purchase price adjustment amounts.

The general view is that no significant findings in connection with “broken-deal disputes” need to be considered in the future.

Shareholder activism has emerged and become increasingly visible in Austria in recent years. However, shareholder activist organisations (typically the Austrian Chamber of Labour, trade unions and consumer protection organisations) mainly focus on advising and representing consumers who have suffered damage to their investment made in units for collective investment or similar instruments, mainly by a wrongful prospectus or advertising (including in legal proceedings), rather than on tackling M&A cases.

In addition, shareholders may exercise minority rights prior to and during the general meeting, eg, by taking advantage of their right to ask questions. Increasingly, minority shareholders have tried to stretch these rights (some public general meetings have lasted for hours), but as the law provides for a rather limited system of minority rights, these strategies have not often proved successful.

In Austria, activists seeking to encourage companies to enter certain M&A transactions, spin-offs or major divestitures are hardly seen, though there may have been very rare M&A cases where this occurred – ie, where hostile acquisitions or takeovers with the likely intention to liquidate, restructure or dispose of large parts of the target business and/or workforce may have triggered certain activism or involvement (typically on a discussion and negotiation level rather than by strikes) by politicians or trade unions. Undoubtedly, there are cases in which activists (typically minority shareholders) have sought to reinforce their ideas by exerting pressure on management.

Shareholder activists rarely interfere with the completion of announced transactions in Austria. Regarding the workforce and employee representatives (such as works councils and trade unions), any interfering measures are quite rare, as Austrian corporate culture is characterised by discussion and compromise rather than strikes or other disruptive action.

In this context, it should be noted that the Austrian Labour Constitution Act grants the works council certain rights to be informed about, comment on and be consulted in a timely fashion about planned transfers or reorganisations of undertakings or business units, particularly as to the consequences for the employee workforce.