Anti-Corruption 2026 Comparisons

Brazil is a party to the main international anti-bribery and anti-corruption instruments, including the United Nations Convention against Corruption (Decree No. 5.687/2006) (UNCAC), the OECD Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials (Decree No. 3.678/2000) and the Inter-American Convention against Corruption of the OAS (Decree No. 4.410/2002). These conventions shape Brazil’s legal and institutional framework, promoting international co-operation, transparency and accountability, and have directly influenced domestic legislation such as the Clean Company Act (Law No. 12.846/2013) and related enforcement mechanisms.

Brazil’s anti-corruption framework is not consolidated in a single statute but spread across multiple laws. The Clean Company Act (Law No. 12.846/2013) establishes strict civil and administrative liability for companies involved in bribery of domestic or foreign officials, while the Penal Code criminalises acts such as active and passive bribery, extortion and influence-peddling. Complementary legislation includes the Public Procurement Law (Law No. 14.133/2021), the Administrative Improbity Law (Law No. 8.429/1992, as amended by Law No. 14.230/2021) and the Anti-Money Laundering Law (Law No. 9.613/1998). Together, these statutes form a comprehensive framework for combating corruption, consistent with Brazil’s civil law principle that only conduct expressly defined by law can constitute an offence.

The interpretation and enforcement of Brazil’s anti-corruption laws are guided mainly by Decree No. 11.129/2022, which regulates the Clean Company Act (Law No. 12.846/2013) and sets procedures for investigations, leniency agreements and compliance assessments. Additional guidance comes from the Office of the Comptroller General (CGU) and the Attorney-General’s Office (AGU) through publications such as the Integrity Programme Evaluation Manual and the Guidelines for Integrity Programmes in Private Companies (2024). These materials define evaluation criteria and best practices for corporate compliance. Judicial decisions, particularly from the Superior Court of Justice (STJ), and recommendations issued by the Public Prosecutor’s Office (MPF) further shape interpretation, promoting proportionality and transparency in enforcement.

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A bribe under Brazilian law is any offer, promise, payment, or acceptance of an undue advantage made to influence a public official’s actions. Both giving and receiving a bribe are offences – active bribery (Article 333) and passive bribery (Article 317) of the Penal Code – while related crimes include influence-peddling, extortion and foreign bribery. The Clean Company Act (Law No. 12.846/2013) also holds companies strictly liable for corrupt acts committed for their benefit, even through intermediaries. Brazilian law does not tolerate facilitation payments or benefits disguised as gifts, hospitality or travel; only modest, transparent courtesies without improper intent are acceptable. A public official includes anyone performing a public function, whether permanently, temporarily or within a state-controlled company, and the bribery of foreign public officials is expressly criminalised. Although there is no stand-alone offence for private-to-private bribery, similar conduct may be prosecuted as unfair competition under the Industrial Property Law (Law No. 9.279/1996) or sanctioned under the Clean Company Act when it involves corruption in commercial relations.

Influence-peddling is a criminal offence under Article 332 of the Penal Code, which prohibits requesting or receiving an undue advantage in exchange for using – or claiming to use – influence over a public official’s decisions. The offence applies even if the influence is only alleged. Article 337-C extends this prohibition to acts involving foreign public officials, aligning Brazil’s framework with the OECD and UNCAC standards.

Brazilian law criminalises the falsification or omission of information in corporate records. Article 177 of the Penal Code prohibits falsifying or concealing accounting data that may harm shareholders or third parties. The Corporations Law (Law No. 6.404/1976) and Securities Law (Law No. 6.385/1976) also hold companies and executives liable for inaccurate financial disclosures, subject to administrative sanctions by the Securities Commission (CVM). Additionally, the Clean Company Act (Law No. 12.846/2013) applies to entities that use false records or documents in corruption schemes.

The Penal Code criminalises various forms of misconduct by public officials, including embezzlement or misappropriation of public funds (Article 312), improper use of public resources (Article 315), and favouritism or abuse of office (prevaricação, Article 319). The Administrative Improbity Law (Law No. 8.429/1992, as amended by Law No. 14.230/2021), also establishes civil and administrative sanctions such as fines, loss of office, suspension of political rights and prohibition from contracting with the public sector.

Brazilian law holds individuals and companies liable for offences committed through intermediaries. According to Article 29 of the Penal Code, anyone who participates in, assists with or induces a criminal act is treated as a principal offender. Likewise, under the Clean Company Act (Law No. 12.846/2013), companies are strictly liable for corrupt acts performed in their benefit by employees, officers, or third parties such as agents or consultants. This prevents organisations from evading responsibility by using intermediaries to commit unlawful acts.

Lobbying activities in Brazil are not yet regulated at the federal level. There is no national law requiring registration of lobbyists or mandatory disclosure of meetings with public officials. However, draft bills under discussion in Congress, such as Bill No. 1.202/2007 and Bill No. 4.391/2021, would establish transparency rules for the representation of private interests before public authorities. Some state and municipal governments – including those of São Paulo, Minas Gerais and Brasília – have adopted limited local regulations that require disclosure of lobbying activities within their jurisdictions. In practice, lobbying in Brazil is indirectly governed by existing ethics, transparency and anti-corruption laws, which prohibit undue influence, bribery or conflicts of interest in public decision-making.

The limitation period for corruption offences in Brazil varies according to the maximum penalty provided in the Penal Code (Article 109). Crimes such as bribery, embezzlement and influence-peddling generally prescribe within 12 to 16 years, depending on the sentence. The period is interrupted by acts such as the filing or receipt of an indictment and may be reduced by half if the offender was under 21 at the time of the offence or over 70 at sentencing. For companies, the Clean Company Act (Law No. 12.846/2013) sets a five-year limitation period from the date the misconduct became known.

Brazil’s anti-corruption laws apply mainly to offences committed within national territory, as established by Article 5 of the Penal Code, but also have extraterritorial reach in specific cases. Under Articles 7 and 337-B, Brazil may prosecute acts of bribery committed abroad by Brazilian citizens or companies, or when the offence produces effects in the country. The Clean Company Act (Law No. 12.846/2013) likewise applies to Brazilian companies involved in corruption against foreign public administrations, ensuring compliance with international conventions such as the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention and the UNCAC.

Brazil provides for corporate liability in corruption cases under the Clean Company Act (Law No. 12.846/2013), which holds companies strictly liable – regardless of intent – for acts of bribery or misconduct committed in their benefit by employees, officers or third parties. This liability operates independently from the criminal liability of individuals, allowing both companies and persons to be sanctioned for the same conduct under separate legal frameworks. The law also recognises successor liability, meaning that a company acquiring or merging with another inherits responsibility for prior unlawful acts, limited to the value of the assets transferred. This prevents evasion of accountability while protecting bona fide transactions.

Defences in corruption cases vary by type of liability. For individuals, the Penal Code allows general criminal defences such as lack of intent, absence of evidence, or the non-existence of an undue advantage or public official involvement. For companies, liability under the Clean Company Act (Law No. 12.846/2013) is strict, so traditional defences do not apply. However, penalties may be mitigated through proof of an effective compliance programme, voluntary self-reporting and co-operation with authorities, as provided in Articles 7 and 16 of the Act and Decree No. 11.129/2022.

Exceptions to these defences arise when there is clear proof of wrongdoing or lack of good faith. For individuals, no defence applies where intent, active involvement or personal benefit from the offence is established. For companies, mitigating factors such as co-operation or compliance programmes are disregarded if the misconduct was authorised or tolerated by management or if the company withholds or falsifies information during investigations. In such cases, authorities may apply the highest penalties allowed under the Clean Company Act (Law No. 12.846/2013) and Decree No. 11.129/2022.

Brazilian law does not provide de minimis exceptions for bribery or corruption. Any undue advantage, regardless of value, may constitute an offence under the Penal Code or the Clean Company Act (Law No. 12.846/2013). While there is no exemption for small or symbolic gifts, enforcement authorities may consider low materiality and effective remediation as mitigating factors when applying sanctions.

There are no sectors or industries exempt from Brazil’s anti-corruption or bribery offences. The Penal Code, the Clean Company Act (Law 12.846/2013) and related statutes apply uniformly to all sectors, whether public or private, domestic or foreign.

Brazil provides a leniency mechanism under the Clean Company Act (Law No. 12.846/2013) for companies that voluntarily report misconduct and co-operate with authorities. Through a leniency agreement with the CGU and AGU, co-operating entities may obtain reduced fines, maintain eligibility for public contracts and mitigate reputational harm. To benefit, the company must admit the violation, cease the illegal conduct, and adopt or enhance compliance measures. This framework encourages self-disclosure and remediation while promoting a culture of integrity.

Penalties differ for individuals and companies. Individuals convicted of bribery or related offences under the Penal Code face imprisonment from two to 12 years, fines and possible disqualification from public office. Legal entities, under the Clean Company Act (Law No. 12.846/2013), may be sanctioned with fines of up to 20% of gross revenue, publication of the conviction and restrictions on public contracts, with severe cases allowing suspension or dissolution of the company.

Penalties in Brazil are determined according to legal and regulatory criteria. For individuals, the Penal Code (Articles 59–68) sets minimum and maximum sentences – such as two to 12 years for bribery – and increases penalties for recidivism or abuse of public office. For companies, the Clean Company Act (Law No. 12.846/2013) and Decree No. 11.129/2022 consider factors such as severity, co-operation, recurrence, and existence of a compliance programme. Repeated offences and management involvement aggravate sanctions, while self-reporting and remediation mitigate them.

There is no general legal obligation for individuals or companies in Brazil to report corruption violations. Public officials, however, must report any wrongdoing they become aware of under Article 319 of the Penal Code and Law No. 8.112/1990. For companies, disclosure is voluntary but incentivised through the leniency programme of the Clean Company Act (Law No. 12.846/2013), which offers reduced penalties and other benefits to entities that self-report and co-operate with authorities.

Brazilian authorities provide clear incentives for voluntary self-disclosure. Under the Clean Company Act (Law No. 12.846/2013) and Decree No. 11.129/2022, companies that self-report and co-operate may sign leniency agreements with the CGU and AGU, obtaining reduced fines and maintaining eligibility for public contracts. For individuals, similar benefits exist through plea-bargain agreements under the Organised Crime Act (Law No. 12.850/2013), which allow sentence reductions in exchange for effective and voluntary co-operation.

In Brazil, companies wishing to self-disclose must formally request negotiations for a leniency agreement with the CGU or jointly with the AGU, under the Clean Company Act (Law No. 12.846/2013) and Decree No. 11.129/2022. The request should include details of the violation, those involved, and supporting documents. The process remains confidential until an agreement is finalised. For individuals, co-operation follows the Organised Crime Act (Law No. 12.850/2013), through plea-bargain agreements negotiated with the Public Prosecutor’s Office (MPF) or Federal Police (DPF), requiring voluntary and truthful collaboration.

Brazil protects whistle-blowers under Law No. 13.608/2018, which guarantees confidentiality, anonymity and protection against retaliation for those who report misconduct in good faith. Decree No. 10.153/2019 created the Federal Whistle-Blower Programme, administered by the CGU, allowing anonymous reports through the Fala.BR platform and, in some cases, financial rewards for information that leads to asset recovery.

Under Law No. 13.608/2018, whistle-blowers may receive financial rewards when their reports lead to the recovery of public funds and are guaranteed confidentiality and protection against retaliation. Decree No. 10.153/2019 established the Federal Whistle-Blower Programme, managed by the CGU, which enables secure and anonymous reporting through the Fala.BR platform.

In Brazil, anti-bribery and anti-corruption laws are enforced through civil, criminal and administrative mechanisms, reflecting a comprehensive approach to integrity and accountability.

Brazil’s anti-corruption enforcement is shared among several authorities. The CGU handles administrative investigations, applies corporate sanctions and negotiates leniency agreements under the Clean Company Act (Law No. 12.846/2013). The AGU assists in recovering public losses and co-signs these agreements. The MPF conducts criminal prosecutions, supported by the DPF, which leads investigations. The Federal Court of Accounts (TCU) oversees public spending and accountability. These bodies often act jointly through co-operation agreements and task forces, co-ordinating administrative, civil and criminal actions.

Brazil’s anti-corruption bodies have nationwide jurisdiction. The CGU and AGU act at the federal level, overseeing cases involving federal funds or contracts. The MPF and DPF handle crimes affecting federal interests or with cross-border elements, while state prosecutors and comptrollers address local cases. The TCU monitors the use of federal resources nationwide. Together, these institutions ensure enforcement across all jurisdictions and, in some cases, beyond Brazil’s borders.

The Brazilian enforcement framework includes clear provisions for mitigation of liability (reduced penalties) and also recognises aggravating factors (which can increase penalties or worsen enforcement outcomes) under the principal anti-corruption legislation, especially the Clean Company Act (Law No. 12.846/2013) and Decree No. 11.129/2022.

Recent headline matters include the Supreme Federal Court’s (STF) reversals impacting the legacy of Operation Car Wash – notably the 2024 rulings that quashed high-profile convictions (eg, Marcelo Odebrecht, José Dirceu), reshaping precedent on due process and statute-of-limitations issues and reverberating across parallel cases and co-operation deals.

Sanctions in Brazil vary by offender and severity. Individuals convicted of bribery or related crimes face two to 12 years in prison, plus fines and possible loss of public office. Companies, under the Clean Company Act (Law No. 12.846/2013), may be fined 0.1% to 20% of gross revenue or a fixed amount under Decree No. 11.129/2022, and may also face contracting bans, public disclosure of the conviction or even dissolution in severe cases.

Brazilian law promotes corruption prevention through corporate compliance programmes. The Clean Company Act (Law No. 12.846/2013) and Decree No. 11.129/2022 encourage companies to adopt integrity measures such as a code of conduct, reporting channels, risk assessment, third-party due diligence and employee training. While “failure to prevent bribery” is not a specific offence, lacking an effective compliance programme can aggravate penalties, whereas having one may mitigate sanctions or support leniency agreements.

The CGU and the AGU have published comprehensive guidelines for corporate integrity programmes. Key references include the Integrity Programme Evaluation Manual and the Guidelines for Integrity Programmes in Private Companies (2024), which outline 16 objective criteria for evaluating effectiveness under Decree No. 11.129/2022. These criteria address governance, risk management, internal controls, training, communication and reporting systems. The CGU also runs the Pro-Ética Programme, which highlights companies with exemplary compliance standards. Collectively, these instruments help align Brazil’s enforcement practices with OECD principles and the ISO 37001 anti-bribery standard.

Brazilian authorities may appoint a compliance monitor as part of leniency agreements under the Clean Company Act (Law No. 12.846/2013). The CGU and AGU can require independent monitoring to ensure that remediation and compliance measures are effectively implemented. The monitor submits periodic reports and audits to verify progress. This practice, provided for in Decree No. 11.129/2022 and Joint Ordinance CGU/AGU No. 4/2019, aligns with international standards focused on promoting lasting corporate integrity.

The OECD Phase 4 Report (2023) and the CGU Integrity Report (2024) both recognise Brazil’s progress in enforcing anti-corruption laws, noting stronger inter-agency co-ordination, improved leniency practices and wider use of the Fala.BR platform. Remaining challenges include fragmented enforcement, slow judicial processes and insufficient whistle-blower protection. Overall, Brazil is seen as a maturing enforcement system with solid institutions but room for greater consistency.

Changes are likely in the foreseeable future. The CGU along with the AGU have already launched a new national initiative, the “Plan for Integrity and Fight Against Corruption 2025–2027”, which involves multi-stakeholder co-operation and signals further regulatory and institutional updates.