Anti-Corruption 2026 Comparisons

The UK is a signatory to the following international conventions relating to anti-bribery and anti-corruption:

• The OECD Anti-Bribery Convention (officially, the Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions) (signed in 1997 and ratified in 1998)
• The Council of Europe Criminal Law Convention on Corruption (signed in 1999 and ratified in 2003)
• The Council of Europe Civil Law Convention on Corruption (signed in 2000 but not yet ratified)
• The UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime (signed in 2000 and ratified in 2006)
• The Additional Protocol to the Criminal Law Convention on Corruption (signed and ratified in 2003)
• The UN Convention against Corruption (signed in 2003 and ratified in 2006)

The UK also signed the Agreement for the Establishment of the International Anti-Corruption Academy in 2010. This agreement has not yet been ratified.

Under UK legislation, there is no single, absolute statutory definition of “corruption”, nor is there an exhaustive list of corrupt conduct.

The Bribery Act 2010 (“BA 2010”) is the main UK legislation that governs bribery and corruption offences. The BA 2010 covers several types of corruption. Other corrupt conduct is covered by an incomplete mix of statutory and common law offences.

Main National Legislation

The BA 2010 applies to conduct occurring on or after 1 July 2011. Bribery and related offences are well defined under the Act. The BA 2010 contains four principal bribery offences:

• bribing another person (Section 1);
• offences related to being bribed (Section 2);
• bribery of foreign public officials (Section 6); and
• failure of commercial organisations to prevent bribery (Section 7).

Offences in Different Sources

Other corrupt conduct is covered by a mix of statutory and common law offences, including:

• misconduct in public office (offence at common law);
• corrupt or other improper exercise of police powers and privileges (Section 26 of the Criminal Justice and Courts Act 2015); and
• offences regarding political donations.

Offences Prior to 1 July 2011

Conduct which took place prior to 1 July 2011 is subject to different law. The principal offences under this law are:

• the common law offences of public sector bribery. These consist of:
1. receipt or offer of an undue reward by or to a person in public office; and
2. misconduct in public office;
• bribery (active or passive) under the Public Bodies Corrupt Practices Act 1889 and the Prevention of Corruption Act 1916;
• corrupt transactions with agents under the Prevention of Corruption Act 1906 and the Prevention of Corruption Act 1916; and
• bribery of foreign public officials under the Anti-Terrorism Crime and Security Act 2001.

The BA 2010 repealed the law relating to offences prior to 1 July 2011.

The UK’s Global Anti-Corruption Sanctions Regulations 2021 empower the government to impose sanctions on individuals and entities involved in serious corruption, such as bribery and misappropriation of property. These regulations allow for asset freezes, travel bans, and prohibitions on making funds or economic resources available to designated individuals, and are established under the Sanctions and Anti-Money Laundering Act 2018.

UK enforcement authorities routinely publish guidance for the interpretation and enforcement of UK anti-corruption and anti-bribery legislation. Key examples include:

• The Bribery Act 2010: Guidance by the Ministry of Justice, updated on 22 January 2025;
• Joint SFO–CPS Corporate Prosecution Guidance by the Director of Public Prosecutions and the director of the Serious Fraud Office (SFO), updated on 18 August 2025;
• SFO Guidance on Corporate Cooperation and Enforcement in relation to Corporate Criminal Offending, published on 24 April 2025;
• United Kingdom Anti-Corruption Strategy 2017–2022, published on 11 December 2017; and
• the British Bankers’ Association’s Anti-Bribery and Corruption Guidance, published in May 2014.

Guidance for “Failure-to-Prevent Offences”

The “failure-to-prevent offences” are a set of offences where an organisation can be held criminally liable because it failed to prevent its associated person from committing an offence. There are three such offences currently in force: failure to prevent bribery, failure to prevent the facilitation of tax evasion and failure to prevent fraud.

The Ministry of Justice is under a statutory duty to issue guidance to companies to assist them with accessing the statutory defence for these offences, namely that the organisation proves that it had in place adequate procedures designed to prevent persons associated with it from committing the offence.

These duties are found in Section 9 of the BA 2010, Section 47 of Criminal Finances Act 2017 and Section 204 of the Economic Crime and Corporate Transparency Act 2023 (“ECCTA 2023”).

While there have been no consequential amendments to UK anti-corruption legislation over the last 12 months, there have been several key developments in this area.

The identification principle was modified by Section 196 of the ECCTA 2023. Under Section 196, if a senior manager of a corporate entity or partnership, acting within the actual or apparent scope of their authority, commits a “relevant offence”, the corporate entity is now also guilty of the offence.

The most significant development affecting offences of fraud is the implementation of the “failure to prevent fraud offence”, which took effect on 1 September 2025. Under Section 199 of the ECCTA 2023, an organisation is liable if it fails to prevent a fraud offence from being committed where an employee or agent commits the fraud, and the fraud is intended to benefit either the organisation or a person to whom the employee or agent provides services on behalf of the organisation.

The types of fraud captured are the following:

• Fraud by false representation (Section 2, Fraud Act 2006)
• Fraud by failing to disclose information (Section 3, Fraud Act 2006)
• Fraud by abuse of position (Section 4, Fraud Act 2006)
• Obtaining services dishonestly (Section 11, Fraud Act 2006)
• Participation in a fraudulent business (Section 9, Fraud Act 2006)
• False statements by company directors (Section 19, Theft Act 1968)
• False accounting (Section 17, Theft Act 1968)
• Fraudulent trading (Section 993, Companies Act 2006)
• Cheating the public revenue (common law)

As set out in 1.3 Guidelines for the Interpretation and Enforcement of National Legislation, an organisation has a statutory defence if it can demonstrate that, at the time of the fraud, it had reasonable prevention procedures in place.

The UK Crime and Policing Bill 2025, which is currently passing through Parliament, introduces proposals which would create criminal liability risk for corporate persons worldwide.

Definition

The BA 2010 does not provide a single definition of a “bribe”. The legislation, however, describes a bribe as involving the offering, promising, giving, requesting or accepting of a “financial or other advantage” to induce or reward the improper performance of a relevant function or activity. This broad description is found in Sections 1, 2 and 6 of the BA 2010.

The BA 2010 sets out a comprehensive range of offences relating to conduct involving the exchange of bribes.

The General Offences

The general offences of bribery have an extremely broad scope. They can also be committed in both public and private/commercial spheres.

Section 1 – offences of bribing another person

This section relates to the “active” offence of bribing someone else. The section sets out two cases where a person will be guilty of an offence, as follows.

Case 1:

A person, Person A, is guilty where:

• Person A offers, promises or gives a financial or other advantage to another person, Person B; and
• Person A intends the advantage to induce the improper performance of a relevant function or activity, or to reward such improper performance.

It does not matter whether Person B is the same person as the person who is to perform, or has performed, the function or activity concerned.

Case 2:

A person, Person A, is guilty where:

• Person A offers, promises or gives a financial or other advantage to another person, Person B; and
• Person A knows or believes that accepting the advantage would itself constitute the improper performance of a relevant function or activity.

In both cases, the advantage can be offered, promised or given by Person A through a third party.

Section 2 – offences relating to being bribed

This section relates to the “passive” offence of being bribed by someone else. The section sets out four more cases (numbered sequentially following Section 1) in which a person would be guilty of an offence, as follows.

Case 3:

A person, Person A, is guilty where Person A requests, agrees to receive or accepts a financial or other advantage with the intention that, as a result, a relevant function or activity should be performed improperly (whether by Person A or another person).

Case 4:

A person, Person A, is guilty where:

• Person A requests, agrees to receive or accepts a financial or other advantage; and
• the request, agreement or acceptance itself constitutes the improper performance by Person A of a relevant function or activity.

Case 5:

A person, Person A, is guilty where Person A requests, agrees to receive or accepts a financial or other advantage as a reward for the improper performance (whether by Person A or not) of a relevant function or activity.

Case 6:

A person, Person A, is guilty where in anticipation of or in consequence of Person A requesting, agreeing to receive or accepting a financial or other advantage, a relevant function or activity is performed improperly:

• by Person A; or
• by another person at Person A’s request or with Person A’s assent or acquiescence.

In cases 3 to 6 it does not matter:

• whether Person A requests, agrees to receive or accepts (or is to request, agree to receive or accept) the advantage directly or through a third party; or
• whether the advantage is (or is to be) for the benefit of Person A or another person.

In cases 4 to 6, it does not matter whether Person A knows or believes that the performance of the function or activity is improper.

In case 6, where a person other than Person A is performing the function or activity, it also does not matter whether that person knows or believes that the performance of the function or activity is improper.

What is a “relevant function or activity”?

The function or activity to which a bribe relates is relevant if it is:

• any function of a public nature;
• any activity connected with a business;
• any activity performed in the course of a person’s employment; or
• any activity performed by or on behalf of a body of persons (whether corporate or unincorporated).

One of the following conditions must also be met:

• A person performing the function or activity is expected to perform it in good faith.
• A person performing the function or activity is expected to perform it impartially.
• A person performing the function or activity is in a position of trust by virtue of performing it.

The relevant function or activity does not need to have a connection to the UK and can be performed in a country or territory outside the UK.

Has the relevant function or activity been performed improperly?

The test to determine the answer to this question is, what would be expected by a reasonable person in the UK in relation to the performance of that function or activity (as set out in Sections 4 and 5 of the BA 2010)? Local custom or practice is not considered if that relevant function or activity is not subject to UK law, unless it is permitted or required by the legislation of another country.

How are hospitality and facilitating payments treated?

There is no de minimis provision built into the general bribery offences under Sections 1 and 2. There is also no provision in the law that addresses hospitality. As such, in theory, even the smallest gift could be found to be a bribe under the BA 2010.

Notwithstanding, there is a general acceptance that gratuities are a staple part of conducting business if done in an appropriate way, which can be recognised by prosecutorial discretion. The Code for Crown Prosecutors also includes the public interest test, which might err on the side of non-prosecution in cases relating to small amounts.

The Bribery Act 2010: Guidance clarifies that “the more lavish the hospitality or the higher the expenditure in relation to travel, accommodation or other similar business expenditure provided to a foreign public official, then, generally, the greater the inference that it is intended to influence the official to grant business or a business advantage in return”. The Bribery Act 2010: Guidance provides additional real-life examples.

The BA 2010 makes no allowance for facility or expediting payments (sometimes referred to as “grease” payments).

Hospitality and facility payments may be caught by the provisions of the BA 2010 if the requisite intention can be established.

Bribery of Foreign Officials

Under Section 6 of the BA 2010, it is a criminal offence to bribe a foreign public official.

Definition of “foreign public official”

A foreign public official is an individual who fulfils at least one of the following conditions:

• The individual holds a legislative, administrative or judicial position outside of the UK. The individual can have just been elected.
• The individual exercises a public function for a country outside the UK or for a public agency or enterprise of that country (this would include employees of state-controlled companies).
• The individual is an official or agent of a public international organisation.

Offence

To be found guilty of an offence under Section 6, a person must have bribed a foreign public official and the person’s intention must be to influence the foreign public official in their capacity as such. The person must also intend to obtain or retain business or an advantage in the conduct of business.

A person bribes a foreign public official if:

• the person, directly or through a third party, offers, promises or gives a financial advantage either to the foreign public official or to another person at the official’s assent or acquiescence; and
• the foreign public official is neither permitted nor required by the law applicable to them to be influenced as a foreign public official by the offer, promise or gift.

There is no requirement under Section 6 for the public official to have acted improperly.

Failure to Prevent Bribery

Under Section 7 of the BA 2010, a “relevant commercial organisation” is criminally liable if a person associated with it bribes another person with the intention of obtaining or retaining business for the commercial organisation or an advantage in the conduct of its business.

A “relevant commercial organisation” is:

• a UK-incorporated entity or partnership which carries on a business (whether in the UK or elsewhere); or
• any other entity or partnership which carries on business in any part of the UK.

A person is “associated” with a commercial organisation if that person performs services for or on behalf of the commercial organisation.

“Bribery” here encompasses the offences under Section 1 or 6. It does not matter whether the person has been prosecuted for such an offence.

It is a defence if the commercial organisation can prove that it had in place adequate procedures designed to prevent persons associated with the organisation from undertaking such conduct.

Jurisdiction

The territorial scope of offences committed under Section 1, 2 or 6 is notably wide.

Proceedings for a Section 1, 2 or 6 offence may take place in the UK even if an act or omission that forms part of the offence did not take place in the UK. This can happen if:

• the offensive behaviour that took place outside of the UK would be an offence if it had taken place in the UK; and
• the person has a “close connection” with the UK.

A person has a “close connection” with the UK if, at the time of the offence, the person was any of the following:

• British citizen
• British overseas territories citizen
• Individual ordinarily resident in the UK
• UK-incorporated entity
• Scottish partnership

An offence is committed under Section 7 irrespective of whether the acts or omissions which form part of the offence took place in the UK or elsewhere.

Influence-peddling is not explicitly recognised as a standalone offence in the UK. However, certain activities that could be characterised as influence-peddling may be caught by other offences, depending on the circumstances.

Influence-peddling is not defined in UK law, but conduct indicative of influence-peddling is generally understood to be the use of influence on decision-making in exchange for money or favours.

Under the BA 2010, offences such as bribing another person or bribing a foreign public official may encompass such conduct. Under Section 6 of the BA 2010, a person who bribes a foreign public official is liable if the person’s intention is to influence the foreign public official in their capacity as such.

Under Section 61 of the Political Parties, Elections and Referendums Act 2000, a person is liable if they facilitate the making of donations to a registered party from an impermissible source.

Financial record-keeping offences in the UK primarily arise under the Companies Act 2006 (“CA 2006”) and other related legislation. Key offences include:

• Failure to keep adequate accounting records: Under Section 387 of the CA 2006, it is an offence for a company to fail to comply with the duty to keep adequate accounting records. Every officer in default commits an offence. A defence is available if the officer can demonstrate that they acted honestly and that the default was excusable in the circumstances.
• Destruction, mutilation or falsification of documents: Under Section 450 of the Companies Act 1985 (“CA 1985”), it is an offence for an officer of a company to destroy, mutilate or falsify a document affecting or relating to the company’s property or affairs, or to make a false entry in such a document. A defence is available if the officer can show that they had no intention to conceal the state of affairs of the company.
• Failure to preserve accounting records: Under Section 389 of the CA 2006, it is an offence for a company to fail to preserve accounting records for the statutory periods (three years for private companies and six years for public companies). Officers in default may face similar penalties as those under Section 387. Additionally, officers who intentionally cause or fail to take reasonable steps to prevent such defaults may also be prosecuted.
• False accounting: Under Section 17 of the Theft Act 1968, false accounting is an offence where a person dishonestly falsifies, destroys or conceals accounting records with the intent to gain or cause loss. This offence is distinct from the CA 2006 provisions and carries its own penalties.

There are numerous additional offences relating to financial record-keeping under the CA 1985 and CA 2006.

Directors may also face criminal liability for malpractice in relation to accounting records, including failing to ensure compliance with statutory requirements or engaging in fraudulent activities. This can include offences under the Insolvency Act 1986, such as falsifying records during insolvency proceedings.

Corrupt conduct by public officials is covered by several offences under UK legislation. There are, however, no specific offences relating to the misappropriation of funds by a public official, the unlawful taking of interest by a public official, embezzlement of public funds by a public official, or favouritism by a public official.

Broadly, the general common law offence of misconduct in public office can cover the types of conduct stated above. An offence is committed when a public officer, acting as such, wilfully neglects to perform their duty or wilfully misconducts themselves, to such a degree as to amount to an abuse of public trust, without reasonable excuse or justification. The offence is punishable by imprisonment for life or any shorter term and by a fine at the discretion of the court.

Specifically, misappropriation of funds and embezzlement of public funds would likely be covered by the general fraud and theft offences under Section 1 of the Fraud Act 2006 and Section 1 of the Theft Act 1968.

Under the BA 2010, offences of bribery can be committed either directly or through or with the assistance of third parties.

Offences of misconduct in public office may also be committed by third parties by aiding or abetting the principal offender, or by conspiring with the public officer in the commission of the offence (see R v Chapman and Others [2015] EWCA Crim 539).

More broadly, there is no general rule in England and Wales as to whether criminal offences can be committed through the actions of third parties. Each case must be examined by reference to the statutory basis of the offence and its factual context, with consideration then given to whether the secondary liability provisions under Section 8 of the Accessories and Abettors Act 1861 apply, or the laws of conspiracy.

The UK’s Foreign Influence Registration Scheme (FIRS) came into force on 1 July 2025. FIRS requires individuals and organisations to register when they undertake certain activities on behalf of a foreign power to influence UK politics, policy or public life. FIRS operates on a two-tier system: the political influence tier for activities like lobbying, and the enhanced tier for activities conducted on behalf of specified high-risk foreign powers, which includes stricter registration deadlines and penalties. Failure to register can result in criminal penalties, including imprisonment and fines.

Lobbying activities are also regulated by the Transparency of Lobbying, Non-Party Campaigning and Trade Union Administration Act 2014. The provisions apply to consultant lobbyists, ie, businesses or individuals making direct communications to Ministers of the Crown, Permanent Secretaries or equivalent officials on behalf of clients, in return for payment.

Any person or organisation carrying out the business of consultant lobbying must register with the Office of the Registrar of Consultant Lobbyists and disclose their clients. A person is prohibited from carrying on the business of consultant lobbying unless they are entered in the register. A breach of that prohibition is an offence under Section 12 of the Transparency of Lobbying, Non-Party Campaigning and Trade Union Administration Act 2014.

For summary offences (those triable only in the summary jurisdiction of the Magistrates’ Courts), there is typically a six-month limitation period for bringing prosecutions. Time runs from the point the offence is committed. However, specific statutes may specify a different starting point.

There is no statutory time limit for bring prosecutions for either-way or indictable offences, as per Section 127 of the Magistrates’ Courts Act 1980 (“MCA 1980”). Proceedings may be commenced at any time unless a specific statutory provision imposes a limitation period. However, undue delay in bringing a case can amount to an abuse of process.

There is no specific statutory time limit for bringing prosecutions for offences under the BA 2010. The offences are either-way or indictable offences, and as such, the general rule in the MCA 1980 applies.

The general rule on territoriality for criminal offences in the UK is that English criminal law only applies to acts or omissions committed within the territorial limits of England and Wales. For a criminal offence to have extraterritorial effect in law, this must be specifically provided for by legislation.

As set out above, the BA 2010 has a broad extraterritorial reach specifically provided for in Section 12 of the Act.

For Section 1, 2 and 6 offences, conduct anywhere in the world can be tried in the Courts of England and Wales providing the person in question satisfies the “close connection” test.

The Section 7 offence covers conduct anywhere in the world providing the entity is a “relevant commercial organisation”, ie, a UK-incorporated company or partnership or a company or partnership that carries on business in the UK. It does not matter whether the underlying bribery offence can be prosecuted in the UK.

Establishing Criminal Liability Generally

In general, to convict a person of a criminal offence, the prosecution must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the person both:

• committed the act prohibited by the offence (actus reus); and
• had the requisite intentions when committing the act that make it an offence (mens rea).

In cases of strict liability, the prosecution is not required to demonstrate mens rea.

Companies, as artificial legal persons, do not have their own intentions. Such intentions may, however, be attributed to a company via the “identification principle”.

Identification Principle

A company can be held criminally liable using the identification principle for acts and omissions committed by a natural person if that person is “identified” with the company.

To be identified with the company, the person must be the “directing mind and will” of the company behind the offence. These persons are limited to the board directors, managing director and other “superior officers who carry out functions of management and speak and act as the company” (Tesco Supermarkets Ltd v Nattrass [1971] UKHL 1).

Prosecutors will consider the constitution of the company (with the aid of its memorandum, articles of association and other company documents) when seeking to identify the “directing mind” of the company.

In practice, this is a high threshold for establishing corporate guilt. This is particularly relevant to larger companies whose directors and senior officers may be far removed from the company levels where the criminal activity in taking place. As a result, it is likely easier to convict a smaller company of a criminal offence than a larger one.

This discrepancy is currently under review by the Law Commission. In 2022, the Law Commission published a report detailing a set of options to redress the law in this area, which included introducing further “failure to prevent offences”.

Reform Under the ECCTA 2023

The identification principle was modified by Section 196 of the ECCTA 2023. Under Section 196, if a senior manager of a corporate entity or partnership acting within the actual or apparent scope of their authority commits a “relevant offence”, the corporate entity is also guilty of the offence.

A “relevant offence” is one listed in Schedule 12 of the ECCTA 2023 and includes several corruption offences such as theft, false accounting, money laundering, fraud and bribery.

Applying the Identification Principle to the BA 2010 Offences

Section 1, 2 and 6 offences

For a company to be prosecuted for a Section 1, 2 or 6 offence, the requisite action and intention for each offence must be attributable to the persons at the company who are sufficiently senior to be held to be the “directing mind and will” of the company. Given the modifications made by Section 196 of the ECCTA 2023, if a senior manager of a corporate entity or partnership acting within the actual or apparent scope of their authority commits a “relevant offence”, the corporate entity is now also guilty of the offence under the identification principle.

Section 7 offence

This offence is not dependent on the liability of an individual “identified” with the company. It is a specific corporate offence, so all that is required to demonstrate liability is sufficient evidence that the bribery took place.

The defences under the BA 2010 are limited.

Defences to the Section 1, 2 and 6 offences include cases where the conduct concerned was necessary for the proper exercise of any function of an intelligence service or the armed forces on active service, as per Section 13 of the BA 2010. Active service for these purposes means:

• in an action or operation against an enemy;
• in an operation outside the British Islands (ie, the UK and Crown Dependencies) for the protection of life or property; or
• the military occupation of a foreign country or territory.

As set out in 2.1 Bribery, it is a defence to a “failure to prevent bribery” (Section 7) offence if the entity can show it had adequate procedures in place to prevent its agents from committing bribery.

The defence under Section 13 of the BA 2010 described in 4.1 Defences only applies to “relevant bribery acts”.

“Relevant bribery acts” are defined to exclude Section 6 offences. The defence under Section 13, therefore, cannot be used for the “bribery of foreign public officials” offence.

There is no de minimis exception for offences under the BA 2010. This means that even low-value gifts, hospitality or other advantages can trigger liability under the BA 2010 if they are linked to improper performance of a relevant function or activity. As mentioned in 2.1 Bribery, there is prosecutorial discretion, and the Code for Crown Prosecutors also includes the public interest test, which might err on the side of non-prosecution in cases relating to small amounts.

The BA 2010 applies broadly to both the public and private sectors, with no exemptions for specific sectors or industries.

The BA 2010 does not explicitly provide a safe harbour or amnesty programme for organisations based on self-reporting, adequate compliance procedures or remediation efforts. There are, however, mechanisms that may mitigate the consequences of bribery offences for organisations that demonstrate proactive compliance and co-operation.

As set out in 2.1 Bribery, a commercial organisation can raise a statutory defence to the corporate offence of “failure to prevent bribery” if it can prove that it had “adequate procedures” in place to prevent bribery.

In The Bribery Act 2010: Guidance, one procedure the Ministry of Justice recommends implementing is whistle-blowing measures (discussed in more detail in 6.3 Self-Disclosure Procedures to 6.5 Incentives Provided to Whistle-Blowers).

Additionally, the SFO has policies that encourage self-reporting and co-operation. Organisations that self-refer incidents of bribery and demonstrate a willingness to cooperate with investigations, including making full disclosures, may influence the SFO’s decision on whether to pursue criminal proceedings.

There are many potential penalties upon conviction for the full range of anti-corruption offences.

Under the BA 2010, the following penalties apply:

• Individuals (summary conviction): An individual found guilty of an offence under Section 1, 2 or 6 may face imprisonment for up to six months for a single offence, or up to 12 months for multiple offences. (Note: From November 2024, the government increased the maximum sentences available in the Magistrates’ Court to 12 months’ imprisonment.)
• Individuals (conviction on indictment): An individual convicted on indictment under Section 1, 2 or 6 may be sentenced by the Crown Court to imprisonment for up to ten years, an unlimited fine, or both.
• Corporate bodies: A corporate entity convicted of an offence under Section 1, 2, 6 or 7 may receive an unlimited fine. The appropriate “harm figure” is typically assessed as the gross profit derived from the contract obtained, retained or sought as a result of the offence. For offences under Section 7, an alternative measure may be the financial cost avoided by failing to implement adequate procedures to prevent bribery. This harm figure forms the basis of the penalty and, in accordance with the Sentencing Council’s Guidance on Bribery sentences, is then adjusted according to the level of culpability and any aggravating or mitigating factors.

In practice, fines under Deferred Prosecution Agreements (DPAs) have been substantial. For example, in 2023, following a CPS DPA, Entain agreed to pay a total of GBP585 million, including a GBP20 million charitable payment and GBP10 million towards costs.

Sentencing in England and Wales is governed by guidelines issued by the Sentencing Council. While these guidelines cover many of the more common criminal offences, numerous offences, including several relevant to corruption, remain outside their scope. Courts are nonetheless required to consider any applicable guidelines when determining sentence.

Specific sentencing guidelines exist for bribery offences under the BA 2010, distinguishing between offences committed by individuals and those committed by corporate entities. There are no prescribed minimum sentences. However, previous relevant convictions, as well as prior civil or regulatory enforcement actions, are treated as aggravating factors, increasing the seriousness of the offence and therefore the severity of the sentence and/or fine imposed.

There is no general statutory duty on individuals or corporates in England and Wales to disclose bribery or corruption offences of which they become aware. Disclosure becomes mandatory only where specific regulatory regimes impose it, such as obligations on regulated entities under the Financial Conduct Authority (FCA) Handbook or anti-money-laundering reporting duties under the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002. For example, those in the regulated sector, including financial institutions, accountants and some lawyers, have an obligation to report suspicions of money laundering, subject to limited exceptions.

Outside those contexts, disclosure of potential bribery or corruption remains voluntary. In practice, however, corporates may decide to self-report to the SFO, Crown Prosecution Service (CPS) or relevant regulator to mitigate potential liability or secure more favourable treatment, particularly in light of the “failure to prevent fraud” offence that took effect in September 2025.

The incentives for voluntary disclosure have strengthened considerably under the evolving enforcement framework.

For corporates, self-reporting can:

• influence the decision whether to prosecute or to invite the company to negotiate a DPA;
• substantially reduce financial penalties on conviction; and
• demonstrate “reasonable procedures” and co-operation, which are key public interest factors under both the BA 2010 and the ECCTA 2023.

The SFO’s Guidance on Corporate Cooperation and Enforcement in relation to Corporate Criminal Offending places heavy emphasis on early, transparent self-reporting. Prompt disclosure within days of discovery and meaningful co-operation thereafter are now central determinants of DPA eligibility.

For individuals, DPAs are not available, but early co-operation may yield a sentence reduction. Individuals may also seek immunity or undertakings under Sections 71–72 of the Serious Organised Crime and Police Act 2005 or a sentence reduction or review under Sections 74 and 388 of the Sentencing Act 2020.

Self-reporting may be made directly to the relevant prosecuting or regulatory authority, typically the SFO, CPS or FCA, either by the organisation or through external legal counsel acting as intermediary.

The SFO’s 2025 guidance specifies indicative timeframes: the agency aims to contact the reporting party within 48 business hours, decide on whether to open a formal investigation within six months and, where appropriate, conclude DPA discussions within a further six months.

A credible self-disclosure should include:

• a clear factual summary of suspected misconduct;
• preservation of relevant digital and hard-copy evidence;
• disclosure of non-privileged materials; and
• transparent dialogue on the scope of internal investigations and potential privilege issues.

Individuals making disclosures that concern wrongdoing in their workplace and that are in the public interest may qualify as statutory whistle-blowers under the Public Interest Disclosure Act 1998.

Statutory whistle-blowers are protected under the Public Interest Disclosure Act 1998 from dismissal or any detriment arising from making a qualifying disclosure in the public interest. These protections extend to most workers in the public, private and voluntary sectors and continue after employment ends.

Reforms under consideration in 2025 would further strengthen these safeguards. The proposed Office of the Whistleblower Bill would create an independent oversight body to manage disclosures and enforce standards, while the forthcoming Employment Rights Bill would expand the definition of protected disclosures.

In addition, since 1 October 2025, under Section 17 of the Victims and Prisoners Act 2024, any non-disclosure agreement that seeks to prevent a person from reporting suspected criminal conduct to specified authorities is void to that extent.

As at late 2025, there is no statutory financial reward scheme for whistle-blowers in England and Wales, in contrast to the US Securities and Exchange Commission and Department of Justice models, although there are limited incentives for disclosure of cartels and tax evasion.

However, momentum towards introducing more widespread financial incentives is building. The SFO Director, Nick Ephgrave, has publicly endorsed the creation of a reward-based programme as part of the agency’s 2025–26 strategy, and proposals for such a scheme are under review alongside the Office of the Whistleblower Bill.

Until legislation is enacted, whistle-blowers’ incentives remain non-financial, principally the statutory protections against detriment, and potential credit for co-operation where their evidence contributes to an investigation or enforcement outcome.

Bribery and corruption offences in England and Wales are subject to criminal enforcement, with potential for civil recovery and administrative sanctions in related regulatory contexts.

Criminal prosecutions are primarily brought under the BA 2010, the Fraud Act 2006 and, since September 2025, the “failure to prevent fraud” offence under the ECCTA 2023.

Civil and administrative enforcement may arise under parallel regimes, including:

• civil recovery proceedings under Part 5 of the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002;
• director disqualification orders, asset freezes and financial sanctions under the Global Anti-Corruption Sanctions Regulations 2021; and
• regulatory penalties by the FCA or HM Revenue & Customs (HMRC) for related compliance failures.

The enforcement environment has become notably more assertive in 2025, characterised by faster investigations, co-ordinated international efforts, and expanded use of data analytics and technology-assisted review.

The main bodies responsible for investigating and prosecuting bribery and corruption offences are:

• SFO: The SFO is competent to investigate and prosecute serious or complex cases involving bribery, corruption and corporate fraud. Its powers include compulsory document production, search and seizure, and pre-investigation disclosure powers under the ECCTA 2023. The SFO also leads on DPAs and cross-border co-ordination.
• CPS: The CPS handles less complex or lower-value cases, and prosecutions arising from investigations by the National Crime Agency, police or local authorities. The CPS also does DPAs (such as with Entain).
• FCA: The FCA oversees financial institutions, enforcing integrity and anti-corruption standards under the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000.
• HMRC: HMRC enforces tax-related corruption and financial crime, including the “failure to prevent facilitation of tax evasion” offence under the Criminal Finances Act 2017, as well as bribery offences.
• Office of Financial Sanctions Implementation (OFSI): OFSI enforces sanctions relating to corruption, including asset freezes and information-related offences.

These agencies frequently operate jointly under the Economic Crime Plan 2 (2023–2026). The SFO, CPS and FCA maintain established co-operation frameworks, while the UK–France–Switzerland Anti-Corruption Alliance (2025) now enables co-ordinated cross-border investigations.

The UK’s anti-bribery and anti-corruption laws have extensive extraterritorial reach.

As set out in 3.2 Geographical Reach of Applicable Legislation, under the BA 2010, UK nationals, residents, and companies incorporated in the UK can be prosecuted for bribery committed anywhere in the world.

Jurisdiction also extends to foreign companies carrying on part of their business in the UK.

The “failure to prevent fraud” and “failure to prevent bribery” offences similarly apply to conduct outside the UK where the organisation benefits from or is connected to UK operations.

The SFO, the CPS and OFSI can, therefore, pursue individuals and corporates for overseas conduct with a “close connection” to the UK, often in collaboration with foreign enforcement bodies such as the US Department of Justice and OECD Working Group on Bribery partners.

All key enforcement bodies exercise discretion in determining whether to prosecute and in assessing mitigation or aggravation.

Under the Joint SFO–CPS Corporate Prosecution Guidance and the SFO’s Guidance on Corporate Cooperation and Enforcement in relation to Corporate Criminal Offending, the following factors are relevant.

Mitigating Factors

Mitigating factors include:

• prompt self-reporting and full co-operation;
• demonstrated reasonable procedures or robust compliance programmes;
• remediation, including disciplinary or structural reforms;
• absence of prior misconduct; and
• provision of transparent and timely financial information for sentencing.

These factors may lead to non-prosecution, a DPA or reduced penalties.

Aggravating Factors

Aggravating factors include:

• delayed or incomplete disclosure;
• obstruction of investigation;
• repeated or systemic misconduct;
• involvement of senior management; and
• failure to preserve evidence or co-operate.

Public interest considerations also guide discretion, particularly where prosecution would be disproportionate in minor, historic or isolated cases.

Several 2025 cases illustrate heightened enforcement intensity and cross-border co-ordination:

• United Insurance Brokers Ltd (UIBL) – April 2025: SFO charged UIBL with failure to prevent bribery relating to reinsurance contracts in Ecuador. This is expected to be the first jury trial for a “failure to prevent bribery” offence.
• Blu-3 and Mace Group – April 2025: There were co-ordinated SFO raids and arrests in the UK and Monaco concerning alleged bribery linked to a Dutch data centre project for Microsoft. This is indicative of the SFO’s new focus on rapid cross-border enforcement.
• Entain (formerly GVC Holdings) – October 2025: Entain’s former executives were charged with bribery and fraud relating to Turkish operations. This follows a GBP585 million DPA concluded in 2023.
• Glencore: These ongoing proceedings concern six former executives following the company’s GBP280 million fine in 2022. The Financial Reporting Council opened an audit investigation in 2025, signalling continued scrutiny.
• Bennett Verby Ltd – August 2025: 2025 marks HMRC’s first prosecution for the “failure to prevent facilitation of tax evasion” offence, marking a more aggressive stance on economic crime enforcement.

These cases collectively highlight a clear shift towards faster case progression, cross-agency collaboration and greater use of the “failure to prevent” model.

Sanctions for bribery and corruption offences vary according to the offender, the severity of the misconduct and the level of co-operation.

Individuals convicted under Section 1, 2 or 6 of the BA 2010 face up to ten years’ imprisonment and/or an unlimited fine on indictment, and up to 12 months’ imprisonment on summary conviction (subject to Magistrates’ Court sentencing limits). In 2012, a court clerk at Redbridge Magistrates’ Court was the first person convicted under the BA 2010; he received a four-year custodial term (reduced on appeal from six years) for accepting a GBP500 bribe in return for manipulating court records.

In more recent examples:

• In 2023, five men were jailed at Cardiff Crown Court for corruption involving a council recycling-centre contract. The sentences included 28 months’, 22 months’ and 18 months’ imprisonment, with confiscation orders exceeding GBP365,000.
• In April 2025, four individuals involved in a demolition-industry corruption scheme (over GBP600,000 in bribes) were sentenced at Southwark Crown Court. Three received three and a half years’ imprisonment and one two years’ imprisonment.
• In May 2025, a group of senior energy sector professionals were convicted following a CPS prosecution for bribery and money laundering. The convicted individuals received custodial sentences between two years five months’ and four years’ immediate imprisonment, while two received suspended sentences of 12 and 13 months.
• In November 2025, the former leader of Reform UK in Wales was sentenced to ten and a half years’ imprisonment after admitting eight charges of bribery relating to the taking of bribes for pro-Russia interviews and speeches. This was the highest sentence yet imposed against an individual convicted under the Act.

Corporate entities convicted under Section 1, 2, 6 or 7 of the BA 2010, or under the ECCTA 2023 “failure to prevent fraud” offence, are subject to unlimited fines. The starting point is generally the gross profit or financial benefit obtained or sought from the offending, adjusted for culpability and aggravating/mitigating features.

Recent examples illustrate the scale of corporate sanctions:

• Airbus (2020 DPA): GBP991 million UK share of a EUR3.6 billion global settlement.
• Glencore (2022 conviction): GBP280 million fine.
• Entain (2023 DPA): GBP585 million financial penalty, GBP20 million charitable donation, GBP10 million costs.

DPAs continue to be accompanied by stringent compliance undertakings, independent monitoring and extensive remedial obligations.

Companies are not under duties to set up compliance programmes to prevent corruption, unless there is a regulatory obligation to do so. For example, those in the financial sector should have appropriate financial crime controls in place.

Failure to put into place adequate procedures to prevent bribery will result, however, in the company not having a defence if it is subsequently charged under Section 7 of the BA 2010 (as discussed in 2.1 Bribery).

If found liable under Section 7, companies may face unlimited fines, and individuals involved can, if prosecuted for bribery under the Act, be imprisoned for up to ten years (individuals cannot be prosecuted for the Section 7 offence). More broadly, organisations risk reputational damage and civil recovery orders.

As mentioned in 1.3 Guidelines for the Interpretation and Enforcement of National Legislation, the Ministry of Justice is under a statutory duty to provide guidance concerning the “failure to prevent” offences.

This guidance outlines government expectations for what constitutes “adequate procedures”. These include proportionate procedures, top-level commitment, risk assessment, due diligence, communication, monitoring and review.

The SFO and CPS also provide materials to supplement this guidance. The SFO’s Guidance on Corporate Cooperation and Enforcement in relation to Corporate Criminal Offending assists prosecutors to evaluate the adequacy of compliance programmes when deciding whether to bring charges or negotiate a settlement.

UK enforcement bodies have the option of requiring a compliance monitor as part of corporate resolutions (particularly within the DPA framework).

Under DPAs, a company agrees to fulfil specific conditions, such as paying a financial penalty, co-operating with investigations and implementing compliance improvements, in exchange for the suspension (and eventual dismissal) of criminal proceedings. One of the possible conditions that enforcement authorities may include in a DPA is the appointment of an independent compliance monitor.

The appointment of a compliance monitor typically occurs where the SFO or CPS determines a company’s existing compliance programme is inadequate or that there is a significant risk of reoffending. The monitor’s duties may include reviewing policies and procedures, testing internal controls, evaluating training and reporting systems and making recommendations for improvement.

As such, UK enforcement bodies have discretion to require a compliance monitor as part of a DPA or negotiated resolution.

The UK’s anti-corruption legislation has been assessed by government strategies, both past and ongoing, and OECD reports.

The OECD conducted a 2025 review and reported that the UK provides clear standards for corporate compliance and is leveraging technology in an innovative way to enhance effectiveness. It also identified weaknesses in the UK’s capacity to conduct assessments due to strained public services and limited expert availability.

The UK’s Anti-Corruption Strategy (2017–2022) sought to establish a comprehensive review of domestic and international anti-corruption efforts. It identified strengths, namely the UK being the first G20 country to establish a public register of beneficial ownership, and the country’s active participation in global anti-corruption efforts. Weaknesses included enforcement gaps (in contrast to strong legal frameworks), and critics noted that the strategy focused heavily on lower-level institutions like local government and border forces, with less emphasis on high-level political corruption. This approach may have limited the strategy’s impact on addressing corruption at the highest levels of government.

As stated in 1.4 Recent Key Amendments to National Legislation, the new “failure to prevent fraud” offence recently came into force. It extends corporate liability to encompass fraud in parallel with the existing “failure to prevent” offences. The ECCTA 2023 also reforms the role of Companies House, enhancing transparency and accountability in company registration and operations.

The Economic Crime Plan 2 (2023–2026) outlines the government’s strategy to combat economic crime, including fraud and corruption. It introduces measures such as the establishment of a National Fraud Squad and the implementation of a new sustainable funding model to support anti-money-laundering efforts.

Discussions are ongoing regarding the creation of a National Counter-Terrorism Force, which could centralise various crime-fighting resources, including those related to economic crime. While still in the planning stages, this initiative indicates a potential shift towards a more unified approach to tackling serious and organised crime.

These developments suggest a proactive stance by the UK government to enhance its anti-corruption framework, focusing on legislative updates, improved enforcement mechanisms and strategic planning to holistically address corruption.