Child Relocation 2024 Comparisons

Last Updated September 10, 2024

Contributed By Chia Wong Chambers LLC

Law and Practice

Authors



Chia Wong Chambers LLC has a strong litigation foundation, with a team of lawyers who take pride in their effective style of dispute settlement and resolution. They have handled many high-profile cases, and recognise the realities of media exposure, commercial practicality, and individual sensitivity. The firm handles a variety of cases, including heavily contested matrimonial cases and many cross-border disputes that involve foreign individuals, entities, and assets. Chia Wong Chambers has been recognised by leading publications. The firm specialises in family law, criminal law, civil litigation, and crisis management. Other practice areas include defamation cases, negligence claims, administration law, banking and finance matters, bankruptcy law, company law, probate, estate, and trusts, insolvency matters and asset recovery, directors’ and shareholders’ disputes, and contentious probate matters.

The following chapter featured in Child Relocation 2023 and is awaiting update from the firm.

The Principle of Joint Parental Responsibility

In Singapore, joint parental responsibility has been said to be “deeply rooted in our family law jurisprudence” (CX v CY (minor: custody and access) [2005] 3 SLR(R) 690 (“CX v CY”) at [26] to [27]). The principle is statutorily enshrined in Section 46(b) of the Women’s Charter 1961 which provides that “[the] husband and wife are mutually bound to co-operate with each other in … caring and providing for the children”. As such, both the husband and wife, or mother and father, have parental responsibility; and parental decision-making is accordingly to be exercised mutually and co-operatively between the parents for the child’s benefit.

Although Section 46 refers only to the “husband and wife”, the courts have recognised that joint parental responsibility is not dependent on the married or unmarried status of the parents (VET v VEU [2020] 4 SLR 1120 (“VET v VEU”) at [16]); it is a lifelong obligation which survives the breakdown of the marriage or relationship and continues until the child attains adulthood (CX v CY at [24] and [38]).

Custody Versus Care and Control

When the parents’ marriage or relationship breaks down, parties are no longer living together and it may no longer be practical to mutually co-operate and agree on all the day-to-day decisions for the child as before. It is recognised that it may then become necessary for the court to make orders under Section 124 of the Women’s Charter 1961 and/or Section 5 of the Guardianship of Infants Act 1934, with the authority to make decisions in relation to a child being divided into “custody” and “care and control” (TAU v TAT [2018] 5 SLR 1089 (“TAU v TAT”) at [6]).

In this regard, “custody” concerns decision-making over the major aspects of the child’s life such as place of residence, education, healthcare, and religion, whereas “care and control” concerns who the child is to live with and consequently who is responsible for making day-to-day decisions such as what the child will eat for lunch, how he/she is to dress, and how he/she is to travel to school, for example (TAU v TAT [6] to [9]; and CX v CY at [31] and [32]). The parent not having care and control will then be granted “access”.

The courts have held that barring any exceptional circumstances such as where one parent had sexually or emotionally abused the child, joint or no custody orders should be the norm (CX v CY at [31]). This is to preserve joint parental responsibility so that the child will continue to enjoy the full support and guidance of both of his/her parents through his/her childhood (VJM v VJL [2021] 5 SLR 1233 (“VJM v VJL”) at [5] and [6]). Joint or no custody orders remain the norm even where there is an apprehension that the parties may be unable to agree on custodial decisions (CX v CY at [29]; and VJM v VJL [2021] 5 SLR 1233 (“VJM v VJL”) at [5] and [6]).

Whilst the courts have observed that it is an impossible task to lay down an exhaustive list of matters which fall under the concept of custody (CX v CY (minor: custody and access) [2005] 3 SLR(R) 690 at [35]), decisions concerning the child’s citizenship or change of name which went towards the child’s identity have been found to fall within the concept of custody (VLI v VLJ [2022] 5 SLR 301 at [15]; and UPD v UPC [2020] 4 SLR 699 at [77] to [80]).

A birth mother has parental responsibility in relation to a child, without further requirements. The court has recognised that it is clear under common law that a child’s biological parent is regarded as his/her parent (UKM v Attorney General [2019] 3 SLR 874 (“UKM v AG”) at [72]). Biological parents may be proved as such from the results of a DNA test and may also be, at first sight, indicated from the record of who the child’s mother and father are on his/her birth certificate (UKM v AG at [72]).

As noted in 1.2 Requirements for Birth Mothers, a child’s biological parents are regarded as his/her parents.

Non-genetic parents may still obtain parental responsibility and be regarded as parents under the Status of Children (Assisted Reproduction Technology) Act where they have a child as a result of a fertilisation procedure as defined in Section 2(1).

For gestational mothers, Section 6 of the Status of Children (Assisted Reproduction Technology) Act provides that subject to Section 9 (where the egg, sperm, or embryo used was not the egg, sperm, or embryo intended to be used), the woman who carried a child as a result of a fertilisation procedure is to be treated as the mother of the child from the date of birth of the child.

For fathers married to gestational mothers, Section 7(2) of the Status of Children (Assisted Reproduction Technology) Act provides that subject to Section 7(7) (where another man is to be treated as the father earlier in time) and Section 9, the husband of the gestational mother at the time she underwent a fertilisation procedure as a result of which she carried a child, is to be treated as that child’s father unless it is proved that he did not consent to the gestational mother undergoing the fertilisation procedure.

The marital status of the mother and father at the point of conception or birth of the child does not impact either of them in obtaining parental responsibility for the child on the child’s birth. Parental responsibility is not dependent on the married or unmarried status of the child’s parents (VET v VEU at [16]).

In line with the policy that the government does not support the formation of same-sex family units, there are no designated processes for parents in a same-sex relationship to obtain parental responsibility. If either of the parents in a same-sex relationship is the biological parent of the child, he/she will have parental responsibility by virtue of his/her biological parenthood. If either or both of the parents in a same-sex relationship are not the biological parents of the child, they will not have parental responsibility unless they apply to adopt the child or to be appointed guardian with custody and care and control of the child.

Both adoption and guardianship nevertheless present difficulties for same-sex partners looking to obtain parental responsibility. At the outset, the Adoption of Children Act 2022 set to come into effect in 2023 precludes same-sex couples from adopting children together. Even prior to, and apart from, this, policy considerations weighed against the granting of adoption to same-sex couples.

In UKM v AG, the appellant, a gay man, had visited the US with his long-term male partner to procure a child through the use of assisted reproductive technology. The appellant’s sperm and the egg of an anonymous donor were used for the procedure which resulted in the surrogate mother eventually giving birth to the appellant’s biological son. The appellant brought the child back to Singapore where the child was permitted to remain temporarily under a long-term visit pass. The appellant then applied to adopt the child under the then Adoption of Children Act 1939.

The High Court hearing the appeal held that whilst adoption would not have the same transformative effect as in the UK, the appellant here, as the biological parent of the child already being recognised as the child’s parent under common law, making the adoption order would nevertheless still be for the welfare of the child as it would increase his prospects of securing Singapore citizenship and long-term residence which would enhance his sense of security, emotional wellbeing, and long-term stability of his care arrangements. Whilst the High Court prioritised the welfare of the child as the first and paramount consideration and therefore allowed the appellant to adopt the child on the facts of that case, it recognised that this breached the policy against same-sex family units.

In coming to its decision, the High Court took the view that it was “not prepared to infer that the appellant’s pursuit of his adoption application [was] tainted with culpability [in the sense of a deliberate violation of public policy] of the kind that would weigh significantly against making an adoption order” (at [246]). It observed, however, that “[w]ith the publication of this decision… it may be more defensible to draw such a conclusion [of culpability] in an appropriate future case” (at [246]). In conclusion, the High Court underscored that its decision was reached on the particular facts of the case, and was not an endorsement of what the appellant and his partner set out to do (at [249]).

In VET v VEU, the same gay couple had decided to raise another child together. A girl was born through a surrogate mother in the US, and the plaintiff, the biological father of the girl, legally adopted her in the US. The plaintiff then applied to the court in Singapore, this time for his partner to be appointed guardian and for them to have joint custody and shared care and control of the two children. The partner, who had no biological links with the children, and otherwise had no legal relationship with them, consented to the application.

The High Court dismissed the application for guardianship because the plaintiff, as the biological parent, already had parental responsibility, and there was no evidence that the children were in need of protection under the court’s wardship jurisdiction, nor was it necessary for the children’s welfare for his partner to be appointed guardian. The High Court also dismissed the application for joint custody and shared care and control as these were legal constructs used only when necessary for the court to intervene where the relationship between parents or guardians had broken down, which was not the case based on the facts.

Eligibility to Adopt

At the outset, prospective adopters have to meet the eligibility criteria to adopt. They must be Singapore citizens, permanent residents, or holders of the Employment Pass, Dependent’s Pass, or such other pass which the Family Court deems as proof of residency. They must also be at least 25 years old, and 21 years older than the child to be adopted, but not more than 50 years older than the child.

When the new Adoption of Children Act 2022 takes effect, a prospective adopter applying with his/her spouse to adopt a child must be a Singapore citizen or both must be permanent residents, whereas a prospective adopter applying as a sole adopter must himself/herself be either a Singapore citizen or permanent resident.

Section 4(1)(a) of the Adoption of Children Act 2022 further provides that only couples married in Singapore under the Administration of Muslim Law Act 1966 or the Women’s Charter 1961, or outside of Singapore under the law of another country in circumstances where the marriage is recognised as valid under that law, and the individuals would be taken to be lawfully married under written law in Singapore if the marriage had taken place in Singapore, can apply as joint applicants to adopt a child together.

The effect is that same-sex couples validly married in another country would still not be eligible to adopt as joint applicants in Singapore because such a marriage would not have been lawful in Singapore. Whilst unmarried individuals can apply to adopt as sole applicants, single males are not allowed to adopt a girl unless there are special circumstances justifying the adoption order (Section 4(3) of the Adoption of Children Act 1939).

Adoption Procedure

Procedurally, prospective adopters must first attend a mandatory pre-adoption briefing covering the criteria and legal implications of adoption. They are also strongly encouraged to attend the briefing on disclosure of adoptive status which will become compulsory when the Adoption of Children Act 2022 comes into effect.

Thereafter, prospective adopters must undergo a Home Study Report which will be renamed the Adoption Suitability Assessment after the Adoption of Children Act 2022 comes into effect. This is conducted by the professional social service staff appointed. A favourable Home Study Report or Adoption Suitability Assessment is a precondition for proceeding with the adoption.

Assuming the prospective adopter(s) obtain a favourable Home Study Report, they may proceed to identify a child to adopt. This may be done through the prospective adopter’s/adopters’ own contacts provided that how the child was sourced, matched, and placed in his/her care does not contravene the laws of Singapore or the child’s country of origin.

Prospective adopters must obtain the notarised consent of the biological parents or the legal guardian/person having custody of the child if the child’s biological parent is not available. If the child is a foreign child, the prospective adopter(s) must apply for and obtain a Dependent’s Pass for the child to remain in Singapore until the adoption proceedings are completed.

Finally, prospective adopters would then file their application for adoption to the Family Court by way of Originating Summons with the Adoption Statement and supporting Affidavit and seek the consent from the Director-General of Social Welfare (DGSW) of the Ministry of Social and Family Development (MSF) to act as the Guardian-in-Adoption (GIA) for the child during the adoption process. This separate application for the MSF to consent to act as GIA will no longer be required when the Adoption of Children Act 2022 comes into effect. An MSF officer will then contact the applicants to conduct the relevant visits and interviews.

When the MSF has concluded its investigations, it will send the Affidavit to the applicant to be submitted to court and apply for a hearing date. Upon hearing the application, the court may grant the adoption order, adjourn the case pending further information if necessary, or dismiss the application accordingly.

If the application for adoption is granted, the adopter(s) will then be legally recognised as the child’s parent(s) as if the child were born to the adopter(s), with the adopter(s) having parental responsibility for the child accordingly (Section 7(1)(b) of the Adoption of Children Act 1939).

Where one parent wishes to move a child of the family permanently to another country, the consent of the other parent having parental responsibility or custody of the child is required.

If the parents having parental responsibility or custody of the child cannot agree on whether such a relocation can take place, the parent wishing to move the child to another country may resolve the issue by taking up an application for leave to relocate under Section 5 of the Guardianship of Infants Act 1934 (where there are no divorce proceedings), or Section 125 of the Women’s Charter 1961 (where there are divorce proceedings).

The courts have held that there is only one fundamental critical legal principle on which a relocation application depends which is that “the welfare of the child [is] paramount and this principle ought to override any other consideration”. This is the “golden thread” that runs through all proceedings involving the interest of children as mandated by Section 3 of the Guardianship of Infants Act 1934 which enjoined the court to have regard for the welfare of the children as the “first and paramount consideration” in any proceeding where the custody or upbringing of a child is in issue (BNS v BNT [2015] 3 SLR 973 (“BNS v BNT”) at [19]). In determining what the welfare of the child/ren requires in any given case, the courts consider a multitude of factors. Amongst them, the following feature most commonly in the context of a relocation application.

Reasonable Wishes of the Primary Care Giver to Relocate

One prominent factor which is often looked at in cases is the reasonable wishes of the primary care giver to relocate. As the Court of Appeal in BNS v BNT recognised, “This is often identified as an important factor affecting the child’s welfare because the child’s emotional and psychological welfare is, generally speaking, intertwined with that of the primary care giver” (at [20]). It was more recently observed that “[i]t is unrealistic to disregard the well-being of the caretaker and treat it as separate and distinct from the welfare of the child” (VLO v VLP [2021] SGHCF 34 at [7]).

It was underscored by the Court of Appeal in BNS v BNT, however, that “the relocating parent’s reasonable wish to relocate is not relevant per se. It is relevant only to the extent that it is found that there will be a transference of his or her insecurity and negative feelings onto the child” (at [20]). This meant that “even where the primary care giver was able to establish that her wishes to relocate were reasonable, that was merely one factor to be considered in the overarching inquiry into the child’s welfare”; and “not a singularly determinative factor... if shown to exist, necessarily trumped all other relevant considerations” (BNS v BNT at [21]).

Moreover, the finding that the primary care giver’s wishes to relocate was not unreasonable, did not itself give rise to a presumption in favour of relocation; instead, the law expected parents to put the interests of their child/ren before their own, and sacrifices may have to be made when the child/ren is/are in need (TAA v TAB [2015] 2 SLR 879 (“TAA v TAB”) at [17] and [18]). Whilst the reasonable wishes may have a bearing on the welfare of the child/ren, the court was still obliged to consider all the relevant facts and circumstances in determining whether those wishes were incompatible with the welfare of the child/ren in any given case (TAA v TAB at [17]; UXH v UXI [2019] SGHCF 24 (“UXH v UXI”) at [11]).

Of the various reasons for relocation, the courts have generally held that a relocating parent’s desire to relocate with, or to join, a new partner or spouse in another country would not suffice where the relocation would otherwise not be in the children’s best interests. The High Court in TAA v TAB, for example, viewed that the father in that case did not have a good enough reason to relocate to Spain, a country where the children had never lived and had no other family, because his decision to do so appeared to be for the benefit of his new spouse who was Spanish. Similarly, the mother’s “driving reason” for relocation to move to the UK with her new partner and set up a family, in UXH v UXI, did not outweigh the concerns that the children would have to adjust to an entirely new living environment, new schools and new friends, and they would lose, to a significant extent, their relationship with their father.

Where, on the other hand, the relocating parent’s reason for relocation is that he/she cannot stay in Singapore due to the loss of employment, the court in TEU v TEV [2016] SGFC 33 (“TEU v TEV”) cautioned that “care must be taken to scrutinise such claims or any foreigner can circumvent the law by simply quitting his or her job, refusing to look for another job in Singapore, and then apply for relocation on the basis that he or she has to leave Singapore because of the loss of job” (at [38]). Rather, to demonstrate that he or she cannot stay in Singapore, an applicant must demonstrate that she has “exhausted all reasonable attempts to stay in Singapore”, and in the case of a person who has been terminated from his or her job, “that [he or she] has actually attempted to look for an equivalent position in Singapore and has not been able to find one” (at [33]).

In determining the weight to be ascribed to the primary care giver’s wishes in the ultimate inquiry, the courts consider all the facts of the case and focus on the likely impact on the child/ren. In the recent case of WNO v WNP [2023] SGFC 19, where there was a shared care arrangement with both parents having care of the child, the court observed that “where there are two primary care givers… the transference of the insecurity and negative feelings onto the child by the parent who is disappointed that his or her relocation application [has not been] granted, is mitigated by the presence of the other care-giving parent” and that “it follows that in such a situation, the wishes of the relocating parent would carry less weight compared to cases where the relocating parent is the sole care-giver” (at [32]).

Loss of Relationship With the Left-Behind Parent

Another significant factor that must be given due consideration in relocation applications is the child’s loss of relationship with the left-behind parent. As the Court of Appeal in BNS v BNT laid down, “It was axiomatic that a child benefited from the nurturing presence and joint contribution of both parents in his or her life and this did not cease to be true upon the breakdown of marriage”, and “relocation… represented a serious threat to this ideal state of joint parenting since the left-behind parent would become less of a presence in the child’s new life” (at [25]).

The impact of the loss of relationship on the child/ren in each case would depend on the facts, and, in particular, the strength of the existing bond between the child/ren and the left-behind parent. As a general rule, “the stronger the bond, the larger the resultant void in the child’s life if relocation were allowed, and, accordingly, the weightier this factor would be in the overall analysis” (BNS v BNT at [26]). However, on the other hand, where there have been difficulties with access and the left-behind parent was fighting to rebuild her relationship with the children, it may also not be in the children’s interests to allow the relocation, particularly in circumstances where the relocating parent was not encouraging or supportive of access (TAA v TAB at [23]).

As with the reasonable wishes of the primary care giver to relocate, the loss of relationship with the left-behind parent was not to be treated as having determinative weight or as being decisive in every case (at [26]). The High Court in UYK v UYJ [2020] 5 SLR 772 (“UYK v UYJ”) observed that the loss of relationship with the left-behind parent was an unfortunate consequence of relationship breakdown when parties were unable to agree on a common country of residence (at [64]). This is because if the parents’ desired countries of residence do not coincide and neither parent makes the sacrifice, a child would inevitably be physically separated from one parent. In such circumstances, the willingness and ability of both parents to support substantial access arrangements could help to mitigate the loss of time and relationship with the left-behind parent (at [64]). Such access may comprise physical access and virtual access.

To what extent such substantial access may be able to mitigate the loss of relationship would depend on the facts of each case. The ages of the children is a relevant factor given that remote access may be less effective for younger children. The Court of Appeal in BNS v BNT cited the High Court’s observation that “… with younger children, closeness is promoted by physical contact and frequent interaction in routine activities. Telephone and internet access are frequently unsatisfactory due to technical difficulties and generally permit only one type of interaction: conversation” (at [34]).

In a similar vein, the High Court in UXH v UXI also expressed concern that “the loss of relationship with the left-behind parent is likely to be more palpable for young children” as they “may not have had sufficient time to establish the bonding required to withstand a long-distance relationship when relocation occur[red] in their earlier childhood years”, whereas “[o]lder children may be better able to control the effects of the loss of relationship through meaningful virtual and phone communications across the miles, especially if the parent-child relationship is already strong from close bonding in the child’s younger years” (at [21]).

The relocating parent needs to be supportive and facilitative of access. Where, for example, the father was not supportive of access but on the contrary appeared to show support for the children to write letters that they did not wish to spend time with the mother, the High Court disallowed the father’s application to relocate, reasoning that such a relocation was “likely to sound a death knell to the relationship between the [m]other and the children” (TAA v TAB at [23]).

On the other hand, in a case where facilitating access was not an issue, but the father’s work commitments involved significant periods of overseas travel anyway, the High Court was satisfied that the post-relocation access plan afforded him substantial time with the children and suitably mitigated the loss of relationship such that the mother’s relocation could be allowed (UFZ v UFY [2018] 4 SLR 1350 at [45]).

Well-Settledness of the Children in Singapore

The courts also frequently consider the settledness of the children in Singapore as a factor weighing against relocation. This is because it is generally thought that it is preferable for a child’s welfare to maintain continuity. The High Court in TAA v TAB considered that the relocation was incompatible with the children’s interest in that case because they would have been uprooted from a very stable living environment in Singapore where they were well settled in schools (at [25]). As there were suggestions that the relocation was not intended to be permanent, the children would have been uprooted for a possibly non-permanent relocation.

At the same time, the High Court in UYK v UYJ observed that it was important to bear in mind that “in a globalised world, families are geographically mobile and adaptable, and the weight to be placed on well-settledness will depend on other related circumstances including how many years the child has lived in that country, the age of the child, and whether that country has been the family’s home for many years” (at [51]). Affirming the decision to allow relocation in that case, the High Court noted that it “was not a case where a child and her family have lived in Singapore for many years with strong ties to Singapore, or at least ties which are not merely transient” and that the district judge below “was not wrong to find that [the child] was young and adaptable, and would be able to settle down in the UK with a loving parent by his side” (at [55] and [57]).

More recently, the High Court in VLO v VLP and another appeal [2021] SGHCF 34 considered that the child was well-settled after moving back to Singapore, having started attending pre-school and spending his weekends with his father. It dismissed the mother’s appeal to relocate to Taiwan. In WNO v WNP [2023] SGFC 19, where the child in question had been born in Singapore and lived in Singapore all her life, the court held that it would be disadvantageous for her to be uprooted from her current environment, expressing concerns that the loss of her relationship with her father would adversely impact her capacity and resilience to adapt to a new environment.

Immigration Status and Ties to Countries

A family’s lack of immigration status and ties to Singapore are factors that frequently provide support in favour of relocation, particularly where the country sought to be relocated to would be the option which would offer the child/ren the prospect of greater long-term stability when compared with remaining in Singapore. As such, the immigration status and citizenship of the parties and child/ren are relevant considerations.

It was the family’s “lack of connection to Singapore” which the High Court in VJM v VJL and another appeal [2021] held was one of the strongest reasons in favour of relocation in that case. The father was a British citizen while the mother was a US citizen and the child was a US and British citizen – neither party nor the child held any permanent residence status in Singapore.

The High Court noted the similarities with UYK v UYJ where it was observed that relocating to the UK was the option that granted the child long-term stability in that context (at [62]), another relevant consideration/factor in the context of relocation applications. This was the converse of TSF v TSE [2018] 2 SLR 833 where the Court of Appeal reversed the High Court’s order allowing relocation because the relocating mother’s immigration status in the UK was not permanent, which resulted in uncertainty of a long-term stay in the UK.

Significantly, the High Court in VPG v VPF and another appeal [2021] SGHCF 18 allowed the appeal in respect of the decision refusing leave for the father to relocate with the child to India. The High Court observed that India was essentially the “seat” of that family, the parties and the child all being Indian citizens with no permanent immigration status in Singapore, and the family not having stayed in Singapore for long. The High Court remarked in its conclusion that it was India that would provide the child with long-term stability.

The Relocating Parent’s Relocation Plans

The courts will also consider the relocating parent’s relocation plans in determining whether such a relocation would be in the children’s best interests. This would include arrangements for the children’s accommodation, schooling, and care post-relocation, and how any other particular needs of the children are to be met. The benefit of having kinship and extended family support in caring for the children is a factor weighing in favour of relocation, particularly in the context of the relocating parent returning to his or her home country (UFZ v UFY; VTU v VTV [2022] 3 SLR 598; UFZ v UFY [2018] 4 SLR 1350; and TCI v TCJ [2015] SGFC 58).

The courts would not allow hastily made unilateral plans that failed to consider the welfare of the children, although well-made plans resulting from robust and extensive discussions between both parents that promoted both the common interests of the parents and the children could be supported (TAA v TAB at [20]). In this regard, it would be necessary for the relocating parent to show how the relocation would “promote” the children’s interests and not just that it would “not harm” their interests (UXH v UXI at [13] to [15]).

The High Court in BNT v BNS [2014] 4 SLR 859 stated that the court should also scrutinise the relocation plan with care to satisfy itself that there is a genuine motivation for the move and that the move is not intended to bring contact with the left-behind parent to an end. Poorly thought-out relocation plans in that case belied the mother’s claim that she was relocating to Canada to seek the support of her extended family, and suggested instead that she was really motivated by a desire simply to avoid unpleasantness of having to maintain contact with the father (at [45] and [46]).

The wishes and feelings of the child are relevant considerations in a relocation application. They are, however, just one factor to be weighed with all the relevant facts and circumstances of the case, subject always to the welfare of the child and not necessarily determinative in themselves.

Section 125(2) of the Women’s Charter provides that “In deciding in whose custody a child should be placed, the paramount consideration shall be the welfare of the child and, subject to this, the court shall have regard… to the wishes of the child, where he or she is of an age to express an independent opinion”. Although the Guardianship of Infants Act is silent on the consideration of a child’s wishes, the courts have held that the voice of the child would be relevant in assessing what is in the child’s best interests and his or her welfare (VJN v VJO [2020] SGFC 61 at [45] citing ZO v ZP and another appeal [2011] 3 SLR 647 (“ZO v ZP”) at [15] and [16]).

As such, the approach laid down by the Court of Appeal in ZO v ZP is that the views of children may be taken into account by way of interviews with the judge concerned provided the children were “mature enough to convey their views independently” (at [15]). Whilst it was acknowledged that there was always a possibility that a child might be coached by a parent prior to the interview, the Court of Appeal expressed confidence that the judge should be sufficiently astute to discern whether or not the child has been so coached, and that, in any case, such a possibility could not negate the implementation of such a helpful and practical procedure (at [16]).

In a similar vein, the High Court in AZB v AZC [2016] SGHCF 1 (“AZB v AZC”) espoused that where a child was of an age where he/she can articulate and express views clearly, then it was desirable for the judge to interview the child to ascertain his/her views and to give the child a “voice”, albeit not necessarily burdened with the “choice” in proceedings (at [11] to [12]). The High Court nevertheless acknowledged that there were concerns regarding the judicial interview of children, such as drawing children into the fray, that judges are not trained to ascertain children’s views, and that children may be coached by parents (at [15]). Whilst a judge was not compelled to interview the children concerned, the High Court observed that such interviews are “useful” and could be very “helpful” to a judge, for the welfare of the children (at [20] and [25]).

It bears noting, however, that giving the child a “voice” in proceedings and interviewing the child “is also not to say that the child’s views would determine the outcome of the custody dispute; it is simply one factor which the court shall have regard for when ascertaining the best interests/welfare of the child” (UGM v UGN [2017] SGFC 123 at [12]). As the High Court in AZB v AZC observed, “when judges are aware of the limitations and reservations [of the judicial interview], they can place appropriate weight on the children’s views as they see fit”.

Going forward, the Family Justice Reform Act 2023 clarifies that where the wishes of the child are to be considered by the court, the Family Justice Rules can set out the mode by which the child’s wishes may be determined. This is anticipated to include judges conducting judicial interviews with the child to hear from him/her. Alternatively, the children’s wishes and feelings may also be ascertained through a Custody Evaluation Report or Specific Issues Report, which judges are already empowered to order/direct and are conducted by the Family Court specialists. As with the judicial interview, however, such reports are not themselves determinative, but are considered by the court with all the relevant facts and circumstances in determining the application concerning the welfare of the child/ren.

The age at which a child’s views should be considered is not fixed. The Court of Appeal in ZO v ZP took the view that “there is no particular age when [the views of the children are to be taken into account] as different children may mature sufficiently at different ages” (at [15]). What mattered was that they were “mature enough to convey their views independently”. Of the children aged 16, 13, and 9 in that case, the Court of Appeal noted that there was no issue of consultation not being appropriate.

Judges have exercised their discretion to interview and speak with children across a range of different ages and maturities since. For example, the judge in VER v VES [2020] SGFC 5 concerning the father’s relocation application, interviewed and spoke with the child aged 10 at the time, whereas the judge in UMR v UMS [2018] SGFC 56 interviewed children aged 10 and 12, observing that they presented as articulate, confident, and bright. More recently, the High Court judge in VTU v VTV [2022] 3 SLR 598 concerning the wife’s relocation application, had interviewed children as young as four and nine years old respectively, and his observations were impressionistic as he found the children to be “cheerful and happy”, and they seemed to have settled down well.

The desirability of keeping siblings together is one of the factors that the courts consider in making orders in relation to children. It was listed amongst the non-exhaustive factors to be taken into account in ABW v ABV [2014] 2 SLR 769 at [23]. Whilst recognising that “keeping siblings together should be the norm for the obvious reason that the anxieties arising from their parental separation should not be increased by a further separation of a sibling”, however, the High Court in WIQ v WIP [2023] SGHCF 16 (“WIQ v WIP”) underscored that “this is just one of many considerations, and the weight to be given to it varies from case to case, each on its own facts” (at [4]).

The High Court in WIQ v WIP affirmed the decision to order split care and control on the facts of that case where the elder child had expressed the desire to be under the mother’s care and it would not be in his best interest to compel him to return to the father’s care; whereas the younger child required greater supervision and coaching which the father was better able to provide.

In the context of relocation, for example, the High Court in TAA v TAB, holding that relocation was incompatible with the children’s interests, considered that relocation would have the effect of splitting the siblings up as the elder sibling intended to live and continue her studies in Singapore. This loss of a relationship with a significant family member, between the siblings, weighed against relocation.

The loss of relationship with the left-behind parent is an important factor to be weighed in the overarching inquiry into the child’s welfare. However, this is not determinative and how much weight is placed on this factor will depend on the facts of each case.

It bears noting that the Court of Appeal in BNS v BNT emphasised that “there can be no pre-fixed precedence or hierarchy among the many composite factors which may inform the court’s decision as to where the child’s best interests ultimately lie – where these factors stand in relation to one another must depend, in the final analysis, on a consideration of all the facts in each case”.

Relevant facts and circumstances affecting the weight placed on the loss of relationship include the strength of the relationship between the children and their respective parents, the ages of the children, and whether the loss of relationship can be mitigated by suitable access arrangements (see 2.3.1 Factors Determining an Application for Relocation).

Of the decisions where leave to relocate was granted, many cases have involved a parent returning to his or her home country after the breakdown of the parents’ relationship. This is particularly where the relocating parent has no significant connection to Singapore and feels, or is, isolated without the support of extended family back home after the breakdown of the parents’ relationship (see UYK v UYJ at [32] to [33]; VTU v VTV [2022] 3 SLR 598; UFZ v UFY [2018] 4 SLR 1350; and TCI v TCJ [2015] SGFC 58).

It bears noting, however, that, as the High Court in UYK v UYJ took pains to emphasise, there is no presumption for or against relocation, and it cautioned against pigeonholing cases into “categories” that would lead to prescribed outcomes (at [37]). Ultimately, no two cases are alike, and deciding whether or not to allow relocation in each case is an intensely fact-centric exercise (at [38]). The High Court reiterated what the Court of Appeal in BNS v BNT had said that there can be no pre-fixed precedence or hierarchy among the many composite factors which may inform a court’s decision.

As the welfare of the children is paramount and overrides all other considerations, the sole ground for opposing relocation is essentially that the relocation would not be in the welfare or best interests of the children. This may be due to a range of factors including the loss of relationship with the left-behind parent, the well-settledness of the children in Singapore, and the lack of well-thought-out relocation plans that prioritise the children’s welfare (see 2.3.1 Factors Determining an Application for Relocation).

There are no publicly-available statistics on the costs of bringing such an application. Depending on the complexity of the case and extensiveness of the evidence, a relocation application may cost at least SGD30,000 to SGD50,000 from filing to first-instance decision.

From the filing of an application, it typically takes three to six months for the application to be determined. If an appeal is filed, this may take another three to six months to be heard and determined.

As the High Court in UYK v UYJ emphasised, there is no presumption for or against relocation, and it would be unhelpful and dangerous to pigeonhole cases (at [37]). Deciding whether or not to allow relocation in each case is, as previously described, an intensely fact-centric exercise (at [38]). The welfare of the children is paramount and is determined on the consideration of all relevant facts and circumstances, and the courts are neither more sympathetic to applications by the primary care giver, nor more favourable to the left-behind parent.

Given that Singapore is a small island nation 50km East to West and 27km North to South, relocation within the jurisdiction is not an issue.

It is illegal to take a child out of the jurisdiction without the relevant consent of the persons having parental responsibility or custody of the child. Section 126(3) of the Women’s Charter 1961 provides that “where an order for custody, or an order for care and control, is in force, a person must not take the child, who is the subject of the order, out of Singapore, except with the written consent of both parents or leave of the court”.

Section 126(5) further makes it a criminal offence for any person to contravene Section 126(3). The caveat to that is that Section 126(4) provides that this does not prevent the person given custody or care and control from taking the child out of Singapore for a period of less than one month which presumably allows for short trips, such as holidays, to be made.

Although it did not concern a criminal prosecution as such, the High Court in TAA v TAB observed that the father’s act of leaving Singapore with the two younger children with neither the leave of court nor the mother’s consent was in breach of Section 126(3) of the Women’s Charter 1961 (at [30]).

Singapore is a signatory to the Hague Convention with its accession on 28 December 2010. The parent whose custodial rights have been breached by the removal of the child/ren from Singapore without his or her consent, may contact the Singapore Central Authority who will assist in the application to the overseas authority/jurisdiction for the return of the child/ren. He/she may also send an application for assistance directly to the central authority of the country/territory to where the child/ren has/have been removed, if that country/territory is a signatory to the Hague Convention, or otherwise directly commence foreign judicial or administrative proceedings for the return of the child/ren.

Free Legal Advice and Legal Aid Under the Hague Convention

If the parent of the abducted child is residing in Singapore and is a citizen of a contracting state to the Hague Convention, they may seek free legal advice in person at the Legal Aid Bureau at 45 Maxwell Road #07-11.

If the parent of the abducted child is residing overseas, he/she may approach the Singapore Central Authority to assist in the application for legal aid. He/she will need to complete and submit the form for application for legal aid for matters relating to the Hague Convention and send the completed form to Singapore_CA@msf.gov.sg together with the relevant supporting documents.

For legal aid to be granted, the applicant must pass both the means test (which assesses financial eligibility) and the merits test (which assesses whether he/she has a reasonable case to bring or defend in the courts in Singapore). More information on the means and merits test may be found here.

Singapore rigorously applies the underlying principles of the Hague Convention pursuant to the International Child Abduction Act 2010. As a starting point, the Court of Appeal in BDU v BDT [2014] 2 SLR 725 had laid down the fundamental premise that, pursuant to the Hague Convention, the court to which the child had been brought was concerned “only with the return of the child concerned to his or her country of habitual residence” and “was not concerned with the substantive merits relating to the relevant issues of custody and/or care and control” (at [26]).

As to the defences under Article 13 of the Convention, the Court of Appeal observed that the onus of proof was on the person who opposes the child’s return and that it “is a stringent burden to discharge” (at [43]). It held that “an abducting parent could not seek to rely on his or her own conduct to create a situation of grave risk of physical and/or psychological harm to the child concerned in order thereby to rely upon that alleged risk to argue against the return of that child” (at [49]). The Court of Appeal in that case upheld the return order with suitable undertakings from the father, despite acknowledging that the mother’s significant psychological problems weighed heavily due to the precise facts of the case given the very young age of the child and that the mother was his primary care giver (at [73]).

The Court of Appeal took a similarly principled approach towards the issue of habitual residence and the alleged defence of consent in TUC v TUD [2017] 4 SLR 877. It held that the removal or retention was wrongful when one parent took a child from the country of habitual residence to another country or failed to return the child to the country of habitual residence in breach of the other parent’s right of custody (at [37] and [38]). The relevant time for assessing habitual residence in this regard was the date on which the alleged wrongful retention or removal was said to have taken place (at [43]). This was in line with securing the return of the child to his or her place of habitual residence before the wrongful retention or removal.

Where the defence of consent under Article 13(a) was concerned, the Court of Appeal held that the parent who sought to rely on this bore the burden of proof, and clear and compelling evidence of a positive consent to the removal or retention was required. The court had to avoid loose reasoning and analysis, and inferences of consent should not be lightly drawn (at [82] and [84]). Allowing the appeal from the Family Court which had dismissed the father’s application for return, the Court of Appeal held that the habitual residence of the children had not changed, and that the father had not consented to their retention in Singapore ([129] to [131]).

Procedure and Principles for Return to a Non-Convention Country

Where the country the child is sought to be returned to is a non-Convention country, the parent seeking such a return may apply for the child’s return by way of summons supported by an Affidavit. However, the applicable principle then would be that mandated under Section 3 of the Guardianship of Infants Act 1934 that the welfare of the child is to be the first and paramount consideration (TSH and another v TSE and another and another appeal and another matter [2017] SGHCF 21 at [73] to [75]).

This entailed a full assessment of welfare in the widest sense including continuity of arrangements, the need for both parents to have an involvement in the child’s life, which parent shows the greater concern for the child, the maternal bond, the child’s wishes, the desirability of keeping siblings together, and the loss to the child of the left-behind parent cited in ABW v ABV [2014] 2 SLR 769 at [20] and [23] and BNS v BNT at [25] to [26].

Costs and Average Timescale for Applications Under the Hague Convention

For costs of applications under the Hague Convention, see 2.3.8 Costs of an Application for Relocation. Such costs may have to be adjusted to take into account the particularly urgent nature of the work. For the timescale of applications under the Hague Convention, the courts are similarly conscious of the particularly urgent nature of Hague Convention cases when giving directions for submissions and hearing dates, and the applications are typically heard at first-instance within three months of filing.

The list of countries/territories to which the Hague Convention applies vis-à-vis Singapore may be found here.

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Law and Practice in Singapore

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Chia Wong Chambers LLC has a strong litigation foundation, with a team of lawyers who take pride in their effective style of dispute settlement and resolution. They have handled many high-profile cases, and recognise the realities of media exposure, commercial practicality, and individual sensitivity. The firm handles a variety of cases, including heavily contested matrimonial cases and many cross-border disputes that involve foreign individuals, entities, and assets. Chia Wong Chambers has been recognised by leading publications. The firm specialises in family law, criminal law, civil litigation, and crisis management. Other practice areas include defamation cases, negligence claims, administration law, banking and finance matters, bankruptcy law, company law, probate, estate, and trusts, insolvency matters and asset recovery, directors’ and shareholders’ disputes, and contentious probate matters.