Space Law 2026 Comparisons

The EU only recently asserted itself as a space regulatory actor, despite operating its own space assets bundled in the EU Space Programme, and EU law already governs certain aspects of space activities. The growing economic importance of the space sector and the role of space in a more contested geopolitical environment, exemplified by the role Starlink played on the battlefield in Ukraine, prompted the EU to publish its first EU Space Strategy in 2023. However, it was the second von der Leyen Commission (which took office in 2024) that gave space policy a central role, by appointing the first Commissioner for defence and space and setting the goal of adopting an EU Space Act. The EU’s ambitions are highlighted in the 2025 Communication on a Vision for the European Space Economy, which sets out a long-term strategy to position the EU as a global leader in the space economy by 2050.

So far, EU space policy has been driven by three interlinked objectives, which are:

• improving the competitiveness of the EU space sector, including through harmonising certain rules and supporting the consolidation of the EU space sector to enable EU space operators to compete globally;
• increasing the EU’s autonomy in the space domain by steering public funding towards EU industry, reducing dependencies on critical space technologies, and developing the EU’s own space assets; and
• improving the resilience of space assets against various threats by, for example, tightening cybersecurity requirements for the EU space sector.

These policies have also created frictions. The EU’s drive to reduce dependencies on third countries across the defence and space industries predominantly impacts the USA and its space sector. In this regard, the USA published its comments on the EU Space Act, expressing its “deep concern” in respect of the regulatory burdens the Eu Space Act would place on US industry. Internally, too, EU member states are cautious not to grant the EC too much power in the space domain ‒ especially where national security interests come into play.

The EU Regulation on the safety, resilience, and sustainability of activities in the Union (the “EU Space Act”), proposed in 2025, would be the first comprehensive space law at the EU level and is currently being negotiated by the EU Council and the EU Parliament. In 2026, the EC has also proposed new rules for the authorisation of mobile satellite services providers using the 2 GHz frequency band and to revise the regulation laying down the mandate of the EU Space Services Agency (the proposed new name for the European Union Agency for the Space Programme, or EUSPA) to prepare it for broader responsibilities under the EU Space Act and the proposed European Competitiveness Fund (ECF). The ECF envisages EUR125 billion in funding for new EU space and defence projects under the 2028‒34 budget, including an EU-owned Earth Observation Governmental Service (EOGS) managed by the EUSPA.

The EU space sector is growing fast. Based on the latest European Space Agency (ESA) data for 2025, EU space ventures attracted just above EUR1.4 billion through 88 deals in 2025, with the EU posting a 37% five-year average growth rate. Still, much investment in the EU space sector remains driven by public spending, boosted by increased defence budgets. The gap with the US space economy continues to widen, as private investment in space ventures grew 177% in 2025 to a total of EUR8 billion in the USA, whereas private investment fell 8% in the EU during the same period. As set out in 1.1 International Legal and Regulatory Developments, the gap with the USA is a driving factor for EU space policy.

The main stakeholders at EU level ‒ including regulators such as the EC’s Directorate-General for Defence, Industry and Space (the “DG DEFIS”) and executive agencies such as the EUSPA and the ESA (which is not an EU body but a separate international organisation), as well as industry groups Eurospace, SME4Space, and YEESS ‒ are broadly supportive of developing the EU NewSpace sector, which is widely seen as a key driver for technological development and economic growth, as well as an enabler for EU member states’ military and security services.

From a legal perspective, the growing NewSpace sector has put the spotlight on the overlapping regulatory regimes governing space activities in the 27 EU member states, triggering an effort to harmonise some of these rules as part of the EU Space Act. Also, to enable private space sector companies to grow and compete globally, the EU has proposed revised merger guidelines that signal a more permissive antitrust environment for the space sector. New compliance risks are arising, too: EU foreign direction investment (FDI) screening and dual-use export control legislation are adapting to capture security risks related to foreign investment in EU start-up space companies and control the transfer of dual-use equipment, software and technology by EU space operators to third countries.

Space activity has historically been concentrated in certain EU member states, especially, France, Germany and Italy, and remains dominated by large established industrial players. Although NewSpace entrants have emerged across launch, subsystem/payload, integration, operation and space services provider (SSP) roles ‒ and across applications (including telecommunications, Earth observation and launch) – in all EU member states, France, Germany, Italy and Spain host the largest concentrations. The EU space sector remains dependent on public investment, which has grown during the past few years but remains well below the USA’s public spending on its space sector. At the same time, private investment is under-represented, as public funding opportunities are broad while venture capital is underdeveloped and equity financing remains low (especially in contrast to the USA).

The EU has no general powers to regulate space activities. Nonetheless, EU member states have ‒ by treaty ‒ conferred competences on the EU allowing it to adopt legislation governing space activities. This includes the competence to draw up a space policy and take the necessary measures to implement such a policy, without harmonising EU member state laws (Article 189 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU)). At the same time, the EU also has a broad competence to harmonise EU member state laws, where the object of such harmonised rules is to improve the conditions for the establishment and functioning of the internal market (Article 114 of the TFEU).

On the basis of Article 114 of the TFEU, the EC has proposed the EU Space Act, which is the first and only legal act that ‒ if adopted ‒ would govern space activities in the EU (and, to some extent, outside the EU). Because it takes the form of a regulation, the EU Space Act would ‒ if adopted ‒ apply directly in all 27 EU member states, without the need for implementing legislation at the national level. The Court of Justice of the EU (ECJ) would have the last word on its interpretation.

The EU member states would, however, remain competent to regulate all areas not governed by the EU Space Act and would ‒ even within those areas ‒ maintain important powers. In addition, the general security exception under the EU treaties would enable EU member states to disapply the EU Space Act where it conflicts with certain essential security interests (Article 346 of the TFEU).

The EU is an operator of space assets through the EU Space Programme ‒ namely, of the Galileo global navigation satellite system and Copernicus Earth observation programme. The EU currently plays a limited role in regulating space activities across the EU. However, under the proposed EU Space Act, the EU would become a key regulator of certain space services within the Eu Space Act’s scope ‒ although responsibilities for the administration and enforcement of the Eu Space Act would be divided among the EU member states, the EUSPA, and the EC, as follows.

• The EU member states’ national competent authorities would authorise and supervise EU SSPs and would have investigative and corrective powers, from conducting on-site inspections to imposing fines. The national competent authorities would also be tasked with supervising technical bodies designated by the EU member states to support the administration of the EU Space Act’s technical rules.
• The EUSPA would assess operators of EU-owned assets and third-country SSPs’ compliance with the EU Space Act’s technical rules and assist the EC in supervising these SSPs. The EUSPA’s decisions would be taken by a compliance board composed of representatives of the EU member states and the EC. The EUSPA also would manage the Union Register of Space Objects.
• The EC would authorise third-country SSPs and operators of EU-owned assets (based on technical assessments provided by the EUSPA), supervise their compliance with the EU Space Act, and have investigative and corrective powers with regard to operators of EU-owned assets and third-country SSPs, including conducting on-site inspections within and outside of EU territory and imposing fines.

Because negotiations between the EU Council and the EU Parliament over the proposed EU Space Act are ongoing at the time of writing (September 2026), the roles of the EU member states, the EC and the EUSPA under the final text of the EU Space Act may differ.

The EU currently does not impose a general authorisation regime or licensing process for space activities ‒ although several EU member states have imposed licensing or authorisation requirements under their domestic laws.

However, the proposed EU Space Act would introduce an EU-wide authorisation requirement for providing space-based services or data within the EU, irrespective of the provider’s location or whether the provider is a private or public entity. The authorisation requirement would extend to four categories of SSPs:

• space operators (entities operating spacecraft, launches and launch sites or providing in-space services);
• primary providers of space-based data (eg, initial processors of observation data);
• international organisations; and
• collision avoidance (CA) service providers.

Still, certain activities would be exempt from the EU Space Act’s scope ‒ notably, those related to space assets used exclusively for defence or national security. Dual-use objects also would be excluded when under military control. A lighter regulatory regime would apply to SMEs. Again, because legislative negotiations over the EU Space Act are still ongoing, the scope of the authorisation requirement may be different under the final agreed text.

At EU level, a specific regime exists for radio frequencies used by space operators for satellite communications. Decision No 626/2008/EC establishes a procedure for the selection and authorisation of mobile satellite systems (MSS) using the 2 GHz band. Under this regime, the EC conducts a comparative selection procedure and EU member states grant national authorisations under harmonised conditions. As part of the EU selection process itself, applicants must demonstrate progress on defined “milestones”, including International Telecommunication Union (ITU) co-ordination filings and successful frequency co-ordination.

As for conflict resolution mechanisms, the current regime provides that where an EU member state informs the EC of an alleged breach of common conditions, the EC examines it with the assistance of the Communications Committee established under Directive (EU) 2018/1972 (the “European Electronic Communications Code”), in which the EU member states are represented.

In 2026, the EC proposed replacing the 2008 decision with a regulation establishing an EU-level authorisation regime for the 2 GHz band. Under the proposed regulation, the EC would directly issue authorisations and rights of spectrum use across the entire EU (not merely co-ordinate national grants), with the EC also empowered to monitor compliance and impose fines for breaches.

The EU does not currently play a role in the launching of space assets, except for the EUSPA being a user of launch services in relation to EU-owned space assets under the EU Space Programme, including Copernicus and Galileo. As set out in 2.4 Role of the State in Licensing Processes for Space Activities, under the EU Space Act, the EU would become a regulator of space services, including launch services.

The EU is currently not a party to any of the main space treaties.

The proposed EU Space Act makes references to the obligations of EU member states under the Outer Space Treaty 1967 (OST). However, the EU Space Act would not affect the obligations of EU member states who are party to the OST ‒ ensuring that space activities comply with international law and setting liability or insurance requirements remains a competence of each EU member state.

Insurance and liability for damages from space activities is not currently regulated at EU level.

Very high altitude (VHA) activities are not currently regulated at EU level.

The EU currently does not set specific rules on space activities. The proposed EU Space Act would not carve out sector-specific rules for space activities but instead set horizontal rules for space activities within its scope ‒ namely, the provision of space services provided by in-scope SSPs (see 2.4 Role of the State in the Licensing Process for Space Activities). Broadly speaking, these rules would set safety (trackability of space objects and reduction of space debris), resilience (a cybersecurity risk-assessment framework tailored to space infrastructure), and environmental sustainability rules (a common method for calculating the environmental impact of space activities).

Rather than sector-based carve-outs, the EU Space Act differentiates by mission type, orbit, and operator size. By way of example, certain space services (CA and in-space operations and services) would be subject to a more limited set of rules to support development of the emerging in-space economy. Also, a lighter safety regime would apply to very low earth orbit missions (given their naturally limited debris risk), while resilience obligations would scale with operator size, mission criticality, and propulsion use.

With regard to rules for space data and its processing, the proposed EU Space Act would include primary providers of space-based data (who first process raw space-derived data such as earth observation data) within its scope but are not subject to the substantive rules that apply to other SSPs. Nonetheless, primary providers of space-based data would be subject to a narrower, gate-keeping-type obligation focused on ensuring that the data they process originates with compliant space operators and objects. The EU Space Act would not impose substantive data protection rules ‒ although horizontal EU data protection rules would apply (see 4.1 Data Protection Regulation and Space).

As for tenure security, the EU Space Act would set maximum processing times (12 months) and require simplified authorisation procedures (eg, a single authorisation for constellations) but would not regulate the duration of authorisations granted by EU member states. The EU Space Act would not provide for general rules on renewals or progress rights either. Regarding cancellation procedures, EU member state authorities would have powers to temporary suspend and withdraw an authorisation if the operator no longer fulfils the conditions under which the authorisation was granted; additional grounds may apply under national law. Withdrawal would be mandatory for single constellation authorisations where non-compliance with the authorisation conditions is established. For EU-owned space assets and third-country operators, the EUSPA would advise the EC on remedial action to be taken, including suspension or withdrawal. Note that for third-country operators, potential remedial measures would be triggered by the loss of the operator’s authorisation in its home country.

With regard to cybersecurity rules, please refer to 4.2 Space Data Spaces.

The EU Space Act would address non-interference through mandatory CA and orbital traffic co-ordination ‒ both for EU-authorised operators and, on a best-efforts basis, with non-EU spacecraft. EU spacecraft operators would have to subscribe to CA services linked to the EU Space Surveillance and Tracking system, covering all mission phases except re-entry, and would have to immediately report to the CA entity any action taken upon receiving a high-interest event (HIE) alert (indicating a close approach between space objects carrying a high level of risk). The EU Space Act would set out a right of way mechanism in case of such HIEs.

Furthermore, trackability requirements would apply to ensure interoperable positioning data; launch operators would need to co-ordinate with air traffic services and perform launch collision-risk assessments; and debris-mitigation design and disposal obligations would limit debris. These obligations would bind only EU operators and equivalence-recognised or registered third-country counterparties. For other third-country entities, the CA entity would have to proactively contact that operator and – if successful – exchange risk-calculation data and jointly determine the best avoidance manoeuver.

The EU Space Act would impose phase-specific obligations. Before launch, operators would have to submit a launch safety plan and perform a launch CA risk assessment, co-ordinate with air traffic authorities and implement a launch closure window. The EU Space Act would require launch vehicles to have real-time tracking, telemetry, and an on-board neutralisation system. Once in orbit, spacecraft above 400 km would need manoeuvrability, and operators would need to justify orbit selection against existing traffic and debris. Operators would be required to subscribe to CA services and report operational changes. As for re-entry or end-of life, operators would have to complete disposal per a mandatory end-of-life plan, and minimise the impact of re-entry on other traffic. Mission extensions would require advance requests and would be approved only if debris-mitigation requirements remain met.

With regard to ESG guidelines for space activities, please refer to 5.1 Environmental Protection in Space. For orbital debris prevention, please refer to 5.3 Orbital Debris.

The EU Space Act itself would not set out substantive obligations regarding national civil and defence interests. Instead, the EU Space Act carves such matters out of its scope entirely: space objects exclusively used for defence or national security purposes fall outside the EU Space Act’s scope, and objects only partially used for defence are excluded for the duration of the relevant military mission. This carve-out preserves the competences of EU member states to impose civil/defende obligations under national law.

At EU level, there is no single instrument that governs space data across its full life cycle. Instead, the applicable framework is composed of several horizontal data and sector-specific instruments that interact depending on the nature of the data, the entities involved, and the purpose of processing.

Regulation (EU) 2016/679 (the General Data Protection Regulation, or GDPR) applies wherever the processing of personal data is concerned in:

• the context of activities of an establishment of a controller or processor in the EU, regardless of whether the processing takes place in the EU; and/or
• the processing of personal data of data subjects who are in the EU by a controller/processor who is not established in the EU but where the processing relates to the offering of goods or services to data subjects in the EU or the monitoring of their behaviour as far as the behaviour takes place within the EU.

Where the GDPR is applicable, it imposes a comprehensive set of obligations on controllers and processors alike. Controllers – those entities that determine the purposes and means of processing – bear the primary compliance burden: they must identify a valid lawful basis for processing under Article 6 of the GDPR, provide transparent privacy information to data subjects, maintain records of processing activities, implement data protection by design, and – by default – conduct data protection impact assessments for high-risk processing, appoint a data protection officer where required, and notify supervisory authorities of personal data breaches within 72 hours.

Controllers may only engage processors that provide sufficient guarantees of compliance, formalizsd through a data processing agreement meeting the requirements of Article 28 of the GDPR. Processors, for their part, must act solely on the documented instructions of the controller, implement appropriate security measures, notify the controller without undue delay upon becoming aware of a breach, and obtain prior authorisation before engaging sub-processors. Where a processor acts outside or contrary to the controller’s instructions, it may itself be treated as a controller in respect of that processing, with the attendant liability consequences under Article 28(10) of the GDPR.

Where space data constitutes personal data within the meaning of the GDPR, its transfer to a third country is subject to Chapter V of the GDPR. This requires either an adequacy decision by the EC or the use of appropriate safeguards such as standard contractual clauses, binding corporate rules, or approved codes of conduct or certification mechanisms. The complexity in the space context arises from the fact that data may be relayed through ground stations in multiple jurisdictions (including third countries) as part of routine mission operations. Each such relay may constitute a transfer under the GDPR if the ground station operator processes personal data on behalf of the EU-established controller.

At EU level, “data spaces” remain first and foremost a policy concept. The goal is to enable trusted data sharing and technical interoperability across sectors. The EC launched this approach with the EU strategy for data and has since refined it through further policy documents, including the second Staff Working Document published in January 2024 and the Data Union Strategy published in November 2025.

The EC’s workstream on common EU data spaces identifies priority domains and supports a range of sector and domain initiatives. However, it does not currently list space as a standalone common EU data space. In practice, horizontal EU instruments provide important building blocks for data-space ecosystems. Regulation (EU) 2022/868 (the “Data Governance Act”) sets out trust and governance mechanisms to facilitate data sharing. Regulation (EU) 2023/2854 (the “Data Act” ) complements this by including rules that are relevant for interoperability and switching between data processing services. Some of these instruments can also have extraterritorial effects, in the sense that certain obligations may apply to non-EU actors when they offer services in the EU.

For Earth-observation and geospatial datasets, the Directive 2007/2/EC (the “INSPIRE Directive”) is another important horizontal layer. The INSPIRE Directive does not create a data space. Instead, it establishes the framework for an EU spatial data infrastructure and requires EU member states to make spatial datasets and services interoperable and accessible through harmonised network services and technical rules. This matters for space-related data because many space-derived datasets can qualify as spatial data in downstream use. The INSPIRE Directive therefore supports long-standing interoperability for public-sector geodata and environmental use cases and can facilitate cross-border reuse and the combination of Earth-observation products with other public datasets. This layer is complemented by the Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2023/138 (the “High-Value Datasets Implementing Regulation”) adopted under the Open Data Directive, which designates geospatial and Earth-observation and environment data as high-value datasets and requires public sector bodies in the EU member states to make these datasets available free of charge.

Operationally, the most concrete EU-level space data space today is the Copernicus Data Space Ecosystem. Introduced in 2023, it provides access to Copernicus Sentinel Earth-observation data and related services under the Copernicus framework. Access is organised through platform terms and operational rules. Registration enables credential-based access; quota and fair-use constraints protect shared platform resources. Governance documents also define how third-party services can participate and how the ecosystem can evolve towards federation with other platforms and communities. At institutional level, governance is set by the EC and the ESA as the responsible parties. Day-to-day operations are delivered under a service contract between the ESA and an industrial service operator team led by T‑Systems, a major private European IT services provider.

The proposed EU Space Act is likely to become the most important sector-specific regulatory development shaping the environment in which future space data ecosystems operate. Although the EU Space Act is not framed as a data space instrument, it promotes more structured data exchange and common data infrastructures in the sector. This includes the sharing of satellite position data to support CA and the use of shared databases for environmental impact assessment. The proposal is also linked to resilience and information-sharing initiatives such as the EU Space Information Sharing and Analysis Centre (ISAC), supported by the EC and the EUSPA to facilitate structured sharing of relevant information across stakeholders.

At EU level, cybersecurity for space infrastructure is still governed mainly through horizontal rules that EU member states implement and enforce in national law. The core instruments are Directive (EU) 2022/2555 (the “NIS2 Directive”) on cybersecurity risk management and incident reporting and Directive (EU) 2022/2557 (the “Critical Entities Resilience (CER) Directive”) on the resilience of critical entities.

For on‑earth infrastructure, the NIS2 Directive and its implementations in EU member state laws include the space sector and apply to operators of ground-based infrastructure that supports the provision of space-based services. Operators in scope must implement risk-management measures, address supply chain risks, ensure access control and business continuity, and report significant incidents within the timelines set by the NIS2 Directive. The CER Directive complements this by requiring EU member states to identify critical entities and impose resilience obligations for essential services, including in relation to ground-based space infrastructure.

For in-space assets and the space–ground link, there is currently no EU-wide binding cybersecurity regime equivalent to the NIS2 Directive. As a result, practice is largely shaped by technical and contractual requirements and by non-binding guidance. In this context, the EU Agency for Cybersecurity (ENISA, from its original name (the European Network and Information Security Agency)) has published space-specific threat and risk material that is frequently used as a reference point across stakeholders.

The Cyber-Resilience Act introduces life cycle cybersecurity requirements for products with digital elements placed on the EU market, which can cover inter alia equipment used in ground stations, user terminals, and mission control environments. As a market-access regime, the Cyber-Resilience Act can also apply to non-EU manufacturers insofar as products are placed on the EU market. In parallel, the Cybersecurity Act provides an EU-wide cybersecurity certification framework for information and communication technology products, services and processes.

The most important pending development is the proposed EU Space Act. The proposal is designed to introduce a sector-specific resilience layer across the ground, space and link segments, and it is intended to establish its own cybersecurity requirements ‒ inter alia, life cycle risk management across all segments of space infrastructure, including ground infrastructure and the systems and subsystems of space infrastructure. It would also add detailed obligations on cryptography and encryption, business continuity, response and recovery planning, threat-led penetration testing, supply-chain risk management, and significant-incident reporting.

Environmental protection in the space context operates on two levels: on Earth and in orbit. Virtually all current binding EU environmental obligations apply to ground-side space activities, whereas the in-orbit layer is still in development.

On Earth, the general EU environmental acquis primarily governs projects linked to space activities. This includes, in particular, the requirement under Directive 2011/92/EU (as amended) (the “Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) Directive”) for environmental assessments of certain space infrastructure projects before they are authorised.

The EIA Directive sits within a broader EU permitting framework that space infrastructure projects must navigate through with EU member state authorities. In practice, operators and project developers should engage with the relevant EU member state authorities at an early stage, as EU environmental rules are a contributing factor but authorisation is granted and enforced nationally.

Ground-side space activities may engage Directive 2012/18/EU (the “Seveso III Directive”) on the control of major-accident hazards involving dangerous substances. Launch sites and associated test facilities routinely handle significant quantities of hazardous materials. Where a launch facility falls within scope, the operator may be subject to notification obligations, safety reporting requirements, and internal and external emergency planning. The Seveso III Directive further requires that land-use planning policies provide for “appropriate distances” between establishments presenting major-accident hazards and residential areas, areas of public use, and areas of particular natural sensitivity.

For the orbital environment, the main regulatory driver is the proposed EU Space Act, which the EC frames around safety, resilience, and environmental sustainability. The proposal aims to introduce sustainability requirements such as tracking of space objects and space-debris mitigation, including end-of-life considerations and life-cycle assessment approaches. Its scope is also designed to cover third-country operators insofar as space-based data or space services are provided in the EU.

One specific environmental dimension addressed by the EU Space Act proposal is the protection of the dark and quiet sky. The proposal requires mitigation measures to reduce optical and radio-frequency interference from spacecraft, with a view to protecting astronomical observation and research capabilities.

The EU framework does not currently establish “protected zones” in outer space in the sense of legally defined exclusion areas around satellites, nor protected areas around lunar heritage sites on celestial bodies. The EU Space Act proposal is centred on authorisation and supervision, safety and sustainability obligations, and traffic-related measures, rather than on designating protected zones on celestial bodies.

As regards the critical minerals used, the relevant EU instrument is Regulation (EU) 2024/1252 (the “Critical Raw Materials Act”). It links critical raw materials to strategic technologies, including space and defence, and lists helium as a critical raw material. However, the Critical Raw Materials Act does not specifically address helium-3 as a distinct isotope, nor does it create an EU regime for extracting resources in outer space. There is accordingly no EU legislative initiative focused on space mining or critical space; the debate remains shaped primarily by international discussions on space resources and sustainability.

At EU level, climate change is primarily governed through Regulation (EU) 2021/1119 (the “European Climate Act”), which establishes the binding framework for achieving climate neutrality and frames climate action across the economy. Space policy is not treated as a standalone climate policy area.

The main binding framework linking space capabilities to climate objectives is Regulation (EU) 2021/696 (the “EU Space Programme Regulation”). The EU Space Programme Regulation assigns the Copernicus programme a role in supporting the formulation, implementation and monitoring of EU and member state policies in fields such as the environment and climate change (see also 4.2 Space Data Spaces). Additionally, the EU Space Programme Regulation explicitly anticipates new observation missions to support climate challenge research, including monitoring of anthropogenic CO₂ and other greenhouse gas emissions.

Beyond monitoring, the EU has invested in the Destination Earth initiative ‒ an EC-led effort to build a high-accuracy digital model of the Earth, implemented jointly with the ESA and the European Centre for Medium-Range Weather Forecasts, and funded under the Digital Europe Programme. Although not a legislative instrument, the Destination Earth initiative illustrates how EU space capabilities are positioned as enabling infrastructure for climate evidence and decision-making.

EU climate targets are operationalised through the “Fit for 55” legislative package and the reformed EU Emissions Trading System, which set binding obligations across the broader economy. Some Fit for 55 instruments, such as the Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism, also have cross-border effects by attaching carbon-related obligations to certain imports into the EU. Although there is no space-sector carve-out, exposure for space businesses is typically indirect and arises primarily through energy and fuel consumption, industrial activities, and supply chain obligations rather than through a dedicated space-sector climate instrument.

There is not yet a single harmonised legal regime that sets detailed debris-mitigation licence conditions for all space operators across the EU. The most concrete binding EU layer today is the EU Space Programme framework, which treats debris as a safety and sustainability risk and supports EU capabilities for monitoring space objects and reducing collision risk.

Operationally, the EU Space Surveillance and Tracking capability provides services that support debris-related risk management, including conjunction assessments and alerts, re-entry analysis, and fragmentation analysis following break-ups or collisions.

EU practice is also shaped by non-binding guidance and standards used as reference points across stakeholders, including the European Code of Conduct for Space Debris Mitigation.

The proposed EU Space Act is intended to be the main step towards a more harmonised internal-market baseline for safe and sustainable operations (see also 5.1 Environmental Protection in Space). The EU Space Act envisages mandatory debris-mitigation plans, post-mission disposal requirements, and enhanced tracking obligations for operators authorised under the framework. Its scope is also designed to capture certain third-country operators where services are provided in the EU.

The EU Space Act proposal also connects space debris to the broader EU waste policy framework. The proposal frames the prevention of space debris as being in line with the prevention approach as a first stage in the waste hierarchy established by the Waste Framework Directive. Although the Waste Framework Directive itself does not directly address activities in orbit, this express legislative linkage signals the EC’s intent to embed space sustainability within the established EU circular-economy architecture.

Local jurisdiction taxation is largely based on the existing rules that apply more generically to non-space activities, given a lack of specifically targeted rules only applying to space-related activities.

The one area of consistency where there seems to be specific rules concerns insurance premium tax (and there is even a Dutch case on this point).

See 6.1 Tax System for Space Activities.

See 6.1 Tax System for Space Activities.

Europe has a technically advanced space ecosystem, with France, Germany and the UK among the leading markets. National governments have adopted space strategies prioritising satellite communications, in-orbit servicing and launch capabilities. The ESA and the European Investment Bank support dedicated funding and financing opportunities.

The key space activity for private funding and legal services is the design, manufacture, launch, and in-orbit operations of satellites and associated infrastructure (eg, any required ground segment).

The form that any financing will take is highly dependent on the scope and scale of the space activities being funded, as well as the company in question. By way of example, different funding packages may apply to a single large geostationary earth orbit (GEO) telecommunications satellite as compared to a constellation of low earth orbit (LEO) satellites. Financing sources include the following.

• Private commercial bank debt may be supported by export credit guarantees from the jurisdiction of manufacture.
• For businesses offering human space-flight or actual satellite-launching services, the equity funding options of companies operating in this sector are clearly essential.
• Equity funding is essential for businesses offering human space-flight or satellite-launch services. A single space flight may not generate revenue and is less suited to debt financing. The SpaceX partial IPO illustrates the importance of equity for infrastructure.
• Government grants, R&D credits, and space agency procurement contracts are also available, alongside direct subsidy programmes (including national programmes such as the UK’s National Space Innovation Programme).

Investment incentives exist on both a national and regional level within the European market, with many national space agencies and participants not only championing domestic incentives and opportunities but also serving as active stakeholders in wider cross-European incentive regimes. National space agencies across Europe play a central role by:

• providing grant funding for R&D;
• operating investment readiness programmes; and
• encouraging the commercial exploitation of space technologies.

By way of example, the UK has recently committed to a package of investment (with a value of GBP1.7 billion) in ESA programmes and has domestically adopted a policy framework combining targeted public funding with regulatory certainty and support for commercialisation, focusing on creating conditions that enable private capital to finance innovation and infrastructure.

A developed and considered regulatory and legislative regime can also help with attracting investment, with many countries in Europe adopting specific space laws. The implementation of a comprehensive regulatory environment (including a transparent licensing regime that sets out established regulatory guidance and liability principles) is helpful in assisting investors in assessing regulatory risk and the commercial viability of proposed space activities and, in turn, contributes to investment attractiveness. The broader legal framework governing companies, IP, insolvency, and financial services within the European market is also important in providing a stable commercial environment, while established capital markets and a sophisticated professional services sector further support complex technology and infrastructure investment in a specific European country or jurisdiction.

Rules and restrictions concerning foreign investment in space activities are governed by both national and regional law. Many jurisdictions within the European market (such as the UK) maintain an open investment environment and encourage foreign investment in the space sector, notwithstanding the fact that (in the UK) investment involving strategically sensitive activities ‒ such as those involving satellite and space technologies ‒ is subject to national security screening under the National Security and Investment Act 2021 (NSIA). The regime developed looks to balance the attraction of foreign capital with the protection of strategically sensitive technologies and infrastructure (including in the space sector).

This approach is broadly consistent with developments across other European jurisdictions, where governments have increasingly strengthened investment-screening mechanisms while continuing to promote commercial investment in strategically important sectors.

The documentation required for any individual fundraising will, of course, be driven by the type of fundraising in question. In many instances, the core documentation remains consistent with other sectors. However, satellite debt financings often have similarities to ‒ but differ from ‒ other large asset financings, such as aircraft. In connection with financing for satellite manufacture, launch and in-orbit operations that is structured as a project financing, lending is typically advanced to a special purpose company and drawn in stages as milestones are met. This differs from the single drawdown structure used for other large assets. A satellite cannot be physically repossessed after launch, so broader security is required. Lenders would typically seek security over:

• the satellite and satellite control facilities and any relevant land or buildings;
• insurances covering pre-launch, in-transit, launch and in-orbit periods;
• offtake agreements;
• shares in the special purpose company; and
• orbital slot rights and licences insofar as achievable.

Lenders will require compliance with environmental and social laws and may seek approval rights over the de-orbiting strategy.

Legal due diligence is a critical component of space transactions, aimed at confirming that the target has the rights, approvals and contracts needed to operate and generate revenue. Key areas of review include:

• regulatory ‒ licences and authorisations under the applicable regulatory regime to ensure compliance compliance;
• commercial ‒ launch services agreements, manufacturing contracts, ground station arrangements, and insurance policies;
• corporate governance ‒ compliance procedures and protections for commercially sensitive information; and
• IP ‒ patents, trade marks, software and know-how, including ownership arrangements.

A liquidity event converts illiquid assets into cash or publicly traded stock. For space businesses, this typically takes the form of a trade sale, private acquisition, or IPO. Structuring is influenced by the existing capital base, including preference shares and convertible instruments, which determine how proceeds are allocated.

The financing life cycle begins with founder capital and venture funding, before progressing to institutional and public equity. As revenues stabilise, debt financing assumes greater importance.

Companies engaging in space activities across Europe can look to access a range of markets for financing purposes, varying from main regulated markets to lighter-touch growth markets and trading platforms. Public markets provide capital for research, manufacturing and deployment, while reporting requirements promote transparency and corporate governance.

By way of example, UK companies may seek admission to the London Stock Exchange’s Main Market or Alternative Investment Market for earlier-stage growth companies. The UK has also introduced the Private Intermittent Securities and Capital Exchange System (PISCES), which allows shares in private companies to be traded during intermittent events without a full listing, thereby bridging private and public financing.

The UK’s IP framework (Patents Act 1977, implementing the European Patent Convention (EPC)) and the EU’s framework (including the Unitary Patent regime, operational since June 2023) are well developed but were not designed for the space environment. Patent protection is inherently territorial, sitting in tension with the non-appropriation principle under Article II of the OST and the freedom of exploration and use of outer space.

The quasi-territorial basis for extending national IP rights to space activities derives from two instruments read together, which are:

• Article VIII of the OST ‒ under which, a state of registry retains jurisdiction and control over a space object and its personnel; and
• the Convention on Registration of Objects Launched into Outer Space 1976 (the “Registration Convention”), which gives practical effect to Article VIII of the OST by establishing the obligation on signatory states to maintain a national registry of space objects and to furnish information to a United Nations (UN) central register.

It is the formal link between a space object and its state of registry, created by the Registration Convention, that provides the current basis for arguing that a state’s national IP laws could extend to activities carried out aboard its registered space objects. However, the Registration Convention was designed to address liability and the identification of space objects rather than IP enforcement, and this extension has never been confirmed by legislation or judicial authority in either the UK or any EU member state.

Beyond patents, other IP rights are engaged as follows.

• Copyright ‒ software, satellite imagery, and data compilations attract protection under the UK’s Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988 (CDPA) and Directive 2001/29/EC (the “EU Information Society Directive”) and Directive 96/9/EC (the “Database Directive”). The EU Space Programme Regulation establishes specific access regimes for Copernicus and Galileo data that interact with, and may limit, conventional IP exploitation.
• Trade marks ‒ UK-registered trade marks and EU Trade Marks (European Union Intellectual Property Office, or EUIPO) provide territorial and pan-EU protection for commercial space operators’ branding. The practical stakes are considerable and extend well beyond hardware and satellites. Space tourism and hospitality ventures, including hotel brands and airline-style operators providing services in space, face an immediate gap in protection: an injunction restraining use of a confusingly similar mark could be obtained in all jurisdictions where the original mark is registered, but this only restrains use on Earth. A competitor adopting an identical brand for space-based hospitality or tourism services could do so without infringing any existing Earth-registered right. Equivalent uncertainty arises for consumer brands seeking to offer goods or services directly in space (eg, food, beverage, or retail brands supplying commercial space habitats or tourism operators): a competitor could adopt an identical mark for the same goods or services in that environment without infringing any Earth-registered right. The risk of space-squatting (analogous to cybersquatting) has been identified as an emerging concern, with a prior Earth registration suggested as a prerequisite for any future space IP registration.
• Design rights ‒ UK and EU design rights protect space hardware design but are similarly constrained territorially.
• The International Space Station (ISS) Intergovernmental Agreement 1998, which was introduced to govern activities on the ISS and is the first treaty to specify IP protection as a covered activity, addresses traditional protections for patents, trade secrets, and marking procedures under Article 21, with jurisdiction determined by the location of the activity ‒ specifically, the flight element or areas under the control of a nation’s particular ISS activities at a given time. No equivalent framework exists for other areas of space. Notably, the Moon Agreement 1979 (which could provide a framework for regulation and control over the flow of goods or services on the Moon) has not been signed, acceded to, or ratified by many of the countries most active in space, including the USA, Russia, China, Japan, and EU member states.

UK- and EU-based NewSpace companies typically adopt multi-layered protection strategies combining PCT patent filings (with selective national or regional phase entry via the European Patent Office (EPO) and the Unitary Patent regime), trade secret protection under Directive (EU) 2016/943 (the “EU Trade Secrets Directive”) and the UK’s Trade Secrets (Enforcement, etc) Regulations 2018, and robust contractual controls. Pharmaceutical companies are already conducting research on the ISS with a view to commercialising products derived from extraterrestrial R&D, raising immediate questions about which jurisdictions are relevant for patent filing and freedom-to-operate searches in respect of discoveries made in space.

Collaboration is a defining feature of the European space sector, driven by capital intensity and public funding through the UK Space Agency, the ESA, and Horizon Europe. Joint development frequently gives rise to co-ownership of patents (subject to Section 36 of the Patents Act 1977 in the UK or national equivalents in EU member states) and joint copyright ownership. Both default positions present commercialisation difficulties and well-advised parties derogate from them through bespoke consortium agreements addressing ownership, licensing, and revenue-sharing across all relevant IP categories.

Speculatively, the rise of AI and the opening up of space mining activity ‒ reducing (or perhaps even eliminating) the need to send materials from Earth ‒ could kick-start manufacturing in space. Currently, international regulations of quasi-territoriality have been put in place for registered space objects.

Neither the UK nor the EU has specific IP enforcement rules for space activities. In the UK, patent enforcement proceeds before the Patents Court or the Intellectual Property Enterprise Court (IPEC). The Unified Patent Court (UPC) now has exclusive jurisdiction over unitary patents and, transitionally, classic European patents ‒ enabling pan-European injunctions through a single set of proceedings. The central difficulty across both frameworks is jurisdictional reach. As noted in 8.1 Territorial Patent Law v International Space Law, the quasi-territorial basis for asserting jurisdiction over activities aboard registered space objects derives from the Registration Convention, but that instrument was not designed as a vehicle for IP enforcement and its application in this context remains untested. This difficulty is particularly acute in the emerging concept of a fully self-sustaining space economy in which commerce between outer space facilities involves no Earth contact at all, rendering the launching state’s jurisdiction of limited practical applicability.

Neither the UK nor any EU member state has enacted a provision equivalent to 35 United States Code (USC) Section 105, which expressly extends US patent protection to in-space activity aboard US-registered space objects ‒ a widely acknowledged gap. The Thaler v Comptroller-General decision (UK Supreme Court, 2023) and the EU AI Act 2024 raise unresolved questions about inventorship and IP ownership in the context of AI-driven in-space manufacturing.

There are several documented examples, including the Sea Launch arbitration, where the parties (including Boeing companies and several Russian and Ukrainian companies) opted for ad hoc arbitration under the UNCITRAL Rules, with Stockholm as the seat.

Another notable example is Devas Multimedia Private Limited v Antrix Corporation Limited (ICC Case No 18051/CYK). The dispute arose from an agreement under which Antrix agreed to build, launch and operate two satellites and lease S-band capacity to Devas for digital multimedia broadcasting services across India. The arbitration clause provided for ICC arbitration seated in New Delhi, India.

The arbitration Globalstar, Inc v Thales Alenia Space France (ICDR Case No 50 132 T 00359 11) concerned contracts for the construction and delivery of 48 LEO satellites and related services for Globalstar’s second-generation constellation. The clause required arbitration administered by the American Arbitration Association (AAA) under its Commercial Arbitration Rules. The award was rendered in New York, confirming New York as the seat.

The EC has also incorporated arbitration mechanisms under the EU Merger Regulation. For instance, in Case COMP/M.3680 (Alcatel/Finmeccanica/Alcatel Alenia Space & Telespazio), the parties’ commitments regarding the licensing and supply of space equipment included a dispute resolution mechanism whereby the ESA ‒ through its Director-General or a designated representative ‒ would serve as arbitrator. The seat was Paris, with French procedural law applying and English as the language of proceedings.

In addition, based on the authors’ own experience, many space-related transactions include arbitration clauses, often providing for Stockholm Chamber of Commerce (SCC) or ICC arbitration ‒ with seats in, for instance, Paris, Munich or Stockholm.

The so-called Devas Saga – four separate arbitrations arising from the same underlying facts – also had several connections to Europe. In 2011, Antrix terminated an agreement under which it had leased S-band satellite spectrum capacity to Devas, invoking force majeure following India’s Cabinet Committee on Security’s decision to reserve S-band spectrum for national needs. In addition to a commercial arbitration seated in New Delhi (ICC Case No. 18051/CYK), where the tribunal ordered Antrix to pay USD562.5 million plus 18% interest per annum, three Mauritius-incorporated Devas shareholders filed a parallel treaty arbitration under the India‒Mauritius bilateral investment treaty (BIT). This UNCITRAL arbitration was seated in The Hague, administered by the Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA) (PCA Case No 2013-09). In a 2016 merits award, the tribunal found India liable for unlawful expropriation; this was followed by a 2020 quantum award ordering India to pay USD111.3 million plus interest.

In 2022, the same three shareholders commenced a second BIT arbitration (UNCITRAL Rules, seat London, PCA Case No 2022-34), characterising India’s post-award conduct as an independent treaty violation. The case remains pending.

In September 2013, Deutsche Telekom, which had invested approximately USD97.2 million in Devas, commenced a separate BIT arbitration under the Germany–India BIT (UNCITRAL Rules, seat Geneva, PCA Case No 2014-10), resulting in a final award ordering India to pay USD93.3 million plus interest. Enforcement and annulment actions in several countries, including Germany, followed.

Another example is Eutelsat v Mexico (ICSID Case No ARB(AF)/17/2), based on the France‒Mexico BIT. The French satellite operator Eutelsat claimed approximately USD120 million ‒ alleging that the Mexican satellite operator it had acquired (Satélites Mexicanos (Satmex)) was required to reserve a disproportionate amount of capacity for the Mexican government, violating the BIT’s fair and equitable treatment standard. In 2021, the tribunal denied a breach and dismissed the claims.

Further examples include Avanti Communications v the Government of Indonesia (LCIA, seat London) ‒ where a British company successfully pursued a USD20 million claim arising from unpaid satellite lease obligations ‒ and the Paris-seated ICC case Thuraya Insurers v Boeing Satellite Systems International, where insurers unsuccessfully brought a USD220 million claim over a defective communications satellite that lost power in orbit.

While space-related litigation has historically been rare in EU member states, the existing cases ‒ particularly in Germany ‒ demonstrate a broad spectrum. The principal domains are addressed here.

In 1999, the German Federal Constitutional Court (1 BvR 2226/94) held ‒ regarding the Federal Intelligence Service’s interception of international telecommunications routed via satellite ‒ that satellite technology enables state surveillance to extend across national borders without using foreign territory.

The German Federal Administrative Court has also engaged with space-related issues in two main areas, as follows.

• On Germany’s constitutional duty of protection in relation to satellite-relayed armed drone operations ‒ in Ramstein I (5 April 2016, 1 C 3.15), the claimant sought to require Germany to monitor US armed drone operations conducted via a satellite relay station at Ramstein Air Base. The action was dismissed, as the German Federal Administrative Court held that making available airbase infrastructure under the NATO Status of Forces Agreement was insufficient to establish Germany’s co-responsibility. In Ramstein II (25 November 2020, 6 C 7.19), the German Federal Administrative Court held that the passive, technical relay of a satellite data stream through facilities on German soil fulfils only a necessary and not a sufficient condition for a qualified territorial nexus.
• On frequency allocation ‒ in 2013 (6 C 3.10), the German Federal Administrative Court addressed the frequency scarcity prognosis of the Federal Network Agency and the primacy of the auction procedure. In 2017 (6 C 3.19), the German Federal Administrative court confirmed that a claim to individual allocation exists only upon fulfilment of the relevant statutory conditions and that the Federal Network Agency retains a margin of discretion.

The most prominent domain for space-related litigation relates to patent law. The German Federal Patent Court has issued several decisions of direct relevance:

• in 2003 (20 W (pat) 38/03), the German Federal Patent Court clarified that a patent application concerning a LEO satellite constellation cannot be refused on the ground that the subject matter is situated in outer space, as the grounds for refusal under the Patent Act are exhaustive;
• in 2011 (21 W (pat) 83/09), a Global Navigation Satellite System (GNSS) navigation patent was found novel and inventive; and
• in 2022 (4 Ni 4/22 (EP)), a Global Positioning System (GPS) positioning patent was declared partially void.

Further decisions address GNSS interference detection in vehicles (19 W (pat) 9/19), spacecraft propulsion system novelty (23 W (pat) 10/16), and laser armouring of space vehicles (11 W (pat) 14/17).

At EU level, the EPO confirmed in 2006 the inventive step of Finmeccanica’s three-axis stabilised satellite patent against opponent Astrium GmbH (T 0872/03), while in 2021 Thales Alenia Space Deutschland’s ADS-B LEO satellite surveillance patent was revoked for inadmissible extension against Airbus Defence and Space (T 1953/17).

Competition law has provided a further arena for space-related proceedings. In 2006 (B4-196/05), the German Federal Cartel Office distinguished titanium for the aerospace and space industry from industrial titanium based on differing metallurgical properties, purity requirements, and price levels, and cleared the merger in the absence of any decision-relevant increase in resources on the EU-wide market.

At EU level, competition law also generated space-related proceedings. In Avio v EU Commission (General Court, T-139/18), Avio challenged the EC’s approval of the ASL/Arianespace merger (COMP/M.7724), arguing that the EC had failed to correctly analyse market foreclosure risks and conflicts of interest within Arianespace. The action was withdrawn in 2019.

Beyond merger control, other EU proceedings bear a direct connection to the satellite industry. A notable example is OHB System AG v EU Commission, where a former chief operating officer (COO) of OHB joined competitor ADS, assuming a leading role in ADS’s bid unit. OHB alleged that the COO had taken confidential files, prompting a German criminal investigation in March 2020. OHB finished third in the final bid ranking and challenged the award before the General Court, which dismissed the action in 2023 (T-54/21). The ECJ set aside this judgment, holding that the principle of equal treatment required the EC to examine all relevant circumstances, including indicia, where there were objective indications of a conflict of interest. In 2026, OHB brought a damages action before the General Court (T-52/26), which remains pending.

Two cases before the Swedish Supreme Court are also notable. After the sole arbitrator in the Sea Launch arbitration dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction, the claimants challenged the award before the Svea Court of Appeal, which held that the arbitration agreement had waived the statutory right to bring such a challenge. The Supreme Court overturned that ruling in 2015 (HD Ö 2528-14), confirming that Swedish courts retain supervisory authority over arbitral jurisdiction decisions even where parties have contractually limited challenge rights.

In Space Leasing v RBC Signals, a dispute arose from a sale-and-leaseback of ground station equipment situated in Sweden, where the seller was domiciled abroad. The Swedish Supreme Court held in 2026 (HD Ä 8221-25) that registration of the transaction may be effected by publication in a foreign local newspaper when the seller is not domiciled in Sweden. The case reflects the growing use of sophisticated financing structures for space infrastructure assets and the legal complexities they generate under existing civil law frameworks.