Sanctions 2025 Comparisons

During the past 12 months, Australia’s steady deceleration in the use of sanctions overall continued and contrasted against an influx of government reviews. It remains to be seen what will come from the multiple recommendations. However, the stakeholders made it very clear that they want change in both the legislation and regulatory operations.

Out from the gates of 2025, the primary regulator’s co-operative and educative regulatory approach has been amped up with the release of a deluge of advisory and guidance notes and in conducting outreach sessions. There is an increasingly strong focus on enforcement and compliance, suggesting that the Australian Sanctions Office (ASO) may soon switch into a more proactive role.

Russia is now the primary focus for Australian sanctions law, with the overwhelming amount of sanctions directed towards the Russia-Ukraine conflict and Russia’s potential sanctions evasion tactics being a primary concern of the recent government reviews.

Statistics on the Use of Sanctions

As of July 2024, approximately 3,259 individuals and entities were designated under Australian sanctions regimes according to the Consolidated List. From an examination of the Consolidated List, the following observations can be made:

• There continues to be a deceleration of sanctions use. As at June 2024, there were almost double the amount of sanctions that had been imposed as at June 2025. Of the sanctions still in force, 35.62% were imposed in 2022, 25.31% were imposed in 2023, 13.96% were imposed in 2024, with only 6.9% being imposed in the first six months of 2025.
• Australia’s overall focus with sanctions remains on the Russia–Ukraine conflict. Over 50% of in-force sanctions as at June 2025 relate to the autonomous sanction regimes concerning Russia and Ukraine.
• Australia’s 2024 focus is narrowing. In the first six months of 2024, an almost equal amount of individuals and entities were designated under the autonomous sanctions regimes relating to Syria (25.3%), Russia (24.1%), and Iran (23.2%). This focus barely shifted throughout the remaining six months. In contrast, Australia’s sanctions regime has been squarely utilised in relation to Russia (85.78%) and the remainder peppered towards ISIL (Da'esh) and Al-Qaida, UN 1373 (2001), and Magnitsky-style sanctions.
• There continues to be a steady but minimal use of Magnitsky-style sanction instruments since the introduction of the Autonomous Sanctions Amendment (Magnitsky-style and Other Thematic Sanctions) Regulations 2021 (Cth) (the “Magnitsky-style Regulations”) in December 2021, with Australia incrementally using these powers more throughout 2024, with five of the nine instruments being issued between November 2023 and June 2024. While there is increased utilisation of these sanctions in relation to human rights violations in the Israel‒Palestine conflict, there has been a notable drop-off in any usage in relation to corruption, with the last set of still-in-force corruption sanctions dating back to 2022.

Statistics on Permits

Statistics on reports, contraventions, enforcement actions, and permits remain undisclosed to the general public. In July 2021, the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT) released a “Sanctions Regulator Performance – Self-Assessment Report”, disclosing that in 2020–21 there were 55 permit applications finalised (where ASO assessed that a sanctions permit was required).

Co-Ordinated Sanctions

Australia continues to impose sanctions in co-ordination with the UK and the USA. All three governments have sanctioned key figures in cybercrime networks and the financial networks of Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad.

Court Proceedings and Enforcement Action

The slow trickle of judicial decisions on Australia’s sanctions regimes has come to a stop in terms of contractual and administrative law, signalling the complexity of the former and difficulty (if not futility) with the latter. There also remains a distinct lack of enforcement cases commencing or enforcement action being publicly announced or pursued. The Australian government may be looking to shift gears, as additional powers for the regulator are being contemplated and sanctions evasion continues to feature prominently in the government’s reviews across 2024 and 2025. 

Sanctions can be imposed on individuals irrespective of their industry, which in turn impacts how other individuals and entities can interact with those designated. Commonly, financial industries are particularly affected by any sanction, given the requirement to freeze the assets of designated individuals.

Australian sanctions can be targeted towards specific industries. By way of example:

• the sanctions concerning Syria have an express focus on the oil and gas industry or the petrochemical industry; and
• the sanctions concerning the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (“North Korea”) expressly sanction any service that assists with or is in relation to an “extractive or related industry”.

Court decisions in 2024 have shone a spotlight on the application of Australian sanctions on the resources (coal, alumina, and bauxite) and transport industries. The ramifications may be felt throughout many global industries with complex and intersecting operations.

Finally, with the recent amendments to the Anti-Money Laundering and Counter-Terrorism Financing Act 2006 (Cth) and proposed new anti-money laundering and counter-terrorism financing (AML/CTF) rules, governance obligations related to sanctions are expanding.

DFAT is broadly responsible for administering and enforcing the sanctions. To this end, DFAT established ASO on 1 January 2022 to sit within DFAT’s Regulatory Legal Division in the Security, Legal and Consular Group. ASO is the Australian government’s sanctions regulator.

As the regulator, ASO:

• provides guidance on Australian sanctions law to regulated entities and to the public, government and relevant parties;
• processes applications for, and issues, sanctions permits (see 2.3 Licensing);
• works with the public to promote compliance and help prevent breaches;
• works in partnership with other government agencies to monitor compliance; and
• supports corrective and enforcement action by law enforcement agencies in cases of suspected non-compliance (see 2.2 Enforcement).

There are no continuous reporting obligations under Australian sanctions law. However, there are record-keeping obligations and certain government officials have information-gathering powers.

Record-Keeping Obligations

Two types of records must be retained, as follows:

• Any records or documents relating to an application must be retained for five years by the applicant. Importantly, this obligation remains even if the permit is not granted. The five years begins from when the permit was granted or, if it was refused, when the application was made.
• Any records or documents relating to the person’s compliance with any conditions of the permit must be retained for five years, beginning on the last day on which an action to which the permit relates was done.

Information-Gathering Powers

A “CEO of a designated Commonwealth entity” can require a person to give information or documents to determine compliance with a sanction law. A designated Commonwealth entity includes DFAT, the Department of Defence, the Australian Customs Service, and AUSTRAC. These are called section 353 notices. The section 353 notice will specify the information and/or documents sought, and the timing and manner in which the notice must be complied with.

Information cannot be withheld on the basis that its provision will be self-incriminating. However, neither the information given ‒ nor the giving of the document ‒ is admissible as evidence against the individual in any criminal proceedings or in any proceedings that would expose the individual to a penalty, apart from proceedings for:

• providing false or misleading information given in connection with a sanction law; or
• failing to comply with the requirement to provide information or documents.

Failing to comply with the requirement is a criminal offence, with a penalty of up to 12 months’ imprisonment.

The three most significant court decisions or legal developments in Australia are:

• Alexander Abramov v Minister for Foreign Affairs (No 2) (2023), which challenged the designation of an individual and confirmed that sanctions could be imposed for past actions that have been discontinued but also provided further insight into the administrative process of sanction-making ‒ this decision, in turn, led to the Australian government passing legislation to reflect the outcome of this decision and retrospectively validate past sanction decisions; and
• Alumina and Bauxite Company Ltd v Queensland Alumina Ltd (2024) FCA 43, which was Australia’s first case examining the sanctions regimes in the context of commercial contracts/force majeure and confirmed the broad scope of sanction provisions (see 6.1 Force Majeure for further details); the Full Federal Court decision (same name, [2024] FCAFC 142) dismissed this appeal in November 2024, confirming the primary judge’s reasoning.

The Australian government has received reports from at least four reviews that addressed the Australian sanctions regimes:

• DFAT’s review that commenced in January 2023 and concluded on 30 October 2024, titled “Review of Australia's Autonomous Sanctions Framework”;
• the Defence and Trade References Committee’s review that commenced in March 2024 and concluded in September 2024, titled “Australian Support for Ukraine”, September 2024;
• the Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade Reference Committee’s review that commenced in July 2024 and concluded in February 2025, titled “Australia’s sanctions regime”; and
• the review by the Human Rights Subcommittee of the Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade Reference Committee that commenced in December 2024 and concluded in March 2025, titled “Australia's thematic sanctions framework: A legislated review of the operation of the Autonomous Sanctions Amendment (Magnitsky-style and other Thematic Sanctions) Act 2021”.

All in all, this patchwork of reviews lays out a variety of stakeholders’ views on Australia’s sanctions regimes and provides a starting point for an array of legal and regulatory developments. However, there is no draft legislation on the table. 

There are two general ways to “challenge” a designation ‒ namely, by requesting a revocation of the designation or by seeking judicial review of the decision to designate.

Request Revocation

The specific procedure depends on the specific case factors, including what basis a person wants to challenge the designation and under which specific regime the person was designated. By way of example, requests for delisting of:

• UNSC listings should be made to the Focal Point for De-listing or through the country of citizenship or residence;
• UNSC listings related to ISIL (Da’esh) and Al Qaeda should be made to the UN Office of the Ombudsperson or through the country of citizenship or residence;
• UNSC listings related to the counter-terrorism (UNSCR 1373) sanctions regime should be made to DFAT; and
• listings related to Australian autonomous sanctions should be made to DFAT.

Importantly for requests relating to Australian autonomous sanctions, once any such request is made, the Minister is not required to review any further requests by (or on behalf of) the same entity for at least 12 months. That is to say, it is important that any initial request be properly made (with legal advice), lest there be a 12-month wait afterwards.

Judicial Review

The procedure by which to challenge the decision to list itself may be different from the foregoing (eg, through administration law) and differ from case to case.

A successful de-listing challenge can result in the removal of the designation list, as this is the primary objective of a delisting challenge.

Importantly, there is no statutory right or framework in Australia to recover financial compensation for being wrongly designated. However, there may be compensation available if the sanctions were imposed “maliciously”. This remains untested in Australia.

The time it takes to obtain a delisting may vary significantly depending on the specific circumstances. There are no statutory timeframes.

There are several – independent and overlapping – statutory regimes prohibiting, authorising or otherwise controlling the import and export of a range of services and goods in Australia.

The primary statutory instruments include the following:

• The Customs Act 1901 (Cth) and the Customs (Prohibited Exports) Regulations 1958 (Cth) ‒ these primarily deal with controls for the import and export of most goods, including defence and dual-use goods and technologies. The ABF is the primary agency responsible for enforcing this regime; however, other government agencies are involved, including the Defence Export Controls (DEC) within the Department of Defence.
• The Weapons of Mass Destruction (Prevention of Proliferation) Act 1995 (Cth) ‒ this controls any goods, technologies, or services that could be used in a weapons of mass destruction programme. This regime is administered by the DEC.
• Defence Trade Controls Act 2012 (Cth) ‒ this controls the transfer of defence and strategic goods, technologies, and services. This regime is also administered by the DEC. Key to this regime is the Defence and Strategic Goods List 2024, which lists the military and dual-use goods, software, and technologies that are subject to export control regulations in Australia.
• Export Control Act 2020 (Cth) – this creates a framework regulating the export of all goods (including agricultural products and food) through the Export Control Rules 2021. This regime is generally administered by the Department of Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry.

The import or export of a good or service must be compliant with any applicable regime, which may require seeking authorisation under each regime from the relevant authority. By way of example, the exporting of a dual-use good to a country in respect of which there is a sanction regime may require an export permit from the DEC as well as a sanctions permit from ASO.

Please refer to 5.1 Services.

Australian courts have recognised that Australian-imposed sanctions can trigger a force majeure clause, allowing the contracting party to terminate a contract. This position was made clear in Alumina and Bauxite Company Ltd v Queensland Alumina Ltd (2024) FCA 43, whereby it was found that a party was entitled to cease supplying, shipping and delivering certain goods to other entities – in which the designated oligarchs held indirect shareholding interests – on the basis that such activities would breach Australia’s autonomous sanctions. This question turned on the construction of the specific sanction regime and each of the contract’s force majeure clauses. This position was confirmed by the Full Federal Court of Australia in dismissing Alumina and Bauxite Company Ltd’s appeal in Alumina and Bauxite Company Ltd v Queensland Alumina Ltd [2024] FCAFC 142.

Based on this, a party would have to show only on the balance of probabilities that they would breach Australian sanctions (a breach that would ordinarily require proving beyond a reasonable doubt).

Even where there is not a suitable force majeure clause, there may be other avenues available to parties where sanctions impact contracted obligations, such as the common-law defence of supervening illegality. This defence is enlivened where there is a change in the law ‒ after the formation of a contract ‒ that renders the future performance of a contract unlawful. Supervening illegality is a defence to the non-performance of the contract. In some circumstances, supervening illegality may have the same terminating effect as frustration.

The impact of non-Australian sanctions on the performance of contractual obligations remains a largely untested question.

Australian courts are yet to consider key questions concerning the enforcement of Australian judgments ‒ or the recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments ‒ where sanctions are live issues.

These questions will turn on the precise sanction regimes that are at play, the role of the sanctioned person or entity (eg, plaintiff, defendant, judgment creditor or judgment debtor), and the circumstances of the matter, including the timing of the proceedings. There may be influence drawn from UK decisions such as PJSC National Bank Trust & Anor v Boris Mints & Ors (2023) EWHC 118 (Comm) and the Ministry of Defence and Support for Armed Forces of the Islamic Republic of Iran v International Military Services Ltd (2019) 1 WLR 6409.

As a starting point, a permit may be able to be issued under regulation 20(4) of the Sanctions Regulations for certain dealings required to “satisfy a judicial, administrative or arbitral lien or judgment that was made before the date on which the person or entity became a designated person or entity” where the dealing is not “for the benefit” of that designatee.

It remains to be seen how courts will interpret and apply this provision, including whether it extends to foreign judgments. Regardless, ASO has noted that assets provided to a designated person or entity as a result of a legal proceeding or settlement will be frozen until the designation is removed, which is an approach that seeks compliance both with pre-designation judgments and sanctions regimes.

What is clear is that a permit basis is not expressly available for judgments secured after a designation, even where those proceedings were ongoing at the time the designation was made, further widening the impact of sanctions.

The Minister of Foreign Affairs is responsible for making designation decisions.

Strictly speaking, only those who are expressly designated are designated. However, Regulation 14 of the Sanctions Regulations prohibits indirect facilitation of providing sanctioned assets to a designated person. That is to say, it is an offence if one “indirectly makes an asset available to or for the benefit of a person or entity” without a permit. Australian courts have stated that this regulation should be given “the full meaning that is open from the words”, so as to include provision “through interposed corporate entities” and “where the benefit is either the object, effect or likely effect of making the asset available”.

There are also additional offences that extend prohibitions to entities or bodies “owned or controlled” by or those “acting on behalf of” (and similar language) sanctioned governments, individuals, or entities.

More definitively, the assets of a designated person may not be easy to identify and extend beyond those that are obvious as it encapsulates assets that are owned or controlled by the designated person. ASO’s Guidance Note – dealing with assets owned or controlled by designated persons and entities – advises that ownership and control of a given asset are determined according to the “factual circumstances, including the kind of asset and the laws of jurisdiction in which it was created”.