Sanctions 2026 Comparisons

Last Updated August 13, 2026

Contributed By WJ Avocats

Law and Practice

Authors



WJ Avocats is a Parisian boutique law firm that was created in 2002 and has since developed expertise in cross-border litigation and a strong presence on the international stage. It was one of the first French firms to specialise in international criminal law, in matters of extradition, international and European arrest warrants, withdrawal of INTERPOL notices and mutual legal assistance. It specialises in sanctions at both international (United Nations and European Union) and domestic levels, advising clients on compliance and representing their interests before the relevant judicial or administrative bodies. The firm assists and represents French and foreign clients, whether natural or legal persons, both in an advisory capacity and before any court. It manages not only the legal aspects but also media and public relations strategy. WJ Avocats also advises its private clients on all aspects of the management of their financial and cultural assets.

Over the past 12 months, the most significant development has been the ongoing implementation of Directive (EU) 2024/1226, which requires member states to criminalise the violation and circumvention of EU restrictive measures and to harmonise criminal penalties across the Union. France has taken its first formal step in that direction with the introduction of Bill No 2544 before the National Assembly on 3 March 2026 (see 3.1 Significant Court Decisions or Legal Developments).

Sanctions of the Council of the EU have continued to expand over the last 12 months due to new sanctions packages (the 19th, 20th and 21st sanctions packages) imposed by the EU in the context of the war in Ukraine.

Energy-related sanctions have been expanded, particularly targeting directly liquefied natural gas (LNG) and crude oil, as well as, indirectly, by the intermediary of sanctions against tankers. Restrictions on financial flux have also increased, especially on crypto-assets and bank transfers.

On 23 July 2026, the Council adopted the 21st package of restrictive measures against Russia, significantly expanding trade, financial and energy restrictions. It extended transaction prohibitions to 33 additional Russian banks and financial institutions and creates a new legal basis for a comprehensive ban on transactions with foreign crypto-asset service providers used by Russia. In the energy sector, the automatic adjustment mechanism for the oil-price cap has been suspended until July 2027, while a temporary exemption allows certain pre-2022 long-term contracts for Russian liquefied natural gas (LNG) exports to third countries to continue until July 2027, subject to strict reporting obligations. The package also clarified that the ban on providing LNG terminal services applies to entities indirectly owned or controlled by Russian persons and establishes a framework for future transaction bans on refineries processing Russian crude oil.

The Court of Justice of the European Union, ruling on requests for preliminary rulings and appeals brought against judgments of the General Court of the CJEU, delivered several key and awaited judgments, establishing standards for the framework of sanctions against Russia and Belarus.

The top trends in France concerning sanctions in the last 12 months have all resulted from the expansion and development of tools regarding EU sanctions, including:

  • new listings and listing criteria;
  • expansion of energy-related sanctions;
  • expansion of restrictions on financial flux; and
  • new definitions and rules arising from the published decisions of the General Court and the CJEU.

The Council of the EU also decided to impose sanctions on individuals identified as responsible for the systematic unlawful deportation, forced transfer, forced assimilation and unlawful adoption of Ukrainian minors in May 2026.

Sectors in France particularly affected by EU sanctions pursuant to Council Decision 2014/512/CFSP and Council Regulation (EU) No 833/2014 include oil, finance, banking and dual-use goods.

Sectors in which natural persons who are under sanctions are involved, or used to be involved, are also affected, as third-party actors refuse to work with all natural and legal persons even remotely linked to them, even if these links are only historic. In particular, this concerns sectors such as fertilisers, oil, coal and IT.

France implements both individual sanctions, targeting natural and legal persons, and sectoral sanctions, decided at the UN, EU and national levels.

Individual sanctions include travel bans and the freezing of assets, and sectoral sanctions include embargoes and other restrictions on the export and import of certain goods.

The scope of France’s sanctions as an EU member state is broad (though narrower than US sanctions, as the EU does not apply secondary sanctions), as EU sanctions must be complied with by:

  • anyone present in the territory of the EU, including its airspace;
  • anyone on board any aircraft or any vessel under the jurisdiction of an EU member state;
  • all nationals of an EU member state, even when outside of the territory of the EU;
  • any legal person, entity or body, inside or outside the EU, incorporated or constituted under the law of a member state; and
  • any legal person, entity or body in respect of any business done in whole or in part within the EU.

First, autonomous sanctions imposed by the French authorities (which are not a mere application of EU or UN restrictive measures) do not have extraterritorial effects.

Second, regarding the scope of application of EU sanctions, they must be complied with by:

  • any person inside or outside the territory of the EU who is a national of a member state, and by any legal entity (Article 13(c) of Regulation 833/2014 and Article 17(c) of Regulation 269/2014);
  • any legal person, entity or body, inside or outside the territory of the EU, which is incorporated or constituted under the law of a member state; and
  • any legal person, entity or body in respect of any business done in whole or in part with the EU.

Although the EU has historically maintained that its sanctions have no extraterritorial effect, this has been called into question since the 11th Russia package (June 2023). The package created the possibility, as an exceptional and last-resort measure, of prohibiting the sale, supply, transfer or export from the Union of certain goods and technologies (in particular sensitive dual-use items and items liable to contribute to Russia’s military and technological reinforcement or to the development of its defence and security sector) the export of which to Russia is already restricted, to third countries found to present a continuing and particularly high risk of being used to circumvent those restrictions.

Article 8a of Regulation 833/2014, in force since June 2024, sets out a “best efforts” obligation: “Natural and legal persons, entities and bodies shall undertake their best efforts to ensure that any legal person, entity or body established outside the Union that they own or control does not participate in activities that undermine the restrictive measures provided for in this Regulation”.

In France, sanctions are imposed at three different levels.

  • National: France has autonomous sanctions regimes in four areas: counterterrorism (Article L. 562-2 of the French Monetary and Financial Code); foreign interference (Article L. 562-2-1 CMF); drug trafficking (Article L. 562-2-2 CMF); and sanctions circumvention (Article L. 562-3 CMF). In addition, Article L. 151-2 CMF provides the general statutory basis empowering the French Government to restrict financial relations with foreign countries in order to safeguard the national interests. Under these regimes, France can impose asset freezing, restrictions on transactions and embargoes. 
  • EU: As an EU member state, France is bound by the restrictive measures decided by the Council of the EU that concern either natural or legal persons subject to sanctions such as asset freezing or travel bans, or to sectors of activity (eg, finance or fertilisers).
  • UN: As an EU member state and member of the UN Security Council, France is also bound by the restrictive measures decided at UN level, which, like those of the EU, relate either to a geographical area – targeting natural persons and legal entities – or to themes such as nuclear non-proliferation.

The primary regulators for sanctions activity in France are:

  • the Ministry for Europe and Foreign Affairs; and
  • the Ministry of Economy and Finance.

Within both ministries, sub-entities handle the different aspects of sanctions:

  • the French Treasury handles financial matters, including the delivery of authorisations for transactions of otherwise frozen assets;
  • the Directorate General for Enterprise handles dual-use import and export; and
  • French Customs implement sanctions on French territory.

They are therefore the competent authorities for enforcing sanctions and granting derogations, and the primary interlocutors on sanctions in France.

In the EU, member states are responsible for enforcing the sanctions created by the Council of the EU. In France, the Ministry for Europe and Foreign Affairs is responsible for the general coordination of EU restrictive measures. The Ministry of Economy of Finance, and in particular the French Treasury, is responsible for all matters related to frozen assets, and financial and sectoral sanctions. The Direction générale des douanes et des droits indirects (DGDDI) is competent for physical exports; and the Direction générale des entreprises (DGE) handles dual-export goods. For access to French ports for Russian vessels, requests for authorisations must be submitted to the préfet de département and the director of the port; information can be requested to the Direction générale des affaires maritimes, de la pêche et de l’aquaculture (DGAMPA)”.

At French Level

At criminal level, Article L. 542-2 of the French Customs Code (formerly Article 459) criminalises the “failure to comply with the restrictions on economic and financial relations provided for under European Union law pursuant to Articles 75 or 215 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union and under international treaties and agreements duly approved and ratified by France”.

These provisions criminalise sanctions breaches regardless of origin – national, EU or UN.

Article L. 542-5 of the Customs Code criminalises inciting, in writing, through propaganda or advertising, the commission of any of these offences, whether or not such incitement was acted upon. 

Potential penalties for breaching sanctions for natural persons include:

  • five years’ imprisonment;
  • confiscation of the corpus delicti;
  • confiscation of the means of transport used to commit the offence;
  • confiscation of property and assets that are the direct or indirect proceeds of the offence; and
  • a fine at least equal to, and at most twice, the amount associated with the offence or attempted offence.

Incitement to breach sanctions is punished by five years’ imprisonment and a fine of EUR225,000.

Legal persons risk:

  • dissolution;
  • a permanent ban, or a ban for a maximum of five years, on directly or indirectly exercising one or more professional or social activities;
  • placement, for a maximum of five years, under judicial supervision;
  • permanent closure, or closure for a maximum of five years, of one or more of the establishments of the company used to commit the offence;
  • permanent exclusion from public contracts or exclusion for a maximum of five years;
  • a ban, either permanently or for a maximum of five years, on making a public offer of financial securities or on having their financial securities admitted to trading on a regulated market;
  • a ban, for a maximum of five years, on issuing cheques other than those enabling the drawer to withdraw funds from the drawee or those who are certified, or on using payment cards;
  • publication of the decision either in the written press or by any electronic means of communication to the public;
  • a ban, for a period of up to five years, on receiving any public aid allocated by the state, local authorities, their establishments or groupings, as well as on any financial aid paid by a private person entrusted with a public service mission; and
  • confiscations.

For legal persons, the maximum financial penalty is ten times the value of the product of the transaction (Article L. 542-4 of the Customs Code, in conjunction with Article 131-38 of the Criminal Code).

Article L. 542-3 of the Customs Code specifies that: “When the property and assets referred to in paragraphs 1 through 3 of Article L. 542-1 cannot be seized or are not produced by the defendant, or when the Minister of the Budget so requests, the court hearing the case may order the defendant to pay a sum equal to the value of such property and assets”.

There are no civil penalties for violating economic sanctions laws or regulations in France.

In addition to applicable criminal penalties, breaches of sanctions can give rise to administrative sanctions under Article L. 612-39 of the Monetary and Financial Code. These sanctions include:

  • a warning;
  • a reprimand;
  • prohibition of conducting certain transactions or other restrictions on business activities;
  • temporary suspension of one or more executives;
  • compulsory dismissal of one or more executives;
  • partial withdrawal of authorisation to operate; and
  • full withdrawal of authorisation or removal from the register of authorised entities.

Furthermore, under Article L. 561-36-1 IV of the Monetary and Financial Code, the Autorité de contrôle prudentiel et de résolution (ACPR) may impose administrative financial penalties of up to EUR100 million or 10% of the entity’s annual turnover, whichever amount is greater.

At EU Level

In April 2024, the EU adopted Directive (EU) 2024/1226, which created the European criminal offence of violation of sanctions. In particular, Article 3 of the Directive provides for the following punishable behaviours:

  • making funds or economic resources available, directly or indirectly, to or for the benefit of a designated person, entity or body in violation of a prohibition that constitutes an EU restrictive measure;
  • failing to freeze funds or economic resources belonging to, or owned, held or controlled by, a designated person, entity or body in violation of an obligation that constitutes an EU restrictive measure;
  • enabling designated natural persons to enter into, or transit through, the territory of a member state in violation of a prohibition that constitutes an EU restrictive measure;
  • entering into or continuing transactions with a third state, bodies of a third state, or entities or bodies directly or indirectly owned or controlled by a third state or by bodies of a third state, including the award or continued execution of public or concession contracts where the prohibition or restriction of that conduct constitutes an EU restrictive measure;
  • trading, importing, exporting, selling, purchasing, transferring, transiting or transporting goods, as well as providing brokering services, technical assistance or other services relating to those goods, where the prohibition or restriction of that conduct constitutes an EU restrictive measure, including where committed with serious negligence, and at least where that conduct relates to items included in the Common Military List of the European Union or to dual-use items listed in Annexes I and IV to Regulation (EU) 2021/821;
  • providing financial services or performing financial activities, where the prohibition or restriction of that conduct constitutes an EU restrictive measure;
  • providing services other than those referred to in the preceding bullet point, where the prohibition or restriction of that conduct constitutes an EU restrictive measure;
  • circumventing an EU restrictive measure by:
    1. using, transferring to a third party, or otherwise disposing of funds or economic resources directly or indirectly owned, held or controlled by a designated person, entity or body, and which are to be frozen pursuant to an EU restrictive measure, in order to conceal those funds or economic resources;
    2. providing false or misleading information to conceal the fact that a designated person, entity or body is the ultimate owner or beneficiary of funds or economic resources that are to be frozen pursuant to an EU restrictive measure;
    3. failing by a designated natural person, or by a representative of a designated entity or body, to comply with an obligation that constitutes an EU restrictive measure to report to the competent administrative authorities funds or economic resources within the jurisdiction of a member state belonging to, owned, held or controlled by them; or
    4. failing to comply with an obligation that constitutes an EU restrictive measure to provide the competent administrative authorities with information on frozen funds or economic resources, or information held about funds or economic resources within the territory of member states, belonging to, owned, held or controlled by designated persons, entities or bodies that have not been frozen, and where such information was obtained in the performance of a professional duty; and
    5. breaching or failing to fulfil conditions attached to authorisations granted by competent authorities to conduct activities that, in the absence of such an authorisation, amount to a violation of a prohibition or restriction that constitutes an EU restrictive measure.

Concerning penalties faced by natural persons, Article 5 of the Directive leaves some leeway to EU member states but provides several indications concerning minimum fines and terms of imprisonment (from one year to five years or a maximum term of three years, depending on the offence committed).

It also provides for accessory criminal or non-criminal penalties or measures, which may include:

  • fines that are proportionate to the gravity of the conduct and to the individual, financial and other circumstances of the natural person concerned;
  • withdrawal of permits and authorisations to pursue activities that resulted in the criminal offence;
  • disqualification from holding, by a legal person, a leading position of the same type used for committing the criminal offence;
  • temporary bans on running for public office; and
  • publication of all or part of the judicial decision.

Concerning legal persons, Article 7 of the Directive provides for the following potential penalties:

  • exclusion from entitlement to public benefits or aid;
  • exclusion from access to public funding, including tender procedures, grants and concessions;
  • disqualification from the practice of business activities;
  • withdrawal of permits and authorisations to pursue activities that resulted in the relevant criminal offence;
  • placement under judicial supervision;
  • judicial winding-up;
  • closure of establishments used for committing the criminal offence; and
  • where there is a public interest, publication of all or part of the judicial decision relating to the criminal offence committed and the penalties or measures imposed, without prejudice to rules on privacy and the protection of personal data.

The Directive provides for minimum fines, depending on the offence committed. The Directive was implemented in France through Decree No 2025-470 of 28 May 2025, which gave competence to the Advisory Board on Combating Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing to ensure co-ordination and co-operation between law enforcement agencies and the authorities responsible for implementing EU restrictive measures (Article D561-51 of the Monetary and Financial Code). As explained above, given that criminal penalties for sanctions violations were already in effect under French law, the transposition of the Directive did not bring any substantial changes at regulatory level. The creation of criminal offences and the determination of applicable penalties fall within the field reserved to the legislature under Article 34 of the Constitution and therefore require transposition by statute; a bill to that effect is currently pending before Parliament (see 3.1 Significant Court Decisions or Legal Developments).

As detailed above, there is no civil enforcement in France. The Autorité de contrôle prudentiel et de résolution (ACPR) exercises administrative enforcement over entities under its supervision, such as banks, insurers and asset managers, especially regarding asset-freeze obligations under UN and EU restrictive measures.

Examples of key criminal enforcement actions in respect of sanctions breaches in France in the last few years include:

  • the Lafarge trial, which related to the financing of ISIS in breach of EU and UN sanctions – in October 2024, the Paris court ordered the trial of Lafarge and eight former executives for alleged terrorist financing activities;
  • the Baltic Leader trial – in July 2024, the Rouen Prosecutor sought EUR8 million in fines, confiscation of a vessel and a ten-month suspended prison sentence against a captain accused of breaching Russian sanctions by departing Rouen with a Russian-flagged vessel controlled by a sanctioned bank; the captain was subsequently acquitted on all charges; and
  • the issuance in April 2025 – by the French media regulator Arcom – of an order to Eutelsat to cease the broadcasting of two channels owned or controlled by JSC National Media Group, which is a designated person under the EU’s Russian sanctions.

More generally, since 2022, several criminal investigations have been launched in France against Russian oligarchs for circumventing EU sanctions, primarily involving money laundering, tax fraud and asset concealment. In March 2024, proceedings targeted Ruslan Goryukhin and Mikhail Opengeym, accused of hiding over EUR70 million in real estate through offshore structures. In 2022, Igor Sechin became the subject of an investigation after his yacht was seized in La Ciotat for attempting to evade asset freezing measures. In 2023, Alexey Kuzmichev was indicted in Paris for aggravated tax fraud and sanctions violations. Assets linked to Artur Ocheretny and Iekaterina Solotsinskaya were also seized in the Basque Country and Paris in similar cases. Since 2023, the French National Financial Prosecutor’s Office and the anti-organised crime unit (Junalco) have intensified their investigative activities targeting individuals and entities under EU sanctions.

Article 132-78 of the French Criminal Code provides for two mitigating circumstances that are applicable only to certain offences, when provided by law, namely:

  • an individual who attempted to instigate an offence but alerted the administrative or judicial authorities, and therefore prevented the offence from being committed and, where applicable, made it possible to identify the other perpetrators or accomplices, is exempt from punishment; and
  • the sentence will be reduced if the perpetrator of an offence notified the administrative or judicial authority and thus made it possible to put a stop to the offence, to prevent the offence from causing damage or to identify other authors or accomplices.
  • At EU level, Article 9 of Directive (EU) 2024/1226 provides for two different mitigating circumstances, and requires that member states implement at least one in their legal system:
  • when the offender provides the competent authorities with information they would not otherwise have been able to obtain, helping them to identify or bring to justice the other offenders; and
  • when the offender provides the competent authorities with information they would not otherwise have been able to obtain, helping them to find evidence.

French law is reluctant to take mitigating circumstances into account in general, and already provides for the first mitigating circumstance required by the Directive. The second one, which is a lot broader, was not integrated into French law when the Directive was implemented.

Under Article L. 542-2 (formerly Article 459), sanctions violations are formal offences in French law, which (unlike material offences) are constituted by the conduct alone, without proof of intent to violate sanctions. The French sanctions regimes therefore operate on the basis of strict liability.

Strict liability does not apply to all offences under French law, but it does apply to sanctions-related offences, which are treated as formal offences. In other areas of law, criminal liability generally requires mens rea (intent or negligence), unless otherwise specified.

France applies the derogations provided by the Council of the EU’s Decisions and Regulations in its different sanctions regimes.

Currently, most of the sanctions-related matters concern Russia. In this regard, Council Decision 2014/512/CFSP and Council Regulation (EU) No 833/2014 of 31 July 2014 concerning restrictive measures in view of Russia’s actions destabilising the situation in Ukraine provide for several derogations to its sanctions, including:

  • the sale, supply, transfer or export of dual-use goods and technology – or the provision of related technical or financial assistance – for non-military use and for a non-military end user, when such goods or technology or the related technical or financial assistance are either intended to aid co-operation between the EU, the governments of member states and the government of Russia in purely civilian matters, or are intended to aid intergovernmental co-operation in space programmes;
  • the provision of insurance or reinsurance after 20 June 2024 to any legal person, entity or body that is incorporated or constituted under the law of a member state with regard to its activities outside the energy sector in Russia;
  • the provision of financial assistance when necessary for the urgent prevention or mitigation of an event likely to have a serious and significant impact on human health and safety, or on the environment; and
  • the authorisation for an aircraft to land in, take off from or overfly the territory of, the EU for humanitarian purposes.

Such derogations must be requested by the persons seeking them from the national competent authorities – ie, the French Treasury, the Directorate General for Enterprise or the French Customs, depending on the derogation sought.

By adopting Council Regulation (EU) 2022/2474 of 16 December 2022, amending Regulation (EU) No 833/2014 concerning restrictive measures in view of Russia’s actions in destabilising the situation in Ukraine, the Council of the EU adopted a general prohibition of the provision of legal services to the government of Russia or legal persons, entities or bodies established in Russia, as enshrined in Article 5(n)(2) of Regulation 833/2014.

However, at the time, it already provided for some derogations, and others were added by Council Regulation (EU) 2023/1214 of 23 June 2023 amending Regulation (EU) No 833/2014 concerning restrictive measures in view of Russia’s actions in destabilising the situation in Ukraine. The most common ones can be found in paragraphs 5, 6, 9(a) and 9(b) of Regulation 833/2014, as follows:

  • the provision of services that are strictly necessary for the exercise of the right of defence in judicial proceedings and the right to an effective legal remedy;
  • the provision of services that are strictly necessary to ensure access to judicial, administrative or arbitral proceedings in a member state, as well as for the recognition or enforcement of a judgment or an arbitration award rendered in a member state; and
  • the provision of services that are strictly necessary for the setting up, certification or evaluation of a firewall that removes control, by a sanctioned natural or legal person, over the assets of a non-listed legal person, entity or body incorporated or constituted under the law of a member state, and which is owned or controlled by the former, as long as no further funds or economic resources accrue to the benefit of the listed natural or legal person, entity or body.

In December 2022, the Paris Bar (Ordre des avocats à la Cour de Paris), supported by the Geneva Bar, filed an action for annulment contesting the ban on providing non‑litigious legal advice to the Russian state and entities in Russia (case T-798/22). By judgment of 2 October 2024, the court dismissed the challenge, holding that Articles 7 and 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU protect access to legal advice only in judicial, administrative or arbitral proceedings, outside which the ban applies, subject to sufficiently broad exceptions. The applicants appealed before the CJEU (case C-866/24); the hearing took place on 14 July 2026. The judgment remains awaited.

The Council of the EU imposes reporting obligations in its sanctions regimes, whereby such reports are to be made to the national competent authorities. The Council also provides the possibility to address such information directly to the Commission of the EU. In the context of Russia, it has created reporting obligations in both its individual and sectoral sanctions regimes.

Council Regulation (EU) No 269/2014 of 17 March 2014, concerning restrictive measures in respect of actions undermining or threatening the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine, provides for reporting obligations in its Articles 8 and 9 that weigh on both persons sanctioned and central securities depositories (CSDs).

As such, natural and legal persons, entities and bodies sanctioned, and CSDs must:

  • supply information that would facilitate the implementation of sanctions – eg, on funds and economic resources frozen as a result of EU restrictive measures or belonging to, owned, held or controlled by persons sanctioned that have not been treated as frozen by the persons obliged to do so – to the national competent authority (in France, the Treasury) within two weeks of acquiring this information;
  • supply information on funds and economic resources belonging to, owned, held or controlled by sanctioned persons that have been moved, transferred, altered, used, accessed or dealt;
  • report within six weeks from the date of their listing the location of their funds that are to be frozen; and
  • co-operate with the competent authority in verifying such information.

Such information must at least identify:

  • the person owning, holding or controlling the frozen funds and economic resources (name, address and VAT registration or tax identification number);
  • the amount/market value of the funds or resources, at the date of reporting and at the date of freezing; and
  • the types of funds.

In its frequently asked questions (FAQs), the Commission explicitly states the objective of such reporting obligations, which is to help ensure that those assets are traced effectively in order to avoid circumvention of sanctions via evasion schemes. The Commission also recalls that non-compliance with such obligations would be treated as a breach of EU sanctions law, with criminal penalties provided by EU member states being applicable.

Regarding sectoral sanctions, Council Regulation (EU) No 833/2014 of 31 July 2014 concerning restrictive measures in view of Russia’s actions destabilising the situation in Ukraine also provides for some reporting obligations, as follows:

  • Natural and legal persons, entities and bodies must “inform within two weeks the competent authority of the Member State where they are resident, located, established or incorporated, of all transactions for the purchase, import or transfer into the Union of natural gas condensates of subheading CN 2709 00 10 from liquefied natural gas production plants, originating in or exported from Russia. The reporting shall include information on volumes”.
  • “Central securities depositories concerned shall report to the Commission and to their national supervisory authorities, by 30 June of each year, on the total amount of cash balances, revenues and net profits”.
  • “Legal persons, entities and bodies established in the Union whose proprietary rights are directly or indirectly owned for more than 40% by: (a) a legal person, entity or body established in Russia; (b) a Russian national; or (c) a natural person residing in Russia, shall, as of 1 May 2024, report to the competent authority of the Member State where they are established, within two weeks of the end of each quarter, any transfer of funds exceeding 100 000 euros out of the Union that they made during that quarter, directly or indirectly, in one or several operations”.

In the past three years, the most significant legal and judicial developments in France have arisen from the EU restrictive measures imposed on Russia since the beginning of the invasion of Ukraine in February 2022.

The CJEU has delivered several key judgments in the last few months:

  • The Court, in its interpretation of the concepts of “leading businessperson”, “influence” and the scope of “economic sectors”, in a Judgment of 26 March 2026, joined cases C-696/23 P Pumpyanskiy v Council, C-704/23 P Khudaverdyan v Council, C-711/23 P Rashnikov v Council, C-35/24 P Mazepin v Council and C-111/24 P Khan v Council. The Court clarified the following.
    1. It is not necessarily the leading businessperson that must provide a substantial source of revenue to the Russian Government, but the “economic sectors” in which they operate.
    2. The concept of the “influence” of the businesspersons must be assessed in light of the economic context in which they operate, irrespective of any link that they may have with the Russian Government. It is because they are of significant importance for the Russian economy that those persons are likely to further, indirectly, the financing of destabilising actions against Ukraine, by contributing to maintaining the profitability, or the prosperity, of the economic sectors in which they are involved, even if there is no specific evidence that they have directly influenced the Russian Government.
    3. The criterion serving as the basis for the imposition of restrictive measures can be considered unlawful only if it is manifestly inappropriate. Such a criterion remains lawful provided that it targets categories of persons that have, although indirectly and although independently of any personal conduct, an objective link with the third country against which the European Union is seeking to impose sanctions. In the present cases, the Court found that there was an objective link between important businesspersons involved in sectors that are lucrative for Russia and the objective pursued by the European Union consisting in increasing the pressure exerted on that country and the costs of its actions destabilising Ukraine.
  • The Court indicated its position concerning the interplays between trusts and sanctions, in a Judgment of 21 May 2026, T Trust, C-483/23, EU:C:2026:408, in a Judgment of 21 May 2026, and in joined cases FZ AR (Gel des biens affectés au trust), C-428/24, and SX Ltd, C-476/24, EU:C:2026:409. It held that the existence of a trust does not, in itself, preclude the freezing of assets held through it. The Court made clear that the decisive question is not who holds legal title over the assets under the law governing the trust or the trust deed but who has the power, in practice, to use, benefit from or dispose of the assets or have influence over them. The Court identified several factual indicators. It did not, however, define any of the underlying concepts of its decision, notably “influence” and “power”, which could create further uncertainties in the future, and might require further clarifications.

Directive (EU) 2024/1226, adopted in April 2024, criminalised violation and circumvention of sanctions at EU level. The transposition of a directive is carried out in France by decree for matters falling within the regulatory power and by statute for those that Article 34 of the Constitution reserves to the legislature. The regulatory aspects of the Directive were transposed through Decree No 2025-470 of 28 May 2025 (see 2.2.2 Breaching Sanctions); the criminal-law aspects must be transposed by statute. On 3 March 2026, a member of Parliament introduced Bill No 2544 to that effect. The bill defines eight categories of conduct constituting criminal offences, with aggravating circumstances notably for organised crime or dual-use items. It departs from the Directive on several points, and raises constitutional concerns. First, whereas Recital 4 permits gross-negligence liability only for trade in dual-use items, the bill extends it to all trade in goods and creates a strict liability offence punishable by fine and confiscation, difficult to reconcile with the constitutional principles of necessity and proportionality of penalties. Second, the bill adopts an overly broad definition of freezing that includes seizure, conflating a precautionary measure with a coercive one, at odds with the CJEU’s holding that restrictive measures are precautionary in nature (Shuvalov v Council, T-289/22). Third, the bill fails to transpose the Directive’s protection of legal professional privilege and creates a reporting offence applicable to anyone obtaining information on a sanctioned person’s assets “in the course of a professional activity”, broad enough to capture both advisory and litigation counsel, with no carve-out for lawyers. The bill has been referred to the Committee on Legal Affairs, but no date has been set.

At national level, as explained above, relevant recent case law includes the Lafarge trial, the Baltic Leader case and the Arcom decision concerning Eutelsat. Also, on 5 February 2026, in a case concerning assets frozen under Regulation (EU) No 2016/44 (Libya), the Court of cassation held that prior administrative authorisation from the DG Trésor is required before any attachment of debt (saisie-attribution) may be levied on frozen funds. That requirement is not confined to the payment stage but goes to the very validity of the attachment, and it cannot be satisfied by a judicial authorisation from the enforcement judge (JEX) (Cass. 2e civ., 5 February 2026, No 23-15.936 (F-B)).

The focus is expected to remain on oil and tankers, with additional listings of individuals and vessels likely in the coming months.

The introduction of new designation criteria, in particular that targeting individuals allegedly responsible for the abduction of Ukrainian children, is likely to generate further listing challenges and, in turn, future case law.

Further sanctions packages are expected in the next few months, continuing the regular pace of the past four years, introducing new criteria and targeting new sectors of the Russian economy.

The delisting process varies depending on the source of the sanction:

  • for sanctions imposed by the French Ministry of Economy and Finance, the sanctioned person may ask the Ministry to reconsider and, if refused, apply to the French administrative court with a recours pour excès de pouvoir (appeal for abuse of power);
  • when sanctioned by the Council of the EU, the affected person may challenge the listing before the Council itself, by letter, and/or before the General Court of the CJEU, by an application for annulment; and
  • when listed on UN sanctions lists, the affected person must apply to the Focal Point for Delisting, except for sanctions on ISIL/Al-Qaeda, where the Ombudsperson is competent.

For French sanctions, recours gracieux and recours pour excès de pouvoir (appeal for abuse of power) only target a delisting; the judge cannot grant damages. However, under Article L761-1 of the Administrative Justice Code, the applicant can ask the court to order the administration to pay sums beyond proceedings costs – a remedy resembling damages.

At EU level, if the delisting is obtained before the Council of the EU, the name of the person is taken off the list. Even if the court annuls an individual’s listing, it will remain in place until the Council takes it off.

Once taken off the sanctions list, the person can ask the court for damages under Article 340(2) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, which provides for the right of individuals or legal persons to obtain compensation for damages occurring by the non-contractual liability of EU institutions.

At the time of writing, only one entity has obtained damages in the context of sanctions before the CJEU: in 2014, the Iranian company Safa Nicu Sepahan obtained EUR50,000 for non-material damage to its reputation (Judgment of 25 November 2014, Safa Nicu Sepahan Co. v Council, T-384/11, EU:T:2014:986).

At French level, a person seeking delisting must first ask the Ministry of Economy and Finance to reconsider (recours gracieux). They have two months from notification to do so. The administration then has two months to reply.

If refused (or if no response is received), the person may bring a recours pour excès de pouvoir (appeal for abuse of power). The deadline is two months in France, three months in overseas territories, or four months abroad.

At the EU level, to oppose their listing before the court, a sanctioned person has two months from the publication or personal notification of the decision to include their name on the lists. There is no time limit for a ruling on an annulment action. Concerning the administrative procedure before the Council, which relists periodically (eg, every six months under the Russian regime and every year under the Belarus regime) there is no time limit to request reconsideration of its decision to target the person with restrictive measures. Delistings currently take around two years before both.

There are no time limits in the Council’s administrative procedure; it relists periodically – every six months under the Russian regime and every year under the Belarus regime. Before the court, there is no time limit for a ruling on an annulment action; delistings currently take around two years before both.

Economic sanctions against Russia include a ban on providing to – and buying from – Russia or Russian persons several services, including crypto-asset wallets, engineering, IT consultancy and legal advisory, brokering and trade secrets, as provided by Decision 2014/512/CFSP and Regulation 833/2014.

Under Decision 2014/512/CFSP and Regulation 833/2014, several goods are prohibited from being imported from or exported to Russia, such as oil and coal, liquefied propane, dual-use goods and technology for military use, navigational instruments, drone engines, chemicals, cement and asphalt, helium, diamonds and gold. The 21st package (July 2026) further expanded these prohibitions, adding on the export side specialised metals, alloys, propellants and drone-related equipment, and on the import side certain metals, ores, car parts, glass products and imitation pearls.

Under Article 1218 of the French Civil Code, three conditions must be met for force majeure to suspend a contractual obligation:

  • the event preventing the execution of the obligation was not foreseeable;
  • the event’s origin does not depend on the person under the obligation concerned; and
  • the inexecution could not have been prevented with appropriate measures other than the one initially anticipated.

In 2020, the French Supreme Court, the Cour de cassation, ruled that the freezing of a person’s assets under sanctions did not constitute a case of force majeure, as it did not meet the second condition (Cass., ass. plén., 10 juill. 2020, P+B+R+I, No 18-18.542 et 18-21.814).

The opposite approach would have offered sanctioned persons the possibility of relying on the restrictive measures to justify non-compliance with their obligations as debtors, which would have undermined the sanctions’ legitimacy.

To guard against sanctions imposed by France, the EU, the UN or third countries (notably the USA, whose sanctions, while not formally binding on French persons, are widely complied with), French parties should include a contractual clause anticipating sanctions on either side and setting out a remedy.

When sanctions issues arise in enforcing French or foreign judgments in France, courts apply a classical approach: examining whether the judge had jurisdiction, whether the decision complies with French public order, and whether it contravenes French law. Exequatur is refused if any condition is not met.

As UN, EU and national sanctions prohibit certain behaviours in France, such as the use of frozen assets, a judicial decision that would provide for the transfer of money from a frozen bank account would not be recognised and executed.

An appeal against the initial refusal is unlikely to succeed, since the same law would apply. The only recourse is to seek a Treasury derogation or wait for the sanctions to be lifted.

At French level, the Minister of Economy and Finance decides on the names to include in France’s sanctions lists. At EU level, the Council, on the basis of proposals from three working committees – COEST (Eastern Europe and Central Asia), RELEX (Foreign Relations Counsellors) and COREPER II (Permanent Representatives Committee – Part II) – decides which natural and legal persons to sanction. In both regimes, therefore, the process is entirely political.

Under Article 2(1) of Decision 2014/145/CFSP and Regulation 269/2014, “all funds and economic resources belonging to, or owned, held or controlled by” sanctioned natural and legal persons shall be frozen.

In its FAQs, the Commission of the EU explicitly states that for companies owned or controlled by listed persons, “it can be presumed that the control also extends to the assets of that entity, and that any funds or economic resources made available to that entity would reach or benefit the listed person”, with Article 2 applying accordingly. This amounts to an indirect designation through ownership or control by another directly designated person. Although non-binding, the FAQs are strictly applied by all EU actors.

At the same time, the Commission recalls that this presumption can be rebutted, “if it can be demonstrated that some or all of its assets are outside the control of the listed person, and/or that funds or economic resources made available to it would in fact not reach or benefit the listed person”.

Ownership and control have generated extensive litigation. The Commission has published two opinions on Article 2 (19 June 2020 and 8 June 2021) to guide practitioners. Some guidance can also be found in the EU best practices, where ownership is defined as “the possession of 50% or more of the proprietary rights of an entity or having majority interest in it”. Where there is no ownership, control is determined based on a non-exhaustive set of criteria.

The French Treasury Department (Direction Générale du Trésor, or DGT) has published a compliance guide in which it defines the notion of ownership as follows:

“Ownership is established by a title of ownership or a debt instrument; in the absence of such a title and in the case of movable property, ownership is presumed if the asset is in the possession of the person subject to a freezing measure”. From this definition, the following can be inferred:

  • when ownership is established by a title, the asset must be frozen – it is irrelevant whether the asset is under the control of the designated person or held by a third party;       
  • when ownership is presumed, the asset must be frozen – it is up to the actual owner to claim true ownership of the frozen asset and to request the lifting of the freezing measure.

Regarding the notion of control, the guide reads as follows:

“Control is a legal concept or one that can be inferred from the facts:

  • There is legal control when it is established by a legal instrument. When a document (such as a company’s articles of association, a shareholders’ agreement, a contract, or a law) states that a person exercises control over an asset, it does not matter whether such control is actually and effectively exercised. The asset must be frozen;
  • There is factual control when, in practice, a person has the power to exercise some or all of the rights attached to ownership: usus, fructus and abusus. The asset must be frozen”.

The French Commercial Code offers further guidance on control and ownership, as follows.

  • When a company owns more than half of the capital of another company, the latter is considered a subsidiary of the former (Article L. 233-1).
  • When a company owns a share of the capital of another company of between 10% and 50%, the former is considered, for the purposes of this chapter, as having a stake in the latter (Article L. 233-2).
  • A company is considered to control another (Article L. 233-3.I):
    1. when it directly or indirectly holds a share of the capital giving it the majority of voting rights at general meetings of that company;
    2. when it alone holds the majority of voting rights in that company by virtue of an agreement with other partners or shareholders that is not contrary to the interests of the company;
    3. when it effectively determines, through the voting rights it holds, the decisions of the general meetings of that company; and
    4. when it is a partner or shareholder of that company and has the power to appoint or dismiss the majority of the members of the administrative, management or supervisory bodies of that company.
  • Control is presumed when a company holds, directly or indirectly, more than 40% of the voting rights, and no other shareholder or partner holds a greater share (Article L. 233-3.II).
  • Two or more persons acting in concert are deemed to jointly control a company when they jointly determine decisions made at general meetings (Article L. 233-3.III).
  • Any shareholding, even below 10%, held by a controlled company is considered to be indirectly held by the company exercising control over it (Article L. 233-4).

Another guiding instrument is the Joint Guidelines of the Directorate General of the Treasury and the ACPR on the Implementation of Asset Freezing Measures. In addition, French authorities refer to the EU best practices.

Article L. 542-2 of the French Customs Code provides for the criminalisation of the “failure to comply with the restrictions on economic and financial relations provided for under European Union law pursuant to Articles 75 or 215 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union and under international treaties and agreements duly approved and ratified by France”.

The Code therefore encompasses circumvention of French, EU and UN sanctions, which are the only sanctions implemented in France.

At EU level, and since April 2024, the circumvention of EU sanctions is also a criminal offence pursuant to Article 3(h) of Directive 2024/1226, which details the behaviours targeted:

  • “using, transferring to a third party, or otherwise disposing of, funds or economic resources directly or indirectly owned, held or controlled by a designated person, entity or body, which are to be frozen pursuant to a Union restrictive measure, in order to conceal those funds or economic resources;
  • providing false or misleading information to conceal the fact that a designated person, entity or body is the ultimate owner or beneficiary of funds or economic resources which are to be frozen pursuant to a Union restrictive measure;
  • failure by a designated natural person, or by a representative of a designated entity or body, to comply with an obligation that constitutes a Union restrictive measure to report to the competent administrative authorities funds or economic resources within the jurisdiction of a member state, belonging to, owned, held or controlled by them; and
  • failing to comply with an obligation that constitutes a Union restrictive measure to provide the competent administrative authorities with information on frozen funds or economic resources or information held about funds or economic resources within the territory of the Member States, belonging to, owned, held or controlled by designated persons, entities or bodies and which have not been frozen, where such information was obtained in the performance of a professional duty”.

As cited in 7.3.1 Prohibiting Provisions, Article L. 542-2 of the French Customs Code (formerly Article 459) provides for the criminalisation of circumvention of sanctions. This offence is punishable by five years’ imprisonment, confiscations and a fine. Until 12 June 2024, an additional penalty barred those convicted from acting as stockbrokers or as voters or elected members of chambers of commerce, commercial courts or industrial tribunals. Constitutional Council decision No 2024-1096 QPC of 12 June 2024 struck it down as unconstitutional, removing it from what is now Article L. 542-2 (formerly Article 459). The Council found that the automatic, fixed-duration disqualification violated the principle of individualisation of penalties.

Directive 2024/1226, adopted on 24 April 2024 (amending Directive (EU) 2018/1673), establishes (in Article 3) minimum rules on criminal offences and sanctions for violations of EU restrictive measures. These cover the freezing of funds and economic resources, prohibitions on making them available, travel bans into or through member-state territory, as well as sectoral economic and financial measures and arms embargoes.

As explained above, the regulatory aspects of the Directive were implemented in France through Decree No 2025-470 of 28 May 2025. Because the creation of criminal offences and the determination of applicable penalties fall within the field reserved to the legislature under Article 34 of the Constitution, the criminal-law aspects must be transposed by statute: on 3 March 2026, as mentioned above, Bill No 2544 was introduced to that effect, with no date yet set for its entry into force.

WJ Avocats

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Law and Practice in France

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WJ Avocats is a Parisian boutique law firm that was created in 2002 and has since developed expertise in cross-border litigation and a strong presence on the international stage. It was one of the first French firms to specialise in international criminal law, in matters of extradition, international and European arrest warrants, withdrawal of INTERPOL notices and mutual legal assistance. It specialises in sanctions at both international (United Nations and European Union) and domestic levels, advising clients on compliance and representing their interests before the relevant judicial or administrative bodies. The firm assists and represents French and foreign clients, whether natural or legal persons, both in an advisory capacity and before any court. It manages not only the legal aspects but also media and public relations strategy. WJ Avocats also advises its private clients on all aspects of the management of their financial and cultural assets.