Sanctions 2026 Comparisons

The UK’s sanctions sector continues to expand exponentially, principally as a result of measures taken in response to Russia’s continuing actions in Ukraine. Delays caused by under-resourcing in criminal enforcement have contributed to the UK’s sanctions enforcement landscape remaining relatively quiet, although this is beginning to change, with increased activity in both criminal prosecution and monetary penalties.

Expanded Use and Provisions of the UK’s Sanctions Regimes

The last 12 months or so have seen significant amendments to the UK’s sanctions regulations and to the lists of designated persons (DPs) under them, which have been designed:

• to continue increasing the restrictions on the government and economy of Russia, in the context of its ongoing hostile actions in Ukraine;
• to delist (albeit, at the time of writing, in numbers that remain stubbornly low, and notably lower than the equivalent regimes in the EU and elsewhere) individuals and entities that (in the view of the Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office, FCDO) should no longer be listed, for instance because of their conspicuous denunciation of the Russia regime or withdrawal from relevant businesses;
• to continue listing, under the “Magnitsky” human rights sanctions regime, allegedly violent settlers in Israel, as well as (at the time of writing) a small number of targeted members of the Israeli government itself, based on public pronouncements, the UK government considers to be unacceptable;
• to deploy the same regime against those allegedly involved in overseas “scam centres”, which used forced labour to commit fraud; and
• to continue and expand the use of anti-corruption sanctions (the second of the two sets of regulations attributed to the “Magnitsky” legacy) in the context of high-profile overseas corruption allegations.

A new regime to tackle those involved in illegal immigration (including those facilitating arrivals of asylum seekers from France on “small boats”) has also been introduced, with various designations of individuals and entities allegedly involved.

Broader Developments in UK Sanctions

In addition to the developments noted above:

• following the Supreme Court’s adverse ruling against Eugene Shvidler, the High Court dismissed a separate challenge from Sarvar Ismailov against the FCDO’s decision to maintain his listing, following a ministerial review (refer to 3.1 Significant Court Decisions or Legal Developments); and
• the Office of Financial Sanctions Implementation (OFSI) has continued its use of the monetary penalty regime, notably including a penalty of over GBP1 million against Sabre Global Technologies Limited for providing travel services to Ural Airlines, a designated entity under the Russia sanctions regulations.

The impact of UK sanctions has been felt in various sectors; however, the financial services industry has undoubtedly been the most affected. Various professional sectors, including accountants, lawyers and trustees, have been affected by the bans imposed as part of the UK’s response to Russia’s actions in Ukraine.

The primary regulators for sanctions activity in the UK are:

• the Office for Financial Sanctions Implementation (OFSI), which issues guidance, makes licensing decisions, and imposes monetary penalties in connection with financial sanctions;
• the National Crime Agency (NCA), which conducts criminal investigations into breaches of sanctions;
• the Crown Prosecution Service (CPS), which brings prosecutions in criminal cases;
• HM Revenue and Customs (HMRC), which deals with the enforcement of trade sanctions;
• the Export Control Joint Unit (ECJU), which deals with licensing decisions in connection with trade sanctions relating to goods and ancillary services;
• the Office for Trade Sanctions Implementation (OTSI), the equivalent of OFSI for trade sanctions (dealing, among other things, with most licences relating to services);
• the Insolvency Service (IS), which deals with enforcement and licensing in connection with director disqualification sanctions;
• the Department of Transport (DoT), which deals with aircraft and shipping sanctions; and
• industry regulators, such as the Financial Conduct Authority (FCA), which regulates the financial sector generally (including in connection with sanctions).

Obligations on Relevant Firms

“Relevant firms” are required to inform OFSI as soon as possible if they know or have reasonable cause to suspect that any person:

• is a DP; or
• has breached a prohibition or failed to comply with a requirement under the provisions of the sanctions regulations.

Legal advisers are not required to report if this would breach legal professional privilege (LPP).

Relevant firms for this purpose include:

• banks and other providers of financial services;
• auditors, accountants and tax advisers;
• lawyers and notaries;
• trust and corporate service providers;
• estate agents;
• casinos;
• crypto-asset exchange providers and custodian wallet providers;
• high-value dealers;
• art market participants;
• insolvency practitioners; and
• letting agents.

Obligations of DPs on the Russia List

DPs themselves (on the Russia list) are now also subject to obligations to report their assets to OFSI. If the DP is a “UK person” (which includes UK citizens and UK-incorporated companies), this extends to all funds and economic resources owned, held or controlled anywhere in the world. Otherwise, it extends only to funds and economic resources owned, held or controlled in the UK.

In practice, many DPs will also have obligations under the equivalent regimes in the UK’s Crown Dependencies (Jersey, Guernsey and the Isle of Man) and/or Overseas Territories (which include the BVI and the Cayman Islands).

The legislative, judicial and executive frameworks for sanctions in the UK have all undergone significant developments since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022.

Legislative Developments: Strengthening Sanctions

From a legislative perspective, changes introduced by the Economic Crime (Transparency and Enforcement) Act 2022:

• removed parliamentary scrutiny from sanctions regulations;
• restricted damages available from successful challenges to designations;
• introduced strict liability monetary penalties for breaching financial sanctions; and
• removed the specific requirement for designations to be “appropriate” (though this is generally accepted to have had no effect, as designations still need to be “proportionate” under human rights law).

More important than any of these, however, were the sweeping changes introduced by amendment to the Russia sanctions regulations, which brought within the scope of designations a huge range of individuals and entities that may have no involvement whatever in Russia’s actions in Ukraine, but which are involved in sectors of the Russian economy deemed to have economic or strategic significance. The use of this power to drive an exponential expansion of the list of designated persons has vastly increased the impact of sanctions in the years since then.

Arguably as significant, though for now with less practical consequence, was a further amendment to these regulations, adding an additional purpose of Russia sanctions: ‘to promote the payment of compensation by Russia for damage, loss or injury suffered by Ukraine or on after 24 February 2022 as a result of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine’. In due course, this may enable the continuation of sanctions after any resolution of the conflict itself.

Court Decisions: Designation Challenges

This expansion contributed in turn to a wave of court decisions on designation challenges under Section 38 of the Sanctions and Anti-Money Laundering Act 2018 (SAMLA). The most significant of these was the Supreme Court’s decision in the case of Eugene Shvidler, whose challenge raised a significant issue on the meaning of proportionality in this context. The Supreme Court broadly endorsed the approach of the High Court and the Court of Appeal in directing that it was the proportionality of sanctions designations in general that fell to be measured against their policy aim, rather than (as Shvidler contended) the specific impact of sanctions on the individual applicant. While recognising the importance of those impacts, the Supreme Court (in its majority judgment) stressed the fact that designations had a cumulative effect, which the Foreign Secretary (given both their constitutional role in this context, and the institutional expertise of the FCDO) was better placed than the courts to determine. (A strong dissenting judgment from Lord Leggatt has been widely praised by sanctions practitioners.)

Since the Shvidler challenge, unsurprisingly few DPs have sought to challenge the decisions of the FCDO to maintain designations. Sarvar Ismailov, nephew of Alisher Usmanov and designated soon after his uncle on a single ground of “association” by that familial tie, was an exception: the High Court declined to accept Ismailov’s challenge of irrationality in respect of either the amending regulations (which made it possible to designate on this basis) or the decision to designate him specifically, saying among other things that it was rational to infer that Ismailov could exert pressure on his uncle.

Enforcement: The Challenge of Ownership and Control

One of the more difficult aspects of UK sanctions regulations (and one where, not coincidentally, the UK’s laws differ from those of comparable jurisdictions) is the applicability of financial sanctions to companies (and other entities) that are “owned or controlled, directly or indirectly” by a DP. The UK’s regulations say that, in addition to the more straightforward tests of 50% of shares or voting rights, the test is also made out where it is reasonable to expect the DP could (if they chose) cause the company’s affairs to be run in accordance with their wishes.

The Court of Appeal prompted significant debate when it commented (in the case of Boris Mints v PJSC National Bank Trust) that this broader test could be applied to any Russian company, given that the nature (it said) of Russia’s economy meant that its president (a DP) could take control of them if and when he wished. Within a few days, the FCDO and OFSI issued guidance stating that they did not adopt this approach, and that each case would be considered on its own merits. But while this effectively prevents OFSI enforcing a sanctions breach on the basis of the Mints test (and subsequent case law has sought to recast the test in terms of a “common sense” question of “who calls the shots” at the company), it remains to be seen whether there is still mileage in it (for instance, where a counterparty seeks to end a contract in reliance on it).

More recently, a call for evidence has been conducted on the narrow issue of whether to retain the “hypothetical element” of the test. If that element were dropped, the test would instead be whether the company was in fact run in accordance with the DP’s wishes, rather than whether the DP could achieve that result if they wanted. No similar exercises have yet been carried out on two significant points of difference between the UK and EU regimes: first, the ownership threshold of “more than 50%” of shares (rather than “50% or more”); and, second, the question of aggregation. With respect to the latter, EU law enables the respective shares of 2 DPs (A and B) to be aggregated, with sanctions triggered if the aggregated percentage meets the threshold; the UK threshold cannot be triggered in this way (though it would be if A and B held their shares pursuant to a joint arrangement, or if A held shares on behalf of B, or vice versa).

Further designations and prohibitions (and the occasional delisting) may safely be expected in connection with Russia sanctions. More fundamentally, debates are ongoing (in the UK as elsewhere) on the potential for forfeiture of assets currently frozen under Russia sanctions, potentially for the benefit of Ukraine’s war effort. Options include the use of fines or monetary penalties under the new reporting regime for DPs, and/or the application of proceeds of crime laws to secure the forfeiture of assets obtained through sanctions breaches or other unlawful conduct. Objections include the chilling effect on lawful foreign investment if any new regime (or aggressive use of existing regimes) is not seen to pay due regard to private property rights.

The Sanctions and Anti-Money Laundering Act 2018 (SAMLA) provides for a procedure for DPs to challenge their designations.

Ministerial Review

Importantly, a challenge cannot be taken directly to court in the first instance. The first step (under Section 23 of SAMLA) is to apply for a ministerial review, by which the minister responsible for taking designation decisions under the relevant sanctions regulations will reconsider their decision. At this point, they will consider any relevant material before them, including any representations and material provided by the DP themselves. The question for the minister, therefore, is not whether the original designation was correct, but whether the DP ought to be designated at the time the review takes place.

Court Review

If the minister’s decision under this procedure is adverse to the DP, they will then be able to challenge that decision (that is, the decision resulting from the ministerial review) in the High Court (under Section 38 of SAMLA). The procedure is similar, and the grounds are the same, as for judicial review more generally: importantly, the court is not asked to make a fresh decision from scratch, but to consider whether the minister has made their decision in the right way and under the Human Rights Act 1998 (the HRA). The latter includes consideration of whether the interference with the DP’s rights (including, for instance, their right to privacy and their right to free enjoyment of their possessions) is proportionate to the stated aims of the relevant sanctions regulations.

Delisting challenges are generally aimed at the simple removal from the list, although they can, in some circumstances, result in an amendment to the listing or the substitution of new grounds. Court reviews may not result in an award of damages except in cases of bad faith.

Ministers typically take six months to make a decision on a ministerial review. Taking into account the time taken to obtain relevant material from the FCDO and to prepare the application, that decision will typically follow a year or more after the DP’s designation. Court reviews are likely to take a year or more from application to judgment.

The sanctions regulations imposed by the UK in response to Russia’s actions in Ukraine remain unusual in banning (under the heading of trade sanctions) the provision (technically “export”, though the consumer may be present in the UK) of certain services to “persons connected with Russia” (PCWRs). For these purposes, a PCWR includes anyone resident in Russia or any company incorporated or domiciled there.

Professional and Business Services

The services affected include:

• accounting services;
• advertising services;
• architectural services;
• auditing services;
• business and management consulting services;
• engineering services;
• IT consultancy and design services; and
• public relations services.

Legal Advisory Services

A more specific prohibition exists for legal advisory services whose object or effect is to enable or facilitate acts that breach the regulations or that (if overseas) would do so if they took place in the UK.

Trust Services

The same regulations also ban (under the heading of financial sanctions) the provision of trust services to DPs and PCWRs.

Sanctions regulations often impose restrictions on the export and/or import of goods, typically starting with goods that may be used for military purposes, but potentially expanding to include goods of importance to the target country’s economy. The most extensive set of restrictions in the UK by far has been imposed in response to Russia’s actions in Ukraine.

The Statutory Immunity

The Sanctions and Anti-Money Laundering Act 2018 (SAMLA), at Section 44, states that a person is “not liable to any civil proceedings to which that person would, in the absence of this section, have been liable in respect of the act” where that person reasonably believes they are complying with regulations made under SAMLA.

Celestial Aviation v UniCredit: The Primary Issue

The above-mentioned regulations include the Russia (Sanctions) (EU Exit) Regulations 2019 (the “Russia regulations”), of which Regulation 28(3) was the subject of a judicial test of the extent of the protection offered by Section 44.

Regulation 28(3) says that “a person must not directly or indirectly provide financial services or funds in pursuance of or in connection with an arrangement whose object or effect is… (c) directly or indirectly making restricted goods or restricted technology available (i) to a person connected with Russia, or (ii) for use in Russia”.

In Celestial Aviation Services Ltd v UniCredit Bank GmbH, London Branch, the primary issue was whether UniCredit was entitled to withhold payments under Letters of Credit (LoCs) issued in relation to aircraft leases to Russian airlines, on the basis that making the payments would have breached Regulation 28(3).

Initially, the High Court ruled that UniCredit was not entitled to refuse payment under the LoCs, as the aircraft had been supplied before the relevant sanctions took effect in March 2022. So, “financial assistance” was provided at the point in time the LoCs were issued, which was before the regulation came into effect. Consequently, since the provisions were not retrospective, UniCredit was not relieved of its payment obligations.

The Court of Appeal overturned this decision, as it found that the lower court did not properly engage with the wording of Regulation 28(3) and erred in its assessment of the purpose of the Russia regulations. Its reasoning on this issue was later upheld by the Supreme Court.

The appeal courts also interpreted the Russia regulations broadly, finding that they applied to any arrangement connected with the supply of restricted goods (including aircraft) to Russia, regardless of the timing of the arrangement. The courts said that a broad interpretation was consistent with the overall purpose of the sanctions regime, which was to put pressure on Russia. While the broad reading may unintentionally capture arrangements that were otherwise compliant with the regulations, the risk was mitigated by exceptions and licences.

Accordingly, UniCredit’s payment obligation under the LoCs was suspended until the UK licence process was completed. The Court of Appeal held that reasonable efforts to apply for a licence must be made.

The Effect of the Immunity

The Supreme Court’s decision in UniCredit Bank effectively clarified that compliance with UK sanctions laws takes precedence over fulfilling contractual obligations, where such performance is likely to breach UK regulations.

The decision also provides comfort to businesses that while Section 44 of SAMLA does not prohibit civil proceedings, it protects if they withhold performance or payments (including of interest and/or costs), where they do so in the reasonable belief that they are complying with sanctions regulations.

Effect of the Immunity on Court Awards

In Boris Mints v PJSC National Bank Trust, the Court of Appeal ruled that the entry of a judgment, and the ensuing judgment debt, in favour of a DP would not breach financial sanctions prohibitions and so would not require an OFSI licence.

The Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office (FCDO) is responsible for making designation decisions.

Financial sanctions (specifically, the “asset freeze” and related provisions) apply not only to DPs themselves but also to entities that are directly or indirectly owned or controlled by a DP.