Investor–State Arbitration 2025 Comparisons

Egypt is recognised as an arbitration-friendly jurisdiction. Having registered more than 1,400 arbitrations (according to UNCTAD), Egypt may be regarded as a jurisdiction that welcomes arbitral proceedings.

As a general rule, Egypt has no history of refusing or showing reluctance to enter into Bilateral Investment Treaties (BITs); on the contrary, Egypt is a party to 73 BITs currently in force, all of which contain arbitration provisions.

Since 2000, Egypt has not terminated any of its BITs. This stability thus reflects a commitment to safeguarding foreign investments – a guarantee consistent with Egypt’s current policy.

In furtherance of this policy, Egypt has no intention of terminating its BITs; it is actively engaged in reviewing and developing them. The new BIT with the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA) bears witness to Egypt’s initiative to develop its international instruments.

Egypt is a state party to 23 multilateral conventions relating to investment and its development (according to UNCTAD), including the New York Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards (the “New York Convention”) and the ICSID Convention.

Egypt is also a member of other major conventions, all containing arbitration as a dispute resolution mechanism, such as the following.

• The OIC Investment Agreement – a regional and multilateral convention aimed at promoting and encouraging economic co-operation among its member states.
• The Euro–Mediterranean Agreement – a multilateral convention between Egypt and the member states of the EU. Its purpose is to foster Egypt’s economic and social development, enabling nationals of its member states to invest in each other’s territories, thereby opening the door to European investors.
• The Investment Agreement for the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA) – establishing a free trade area among its members with the aim of facilitating foreign direct investment.

Investor–state arbitration is the prevailing method in Egypt for the resolution of disputes. The Egyptian Arbitration Law No 27 of 1994 (EAL), together with Egypt’s membership in various bilateral and multilateral conventions, and its continuous development of its legal framework – which has resulted in a considerable increase in foreign investments in recent years across multiple sectors – makes investor–state dispute resolution through arbitration the most common mechanism, particularly in the context of large government contracts with the state of Egypt.

However, arbitration is not necessarily the sole method, the applicable method of dispute resolution depends on the provisions of each treaty. Some may offer alternatives to arbitration, such as allowing a choice between resolving a potential dispute through arbitration or alternatively before domestic courts.

In such cases, it is for the investor in particular to select the most suitable alternative in light of its needs, bearing in mind that resorting to domestic courts is generally far less costly, though the process may prove more cumbersome.

The choice will thus depend on the investor’s resources and the scale of the investment.

Given that the majority of investments in Egypt are of large scale, both investors and the Egyptian government tend to favour arbitration.

Egypt is currently experiencing exponential development, marked by the implementation of mega projects involving the building materials, construction, energy, infrastructure, and industrial sectors in general. These sectors entail complex and high-value financial transactions and are, consequently, the most affected by investor–state arbitration.

Considering the previously noted industrial sectors most affected in Egypt in recent years, it is not surprising that investor–state arbitrations have arisen from these areas.

One of the most significant cases is Heidelberg v Egypt. In this arbitration, the investor’s allegations focus in particular on anti-competition practices and failure to accord national treatment. However, as this case is still ongoing, its outcome remains uncertain.

Another significant case, unrelated to the industrial sectors mentioned in 1.4 Key Industries, is the Al Jazeera v Egypt case. In this matter, the investor claimed under the Egypt–Qatar BIT, that Egypt has allegedly placed the local branch of the investor’s company into compulsory liquidation. The case was ultimately resolved by the withdrawal of the investor’s claim against Egypt.

A further important case is Tantalum International and Emerge Gaming v Egypt. The arbitration was triggered by the cancellation of licences granted to the investor. Similar to Al Jazeera v Egypt, after negotiations, the investor received a settlement sum.

Also worth mentioning is the case of Gesenu v Egypt. The case involved the expropriation of investments made in Egypt by Gesenu, a waste management company. Once again, the case was discontinued as the parties reached a settlement.

The last case to highlight is Qatar Airways Group Q.C.S.C. v Egypt in which the investor alleged that Egypt blocked the company’s operations by closing the Egyptian airspace for the investor and revoking its licences to operate. Yet again, the dispute was settled.

With the exception of the first case mentioned, which is still ongoing, Egypt shows a pattern of settlement, reflecting a willingness to negotiate in the event of a dispute. While arbitration remains an unavoidable means of dispute resolution, amicable settlement is also an established outcome.

In general terms, Egypt is a member of the New York Convention. Egyptian courts, especially the Cairo Court of Appeal, recognise and enforce arbitral awards, including those made against Egypt or its entities. The Egyptian legal system does not grant immunity to state entities or to public officials, who are therefore required to implement and comply with arbitral awards once they have been recognised and enforced in Egypt.

More specifically, the provisions of the EAL concerning the annulment of arbitral awards (Article 53), is very limited in scope. It sets out an exhaustive list of eight grounds for annulment, such as the incapacity of the parties when entering into the arbitration agreement, the tribunal’s failure to apply the law chosen by the parties, or when the award is contrary to Egyptian public policy, among others.

In a recent judgment rendered by the Egyptian Court of Cassation, Judge Nabil Omran emphasised that, according to the legislature, the spirit of the annulment regime is precisely to limit the scope of annulment of arbitral awards, and in this respect, the EAL adopts a pro-arbitration stance.

While the general rule is to limit the scope of annulment grounds, there are rare exceptions. One example is the DIPCO case (ICC Case No 21341/MCP/DDA/AYZ), in which the Egyptian Court of Cassation ruled that since arbitrators are aware of the applicable law, they were required to apply it properly and could not disregard Egyptian public policy. As a result, a misapplication of the law is considered to amount to a violation of Egyptian public policy.

According to the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, Egypt is among the top ten signatories of BITs worldwide with more than 100 BITs: Albania, Algeria, Argentina, Armenia, Australia, Austria, Azerbaijan (signed, but not in force), Bahrain, Belarus, the Belgium–Luxembourg Economic Union, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Botswana (signed, but not in force), Burundi (signed, but not in force), Bulgaria, Cameroon (signed, but not in force), Canada, Central African Republic (signed, but not in force), Chad (signed, but not in force), Chile (signed, but not in force), China, Comoros, Democratic Republic of the Congo (signed, but not in force), Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Djibouti (signed, but not in force), Eswatini (signed, but not in force), Ethiopia, Finland, France, Gabon (signed, but not in force), Georgia (signed, but not in force), Germany, Ghana (signed, but not in force), Greece, Guinea (signed, but not in force), Hungary, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Iran (signed, but not in force), Italy, Jamaica (signed, but not in force), Japan, Jordan, Kazakhstan, North Korea, Korea, Kuwait, Latvia, Lebanon, Libya, North Macedonia (signed, but not in force), Malawi, Malaysia, Mali, Malta, Mauritius, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique (signed, but not in force), the Netherlands, Niger (signed, but not in force), Nigeria (signed, but not in force), occupied Palestinian territories, Oman, Pakistan (signed, but not in force), Poland, Portugal, Qatar, Romania, the Russian Federation, Saudi Arabia (signed, but not in force), Senegal (signed, but not in force), Serbia, Seychelles (signed, but not in force), Singapore, Slovakia, Slovenia, Somalia, South Africa (signed, but not in force), Spain, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Sweden, Switzerland, the Syrian Arab Republic, Tanzania (signed, but not in force), Thailand, Tunisia,Türkiye, Turkmenistan, Uganda (signed, but not in force), Ukraine, the United Arab Emirates, the United Kingdom, the United States, Uzbekistan, Vietnam, Yemen, Zambia (signed, but not in force) and Zimbabwe (signed, but not in force).

Egypt’s recent entry into the BRICS would suggest a potential collaboration on investment with Brazil, for instance, by ratifying a BIT for the first time with that state. Egypt could also renew its BIT with India, and bring into force the BITs ratified with South Africa and Iran, all of which are member states of the BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa).

Given Egypt’s history of participation in numerous bilateral and multilateral treaties, and above all its current legal framework, all of this suggests that Egypt maintains and develops an environment conducive to its entry into such agreements as a strategy to attract and protect foreign investments, as the authors have seen with the BIT with the KSA which entered into force in June 2024.

Egypt has adopted only a couple of model BITs that serve merely as a framework for the negotiation and ratification of a full BIT. It contains only the basic provisions typically found in any model, such as definitions of “investment” and “investor”. It also sets out provisions on the treatment, promotion, and protection of investments, most-favoured nation provisions, national treatment, fair and equal treatment, as well as expropriation, compensation for losses, transfer of funds, and dispute resolution.

The model, however, is meant to be refined and further developed during the negotiation of a specific BIT. By itself, the model is not comprehensive; it must be supplemented. For example, the BIT concluded with the KSA includes provisions on the protection of intellectual property, confidentiality, environmental and labour matters, corruption and competition. Furthermore, it addresses matters relating to residence and stays, provisions virtually unknown in previous BIT practice, at least with respect to Egypt.

Such provisions are absent from earlier models, which, as their name suggests, serve only as a basic template. It is left to the contracting states to adapt, supplement, and implement their particular needs and priorities in the final negotiated BIT.

Egypt is a member of several free trade agreements, including the Greater Arab Free Trade Agreement (GAFTA), the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA), the European Union–Egypt Association Agreement, the Egypt–Turkey Free Trade Agreement, and the Egypt–EFTA Free Trade Agreement.

These agreements grant protection to investors, such as in the COMESA treaty, which sets out provisions concerning protections from nationalisation, potential political unrest, or unforeseen economic setbacks in the host state. Furthermore, investors are entitled to receive fair and equitable treatment and the right to repatriate their funds into their native states.

These same agreements also contain dispute resolution provisions. For instance, Article 41 of the Egypt–EFTA Free Trade Agreement and Article 34 of the Egypt–Turkey Free Trade Agreement establish arbitration as the method of dispute resolution. The COMESA treaty, by contrast, is different in that it establishes a court, but still provides arbitration as an available option.

In these agreements, the protection of investors and their investment, as well as the resolution of disputes through arbitration, are essential components designed to promote cross-border investment, and enhance mutual trust.

To the authors’ knowledge, Egypt does not publish commentaries or exchange of notes as guidance for investment treaties.

Interpretative guidance for investment treaties and their content, even in the absence of official publications by Egypt, may still be found in arbitral jurisprudence, in domestic legislation relating to investment, and in relevant scholarly writings, while Egyptian jurisprudence may also provide additional assistance for the interpretation of laws relating to arbitration and investment.

Egypt’s investment regime is anchored in Investment Law No 72 of 2017 (EIL), the principal legislative instrument governing foreign and domestic investment. Amongst its key substantive provisions, the EIL provides investors with general incentives such as exemptions from stamp duty and notarisation fees, as well as reduced customs duties on imported machinery, as well as special incentives to projects located in priority regions, with deductions of up to 50% or 30% of investment costs. Additional incentives under the EIL include the establishment of custom ports dedicated to specific projects, coverage of utility connection costs, and in some cases, the allocation of land free of charge. The framework also enables the creation of Public and Private Free Zones, which benefit from extensive tax and customs exemptions. Notably, the EIL introduced the so-called “golden licence”, a one-stop approval that consolidates permits, licences, and land allocation for strategic projects, streamlining processes for strategic projects.

The EIL further provides investors with a wide range of dispute resolution and settlement mechanisms. It first considers amicable settlement as the primary mode of resolution. It then establishes a Grievance Committee for decisions issued by the General Authority for Investments and Free Zones (GAFI) – Egypt’s central authority for investment administration and promotion – or any other authority responsible for granting approvals, permits or licences. The EIL also provides for a Ministerial Committee for Investment Dispute Resolution to resolve disputes concerning investors’ claims, complaints, or conflicts. In addition, it establishes a dedicated Centre for Arbitration and Mediation for investment-related disputes, while arbitration remains an option available to investors.

Accordingly, the EIL offers investors a considerable number of avenues to resolve potential disputes. It also sets out the same protections found in most BITs concluded by Egypt, notably, fair and equal treatment, national treatment, protection against arbitrary and discriminatory measures or decisions, residence and stays, respect for enforcement of state contractual obligations, and protection against expropriation and nationalisation.

In parallel with the aforementioned mechanisms, when an investor contracts directly with Egypt or an Egyptian entity, it is relatively common for such contracts, characterised as “administrative contracts”, typically involving large-scale projects, to include an arbitration clause. However, such clause is subject to the approval of the competent minister and to a prior review of the contract by the High Committee for Arbitration and International Disputes before its conclusion. Moreover, the protections guaranteed by BITs are distinct from those contained in such contracts.

This distinction stems from the fact that an arbitration clause provided in a contract governs disputes arising out of that contract. The protection is therefore limited to the rights and obligations established between the parties under the contract.

By contrast, BITs provide a much wider framework of protection, allowing an investor to bring claims from breaches of the BIT itself, claims that naturally extend beyond the contractual terms. Thus, contract-based claims and treaty-based claims are distinct, and a breach of contract is not considered in itself a breach of a BIT.

However, some BITs include an “umbrella clause”, which affords investors an additional layer of protection. This clause requires the state to comply with obligations it has entered into with respect to investments. Consequently, such a clause may potentially elevate and extend a contractual breach to a breach of the BIT itself.

This additional layer of protection may not be necessary in the BITs concluded by Egypt, since under the EIL, Egypt and its entities are already under an obligation to respect and perform their contractual obligations. As the law applicable to such contracts is necessarily Egyptian law, the latter takes the lead by imposing this obligation directly on the state.

Furthermore, the EIL already reflects most of the protections provided in BITs. Therefore, even without bringing a treaty claim, an investor may simply rely on the application of the law governing the contract.

The most frequent claims made by investors against states in investor–state arbitration are naturally based on the obligations that states owe to investors and, by analogy, the rights that investors hold against states.

In general terms, the most frequent claims are made on the basis of the following.

• Expropriation – in this case, the investor alleges that the state in which it has its investments, acting in its sovereign capacity, has taken its property or seized its investments.
• Fair and equitable treatment – in this case, the investor alleges that the state acted in an arbitrary and discriminatory manner against the investor. This principle remains very broad and encompasses many other principles such as due process and protection against denial of justice.
• National treatment – in this case, an investor alleges that it did not receive treatment equal to that of local investors.
• Most-favoured nation – unlike national treatment, in this case the investor alleges that it did not receive treatment equal to that of an investor from a third state, who, under its BIT, benefits from more favourable treatment than the claimant investor.

These claims are made on the basis of the treaty itself, of the obligations that the state has towards investors and the rights that investors hold against the state.

However, an investor may also bring a claim on the basis of a contract. In this case, the investor alleges that the state breached one of its contractual obligations.

Egypt includes in its BITs, and in particular in its model BIT, protections for investors such as expropriation, fair and equitable treatment, as well as most-favoured nation. This inclusion by Egypt thus reflects the most frequent claims made by investors against a state and, in order to address such complaints, Egypt includes these protections in its BITs.

There are no limitations on arbitrator selection in Egypt (aside from requirements of independence and impartiality).

The EAL, for instance, does not limit the parties’ autonomy in their selection of arbitrators; quite the contrary, Article 15 of the EAL provides that the tribunal is constituted by agreement of the parties – the parties are free to agree on the number of arbitrators.

However, the parties’ autonomy is subject to two requirements.

• The first requirement is that if the parties agree to a tribunal constituted by more than one arbitrator, their number must be odd. If the tribunal is constituted by an even number of arbitrators, the arbitration is considered invalid. While the odd number requirement could be considered a limitation, it is a common rule ensuring that the tribunal can always reach a majority decision.
• The second requirement is more of a default rule guaranteeing the progress of the arbitration proceedings. If the parties cannot agree on the constitution of the tribunal, the number of arbitrators shall be three.

In such cases if the parties cannot agree on the constitution of the tribunal, the Cairo Court of Appeal or any other court of appeal as agreed by the parties may intervene, applying the general procedures set out in the EAL.

In the rare cases of multi-party arbitrations, the EAL does not prescribe a default procedure for the appointment of arbitrators. Egyptian law provides general default procedures for the appointment of arbitrators and the constitution of the tribunal.

However, alongside the EAL, the CRCICA (The Cairo Regional Centre for International Commercial Arbitration) Rules provide that in cases involving multiple parties, the claimants and the respondents shall jointly appoint an arbitrator. If the parties concerned failed to do so, the CRCICA shall appoint an arbitrator on their behalf.

Aside from the procedure prescribed under institutional rules, under the EAL (Article 17), a court can intervene in the selection of arbitrators. The selection by the court is made in two circumstances.

• 1. If the parties do not agree on the procedure or timing for the selection of arbitrators, or if the parties agreed procedure fails, the Cairo Court of Appeal or any other court of appeal agreed upon by the parties may appoint the arbitrators upon request of either party.
• 2. If the two appointed arbitrators by the parties cannot agree on the selection of the presiding arbitrator, the court may, upon request, appoint the presiding arbitrator.

The court must observe the requirements of the EAL and any conditions agreed upon by the parties when appointing the arbitrators. In addition, the EAL provides that the court must issue its decision on the appointment promptly. After rendering its decision, it is not subject to appeal.

Certain limitations arise under the EAL regarding the court’s power to appoint arbitrators. The first of these is that the intervention of the court is only triggered if the parties fail to agree, breach the agreed upon procedure, or if a third party fails in its role. In addition, the court must respect any legal and contractual requirement for arbitrators’ qualifications set by the law and the parties.

Article 18 of the EAL finds that an arbitrator may be challenged only if circumstances exist that give rise to serious doubts on his or her impartiality or independence. The EAL provides that a party to the arbitration may challenge the arbitrator appointed by it or in whose appointment it has participated, only for reasons of which it becomes aware after the appointment has been made.

If a party wishes to challenge an appointed arbitrator, it needs to file its application within 15 days of becoming aware of the circumstances justifying such a challenge. If the challenged arbitrator does not withdraw, the court (of Article 9) can intervene.

The IBA (International Bar Association) Guidelines on Conflicts of Interest in International Arbitration are not followed. While the parties are free to choose their application to a dispute, this would be practically futile because national courts are the competent authorities deciding on challenges to arbitrators, and the judges would need to be familiar with the guidelines, which would also need to be translated to Arabic.

The authors should mention that the Egyptian Court of Cassation has rendered its decisions confirming the views of international arbitration best practice (saying that there should be a real threat of bias).

The EAL sets a benchmark of requirements for arbitrators. In particular, Article 16 of the EAL provides that, upon accepting their mandate, arbitrators must disclose any information that could give rise to doubts regarding their independence and impartiality.

Similarly, the CRCICA Rules of 2024 provide that within a week of their appointment, arbitrators shall disclose any information that could give rise to any justifiable doubts as to their independence and impartiality.

In addition to the EAL and the CRCICA Rules, it is a well-established practice in arbitrations seated in Egypt for both parties and tribunals to rely on the IBA Guidelines.

Article 24 of the EAL provides that both parties to an arbitration may agree to confer upon the arbitral tribunal the power to order, upon request of either party, interim or conservatory measures considered necessary in respect of the subject matter of the dispute and to require any party to provide appropriate security to cover the costs of the ordered measure.

Under the same provision, interim relief granted by arbitral tribunals is binding on the parties. If the party against whom the order was issued fails to comply therewith, the requesting party may be authorised by the arbitral tribunal to undertake enforcement measures against the defaulting party. Further, the provision preserves the requesting party’s right to seek judicial enforcement of the interim measure.

The types of relief that can be awarded are not exhaustively specified in the provision, leaving the arbitral tribunal with the discretion to award any relief it considers necessary in respect of the subject matter of the dispute. Finally, Article 42 of the EAL grants the right to the arbitral tribunal to make interim or partial awards before making its final arbitral award, which terminates the entire dispute.

Domestic courts play a critical role in both the application for and enforcement of interim measures granted in investor–state arbitration.

At the application phase, Article 14 of the EAL empowers the Cairo Court of Appeal to order interim or conservatory measures prior to the commencement of the arbitral proceedings or during the conduct thereof.

In this regard, Article 194 et seq of the Code of Civil and Commercial Procedures (CCCP) allows for ex parte applications and expedited relief. The courts’ involvement at this stage ensures that urgent matters can be addressed even before the arbitral tribunal is constituted or able to act.

At the enforcement stage, Article 24 of the EAL recognises judicial enforcement of interim measures granted by arbitral tribunals, empowering the Cairo Court of Appeal to issue an execution order to enforce such measures.

Notably, in 2017, Shahid Law Firm successfully obtained an enforcement order from the president of the Cairo Court of Appeal in ex parte proceedings for an interim measure issued by an ICC arbitral tribunal seated in Paris, the first instance of a foreign arbitral interim measure being enforced in Egypt. The Cairo Court of Appeal subsequently upheld this order in adversarial proceedings in 2018, establishing a landmark precedent for the judicial enforcement of arbitral interim measures in the country.

Article 24 of the EAL provides that both parties to an arbitration may agree to confer upon the arbitral tribunal the power to order, upon request of either party, interim or conservatory measures considered necessary in respect of the subject matter of the dispute and to require any party to provide appropriate security to cover the costs of the ordered measure.

Egyptian law does not generally regulate third-party funding. Accordingly, there are no restrictions on recourse to such means of funding with respect to investor–state claims, which is commonly used by investors in cases against Egypt.

That said, third-party funding was addressed by the Egyptian legislator in the Egypt–Saudi Arabia BIT (2024), which provides in its Article 28 an explicit obligation on parties having recourse to third-party funding to disclose such arrangement, and sets out the consequences of non-disclosure.

No rules exist on third-party funding of arbitral claims. There is no law or regulation that specifically regulates third-party funding under Egyptian laws. Hence, it is not prevented.

From a practical perspective, the institutional rules applicable to the arbitration prevail. The authors must, however, highlight that third-party funding is not generally practised in Egypt and is still a novel concept.

Concurrently, the authors are not aware of any impact the existence of third-party funding may have on applications for security for costs, considering that there are no established arbitration or court cases dealing with the practice of third-party funding in Egypt.

The Ministerial Committee for the Settlement of Investment Contract Disputes, as established by Prime Minister Decree No 2432 of 2015 (as amended subsequently), offers investors an optional amicable settlement mechanism for disputes arising from investment contracts involving the state or any of its entities, bodies, or affiliated companies.

Under Article 2 of the aforementioned Decree, there is no explicit mention that parties must submit their disputes to this Committee before resorting to arbitration, meaning that recourse to the Committee cannot be deemed as a mandatory pre-arbitration step per se.

That being said, in practice, the Committee has proactively resolved numerous investment disputes prior to escalation to arbitration, namely with the Netherland’s Future Pipe Industries BV, Italy’s Tecnimont, as well as Egyptian private-sector firms Sonker Bunkering Company and Misr Technology Services.

This reflects the government’s direction to settle disputes with investors to attract foreign direct investments and ensure an investment-friendly environment in the country.

While Article 44 of the EAL prohibits the publication of arbitral awards unless otherwise agreed by the parties, it does not impose a general duty of confidentiality over the proceedings themselves.

That being said, the confidentiality of proceedings in the investor–state context ultimately depends on the provisions of the treaty under which the claim is brought: older BITs (namely, the Egypt–Kuwait 1966 BIT and its 2001 revision) are generally silent on the matter, defaulting to private proceedings, while modern treaties (namely, the Egypt–Saudi Arabia 2024 BIT) and updated rules increasingly require public access to documents, hearings and awards.

With that in mind, parties can balance interests of confidentiality and transparency by agreeing on selective publication of awards and/or pleadings, adopting transparency-oriented rules, and/or issuing joint statements; allowing for protection of sensitive information all the while ensuring public access to information on disputes involving the public interest.

Under Egyptian law, arbitral tribunals are constrained by Egyptian mandatory public policy, as prescribed in legal provisions or case law, when awarding damages.

Most significantly, tribunals may award by default simple interest within the legal cap of 5% for commercial matters (and 7% per annum maximum for agreed-upon simple interest – Article 227 of the Egyptian Civil Code (ECC)); awards granting interest above this cap, or compound interest, will not be enforced. This limitation is in line with Egyptian public policy, which restricts remedies to compensatory measures, hence restricting the award of punitive financial remedies (unless specifically authorised by statute).

The Egyptian legal system does not recognise consequential damages.

As for injunctive relief, there is no express statutory limitation on arbitral tribunals’ power to order injunctions under Egyptian law. In practice, however, the power to grant injunctions is generally exercised in the context of interim measures (see 5. Preliminary and Interim Relief), and the issuance of injunctions as part of a final award is rare. Egyptian law does not expressly prohibit injunctions as a remedy, but courts generally do not render such injunctions, and their issuance remains unregulated and uncommon.

In investor–state arbitration involving Egypt, tribunals typically employ a range of valuation methodologies to quantify damages, depending on the asset and case specifics. The discounted cash flow (DCF) method is widely used, especially for ongoing businesses with predictable future cash flows, such as in the energy sector. Market value approaches, including comparable transactions and publicly traded comparables, are applied when reliable market data exists. Cost-based approaches, such as replacement or net book value, may be used as a floor value, particularly when other methods are impractical. Ultimately, tribunals exercise discretion to select, combine, or cross-check methods, often considering the reasonableness of the parties’ claims and appointing independent experts if needed.

As explained in 8.1 Remedies, parties are entitled to claim interest on the amount in dispute, within the statutory cap of 7% per annum.

While the EAL is silent on costs, reference may be made to Article 184 et seq of the CCCP, which recognise that the unsuccessful party bears the costs of the proceedings (including attorney fees) as a matter of principle, following a costs-follow-the-event approach.

That being said, the CCCP provides an exception to the above principle, whereby the successful party may be ordered to bear all or part of the costs if the right was undisputed (ie, the unsuccessful party did not contest the right, and the successful party still brought proceedings), the successful party caused unnecessary expenses, and/or if decisive evidence was withheld.

Finally, the CCCP envisages the scenario where each of the parties fail in some of their claims; in that case, the court (and accordingly, an arbitral tribunal) has the discretion to order each party to bear its own costs, or apportion costs in the manner it deems fit, namely by ordering one party to bear all costs.

The EIL does not impose any explicit statutory obligation on investors to mitigate their losses. However, the principle of mitigation of losses is recognised under the Egyptian Civil Code, specifically Article 221(1), which applies to investors as contracting parties. Under this provision, an investor’s entitlement to compensation is contingent upon demonstrating that the harm suffered was the natural consequence of the opposing party’s conduct, and that such harm could not reasonably have been avoided through the investor’s own efforts.

The first step in enforcing a final award in Egypt is to notify the unsuccessful party by court bailiff by providing a copy of the award duly legalised and notarised. A full translation of the award is not required; however, an official Arabic translation of the award will be required later at the deposit stage below.

The second step is for the award to be deposited at the registry of the Cairo Court of Appeals. This deposit requires the presentation of the original award or a signed copy thereof, an official notarised Arabic translation of the award, the original agreement containing the arbitration clause along with an official notarised Arabic translation thereof, and proof that the unsuccessful party has been officially notified of the award by a court bailiff.

Once the above items have been submitted, the entire file is transferred to the Arbitration Office at the Ministry of Justice, which must approve the deposit of the award. To this end, it will first verify that the Cairo Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over the depositing of the award. Second, it will ensure that the award does not:

a) conflict with Egyptian public policy or morals;

b) involve an in-kind right to real estate (ie, possession, division and confirmation of ownership, etc);

c) involve any matter as to personal status under law (ie, matters usually within the domain of family law);

d) involve any criminal matter;

e) relate to a settlement in any of the matters listed in (b) through (d); or

f) relate to any matter in which settlement is not permitted by law.

If the Office approves the deposit of the award, the registrar of the Cairo Court of Appeals will issue minutes of deposit. The unsuccessful party must then be notified with a copy of the minutes of deposit by a court bailiff.

The third step is exequatur of the award. An exequatur order must be obtained from the competent judge at the Cairo Court of Appeals. This requires the submission of a request addressed to the Chief Justice of the Cairo Court of Appeals, which must be accompanied by a copy of the minutes of deposit, a certified copy of the award submitted with the deposit of the award and a copy of the agreement containing the arbitration clause along with an Arabic translation thereof.

The competent judge will issue the exequatur order once he or she confirms that:

• the request for the exequatur order was filed after a 90-day waiting period, during which the unsuccessful party may file an action to set aside the award;
• the award does not conflict with a prior judgment issued by the Egyptian courts covering the same subject matter;
• the award does not conflict with Egyptian public policy or any of its mandatory rules; and
• the unsuccessful party was properly served and represented.

If the competent judge does not grant the exequatur order, an appeal challenging this decision may be filed before the Cairo Court of Appeals within 30 days.

Where there is no application to set aside the award and the competent judge is satisfied that the award meets the requirements described above, an exequatur order can be issued within 120 to 150 days of issuance of the award.

Once exequatur is granted and notified, enforcement against the debtor’s assets in Egypt may begin.

Notably, both award creditors and debtors may challenge court orders granting or refusing exequatur before the President of the Cairo Court of Appeal – creditors within 30 days of refusal and debtors within ten days of granting – with adversarial proceedings that typically follow the ordinary appeals timeline (circa one year).

Separately, while the EAL does not contain any provision allowing or barring the enforcement of foreign awards annulled at the seat and absent court precedents on the matter, reference may be made to the CCCP enforcement regime, particularly Article 298 which explicitly requires the award to have a res judicata effect at the seat in order for it to be enforced in Egypt.

As such, the existence of set-aside proceedings at the seat may constitute serious grounds for challenging the exequatur, and at the least, mandate a stay of enforcement pending the annulment court’s ruling.

Finally, state entities are not immune to enforcement of arbitral awards, provided that the concerned entity has validly consented to arbitration and has obtained necessary prior approvals in this regard (namely, under Article 1 of the EAL, an arbitration agreement within an administrative contract is valid only if approved by the competent minister or their authorised delegate), and that the matter in dispute is arbitrable.

In practice, arbitral awards are generally enforced in Egypt; however, courts in Egypt are reluctant to recognise and enforce foreign awards that were set aside or nullified at the place or seat.

Separately, with respect to sovereign immunity, as previously explained, state entities may not invoke sovereign immunity to avoid enforcement, if they have validly consented to arbitration and if the matter in dispute is arbitrable. In the absence of court precedents on the matter, it is ultimately left to the courts’ discretion, in light of the specific facts of each case.

Under Article 87 of the ECC, state assets allocated for public benefit are considered public funds and may not be disposed of, seized, or acquired by prescription, hence cannot be subject to enforcement.

Accordingly, only state assets in the private domain – ie, used for commercial purposes – can be enforced against, following the ordinary enforcement procedure prescribed under the EAL (see 9.1 Enforcement Procedure).

In terms of identification of assets, the authors note that, although not a formal requirement under the EAL, it is established in Cairo Court of Appeal case law that the admissibility of enforcement proceedings is conditional upon the availability of assets for attachment within the Egyptian territory (Cairo Court of Appeal, Challenge No 10 JY122, session dated 30 May 2005).

Separately, while the corporate veil piercing doctrine is not formally recognised by Egyptian courts, the award creditor may initiate a fraudulent conveyance action (or “Pauline action”) to obtain the annulment of the transaction undertaken by the award debtor to dissipate their assets, under Articles 237 and 238 of the ECC. By seeking a judgment of non-enforceability of the fraudulent transaction undertaken by the award debtor, the award creditor may seek enforcement against the former’s dissipated assets.