International Trade 2025 Comparisons

Brazil is a founding member of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and of the World Trade Organization (WTO). Brazil is also a party to the Agreement on Trade in Civil Aircraft, and an observer at the Committee on Government Procurement.

From 2020 to 2022, under the (past) “Bolsonaro” Administration, Brazil negotiated its accession to the WTO Government Procurement Agreement (GPA). In June 2022, Brazil submitted a final offer for accession, including a detailed list of the contracting entities, goods and services that would be covered by the rules of the GPA, and the corresponding terms and conditions. However, in May 2023, under the (current) “Lula da Silva” Administration, Brazil withdrew its accession offer.

Brazil is a member of MERCOSUR – an imperfect Customs Union with Argentina, Paraguay and Uruguay. Mercosur members adopt a Common Tariff Nomenclature (known as the Mercosur Common Nomenclature of NCM) through which they apply a Common External Tariff (TEC). The TEC is subject to significant exceptions.

Brazil is a party to numerous regional preferential trade agreements negotiated under the umbrella of MERCOSUR. These agreements are often known as Economic Complementation Agreements (ACEs) and typically have only partial coverage, which varies by MERCOSUR country:

• Mercosur – Andean Community (except Plurinational State of Bolivia and Peru) (AAP.CE 59);
• Mercosur – Bolivia (AAP.CE 36);
• Mercosur – Chile (AAP.CE 35);
• Mercosur – Colombia (ACE-72);
• Mercosur – Cuba (AAP.CE 62);
• Mercosur – Ecuador (ACE-59);
• Mercosur – Mexico (AAP.CE 54 and AAP.CE 55, ACE-54, ACE-55);
• Mercosur – Southern African Customs Union (SACU);
• Mercosur – Peru (AAP.CE 58);
• Mercosur – Egypt;
• Mercosur – India; and
• Mercosur – Israel;

In addition to these agreements under the MERCOSUR umbrella, Brazil has the following preferential trade agreements under the umbrella of the Latin American Integration Association (ALADI) – also typically with partial coverage:

• Brazil – Argentina (AAP.CE 14);
• Brazil – Chile (ACE-35);
• Brazil – Guyana – Saint Kitts and Nevis (AAP.A25TM 38);
• Brazil – Mexico (AAP.CE 53);
• Brazil – Paraguay (AAP.CE 74);
• Brazil – Suriname (AAP.A25 TM 41);
• Brazil – Uruguay (AAP.CE 2); and
• Brazil – Venezuela (AAP.CE 69, AAP.A14TM 15).

In December 2024, MERCOSUR countries and the European Union announced the conclusion of negotiations for the MERCOSUR-EU Partnership Agreement. A similar announcement had been made in 2019, but the parties reopened negotiations to address concerns mainly related to agriculture (environment), public procurement and the auto industry. The parties have begun a preparation process for execution, which includes internal processes in MERCOSUR countries and the EU. When in force, the Partnership Agreement will cover nearly 720 million people, a total product of over USD20 trillion and two continental areas.

Brazil is a beneficiary of the Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) provided by Australia, New Zealand, Norway, Switzerland, and the United States of America. Brazil is also a member of UNCTAD’s Global System of Trade Preferences among Developing Countries (GSTP), which sets out tariff concessions to promote trade among nations in Africa, Asia, and Latin America. The government of Brazil maintains a website where it tracks the tariff preferences it grants and receives under the GSTP.

Brazil has been engaged in several trade negotiations under the MERCOSUR framework. The Bolsonaro Administration sought to initiate or accelerate negotiations with a number of countries. Generally speaking, the Lula da Silva Administration has reduced the pace of negotiations or attempted to renegotiate certain terms with most countries. Renegotiation efforts led to the conclusion of the MERCOSUR-EU Partnership Agreement in December 2024. The following agreements have been proposed or have been under consideration or negotiations.

• Mercosur – Canada – The negotiations have been underway since 2018, with seven rounds completed to date. There has been no recent sign of significant development.
• Mercosur – South Korea – Seven rounds of negotiations have been held, the latest in September 2021. There has not been significant breakthrough.
• Mercosur – EFTA – The negotiations started in 2017. There have been 11 negotiating rounds, most recently in April 2024.
• Mercosur – Indonesia – The negotiations started in December 2021, but have been quiet.
• Mercosur – Lebanon – A first round of negotiations took place in 2019; a second round took place in December 2020. Since then, no significant development has taken place.
• Mercosur – European Union – This is by far the most economically significant and longstanding negotiating process involving Brazil. Negotiations started in the 1990s, and the commercial aspects of an agreement were concluded in 2019, but have been subject to renegotiations based on resistance on both sides of the deal. The Lula da Silva Administration had publicly announced its intent to conclude the renegotiations and seal the Agreement by the end of 2024. This took place in December 2024, with the announcement of the conclusion of negotiations and the beginning of the preparation for signature of a Partnership Agreement.
• Mercosur – Vietnam – In 2020, Mercosur and Vietnam conducted exploratory dialogues and expressed their interest in negotiating a comprehensive free trade agreement. However, there have not been significant developments in these negotiations.
• Mercosur – United Arab Emirates – Exploratory discussions have been underway during the past few years and negotiations were officially launched in July 2024. 

The change from the Bolsonaro Administration to the Lula da Silva Administration has brought about a change of mindset, style and operation of Brazilian trade policy. As the Lula da Silva Administration progresses to its third year, these changes have become more visible. The underlying justifications for the changes include changes in the trade policy of other countries and their reflex on the Brazilian market, and a renewed developmental disposition in the government of Brazil.

The practical effect of these changes is particularly visible on four fronts. First, tariff increase requests and decisions have expanded in tandem with a disposition to offer additional tariff protection to incentivise traditional segments of domestic production. The effects of these measures have been subject to some debate, but the government of Brazil has clearly leaned towards more protection. Tariff increases have included steel and chemical products, wind and solar energy-generating equipment, vehicles, optical fibre and cables, among others. Second, anti-dumping investigations have been on the rise – more noticeably against Chinese products. Third, the government of Brazil has designed sectoral programmes to incentivise local production and the renewal of industrial parks, and foster greener production techniques. Fourth, priorities have shifted in trade negotiations. For instance, in a sign of lower disposition to compromise, Brazil has reacted to the European Union’s attempt to renegotiate terms of the MERCOSUR-EU trade agreement by asking for other changes to the negotiated terms – including on government procurement.

A significant development concerning trade agreements was MERCOSUR updating its Rules of Origin Regime, which came into force in July 2024. Among the new aspects of the regime, the following stand out:

• a single MERCOSUR list with the product-specific origin requirements;
• an increase in the limit of inputs imported from third countries under which the final product will qualify as originating from MERCOSUR, from 40% to 45%; and
• the implementation of a hybrid model for proof of origin, through self-certification by exporting companies and through the issuance of a certificate of origin by an entity authorised by the government of the exporting country.

The main development concerning trade agreements was the conclusion of the MERCOSUR-EU negotiations for a Partnership Agreement announced in December 2024. As the legal scrubbing and internal processes for the signature and ratification of the Agreement get traction, the Agreement is going to become a central topic on the trade agenda of business leaders in the near- and medium-term, with potentially significant long-term effects. 

There is a tendency that the developments on trade policy described in 1.5 Key Developments Regarding Trade Agreements intensify in the near-term. At the end of 2023, the Brazilian government established a Working Group to review the MERCOSUR tariff structure and evaluate the existing mechanisms for TEC exceptions. The declared aim is to enhance Brazilian competitiveness in the global market. It remains to be seen whether the government of Brazil’s intent to finally have the MERCOSUR-EU Trade Agreement signed will materialise.

In Brazil, the primary administrative authority for customs matters is the Federal Revenue Service (RFB). Administrative import-export regulations are also issued and administered by the Foreign Trade Secretariat (SECEX) at the Ministry of Development, Industry, Commerce and Services (MDIC).

Brazil does not have a centralised, unique “Customs Border Protection Service”. In addition to the RFBs and SECEX, the following government bodies also administer or enforce customs law and regulations in their areas of competence:

• National Electric Energy Agency (ANEEL);
• National Mining Agency (ANM);
• National Petroleum Agency (ANP);
• National Health Surveillance Agency (ANVISA);
• National Nuclear Energy Commission (CNEN);
• Federal Police Department (DPF);
• Brazilian Institute of Environment and Renewable Natural Resources (IBAMA);
• Ministry of Agriculture, Livestock, and Supply (MAPA);
• Ministry of Science, Technology, Innovations, and Communications (MCTIC); and
• Ministry of Defence.

Brazilian businesses whose interests are affected by trade practices in other jurisdictions (other than trade remedies, which are specifically discussed below) can petition the Brazilian government for action on behalf of their interests on the international sphere. There are two main avenues to that effect.

First, the Brazilian government maintains an electronic directory of foreign trade barriers, known as Sem Barreiras or “Without Barriers”, where interested parties can include and consult information about barriers to trade in other countries. The repository will state public action undertaken by the Brazilian government, if any, with regard to the barrier at issue, and the outcome of such action, if any.

Second, Brazilian persons can apply to the Brazilian government, through the Chamber of Foreign Trade (CAMEX) or the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, to seize an international forum (such as the WTO Dispute Settlement System) to address the trade barrier at issue. In that case, the application will be considered based on the quality and strength of the submissions and broader commercial and foreign policy considerations. If the application is successful, CAMEX will authorise the initiation of dispute settlement procedures to address the matter at issue. The representation of the government of Brazil will be carried out by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 

If a WTO dispute settlement procedure results in an authorisation for Brazil to suspend WTO concessions to another member (ie, retaliate a trade-barrier-imposing country), CAMEX can order such suspension, including through the suspension of intellectual property rights.

Since 2022, CAMEX can also order retaliation if (i) a WTO panel finds a violation of a WTO-obligation, and (ii) the Appellate Body is not functional or the panel report cannot be approved by the WTO Dispute Settlement Body, and (iii) Brazil has notified the respondent of its intention to suspend obligations at least 60 days before the order.

In the past 12 months, the government of Brazil has expanded its Authorised Economic Operator (AEO) programme to further facilitate trade by AEOs. Brazil also concluded the bulk of its Single Window project (SISCOMEX) to simplify and streamline customs procedures for import operations, with the integration of maritime import operations for consumption and operations under special customs regimes into the new system.

The RFB also created the Courier in Conformity Programme (Programa Remessa Conforme – PRC), a programme that certifies e-commerce companies that agree to follow differentiated import rules. Under the PRC, taxes are paid in advance at the time of purchase of products. The goal of the programme is to ease compliance with customs rules in imports made through e-commerce and facilitate the payment of corresponding taxes in these operations.

SECEX has also increased its efforts to combat illegal trade practices through the Foreign Trade Intelligence Group (GI-CEX), a group tasked with identifying signs of violations of foreign trade legislation and proposing measures to detect and prevent violations of the legislation. To date, GI-CEX has focused on fraudulent tax classification of imported products and on under-invoicing of transactions.

In the near-term, the government Brazil aims to complete the rollout of the SISCOMEX. In the first half of 2025, Single Window is expected to integrate imports by air and operations subject to administrative control, including imports under Duty Drawback. In the second half of 2025, the system should integrate imports by land and into the Manaus Free Trade Zone.

Brazil neither has a specific unilateral sanctions regime, nor adheres to, nor implements other countries’ unilateral sanctions regimes. The current Brazilian legal framework consists of the implementation of United Nations Security Council (UN) sanctions. Brazil established the current framework in order to address certain deficiencies that the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) had flagged in 2010 – notably concerning the implementation of UN sanctions.

Brazil’s sanctions regime reflects UN Sanctions. Law No 13,810/2019 establishes an obligation to immediately execute UN Sanctions and Designations Resolutions. In practice, once the UN issues a Resolution, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ Division of External Acts must publish the Resolution in the Federal Register by means of a “Dispatch”.

The Ministry of Justice is the main government body tasked with the administration of the sanction’s regime. However, the regime is not centralised, and other regulatory bodies are also involved in the regime, such as the Central Bank (BCB) and its Council for the Control of Financial Activities (COAF), and the Federal Police (PF).

The persons subject to sanctions are the individuals or entities listed in the relevant UN Resolution. Persons subject to the Anti-Money Laundering Law (Law No 9,613/1998) due diligence and books and records requirements (regulated persons) shall comply with sanctions and designations that determine the freezing of assets without delay or previous notice to sanctioned persons and entities. Regulated persons are also subject to know-your-customer compliance and books and records requirements in order to enable compliance with sanctions and designations without delay. Regulated persons include, among others, financial market agents (portfolio/asset managers, investment funds, exchange operators), insurance companies and brokers, leasing, factoring and credit companies, real estate companies, lotteries, luxury and high-value goods retailers, and certain consulting and auditing firms.

By law, the Ministry of Justice shall maintain a list of sanctioned persons and entities. In practice, the Ministry of Justice makes a link to the UN Sanctions List.

Brazil maintains sanctions or embargoes against countries or regions as determined by the UN.

Brazil maintains sanctions of the types determined by the UN.

Brazil typically does not apply or threaten sanctions in connection with transactions that do not have a Brazilian nexus, unless as determined by the UN.

Depending on the specific facts at issue, penalties for violating Brazil’s sanctions laws and regulations may constitute a warning notice, asset freezing, asset forfeiture, fines, suspensions or prohibitions from exercising public functions or certain business functions, and prison.

Brazil would authorise activities otherwise prohibited by sanctions as determined by the UN to the extent that the UN sanctions themselves provide for such authorisation. Additionally, the law provides for the partial unblocking of assets for the financing of strictly limited expenses, for instance, food, rent, medicine and legal representation fees.

Regulated Persons are subject to know-your-customer compliance and books and records requirements in order to enable compliance with sanctions and designations without delay. Regulated persons shall comply with sanctions and designations that determine the freezing of assets without delay or previous notice to sanctioned persons and entities.

There is no specific rule regarding standards of liability for violations of sanctions laws and regulations. However, criminal liability, in particular, shall always require intent or fault (ie, subjective liability).

Sanctions reporting requirements in Brazil will mimic the requirements as determined by the UN.

Brazil does not have explicit blocking statutes, anti-boycott regulations or other restrictions that prohibit adherence to other jurisdictions’ sanctions. Broadly speaking, private parties are not prohibited or prevented from adhering to foreign sanctions in their private (contractual) relations.

The main recent development regarding sanctions in Brazil was the transfer of COAF from the Ministry of Justice to the Ministry of Economy, and then to the Central Bank of Brazil, during 2023.

Sanctions tend to mount in connection with increased conflicts and geopolitical tensions. To the extent that the UN expands its sanctions and designations, Brazil will follow. To the extent that foreign countries expand their own sanctions regime, the Brazilian government and private companies will face pressures to adhere or associate themselves to those regimes. Brazilian companies and companies contracting with them should be intentional about sanctions and trade embargo clauses, and take care not to draft sweeping clauses that may lead to unintended contractual encumbrances in the face of expanding foreign countries’ sanctions regimes.

Brazil’s export control regime has four main prongs: (i) the general export control regime, (ii) the export control regime for defence products, (iii) the export control regime for sensitive goods and services directly linked thereto and (iv) the export control regime for army-controlled products.

General Export Control Regime

As a general rule, all imports into and exports from Brazil require registration with SISCOMEX, the operating system for Brazilian foreign trade. SISCOMEX is a “single portal” created to reduce red-tape and manage import and export procedures, integrating trade operators and governmental entities involved in the process.

In order to register with SISCOMEX, companies must possess a digital certificate and request registration through the Habilita Portal by submitting the required documentation. The Federal Revenue Services will grant an Habilita authorisation based on the information submitted.

Brazilian trade controls are typically product-related – ie, the controls are specific for each product and do not vary depending on the country of origin or destination. The product-related controls are primarily based on the product classification according to the Mercosur Common Nomenclature (NCM). The NCM is an eight-digit code based on the Harmonised System. SISCOMEX records the relevant information for imports and exports of each product (NCM), including applicable trade controls. As a general rule, import licensing is not required.

An assessment of the specific import and export controls and requirements for a given product depends on the NCM code information.

Export Control Regime for Defence Products

Brazil’s National Policy for the Export and Import of Defence Products (Decree 9,607/2018 or PNEI-PRODE) sets out the regime for the export of defence products as listed on the “List of Defence Products” (LIPRODE). Defence products are classified according to their sensitivity as “Level 1” or “Level 2” products. Export control procedures for Level 2 products are relatively more stringent, and cover exports since before the start of negotiations between the Brazilian exporter and the foreign buyer/country. Subject goods are listed on the list of controlled defence products, designated as the LIPRODE.

Export Control Regime for Sensitive Goods and Services Directly Linked Thereto

Brazil imposes specific export control for dual- and single-use goods in the nuclear, chemical and biological fields (Law No 9,112/1995).

Export Control Regime for Army-Controlled Products

Brazil imposes specific export control for army-controlled products (Decree 10,030/2019). Army-controlled products consist of products with destructive power or damaging properties or those that should be restricted for safety reasons, and products of military interest.

General Export Control Regime

The SECEX is the main authority for export controls under the general regime.

Export Control Regime for Defence Products

The Ministry of Defence and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs are the main authorities for export controls of defence products under the PNEI-PRODE.

Export Control Regime for Sensitive Goods and Services Directly Linked Thereto

The main authority for export controls of sensitive goods and services linked thereto is the Interministerial Commission for Export Control of Sensitive Goods, which is co-ordinated by the Ministry of Science, Technology and Innovation. The ministries represented in the Interministerial Commission have specific roles throughout the control process. 

Export Control Regime for Army-Controlled Products

The Army Command is the authority for the export control of Army-Controlled Products.

Export controls are enforced at the border by the Federal Revenues Service (acting as the primary Customs Border Protection body), and by the Federal Police.

Typically, exports may be subject to specific controls as indicated for the product’s MERCOSUR Common Nomenclature (NCM) code – an HS-based code consisting of eight digits that corresponds to the MERCOSUR Tariff Nomenclature. The product may also fall under specific export control procedures depending on its description and characteristics and whether these match existing export controls.

Persons may be subject to export controls depending on whether their activities falls under the export control regimes for defence products, sensitive goods, or army-controlled products. 

Brazil only maintains a public list of restricted persons to the extent that United Nations Security Council Sanctions restrict trading with those persons. However, although not based on a public list of restricted persons, the procedures for exporting controlled products do include assessments of the importers, buyers, end-users and countries of destination. This assessment may cause an export transaction to be rejected. 

Brazil maintains two main sets of lists of controlled exports.

First, Brazil maintains the LIPRODE that the Secretary of Defence Products within the Ministry of Defence issues upon assessment of the sensitivity of the products in question.

Second, Brazil maintains Lists of Sensitive Exports, related to goods in the nuclear, chemical and biological fields. These lists are: (i) the Control List for the Nuclear Field, (ii) the Control List of the Chemical Field, (iii) the Control List for the Biological Field and (iv) the Control List for the Missile Area. The Interministerial Commission for Export Control of Sensitive Goods and the Ministry of Science and Technology issues and updates the Lists of Sensitive Exports in light of Brazil’s international obligations.   

See 4.1 Export Controls for a description of the types of export controls under Brazilian law.

Depending on the specific facts at issue, violation of Brazil’s export control laws may result in warning notices, fines, forfeitures, suspensions or prohibitions from engaging in foreign trade, and prison.

Brazil’s export control regime typically does not prohibit the export of defined products. Rather, the export control regime establishes that the export transactions shall be subject to specific authorisation procedures before they take place.

There is no specific rule regarding compliance expectations and standards of liability for violations of export controls. As explained above, Brazil typically requires that administering authorities pre-authorise export transactions subject to controls. Accordingly, unauthorised exports of products subject to export controls will typically lead to a finding of a violation. However, criminal liability, in particular, shall always require intent or fault (ie, subjective liability). 

Reporting requirements for export controls depend on the export control regime at play.

General Export Control Regime

The general export control regime does not have particular reporting requirements. Exporters are generally required to retain the documents related to exports for five years, regardless of existing export controls.

Export Control Regime for Defence Products

In addition to standard document-retention obligations, exporters of defence products shall register with multiple systems covering export authorisation (Exprodef), company and record of transactions (SisCaPED) and product cataloguing (Siscade) of products and components.

Export Control Regime for Sensitive Goods and Services Directly Linked Thereto

In addition to standard document-retention obligations, exporters of sensitive products shall register with the Ministries intervening in the authorisation of the export transaction (which may vary depending on the product’s field and application). Moreover, after receiving an authorisation, exporters shall report the transaction to the controlling authority of the specific product list. 

Export Control Regime for Army-Controlled Products

In addition to standard document-retention obligations, exporters of army-controlled products shall keep specific inventory and sales controls, and they shall also register with the Army Command. Any loss, theft or diverting of products shall be reported to the army command. 

The Brazilian export controls regimes have not seen significant changes in the most recent 12-month period.

Brazilian export controls are currently regulated by piecemeal laws and regulations. The Ministry of Science, Technology and Innovation has identified that the Brazilian export control regime would benefit from broader, all-encompassing legislation and more intense co-ordination among the various bodies involved in the regimes. This is an area that may receive some attention in the near future. However, there are no concrete signs of significant pending changes and issues on the horizon pertaining to export controls over the next 12 months or so.

On the other hand, export controls tend to increase in connection with increased conflicts and geopolitical tensions. To the extent that foreign countries expand their own export control regimes, the Brazilian government and private companies may be pressed to adhere or associate themselves to those regimes. In this regard, Brazilian companies of products subject to specific controls can expect to face enhanced scrutiny on transactions, for instance, in connection with the assessment of end users and countries of destination.

Moreover, from a practical standpoint, risk and export compliance teams, the Federal Revenue Services and the Federal Police have been challenged by an increasing use of Brazilian ports, airports and containers as linking routes between narcotics’ producing and consuming regions of the world. One area that has required increased attention by exporters and their importers is the interception and use of otherwise lawful shipments from Brazil to Northern hemisphere countries as carrying means for international drug trafficking.

The imposition of trade remedy measures (AD, CVD and safeguard measures) in Brazil implicates a number of administrative authorities. First, the SECEX of the MDIC initiates investigations, based on reports produced by the Department of Trade Defence (DECOM) within SECEX.

Second, DECOM acts as the investigating authority for dumping, subsidies or import surges (as applicable), injury or threat of injury to the domestic industry or material retardment to the establishment of the domestic industry, and causal link. DECOM further acts as the investigating authority in public interest procedures.

At the end of its investigations, DECOM issues recommendations regarding duties. If DECOM does not recommend the imposition of duties, SECEX will terminate the investigation. If DECOM recommends the imposition of duties, DECOM’s report will be placed on the agenda of the Executive Management Committee (GECEX) at the Brazilian CAMEX. Following DECOM’s recommendation, GECEX is ultimately responsible for the imposition, modification and suspensions of trade remedy measures.

The RFB is responsible for the collection of AD, CVD and safeguard measures.

SECEX initiates reviews after having received a petition by the domestic industry. Theoretically, in exceptional circumstances, SECEX may self-initiate a review, provided it has sufficient evidence to do so.

Brazilian AD/CVD regulations provide for the types of reviews discussed below. A review of any kind typically requires a petition by an eligible interested party. In special cases, DECOM may initiate a review on its own motion – but this possibility has not materialised from a practical perspective.

New Shipper Review (AD) or Accelerated Review (CVD)

New shipper reviews are procedures to calculate individual margins for producers/exporters that have not exported the product to Brazil during the period of investigation in the procedure that led to the imposition of the AD duty in question. Accelerated reviews are procedures to calculate individual duties for exporters that have not been investigated in the CVD investigation.

Anti-Circumvention Review

Anti-circumvention reviews aim to avoid minor modifications to the trade pattern existing prior to the investigation frustrating the effect of a trade remedy measure. An anti-circumvention review may lead to the extension of a measure to cover (i) imports of parts, pieces and components from the subject country for manufacturing in Brazil, of subject product, (ii) imports of a product from a third-country made from parts, pieces or components from the subject country that result in subject product, and (iii) imports of products from the subject country with minor modifications compared to the subject product.

Restitution Review

Restitution reviews allow the refund of duties collected in the event that the margin calculated for the review period is lower than the duty in force. Only interested importers may request a restitution review, and the application shall contain precise information of the amount to be reimbursed (including payment of duties, normal value and export price). The interested parties in a restitution review are the interested importer and the producers/exporters with an individually applicable margin.

Scope Review

Scope reviews aim to resolve an issue as to whether a given product is subject to a given measure. Scope reviews are essentially an exercise of interpretation of the order and cannot change the scope of the measure at issue. The main signposts for a scope review are, on one hand, the subject product definition and its parameters and, on the other hand, the product under review’s defining characteristics. DECOM may refer to the outcome of a scope review in the context of investigations or other reviews regarding the subject product.

Redetermination

Redetermination procedures examine whether a measure has been compromised by either: (i) the form of application of the measure (ad valorem, fixed duty) or (ii) the export pricing behaviour. In the case of a change in the amount of the duty, the revised duties must not be higher than the calculated margin for the most recent investigation or review. The reason why a redetermination may result in an increase in the duty is that Brazil applies the lesser duty rule for co-operating exporters in original investigations (and in certain cases, in sunset reviews). 

Changed Circumstances Review

Changed circumstances reviews (CCRs) can be conducted upon request, provided that there has been a “significant and lasting” change of circumstances that do not consist of “changes or fluctuations inherent to the market”. CCRs may lead to the termination or alteration of the duties on dumping or injury grounds.

Sunset Review

AD/CVD duties are imposed for five years, at which time they lapse, unless a sunset review is initiated. AD/CVD duties are typically not reviewed, unless there is a petition to that effect. Petitioners shall petition for a sunset review up to four years and eight months from the last imposition of the duties. If no sunset review is initiated up to the day of the duties’ fifth anniversary, the duties in question shall automatically lapse on the day after their fifth anniversary. If a sunset review is timely initiated, the duties shall remain in force during the review process.

Sunset reviews assess the likelihood of continuation or recurrence of the practice at issue and the corresponding injury. Sunset reviews can result in the extension of the duties for an additional period of five years, or in the termination or change of duties.

Brazilian trade remedy proceedings are open to foreign companies that qualify as “interested parties”. Producers and/or exporters of the product subject to the investigation, trade associations that represent such producers and/or exporters, and the government of the country subject to the investigation typically qualify as “interested parties”, and therefore have the opportunity to participate in investigations and reviews.

From the date that SECEX publicises the initiation of the investigation, interested parties that were not initially identified as an “interested party” in DECOM’s opinion on the initiation of the investigation of the investigation (or review) have 20 days to request to participate.

AD/CVD

AD investigations should take up to ten months and CVD investigations should take up to 12 months. However, these time limits are subject to extensions up to 18 months. The process and main timelines for the investigation of AD/CVD duties since initiation are the following:

• filing of the request to qualify as an “interested party” in the proceeding – 20 days from initiation;
• response to the exporter/importer questionnaire – 30 days from receipt of questionnaire;
• publication of DECOM’s preliminary determination – from 120 days (AD) or from 150 days (CVD) from initiation;
• deadline for parties to present evidence (evidentiary phase) – 120 days from the preliminary determination; and
• deadline for parties to present statements and comments (statement phase) – 20 days from the evidentiary phase.

Safeguards

For safeguard measures, the relevant parties that may apply for the remedy are SECEX, other federal government agencies or companies and industry trade groups that manufacture the product under investigation. The initiation of the investigation will be published by SECEX, and affected parties may request hearings with the government authorities within 30 days. The decision regarding the application, suspension or modification of safeguard measures will be made by the MDIC based on DECOM’s report.

The Brazilian Federal Register (DOU) publishes public versions of the reports for: (i) the initiation of investigations, (ii) the preliminary determination and (iii) the final determination. However, only the interested parties can access the restricted case files and only the authority can access the confidential case file (ie, the file containing “Business Proprietary Information”).

In Brazil, AD/CVD duties and can be imposed on exports of any country. However, safeguards are not imposed on MERCOSUR members: Argentina, Paraguay and Uruguay.

AD/CVD duties are typically not reviewed, unless there is a petition to that effect. If no petition for a sunset review is submitted up to four years and eight months from the last imposition of the duties, or if no sunset review is initiated up to the day of the duties’ fifth anniversary, the duties in question shall automatically lapse on the day after their fifth year-anniversary.

Safeguard measures that last for over three years are subject to a review up to when they reach half of their lifetime.

In Brazil, AD/CVD duties shall automatically lapse on their fifth anniversary, unless a sunset review is initiated by that time. The sunset review procedures take up to 12 months, during which time the AC/CVD in question shall remain in place.

Sunset reviews assess the likelihood of continuation or recurrence of the practice at issue and the corresponding injury. Interested parties are allowed to participate in the review, including the producers/exporters concerned, their representative associations and governments, and importers concerned. Sunset review questionnaires are similar to original investigation questionnaires. The investigating process mirrors original investigations. 

The Brazilian legal system allows administrative appeals from GECEX decisions and judicial review of administrative decisions regarding AD/CVD and safeguard measures.

Administrative appeals can be submitted to GECEX, which will direct the matter to DECOM for reconsideration. Because the authorities involved in administrative appeals are the same as the ones that administer investigations and the imposition of duties, it is relatively rare for appeals to succeed, except in the case of evident errors or omissions.

Requests for judicial review of trade remedy measures are possible, but relatively rare in practice. One of the reasons for the scarcity of judicial review requests is an identified lack of expertise in the court system to address technical and specific questions that tend to arise in trade remedy procedures.

On the regulatory front, in November 2023, SECEX significantly changed the regulations regarding the procedures related to public interest assessments. The stated policy objective was to expedite the procedures and reduce bureaucracy (costs for interested parties and the government). In practice, SECEX increased the bar for public interest initiations and sequenced public interest initiations so that they will not concur with the underlying AD/CVD case.

In terms of investigative activity, AD/CVD initiations have been intense. From January to the end of October 2024, SECEX initiated 48 new procedures – the highest number since at least 2015.

In addition to the uptick in initiations, SECEX initiated certain types of procedures for the first time in 2024. DECOM has therefore been more open to the exploration of the different possibilities for the review of ADs/CVDs provided by law and the regulations. 

• In March 2024, SECEX initiated the first procedure (a sunset review on grinding media from India) under the new CVD Regulations, which had been in place since October 2021.
• In June 2024, SECEX initiated the first changed circumstances review since the publication of the AD regulations in 2013 (on S-PVC from the United States).
• In August 2024, SECEX initiated the first accelerated review of a CVD (on PET films from India) under the new CVD regulations.
• In October 2024, SECEX initiated the first changed circumstances review of a CVD (on grinding media from India).

In the near term, original anti-dumping investigations are expected to continue rising in number. At the same time, DECOM is likely to face challenges to manage a growing caseload – and parties are likely to face corresponding challenges as the authority faces an overload. DECOM’s overload may also negatively impact its ability to provide technical support to Brazilian exporters as other major jurisdictions also increase their trade remedy-activity. 

Brazil does not use any specific investment security mechanism or a specific investment security-related administrative authority. Generally speaking, the Brazilian legal and policy framework does not discriminate investors based on defined security interests, and Brazilian authorities will typically support productive foreign investment without prejudice to the country of origin. That, however, does not mean that security interests do not have any impact on investments. For instance, security will be factored into the political and technical public-interest considerations if and when the Administration is involved in an investment process (eg, during the privatisation of state-owned enterprises). Additionally, security interests are reflected in import controls, and such controls can apply to the products and/or services related to an investment.

Brazilian law provides for narrow, industry-specific restrictions on foreign direct investment. The restrictions that can be more directly related to security interests are on foreign investment in nuclear power, and on the acquisition of lands located in areas of national borders.

Brazil does not have a specific investment security mechanism or a specific investment security-related administrative authority.

Generally speaking, Brazil does not subject investment transactions to specific security screening. Security interests are an element of public-interest considerations if and when the Administration is involved in an investment process (eg, during the privatisation of state-owned enterprises).

Brazil does not mandate specific filing or notifications related to investment security.

Brazil does not mandate specific filing or notifications related to investment security.

Brazil does not mandate specific filing or notifications related to investment security.

Brazil does not mandate specific filing or notifications related to investment security.

There have not been noticeable developments regarding investment security review in the past 12 months.

Because Brazil has avoided discriminating investors based on defined security interests, and because Brazilian authorities will typically support productive foreign investment without prejudice to the origin country, no changes are expected to the Brazilian investment regime in the near term.

Brazil has relatively high import tariff protection. Typically, and historically, Brazil has relied on this tariff protection in an attempt to encourage domestic production focused on supplying the domestic market.

The current Federal Administration has also adopted sectoral incentive programmes to foster specific objectives. A noticeable initiative in this regard is the “Mover Programme” or “Green Mobility Programme”. Mover consists of value added tax incentives and penalties, financial credits and import tariff amendments depending on the energy source and consumption of vehicle, motor power, recyclability, structural performance and driving-assistance technologies, R&D investments and relocation of production plants to Brazil.

Typically, Brazilian technical regulations aim to address concerns such as product safety, the protection of life, health and/or the environment, and follow the principles and rules of the WTO TBT Agreement – which is incorporated into Brazilian law. Technical regulations may or may not include voluntary or compulsory Conformity Assessment Procedures.

Standards and other technical requirements may affect imports or encourage domestic production, but a case-by-case analysis of the relevant standard or regulations, the product and market at issue is required to reach a conclusion about the adherence of the relevant standard or regulations to domestic and international law.

The main authority that establishes and administers technical regulation is National Institute for Metrology, Quality and Technology (INMETRO), an autarchy linked to the MDIC. INMETRO also acts as import licensing authority for goods subject to its regulations and as a notifying authority for issues related to the WTO TBT Agreement.

Typically, Brazilian sanitary and phytosanitary requirements aim to address concerns such as ensuring human, animal and plant health, and follow the principles and rules of the WTO SPS Agreement – which are incorporated into Brazilian law.

The main authorities that issue and administer SPS requirements are (i) the National Health Surveillance Agency (ANVISA), an autarchy linked to the Ministry of Health, which establishes requirements for products under sanitary surveillance, and (ii) the International Farming Surveillance (VIGIAGRO), an organ of the Ministry of Agriculture and Cattling.

Brazil does not have currently have competition policy and price controls aimed at reducing imports or encouraging domestic production. However, in a not-distant past, Brazilian authorities have occasionally applied price controls on import transactions subject to licensing.

In 2021, a Presidential Act (Provisional Measure) expressly prohibited the Federal Administration from controlling import prices. However, when Congress converted the Presidential Act, it removed that express prohibition from the Law.

Historically, the Department of Operations of Foreign Trade (DECEX) within the SECEX at MDIC had been expressly authorised to monitor import prices and request information from importers about the prices. In August 2024, SECEX revoked this express authorisation.

Brazil does not typically engage in state trading, and Brazilian state-owned enterprises and privatisation measures typically do not aim to reduce imports or encourage domestic production.

The Brazilian Development Bank (BNDES) has several programmes that provide financial support to investors and companies operating in Brazil – including long-term financing, equity investment and capital markets operations. The Bank of Brazil administers export finance facilities and the Brazilian Agency for the Management of Guarantee Funds administers export credit insurance facilities.

The Lula Administration generally favours the application of “buy Brazil” requirements in government procurement. The Brazilian Government Procurement Act prohibits the imposition of qualification requirements or criteria that may constitute barriers to foreign bidders. However, the Government Procurement Act expressly allows a “preference margin” of up to 10% of the price to domestic goods and services compared to foreign goods and services. In the case of domestically manufactured products and services resulting from technological development and innovation from Brazil, the margin of preference may be up to 20%.

Brazil has adopted and implemented a policy to foster Geographical Indications (GIs) through Protected Designations of Origin (PDOs) and Protected Geographical Indications (PGIs). Brazil recognised the first domestic GI in 2002: red, white and sparkling wines from the region of Vale dos Vinhedos. By the end of 2023, Brazil had registered 109 domestic GIs – and 29 requests for registration were under analysis. Brazilian GIs cover an array of fruits and fruit products, cereals, manioc, yams, coffee, fish, cheese, flour, honey, propolis, herbs, pepper, saffron, meat-products, spirits and wine, textile-products and shoes, and/or their producing regions.

Brazil has also registered international GIs. It granted the first such recognition in 1999: the protection of origin designation to the region of the Vinhos Verdes in Portugal. Since then, Brazil has registered several other GIs. International registered GIs in Brazil cover several spirits, wine and cheese, and/or their producing regions.

The National Institute for Industrial Property (INPI) maintains a Manual on Geographical Indications that consolidates guidelines and procedures for the analysis of geographical indication requests.

National Strategy for Foreign Trade

In November 2023, the government of Brazil launched consultations on the National Strategy for Foreign Trade. However, there has not been an official issuance of the strategy to date.

The White Paper published for consultation explains that the strategy’s objective is to promote the competitive insertion of Brazil in international trade, in line with the Industrial Policy. The White Paper divides the strategy under consultations into five axes:

• export competitiveness;
• economic integration;
• de-bureaucratisation and trade facilitation;
• trade and sustainability; and
• fighting unfair and illegal trade practices.

The horizontal principles guiding the strategy are:

• inclusion;
• evidence-based decision-making;
• transparency;
• coherence;
• predictability;
• planning and monitoring; and
• efficiency and effectiveness.

Several initiatives of note can be related to the umbrella of the strategy’s White Paper, for example as follows.

• The provision for procedures for import-tariff change applications due to “conjunctural trade imbalances”. These procedures are a means for the imposition of import-tariff increases to selected products groups, in addition to previously existing mechanisms. Based on these procedures, several import-tariff increases have been implemented during 2024.
• The launching of public consultations on sustainable goods in foreign trade in July 2024. This request for information seeks to obtain information about the sustainable product characteristics of goods produced in Brazil, concerning carbon emissions, circular economy standards and labour standards. A report on this initiative is expected before the end of 2024.
• Brazil’s adherence to the Global Trade and Gender Arrangement (GTAGA) during the 13th WTO Interministerial Conference, in February 2024 and, in March 2024, the launching of the Programme “Women export” (Elas exportam), a mentoring programme for women-led companies to engage in foreign trade.