Cartels 2025 Comparisons

In Poland, anti-competitive agreements are sanctioned under Article 6 of the Act of 16 February 2007 on Competition and Consumer Protection, which regulates the prohibition of entrepreneurs entering into anti-competitive agreements, and under Article 15c of the Act of 16 April 1993 on Combatting Unfair Competition, which indicates that prohibited agreements constitute an act of unfair competition. Furthermore, the Act of 6 June 1997 on the Code of Criminal Procedure (“Criminal Code”) outlines the crime of bid-rigging.

In accordance with the Act on Claims for Redress of Injury Caused by Infringement of the Competition Law of 21 April 2017 (private enforcement) (“Act on Claims”), entrepreneurs can secure a claim for the redress of damage from cartel members.

Public Enforcement Agencies

The President of the Competition and Consumer Protection Office (Prezes Urzędu Ochrony Konkurencji i Konsumentów) (“President of UOKiK”) is the central authority for competition and consumer protection, and is responsible for:

• conducting explanatory and anti-monopoly proceedings;
• imposing administrative sanctions, including fines;
• issuing commitment decisions; and
• conducting dawn raids.

Administrative Sanctions

The President of UOKiK conducts administrative proceedings, resulting in decisions and fines of up to 10% of the previous year's turnover, considering:

• the nature of the violation;
• market impact;
• prior violations; and
• the duration of the violation.

Civil Liability

Entrepreneurs harmed by anti-competitive agreements can seek:

• damages;
• orders to remove unlawful practices;
• public statements;
• restitution of unfair benefits; and
• awards for socially beneficial purposes.

Criminal Liability

Bid rigging is criminalised under the Polish Criminal Code, with penalties ranging from three months to five years imprisonment, or from six months to eight years if committed for financial or personal gain.

New Trends

In 2024, new guidance on fines was issued, influenced by the ECN+ Directive, affecting international corporate groups and clarifying factors like infringement duration and market impact. The guidance also outlines mitigating circumstances, such as co-operation, as well as aggravating factors, like leading a cartel.

There is increased activity in seeking compensation for anti-competitive agreements, particularly through private enforcement. The President of UOKiK has intensified efforts to detect cartels, especially in consumer electronics, household appliances and the automotive industry.

An entrepreneur whose interests have been threatened or infringed by an act of unfair competition is entitled to bring a civil lawsuit. Claims for damages are regulated by the Act on Claims and the Civil Code. Procedural aspects not regulated by the Act on Claims are subject to the provisions of the Polish Code of Civil Procedure.

Conditions for Filing a Lawsuit

Liability for damages resulting from an infringement of competition law requires that the defendant acted with fault and that the claimant suffered damage. There is a presumption that a violation of competition law causes damage. An entrepreneur whose interests were threatened or infringed as a result of an act of unfair competition is vested with the right to file a lawsuit.

Agreements that eliminate, restrict or distort competition in the market are prohibited. Examples of anti-competitive agreements under the Act on Competition and Consumer Protection include:

• fixing prices and conditions of purchase or sale;
• limiting or controlling production, sales, technological progress or investment;
• dividing sale or purchase markets;
• applying onerous or disparate contract conditions in similar contracts;
• making contracts conditional on unrelated performances;
• restricting market access or eliminating non-party undertakings; and
• bid rigging in tenders.

Agreements can be formal contracts or any form of co-ordination between undertakings.

Exemptions

Prohibitions on anti-competitive agreements generally apply to all industries.

Quantitative exemptions

Agreements are excluded if:

• competitors have a combined market share not exceeding 5%; or
• non-competing entrepreneurs each have a market share not exceeding 10%.

Qualitative exemptions

Prohibitions do not apply if agreements:

• improve production or distribution, or promote technical/economic progress;
• allow consumers an appropriate share of benefits;
• do not impose unnecessary restrictions on entrepreneurs; and
• do not eliminate competition in a substantial part of the market.

Temporary Statutory Exclusion

The Council of Ministers may exclude certain agreements by regulation, considering potential benefits. Current exclusions cover:

• technology transfer agreements;
• vertical agreements, including selective and exclusive distribution systems; and
• specialisation and R&D agreements.

Private Enforcement

A claim for damages resulting from a breach of competition law (within the scope of an unlawful agreement) is subject to a limitation period of five years from the date on which the injured party became aware or, with appropriate due diligence, could have become aware of both the damage and the party liable for its redress.

The limitation period runs from the cessation of the infringement and is suspended upon the initiation of explanatory or antitrust proceedings by the President of UOKiK (or the European Commission). The limitation period expires at the end of the calendar year.

Public Enforcement

Proceedings concerning anti-competitive practices shall not be initiated if more than five years have elapsed since the end of the year in which the infringement ceased.

The Act on Competition and Consumer Protection applies to anti-competitive practices that produce or are capable of producing effects in the territory of the Republic of Poland. To that extent, the President of UOKiK is competent to monitor and enforce compliance with the provisions of the Act on Competition and Consumer Protection by entrepreneurs. This means that, even if the agreement was concluded entirely in another country, the President of UOKiK is entitled to initiate proceedings if such agreement has an effect in the territory of the Republic of Poland.

The President of UOKiK and other national competition authorities co-operate within the European Competition Network (ECN) and under the ECN+ Directive. The President of UOKiK applies the principles of comity regulated by EU law and may, for instance, exchange evidence while applying EU law. The European Commission and the national competition authorities of all EU member states co-operate by informing each other of new cases of abuse of the law and by exchanging information, documents and experiences of investigations. There are also some other co-operation agreements but they are less significant because they relate mostly to creating good practices together and sharing experiences in general.

In 2024, 386 notifications concerning anti-competitive practices were received, and 13 decisions were issued in cases involving competition-restricting practices – 11 of which concerned prohibited agreements, and two involved abuse of a dominant position. In nine of these cases, pecuniary penalties were imposed on undertakings.

The number of leniency applications has been gradually increasing: three applications were filed in 2022, seven in 2023, and eight in 2024. However, leniency applications still represent a minority compared to newly initiated ex officio proceedings.

Co-operation with whistle-blowers is gaining importance. Under the whistle-blower programme, thousands of anonymous reports were submitted in 2024.

The vast majority of proceedings concerning cartel agreements are domestic in nature: approximately 85% involve entities operating within the territory of Poland and affecting the national market. A relatively high number of recent cases concerned vertical cartels, focusing particularly on resale price maintenance issues.

The Office of Competition and Consumer Protection can issue and publish explanations and interpretations relevant to the application of provisions within the scope of the President of UOKiK's actions, based on Article 31a of the Act on Competition and Consumer Protection. These are published in the official gazette.

The President of UOKiK has issued explanations and interpretations in competition law regarding the following in particular:

• calculating financial penalties for anti-competitive practices;
• imposing fines on individuals in managerial positions;
• voluntary submission to a pecuniary penalty; and
• issuing binding decisions on anti-competitive practices.

In 2024, UOKiK published a guide on no-poach and wage-fixing agreements in the labour market.

The President of UOKiK typically initiates explanatory proceedings if there is a possible violation of the Act on Competition and Consumer Protection. If sufficient grounds are found, antitrust proceedings may be issued. Proceedings are conducted in written form, primarily involving requests for information via written correspondence. If justified, such as when there is a risk that evidence will be tampered with, a dawn raid may be carried out.

The President of UOKiK can conduct searches during explanatory and anti-monopoly proceedings with prior consent from the Competition and Consumer Protection Court. There has been an increase in searches at company premises to uncover relevant evidence.

Dawn Raid Powers

The court’s consent for a search is served at the start of a dawn raid. The inspected company must provide the requested information, grant access to rooms and items, hand over materials, and enable access to data carriers, IT equipment and email correspondence. The authority can also request oral explanations from employees. Police assistance is typical during dawn raids.

Refusal to Co-Operate

If a company refuses to provide information or hampers an inspection, the President of UOKiK can impose a financial penalty of up to 3% of the company’s turnover and a personal fine on the manager, of up to 50 times the average monthly remuneration.

Evidence Collection

Evidence collected during inspections can be secured at the company’s premises or at the authority’s premises, for up to seven days. A receipt is issued to the individuals concerned.

Legal Professional Privilege

Communication between an entrepreneur and their qualified lawyer is confidential. There are disputes in Poland over whether internal lawyer documents and communication outside proceedings are covered by legal professional privilege; disputes frequently occur between entrepreneurs and the President of UOKiK in this area.

Proceedings by the President of UOKiK formally begin with the delivery of a decision specifying the subject matter. From that moment, the undertaking must co-operate and provide information, including documents.

Failure to comply can result in financial penalties of up to 3% of the undertaking’s turnover being imposed on the undertaking or managing individuals for actions like providing false information, failing to provide requested data, or obstructing inspections or searches.

Polish regulations do not provide for criminal liability for merely obstructing a search or requests for information. However, penalties exist for destroying documents not exclusively held by the entrepreneur or for refusing to provide such documents.

In antitrust proceedings, the parties are the President of UOKiK and the entity against whom the proceedings have been initiated. Officers or employees are not considered parties. Parties may appoint attorneys or legal representatives, except when procedural actions require personal involvement, such as witness hearings.

An in-house lawyer may act as a representative, but documents prepared by them may not be fully protected by legal professional privilege during dawn raids, which is typically reserved for external qualified lawyers. Legal representatives can actively participate at every stage of the proceedings.

Witness testimony is personal and cannot be given by a representative. However, a professional attorney oversees the hearing and may engage with UOKiK officials, including raising objections. An external qualified lawyer should verify that the President of UOKiK does not exceed the scope of powers during a dawn raid.

Due to potential conflicts of interest, the in-house lawyer and the external lawyer of a managing individual should not be the same person. It is recommended that entrepreneurs appoint a qualified external lawyer to ensure lawful actions by the authority during interviews and inspections. If irregularities occur, the external lawyer should submit objections and file complaints against procedural acts infringing the rights of the inspected entrepreneur.

In antitrust proceedings, evidence matters are governed by the Act on Competition and Consumer Protection and the Polish Code of Civil Procedure. Proceedings are conducted ex officio, with the President of UOKiK gathering evidence by requesting written information from the undertaking. The authority may also conduct inspections or dawn raids to obtain evidence. During a dawn raid, a mixed team of lawyers and IT specialists search data carriers using keywords, examining both paper documents and digital communications like WhatsApp messages.

The President of UOKiK can hear witnesses and demand documents from entities that are not party to the proceedings, often requesting both source data and synthetic compilations, especially in cases with extensive corporate documentation.

Legal Professional Privilege

In Poland, legal professional privilege generally applies only to communications with independent qualified lawyers. The President of UOKiK must prove that an in-house lawyer is not independent. There is no settled case law on this issue, and the Polish principle of legal professional privilege offers higher protection than the EU standard. Although some jurisprudence extends privilege to in-house lawyers, the President of UOKiK and other jurisprudence disagree, making this a contentious issue often resolved in courts.

Documents covered by legal professional privilege must relate to the proceedings' subject matter. The protection of internal documents quoting a lawyer's advice is not explicitly regulated.

Privilege Against Self-Incrimination

Polish competition law does not explicitly state a right against self-incrimination, except for specific provisions regarding witnesses. Polish courts accept this privilege based on EU law, limiting the President of UOKiK's demands to information and documents but not studies, analyses or opinions. This privilege does not equate to criminal law protection and does not prevent entrepreneurs from voluntarily providing incriminating information.

Other Specific Privileges

Individuals can refuse to provide information if doing so would expose them or their relatives to criminal liability. Information provided cannot be used against the individual or their relatives in penalty proceedings against the entrepreneur's manager.

Entrepreneurs, managers and other entities must provide requested information, make documents available, and allow inspections and searches.

Refusals to co-operate, though rare, include providing false information, failing to provide requested information, hindering inspections or searches, and data deletion. Non-cooperation also includes failing to comply with decisions, not appearing for interrogation without a justified reason, and providing false or misleading information.

Consequences of non-cooperation are severe. Monetary penalties can reach up to 3% of the previous year's turnover, with additional periodic penalties for delays. Penalties can be up to 5% of annual revenue and may be imposed for late responses. Failure to provide information or providing false information can affect leniency proceedings, as full co-operation is required.

UOKiK annually records penalties for obstructing proceedings or failing to respond to summonses, indicating that the authority uses this instrument as needed.

The President of UOKiK, vice-presidents and office employees must protect business secrets and other protected information obtained during their duties. The President of UOKiK can restrict access to material evidence if disclosure risks revealing a business secret or other protected secrets. Requests to restrict access must include justification.

Parties to the proceedings have the right to access evidence in the case files, but UOKiK decisions published on the office's website do not disclose business secrets. Requests to restrict file inspection can be submitted by parties or any entity with a legitimate interest in protecting business secrets.

Qualified lawyers play a crucial role in determining which information should be protected. The President of UOKiK does not act ex officio in this respect; only properly formulated requests will protect sensitive information. Once accepted, business secrets are not published, and relevant parts of case files are not accessible to third parties.

In limited instances, the President of UOKiK exercises the option of addressing a formal communication to an undertaking without initiating proceedings in matters concerning competition protection, or initiates explanatory proceedings without commencing antitrust proceedings directed against the alleged members of a cartel. Such communications typically serve as a warning signal preceding the formal initiation of proceedings; co-operation with the competition authority at this stage may prevent the opening of antitrust proceedings and the formulation of formal charges. It is essential to provide a timely response to such communication and to thoroughly demonstrate the absence of any infringement on the part of the undertaking.

If antitrust proceedings are initiated, the President of UOKiK issues a formal statement of objections, to which the undertaking is entitled – and indeed advised – to respond in order to avoid the issuance of an adverse decision by the authority. Regardless of the statement of objections, the undertaking retains the right to submit arguments and evidence at any stage of the proceedings conducted by the President of UOKiK.

In Poland, a leniency programme exists for competition law infringements, and is available to both entrepreneurs and business managers. It offers an extra opportunity to reduce penalties by co-operating with the antitrust authority, differing from EU law.

Key requirements for a leniency application include the following:

• disclosure of details of the anti-competitive agreement;
• submission of an application for immunity or fine reduction;
• provision of evidence enabling UOKiK to authorise a search or establish an infringement;
• confidentiality of the leniency application;
• full co-operation with UOKiK; and
• no coercion of others to join or remain in the cartel.

Meeting these conditions may lead UOKiK to refrain from imposing fines, although assessment is discretionary. The leniency programme is rarely used, with three to eight applications annually over the past three years. UOKiK does not disclose application outcomes.

In practice, the leniency procedure presents difficulties, acknowledged by the President of UOKiK. The detailed requirements and submission procedures are outlined in the 2017 guidelines, which are a valuable resource for entrepreneurs. In addition, co-operating with UOKiK on another unknown anti-competitive agreement can lead to a further 30% penalty reduction (“leniency plus”).

Leniency does not protect against civil claims for competition law violations. Multiple leniency applications in the same case are assessed in order of receipt, affecting potential fine reductions: the first applicant may receive a 30–50% reduction, the second 20–30%, and subsequent applicants up to 20%.

The first member of the cartel who takes advantage of the leniency programme can be completely exempt from financial penalties (if their co-operation meets the requirements outlined in 3.1 Leniency). In practice, this means that the entrepreneur who first reports to the antitrust authority and provides crucial evidence can avoid all sanctions related to their participation in the illegal agreement.

At the outset, it is important to distinguish between two categories of whistle-blowers:

• whistle-blowers who report in a work-related context under the Whistle-Blower Protection Act (Law of 14 June 2024); and
• whistle-blowers who submit information within the leniency plus procedure under competition law.

External Whistle-Blowers

The Whistle-Blower Protection Act requires public authorities, including the President of UOKiK, to establish procedures for receiving external reports and taking follow-up actions. Typically, this applies to employees or collaborators of entrepreneurs reporting competition law violations. Whistle-blowers receive a certificate confirming their protection, safeguarding them from adverse professional consequences such as termination of employment. The President of UOKiK operates a platform for anonymous reports of competition law violations at uokik.whiblo.pl, which is regularly promoted in official communications.

Leniency Plus Procedure

This mechanism applies to entrepreneurs or managers who have already been granted a fine reduction under the standard leniency procedure and are seeking an additional reduction. If, before a decision in the initial case, the same entrepreneur submits a leniency application for a separate anti-competitive agreement and provides the required information, the authority will reduce the fine for the first agreement and refrain from imposing a fine for the second agreement.

Whistle-Blower Legal Advisers

Law firms offering whistle-blower-related legal services are present in Poland, but significant activity by lawyers soliciting whistle-blower clients has not been observed.

Obligation to Provide Information

Anyone addressed by the President of UOKiK must provide the requested information, including former employees. Individuals can refuse to provide information only if doing so would expose them or their relatives to criminal liability.

The President of UOKiK must issue an official request specifying the scope, purpose, deadline and sanctions for failure to respond. The Code of Administrative Procedure applies where antitrust laws do not regulate.

Testimony

Anyone can be called to testify in antitrust proceedings and must appear and testify. Relatives of a party can refuse to testify. Witnesses may refuse to answer questions if doing so could expose them or their relatives to criminal liability, disgrace, property damage or breach professional secrecy.

The President of UOKiK's summons includes the witness's name and residence, the place and time of explanation, the parties, the subject matter and provisions on criminal liability for false testimony.

The President of UOKiK may request documents from any business and individual, including subject/target companies.

Although the provisions of the law narrowly define the right to decline the request for evidence, in practice there is a possibility to invoke the privilege against self-incrimination.

The President of UOKiK may demand information or testimony from anyone who may have information relevant to the determination of the case; the foreign element is not relevant in this case, so a request for information can be addressed to an entity located abroad. In addition, the law provides for a special procedure for co-operation among European competition and consumer protection authorities, through which the authorities of the place of residence of a witness may take testimony from the witness at the request of the Polish authorities.

In addition, in the case of obtaining evidence, it is irrelevant to the President of UOKiK where the evidence is located, if it may, in the opinion of the authority, be relevant to the proceedings. When the authority requests its handover, the person/entity to whom the request was directed is obliged to hand over the evidence. In the case of documents prepared in a language other than Polish, it is necessary to attach a sworn translation of such document.

Storage of Data in the Cloud and the Obligation to Provide Evidence

An entrepreneur is obliged to present any information as part of a request for information, including files stored in the cloud. However, in practice, the application of this regulation sometimes encounters difficulties.

In Poland, co-operation between the President of UOKiK and other regulators stands at a high level. The financial market authority and the telecommunications market authority actively co-operate with the President of UOKiK. The supervisory authorities also provide each other with information on the basis of a co-operation agreement, particularly on unfair market practices.

The President of UOKiK co-operates within the ECN and may, for instance, exchange evidence while applying EU law. The European Commission and the national competition authorities of all EU member states co-operate by informing each other of new cases of abuse of the law and by exchanging information, documents and experiences of investigations. There are also some other co-operation agreements but they are less significant because they relate mostly to creating good practices together and sharing experiences in general. The exact number is hard to estimate, but the minority of cases conducted by the President of UOKiK are in co-operation with other national competition authorities.

The only type of agreement prohibited under competition law that is also criminalised under the Criminal Act is collusive bidding. In order to be prosecuted by public authorities (ie, the prosecutor's office), this is a crime that requires the filing of a complaint by the victim of the act. From the moment the complaint is filed, the case is prosecuted in public law – ie, by the public prosecutor.

The court with jurisdiction to hear the case for this crime in the first instance is the district court, and in the second instance the district court. The proceedings are two-instance.

In criminal proceedings, most of the evidence is obtained ex officio, but the parties can also make their own requests for evidence. Evidence is obtained by the court. Primacy is given to the principle of the free evaluation of evidence by the court and the principle of resolving doubts in favour of the accused. This means that, in order for there to be a conviction for the commission of a crime covered by the indictment, the evidence gathered during the proceedings must not leave unresolvable doubts about the guilt of the accused. In the justification for the judgment, the court is required to indicate the facts it has established in the course of the proceedings and the evidence it has given credence to and the evidence it has refused to give credence to, as well as why it has found the evidence in question unreliable. All evidence on which the judgment is based must be disclosed in the course of the proceedings, which means that the defendant must have the opportunity to become acquainted with it.

In Polish criminal proceedings, up to the stage of drafting the indictment, a suspect's access to the case file is limited and takes place with the permission of the prosecutor.

In order to initiate civil proceedings, a lawsuit must be filed with a common court. In claims for damages caused by violations of competition law, the competent court of first instance is the district court, while in the second instance the Court of Appeal has jurisdiction. The proceedings are two-instance.

Civil proceedings in Poland are based on an adversarial model, which means the parties to the proceedings are obliged to present evidence. Evidence obtained ex officio is a definite minority. Evidence is presented before the deciding court at the request of a party.

There is a presumption that a violation of competition law causes damage, so the civil track is much easier for victims of acts of unfair competition when there has been a final decision from the President of UOKiK (follow-up lawsuits). As a rule, the burden of proof is on the one who makes a given claim. The trial court is guided by a free assessment of the evidence in deciding the case. There is no hierarchy of evidence nor any principle of preponderance of evidence.

Upon the written request of a plaintiff who has agreed that the evidence obtained will be used only for the purposes of the pending proceedings, the court may order the defendant, a third party or the competition authority to disclose the means of evidence for establishing a fact relevant to the outcome in their possession. A motion to disclose an item of evidence may also be filed by a defendant who has agreed that the evidence thus obtained will be used only for the purposes of the pending proceedings. If the request relates to an item of evidence in the file of a case conducted by the competition authority, the court may order the competition authority to disclose such item only if it is impossible or excessively difficult to obtain it from the opposing party or a third party.

Before initiating legal proceedings, the plaintiff is obliged to request the defendant to attempt an amicable settlement of the dispute.

President of UOKiK

The President of UOKiK has an economic analysis department within the structure of the office, which includes economic experts.

Courts

The specialisation of experts appointed by the court deciding the case depends on the requested content of the opinion or the type of evidence to be conducted. In the case of claiming damages for violation of competition law, common courts use lists of expert witnesses maintained by district courts. The lists of experts include nationally recognised economists who specialise in the economic issues of competition law.

It is also permissible to take evidence from the opinion of an institute (eg, a department of economic sciences) or a panel of court experts. The court relies on the opinion of a court expert for special knowledge – ie, expertise. However, the opinion of the court expert is subject to the court's review, and the parties themselves may also raise objections to the opinion, or request the appointment of another court expert if irregularities are found.

Entrepreneurs

Entrepreneurs usually use external economic experts to prepare opinions for anti-monopoly proceedings. Expert opinions prepared at the request of entrepreneurs in terms of the regulations do not constitute evidence, but rather constitute the claims of entrepreneurs due to the fact that they are prepared at their request. In practice, private expert opinions are the norm in such proceedings.

Antitrust Proceedings

For reasons of procedural efficiency, cases involving the same or related facts are conducted in a single proceeding before the President of UOKiK, who may file several charges in a single proceeding. In cases in which the rights or obligations of the parties arise from the same facts and from the same legal basis, and in which the same public administration body has jurisdiction, a single proceeding may be initiated and conducted concerning more than one party. In the case of proceedings under the same laws, information obtained in the course of antitrust proceedings may be used in other cases, as long as the decision is not validly revoked. The President of UOKiK shall notify the parties of the inclusion in evidence of information obtained in the course of other proceedings conducted by the President.

Civil Proceedings for Damages

A victim of a competition law violation may sue all participants in the cartel in a single proceeding. If proceedings for redress of damages caused by the same violation of competition law are pending before several courts in the first instance, each of these courts may request that the others transfer these cases to it for joint examination and determination, for expediency and, in particular, to avoid conflicting rulings.

In addition, the findings of a final decision of the President of UOKiK on the recognition of a practice as restrictive of competition or a final judgment issued as a result of an appeal against such a decision are binding on the court in the proceedings for compensation for damage caused by a violation of competition law as to the finding of a violation of competition law.

In Poland, the competent authority for investigating antitrust practices, including cartel agreements, is the President of UOKiK, who has the authority to impose fines by administrative decision alone.

In the event of a violation of the prohibition on anti-competitive agreements, the President of UOKiK may impose on an entrepreneur a fine of up to 10% of the turnover achieved in the year preceding the making of the decision. Decisions of the President of UOKiK are subject to judicial review – entrepreneurs can appeal them to the Competition and Consumer Protection Court, operating at the district court in Warsaw.

Both the initiation and completion of antitrust proceedings are regulated by law. Initiated proceedings often end with the imposition of a fine or the issuance of a commitment decision; proceedings are rarely discontinued due to their pointlessness. According to data from UOKiK's 2024 activity report, of the 13 decisions issued in antitrust cases, nine ended with a financial penalty, one with a commitment decision and two with a voluntary surrender procedure.

In the Polish competition protection system, there is a procedure similar to the institution of “plea bargaining” or settlement, which takes the form of a voluntary submission procedure. The possibility of applying this procedure arises after the presentation of allegations by the President of UOKIK, but before the issuance of a decision.

The proposal to voluntarily surrender the penalty can come either from the President of UOKiK or from a party to the proceedings before the antitrust proceedings are concluded. The entrepreneur then submits a statement of voluntary submission to the penalty, confirming the amount of the penalty and the fact that they were informed of the allegations and had the opportunity to respond to them. In this situation, a party to the proceedings has the opportunity to reduce the penalty by 10%, avoiding a lengthy and costly court trial and closing the proceedings early.

In addition, the entrepreneur may submit an undertaking – ie, a proposal to take certain corrective measures. If the undertaking is accepted, the procedure ends without a finding of violation and without the imposition of a fine. At any stage of the proceedings, an entrepreneur may submit to the President of UOKiK a proposal to make specific commitments that will lead to the removal of the negative effects of the alleged restrictive practice. In the case of vertical cartels, such decisions are issued quite often, while they are rare in the case of horizontal cartels. After the President of UOKiK accepts the content of the undertaking, a decision is issued imposing certain commitments on the entrepreneur. The main benefit for the entrepreneur is that they are then not found to have followed the alleged practice and no financial penalty is imposed.

A finding of a violation of competition law, especially participation in a cartel, has important collateral effects. First of all, the decision of the President of UOKiK finding a violation of competition law constitutes prima facie evidence in proceedings for damages caused by a violation of competition law in terms of the violation of competition law (but not the fact of the amount of damage). A judgment or decision of a competition authority finding a violation is evidence to the court of the existence of the violation.

Entities responsible for competition violations may be excluded from public procurement procedures. Such exclusion is aimed at preventing the participation of infringers in publicly funded procurements.

As for the possibility of reducing these effects through settlement procedures, voluntary surrender may result in a reduction in the administrative sanctions imposed (eg, a 10% reduction in the fine) and a faster conclusion of the proceedings, but it does not automatically eliminate civil law effects, such as the possibility of seeking damages, nor does it exempt from possible exclusion from public procurement.

In the case of administrative penalties and other sanctions, the decision is made by the President of UOKiK, but civil consequences and exclusions from public tenders are adjudicated by the courts or other bodies according to relevant regulations.

In summary, establishing liability for competition law violations has wide-ranging consequences that can be mitigated to some extent by settlements and voluntary submission to punishment, but cannot be completely avoided.

As a rule, violations of competition law are sanctioned on the basis of administrative proceedings before the President of UOKiK.

Collusive bidding is the only type of prohibited agreement that is criminalised under the Criminal Code. The perpetrator of such behaviour is subject to a penalty of imprisonment of between three months and five years; if the action is motivated by the desire to achieve financial or personal gain, the responsibility is aggravated and increases the threat of imprisonment to between six months and eight years. The court is authorised to impose a penalty that falls within the scope provided for in the law at its discretion, taking into account the statutory directives for the assessment of punishment. Although the fine is not directly provided for in the Criminal Code, it may be applied as an additional measure.

The President of UOKiK has no influence on the amount of sanctions in criminal proceedings

Sanctions for entering into prohibited agreements are imposed by the President of UOKiK through an administrative decision. These are not criminal sanctions.

The highest pecuniary sanctions imposed in a single decision on a single company and its managers amounted to nearly PLN331 million (EUR78,038,215) in 2024, in a case concerning KIA Poland and its car dealers colluding on prices and market sharing. In terms of the aggregate penalty imposed on multiple cartel members, the highest historical penalty was PLN411 million (EUR96 million), which was imposed on long-standing members of the cement cartel in 2009.

The average penalties imposed on entrepreneurs for participation in restrictive agreements are difficult to estimate unequivocally, as they depend on a number of factors, such as the turnover of the business in question, the duration of the violation, the number of cartel participants and the degree of co-operation with the President of UOKiK. As a rule, they range from several hundred thousand to tens of millions of zlotys, depending on the turnover of the entrepreneur in question.

Individuals, including board members and managers, can be punished with an administrative fine of up to PLN2 million. The President of UOKiK is not authorised to impose a prison sentence as part of an administrative decision and there is no criminal sanction for illegal cartel activities.

There is no publicly available information on the extradition from Poland of individuals accused of cartel involvement.

The catalogue of mitigating circumstances is open, which means that the President of UOKiK may, in adequately justified cases, take into account mitigating circumstances other than those indicated in the Act on Competition and Consumer Protection, as well as compliance programmes.

Although the guidelines of the President of UOKiK do not point to compliance programmes as a mitigating circumstance for the penalty, it should be noted that this circumstance may be taken into account by the Competition and Consumer Protection Court.

In proceedings concerning an infringement of competition law, the President of UOKIK is not competent to adjudicate on the award of compensation to consumers. This type of remedy is reserved for actions constituting an infringement of the collective consumer interests.

The right to claim damages through civil proceedings, on the other hand, belongs to the party harmed by the conclusion of an unlawful agreement. Accordingly, locus standi is strictly linked to the existence of actual damage.

Consumers may use decisions issued by the President of UOKiK as the basis for civil claims for compensation before the courts. Polish law provides for class actions, which do not in any way limit consumers' claims for infringement of competitors' rights, and first attempts at such class actions have been made.

It is also worth noting that commitment decisions (a kind of settlement with the President of UOKiK) sometimes contain certain commitments to consumers.

An appeal against the decision of the President of UOKIK may be lodged with the Competition and Consumer Protection Court within one month from the date of delivery of the decision. If they consider the appeal to be legitimate, the President of UOKIK may – without removing the records to the court – revoke or change their decision, in whole or in part, and shall promptly notify the party to this effect, forwarding to the party the new decision from which an appeal shall be possible. While revoking or changing the decision, the President of UOKiK shall at the same time ascertain whether the decision was issued without the legal grounds or in flagrant violation of the law.

Proceedings before the Competition and Consumer Protection Court are adversarial and governed by the provisions of the Polish Code of Civil Procedure concerning commercial proceedings. These proceedings are characterised by a high degree of formality and evidential preclusion.

After filing the appeal against the decision, the whole evidentiary proceedings are duplicated by the Competition and Consumer Protection Court. An appeal against the judgment of this court may be filed with the Warsaw Court of Appeal. The full appeal model applied in Polish civil procedure involves a comprehensive system of reviewing a case by an appellate court. Under this model, the Competition and Consumer Protection Court has the authority to reconsider both the factual and legal aspects of the case, meaning it can evaluate the evidence and, in exceptional cases, even re-examine witness testimonies, and reassess the legal arguments presented during the initial trial.

A valid judgment of the Court of Appeal may be challenged by means of an extraordinary remedy: a cassation complaint filed with the Supreme Court of Poland. This remedy is subject to significantly more substantive requirements than an appeal.

A portion of the decisions issued by the President of UOKIK is subject to judicial review, particularly due to the authority’s practice of imposing relatively high pecuniary penalties. Some of the contested decisions are upheld by the courts. If a decision is reversed, the most common grounds include procedural errors or insufficient evidentiary support.

In Polish law, there is a ne peius principle, which means that the court has no power to increase the penalty from the decision of the President of UOKiK in case of the entrepreneur's appeal.

Cartel proceedings conducted by the President of UOKiK are complex and time-consuming, particularly when they involve dawn raids, a large number of participants, and the need to analyse voluminous evidence.

In recent years, the President of UOKiK has treated cases initiated by dawn raids as a priority, with antitrust decisions typically issued approximately one year after the search (eg, the Kärcher case). In contrast, explanatory proceedings often last for years without the presentation of charges. In such proceedings, the President of UOKiK frequently seeks to reach an agreement and bind the entrepreneur with an obligation to fulfil certain commitments (eg, the IBM case).

The average duration of the entire cartel enforcement process – from the execution of a dawn raid to the completion of judicial appellate proceedings (final judgment) – takes years, depending on the complexity of the case. Proceedings before UOKiK usually last from one to three years. The issuance of the decision by the President of UOKiK concludes the administrative phase of the case, and the decision may be appealed to the court. Proceedings before the Competition and Consumer Protection Court, as well as the appeal proceedings, may take an additional couple of years.

In some cases, particularly those involving the use of leniency programmes or voluntary submission to a pecuniary penalty, the duration of proceedings may be significantly reduced. On the other hand, proceedings involving multiple entities and long-lasting infringements tend to be more time-consuming.

In recent years, UOKiK has undertaken efforts to shorten proceedings, notably through the use of commitment decisions and by promoting co-operation with the authority. However, the average total duration from initiation to final resolution remains relatively long.

The injured party as a result of an unlawful agreement is entitled to bring a civil action for compensation for the damage incurred and the payment of damages. There are no threshold requirements regarding the amount of the damage that would affect the admissibility of such a claim.

According to general civil procedure principles, the plaintiff bears the full burden of proof regarding all issues. Polish law provides an exception for follow-up claims. In the case of a final decision issued by the President of UOKiK stating infringement of the competition law, the plaintiff does not have to prove violation of the law; it is presumed that damage was caused by the violation of competition law (but there is no presumption regarding the amount of damage).

Polish law allows class actions, which do not limit consumers' claims for infringement of competitors' rights. There have been initial attempts at class actions against cartelists.

Non-governmental organisations representing entrepreneurs, whose statutory tasks include market protection against competition law infringements, may institute an action or join pending proceedings, with the claimant's written consent. Similarly, non-governmental organisations protecting consumers may institute an action or join pending proceedings, again with the claimant's written consent.

Under Polish law, the legal presumption of passing on an overcharge can only be used by an indirect purchaser seeking damages directly from the infringer. This presumption acts as an “attack” for the indirect purchaser. Consequently, a violator cannot use this presumption when a direct purchaser seeks damages for a competition law violation. The violator cannot use the passing on defence, arguing that the direct purchaser passed on the overcharge to indirect purchasers, thereby reducing the harm suffered. The infringer must prove that the direct purchaser passed on the overcharge.

The legal presumption aims to simplify the process for indirect purchasers to claim damages and prevent infringers from receiving compensation exceeding actual damages, especially when purchasers resell affected products or services. This measure also seeks to prevent unjust enrichment, such as when resale profits are not subtracted from the direct purchaser's burden.

Evidence obtained in proceedings by public administration authorities, including the President of UOKiK, may be used in civil proceedings for damages from competition law infringements, provided the decision has not been reversed by a final judgment.

The court may request evidence disclosure from the President of UOKiK based on a written motion by the claimant, who must demonstrate the plausibility of the claim and undertake to use the evidence solely for the ongoing proceedings. However, leniency statements and settlement proposals are not subject to disclosure. If such statements are part of a document, only the remaining part may be disclosed.

Prior to the introduction of the Act on Claims, the number of cases filed by plaintiffs was relatively small, but included claims for significant amounts (usually tens of millions of zlotys, with the highest value of the object of litigation exceeding PLN500 million). The number of cases arising from private enforcement after the introduction of the new regulations has increased. These types of cases are very time-consuming and can sometimes take more than ten years. In one example of a simple case, the proceeding took five years.

To date, there has not been a final case that ended with an award of compensation to the plaintiff (cases ended with the dismissal of claims), but a large number of cases are pending.

Under the Polish legal system, the prevailing party in litigation can seek reimbursement of litigation costs from the losing party, including legal representative fees. The court awards reimbursement to the party, not directly to the attorney. The attorney’s fee depends on the agreement with the client and may include a success fee.

Reimbursable costs are determined by regulations from the Minister of Justice, establishing minimum and maximum rates for legal counsels and advocates, based on the dispute's value and nature. The court may increase awarded costs if the case was complex or time-consuming. These court-awarded costs do not necessarily reflect the actual fees agreed upon between the client and the attorney. Parties can request the court to award costs based on actual expenses incurred, supported by a statement of costs.

The losing party in a dispute is obliged to reimburse the prevailing party for the costs of the proceedings, including attorneys’ fees and court fees. The amount of such costs is determined based on executory provisions and depends on the value of the dispute and the type of proceedings, among other factors.

Class action lawsuits have lower court fees, which is favourable for plaintiffs.

In the Polish legal system, judgments in civil proceedings, including those related to competition law damages, undergo a two-instance judicial review. Parties can appeal a first-instance court judgment to the second-instance court. In certain cases, the court may be bound by a decision of the President of UOKiK or a judgment resulting from an appeal against such a decision. If final, these findings are binding on the court.

A party may appeal a first-instance judgment to the Warsaw Court of Appeal. The full appeal model in Polish civil procedure allows the appellate court to review both factual and legal aspects, including re-examining evidence and witness testimonies.

After two instances, a cassation complaint can be filed with the Supreme Court of Poland if the case involves significant legal issues, doubts ion legal provisions or divergent judicial rulings.

Appeal proceedings are common, whereas cassation complaints are less frequent due to their limited admissibility and strict formal requirements.

The exchange of information may be deemed by the President of UOKiK to constitute a prohibited agreement if its object or effect is to eliminate, restrict or otherwise distort competition on the relevant market. The President of UOKiK relies on the Commission's latest guidelines on information sharing among competitors in this regard.

Anti-competitive practices often manifest as concerted practices, which are significantly more demanding in terms of evidentiary standards. In antitrust proceedings, the standard of proof is lower than in typical administrative proceedings, and the use of indirect evidence is widely permitted.

To date, the President of UOKiK has not issued any decision sanctioning the use of AI or pricing algorithms as part of a cartel. However, it is already evident that the authority is becoming increasingly adept at analysing the functioning of new technologies in the area of consumer protection. The President of UOKiK has repeatedly made statements to this effect at conferences and other meetings with scholars, indicating that he recognises the existence of this problem.

As in EU law, monopolisation in itself is not forbidden in Polish law, but there are restrictions on the abuse of a dominant position (and a collective dominant position). This is covered under different provisions of competition law, specifically under Article 9 of the Polish Competition and Consumer Protection Act, which prohibits the abuse of a dominant position.

The dominant position is typically assessed based on market share, with a share of over 40% often being considered indicative of dominance, although other factors are also considered, such as barriers to entry, market structure and economic strength. It is forbidden to use a dominant position to unfairly limit competition.

In recent years, the President of UOKiK has directed particular attention toward sectors of key importance to the economy and consumers, as well as those characterised by a limited number of market participants, which increases the risk of anti-competitive collusion. Increased enforcement has been observed in the following sectors:

• consumer electronics (especially household accessories);
• automotive; and
• construction.

Looking ahead, enhanced scrutiny is expected in the digital and e-commerce sectors, particularly regarding online marketplaces, price aggregators and algorithmic practices that may facilitate price co-ordination.

In the context of green technologies and the renewable energy sector, joint market initiatives may cross the line from permissible co-operation into prohibited co-ordination, triggering investigations.

No official guidelines have been published regarding the procedure for storing ephemeral communications or the special treatment of chat messages. However, during dawn raids, the President of UOKiK regularly examines messaging applications used by employees and contractors, as such tools are increasingly used alongside official email channels. In one case, the deletion of WhatsApp messages detected by UOKiK served as the basis for imposing a separate pecuniary penalty. The President of UOKiK is entitled to impose a fine of up to 3% of the undertaking's annual turnover for obstructing proceedings, including by refusing to provide access to messages.

In 2024, the President of UOKiK published guidelines on collusion and abuses on the labour market, which clearly represents a priority area for UOKiK in the coming years. Competition law infringements in the labour market may, in particular, involve the conclusion of anti-competitive agreements between undertakings, such as jointly setting wage levels for employees, agreeing not to compete for employees (non-poaching agreements), or jointly determining other employment conditions.

These types of agreements, especially non-poaching arrangements, are sometimes applied in practice, and there is limited awareness of the legal consequences of such anti-competitive conduct.

In recent years, Poland has witnessed a relatively low number of leniency applications being submitted to the President of UOKiK by undertakings. In 2022, 24 new proceedings were initiated, and three leniency applications were filed. The following year, the number of proceedings increased to 32, with seven leniency applications submitted. In 2024, 15 new investigative proceedings were initiated, accompanied by eight leniency applications.

In response to the limited use of the leniency programme, UOKiK has intensified ex officio controls. These measures include conducting dawn raids, monitoring the market based on economic analyses and market signals, and enhanced co-operation with whistle-blowers and the use of an anonymous whistle-blower form. In 2024, the whistle-blower programme received thousands of notifications.

In Poland, the vast majority of cartel proceedings conducted by the President of UOKiK are of a domestic nature. It is estimated that the overwhelming majority of cartel cases involve entities operating solely within the territory of Poland and affecting the national market.

On the other hand, cross-border proceedings involving cartels with an international or EU-wide scope constitute a minority of all cartel cases. These typically concern sectors with strong international connections, such as transport, automotive, chemicals or technology.

The President of UOKiK co-operates with the ECN and the European Commission. An increase in the number of proceedings with a cross-border component can be expected.

The topic of adopting ESG policies as an issue of competition law has not yet gained prominence in Poland. Supervisory authorities have not yet published any guidelines in this area. The authority’s interest is much more visible in relation to ESG matters within consumer protection law, particularly concerning false environmental claims (greenwashing).

During the COVID-19 pandemic, some entrepreneurs planned to influence prices in a co-ordinated manner under the pretext of the pandemic, with the help of some government bodies. Thanks to the decisive reaction of the President of UOKiK, this illegal initiative did not take effect.

Post-pandemic inflationary pressures and supply chain disruptions have influenced cartel enforcement investigations in Poland. For instance, the President of UOKiK has initiated proceedings against pharmaceutical wholesalers for anti-competitive exchanges of commercial information, including price lists, discounts and margins.

Certain markets in Poland, such as the construction industry, have a higher risk of cartels. However, it is difficult to generalise which markets have a greater risk of illegal activities, as this depends on many factors.