Legal Environment
The Constitution of Ukraine enshrines the right to privacy through a general ban on interference in personal and family life, except for cases provided for by it. Additionally, the Constitution declares that the protection of information security is one of the most important functions of the state and the affair of the whole Ukrainian nation.
Ukraine has established a legal framework for both cybersecurity and personal data protection. However, while the cybersecurity law is adapting dynamically to evolving challenges, the personal data protection law remains comparatively static for over a decade. The current personal data protection law is notably outdated, suffering from a weak enforcement mechanism applied by the under-resourced authority. As a result, the role of personal data protection laws in ensuring data security in Ukraine has been diminished.
The Law of Ukraine “On the Protection of Information in Information and Communication Systems” is the basic law in the area of information security. This law establishes general conditions for processing information in the system depending on the type of information. It defines responsibilities for protecting information in systems, including the obligation of the system owner to report attempts and/or actual unauthorised activities in systems handling specific types of classified information. This law also establishes overall state governing mechanisms in information security, specifying the roles and powers of state bodies.
The Law of Ukraine “On Basic Principles of Cyber Security of Ukraine” is the fundamental law in the sphere of cybersecurity which defines the main goals and principles of state policy in the field of cybersecurity in Ukraine, as well as the main subjects of the national cybersecurity system and their powers in the specified field.
The Cybersecurity Strategy of Ukraine defines the priorities, goals and tasks of ensuring the cybersecurity of Ukraine. Complementing this strategy, the Government of Ukraine adopts action plans, detailing a comprehensive suite of specific measures along with their implementation deadlines.
Regulatory acts of the State Service of Special Communications and Information Protection of Ukraine (SSSCIP) constitute a significant part of the Ukrainian legislative framework in the sphere of cybersecurity. Its regulatory acts cover a broad spectrum of areas, including information security and cybersecurity, cryptography, digital signatures, security of electronic trust services, protection of state information and classified information, and critical information infrastructures.
Beyond its regulatory functions, the SSSCIP also contributes to the cybersecurity field by issuing guidelines, scientific and practical commentaries on the existing legislation.
Cyber protection of critical infrastructure (CI) facilities is governed by specific regulations. Key among these are:
Regarding sector-specific legislation, distinct regulatory bodies are responsible for adopting cyber protection measures within their respective domains. The National Bank of Ukraine, for instance, adopts regulations governing cyber protection in financial organisations. Similarly, the Ministry of Energy of Ukraine is tasked with establishing cybersecurity requirements for CIs in fuel and energy sectors.
The Law of Ukraine “On Personal Data Protection” governs issues related to the protection and processing of personal data. Despite a number of amendments made to this law since its adoption in 2010, it currently does not fully meet the international best standards of personal data protection.
In addition, the Ukrainian Parliament Commissioner for Human Rights ("the Commissioner"), a competent authority in personal data protection, has enacted a number of regulations addressing data protection issues. However, none of them mandate the reporting of data breach incidents. Instead, they primarily focus on general requirements for documenting violations in personal data processing, notifying senior management about such violations and engaging with the Commissioner on issues of prevention and elimination of such violations.
Specific provisions regarding cybersecurity, data protection and data classification are also contained in other laws such as Laws of Ukraine “On Electronic Communications”, “On Electronic Commerce”, “On Electronic Identification and Electronic Trust Services”, “On Payment Services”, “On Access to Public Information”, “On Information”.
Enforcement and Penalty Environment
Personal data protection
The Commissioner oversees compliance with personal data protection legislation by conducting inspections of personal data controllers and processors. These inspections can be scheduled, unscheduled, on-site and off-site. Upon identifying infringements, the Commissioner has the authority to issue either a directive for rectifying these infringements or a protocol that imposes administrative liability on the offending person.
The Code of Ukraine on Administrative Offenses establishes liability for specific violations of personal data protection, namely:
The Code imposes administrative liability for non-fulfilment of the Commissioner’s legal directives or those of its representatives.
This liability is imposed in the form of fines ranging from UAH170 to UAH34,000 (approximately EUR4 to EUR817).
While the Criminal Code of Ukraine imposes liability for violation of privacy, including illegal collection, storage, usage, destruction, dissemination of confidential personal information, as well as illicit alterations of such information, the prosecutions under this specific provision for the breaches of personal data are rare in practice.
Cybersecurity/Information Security
The SSSCIP as a principal regulatory authority in cybersecurity employs various oversight mechanisms to ensure compliance with the legal requirements.
For example, the SSSCIP can conduct both scheduled and unscheduled inspections to verify: (i) compliance with cryptographic and technical protection requirements for particular types of classified information (“state information resources” and “information, the requirement for the protection of which is established by law”); (ii) compliance with licensing conditions by entities offering certain kinds of cryptographic and technical protection services; (iii) compliance with the legal requirements in the field of electronic trust services.
In instances of non-compliance, particularly concerning electronic trust services law, the SSSCIP is authorised to demand correcting actions. If the required actions are not taken within the specified timeframe, the SSSCIP may propose to the Central Certifying Body the removal of a qualified provider of electronic trust services from the Trust List. The SSSCIP can also initiate court proceedings to enforce the corrective measures.
Additionally, the SSSCIP is empowered to impose fines for the following administrative offences:
Additionally, the Criminal Code of Ukraine features a separate anti-hacking section, which outlines six distinct criminal offences pertaining to cybersecurity and information security. Among these, the most notable offence is the unauthorised interference with the functioning of information and electronic communication systems. Depending on various factors such as severity and the resulting consequences, penalties for this offence can range from UAH17,000 (approximately EUR416) to 15 years of imprisonment. In 2022, amendments were introduced to this section aiming to decriminalise “white hat” activities conducted in accordance with the established rules and procedures.
Personal data security incidents v cybersecurity incidents
Under the current Ukrainian legislation on personal data protection, there is no specific definition of a "personal data security incident", nor is there a general requirement for reporting such incidents. However, an exception exists in the context of electronic trust services. In these cases, any breach of confidentiality and/or integrity of personal data related to the service users must be reported.
Conversely, the cybersecurity legislation defines a “cybersecurity incident”, which may or may not include a personal data breach, and imposes reporting obligations on certain entities in the event of such incidents.
Please see 5.1 Definition of Data Security Incident, Breach or Cybersecurity Event and 5.8 Reporting Triggers for more details.
Key Authorities
The principal regulators and their respective areas of jurisdiction include:
The data protection authority is the Ukrainian Parliament Commissioner for Human Rights.
For a detailed description of their functions and tasks please see 2.2 Regulators to 2.6 Other Relevant Regulators and Agencies.
Administration and Enforcement Process in the Field of Personal Data Protection
The Ukrainian legislation defines the procedure for the Commissioner to oversee compliance with personal data protection legislation. Planned inspections are carried out in accordance with annual or quarterly plans. The grounds for conducting unscheduled inspections are defined by legislation and typically occur in response to substantiated requests from individuals and legal entities, or through the Commissioner's own initiative.
Administration and Enforcement Process in Cybersecurity
The SSSCIP employs various oversight tools to ensure compliance with the legal requirements.
For example, the SSSCIP can conduct both scheduled and unscheduled inspections to verify compliance with laws and regulations on cryptographic and technical protection, licensing conditions by entities offering certain kinds of cryptographic and technical protection services, and compliance with the legal requirements in the field of electronic trust services.
For more information please see 1.1 Laws.
Recently some attempts were made to expand the cybersecurity enforcement powers of the SSSCIP. Draft law No. 8087, currently pending the second reading in the Parliament of Ukraine, suggests granting the SSSCIP the right to conduct scheduled and unscheduled inspections related to cyber protection of critical information infrastructure (CII). It also proposes to include into the SSSCIP the authority to mandate corrective actions for identified violations and responses to cyber threats and incidents for CIs of I and II criticality categories.
In 2022 the procedure for monitoring the security level of CIs was adopted. This procedure establishes a monitoring mechanism for ensuring compliance with the requirements and offering methodological assistance for enhancing protection. Sectoral and functional bodies in the field of CI protection perform this assessment once every three years.
Following the assessment, a security evaluation report is drafted, outlining proposals for improving protection systems and rectifying any violations or deficiencies, with specified deadlines for corrective actions. The CI operator must notify the monitoring entity and the authorised CI protection body about implementation of proposed actions and any measures taken to address identified issues within specified timeframes.
The Budapest Convention on Cybercrime (ETS No.185) entered into force in Ukraine in 2006. Over 16 years, Ukraine has enacted various laws to implement this convention.
In 2022, Ukraine also signed the Second Additional Protocol to the Convention on Cybercrime on enhanced co-operation and disclosure of electronic evidence, though it is yet to be ratified.
Furthermore, Ukraine is trying to update its personal data protection legislation to align it with the GDPR and the Convention 108+. In 2017, the Ukrainian government adopted the Plan of Measures for Implementing the EU-Ukraine Association Agreement, which includes measures for enhancing its personal data protection law referring specifically to the GDPR. To this end, draft laws have been introduced to the Ukrainian Parliament.
However, the timeframe for consideration of these legislative changes remains unclear. Current martial law conditions and other urgent wartime priorities continue to dominate in the Parliament's agenda, potentially delaying advances in data protection reforms.
Cybersecurity policy in Ukraine is based on the principle of public-private collaboration, achieved inter alia through the information exchange about cyber threats and incidents between state bodies, the private sector and citizens. This interaction primarily focuses on protecting CIs against various threats.
The CERT-UA can receive information about cyber incidents from citizens and provide practical assistance in their prevention, detection and elimination of their consequences.
The NCSCC actively engages with the private sector, primarily through information exchange memoranda.
Key documents have been adopted to facilitate effective information exchange, including general rules for exchanging information about cyber incidents based on ENISA Considerations on the Traffic Light Protocol and the FIRST Standards Definitions and Usage Guidance. These rules determine the method for marking cyber incidents reports to restrict access only to designated parties. They are mandatory for government bodies and recommended for CIs.
The list of categories of cyber incidents is based on the ENISA Reference Incident Classification Taxonomy and the Common Taxonomy for Law Enforcement and The National Network of CSIRTs. The list aims to implement a unified taxonomy as a tool for sharing information about cyber incidents.
The Cybersecurity Strategy of Ukraine requires the development of a system for cybersecurity state indicators. It also anticipates formation of the National Plan to address emergencies in cyberspace and the establishment of a framework for systematic sharing information about cyber attacks, incidents and threat indicators.
The Cyber Security Incident Response Team in the banking system of Ukraine (CSIRT-NBU) provides advisory assistance to the financial sector on cyber protection, incident detection, threat response, and remediation, and develops recommendations for cyber protection.
The National Bank of Ukraine and the Ukrainian banks exchange information on cyber threats and cyber attacks. This includes operational messages on the Cyber Protection Center portal of the National Bank of Ukraine and official correspondence. CSIRT-NBU shares information about cyber threats and threat indicators through operational messages on MISP-NBU and/or via email.
The Legal System
Ukraine’s legal framework for cybersecurity comprises a mix of horizontal and sector-specific laws and regulations.
Horizontal laws and regulations provide a general framework, outlining governance principles, roles and responsibilities of public and private stakeholders, and implementation mechanisms. Key examples include the Law of Ukraine “On Basic Principles of Cyber Security of Ukraine”, “On the Protection of Information in Information and Communication Systems”, and “On Personal Data Protection”.
The key examples of sectoral laws are the Law of Ukraine “On Electronic Communication Services” and the Law of Ukraine “On Payment Services”. While these laws generally align with horizontal legislation, they incorporate sector-specific provisions, especially in energy and financial sectors.
The National Bank of Ukraine maintains a distinct and somewhat autonomous status in cybersecurity as compared to other sectoral regulators, administering a well-developed, adaptable cybersecurity framework.
Enforcement
Enforcement across sectors is uneven. Outside the financial sector, enforcement of horizontal and sector-specific laws is hampered by weak mechanisms usually associated with limited authorities of sectoral agencies, inefficient sanctions, and resource constraints. Common enforcement tools include the Code of Ukraine on Administrative Offences which incorporates a limited range of cybersecurity-related offences and non-deterrent sanctions. Another common tool is the Criminal Code of Ukraine. However, the latter is primarily used for prosecuting hacking-related criminal offences and is generally viewed as ineffective in enforcing compliance with horizontal or sectoral cybersecurity regulatory requirements.
Critical Infrastructures
Operators of CII, which encompasses both information and operational technologies, must comply with the Basic Requirements for Cyber Protection of CI.
This includes implementing an information security system, conducting independent audits, and reporting incidents to CERT-UA.
Additionally, cryptographic products used in CII must comply with the Technical Regulation for Cryptographic Means of Information Protection.
Furthermore, if CII handles such specific classes of information as “state secrets” and “official information”, operators must employ a security management system with technical and cryptographic means certified in result of state expertise.
For handling so-called “state informational resources’’ and “information, the requirement for the protection of which is established by law”, operator of CII must also use cryptographic products certified in the result of state expertise.
A number of regulatory acts were developed, including:
Special attention has been paid to the detection of cyber attacks and implementation of countermeasures against cyberterrorism and cyber espionage targeting CIIs. To this end, the SSSCIP has developed a standard plan format for protecting CIs based on the projected threat of the national level "cyber attack/cyber incident" along with recommendations for developing these plans.
Moreover, a mandatory independent audit of information security at CIs has been introduced.
Pending Changes in Personal Data Protection Framework
A new framework for personal data protection is expected in Ukraine. The pertinent draft law is currently pending parliamentary hearings.
This draft law seeks to bring data protection legislation in line with the GDPR and the modernised Convention 108+.
Pending Changes in Cybersecurity Framework
In 2024 Ukraine plans to focus on several key areas of cybersecurity:
In addition, a new cybersecurity framework for CIs, influenced by the EU NIS 2 Directive and best practices in the field, is under active development. Among other things this framework is expected to:
Draft law, currently under consideration in Parliament, aims to strengthen the cyber resilience of state information resources and CIIs. Along with expanding the powers of the SSSCIP, it proposes: (i) implementing the regulatory oversight of certain categories of entities, including suppliers and their subcontractors of CIIs; and (ii) creating a national system for exchanging information about cybersecurity incidents.
For information on which laws apply to data, systems, infrastructure and software, see 1.1 Laws.
The State Service of Special Communications and Information Protection of Ukraine
The SSSCIP is a state authority responsible for the formation and implementation of state policy in cryptographic and technical protection of information, cyber protection, and other related areas. It is also responsible for state policy in the field of cyber protection of CIIs and oversight in these spheres.
In August 2022 the mission of the SSSCIP was broadened to include active countermeasures against cyber aggression and operation of the Center for Active Countering Aggression in Cyberspace.
The SSSCIP also carries out state control over compliance with the requirements in the fields of electronic trust services.
The SSSCIP was designated as the authorised body for CI protection during martial law and 12 months after its termination. In normal time, legislation calls for the creation of a separate authority responsible for CI protection.
The SSSCIP also operates :
The National Cyber Security Coordination Center
Under the National Security and Defence Council of Ukraine, the NCSCC:
The National Police of Ukraine
The National Police of Ukraine, through the separate Cyber Police Department, carries out measures to prevent, detect, stop and investigate cybercrimes.
The Security Service of Ukraine
The Security Service of Ukraine is responsible for:
The Cyber Security Situation Center is established within the structure of SSU. On the basis of this centre there operates the system of security information and event management (SIEM), which monitors events in real time and allows analysis of the state of information security.
The Ministry of Defence of Ukraine
Itdevelops and approves a cyber protection plan in the sphere of its competence based on the specifics of data and systems handled by the Ministry of Defence of Ukraine, and military formations of the Armed Forces of Ukraine (provided that such systems do not interact with other systems and are not used for the provision of electronic public services).
In addition, the Ministry of Defence of Ukraine conducts military co-operation with NATO, carries out international co-operation in the field of cyber defence and determines, within its competence, the specifics of information security requirements for suppliers (their subcontractors) of defence goods, works and services.
The Cybersecurity Strategy of Ukraine requires the creation of MIL.CERT-UA in the interests of the Ministry of Defence of Ukraine and the Armed Forces, as well as for co-operation with the European military CERT network.
Intelligence agencies of Ukraine carry out intelligence activities regarding threats to Ukraine’s national security in cyberspace.
Currently, the SSSCIP is the authority performing a leading role in the field of cybersecurity in Ukraine and co-ordinating cyber protection activities of other entities. For more information see 2.2 Regulators.
Data Protection Authority
Since 2014, the Ukrainian Parliament Commissioner for Human Rights ("the Commissioner") has been the data protection authority supervising compliance with the legislation on personal data protection.
For more information see 2.2 Regulators.
The Financial Sector
The National Bank of Ukraine (NBU) determines and supervises requirements for cyber protection and information security applicable to:
The NBU is tasked with assessing the state of cyber protection and conducting information security audit at CIs in the banking sector.
In addition, in 2017 the NBU established a Cyber Protection Center to enhance the effectiveness of the cybersecurity system in both banking and non-banking financial sectors.
Additionally, since 2018 the CSIRT-NBU has been operational as part of the Cyber Protection Center of the NBU.
The Energy Sector
The Ministry of Energy of Ukraine regulates cybersecurity protection in the fuel and energy sector by establishing specific requirements for CIIs.
The Military Sector
The Ministry of Defence of Ukraine adopts a cyber protection plan within its competencies and performs other functions described in 2.2 Regulators.
The Ministry of Digital Transformation of Ukraine plays a significant role in shaping national policy in digital domain, including cybersecurity.
In recent years, the Ministry has undertaken several initiatives in cybersecurity, including the launch of training programs for cybersecurity specialists, the conclusion of memorandums of co-operation with a number of international organisations and companies (the European Cyber Security Organisation (ECSO), Cyberfame GmbH and others).
Ukraine allows the application of various standards and international best practices in information security depending on the particular context.
For systems handling less sensitive types of classified information (such as “state information resources” and “information, the protection of which is required by law”), the law permits the use of information security management systems implemented in accordance with the national standards. Ukrainian national standards adopt many ISO standards, including the ISO 27xxx series.
Critical Infrastructures
The SSSCIP has also issued several Methodological Guidelines relating to cybersecurity of CIIs.
Based on the NIST Cybersecurity Framework, these guidelines include the list of the national and international standards like ISO 27001, COBIT 5, NIST-SP 800-53.
Financial services
The National Bank of Ukraine regulations in cybersecurity are primarily based on such international standards as the ISO 27xxx series.
The Payment Card Industry Data Security Standards (PCI DSS) is also extensively applied in Ukraine’s payment industry.
Please see 3.1 De Jure or De Facto Standards and 3.3 Legal Requirements and Specific Required Security Practices.
Public Sector
Ukrainian information security law requires the implementation of the so-called Comprehensive Information Security System (CISS) in systems handling special types of classified information such as “state secrets”, “official information”, and “state registers the creation of which is required by law”.
The CISS is generally created in line with specific “normative documents”, adopted by the regulator, describing specific goals, technical and organisational measures.
In particular, the CISS requires the establishment of security policy, threats and threat actors models, an information security unit, and a training plan. The selection of specific security controls depends on the type of system, class of information and the design of the CISS.
For systems handling less sensitive types of classified information (such as “state information resources” and “information, the protection of which is required by law”), the law permits the use of information security management systems implemented in accordance with the national standards, including ISO 27xxx series. In the latter case, requirements of a specific standard will apply.
Critical Infrastructure
Under the Law of Ukraine “On Critical Infrastructure” operators of CIIs are required to implement a plan of measures for protecting and ensuring resilience of CI, which should include overall risk management measures, cybersecurity, physical security, response and recovery measures.
Operators of CIIs are also required to comply with the Basic Requirements for Cyber Protection of CIs, which mandates implementing an information security system, conducting independent audits, and reporting incidents to CERT-UA.
Operators of CII must conduct risk assessment and implement appropriate technical and organisational measures.
Specifically, operators of CII have to: (1) create a unit or appoint an officer responsible for information security; (2) adopt information security risk management policy, including risk assessment methodology; (3) incorporate the principles of least privilege and separation of duties; (4) enforce policies for the minimum strength of passwords, and similar authenticators, and employ, as a rule, multi-factor authentication; (5) establish business contingency policy, including data back-up; (6) implement cyber incident response management policy, including incident taxonomy and procedure for incident reporting to CERT-UA; (7) provide basic cybersecurity awareness and training to employees; (8) use security information and event management or other tools to continuously monitor and log events of malicious and suspicious activity; (9) perform at least annually penetration testing to identify opportunities to improve the security posture of its systems; (10) not to use hardware and software components originated from a country under sanctions imposed by Ukrainian law; (11) place information technology components in third-party data centres provided that they are located in Ukraine and their owner is a Ukrainian resident; (12) place components of industrial control systems only in the operator’s own data centres; (13) implement policy for updates (patches) and system configuration.
Energy Sector
The Ministry of Energy has adopted sectoral cybersecurity regulation, which is based on the NIST Cybersecurity Framework.
Among other requirements, this cybersecurity regulation mandates operators of CIs in the energy sector to develop and implement a supply chain risks management plan, an incident response plan (cyber incident response, and business continuity), an incidents recovery plan, and a vulnerability management plan.
Financial Sector
The National Bank of Ukraine’s information security regulation establishes minimum requirements relating to information security and cybersecurity measures.
Generally, the regulations require banks to establish information security management system in accordance with the national ISO 27001 standard, considering specific requirements.
Among other requirements, banks must: (1) form or designate a collective management body responsible for implementation and maintenance of an information security management system and define its roles and responsibilities; (2) appoint a CISO from the executive-level managers; (3) create an information security unit; (4) develop an information security strategy aligned with the bank’s general strategy objectives; (5) develop business continuity and incident response plans; (6) implement policy for using cryptographic products, including cryptographic keys management, use of particular cryptographic algorithms, protocols and standards; (7) perform periodic penetration testing; (8) use Open Web Application Security Project (OWASP) standards for web application development.
Ukraine’s Cybersecurity Strategy emphasises the development of international relationships in the cybersecurity domain, particularly with the EU, USA, NATO and NATO member countries.
Following Russia’s full-scale invasion, Ukraine has received an unprecedented level of international support, establishing multifaceted co-operation in cybersecurity at strategic and operational levels, involving both public and private organisations.
In late 2023, Ukraine, Canada, Denmark, Estonia, France, Germany, the Netherlands, Poland, Sweden, the UK and the USA announced the launch of a new tool for co-operation in the field of cybersecurity - the Tallinn Mechanism.
The purpose of this mechanism is to co-ordinate and deliver cyber capacity building assistance to Ukraine across short, medium and long-term lines of effort, focusing on assistance, recovery, and resilience in both military and civilian areas.
In 2023 the SSSCIP signed the Working Arrangement with the ENISA. The arrangement encompasses main areas of co-operation: cyber awareness and capacity building, best practice and information exchange, specifically related to legislation alignment with a focus on telecommunications and energy sectors.
In 2022 the US CISA and the Ukrainian SSSCIP signed a Memorandum of Cooperation. This memorandum focuses on information exchanges and best practices on cyber incidents, technical exchanges on CI security, and joint cybersecurity training and exercises.
In 2023 Ukraine officially joined the NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence, a NATO-accredited cybersecurity centre and think tank that specialises in interdisciplinary applied research, analysis, information exchange, and cyber defence training and exercises.
Throughout 2022-2023, numerous co-operation arrangements were established with a broad network of private businesses operating in such areas as cloud technologies, threat intelligence, cyber capacity building, cyber defence, and training and exercises.
General Requirements
The Law of Ukraine “On Personal Data Protection” mandates controllers, processors and third parties to safeguard personal data from accidental loss or destruction, and illegal processing, including unlawful destruction or access.
State and local authorities, as well as controllers and processors handling personal data posing a significant risk to data subjects’ rights and freedoms, are required to establish either a data protection unit or appoint a data protection officer. In these cases, controllers and processors must notify the Commissioner as the competent authority in personal data protection.
Specific Requirements
Controllers and processors must implement technical and organisational data protection measures throughout the entire data processing cycle. Controllers and processors select such measures based on the requirements of data protection and information security laws.
Organisational measures include: (i) establishing an employee data access procedure; (ii) setting up a procedure for recording personal data processing operations and access to them; (iii) implementing a response plan in case of unauthorised access to personal data, damage to technical equipment, or other emergencies; (iv) conducting regular training for employees who work with personal data.
Controllers and processors are required to maintain a list of employees with access to personal data and determine the level of that access based on their job requirements, adhering to the “need to know” principle.
They must also keep a detailed record of all personal data processing activities, including date, time and source of collection of personal data, modifying, access, transfer, copy of personal data, date and time of deletion or destruction of personal data, along with an employee involved in, and purpose and grounds for these actions.
Technical measures, while not specified, should, among other measures, prevent an unauthorised access to personal data and processing systems.
Special Cases
As mentioned above, while implementing data protection measures, controllers and processors must consider the requirements of information security laws.
In line with that, the implementation of a CISS is required for handling specially classified information like “state secrets”, “official information”, and “state registers the creation of which is required by law”.
For less sensitive types of classified information the information security law permits the use of information security management systems implemented in accordance with standards like ISO 27xxx series.
Therefore, if personal data fall under the classifications above, security measures must comply with either the CISS’s normative framework or a relative standard.
Reporting
Ukrainian legislation does not explicitly require reporting data security breaches or losses to state authorities or data subjects.
However, the data protection unit or an officer (if designated under the law) must: (i) inform the head of the controller or processor about violations of the personal data protection to initiate corrective measures; (ii) document facts of such violations; (iii) interact with the Commissioner to prevent and rectify breaches of data protection law; (iv) ensure the realisation of data subjects’ rights.
Before Russia’s 2022 full-scale invasion, Ukrainian cloud law imposed data localisation requirements on the public sector, prohibiting the storage and processing of data in cloud infrastructures located outside Ukraine.
In response to the invasion, Ukraine amended its laws to permit the migration of most public sector workload into cloud infrastructures abroad. This change is applicable for the duration of martial law plus six months after its conclusion.
Despite this temporary relaxation of restrictions, the Law of Ukraine “On Cloud Services” still contains this data localisation requirement.
A similar regulatory environment exists in the banking sector. Under normal circumstances, the NBU requires Ukrainian banks to process and store information related to banking operations on servers and equipment physically located within Ukraine.
Following a full-scale invasion by Russia, the NBU temporarily relaxed these restrictions, as a result of which Ukrainian banks can process and store information on banking operations, client personal data, and banking secrets using cloud resources located in EEU countries, the US, the UK and Canada.
However, as with the public sector, this allowance is temporary, enacted only for the period of martial law plus two years after its conclusion.
Please see 3.1 De Jure or De Facto Standards and 3.3 Legal Requirements and Specific Required Security Practices.
The Basic Requirements for Cyber Protection of CI stipulate that when it is impossible to physically isolate the CII from external networks or systems, an operator of CII must install network security devices with the minimum set of functionalities, one of which is protection against denial-of-service attacks.
A similar requirement is established in cybersecurity regulations applicable to the banking sector. Banks are required to implement security measures specifically designed to protect against denial-of-service (DoS) and distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) attacks at the external perimeter of their networks.
Internet of Things
The Basic Requirements for Cyber Protection of CI stipulate that for transmitting data between components outside the controlled territory of CI or between CII and other (external) information and communication systems, a secured connection must be used. This is to ensure the confidentiality and integrity of this data.
CII is permitted to connect to global data transmission networks, such as the internet, only through service providers that have secured access nodes to those networks with established CISS. Contracts between CII operators and service providers must obligate the latter to comply with these requirements.
Furthermore, industrial control systems may only connect to global data transmission networks, including the Internet, under specific conditions: if the technological process necessitates such connection and all security measures outlined in the Basic Requirements are implemented.
Supply Chain Security
The Basic Requirements for Cyber Protection of CI require operators of CIs to develop and implement an information security policy that incorporates security requirements for dealing with suppliers.
Operators of CI must also use software and hardware components for their CII that are still supported by the manufacturer.
Additionally, the Basic Requirements prohibit the use of software and hardware components originating from any country subject to sanctions as per Law of Ukraine "On Sanctions". This prohibition extends to products developed or manufactured by entities which include residents of such a country that have a significant portion of their authorised capital owned by that foreign state, or are controlled by entities from the sanctioned country.
There are no specific requirements applicable to ransomware attacks or extortion.
However, the Basic Requirements for Cyber Protection of CI establish general requirements, such as:
Ukrainian legislation provides the following definitions:
For state information resources and information, the requirement for the protection of which is established by law, any attempts or actual unauthorised actions are subject to mandatory reporting. Unauthorised actions in the system are defined as those contravening the legally established procedure for access to this information.
Additionally, in the context of electronic trust and electronic identification services, any breaches of confidentiality and/or integrity of information that affect the provision of relevant services or involve personal data of service users must be reported.
Information about a cybersecurity incidentincludes, in particular, targeted objects, conditions under which they were attacked, cyberattacks that were successfully detected, neutralised and prevented, and cyber protection measures, including cyber threat indicators that were used.
In cases of unauthorised actions in relation to state information resources, the SSSCIP has established a standard format for an electronic report. This report includes time and date of detection, a description of unauthorised actions (in particular, methods and means employed, versions and types of software, details of software hardware vulnerabilities exploited, attack sources and its targets, server log files, any other important information).
Incidents reporting obligations encompass the following systems: (i) systems operated by government authorities and other public bodies; (ii) systems that process classified information such as “state informational resources” and “information, the protection of which is required by law”; and (iii) CIIs, defined as a communication or technological system within CI, a cyber attack on which could directly impact the sustainable functioning of such infrastructure.
In Ukraine, medical devices are governed by Technical Regulation on Medical Devices (MDR), Technical Regulation on Medical Devices for In-Vitro Diagnostics, and Technical Regulation on Implantable Medical Devices.
Aligned with the former EU directives on medical devices, these Ukrainian technical regulations do not incorporate the specific cybersecurity requirements outlined in the new Regulation 2017/745.
However, Ukrainian technical regulations include other provisions that may have security-related implications for manufacturers of medical devices.
For instance, the MDR requires that devices incorporating software, or software being considered as devices in themselves, must be developed and manufactured in accordance with the state of the art taking into account the principles of development life cycle, risk management, verification and validation.
The primary approach to security verification and validation is testing. This includes methods like security feature testing, vulnerability scanning and penetration testing.
Additionally, the MDR requires that devices with electronic programmable systems must be designed to ensure repeatability, reliability, and effectiveness of these systems in line with their intended use. In the event of a single fault condition, appropriate measures must be adopted to eliminate or reduce resultant risks.
These requirements indirectly address operational and information security concerns. In effect, they necessitate safeguards against the workflow corruption or unintended outcomes, and ensure the integrity, availability and confidentiality of data, processes, and systems.
The Basic Requirements for Cyber Protection of CI applies also to SCADA.
In particular, Basic Requirements stipulates that CII (which by definition includes SCADA) is permitted to connect to global data transmission networks, such as the internet, only through service providers that have secured access nodes to those networks with established CISS. Contracts between CII operators and service providers must obligate the latter to comply with these requirements.
Furthermore, Basic Requirements mandate placing components of industrial control systems only in operator’s own data centres.
Ukrainian legislation does not provide for specific requirements related to IoT. Therefore, general provisions of legislation on data protection and cybersecurity apply.
There are no requirements for secure software development.
The banking cybersecurity regulation only mandates using Open Web Application Security Project (OWASP) standards for web application development.
Mandatory Reporting Requirements
Critical infrastructure facilities
The operator of the CI is responsible for prompt notification of CERT-UA and, if applicable, the sectoral CERT, and the Cyber Security Situation Centre of the Security Service of Ukraine (or the regional body of the SSU) on cyber incidents and attacks related to their CII.
Owners of systems processing special classes of information
Owners of information and communication systems notify the SSSCIP about attempts or actual unauthorised actions in systems handling “state information resources” or “information with limited access, the requirement for the protection of which is established by law”.
Banks
Banks inform the Cyber Protection Centre of the NBU of cyber attacks and incidents and provide relevant information upon the request of the CSIRT-NBU.
Providers of electronic services
Providers of electronic identification and trust services are obliged to:
The SSSCIP informs the public if it receives information about such violations from service providers or based on inspection results.
In addition, national legislation establishes a declarative obligation for a broad range of entities, including state and local governments, their officials, organisations regardless of ownership, and individuals about their assistance in ensuring cybersecurity, by reporting known information about cyber threats, cyber attacks and any related circumstances that could help in the prevention, detection and eradication of such threats, as well as in combating cybercrimes, cyber attacks and minimising their consequences.
Under current Ukrainian legislation, there are no defined “risk of harm” thresholds for notification obligations. Mandatory reporting encompasses all cyber incidents and cyber attacks targeting CIs. This also includes any attempts or actual unauthorised activities within systems handling state information resources or information, the requirement for the protection of which is established by law.
However, specific obligations are in place for providers of electronic trust services. These providers are required to report incidents only if there is a breach of confidentiality and/or integrity of information that impacts the provision of their services or involves personal data of service users.
Interception/Surveillance: General Requirements
Operators of electronic communications networks are required to grant access to their networks to authorised state authorities for lawful interception/surveillance. This access is granted only in cases and according to procedures established by law. The Criminal Procedure Code of Ukraine is the primary law that outlines the procedural requirements that law enforcement bodies must meet to conduct such interception/surveillance activities.
Scanning: State Information Resources
The State Centre for Cyber Protection (SCCP) of SSSCIP is authorised to scan information and communication systems, or their components, which handle state information resources accessible via the internet. The aim is to detect vulnerabilities that could compromise confidentiality, integrity and availability of the information or the functionality of these systems.
The SCCP performs scanning pursuant to the established procedure on the assessment of security state of information state resources in information and communication systems.
Scanning can be initiated either: (i) upon written request from state or local authorities, military formations, or state-owned entities; or (ii) automatically, based on a predetermined list of scanning objects, formulated during the planning of security assessments in state and local authorities, military formations, private and public entities.
The SCCP compiles a report outlining the findings and recommendations. This report is then submitted to the operator of the respective information or communication system. Within one month of receiving the report, the operator must inform the SSSCIP in writing about measures taken to address the recommendations.
Sectoral Requirements
Financial sector
The National Bank of Ukraine’s cybersecurity regulations mandates banks to:
The CSIRT-NBU is authorised to monitor information space and the internet to identify vulnerabilities, potential compromises of protected assets, and data leaks related to banks.
Energy Sector
The Ministry of Energy of Ukraine’s cybersecurity regulation mandates operators of CI in energy sector to:
Please see ‘Legal environment’ in 1.1 Laws.
In addition to the comments at 5.8 Regarding Triggers on the required sharing of cybersecurity information, the Ukraine is actively developing a framework for the authorised exchange of information about cyber attacks, cyber incidents and cyber threats indicators. This initiative aims to encompass all key stakeholders in cyber security, primarily state bodies and CI operators. The technological platform of the NCSCC will facilitate this exchange. Efforts are also being made to standardise the formats for this information exchange, ensuring uniformity and efficiency in communication among these stakeholders.
Ukrainian legislation currently neither specifies nor imposes any restrictions on the mechanisms for sharing cybersecurity-related information among private sector entities.
Opportunities for voluntary information sharing are primarily facilitated through the activities of CERT-UA. CERT-UA plays a crucial role in processing the received information and providing practical assistance.
Please see ‘Enforcement’ in 1.6 System Characteristics for more details.
A notable incident was the cyber attack on Kyivstar, Ukraine’s largest mobile network operator.
On 12 December 2023 the Kyivstar cybersecurity team detected suspicious activities within its system.
In response, Kyivstar shut down its entire network. This left subscribers nationwide without mobile communication and home internet services. The attack also disrupted systems associated with the operator’s network and services, such as ATMs and payment terminals of several Ukrainian banks.
Within three days, Kyivstar managed to restore most of its services, and by 21 December announced the full restoration of all its basic services.
The company’s CEO described the incident as “the largest cyber attack on telecom infrastructure in the world.” Reportedly, the attackers targeted Kyivstar’s core network, destroying 40% of its infrastructure. The attack led to extensive server and data damage, and the complete destruction of the subscribers’ database. However, Kyivstar assured that no personal data leakage occurred.
The loss of revenue due to compensation to customers through waived services monthly fees was estimated at about UAH3.6 billion (approximately USD95 million).
The Security Service of Ukraine initiated investigations under eight criminal offences: (1) unauthorised interference with information and communication systems; (2) development for unlawful use, distribution or sale of malicious software or hardware, their distribution or sale; (3) encroachment on Ukraine’s territorial integrity; (4) high treason; (5) sabotage; (6) planning, preparation, initiation and conduct of aggressive war; (7) violation of laws and customs of war; (8) establishing, managing a criminal community or criminal organisation.
These allegations seem to suggest that, additional to typical hacking offences, the cyber attack on Kyivstar may involve violation of the International Humanitarian Law, such as, for example, the prohibition of attacking civilian objects, prohibition of terror attacks, indiscriminate use of means and methods of warfare.
Responsibility for the attack was claimed by a group called Solntsepek, allegedly linked to the Sandworm group associated with the Russian intelligence services.
It is believed that hackers gained access to Kyivstar’s systems through a compromised employee account.
The criminal cases and further details of the attack are still under investigation.
Please see 1.1 Laws (with regard to 'Enforcement and penalty environment')and 1.3 Administration and Enforcement Process.
There is no applicable information in this jurisdiction.
The procedural framework in Ukraine offers certain modalities for “collective lawsuits”. However, it does not implement principles of protection of collective interests and collective compensation, as seen in the class action suits in the US or the collective redress system in the EU such as those outlined in the EU Directive 2020/1828.
Please see 3.3 Legal Requirements and Specific Required Security Practices.
In the context of the Ukrainian cybersecurity legal requirements, the due diligence should focus on issues related to CIs, information security and personal data protection.
For example, if the potential target is a CI, it must comply with the general and sectoral laws and regulations. As discussed above, under the Law of Ukraine “On Critical Infrastructure” operators of CII are required to develop and implement a plan of measures for protecting and ensuring the resilience of CI, which should include overall risk management measures, information protection, cybersecurity, physical security, response and recovery measures.
Operators of CII are also required to comply with the Basic Requirements for Cyber Protection of CI, which mandates implementing an information security system, conducting independent audits, and reporting incidents to CERT-UA.
Under current non-cybersecurity-specific Ukrainian legislation there are no specific requirements for organisations to publicly disclose cybersecurity-related information.
However, the Law of Ukraine "On Electronic Identification and Electronic Trust Services" authorises the SSSCIP to inform the public in the event of receiving information about violations.
Ukraine is adopting a pragmatic, bottom-up approach to the regulation of artificial intelligence.
Specifically, the Conception on the Development of AI in Ukraine calls for the integration of AI into the national cybersecurity system. This integration is expected to provide necessary tools for analysing and classifying various threats and developing effective response strategies.
Various state authorities are involved in this endeavour, including the National Police of Ukraine, the SSSCIP, the Security Service of Ukraine, the National Security and Defence Council, and the Ministry of Digital Transformation.
In October 2023 the Ukrainian National Center for Cybersecurity Coordination and IP3 Corporation, a leading energy security developer, declared the establishment of the Collective Defense AI Fusion Center (CDAIC) in Ukraine.
The CDAIC is envisioned as a secure collaboration platform for real-time sharing of threat intelligence that aims to address the mutual cybersecurity concerns of Ukraine and its allies. Its goal is to establish an AI-based, networked defence system for the future of the proactive protection of Ukraine and its allies. The network will provide early warnings about various types of attacks and malware, particularly those associated with Russia and other similar adversaries.
19-21 Bohdana Khmelnytskoho St
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+380 44 230 6000
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info@asterslaw.com www.asterslaw.comIntroduction
In 2021, President of Ukraine Volodymyr Zelenskyy enacted the decision of the National Security and Defense Council of Ukraine “On the Cybersecurity Strategy of Ukraine”.
The Cybersecurity Strategy defines key goals and tasks, broadly categorised into three strategic priorities: deterrence (aimed at preventing cyber threats), cyber resilience (focusing on the nation’s ability to withstand and recover from cyber incidents) and fostering collaboration among all key stakeholders.
The Government of Ukraine (GoU) monitors the progress of each task outlined in the strategy. Annually, the GoU prepares a progress report and formulates an updated action plan. This process ensures that actions remain responsive to the evolving environment and align with new trends and developments.
In December 2023 the GoU released the Action Plan for the Implementation of the Cybersecurity Strategy of Ukraine. The Action Plan delineates specific tasks and measures that must be taken in 2024 to achieve strategic objectives in cybersecurity.
Three primary lines of effort in the Action Plan would form trends and developments in 2024. These are the defence and national security, critical infrastructure protection, and private-public collaboration.
Defence and National Security
For over two years, Ukraine has been engaged in intense fight against Russian aggression on land, in the air, at sea and in space. Cyberspace is another battlefield on which we are actively engaged. Therefore, it is not a surprise that the main cyber-related developments are anticipated in the military and national security fields.
Firstly, the Action Plan mandates the development of the national cyber defence plan as a part of the national defence plan. Recognising cyberspace as a domain of operations, Ukraine aims to defend itself as robustly as it does in the air, on land, and at sea.
Therefore, it is expected that cyber defence, as a military capability, will be integrated into joint action with land, sea, air and space capabilities of the armed forces, as well as security services and intelligence agencies in Ukraine to fight against aggression across all domains.
Secondly, there is an initiative to establish a unified cyber force command. Although Ukraine possesses units capable of conducting cyber operations, it lacks enough clarity in its missions, operational tasks and command structure.
Therefore, the Action Plan calls for the development of legal, organisational, and technological frameworks to build and engage cyber forces in wartime and normal conditions. It is expected that a cyber force command will be integrated within the structure of the Armed Forces of Ukraine.
Thirdly, on the technical side, Ukraine wants to enhance its technical capabilities to perform real-time monitoring, detection, and management of cyber attacks on national networks and systems, including critical information infrastructures. This line of effort would also broaden capabilities of intelligence communities, especially those relating to cyber threat intelligence.
Lastly, the Action Plan seeks to integrate measures countering reconnaissance and subversive activities in cyberspace as well as cyberterrorism as part of the broader anti-terrorism system. This will likely necessitate significant amendments to the existing legal framework, especially those that relate to roles, responsibilities, and interaction between law enforcement authorities, clarification of definition of cyberterrorism.
Critical Infrastructure Protection
Long before the full-scale Russian invasion, Ukraine recognised cyber attacks on its critical infrastructure as the main threat. After the invasion, Ukrainian critical infrastructure has become a prime target for both kinetic and cyber attacks by Russia. Therefore it is crucial for Ukraine to enhance the resilience of its critical infrastructure sectors, both public and private.
So what can be anticipated in 2024 in this realm? In general, all current rule-making efforts in Ukraine are pivoting around aligning its laws and regulations with those of the EU. Thus, all major developments in cyber-resilience of critical infrastructures will be, one way or another, aimed at de-conflicting and aligning the Ukraine’s policies, laws and regulations with EU governance mechanisms, such as the EU’s Network and Information Systems (NIS) Directive(s).
Initiated at the beginning of 2022, Ukraine is now targeting to finalise the designation of critical infrastructures across all sectors by 2024. The ongoing process still faces several challenges, primarily due to the absence of all necessary rules and procedures and the need for more effective collaboration among all stakeholders, which was constantly burdened by other vectors of constant threats of physical destruction or capture by the aggressor.
Once designated and registered, the operator of critical infrastructures must comply with a comprehensive set of obligations, including those pertaining to cybersecurity.
The Action Plan acknowledges the necessity to update basic cybersecurity requirements for all critical information infrastructure, encompassing both information and operational technologies.
Current requirements regarding technical, operational, and organisational measures are often criticised for their complexity, inflexibility and a one-size-fits-all approach. As a result, many of those requirements are just ignored or treated as a “tick-box compliance”. Therefore anticipated changes are expected to focus more on high-level desired outcomes that can be used across all sectors, rather than on the specific measures to achieve these outcomes.
It is also anticipated that sectoral regulators will gain the necessary authority to establish specific cybersecurity requirements tailored to the unique characteristics of each sector. Thus, an operator of critical infrastructure will likely have the flexibility to choose measures that would be appropriate and proportionate to the degree of its exposure to risks, size, and other individual and sector-specific characteristics.
In essence, Ukraine’s updated basic cybersecurity requirements are expected to align with the global best practices in cybersecurity risk management. Specifically, it is expected that the updated basic cybersecurity requirements would accommodate approaches taken in the NIST Cybersecurity Framework 2.0.
In efforts to enhance the resilience of critical infrastructures, the introduction of specific mechanism for managing supply chain risk is anticipated. Under the proposed draft laws, suppliers of products and services to critical infrastructures are expected to comply with the minimum cybersecurity requirements, which include the obligation to report cyber incidents.
The Action Plan calls for the expansion of Computer Security Incident Response Teams. Specifically, the adoption of legal framework is designed to facilitate the creation of an extensive network of sectoral and regional CSIRTs, as well as integration of private CSIRTs into incident management processes in both public and private sectors. To support this initiative, the development of methodologies for organising and governing CSIRTs/ISACs is also anticipated.
Additionally, the development of a framework for establishing a national system of information sharing among all stakeholders from both public and private is underway. Thus, the establishment of mechanisms for mandatory reporting and voluntary sharing of cyber incidents and threats among all stakeholders may soon be seen.
It is expected that information sharing and multi-stakeholder situational awareness will be based on the automated indicator sharing platform of the National Cybersecurity Coordination Center at the National Security and Defense Council of Ukraine. This platform will facilitate information sharing between stakeholders based on the unified information exchange standards.
The Action Plan also mandates the development of the National Cyber Incident Response Plan (NCIRP). NCIRP should define a whole-of-government approach to handling national-scale cyber incidents and crises on critical information infrastructure. This plan will define key processes and actions for handling the crisis, roles and responsibilities of different stakeholders during a cyber-crisis, mechanisms for information exchange and situational awareness sharing. It will also include incident response plans at sectoral, regional and critical asset levels, and encompass the integration of private CSIRTs/ISACs into the national incident response system.
Given the current situation of Ukraine when most attacks can be presumed to be attacks aimed at destabilising the country, the NCIRP is likely to include both normal and wartime components. The wartime component would deal with a different kind of co-ordination amongst a different set of stakeholders. Specifically, it may necessitate the active and extended significant involvement of military, intelligence and counterintelligence cyber units.
The Action Plan requires the implementation of an information security audit framework, predominantly for critical infrastructures. This involves developing audit processes and auditing methods, setting requirements for auditors, their certification (attestation), determining audit frequency, cases of obligatory audits, and mandating the communication of generalised audit results to the National Cybersecurity Coordination Center at the National Security and Defense Council of Ukraine.
The development of mechanisms for assessing the cybersecurity of critical information infrastructures is also anticipated as a component of the wider system for monitoring critical infrastructures. Operators of critical infrastructures are expected to conduct such assessments on an annual basis.
The development of the certification framework for cybersecurity products used in critical information infrastructures is proposed. It remains to be seen what those requirements and certification mechanisms will be, and whether they will be nationally unique or fully align with EU cybersecurity certification schemes.
If adopted, this new regulatory framework would increase compliance responsibilities of operators of critical infrastructures and suppliers of cybersecurity products.
Private-public Collaboration
Ukraine recognises the importance of public-private collaboration in the cybersecurity field, as reflected in its laws, strategy, other policy documents.
Like many other countries, Ukraine faces challenges in defining and prioritising forms and areas of such collaboration, as well as in trust challenges.
The full-scale Russian invasion triggered an unprecedented level of private sector involvement in national defence. Thousands of individual actors and private sectors have backed Ukraine in its effort to counter Russian aggression. This will significantly influence the possible branches of evolution of public-private collaboration in cybersecurity.
Ukraine aims to work out versatile mechanisms for tapping individual experts and private entities in its cyber defence efforts. Traditionally seen as a military or special agency task, Ukraine is now approaching national defence as a whole-of-nation endeavour.
Civilians interested in contributing to national defence in the area of cybersecurity can participate in voluntary activities as part of a pro-bono cyber defence organisation during peacetime, as well as serve as members of the specialised cyberwar defence unit during war and other emergency times.
There were multiple discussions of possible engagement formats. One of the formats being considered is the model used in Estonia, specifically its Cyber Defence Unit comprising volunteers from the private sector under the auspices of the Estonian Defence League, a paramilitary organisation.
The models and formats for such defence-civilian collaboration in Ukraine are still evolving. However, given the challenges and the actual experience gained, Ukraine needs to approach private sector involvement in a broader and more flexible way, and the Estonian model is only one way here.
Volunteer units are unlikely to engage in offensive cyber operations, which remains the purview of the specialised national defence and intelligence bodies.
However, the mission and core tasks of such volunteer units might include education and training, professional support to public and private organisations (specifically, consultation on security measures, red-teaming, and implementation of tests on the security functions of information systems, threat, and other information intelligence), and support in investigation of incidents and restoration of functions, especially in times of emergency.
There are many challenges in the selection and development of formats for engaging individuals and private sectors. To name a few, these are confidentiality/classified information screening, privacy, remuneration, command-and-control or co-ordination structures, legal status and responsibilities under national and international law, particularly in armed conflicts.
Since it seems to be a top priority in Ukraine, soon the development of legal mechanisms designed to lay down a foundation for diverse modes of public-private collaboration in cybersecurity can be expected.
Also, the GoU is actively promoting the development of local cybersecurity products and services and encouraging innovation in this sector.
Ukraine has already established a special legal regime called “DIIA CITY” to foster the growth of the IT industry, including the cybersecurity sector.
Other notable initiatives also include clusters prioritising cybersecurity innovation, like BRAVE1, the Ministry of Defence of Ukraine’s accelerator, and the annual national defence hackathon.
Ukraine also continues investing into its cybersecurity educational system, creating favourable conditions for young professionals and otherwise supporting the workforce development. This investment is expected to enhance public awareness and improve overall cybersecurity culture among Ukrainian citizens.
Lastly, before Russia’s 2022 full-scale invasion, Ukrainian cloud law restricted public sector from storing and processing their data in cloud and data centres located outside Ukraine.
This restriction, previously seen as safeguarding national information security risk, proved to be ineffective and even subversive to the new threat of physical attacks from missiles or other munitions. To address this threat Ukraine needed to go through the whole law-making process in order to adopt new laws and implement acts. Though temporarily, this new legislation has allowed most of the public workload to migrate into cloud infrastructure abroad.
As a result of this, the large cloud service providers were able to help the Ukrainian government in protecting vital state registers and databases from Russian kinetic attacks.
However, despite these changes, Law of Ukraine “On Cloud Services” still has legal restrictions for state enterprises and other public sector users that prevent them from utilising cloud resources and data centres located outside of Ukraine.
As noted above, these restrictions have been relaxed to some extent during periods of martial law and for six months following its conclusion. However, they continue to operate as a general state policy concerning the cloud industry in Ukraine.
It seems that data localisation laws in time of war may inadvertently expose valuable assets to the risks unexpected in time of peace.
Therefore, given the effectiveness of moving public data into a cloud environment outside of Ukraine in mitigating impacts of both kinetic and cyber attacks, Ukraine may reconsider its data localisation restrictions in cloud law. However, the discussion is still ongoing.
Other Areas
Another area where changes are expected in 2024 is the personal data protection law.
Ukrainian personal data protection legislation, unchanged over a decade, now contrasts with General Data Protection Regulation and other contemporary data protection practices. This discrepancy has become increasingly pronounced amidst Ukraine’s rapid integration into the EU Digital Single Market.
Several draft laws have been introduced in the Parliament of Ukraine, aiming to bring Ukrainian data protection laws in line with GDPR and the updated Convention for the Protection of Individuals with Regard to Automatic Processing of Personal Data 108+. These drafts not only seek alignment with the best data protection practices but also propose the establishment of a competent authority. This authority is expected to have sufficient powers to effectively enforce data protection laws within Ukraine.
Adoption of these new laws is anticipated as a key step in Ukraine’s implementation of EU legislation under the EU-Ukraine Association Agreement and its integration into the EU Digital Single Market. This would also support the government's wider digital agenda.
However, the timeline for these legislative developments remains uncertain. The ongoing martial law in Ukraine and other pressing wartime priorities continue to dominate the Parliament's agenda, potentially delaying progress in this critical area.
19-21 Bohdana Khmelnytskoho St
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Ukraine
+380 44 230 6000
+38 044 230 6001
info@asterslaw.com www.asterslaw.com