The most common ground for divorce is a separation that lasts for a period of 12 months with no prospect of reconciliation. Canada still has two “fault” grounds (cruelty and adultery) but they are rarely ‒ if ever ‒ used. The same grounds apply to same-sex spouses.
A divorce may be granted by the court after the parties have lived separately and apart with no reasonable prospect of reconciliation for a period of no less than 12 months. The 12-month period starts on the date of separation, which is a finding of fact. There is no requirement that the parties obtain a court order or court finding of the date of separation ‒ although, in some cases, a finding may be required if the parties cannot agree on the date of separation.
Consent is not required to apply for a divorce. One or both parties can apply to the court for a divorce. The unwinding of the parties’ financial affairs and any child-related issues are corollary relief to the application for divorce. Service is personal on the responding party even if the divorce is uncontested.
Canadian courts deal only with the severing of the legal marriage and the corollary issues of separation and divorce. Ontario courts may remove a religious barrier to marriage if certain criteria are met.
Annulment
Annulment is available in Canada in limited circumstances related to a defect in the formality of the marriage. In practice, it is rare. An annulment can be ordered if a marriage lacks the formal validity requirements, such as proper registration for the marriage. An annulment can also be ordered if a marriage lacks essential validity requirements. By way of example, a marriage wherein one party did not understand the nature of the duties or responsibilities that flowed from a contract may be annulled on that basis.
A spouse may only obtain a divorce in Canada if they, as the moving party, have lived in the jurisdiction for a period of no less than 12 months. The divorce is the severing of the legal marriage only. There are four primary areas of corollary relief that have different jurisdiction requirements, as follows.
In cases where both spouses reside in a foreign jurisdiction for at least one year prior to the time of the divorce application, and that jurisdiction does not recognise the validity of their marriage, the court in the province where the spouses were married may grant a divorce in accordance with Section 4-13 of the Civil Marriage Act. However, given that the Divorce Act does not apply in circumstances where a Canadian court grants a divorce for foreign spouses, the court does not have jurisdiction to adjudicate any support or custody claims.
Any person may make a claim for a divorce and/or corollary relief regardless of their nationality and/or religion. Where the parties reside (ie, their domicile) impacts where they are able to commence a court application.
Contesting Jurisdiction and Staying Proceedings
A party can contest jurisdiction based on the following factors:
The court may decline jurisdiction and/or stay the Canadian proceeding if a foreign jurisdiction has already taken jurisdiction. In declining or staying the Canadian proceeding, the court will consider whether the foreign court has jurisdiction over the proceeding. A province will have jurisdiction over a divorce if either spouse has been habitually resident in the province for at least one year immediately prior to the commencement of the divorce proceeding.
If a party wants to pursue divorce in a foreign jurisdiction, they must demonstrate that the foreign jurisdiction is the more convenient forum. Among the factors that a court will look to in determining if a foreign jurisdiction is more convenient are the geographical location of the parties and/or whether one spouse would be deprived of a juridical advantage in the foreign jurisdiction.
As regards the grounds for jurisdiction and the possibility of contesting jurisdiction and/or staying proceedings in financial proceedings, please refer to 1.2 Choice of Jurisdiction.
Pursuant to the Federal Divorce Act, Canadian courts do not have jurisdiction to hear and determine a corollary relief proceeding following a valid foreign divorce. Provincial courts may have jurisdiction to determine child support and property claims that have not been dealt with in the foreign proceeding.
Financial claims are commenced under provincial jurisdiction, most commonly by way of application to the relevant provincial Superior Court of Justice. Most financial claims are corollary to the divorce proceeding and, as such, service is personal or admitted through counsel in the case that the party has representation.
There are no statutory timelines for parties dealing with financial proceedings. Regardless of whether the matter is negotiated or litigated, all cases start with the exchange of financial disclosure – a process that almost always informs the pace of the negotiation and/or the litigation. The case law requires the asset-holding party to provide a value and supporting documentation for the asset(s) in question. The form and extent of disclosure depends on the nature and complexity of the assets. In some cases, particularly in high net worth matters, one or both parties may need to obtain the assistance of an arm’s length expert to provide an opinion of value with regard to various assets ‒ a process that can be time-consuming and expensive.
Division of property is governed by provincial legislation and is individual to each province. Generally speaking, the statutory right to division of assets (which is available only to married couples) is intended to provide an equal division of the value of all assets acquired during the course of the marriage, not a redistribution of title and/or ownership.
The question of value is a determination based on fact, rather than statutory definition. Value is calculated on a net basis, which can include actual liabilities and/or disposition costs and potential notional disposition costs or discounts. An example of this is when a minority discount is applied (in some circumstances) when a shareholder is in a non-control, minority position in the corporation and the value of their interest should be discounted based on liquidity and/or ability to dispose of the interest.
Financial Orders
In all Canadian provinces, the statutory scheme focuses on title, meaning that marriage does not create an ownership interest in the other spouse’s assets (equitable or otherwise) and only in the case of equitable relief can a spouse obtain an equitable ownership interest in an asset. In some extreme cases, a party may obtain relief to have an asset transferred to them or to compel the sale of an asset to satisfy a payment – although this is the exception, not the rule.
The courts have jurisdiction in exceptional cases to transfer assets from one spouse to the other either:
As in non-matrimonial cases, in exceptional circumstances the court can also seize and/or freeze assets to protect against depletion and potentially to enforce an outstanding order.
Disclosure Process
Canadian courts have described the failure to provide proper disclosure as the “cancer of matrimonial litigation”. Canadian jurisprudence dealing with the positive duty of a spouse to provide full and frank disclosure is robust and far-reaching. If a party resists disclosure that is relevant and ought to be produced, the court can restrict the party’s ability to participate in the proceeding and make orders in their absence, impose monetary and/or non-monetary penalties until compliance, and – in extreme cases ‒ make a finding of contempt.
An asset-holding party has the positive obligation to disclose all worldwide assets and provide a value for the disclosed assets. In the case of complex assets, this may include an obligation to provide an expert opinion on the question of value. Once disclosure (including the value) is provided, it is open to the responding spouse to request further disclosure and/or obtain their own expert opinion with regard to the value.
Sometimes the required information to value a spouse’s asset (or interest in an asset) requires production from third parties. The burden on who moves against the third party depends on the nature of the requested disclosure.
If an asset-holding party is not able to obtain the required supporting documentation to value the asset, they may have an obligation to obtain a court order requiring third parties to release the necessary information to determine value. An example of this would be if the asset holder is a minority shareholder in a privately held corporation and does not have a right of access to the working papers of the corporation. In this case, the spouse would have a positive obligation to move before the court as against the corporation to obtain the disclosure.
If a responding spouse is not satisfied with the disclosure provided and wishes to pursue further or other disclosure, they are also free to ask the court to compel the asset-holding spouse (or third parties) to produce additional information.
Trusts
A spouse’s interest in a trust may be an asset that is valued and then equalised by the courts. Determining value of an interest in a trust is a fact-finding exercise. The court will examine the following questions.
Equitable trusts arising from unjust enrichment are remedies available both as a matter of common law and, in some jurisdictions, by statute. In addition to the traditional equitable remedies of resulting and constructive trust, the Supreme Court of Canada has expanded the reach of equitable claims and created a common-law finding of Joint Family Venture (JFV). A JFV finding allows the court to expand the reach of traditional trust remedies when the nature and dynamic of the spouse’s contribution is not specifically tied to an identified asset. A finding of JFV requires the parties to have engaged in a joint economic enterprise. The determination involves many of the traditional considerations for a constructive trust remedy but, again, relieves the trier of fact of the obligation to attach those contributions to a specific asset. This has been an important development for non-married spouses.
Generally, trust claims (including a JFV finding) are available only to non-married spouses. However, the case law has not closed off certain circumstances whereby a married spouse may also have a trust claim, including a JFV.
Canada has a robust and well-developed body of jurisprudence related to spousal support. In addition to extensive case law, the courts rely on the Spousal Support Advisory Guidelines (SSAGs), which is a set of rules and guidelines for how to fashion an appropriate support order.
Spousal support is available to spouses on an interim and final basis. On an interim basis, the court is not required to determine a precise amount and will, in most circumstances, fashion an interim order that is intended as a holding pattern until final resolution. The court also has jurisdiction to order partial lump or uncharacterised advances on an interim basis.
Grounds for Spousal Support
Entitlement to spousal support is based on compensatory and non-compensatory grounds.
Compensatory support is payable when a spouse has made direct or indirect contributions to the marriage and/or the economic success of the other spouse and suffered an economic loss as a result of those contributions. A spouse will have a strong compensatory claim if they have sacrificed a job or career trajectory for the family, most commonly for childcare or for the advancement of the other spouse’s career. Strong compensatory claims also exist in traditional marriages where one spouse works outside the home and the non-income-earning spouse works inside the home.
Non-compensatory support is payable when a spouse has suffered economic disadvantage arising from the marriage breakdown. This most commonly occurs in shorter-term marriages where a lower-income-earning spouse will suffer economic loss or hardship arising from the physical separation. By way of example, the lower-income-earning spouse may experience job disruption or relocation costs arising from the marriage breakdown.
Most spousal support claims have blended entitlement, meaning they are a combination of compensatory and non-compensatory support.
Determination of Duration and Quantum of Support
The nature of a compensatory claim can inform both the duration and quantum of support. The stronger the compensatory claim, the more likely that duration will be longer and the amount will be higher.
The court can order spousal support on a monthly or lump sum basis. Although lump sum spousal support is exceptional, it may be appropriate in cases where income is uncertain and/or a lump sum more appropriately compensates a recipient spouse. Lump sum spousal support may also be appropriate if there are concerns about the payor’s ability to service monthly support in a reliable way. If spousal support is ordered on a monthly (sometimes called “periodic”) basis, the payments can be ordered with or without a termination date or with a structured review.
Aside from the nature of the compensatory claim, the quantum of spousal support is determined based on:
Duration of support is largely governed by the length of the marriage and the ages of the parties at the time of separation. Generally, a support obligation will not be less in duration than the length of the relationship. Importantly, duration for spousal support is determined by the length of the relationship, which can include cohabitation prior to the date of marriage if the parties are married.
Cohabitation does not require physical residence. There are cases in Canada where a party has established a sufficient level of economic integration and dependency during the course of a relationship for a support obligation to be imposed even though the parties did not physically live together during the relationship.
Domestic contracts can be entered into between married and unmarried spouses alike. In most provinces and territories, the validity and enforceability of domestic contracts are governed by both statute and case law. Domestic contracts can take the following forms.
Generally, courts will enforce valid and enforceable domestic contracts that do not give rise to unconscionable circumstances.
Validity of Domestic Contracts
Validity is governed primarily by statute in the relevant province. Validity is concerned primarily with the formal requirements of establishing the existence of the contract. In Ontario, for example, validity requires that the domestic contract be in writing, signed by both parties, witnessed, and dated.
Enforceability of Domestic Contracts
Enforceability, by contrast, concerns itself with whether the circumstances of entering into the contract were appropriate and with the fairness of the contract. The threshold requirements for the enforceability of all domestic contracts are threefold, as follows.
Duress
Duress is addressed extensively in the case law. Broadly understood, duress will be found when a spouse felt ‒ at the time of execution or in the time leading up to the execution ‒ that they had no choice but to enter into the contract and that the duress was impressed on them by the acts or words of the other contracting spouse. External stress, discomfort or stressful circumstances do not rise to the level of duress necessary to set aside a domestic contract that was otherwise validly entered into.
Financial disclosure
The complete absence of disclosure leading up to the execution of a domestic contract is almost always a basis for setting aside a domestic contract. More often, however, there is a question about the sufficiency of the disclosure provided. A material misrepresentation or omission, whether intentional or inadvertent, will likely be considered a basis for setting aside an agreement. For a misrepresentation or omission to be material, it must directly connect to the substantive content of the contract and will depend on the facts of the case.
Independent legal advice
The absence of independent legal advice does not automatically result in a contract being unenforceable, but the presence of independent legal advice is a powerful indicator that the contract should be enforced. A certificate confirming independent legal advice was given is commonly attached as a schedule to domestic contracts to confirm the nature and extent of the legal advice given. The presence of independent legal advice leading up to and during the execution of the agreement is often, but not always, a mitigating factor against a duress allegation. Independent legal advice may not be sufficient if there was an absence of full financial disclosure. Put another way, the presence of independent legal advice may be useless if the lawyer did not have appropriate disclosure in order to administer the appropriate advice.
Unconscionable Circumstances
In addition to the above-mentioned criteria, the court has jurisdiction to set aside all or part of a domestic contract if the contract results in an unconscionable circumstances. The lead case in respect of this analysis comes from the Supreme Court of Canada in Miglin v Miglin (2003).
One example of unconscionable circumstances would be if the parties entered into a domestic contract containing a full spousal support release and then were subsequently married for 45 years in a traditional marriage. In this case, the court may set aside the spousal support release because the outcome of the contract is inconsistent with the terms and entitlement that the spouse would have otherwise received without the contract. Given the severity of the circumstances in this case, a court would likely set the spousal support release aside because its results would be unconscionable and/or inconsistent with the intentions of the parties at the time that the contract was signed.
In Ontario, Alberta, New Brunswick, Nova Scotia, and Quebec, unmarried spouses have no automatic right or statutory right to share in their partner’s property unless they hold legal title to the property. In these jurisdictions, unmarried spouses’ property rights are limited to common law rights and equitable claims (ie, claims that anyone may advance). The Supreme Court of Canada in Walsh v Bona (2002) confirmed that the different treatment of married and unmarried spouses when it came to property rights arising from their relationships was not discriminatory under the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. Conversely, in Saskatchewan, Manitoba, and British Columbia, unmarried couples who are living together in a conjugal relationship have statutory property rights and are entitled to equally share in property acquired during their relationship.
The contributions of the spouse to the home (including contributions to childcare) and the length of the relationship are factors that the court will considering when assessing both the finding of unjust enrichment and in fashioning a monetary or non-monetary remedy.
Enforcement falls under provincial jurisdiction and varies from province to province. A spouse has a combination of institutional enforcement and enforcement through the courts. An example of institutional enforcement can be found in the province of Ontario. There, the Family Responsibility Office enforces support obligations using tools such as garnishment, seizing of driver’s licence and/or passports, and ‒ in some cases ‒ incarceration.
Court-ordered enforcement can include penalties for non-compliance, contempt findings, and writs of seizure and sale. A party that fails to comply with a financial order may also be responsible for the moving party’s costs.
Enforcement of International Orders
Enforcement of international orders is governed either by treaty or common law. All provinces and territories except Quebec have reciprocal support arrangements with some countries and territories, such as the USA. However, Quebec has arrangements with a number of states, including California, Maine and Florida.
Canada also has reciprocal support arrangements with Africa, Asia, Caribbean, Europe and the South Pacific. By way of example, Canada is a signatory to the Hague Convention of 23 November 2007 on the International Recovery of Child Support and Other Forms of Family Maintenance (the “2007 Hague Convention”). The 2007 Hague Convention is an international system for the cross-border recovery of child support and other forms of family maintenance. Some provinces, including Ontario and Manitoba, have implemented the 2007 Hague Convention into a provincial law that provides the applicable procedures to enforce foreign child support orders. For the Ontario legislation, see Chapter 13 of the Interjurisdictional Support Orders Act 2002.
Canada enjoys freedom of expression protected by the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. This includes freedom of the press. In addition to freedom of expression, the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms protects court openness as a procedural and substantive protection. In the absence of a sealing order, there is no restriction on the media’s ability to access court proceedings and report on the proceeding.
Canadian court proceedings are rarely televised except at the appellate level as a matter of custom. However, there is no constitutional prohibition.
Anonymising of proceedings is required by statute in child protection proceedings. Anonymisation is available by way of application in domestic child-related proceedings based on both statute and common law and, rarely, may be ordered in financial proceedings based on common law.
Parties are permitted by way of agreement to resolve their financial dispute outside of the court system. Parties must enter into a contract specifically agreeing to the form of dispute resolution and the terms of the process. In some provinces, there are statutory requirements to screen for domestic violence and to apply the law of the province in the private ADR process. Parties may contract into mediation only, mediation with focused arbitration on specific issues, or full arbitration on all issues.
There are no universal statutory obligations for parties to explore ADR methods. However, the case law in most provinces speaks to the positive obligation of parties to divert their dispute from the litigation process and attempt ADR in advance of litigation. That being said, many cases are not appropriate for ADR and counsel must consider the appropriate screening requirements before referring matters to private dispute resolution.
In the case of a settlement reached through negotiation and memorialised in a final agreement, the courts will generally enforce the agreement in the absence of a material defect. In cases where the parties properly enter into an arbitral process and a decision is made by the arbitrator, the court will treat such an award as valid and enforceable, provided that the award has not been successfully appealed, varied or set aside.
As regards the grounds for jurisdiction and the possibility of contesting jurisdiction and/or staying proceedings in domestic child-related proceedings, please refer to 2.1 Choice of Jurisdiction.
Living/Contact Arrangements
In Canada, children have the right to have contact with their parents. As a result, either parent can apply to the court to request that a parenting schedule be ordered. This can be done as part of a divorce application, an application that considers support issues, or as a standalone application. Several factors must be considered when determining what the appropriate parenting schedule should be, but the court’s primary consideration is always what is in the best interests of that child.
Following the breakdown of a relationship or a marriage, the legal approach to determining questions of custody and parental responsibility is one that focuses on the best interests of the child. The court will give primary consideration to the child’s physical, emotional and psychological safety, security and well-being. The status quo is not the default position in determining what is in the best interests of the child and by the same token, there is no presumption in favour of shared or equal parenting arrangements and/or decision-making responsibility regimes. The sole focus of the court is the best interests of the child in the specific factual context before it.
Child Maintenance
In Canada, child support is defined as the amount of financial support one parent must pay to the other parent to help support their child or children while in the care of the other parent.
Canada’s Federal Child Support Guidelines are rules and tables for calculating the quantum of child support one parent must pay to the other parent. The quantum of child support that one (or each) parent is responsible for depends on several factors – among which are the division of parenting time, each parent’s yearly salary, and the needs of the child. The Federal Child Support Guidelines are designed to advance the best interests of children and to ensure that child support orders are fair, objective, and consistent across Canada, as well as straightforward and inexpensive to review on an annual basis. To calculate the support owing in any given year, the Federal Child Support Guidelines mandate that parents provide certain financial information to one other on request. Child support orders based on the Federal Child Support Guidelines are enforceable across Canada.
In cases where the parties can reach an agreement on child support issues, there is no requirement that the agreement be presented to the court. In these circumstances (ie, where there is no court involvement), the parties can reach agreements that do not necessarily follow the Federal Child Support Guidelines. However, if the parties were married and seek a divorce order, then the child support arrangements will be scrutinised by the court and the court will not grant the divorce until it is satisfied that the children have been appropriately provided for. Usually this requires compliance with the Federal Child Support Guidelines ‒ although there are exceptions where special arrangements have been made that benefit the children.
In Canada, courts routinely make orders in relation to child support. Typically, there is no time limit or fixed duration set with regard to such orders at first instance. Rather, child support will end for a child when that child ceases to be a child entitled to support, as that term is defined by the common law in the relevant jurisdiction. This can happen as a result of various circumstances, which include but are not limited to:
Under the Federal Divorce Act, only spouses are able to bring an application for child support. However, under provincial legislation there are limited circumstances in which a child may bring their own child support application. Typically, this requires a child who is under the age of 18 (or who has not yet completed high school) to demonstrate that they have not voluntarily withdrawn from parental control – see, for example, Letourneau v Haskell (1979) and G(O) v G(R) (2017).
With limited exceptions, courts do not have the power to make orders that dictate the upbringing of a child. Decision-making responsibility is the right of a person to make decisions about the child. In a situation where parents have diverging views on a specific issue relating to the child, it is the court’s role to determine which parent is best equipped to make the determination of what is in the child’s best interests. Thereafter, it is up to the parent who has been granted decision-making responsibility to exercise that responsibility in a manner that is consistent with the best interests of the child.
Parental Alienation
Parental alienation is a serious issue, which first started to be identified by Ontario courts in the 1990s and has become an increasingly prevalent concept in Canadian family law cases. It is premised on one parent choosing to damage the character of their spouse and this, in turn, damaging the child’s relationship with the “rejected” parent. Although there is no one approach taken by courts in evaluating alienation, courts tend to focus on the harmful impact alienation has on the alienated children.
The courts have generally relied on the wide plethora of social science literature to guide their analysis of whether one party is exemplifying alienating behaviour and whether children are exhibiting indicia of exposure to alienating conduct by a parent. The court will look to a variety of behavioural cues from both the alienating parent and the alienated child as indicators of the presence of parental alienation, serving as predictors of future conflict and relationship dysfunction. Some factors that the court will consider include (but are not limited to):
The court will then look for a corresponding irrational and unfounded rejection of the alienated parent.
The remedies order in a finding of alienation have included parental educational programmes, reconciliation therapy, and changes to custody arrangements. See MM(V) v CMV (2017) for an overview of alienation literature.
Views of the Child
The child’s perspective, views and preferences are important factors for the court to consider in parenting cases. Although children are able to testify, it is widely accepted that it is harmful and not in the best interests of children to be brought into the courtroom. This reality must be balanced by the principle that children have a right to have their views heard on matters that concern them, as articulated under Article 12 of the United Nations Conventions on the Rights of the Child 1989 (to which Canada is a signatory).
In order to protect children from the conflict between the parties, some provinces will order that judicial interviews take place. Frequently, provincial statute mandates that the interview be recorded and that the child be entitled to have counsel present during the interview. Depending on the province, courts may appoint a children’s lawyer representative to evaluate and represent the child’s wishes or interests within the litigation. Generally, the court is obliged to ‒ if possible ‒ take into consideration the views and preference of the child to the extent that the child is able to express them and the views are deemed sufficiently independent and reliable. Where applicable, the child’s views will be given weight proportionate to the child’s age and maturity, among other factors.
Parties can decide to use ADR at any point in their separation, including before starting any proceedings in court. The ADR process can be used to resolve all issues, no matter how big or how small. The parties can even choose to have all interim issues dealt with by ADR yet have the final issues resolved in the courtroom. The most common forms of ADR for family law disputes are mediation, arbitration, mediation-arbitration, and collaborative family law. Parties must voluntarily enter into such processes.
No ADR processes are mandated by the court in family law proceedings ‒ although discussions and mediated resolutions are encouraged. The court does frequently refer family law litigants to publicly funded mediation services where the dispute is deemed appropriate for such a form of dispute resolution.
In order for agreements reached outside of court to be enforceable, they must be made in writing, signed by the parties, dated, and witnessed. A court may, on application, set aside a domestic contract or a provision in it if:
Currently, there are no requirements imposed by statute for parties to engage in ADR. However, in the recent amendments to the Divorce Act that came into effect on 1 March 2021, Parliament mandated that ‒ to the extent that it is appropriate to do so – the parties to a proceeding must try to resolve matters that may be the subject of an order under the Divorce Act through a family dispute resolution process. These new changes have imposed a duty on legal advisers to encourage clients to try to resolve issues through a family dispute resolution process unless it would be clearly inappropriate to do so.
In Ontario, the media and press are generally permitted to report on cases involving children (including family law matters), unless there are specific court orders or legal restrictions in place. In order to safeguard the confidentiality and well-being of minors involved in legal proceedings, courts may impose publication bans or other restrictions to limit the extent to which media can report on child-related cases.
When reporting on child protection hearings, it is prohibited to publish or publicly disclose information that reveals the identity of a child who is either a witness or involved in a hearing or is the focus of a legal proceeding, pursuant to Section 87(8) of the Child, Youth and Family Services Act 2017. This includes the child’s parent, foster parent, or family member.
Child Anonymity
As a result of Canada’s open court principle, children are not automatically anonymised in court proceedings in most Canadian provinces. Quebec is the only Canadian province that automatically anonymises the parties’ names with letters and a catalogue number.
In provinces other than Quebec, if a party to a proceeding wishes to anonymise any names within the proceeding, they are generally required to obtain a court order. Typically, the order is obtained by motion in a scheduling court or in writing before commencement of the proceedings.
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In June 2019, Bill C-78 was passed in Canada, an act that amended (among other legislation) the federal Divorce Act, R.S.C. 1985, c.3 (2nd Supp) (the “Divorce Act”). The bill received Royal Assent on 21 June 2019. Most changes, and particularly those affecting the Divorce Act, came into force on 1 March 2021 (the “2021 Amendments”).
The changes to the Divorce Act modified not only long-standing language but also concepts and paradigms used for decades by family lawyers, family law judges, and, to some extent, the Canadian public. The 2021 Amendments, while varied and sometimes quite specific, are collectively understood to have initiated a reshaping of how family law issues – particularly child-related family law issues – are practised and adjudicated in Canada. The 2021 Amendments triggered this change by renaming, and thus reframing, some of the central language and concepts in the Act. Generally, the changes can be summarised as shifting focus away from parents and adult litigants’ experience of the issues in question, and towards children, relationships with children, children’s best interests, and children’s experiences of those issues.
These changes have been widely applauded insofar as they encourage a less contentious approach to family litigation. However, the application of the 2021 Amendments, and their impact on some of the older common law principles that pre-date the amendments, have made the changes less linear, and more of a gradual evolution – and one that might be closer to the beginning than the end.
This paper first sets out to explain the most significant parenting-related amendments to the Divorce Act, and summarises the reasons why some of the changes were made. Second, it considers how the amendments have affected certain pre-amendment principles used in the court’s analyses in family law cases, specifically, the “maximum contact” principle, which is used as a case study to exemplify how the changes have played out in the jurisprudence.
Introduction to the Child-Related Amendments
To emphasise the child-focused nature of all parenting and decision-related inquiries – and, specifically, the importance and primacy of children’s best interests – the Divorce Act now features concepts and words that focus on relationships with children, such as “parenting time”, “decision-making responsibility“ and “contact”, rather than on parental responsibility and authority, which the pre-amendment language tended towards, with words and concepts such as “primary caregiver”, “access time”, “custody” and “custodial responsibility”.
Details of the Child-Related Amendments
The term “parenting order” replaces “custody order” throughout the Divorce Act. The term “contact order” describes an order that sets out time for children to spend with important people who are not in a parental role, such as grandparents. These changes in language reflect an increasing recognition of diverse family structures. The amendments capture the realities of blended families, families with same-sex couples, and family structures involving more than two adults with whom children spend time consistent with their best interests. This understanding allows for a more inclusive approach to parenting arrangements, and reflects a modern view of family. This inclusivity also ensures that children maintain connections with all important adults in their lives.
The term “access” is no longer used in the Divorce Act. Instead, to emphasise the best interests of the child, the Divorce Act features concepts that emphasise children and relationships with children, such as “parenting”, “parenting time” and “contact”. The old concepts of “primary caregiver”, “custodial parent” and “access parent” implied control or ownership of a child (or the lack thereof), and consequently left parents with more interpersonal conflict and controversy on account of a “win-loss” paradigm. The new terms are intended to promote respect between all adults involved with the child and are intended to be child-centred rather than parent-centred. Indeed, the language is deliberately neutral rather than loaded with implications.
Similarly, a new section was added to the Divorce Act to deal with “decision-making responsibility”. Decision-making responsibility means the responsibility for making significant decisions about a child’s well-being, including in respect of health, education, culture, language, religion and spirituality, and significant extracurricular activities. Prior to the amendments to the Divorce Act, “custody” was the term used to describe decision-making responsibility, with the specific categories of major decision-making often referred to in the jurisprudence as “heads of custody”. Whereas the old language was once again laden with “win-loss” dynamics and false assumptions, the new language captures more clearly the purpose of the responsibilities at issue and authorises a court to assign responsibility for making significant decisions about a child’s life.
The Divorce Act has also been amended to include an explicit clause providing that any person to whom parenting time or decision-making responsibility has been allocated in respect of a child or who has contact with that child under a contact order shall exercise that time, responsibility or contact in a manner that is consistent with the best interests of the child. This amendment reminds parties of their obligations and the purpose of the determinations governed by the Divorce Act. By way of example, when a parent exercises decision-making responsibility about a child’s education, the emphasis is not on the parent’s right to decide, but rather on making the decision that is in the best interests of the child.
Similarly, the Divorce Act also includes new language providing that any party to a proceeding under the Divorce Act shall, to the best of their ability, protect any child of the marriage from conflict arising from the proceeding. This amendment requires parties – to the extent possible – to shield children from conflict related to issues being decided under the Divorce Act. This amendment was made on account of research that indicates that children’s well-being suffers if they are exposed to conflict between parents during and after a separation or divorce. In the best interests of children, parents must try to shield children from conflict as much as possible.
A new section, titled “Best Interests of the Child”, was added to the Divorce Act. This new section specifically requires courts to consider only the best interests of the child in decisions about parenting and contact orders. This is not to say that courts did not previously consider the best interests when arriving at decisions. Courts have long focused on the best interests of the child in decisions about parenting, and this test is also found in provincial and territorial family law legislation, and in the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child. However, the amendments included more detailed and, in some cases, new criteria to be considered when undertaking the “best interests” analysis, specifically when it comes to deciding the appropriate parenting time and/or contact arrangements for a given child.
In some cases, there may be conflicts between two or more of these criteria. When considering the criteria, and when necessary to resolve conflicts between two or more of these criteria, the amendments to the Divorce Act clarify that courts shall prioritise the child’s safety, security and well-being: “When considering the factors referred to in subsection (3), the court shall give primary consideration to the child’s physical, emotional and psychological safety, security and well-being.”
At subsection (3) of the new Section 16 of the Divorce Act, the factors to be considered are set out, and include:
The Maximum Contact Principle as Case Study for the Paradigm Shift
In this section, the “maximum contact principle” that was set out in the Divorce Act prior to the 2021 Amendments is analysed as an example of how the 2021 Amendments have led courts to re-examine and reinterpret long-standing principles that had been the subject of detailed development in the common law prior to 2021.
Interpretation and application of the maximum contact principle (pre-2021 amendments)
Prior to the 2021 Amendments, Section 16(10) of the Divorce Act provided as follows:
“In making an order for custody, the court shall give effect to the principle that a child of the marriage should have as much contact with each spouse as is consistent with the best interests of the child and, for that purpose, shall take into consideration the willingness of the person for whom custody is sought to facilitate such contact.”
While the origin of the maximum contact principle comes from legislation, and not jurisprudence, it was jurisprudence that contributed to the rather conflicting interpretation of the principle prior to the 2021 Amendments.
Young v Young (1993) 4 SCR 3, 108 DLR (4th) 193 (SCC)
The Supreme Court of Canada caseYoung v Young is recognised for its substantial initial discussion on the nature of custody and access and, specifically, the maximum contact principle. In Young v Young, the father had access to the parties’ three daughters and the mother had custody. The custodial mother was raised in the Anglican faith and sought to limit the access rights of the father who was a member of the Jehovah’s Witness faith. The trial judge imposed limits on the father exposing the children to his faith and this was reversed by the Ontario Court of Appeal. On appeal at the Supreme Court of Canada, the mother sought affirmation that the father was not permitted to expose the children to his faith during his access time. The exposure to the father’s faith was ultimately allowed. The case emphasised that the maximum contact principle reflects the importance of the continued involvement of non-custodial parents in the course of their children’s lives.
Justice McLachlin set out the historical framework under which matters of custody and access had previously been resolved, from near absolute paternal preference in the 18th and 19th centuries, which was displaced to establish that mothers had the primary right to custody of a child of “tender years”, then expanded in many jurisdictions to maternal preference, and finally settling on a “best interests” or “welfare of the child” test by the 1970s (paragraphs 205–206). Justice McLachlin confirmed that the best interests test (referring to the child’s condition, means, needs and other circumstances) is the only test that is relevant, and that the preferences of the parents and their rights have no role at all (paragraphs 210–211).
Her Honour found that the fact that the court enshrined the principle that “a child of the marriage should have as much contact with each spouse as is consistent with the best interests of the child” was significant, as it was the only specific factor that Parliament had singled out (paragraph 212). Her Honour specifically held that the custodial parent did not have the right to forbid certain types of contact between the access parent and the child, as “the custodial parent’s wishes are not the ultimate criterion for limitations on access” (paragraph 216).
Gordon v Goertz, 1996 CanLII 191 (SCC) (1996) 2 SCR 27
The 1996 case of Gordon v Goertz required the courts to consider “the desirability of maximising contact between the child and both parents” (paragraph 49). While the case confirmed that the maximum contact principle is mandatory, it notes that it is not absolute “and the judge is only obliged to respect it to the extent that such contact is consistent with the child’s best interests; if other factors show that it would not be in the child’s best interests, the court can and should restrict contact” (paragraph 24).
Slade v Slade, 2002 YKSC 40
This 2002 case demonstrates how, in the years following Young v Young and Gordon v Goertz, the courts made sense of Section 16(10) as an authority for the presumption of equal parenting time. Paragraph 10 states:
“Counsel for Ms Slade suggests that a determination must be made as to which parent is the primary caregiver. The corollary relief order is silent in that respect and states that there has been a joint and shared custody since November 1997. I do not find it helpful to go behind that order and review the evidence before the date of separation. What is clear to me is that there is a true shared custody arrangement where it would be difficult to say one parent or the other is the primary caregiver. Rhea has a good relationship with both her parents and the present arrangement achieves the desired goal of maximising contact between Rhea and both her parents. It is my view that the move of Ms Slade is not relevant to meeting the needs of Rhea, who will clearly be better off with both parents remaining in Whitehorse where she has friends, her school and is involved in a developmental gymnastics program for the past two years. The move to Prince George would be a disruption of her life at this time.”
Folahan v Folahan, 2013 ONSC 2966
Similar to Slade, this 2013 case demonstrates how, in the years following Young v Young and Gordon v Goertz, courts made sense of Section 16(10) as an authority for the presumption of equal parenting time. Paragraph 14 states:
“The principle of maximum contact is an important consideration under either legislative regimen when determining the best interests of children. Contact with both parents is the children’s, not the parents’, right. Where, as in this case, a parent argues for unequal contact between the children and each of their parents, the onus is on that parent to rebut the presumption.”
Rigillo v Rigillo, 2019 ONCA 548 and Rigillo v Rigillo, 2019 ONCA 647
In the trial decision in this matter, the trial judge ordered that the child would primarily reside with the mother, and reside with the father one overnight each week and alternating weekends. The court of appeal found that the trial judge had not adequately considered the maximum contact principle and required submissions from both parties as to the appropriate schedule for the child.
In ordering an expanded but unequal parenting schedule, the court of appeal at paragraph 23 stated that that the maximum contact principle does not necessarily require equal parenting time.
Reconciling the jurisprudence
The differentiating stances on the maximum contact principle between the above-mentioned decisions reflected the tension and uncertainty associated with the principle, being subject to unpredictable and often conflicting judicial interpretation and in fact ultimately only serving to create confusion as to whether the maximum contact principle constituted a sword or a shield for the court when battling parents embroiled in high-conflict parenting litigation and setting up equal-time orders.
While many decisions pre-2021 seemed to accept that Section 16(10) instructs the presumption of equal parenting time, there was inconsistency and confusion about where the “child’s best interests” inquiry fit within the defaulting presumption. Ultimately, in the intervening 36 years from 1986 to the 2021 Amendments, the notion of whether Section 16(10) of the Divorce Act meant a standalone presumption of equal parenting time remained the subject of fierce debate.
Interpretation and application of the maximum contact principle (post-2021 Amendments)
As outlined earlier, the intention of the 2021 Amendments to the Divorce Act was to move towards focusing on the interests of children and not on the rights of parents. The aim of changes in terminology and language was to move away from “win-loss” dichotomies in child-related disputes. Importantly, the amendment to Section 16(10) has helped to create new conversations, and thus more clarity, around the interpretation (and relevance) of the prior “maximum contact” principle.
Subsection 16(10) of the Divorce Act was replaced with Section 16(6), which provides for the following: “In allocating parenting time, the court shall give effect to the principle that a child should have as much time with each spouse as is consistent with the best interests of the child.”
The concept of “maximum contact” no longer exists under the new provision and is replaced with “parenting time consistent with best interests of child”. Under the new provision, the courts are directed to only consider the best interests of the child (by considering the criteria in Section 16(3)) when determining parenting time. There is no longer any basis for a common law presumption of equal parenting time, however inconsistently such a presumption was or was not applied prior to 2021. While courts do still, in some cases, seek to maximise a child’s parenting time with each parent, they now do so only subject to the best interests of the child.
Some of the jurisprudence on Section 16(6) since the 2021 Amendments includes the following.
Barendregt v Grebliunas, 2022 SCC 22
This case is paramount in asserting the new version of the maximum contact principle following the 2021 Amendments. In Barendregt, the Supreme Court of Canada provided a definitive direction on interpreting the new provision. There, the court clarified – and in so doing settled a long-standing debate and subject of conflict in the jurisprudence – that previous judicial interpretation of the maximum contact principle as meaning a presumption of equal parenting time was a judicial overreach. The court further confirmed that the old “maximum contact principle” is better referred to as the “parenting time factor” and that the principle must “not be used to detract” from the “child’s best interests” inquiry (Section 16(3)).
At paragraph 9, the decision reads:
“The law relating to the best interests of the child has long emphasised the need for individualised and discretionary decision-making. But children also need predictability and certainty. To balance these competing interests, the law provides a framework and factors to structure a judge’s discretion. This case calls on the court to examine how some of those considerations apply in mobility cases. In particular, I clarify that a moving parent’s reasons for relocation and the “maximum contact factor” are relevant only to the extent they bear upon the best interests of the child; a parent’s testimony about whether they will move regardless of the outcome of the relocation application should not be considered; and family violence is a significant factor impacting the best interests of the child.”
Paragraph 164 provides: “The question before the trial judge was not how to best promote the parenting time factor; it was how to best promote the best interests of the children. These considerations are not synonymous. Nor are they necessarily mutually reinforcing. Courts should only give effect to the parenting time factor to the extent that it is in the best interests of the child.”
Den Duyf v Den Duyf, 2024 BCSC 2151
In this matter, the parties separated after a four-year relationship. The father moved to Pemberton, British Columbia, while the mother lived with the child on the mainland. The parties entered a consent order providing the father with parenting time. The mother sought to relocate with the child to Salt Spring Island (a substantial distance away) on a final basis or, alternatively, on an interim basis. The mother argued that relocation would assist the mother’s work experience and skill.
The mother’s application for interim and temporary relocation was dismissed. The judge also elected not to implement a 50/50 parenting time schedule. Although the mother was the child’s primary caregiver, the child has close relationships with his father and grandparents, and the judge considered that the disadvantages of a relocation outweighed the advantages. The judge also reasoned that moving directly to a shared parenting schedule would be too much of a change for the child. However, the judge found that an increase in the father’s parenting time would be in the best interests of the child. The judge considered and applied Barendregt in ordering parenting time consistent with best interests of the child.
At paragraph 122, the court held that remaining in place “would help foster and maintain his relationship with his father as he develops, which happens quickly at this age”.
CK v MK, 2024 ABKB 626
In this case, the parties were married and separated after 17 years. During their marriage, they had two children together. The mother struggled with substance abuse, and it had affected the family and the children. The father sought sole parenting and decision-making for the children.
The court considered what was an appropriate order for parenting and decision-making. At paragraphs 194‒196, the court held: “CK [the father] shall have primary parenting and sole decision-making responsibility for the children. MK [the mother] shall be entitled to information from CK regarding the children’s education, health and extracurricular activities and interests at her request. […]. Any parenting time for MK, whether by phone, video or in person, shall be at CK’s discretion, having considered the express preferences and wishes of the children.”
In making the parenting order, the judged considered that, based on Section 16(6) of the Divorce Act, the children should have as much time with each parent as is consistent with their best interests. The court held that, as a result of MK’s limited ability to care for the children, and as a result of the impact of the family violence upon the children (caused by MK), it was not in the best interests of the children to have a specified parenting schedule with MK. The court also found that was potentially not possible for the mother to have any parenting time with one of the children depending on the outcome of the mother’s sentencing regarding her assault charge.
Conclusion
Today, greater clarity and certainty exists in both the common law and legislation around the need for individualised best-interests analyses and the absence of any presumption with respect to parenting time arrangements. There is little dispute over the fact that, when considering parenting time arrangements, the only analysis applicable is that of the best interests of children in all cases. Indeed, both the Divorce Act and the cases decided since the 2021 Amendments make clear that a presumption of any kind would be in direct conflict with the court’s requirement to consider and only consider children’s best interests pursuant to Section 16.
The adjustments to our understanding of the former maximum contact principle are emblematic of how the legislation and common law have been required to evolve in recent years. As the focus in the legislation has shifted towards children, so too have the courts reframed older principles, particularly those that had been applied inconsistently prior to 2021. The result has been to start to create healthier environments for children during family separations and divorce.
It is essential for family lawyers and the courts to embrace these developments in the law and in jurisprudence, and advocate for outcomes that prioritise children and help to foster a brighter future for families navigating the challenges of separation.
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