Financial Crime 2026

Last Updated June 03, 2026

Singapore

Law and Practice

Authors



Sreenivasan Chambers LLC is a boutique disputes firm, focusing on complicated civil litigation, arbitration, white collar criminal defence, money laundering and asset seizure matters. Headed by Sreenivasan Narayanan SC, the 12-lawyer team consists of directors, associate directors, counsel and associates who have spent their entire professional lives in handling complex matters including landmark cases in the Court of Appeal and the High Court. The seniors in the firm have served on the board of listed companies and large charities and have legal and advisory knowledge as well as hands-on experience in corporate governance matters.

There is no statutory definition of the term “financial crime”. This term is a descriptor of various offences including, but not limited to, fraud, cheating, criminal breach of trust, bribery and corruption, money laundering, market abuse, sanctions-related offences, tax evasion, trade mark and copyright infringement and cyber-enabled financial crime.

Constituent Elements of an Offence

Generally, an offence requires both the actus reus and mens rea to be proven beyond reasonable doubt. The actus reus refers to the prohibited act or omission. The mens rea refers to the requisite mental element (ie, the state of mind), which can be intent or even recklessness or negligence.

However, mens rea is not required for certain offences. Such offences are known as strict liability offences and are often regulatory in nature. Depending on the offence-creating action, it may be a defence if the person alleged of committing such an offence had exercised reasonable care. Certain statutes also provide for presumptions of knowledge or intent, with the burden of proof then placed on the accused to rebut such knowledge or intent, on the balance of probabilities.

Intent, Recklessness or Negligence

The requisite mens rea (ie, state of mind) varies across financial crime offences. Some financial crime offences require proof of specific intent while others require only proof of wilfulness, knowledge, rashness or negligence. The definitions of the various states of mind are set out in Sections 26C to Section 26F of the Penal Code 1871 (PC). 

An act is done “intentionally” where it is the accused’s conscious objective to bring about a particular result. An act is done “knowingly” where the accused is aware of the relevant facts or circumstances. Rashness involves conscious risk-taking, where the accused proceeds despite being aware of a risk. Negligence generally bears the same meaning as in tort, and is often a fact-specific ingredient of an offence.

Attempt, Abetment, Conspiracy and Inchoate Offences

The PC provides for inchoate offences, including attempt and conspiracy. Section 511 of the PC provides that whoever attempts to commit an offence punishable by the PC or by any other written law, and in such attempt does any act towards the commission of that offence, shall be liable for punishment as provided for the offence. An attempt is punishable even if the offence is not ultimately completed. The courts have held that the accused must have had the intention to commit the offence and taken a “substantial step” towards committing the offence.

Abetment of offences are punishable under Section 109 of the PC, and defined in Section 107. Abetment arises where the abettor aids or instigates the primary offence or where the abettor is a party to a conspiracy which results in the primary offence.

Criminal conspiracy is by itself also a distinct offence under Section 120A of the PC. A conspiracy arises where two or more persons agree to do, or cause to be done, an illegal act, or an act which is not illegal by illegal means. This is punishable even if the act is not committed.

Corporate Criminal Liability

Corporate entities are not absolved of criminal liability. Section 2 of the Interpretation Act 1965 and Section 11 of the PC define “person” to include companies and other bodies of persons, whether incorporated or not.

Liability may be attributed to a company and the acts and mental state of an officer are treated as those of the company itself, as the officer is regarded as the company’s directing mind and will. The company may also face liability for actions of an officer or employee acting within a delegated managerial function.

Singapore legislation also imposes express corporate liability. Section 236B of the Securities and Futures Act 2001 (SFA) provides that a corporation may be guilty of market conduct offences (including false trading, market rigging and market manipulation) where such offences are committed by an employee or officer with the corporation’s consent or connivance, and for its benefit.

The Prosecution bears the burden of proof. It must prove all requisite elements of the offence beyond a reasonable doubt. This evidentiary principle is grounded in the presumption of innocence, which is in turn a fundamental principle of Singapore’s criminal justice system. 

Presumptions, Reverse Burdens and Strict Liability Offences Relevant to Financial Crime

Certain financial crime offences are often strict liability offences. For example, Section 253 of the SFA provides that where an offer of securities or securities-based derivatives contracts is made pursuant to a prospectus or profile statement, and the document contains a false or misleading statement, an omission of required information, or a failure to disclose a new material circumstance arising after lodgment, liability arises under Section 253(4). Here, liability is imposed even where the accused was not involved in making the false or misleading statement or omission.

There are offences where the burden of proof shifts to the accused. For example, Section 8 of the Prevention of Corruption Act 1960 (PCA) provides that where gratification is shown to have been given to a public officer by a person who has dealings with the government or a public body, it is presumed to have been given corruptly unless the contrary is proved. The standard of proof, to prove the contrary, is on a balance of probabilities.

Where a person conspires with or assists the principal offender, the person may be held secondarily liable by way of abetment. Section 107 of the PC provides that a person abets an offence if they:

  • instigate another person;
  • engage in a conspiracy, where an act or omission occurs pursuant to that conspiracy; or
  • intentionally aid the commission of the offence.

Criminal Offences

There are no limitation periods for the prosecution of criminal offences in Singapore. Criminal charges do not lapse and may be instituted at any time at the discretion of the Public Prosecutor.

Civil Recovery Actions

Civil recovery actions are subject to limitation periods as prescribed in the Limitation Act 1959 (LA). Section 6(1) of the LA provides that certain categories of actions must be commenced within six years from the date on which the cause of action accrued. 

Section 6(2) of the LA further provides that an action for an account shall not be brought in respect of any matter which arose more than six years before the commencement of the action.

However, some exceptions apply. Section 24A(3) of the LA introduces an alternative time limit tied to the claimant’s knowledge. In this connection, an action must be brought within six years from accrual or three years from the earliest date on which the claimant first had the requisite knowledge and a right of action, whichever is later. Section 29(1) of the LA allows for the commencement of the reckoning period of six years to be delayed in cases of fraudulent claims.

Distinct limitation periods are specified for certain civil penalties. One example is the six-year limit for a civil penalty under the Securities and Futures Act.

The starting point is the presumption of territoriality. In Public Prosecutor v Taw Cheng Kong [1998] 2 SLR(R) 489 @ [66-69], the Court of Appeal ruled that, in the absence of express words to the contrary, provisions of the Penal Code are presumed to apply only within Singapore.

In this regard, Section 4B of the PC expressly provides that certain offences are deemed to have been committed in Singapore where there is a sufficient territorial nexus. This includes situations where:

  • part of the offence occurs in Singapore; or
  • the offence, wherever committed, was intended to cause gain, loss or harm in Singapore.

Such offences comprise, amongst others, criminal breach of trust, cheating and forgery.

Notwithstanding the above, some statutes also provide for extraterritorial application. Jurisdiction for offences under the Corruption, Drug Trafficking and Other Serious Crimes (Confiscation of Benefits) Act 1992 (CDSA) extends to conduct occurring outside Singapore, where proceeds associated with serious offences committed overseas are dealt with within Singapore. In relation to corruption, Section 37(1) of the Prevention of Corruption Act 1960 (PCA) states that its provisions “have effect, in relation to citizens of Singapore, outside as well as within Singapore”, such that a Singapore citizen who commits a corruption offence anywhere in the world may be dealt with as if the offence had been committed within Singapore.

Similarly, Section 339(1) of the SFA extends to offences that are committed partly outside Singapore, including market misconduct such as insider trading and front-running. The Personal Data Protection Act 2012 (PDPA) also has extraterritorial effect as its provisions apply to organisations physically present outside Singapore in relation to the collection, use and disclosure of personal data collected in Singapore. In addition, the Computer Misuse Act 1993 (CMA) extends to acts committed overseas that affect computers, data or systems in Singapore.

Mechanisms for International Co-Operation and Mutual Legal Assistance

The principal legislation governing international co-operation is the Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters Act 2000 (MACMA).

The MACMA applies both to requests made by Singapore to foreign states and to requests made by foreign states to Singapore. Section 3 sets out the types of assistance that may be provided, including:

  • the taking of evidence and production of materials;
  • arrangements for persons to assist in investigations;
  • the recovery, forfeiture or confiscation of property;
  • the restraint or freezing of assets; search and seizure;
  • the identification and location of persons; and
  • service of documents.

The Attorney-General’s Chambers acts as the Central Authority for all requests. Even in the absence of a bilateral treaty, assistance may be rendered on the basis of reciprocity, subject to the provisions of MACMA.

The legal framework governing extradition in Singapore is primarily set out in the Extradition Act 1968 (EA). The EA is intended to govern extradition arrangements with declared Commonwealth territories and foreign states generally subject to applicable treaties.

Section 2(1) of the EA defines an “extradition offence” as follows.

  • In relation to a request made by Singapore – an offence that carries a maximum punishment of two years’ imprisonment or more and which, if it had been committed in Singapore in corresponding circumstances, would be punishable under Singapore law and satisfy the relevant threshold of seriousness (typically punishable by imprisonment of a specified minimum duration).
  • In relation to a request made by a foreign state of declared Commonwealth territory – an offence that carries a maximum punishment of two years’ imprisonment or more which is similarly punishable under the law of the requesting jurisdiction and would also constitute an offence in Singapore if committed in corresponding circumstances.

The definition therefore adopts a dual criminality approach, requiring that the conduct be criminal in both jurisdictions and meet the statutory threshold of seriousness.

The Commercial Affairs Department (CAD) of the Singapore Police Force is the principal law enforcement agency responsible for investigating financial and commercial crimes in Singapore. It handles offences such as fraud, cheating, criminal breach of trust, money laundering and other complex economic crimes.

The Corrupt Practices Investigation Bureau (CPIB) is an independent agency responsible for investigating corruption offences under the PCA. It reports directly to the Prime Minister and has the authority to investigate both public and private sector individuals.

The Monetary Authority of Singapore (MAS) is both Singapore’s central bank and its integrated financial regulator. MAS regulates and polices financial crime offences under the SFA, including insider trading and market manipulation. It also exercises administrative and civil enforcement powers such as licensing actions, prohibition orders, composition penalties and civil penalty applications.

The Attorney-General is also the Public Prosecutor. The Attorney General’s Chambers (AGC) is responsible for prosecuting all criminal offences in Singapore.

MAS and CAD have established a framework for joint investigation of market misconduct offences such as insider trading and market manipulation under Part XII of the SFA. MAS officers taking part in joint investigations are gazetted as Commercial Affairs Officers so that they hold equivalent criminal powers of investigation. This arrangement is intended to deliver more effective enforcement outcomes and strengthened public confidence in Singapore’s capital markets.

Financial crime investigations in Singapore can be initiated through multiple channels. The most common include:

  • suspicious transaction reports filed with the Suspicious Transaction Reporting Office by reporting entities pursuant to their obligations under Section 45 of the CDSA;
  • complaints lodged by victims with the Singapore Police Force or the CAD; and
  • regulatory referrals from the MAS or other regulatory bodies following supervisory inspections or market surveillance. Listed companies are also required to establish and monitor whistle-blower channels to the Audit Committee of the board.

Investigating authorities such as the SPF and CAD have discretion as to whether to commence investigations. The threshold for commencing investigations is crossed when the report reveals a prima facie arrestable offence and there are sufficient grounds to proceed with the matter.

After investigations are completed, the AGC has broad prosecutorial discretion, both as to whether to proceed, and what charges to proceed on. This discretion is generally not subject to judicial review, except in limited circumstances such as unconstitutionality or improper purpose.

Powers to Compel Documents and Information

Investigating authorities in Singapore have broad powers to compel the production of documents and information. Under Section 20 of the Criminal Procedure Code 2010 (CPC), a police officer investigating a seizable offence may require any person to produce documents or things necessary for the investigation. In addition, Section 21 of the CPC empowers a police officer to require any person who appears to be acquainted with the facts and circumstances of a case to attend and provide information.

Search and Seizure Powers

Section 24 of the CPC provides that a court may authorise a police officer to search any premises and seize property connected with an offence. In urgent situations, Section 34 of the CPC permits searches without warrants where there is reasonable cause to believe that delay would result in the removal, concealment or destruction of evidence.

Asset Tracing, Freezing and Confiscation

Singapore’s asset recovery regime is primarily governed by the CPC and the CDSA. Under Section 35 of the CPC, police officers may seize property suspected to be connected to an offence, including property used or intended to be used in committing an offence, or which constitutes evidence.

In addition, Section 16 of the CDSA empowers the courts to issue restraint orders to prevent dealing with realisable property pending criminal proceedings. Upon conviction for relevant offences, the court may also order confiscation of benefits derived from criminal conduct.

These powers extend to tracing, freezing and confiscating assets, including proceeds of crime. In practice, they also apply to digital assets and cryptocurrencies where they constitute “property” or “realisable property” under the statutory framework.

Singapore’s enforcement authorities increasingly leverage technology in the detection, investigation and prevention of financial crime. MAS has invested significantly in supervisory technology (“SupTech”) to enhance its oversight capabilities. This includes the use of artificial intelligence and machine learning, natural language processing, big data analytics and distributed ledger technology to aid in MAS’ supervision and regulatory compliance.

MAS has also developed a digital platform by the name of “COSMIC” (Collaborative Sharing of Money Laundering/Terrorism Financing (ML/TF) Information & Cases). This was developed in collaboration with six major commercial banks in Singapore (DBS, OCBC, UOB, SCB, Citibank and HSBC). One of COSMIC’s features enables financial institutions to share information on customers who exhibit multiple “red flags” with each other.

Financial institutions regulated by MAS are expected to conduct internal investigations where potential breaches of anti-money laundering, sanctions or market conduct requirements are identified. Corporates and financial institutions may also initiate internal investigations following whistle-blower reports, compliance alerts or the receipt of regulatory queries. The findings of internal investigations may be reported to relevant authorities, and in some cases, such reports may influence the scope and direction of subsequent regulatory or criminal investigations.

Legal professional privilege is recognised in Singapore and generally protects communications between a client and their legal adviser made for the purpose of obtaining or providing legal advice, as well as communications made in contemplation of litigation. Privilege may be claimed over documents generated during internal investigations, provided the dominant purpose of the investigation was to obtain legal advice or in connection with anticipated litigation. However, the scope of privilege in the context of internal investigations requires careful consideration, particularly where fact-finding and legal advice functions are intertwined.

Data protection obligations under the PDPA apply to the collection, use and disclosure of personal data during internal investigations. Organisations must ensure that any processing of personal data in the course of an investigation complies with the PDPA’s requirements, including the obligation to obtain consent or rely on an applicable exception.

Employment law considerations also arise in the context of internal investigations. Employers must exercise care when interrogating or questioning employees, taking disciplinary action against staff or dismissing them, to avoid claims for wrongful dismissal, harassment or breach of contract.

Voluntary disclosure and co-operation with authorities are taken into account in Singapore’s enforcement framework. Early self-reporting of breaches and proactive co-operation with regulatory inquiries are factors that could potentially be considered favourably in determining enforcement outcomes, including the type and severity of the breach. Similarly, in the criminal context, the courts may take into account an accused person’s co-operation with investigations as a mitigating factor in sentencing. However, there is no formal leniency or immunity programme for financial crime offences in Singapore, and voluntary disclosure does not guarantee immunity from prosecution or regulatory action.

There is a regime in place where corporate entities can negotiate with the AGC for “deferred prosecution” where a negotiated civil penalty is imposed in lieu of prosecution.

Financial crime investigations in Singapore may involve the arrest and interview of suspects. Arrests and interviews are governed by the CPC. Many financial crime investigations lead to raids being carried out where numerous suspects are arrested at once. Upon arrest, suspects are typically brought to a police station or the premises of the relevant investigating authority for interviews. Accused persons may have to furnish a bond to be released pending investigations.

There are several circumstances in which a suspect or other persons may be compelled to co-operate with investigators. Under Section 21 of the CPC, police officers may require any person acquainted with the facts of a case to attend and provide information. Failure to comply may, in and of itself, constitute an offence. However, this is subject to the limited right against self-incrimination. Section 22(2) of the CPC provides that while a person examined by a police officer during an investigation is bound to state truly the facts and circumstances with which they are acquainted, they need not say anything that might expose them to a criminal charge, penalty or forfeiture.

Under Section 20 of the CPC, police officers may order the production of documents and other materials. Additionally, the court may issue production orders requiring specified persons to produce documents or information relevant to an investigation.

Under Section 35 of the CPC, a police officer may seize and detain property that is suspected to have been stolen, or property found in circumstances giving rise to suspicion of the commission of an offence. This power may be exercised without a court order, provided there is reasonable suspicion. The seized property may be retained pending the conclusion of investigations or proceedings.

Under Section 16 of the CDSA, the High Court may issue restraint orders prohibiting any person from dealing with realisable property. These orders are typically granted where there is an ongoing investigation or prosecution and a risk that assets may be dissipated. The order may be subject to conditions and exceptions as the court considers appropriate.

These powers are primarily domestic in nature but may have cross-border effect in practice through co-operation mechanisms such as mutual legal assistance. They may also extend to third parties, including nominees, beneficial owners and persons holding or receiving tainted assets, to the extent that the property is “realisable property” or otherwise linked to the alleged offence.

Singapore recognises a range of fraud-related offences under the PC, including false representation, misappropriation, criminal breach of trust, cheating, conspiracy and forgery.

Fraud by False Representation, Non-Disclosure or Abuse of Position

Under Section 424A PC, it is an offence to fraudulently or dishonestly:

  • make a false representation;
  • fail to disclose information where there is a legal duty to do so; or
  • abuse a position in which a person is expected to safeguard or not act against another’s financial interests.

The offence is punishable with imprisonment of up to 20 years and/or a fine.

Misappropriation of Property/Criminal Breach of Trust/Cheating

These offences are dealt with in the Penal Code with sentences depending on the role of the offender (eg, whether agent, director or fiduciary), subject matter (eg, accounting entry or valuable security) and method. As both the offences and possible punishment rage widely, specific advice should always be sought. Within each category, the AGC has significant discretion in relation to the section to proceed under; and hence the likely punishment outcome.

CBT is punishable with imprisonment of up to seven years and/or a fine. Higher penalties apply in respect of aggravated CBT offences. CBT offences committed by an employee entrusted with property attract a maximum of 15 years imprisonment, and up to 20 years’ imprisonment where such offences are committed by a public servant, banker, agent, director, key executive or fiduciary.

Forgery

Under Section 463 PC, forgery is committed where a person makes any false document with the intent to commit fraud, to cause any person to part with property or to cause damage or injury to any person. Under Section 465 PC, forgery is punishable with imprisonment of up to four years and/or a fine. Where forgery is committed for the purpose of cheating, the penalty is up to ten years’ imprisonment and/or a fine. 

Criminal Conspiracy

Under Section 120A PC, criminal conspiracy is an agreement between two or more persons to commit an offence or cause an offence to be committed. A conspirator is generally punishable in the same manner as if they had abetted the substantive offence. This means that the sentencing range for a criminal conspiracy offence would depend on the substantive offence.

General Bribery Offences (Public and Private Sectors)

Section 5 of the PCA sets out a broad offence covering both public and private sector bribery. It criminalises corrupt solicitation, receipt, agreement to receive, giving, promising or offering of any gratification as an inducement or reward for doing (or refraining from doing) any act in relation to any matter or transaction.

The offence is punishable by a fine of up to SGD100,000 and/or imprisonment of up to five years.

Bribery Involving Agents (Private Sector Focus)

Section 6 specifically addresses bribery involving agents and principals (commonly arising in the private sector). An offence is made out where an agent corruptly accepts or obtains gratification as an inducement or reward in relation to the principal’s affairs. The key elements include:

  • the receipt or solicitation of gratification;
  • a corrupt inducement or reward;
  • an objectively corrupt transaction; and
  • knowledge of the corrupt nature of the arrangement.

Public Sector Bribery

Public sector bribery is subject to stricter treatment. Under Section 8 of the PCA, where gratification is given to or received by a person employed by the government or a public body, there is a rebuttable presumption that the gratification was corruptly given or received.

Bribery involving members of parliament or members of public bodies attracts enhanced penalties of up to SGD100,000 in fines and/or imprisonment of up to seven years.

Foreign Public Officials and Extraterritoriality

Bribery of foreign public officials is not a separate offence but falls within the general offences under the PCA. However, the PCA has extraterritorial reach in relation to Singapore citizens, who can be prosecuted for corrupt acts committed outside Singapore as if the offence occurred within Singapore.

“Failure to Prevent” Bribery

Singapore does not currently recognise a standalone “failure to prevent bribery” offence, unlike some other jurisdictions.

Principal Money Laundering Offences and Predicate Offences

Money laundering offences in Singapore are set out in the Corruption, Drug Trafficking and Other Serious Crimes (Confiscation of Benefits) Act 1992 (CDSA).

Under Section 54(1) of the CDSA, a person commits a money laundering offence if they:

  • conceal or disguise property that represents (in whole or in part, directly or indirectly) the proceeds of criminal conduct;
  • convert or transfer such property, or remove it from the jurisdiction; or
  • acquire, possess or use such property.

Section 54(2) of the CDSA criminalises dealing with such property where a person knows or has reasonable grounds to believe that the property represents another person’s benefits from criminal conduct.

Under Section 51(2) of the CDSA, it is an offence to assist another person to retain the benefits of criminal conduct, where the assister knows or has reasonable grounds to believe that the other person has engaged in criminal conduct or benefited from it.

AML Obligations and Sanctions

Singapore imposes extensive anti-money laundering (AML) and countering the financing of terrorism (CFT) obligations, particularly on financial institutions.

The Monetary Authority of Singapore (MAS) issues legally binding AML/CFT Notices requiring financial institutions to implement robust controls. These include:

  • customer due diligence;
  • ongoing monitoring;
  • record-keeping; and
  • suspicious transaction reporting.

In addition, the Financial Services and Markets Act 2022 (the “FSMA 2022”) and its subsidiary legislation (including the FSM Regulations) support Singapore’s compliance with international AML/CFT obligations, including those arising from United Nations Security Council Resolutions.

A failure to comply with applicable AML/CFT requirements constitutes an offence. Under the FSMA 2022, a financial institution that breaches MAS AML/CFT Notices may be liable on conviction to a fine of up to SGD1 million per offence, in addition to potential regulatory actions by MAS (eg, directions, reprimands or licence-related sanctions).

Insider Dealing

Insider dealing is prohibited under Section 219 of the SFA.

A person who possesses information that is not generally available and which, if it were generally available, would be expected to have a material effect on the price or value of securities, securities-based derivatives contracts or units in a collective investment scheme must not:

  • subscribe for, purchase or sell such products; or
  • communicate that information to another person where they know or ought reasonably to know that the recipient would trade on it.

A contravention of Section 219 is punishable by a fine of up to SGD250,000 and/or imprisonment for up to seven years.

Market Manipulation

Part 12 of the SFA criminalises various forms of market manipulation, including:

  • false trading and market rigging – engaging in conduct that creates a false or misleading appearance of active trading or the market for or price of capital markets products;
  • wash sales – transactions that do not result in any change in beneficial ownership; and
  • use of another person’s trading account – directly or indirectly to execute trades through another person’s account.

Such offences may attract criminal or civil liability. Under Section 204(1), a person is liable on conviction to a fine of up to SGD250,000 and/or imprisonment for up to seven years. The court may alternatively make an order for the payment of a civil penalty.

Misleading Disclosures

Section 200 of the SFA prohibits false or misleading statements in relation to capital markets products. It is an offence to:

  • induce or attempt to induce another person to trade by making a statement that is false or misleading; or
  • make or publish any statement, promise or forecast that is false or misleading, whether knowingly or recklessly.

The offence is punishable by a fine of up to SGD250,000 and/or imprisonment for up to seven years.

Non-Disclosures

Under Section 203 of the SFA, it is an offence to intentionally, recklessly or negligently fail to notify the Singapore Exchange (SGX) of any information that is required to be disclosed under the Listing Manual.

Under Rule 703 of the Listing Manual issued by SGX, subject to certain exceptions, a company whose shares are listed must announce any information known to it which:

  • is necessary to avoid the establishment of a false market in the company’s securities; or
  • would be likely to materially affect the price or value of its securities.

Unauthorised Financial Services Activity

The SFA also regulates the provision of financial services. A person must not carry on a business in any regulated activity (such as dealing in capital markets products or advising on corporate finance) without the appropriate Capital Markets Services licence or exemption under the Act.

Carrying on a regulated activity without authorisation constitutes an offence and may result in criminal sanctions, including fines and/or imprisonment, as well as regulatory action by the Monetary Authority of Singapore.

The Financial Advisers Act 2001

The Financial Advisers Act 2001 (FAA) acts as an additional safeguard by regulating financial advisory services and governing the conduct of financial advisors. Under the FAA, financial advisers are obliged to:

  • have the requisite financial adviser’s licence;
  • disclose all material information relating to the investment product when making a recommendation;
  • ensure they do not make false or misleading statements; and
  • have a reasonable basis for any investment regarding any investment products.

Tax Evasion

Under the Income Tax Act 1947, it is an offence to evade or assist another person to evade tax. A person convicted of tax evasion is liable to:

  • a penalty of up to three times the amount of tax undercharged or obtained; and
  • a fine of up to SGD50,000 and/or imprisonment for up to five years.

Where the offence involves serious fraudulent tax evasion, the penalty increases to:

  • up to four times the amount of tax undercharged or obtained; and
  • a fine of up to SGD50,000 and/or imprisonment for up to five years.

Under the Goods and Services Tax Act 1993, where a person wilfully and with intent to evade goods and services tax understates output tax or overstates input tax or assists any other person to evade such tax, the Comptroller may impose a penal tax of up to three times the amount of tax undercharged and be liable to a fine and/or imprisonment.

False Accounting and Inaccurate Financial Records

Section 477A of the Penal Code criminalises the falsification of accounts.

It is an offence for a clerk, officer or servant, acting with intent to defraud, to:

  • falsify, conceal or destroy any book or account;
  • make or abet the making of false entries; or
  • omit or alter material particulars in any such records.

This offence is punishable by a fine and/or imprisonment for up to ten years.

Cartel and Competition Law Offences

In Singapore, cartel and anti-competitive conduct are primarily addressed through administrative enforcement rather than criminal sanctions. Enforcement is carried out by the Competition and Consumer Commission of Singapore, a public body constituted under the Competition Act 2004 (the “Competition Act”).

The key prohibitions under the Competition Act are as follows.

  • Section 34 prohibits agreements between undertakings, decisions by associations of undertakings, or concerted practices that have as their object or effect the prevention, restriction or distortion of competition within Singapore. This includes cartel conduct such as price-fixing, market sharing and bid-rigging.
  • Section 47 of the Competition Act prohibits conduct by one or more undertakings that amounts to an abuse of a dominant position in any market in Singapore.
  • Section 54 of the Competition Act prohibits mergers that result in a substantial lessening of competition in any market in Singapore for goods or services.

Enforcement and Penalties

The CCCS has broad powers to investigate and enforce infringements. It may:

  • issue directions requiring undertakings to cease anti-competitive conduct; and
  • require steps to remedy, mitigate or eliminate the adverse effects of the infringement.

In addition, the CCCS may impose financial penalties of up to 10% of the undertaking’s turnover in Singapore for each year of infringement, subject to a maximum of three years, pursuant to Section 69(4) of the Competition Act read with the Competition (Financial Penalties) Order 2007.

Counterfeiting and Trade Mark Offences

In Singapore, counterfeiting and dealing in counterfeit goods are primarily governed by the Trade Marks Act 1998 (TMA).

Under Section 46, it is an offence to counterfeit a registered trade mark. This offence carries a fine of up to SGD100,000 and/or imprisonment for up to five years. The burden of proving the proprietor’s consent lies on the accused.

Under Section 47, applying a registered trade mark to goods or services without authorisation is an offence. This offence carries a fine of up to SGD100,000 and/or imprisonment for up to five years.

Under Section 49, it is an offence to import or sell goods with a falsely applied trade mark. This offence carries a fine of up to SGD10,000 per infringing item (capped at SGD100,000) and/or imprisonment for up to five years.

Copyright Offences

Criminal offences relating to copyright infringement are set out in the Copyright Act 2021 (the “Copyright Act”).

Under Section 136(2) of the Copyright Act, it is an offence to possess infringing copies of copyrighted material for the purpose of distribution or trade. The offence carries a fine and/or imprisonment for up to five years.

Singapore does not have standalone legislation specifically labelled as dealing with “greenwashing offences”. However, such conduct is regulated under general consumer protection and advertising laws.

The key framework is the Consumer Protection (Fair Trading) Act 2003 (CPFTA).

Under the CPFTA, it is an unfair practice for a supplier to do or say anything; or omit to do or say anything if this results in a consumer being reasonably deceived or misled. This can include misleading environmental or sustainability-related claims (commonly referred to as “greenwashing”).

Enforcement and Remedies

Consumers may bring civil claims against suppliers under Section 6(1) of the CPFTA.

Remedies include restitution, damages or other civil relief ordered by the court.

Enforcement is primarily civil and regulatory rather than criminal.

Environmental Pollution and Regulatory Offences

The Environmental Protection and Management Act 1999 regulates air, water and noise pollution, as well as hazardous substances. The offences include unlawful discharge of pollutants and unauthorised handling or import of hazardous substances. The penalties may include fines of up to SGD50,000 or higher depending on the offence and/or imprisonment of up to two years.

The Transboundary Haze Pollution Act 2014 criminalises conduct by entities (including foreign entities) that contribute to haze pollution affecting Singapore. The penalties include fines of up to SGD100,000 per day of non-compliance.

The Carbon Pricing Act 2018 introduces a carbon tax regime for industrial facilities emitting greenhouse gases above prescribed thresholds. Non-compliance may result in financial penalties and enforcement action by regulators.

Initiation of Financial Crime Prosecutions

Financial crime prosecutions in Singapore are typically initiated following investigations by specialist enforcement agencies, like the Commercial Affairs Department (CAD) for financial and commercial crimes, or the Corrupt Practices Investigation Bureau (CPIB) for corruption-related offences. For market misconduct and securities-related offences, the Monetary Authority of Singapore may also conduct preliminary investigations and may work jointly with CAD under established joint-investigation arrangements.

Investigations generally involve:

  • recorded interviews of suspects under the Criminal Procedure Code 2010;
  • seizure of documents and electronic devices; and
  • in serious cases, dawn raids on residential or business premises to secure evidence.

Commencement of Proceedings

Criminal proceedings are typically initiated by the filing of a formal charge in court, which is read to the accused person.

Decision to Prosecute and Prosecutorial Discretion

The decision to prosecute lies exclusively with the Attorney-General’s Chambers (AGC), acting as Public Prosecutor, under Article 35(8) of the Constitution of the Republic of Singapore. This power includes the discretion to:

  • institute proceedings;
  • conduct prosecutions; or
  • discontinue proceedings.

The AGC makes prosecutorial decisions based on investigative findings submitted by enforcement agencies such as CAD, CPIB or MAS.

In this connection, prosecutorial discretion applies to both individuals and corporate entities. The Public Prosecutor may choose to prosecute individuals only or both individuals and companies.

The scope of prosecutorial discretion is broad but not absolute. Singapore courts have held that prosecutorial discretion is generally not subject to judicial review, except in limited circumstances, such as where there has been breach of constitutional rights (eg, Article 12 equality before the law); or bad faith or abuse of power.

Beyond these narrow exceptions, the courts will not interfere with prosecutorial decision-making

Financial crime cases in Singapore generally take significantly longer to prosecute than other offences. This is mainly due to the volume and complexity of evidence involved, including financial records, bank statements, corporate documents and electronic communications. These cases often also require expert evidence, such as forensic accounting or digital forensics, and may involve cross-border investigations requiring mutual legal assistance. In addition, many cases involve multiple accused persons and complex transactional structures. As a result, financial crime proceedings can take around two to five years from investigation to trial, and longer in more complex matters.

Granting of bail to accused persons depends on whether the offence is bailable or non-bailable under the Criminal Procedure Code 2010. Most financial crime offences are non-bailable as a matter of right, but in practice bail is often granted subject to conditions. The court considers factors such as flight risk, risk of interference with evidence or witnesses, seriousness of the charges and personal circumstances of the accused.

Singapore does not impose statutory custody time limits for bringing cases to trial. Instead, delay is managed through judicial case management and general constitutional safeguards ensuring a fair hearing within a reasonable time.

Singapore provides several avenues of publicly funded legal assistance for individuals facing criminal charges, including financial crime charges. For example, the Public Defender’s Office (PDO), which was established in 2022. The Criminal Legal Aid Scheme (CLAS), administered by the Law Society of Singapore, also provides legal representation to accused persons. Both schemes require applicants to satisfy a means and merits test.

Parties accused of white-collar or regulatory offences are highly unlikely to have incomes/assets low enough to satisfy the means test.

Trials involving financial crimes trials in Singapore are heard in the State Courts (specifically the District Courts), and occasionally the High Court (for high-value complex cases). As a general rule, where the prosecution is seeking a sentence in excess of ten years’ imprisonment, the matter will be tried in the High Court.

Singapore does not have a dedicated financial crime court or specialist criminal list for financial crime cases.

Singapore abolished the jury system in 1969, and all criminal trials, including those involving financial crime, are heard and determined by a single judge.

In Singapore, companies and individuals can be prosecuted concurrently for the same underlying conduct. Corporate criminal liability is generally attributed through the doctrine of attribution, under which the acts and mental state of individuals who constitute the “directing mind and will” of the company, or who are acting within delegated managerial authority, are treated as the acts of the company.

Within corporate groups, Singapore maintains the principle of separate legal personality. Each company is treated as a distinct legal entity, and as a general rule, a parent company is not liable for the criminal acts of its subsidiaries, and vice versa. The corporate veil will only be pierced in exceptional circumstances, and not merely because of a parent-subsidiary relationship.

Individual officers and employers can also be prosecuted, where they have independent personal criminal liability or where the statute creates such liability where there is connivance or consent by officers and employees.

Singapore does not recognise a general doctrine of successor criminal liability. Accordingly, criminal liability does not automatically transfer to a successor entity following mergers, acquisitions or corporate restructuring.

There is no general statutory requirement for all companies in Singapore to maintain financial crime compliance programmes. However, such obligations are imposed on specific regulated sectors, particularly financial institutions, property developers and other designated entities.

Financial institutions are subject to comprehensive AML/CFT obligations imposed by the Monetary Authority of Singapore through legally binding Notices issued under Section 27B of the Monetary Authority of Singapore Act 1970. These require financial institutions to implement robust compliance frameworks, including risk assessments, customer due diligence, ongoing monitoring, record-keeping and suspicious transaction reporting.

Similarly, under the Sale of Commercial Properties Act 1979, property developers are required to implement measures to detect and deter financial crime, including conducting customer due diligence and reporting suspicious transactions. Similar amendments were made to the Real Estate Agents Act 2010. The Corporate Service Providers Act 2024 also imposes such requirements on service providers who provide incorporation and corporate secretarial services.

Singapore does not have a general “failure to prevent” corporate offence regime akin to the UK Bribery Act 2010, however, the existence and effectiveness of compliance measures may be relevant in enforcement and sentencing. In Public Prosecutor v China Railway Tunnel Group Co Ltd (Singapore Branch) [2025] SGHC 101, the High Court considered the company’s internal compliance framework and policies in assessing liability and penalty, indicating that such measures can be relevant as a mitigating factor even where they do not provide a substantive defence.

Defendants may seek to establish that they lacked the requisite mens rea for the offence.

Reliance on legal advice is not a defence in itself. However, evidence that a defendant sought and followed legal or professional advice may be relevant in negating mens rea, particularly where it goes to showing absence of knowledge or recklessness.

The general exceptions under Chapter IV of the Penal Code 1871 also apply to financial crime offences, except where they have been specifically excluded. For example, a person is not guilty of an offence if, by reason of a mistake of fact made in good faith, they believe themselves to be legally justified or bound to act as they did. Other general defences such as duress and necessity may also apply, although they are narrowly construed in practice.

Singapore also does not provide general de minimis thresholds for financial crime offences, and liability may arise regardless of the scale of the conduct. However, this subject to prosecutorial discretion and de minimis offences are often dealt with by way of a warning.

Protection for whistle-blowers in Singapore is provided through a combination of statutory provisions and regulatory guidance.

Under Section 36 of the PCA, complaints made to the authorities cannot be admitted as evidence in civil or criminal proceedings, and no witness is required or permitted to disclose the identity of an informer.

The CDSA also imposes reporting obligations on persons who know or suspect that property is linked to criminal conduct. Good faith disclosures to a Suspicious Transaction Reporting Officer are protected from civil or criminal liability and do not constitute a breach of confidentiality obligations.

In addition, the Code of Corporate Governance encourages listed companies to implement whistle-blowing policies that allow employees to report concerns confidentially.

While there is no general statutory guarantee of anonymity, reporting channels (including STR submissions and reports to the Corrupt Practices Investigation Bureau) are structured to protect the identity of informants in practice.

In Singapore, financial crime cases are generally resolved in the following ways:

  • conclusion of investigations without a charge being brought;
  • withdrawal (either unconditionally or upon a warning being given) or reduction of a charge after it is brought;
  • plea of guilt after a charge is brought; and
  • proceeding to trial.

Plea discussions may occur between the accused and the Public Prosecutor, but any private “plea agreements” are not specifically enforceable. Deferred or non-prosecution agreements are available in certain circumstances but extremely rare.

Factors influencing sentencing and mitigation include:

  • the offender was a public company;
  • damage to public confidence and reputational harm to financial institutions; 
  • the degree of planning, pre-meditation and sophistication; and
  • period and frequency of offence.

Penalties

Penalties for individuals and legal entities include imprisonment and/or fines under statutes such as the PC, the PCA and the CDSA. Individuals and companies are subject to different penalty structures.

Under the CDSA, the court can order confiscation of benefits from serious offences where it is satisfied that the offender had derived benefits from criminal conduct. 

Sentencing Factors

In white collar crime cases, the courts have identified the following factors that may be considered in sentencing an offender: 

  • the value of the assets that were misappropriated;
  • extent of harm caused;
  • extent of distortion to the market;
  • abuse of trust and breach of trust;
  • difficulty of detection; and
  • criminal record.

Mitigating factors would include co-operation with the authorities, personal and family circumstances, clean criminal record and remorse (as demonstrated by an early plea of guilt and/or restitution of monies).

Confiscation Under the CDSA

In Singapore, the crime recovery regime is primarily governed by the CDSA. Following an offender’s conviction for a serious offence, the High Court must make a value-based confiscation order in respect of the offender’s benefits. The amount to be recovered under the confiscation order is the amount the court assesses to be the value of the benefits derived by the offender from criminal conduct. The recoverable amount is capped at the amount appearing to the court to be the amount that can be realised (“realisable property”).

Realisable property includes any property held by the defendant and any property held by a person to whom the offender has directly or indirectly made a gift caught by the CDSA ie a gift made within the 6-year period preceding the date on which criminal proceedings were instituted against the offender. The inclusion of gifts in this definition prevents the dissipation of value by the defendants through gifts made to his associates.

The CDSA empowers the Court to impose restraint orders. The High Court may issue restraint orders prohibiting dealings with “realisable property” where there is reasonable cause to believe benefits have been derived and proceedings have commenced. Judicially appointed receivers can take possession and manage or deal with the property.

On the conviction of an accused person, the High Court may make a confiscation order.

Under Section 20 of the CDSA, upon application by the Public Prosecutor, the High Court also has the power to make a charging order on realisable property for securing payment to the government where a confiscation order has not been made. Charging orders may be made over land or securities, receivers can be appointed and the court can order sale and application of proceeds towards the quantified recoverable amount.

Procedure

Confiscation is brought in the General Division of the High Court, upon application by the Public Prosecution. It proceeds on affidavit evidence. In practice, the Public Prosecutor tenders a sworn financial analysis (frequently using a “concealed income” methodology) as a “statement” under Section 9 of the CDSA, setting out the benefit assessment and the defendant’s known income; the court may then issue a certificate under Section 10(2) stating the amount that might be realised at the date of the order.

Sections 4(4) and 5(6) of the CDSA provide that where a person holds any property that is disproportionate to their known sources of income, the holding of which cannot be explained to the satisfaction of the court, such property shall be presumed to have derived benefits from criminal conduct.

Quantification is value based. The court assesses the value of “benefits derived”, including any income accruing, and then determines the “amount to be recovered” as either that value or, where the immediately realisable property is less, the amount that might then be realised. The certificate under Section 10(2) of the CDSA is the mechanism to record the latter finding. The High Court has routinely coupled the confiscation order with specific realisation directions and, where appropriate, liberty to apply for supplementary orders if further assets become available thereafter.

Enforcement and Consequences of Non-Payment

The CDSA does not provide for interest to accrue on unpaid confiscation amounts or for automatic default imprisonment upon non-payment.

There are two limiting mechanisms that deal with the scenario where assets are insufficient.

Firstly, the recoverable amount is capped at the amount of assets that might be realised at the time of the confiscation order. This ensures the order does not over-extend beyond the presently available pool of assets. Secondly, the CDSA contemplates further applications where new assets are identified. This ensures that recovery can be increased if more property is discovered.

Treatment of Gains/Profits on Invested Proceeds

Civil recovery or asset tracing proceedings can run in parallel with criminal cases. The CDSA allows for the recovery any profits, gains or income accruing on the benefits of criminal conduct. The statutory definition of “benefits derived” include “income accruing from such property or interest”, and the court applies these definitions when quantifying the benefits figure that it orders the defendant to pay. In practice, this means that profits, interest including compound interest and dividends can constitute the benefit from criminal conduct.

Section 359 of the Criminal Procedure Code 2010 states that a court may, after the conviction of an offender, consider compensation to any of the victims of the offence. Quite apart from this, the court can order the return of any seized assets and case exhibits to their rightful owners, after criminal proceedings are concluded.

Victims can assert proprietary claims over misappropriated assets through constructive trusts. This will be done in relation to seized assets at the disposal inquiry after conclusion of criminal proceedings. Civil claims against parties holding assets can also be commenced. For example, where a fiduciary or agent receives a bribe, the bribe and its traceable proceeds are held on constructive trust for the principal, and can be recovered. Similarly, where a director or fiduciary misapplies or obtains the principal’s property, they hold it on trust for the principal. Singapore courts have applied these principles to recognise victims’ beneficial ownership of stolen or diverted assets and their proceeds, including in complex corporate frauds, and have ordered constructive trustees to account for value at the time of misappropriation or for substitutive equitable compensation. The same would apply to third parties in “knowing receipt” or guilty of “knowing assistance”.

Singapore’s current enforcement priorities in financial crime reflect a risk-based approach, with MAS and other enforcement agencies focusing on conduct that poses the greatest threat to the integrity and stability of Singapore’s financial system.

The risk-based approach involves collaboration and co-ordination with government agencies working closely with one another and with the private sector to identify, monitor and respond to evolving risks, trends and typologies. MAS’ risk assessments draw on observations from ongoing risk monitoring and surveillance efforts over the years. According to the MAS website, these risk assessments are published to strengthen the industry’s collective understanding of prevailing risks and to enable targeted prevention, detection and enforcement measures to be taken in a timely manner.

The decision of the Court of Appeal in Soh Chee Wen v Public Prosecutor [2025] 2 SLR 176 (the “Soh Chee Wen (Conviction)”) represents one of the most significant cases in the area of market misconduct in Singapore. The prosecution described the matter as the “most serious case of stock market manipulation in Singapore”.

The case is notable for its clarification of the elements of the offence of false trading and market rigging under Section 197(1)(b) of the SFA. The charges were framed as criminal conspiracies under Section 120A of the Penal Code, and the court considered in detail the requirements for proving that the appellants had agreed to do acts with the intention of creating, or to engage in a course of conduct a purpose of which was to create a false appearance with respect to the market for or price of securities.

Soh was sentenced to an aggregate of 36 years’ imprisonment and the co-accused, Quah, to 20 years’ imprisonment. The court noted the unprecedented scale of the scheme: it involved well over seven billion trades, caused a loss in market capitalisation of approximately SGD7.8 billion, and resulted in approximately SGD273 million in financial losses to the financial institutions involved. 

Another recent case is Lim Oon Kuin v Public Prosecutor [2026] SGHC 47. In this case, Lim Oon Kuin, the founder and managing director of Hin Leong Trading (Pte) Ltd (HLT), one of Singapore’s largest oil trading companies, was convicted after trial on three charges: two charges of cheating under Section 420 of the Penal Code and one charge of abetment of forgery for the purpose of cheating under Section 468 read with Section 109 of the Penal Code.

This case addressed several important legal principles and the court clarified the legal elements of cheating under Section 420 of the Penal Code. The court confirmed that the elements of the cheating charges required: (i) the practice of a deception on HSBC by Lim through HLT employees; (ii) that by such deception, HSBC was induced to deliver property to HLT; and (iii) that there was dishonest intent on Lim’s part.

The court also clarified the element of delivery – the court held that the crediting of the discounted sums into HLT’s current account constituted delivery of property, even though HLT’s account was in overdraft and a portion of the sums was automatically applied to repay the overdraft. The court stated that “no meaningful distinction may be drawn between the crediting into a bank account with a positive balance... And a bank account in overdraft”.

Sreenivasan Chambers LLC

96 Robinson Road
#15-02 SIF Building
Singapore 068899

+65 6031 1577

kylegabriel@sreenivasanchambers.com www.sreenivasanchambers.com
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Sreenivasan Chambers LLC is a boutique disputes firm, focusing on complicated civil litigation, arbitration, white collar criminal defence, money laundering and asset seizure matters. Headed by Sreenivasan Narayanan SC, the 12-lawyer team consists of directors, associate directors, counsel and associates who have spent their entire professional lives in handling complex matters including landmark cases in the Court of Appeal and the High Court. The seniors in the firm have served on the board of listed companies and large charities and have legal and advisory knowledge as well as hands-on experience in corporate governance matters.

Two topics stand out – market-related offences under the Securities and Futures Act 2001 (SFA), and asset seizure cases (often linked to money-laundering). In this section we will be looking at a number of cases, some of which have been highly publicised in Singapore. We hope to offer practical guidance to those looking to work and/or do business in Singapore. 

Market-Related Offences

The SFA is the cornerstone of Singapore’s securities regulation framework. It regulates listed companies, their directors and market participants to rigorous statutory obligations in matters of market conduct, disclosure and corporate governance. Heightened enforcement activity has brought these obligations into sharp focus in recent years.

We will focus on two categories of offences prosecuted under the SFA – non-disclosure of material information under Section 203, and market manipulation under Section 197.

Non-disclosure offences (Section 203 of the SFA)

The collapse of Hyflux Ltd – once a flagship water treatment company with a market capitalisation peaking at approximately SGD3 billion – exposed systemic failures in corporate disclosure. Criminal proceedings were brought against not just executive directors but also independent non-executive directors for non-disclosure of material information under Section 203 of the SFA. This case, which affected some 36,000 retail investors, serves as a reminder to skilled professionals taking up board and management appointments in Singapore of the serious consequences that flow from inattention resulting in disclosure failures.

Key observations include the following.

  • Section 203 of the SFA, read with SGX Listing Rules 703(1)(b), imposes a continuous disclosure obligation on listed entities.
  • An offence arises where a responsible person intentionally, recklessly or negligently fails to disclose material information that would be necessary to avoid the establishment of a false market in the entity’s securities.
  • The test of materiality requires a determination of whether the information is “likely to materially affect the price or value” of the securities in question. There are a few categories of information which would clearly constitute material information – events of default, loss of key franchises or significant litigation. Save for these clear-cut categories, the inquiry as to whether a piece of information (eg, the progress or failure of M&A negotiations or the devaluation of particular assets) is material is often a judgment call. Critically, materiality is a business judgement, and not a purely legal test.
  • Judgement calls made as to the materiality of information are open to scrutiny subsequently, often with the benefit of hindsight, although liability is a matter to be determined on the state of knowledge at the time of the offence.

Notable cases include the following.

  • The Hyflux case involved a company with a market capitalisation that peaked at approximately SGD3 billion and affected 36,000 retail investors and bond holders. Rajsekar Kuppuswami Mitta, a former Independent Director of Hyflux who served on the board for over eight years, was convicted upon a plea of guilt in respect of Hyflux’s intentional non-disclosure of material information relating to the Tuaspring project. Mr Mitta was sentenced to a financial penalty of SGD90,000. Hyflux’s collapse demonstrated that even independent directors bear personal criminal liability where they fail to exercise proper oversight over disclosure decisions. Proceedings are currently continuing in relation to executive and non-executive directors who have claimed trial to various charges.
  • Although Madhavan Peter v PP [2012] 4 SLR 613 is an older case, it was and is the landmark decision being cited and relied upon in current matters. The case is instructive in its detailed discussion of what constitutes materiality in the context of both non-disclosure and misleading disclosure charges.
  • In the Swiber Holdings case, the former CEO was sentenced to a fine of SGD310,000 for, amongst other things, procuring a false announcement that Swiber had secured a USD710 million project in West Africa when, in reality, only a conditional letter of intent for preliminary engineering work worth approximately USD2 million had been signed. The former CEO was also convicted of insider trading after advising his wife to sell their joint holdings in Swiber debentures ahead of the disclosure of the company’s financial difficulties. The former CEO, who was aware of Swiber’s severe financial difficulties (including the company’s inability to redeem approximately SGD305 million in debentures) had advised his wife to sell SGD500,000 worth of Swiber debentures ahead of the disclosure of the issues, thereby avoiding a loss of around SGD629,762. The former CEO also failed to disclose changes in his interest in Swiber debentures, including numerous sales of the debentures.

Practical guidance

  • Directors should err on the side of disclosure in cases where it is not clear whether a piece of information is material. Where there is any doubt as to what the disclosure obligations are, prompt legal advice should be sought. Board discussions on materiality should be robust, thorough and well-documented: detailed minutes recording the information considered, the views expressed, and the reasons for the ultimate decision are essential.
  • Independent directors are not immune from liability; ie passive reliance on management or external advisers is not a defence. Each director bears a personal responsibility to satisfy themselves that disclosure obligations are being met.

Market manipulation offences (Section 197 of the SFA)

Whilst non-disclosure cases focus on what directors fail to disclose, market manipulation offences under Section 197 of the SFA address what participants actively do to distort the market.

Key observations include the following.

  • Section 197(1)(b) of the SFA provides that a person must not do any thing, cause any thing to be done or engage in any course of conduct if any of the person’s purposes is to create a false or misleading appearance with respect to the market for, or the price of, any capital markets product traded on an organised market.
  • The statute does not require the sole purpose of the act to be the creation of a false or misleading appearance; even if it was merely one of multiple purposes, that would be sufficient for the court to find guilt.
  • Further, an offence can be made out even if the act done did not actually result in a distortion to the market.

Notable cases include the following.

  • The starting point for any discussion of market manipulation in Singapore must be the landmark prosecution of Soh Chee Wen, which culminated in the Court of Appeal’s decision in Soh Chee Wen v Public Prosecutor and another appeal [2025] 2 SLR 176 and Soh Chee Wen v Public Prosecutor and another appeal [2026] 1 SLR 214. This was the most significant market manipulation prosecution in Singapore’s history, spanning over 200 days of trial and many years of investigation. The accused persons were found to have conspired to manipulate the share prices of three listed companies, with the involvement of numerous trading representatives and account holders at various local and foreign brokerages. Pre-arranged trades were done between controlled accounts, thus affecting prices without any genuine change in beneficial ownership.
  • Mr Huang Yiwen, the sole director and shareholder of a company that provided market-making services, was convicted for his involvement in four conspiracies to rig the market or price of shares of listed companies. While market-making to provide liquidity in the market is allowed in Singapore, Mr Huang had gone further to create a false impression as to the price of the shares, such as by “marking the close” (buying shares at the end of the day to improve the closing price).
  • Another interesting case would be that of Mr Kenneth Goh and Mr Oon Yun Cong. They were involved in a scheme where they made false statements in Telegram group chats to induce members of those chats to purchase shares which were held by them. These acts formed offences under a different section – Section 200(1)(a) of the SFA – for making false statements to induce others to trade.

Practical guidance

  • Prosecutors routinely rely on trading data and expert evidence (including analysis of timing, volume, price impact, dominant buyer/seller patterns, upticking, ramping and end-of-day bids), as well as contemporaneous communications such as WhatsApp messages, emails, call records and IP address access logs.
  • Directors and professionals who are not themselves orchestrating any manipulative scheme are nevertheless at risk of being implicated through proximity. Participation in WhatsApp group chats or other informal communications discussing share price movements can, in certain circumstances, be sufficient to ground liability through conspiracy or connivance. Care should be taken to avoid any conduct that could be construed as participation in, or encouragement of, co-ordinated trading activity. Where a director becomes aware of suspicious trading patterns or communications, they should immediately seek independent legal advice and take steps to distance themselves from the conduct in question.

Asset Seizure Cases

In August 2023, Singapore’s news headlines were dominated by what authorities described as the largest money laundering case in its history. A joint operation by the Singapore Police Force and other agencies led to the arrest of ten foreign nationals and the seizure of assets worth approximately SGD3 billion. The scale of the haul was staggering. It included luxury properties, fleets of high-end vehicles including Rolls-Royces and Ferraris, crates of designer handbags, gold bars and vast sums held in bank accounts across multiple financial institutions. The case cast a new light on vulnerabilities to illicit capital flows and the importance of having a strong and robust asset recovery regime.

The case also demonstrated the breadth of Singapore’s enforcement toolkit. Within days of the raids, the authorities had deployed a range of statutory powers to freeze bank accounts, seize real property and restrain assets pending investigation.

This section explores Singapore’s legal framework for asset seizure and recovery, with a focus on the practical recourse available to persons whose assets have been affected. In particular, we highlight three principal statutory mechanisms in which assets can be seized by the police: Section 35 of the Criminal Procedure Code 2010 (CPC), the Corruption, Drug Trafficking and Other Serious Crimes (Confiscation of Benefits) Act 1992 (CDSA) and the Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters Act 2000 (MACMA).

Singapore’s broad policy stance against money laundering

The Monetary Authority of Singapore (MAS) has described its anti-money laundering and countering the financing of terrorism framework as a “critical pillar” of Singapore’s status as a trusted financial centre. The framework is built on a combination of robust legislation, active supervision of financial institutions, and a willingness to take decisive enforcement action.

The CPC, CDSA and MACMA are supplemented by various subsidiary legislation, MAS Notices (including MAS Notice 626 for banks and equivalent notices for other financial institutions) and guidelines. These impose stringent customer due diligence, suspicious transaction reporting and record-keeping requirements on the private sector.

Section 35 of the CPC

Key observations include the following.

Section 35(1) empowers any police officer to seize any property which is alleged or suspected to have been stolen, or which is found under circumstances that create suspicion of the commission of any offence. Property that may be seized includes: (i) property in respect of which an offence is suspected to have been committed; (ii) property that is suspected to have been used in the commission of an offence; and (iii) property that constitutes evidence of an offence.

A critical limitation of Section 35 was articulated by the High Court in Rajendar Prasad Rai v Public Prosecutor [2017] SGHC 49. In that case, the court held that Section 35(1)(a) covers only the traceable proceeds of an identifiable crime; it does not extend to the seizure of unexplained wealth. This is an important distinction: where the authorities cannot link specific assets to a specific predicate offence, Section 35 alone will not suffice. As we discuss below, this gap is addressed by the CDSA, which takes a broader approach to the confiscation of criminal benefits.

Once property has been seized, the seizing authority must report the seizure to the court. There is a one-year “long-stop” period after which continued seizure requires fresh judicial authorisation. Importantly, the Court of Appeal held in Mustafa Ahunbay v Public Prosecutor [2013] SGHC 188 that the court’s role under Section 370 is not merely a rubber stamp; the court must be “satisfied” that continued seizure is justified, and this entails genuine judicial scrutiny.

This is a point of considerable practical significance. The upshot is that the timing of an application to lift or challenge a seizure should be carefully considered. An application brought too early, before the one-year long-stop has expired, may face a lower threshold of justification in the Prosecution’s favour. Conversely, waiting for the Section 370 reporting stage may give the affected person a stronger platform to argue that continued seizure is no longer warranted.

Sections 35(7) and 35(8) of the CPC provide a mechanism to apply for the release of seized property where it is needed for basic living expenses, the payment of legal fees, or the continued operation of a business. These provisions recognize that a blanket freeze may cause disproportionate hardship, particularly where a person has not been charged with any offence.

The Court of Appeal in Mustafa Ahunbay confirmed that persons with a legitimate interest in the seized property have a right to be heard at the Section 370 hearing. Affected persons may also invoke the High Court’s revisionary jurisdiction to challenge a Magistrate’s decision to authorise continued seizure.

Seized property may also be released where the affected person demonstrates that the property is unconnected to the offence under investigation, or where the investigations or criminal proceedings have been completed and there is no longer any basis for continued seizure. In practice, assembling the evidence to support such an application requires prompt and careful preparation, including the gathering of documentary records tracing the provenance of the assets in question.

The CDSA

The CDSA provides a more powerful suite of tools for restraint upon and confiscation of assets than the CPC provisions. The court in Rajendar Prasad observed that assets which could not be seized under Section 35 of the CPC might nonetheless be amenable to proceedings under the CDSA. The reason lies in the CDSA’s fundamentally different approach: whereas Section 35 of the CPC requires a connection between the property and a specific offence, the CDSA targets the “benefits of criminal conduct” more broadly and incorporates statutory presumptions that shift the burden of proof onto the asset owner.

Under Sections 4 and 5 of the CDSA, the court may make a confiscation order requiring a defendant to pay a sum equal to the value of the benefits derived from criminal conduct. Sections 18 and 19 empower the court to make restraint orders over realisable property to preserve assets pending the determination of confiscation proceedings. A restraint order under the CDSA prohibits any person from dealing with the property to which the order relates, and may be accompanied by ancillary orders (including the appointment of a receiver) to ensure that the property is preserved.

A significant feature of the CDSA is the statutory presumption in relation to unexplained wealth. Where a person has been convicted of a qualifying offence, any property held by the person (or transferred by the person at any time since the date of the offence) is presumed to be derived from criminal conduct. The burden of proof thus falls on the asset owner to demonstrate that the property was legitimately obtained.

In practice, this means that the asset owner will need to commission a comprehensive tracing exercise, typically with the assistance of a financial or accounting expert, to demonstrate a legitimate source of funds. The prosecution will similarly engage experts to calculate the quantum of unexplained wealth.

The MACMA

The MACMA provides the statutory framework for international mutual legal assistance in criminal matters. It is purposed to facilitate co-operation between Singapore and foreign states in the investigation and prosecution of criminal offences. Such co-operation spans the recovery, restraint and confiscation of assets, the execution of search and seizure orders and the production of evidence. The MACMA is especially relevant in the context of transnational money laundering, where the predicate offence may have been committed overseas and the proceeds are then layered through Singapore-based accounts or assets.

Pursuant to Section 22 of the MACMA, the court is empowered to make production orders requiring any person in Singapore to produce material relevant to foreign criminal proceedings.

The MACMA also provides for the enforcement and registration of foreign confiscation orders in Singapore. Under Section 29 read with the Third Schedule to the MACMA, the Attorney-General may apply to the High Court for the registration of a foreign confiscation order. In order for registration to be granted, it has to be shown that (i) the foreign confiscation order is issued by a prescribed foreign country; (ii) the foreign confiscation order is in force and not subject to further appeal in the foreign country; (iii) where a person affected by the foreign confiscation order did not appear in the proceedings, that the person received notice of the proceedings in sufficient time to enable the person to defend them; and (iv) enforcement of the foreign confiscation order in Singapore would not be contrary to the interests of justice. 

Once registered, a foreign confiscation order has the same force and effect as if it was made by a Singapore court. Foreign states can therefore enforce their criminal confiscation orders against assets located in Singapore without having to commence fresh confiscation proceedings domestically. This would mean that persons who are affected by a foreign confiscation order and seek to challenge its registration must do so swiftly.

Practical considerations and emerging trends

Asset owners must maintain meticulous documentary records of title to their assets. A clear and verifiable chain of title to the assets in question is often determinative in any seizure or confiscation proceedings. A tracing exercise – conducted with the assistance of a qualified financial or accounting expert – should be undertaken as early as possible to identify the strengths and weaknesses of the asset owner’s position.

As Singapore continues to strengthen its AML regime in response to the growing sophistication of financial crime, the tension between robust enforcement and the protection of individual rights will remain at the forefront of legal debate. For practitioners and asset owners, the message is clear. Early engagement, thorough preparation, and a deep understanding of the interplay between the statutory mechanisms are essential to navigating the complexities of asset seizure and recovery in Singapore.

Sreenivasan Chambers LLC

96 Robinson Road
#15-02 SIF Building
Singapore 068899

+65 6031 1577

kylegabriel@sreenivasanchambers.com www.sreenivasanchambers.com
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Authors



Sreenivasan Chambers LLC is a boutique disputes firm, focusing on complicated civil litigation, arbitration, white collar criminal defence, money laundering and asset seizure matters. Headed by Sreenivasan Narayanan SC, the 12-lawyer team consists of directors, associate directors, counsel and associates who have spent their entire professional lives in handling complex matters including landmark cases in the Court of Appeal and the High Court. The seniors in the firm have served on the board of listed companies and large charities and have legal and advisory knowledge as well as hands-on experience in corporate governance matters.

Trends and Developments

Authors



Sreenivasan Chambers LLC is a boutique disputes firm, focusing on complicated civil litigation, arbitration, white collar criminal defence, money laundering and asset seizure matters. Headed by Sreenivasan Narayanan SC, the 12-lawyer team consists of directors, associate directors, counsel and associates who have spent their entire professional lives in handling complex matters including landmark cases in the Court of Appeal and the High Court. The seniors in the firm have served on the board of listed companies and large charities and have legal and advisory knowledge as well as hands-on experience in corporate governance matters.

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