In general terms, an internal investigation within a company is initiated when there are grounds to collect sufficient information to assess the organisation’s proper functioning and to clarify potential improper conduct occurring within it. This includes situations where it is presumed that an individual or group of individuals may have committed a breach in the performance of their duties, as well as the need to determine the scope and seriousness of such conduct. Internal investigations may arise both from infringements of the legal framework and from facts that, without necessarily constituting criminal offences, breach the company’s internal standards, rules or policies. They may also be initiated when poor practices previously unidentified in risk management processes are detected, or when it is necessary to assess the effectiveness of compliance programmes, with the aim of preventing or mitigating legal, operational, economic, or reputational consequences for the organisation.
Notably, in the Chilean labour context, opening an internal investigation becomes a legal obligation, not merely a discretionary action, in cases regulated by Law No 21,643 (the “Karin Act”). This law requires employers to investigate complaints of workplace harassment, sexual harassment and workplace violence in accordance with the applicable legal framework.
Historically, Chilean law has not provided a general and systematic framework imposing a cross-cutting obligation to carry out internal investigations in either the labour or corporate context. In general terms, internal investigations have been grounded in the employer’s discretionary powers, derived from the need to collect sufficient information to assess the proper functioning of the organisation, clarify improper conduct, and prevent or mitigate legal, operational and reputational risks. In this context, internal investigations have been linked to compliance programmes, internal regulations and models for the prevention of crime, particularly in the criminal sphere, where internal investigations constitute a relevant tool for risk detection and for assessing the effectiveness of such models, without criminal legislation establishing a specific labour investigation procedure.
In the labour context, prior to the entry into force of the Karin Act, there were limited obligations relating to sexual harassment, mainly through the Internal Regulations on Order, Hygiene and Safety, which were required to set out duties, prohibitions and disciplinary measures, as well as general guidelines for the handling of such complaints. However, these requirements did not constitute a uniform or detailed statutory procedure for internal investigations, leaving the employer with a broad margin of discretion.
This situation changes with the entry into force of the Karin Act, which amends the Labour Code and expressly imposes on employers the obligation to investigate complaints relating to workplace harassment, sexual harassment and violence at work, establishing for the first time a structured internal investigation procedure with minimum stages, timeframes and rules, or alternatively the option to refer the matter to the Labour Board. In these cases, the investigation ceases to be merely discretionary and becomes a legal duty, and the decision to initiate the investigation or to refer the matter to the administrative authority must be communicated to the reporter within the applicable timeframe. Outside these specific scenarios, internal investigations continue to operate primarily as a permitted and recommended tool from a preventive, risk-management and compliance perspective.
In addition to domestic sources, the legal basis of the Karin Act is directly linked to international labour standards, in particular Convention No 190 of the International Labour Organization (ILO) and Recommendation No 206, both adopted in 2019 and ratified by Chile in June 2023, entering into force on 12 June 2024. These international instruments constitute the normative foundation of the current Chilean framework on workplace harassment, sexual harassment and violence at work.
ILO Convention No 190 introduces several core elements that are reflected in Chilean law, including:
Recommendation No 206 complements Convention No 190 by reinforcing the need for preventive policies, effective remedial measures, and accessible and reliable investigation mechanisms, highlighting the central role of employers in the detection, investigation and sanctioning of such conduct.
The transposition of these international standards into Chilean law is reflected in several key features of the Karin Act. In particular, the Act:
From a systemic perspective, the legal sources underpinning the new Chilean labour compliance model therefore derive not only from domestic legislative reform, but directly from Convention No 190 and Recommendation No 206 of the ILO. These international instruments establish that workplace violence and harassment are unacceptable, even as isolated incidents, and require States to adopt effective measures for prevention, investigation and sanction. Law No 21,643 incorporates these requirements into Chilean law, creating a mandatory compliance framework in the labour sphere. This represents a significant shift: investigations that were previously discretionary for employers have become legally imposed duties in defined cases.
In Chile, the existence and design of communication channels must be analysed by distinguishing between general compliance frameworks and the specific regime applicable to workplace harassment, sexual harassment and violence at work under the Karin Act.
General Communication Channels (Non-Karin Act Frameworks)
Outside the specific scope of the Karin Act, employers commonly implement general reporting or ethics channels as part of their compliance and risk-management systems. These channels are designed to allow employees and other stakeholders to report potential irregularities, breaches of internal policies or other misconduct, whether internal or external, in written or electronic form. Within this general compliance framework, reporting channels may admit both identified and anonymous complaints. Anonymous reporting is recognised as a legitimate tool for detecting risks and encouraging reporting, although it also presents practical limitations, such as difficulties in gathering additional information or assessing the credibility of the allegations. Importantly, in this general context, the existence of an anonymous report does not prevent the employer from assessing the situation and adopting preventive or corrective measures in accordance with its general duty of care.
Communication Channels Under the Karin Act
The regulatory landscape changes in relation to complaints concerning workplace harassment, sexual harassment and violence at work. Under the Karin Act and its implementing regulation, employers are expressly required to make available and inform appropriate channels for the receipt of such complaints. The regulation allows complaints to be submitted verbally or in writing, in person or electronically, either to the employer or to the Labour Board, and requires that a receipt be issued and clear information about the procedure be provided.
For the purposes of the formal investigation procedure established by the Karin Act, complaints must be filed by an identified person. The regulatory framework and the Labour Board’s administrative practice have clarified that anonymous complaints do not initiate the statutory investigation procedure. This does not mean, however, that anonymous alerts may be disregarded – employers remain bound by their general duty to protect the life, health and dignity of employees and must therefore assess the information received and utilise appropriate preventive or protective measures.
A key feature of the Karin Act regime is the emphasis on confidentiality and controlled access to information. Employers are required to designate one or more specific individuals responsible for receiving and administering complaints, centralising the management of the reporting channel and strictly limiting access to sensitive information. This approach reflects the heightened confidentiality standards applicable under the Karin Act and distinguishes the statutory framework from more general compliance-based reporting systems.
A relevant practical issue associated with reporting channels is the risk of false or malicious complaints. Practice has shown cases in which an employee’s identity has been improperly used to file multiple unfounded complaints, resulting in adverse effects on the person involved. Cross-complaints, often arising from personal conflicts, friendships, or sentimental relationships, are also frequent: one party reports, and the other counters. Importantly, the fact that a complaint is not substantiated does not, by itself, render it false; deliberate intent to misrepresent the facts must be proven. In particularly serious cases, false or malicious complaints may give rise to disciplinary consequences and, if duly accredited, could constitute grounds for dismissal under Article 160 of the Labour Code.
A related phenomenon is the abuse of reporting channels. Situations have arisen in which the same employee repeatedly files Karin Act complaints regarding the same facts through different internal compliance channels, forcing the employer to investigate identical matters multiple times. This repetition has, in some cases, led to claims by investigated employees alleging violations of fundamental rights due to being subjected to successive identical procedures. Employers must establish clear internal rules, respond proportionally and carefully assess each case to protect all parties.
Outside the scope of the Karin Act, internal investigations are generally carried out by the compliance officer or the person designated in internal policies, who may receive complaints, conduct a preliminary assessment, initiate or coordinate the investigation, and ensure confidentiality. Depending on the nature and complexity of the case, the matter may be handled internally or referred to another competent area, such as HR, ensuring independence and proper documentation.
Under the Karin Act, when the employer conducts the investigation, it must (if possible) appoint a person with training in harassment, gender, or fundamental rights and inform the complainant in writing. Both the complainant and the respondent may challenge the investigator’s impartiality, in which case the employer must decide on a reasoned basis and record this decision in the investigation report. External specialists may participate as technical support, without releasing the employer from its legal responsibility.
In Chile, the obligation to conduct an investigation arises expressly under the Karin Act in cases involving complaints of workplace harassment, sexual harassment or violence at work, as the employer may not conduct an admissibility review or dismiss the complaint and must always activate the relevant procedure. In such cases, the employer must either initiate an internal investigation in accordance with its applicable internal regulations or refer the matter to the Labour Board, as applicable.
Outside this specific framework, internal investigations do not constitute a general legal obligation, but rather a faculty of the employer linked to risk management and the general duty to protect employees.
Under the Karin Act, the employer may not conduct an internal investigation unless it has established internal regulations that incorporate the legally required procedure; in that case, the complaint must be immediately referred to the Labour Board.
Likewise, where the complaint is directed against persons deemed to represent the employer under Article 4 of the Labour Code, an internal investigation is prohibited, and the matter must always be investigated by the administrative authority.
Outside these specific circumstances, there are no general legal prohibitions on conducting internal investigations in labour matters.
When an investigation is neither mandatory nor prohibited, the employer may decide to initiate it in the exercise of its disciplinary powers or in compliance with the duty to protect and safeguard employees established in Article 184 of the Labour Code, in order to clarify relevant facts, prevent or mitigate legal, operational or reputational risks, and verify compliance with internal rules or compliance programmes.
In this context, the employer’s decision is typically guided by an assessment of the seriousness, credibility and potential impact of the facts reported, as well as by the need to ensure a safe and respectful working environment. Factors that may justify opening an investigation include:
Likewise, initiating an internal investigation may serve as a preventive tool to demonstrate that the employer has acted diligently and in good faith, particularly in highly regulated environments or where future administrative or judicial scrutiny is foreseeable. In these cases, internal investigations are part of the employer’s broader governance, risk management and compliance framework, allowing the organisation to detect weaknesses, reinforce internal controls and adopt corrective measures before conflicts escalate or turn into legal disputes.
In Chilean practice, both the reporter and the respondent have a right to be informed of the opening of an HR internal investigation, as part of the broader requirements of due process and respect for fundamental rights applicable to internal disciplinary and investigative procedures. This applies both in general internal investigations and, with greater intensity, in investigations governed by the Karin Act.
In general, internal investigations must respect principles of transparency, bilateral hearing and due process. This implies that both the reporter and the respondent should be informed, in a timely manner, that an investigation has been initiated, the general nature of the allegations and the procedural framework that will apply. While the law does not impose a fixed notice period in these cases, the information must be provided in a manner that allows the respondent to effectively exercise their right of defence, subject always to confidentiality requirements.
Under the Karin Act, the right to be informed is expressly reinforced. The reporter must be promptly informed whether the employer will conduct an internal investigation or refer the matter to the Labour Board, and the respondent must also be informed in a clear and timely manner to ensure due process and the possibility of defence. Although the statute does not set a specific deadline for such communications, they must be made without delay, given their direct connection to the adoption of protective measures. Where the complaint is filed directly with the Labour Board, the employer must implement protective measures within three business days of receiving the authority’s notice, which, in practice, sets the timing of the relevant communications. In all cases, confidentiality must be strictly preserved, and anonymous complaints do not allow the formal procedure under the Karin Act, as identification is required to safeguard the respondent’s right to defence.
As a general rule, the opening of an internal investigation does not need to be communicated to public authorities, unless expressly required by law.
Karin Act
Where the employer decides to conduct an internal investigation, it must inform the Labour Board within three working days from receipt of the complaint; if the matter is referred, the relevant background information must be submitted within the same timeframe. In addition, the employer must notify the relevant mutual insurance entity within 24 hours to ensure early psychological support and must inform the reporting party of the available criminal reporting channels before the Public Prosecutor’s Office (Ministerio Público), police (Carabineros de Chile) or the Investigative Police (PDI), where the facts may constitute a criminal offence.
In addition, under the Karin Act framework, employers are subject to a specific and autonomous reporting obligation to the workers’ compensation insurance entity (mutual insurance entity) that administers the statutory occupational accidents and diseases insurance. In accordance with Circular No 3854 of the Superintendence of Social Security (2025), employers must report all complaints under the Karin Act to their mutual insurance entity within five business days of becoming aware of the complaint. This applies whether the investigation is conducted internally or referred to the Labour Board. This reporting obligation is separate from and complements the immediate notification required to secure early psychological support.
Economic or Criminal Offences
There is no general obligation to inform public authorities of the commencement of an internal investigation; any report to the Public Prosecutor’s Office is discretionary and strategic, in accordance with the crime prevention model and the duty of confidentiality.
The parties may be required to sign NDAs in the context of an internal investigation, which is a common practice, particularly in sensitive labour matters, and is usually regulated in the internal regulations and communicated at the outset of the procedure.
Such agreements are subject to the overriding requirement to respect workers’ fundamental rights and therefore may not restrict the right of defence or prevent reporting to the competent authorities.
Even where no NDA is executed, the internal investigation remains subject to a legal duty of confidentiality, particularly in cases of sexual harassment, workplace harassment and violence at work, where the law requires the protection of information and personal data, without prejudice to requests from courts or the Labour Authority.
A breach of confidentiality may give rise to liability for the individual who disclosed the information and, potentially, for the employer if it failed to adopt reasonable protective measures, and may even result in claims for infringement of fundamental rights.
Outside the scope of the Karin Act, the possibility of conducting a preliminary investigation depends on what is established by law or by the company’s internal regulations and may be used to determine whether a formal investigation is warranted and to define its scope; however, in cases governed by the Karin Act, there is no admissibility review or preliminary stage, as the employer must immediately initiate the internal investigation or refer the complaint to the Labour Board.
In an internal investigation, the reporter, the respondent and any other individuals who may provide relevant information regarding the facts are typically interviewed, including direct or indirect witnesses. There is no predetermined legal limit on the number of witnesses each party may propose.
Participation in interviews is voluntary and must be non-coercive. If an interviewee refuses to participate or remains silent, the employer may not compel participation or impose sanctions, as individuals retain the right not to self-incriminate. Any refusal or partial participation must be documented in the investigation record.
Interviews may be conducted remotely (eg, via Teams or Zoom), provided that confidentiality, privacy and due process are ensured, and that the setting allows for a proper and unpressured statement. In all cases, the employer must ensure adequate documentation of the interview. In investigations governed by the Karin Act, all interviews (conducted remotely or in person) must be documented in writing as part of the mandatory investigation record.
There is no legally fixed number of interviewers in an internal investigation, which should instead be conducted in accordance with internal regulations and principles of objectivity and impartiality. Under the Karin Act, and as a key requirement for the validity and adequacy of the procedure, the employer must appoint an investigator with training in harassment, gender or fundamental rights.
Outside the scope of the Karin Act, the presence of a neutral third party during interviews depends on what is established in the employer’s internal regulations and investigation procedures, and may be allowed if duly regulated and justified. Under the Karin Act, third parties are not permitted to participate as witnesses in interviews due to strict confidentiality requirements. More than one interviewer may be involved if expressly authorised by the internal regulations, but access to the investigation must be strictly limited to authorised persons.
In general, whether an interviewee may be accompanied by a third party depends on the employer’s internal regulations and does not constitute an automatic legal right. Under the Karin Act, there is no right to attend interviews accompanied by a lawyer or other support person, given the administrative and confidential nature of the procedure, without prejudice to the possibility for trade unions to accompany and represent the reporting party at their request, as provided by law.
In an internal investigation, the interviewee must be informed, at a minimum, of the purpose of the interview and the confidential nature of the procedure, in accordance with internal regulations and due process principles. In cases governed by the Karin Act, such information must be provided clearly and in a timely manner, including the interviewee’s rights and obligations, and how their statement will be recorded in the investigation file.
If an interviewee requests to stop the interview, the interview must be suspended immediately, as participation is voluntary and the interviewer must respect the individual’s dignity and due process rights. The request to stop and the resulting interruption must be documented in the investigation record. The interview may be rescheduled or resumed at a later time, provided that doing so does not compromise the fairness or integrity of the investigation, particularly in procedures governed by the Karin Act.
Interviews are generally documented through written minutes, which may be summarised, provided they accurately reflect the statements given. Interviewees are usually allowed to review the minutes and, in practice, are asked to sign them to confirm their content, particularly in investigations governed by the Karin Act. There is no legal requirement for the minutes to be taken by an external party, although this may be used where internal rules or the circumstances of the case so provide.
Interviews in internal investigations may be recorded, provided that fundamental rights, data protection rules and the physical and mental integrity of the interviewees are respected. Under the Karin Act, the law requires written and signed records of statements, but does not prohibit recording as a complementary tool, provided its purpose is to ensure the accuracy of the testimony. If an interview is recorded, a transcript should be produced and made available to the interviewee for review, correction or amendment, which is an irrevocable right. In remote investigations, the absence of recording can be ensured through clear instructions to the parties and rules established in the internal procedure.
In addition to interviews, an internal investigation may use other fact-finding and evidence-preservation measures, such as reviewing physical and digital documents, emails, access logs, IT systems, and information storage and custody protocols and assessing the relevance of each measure on a case-by-case basis. Early preservation steps are key to preventing alteration, concealment, or destruction of evidence through internal instructions and appropriate access controls.
In all cases, investigative steps that infringe fundamental rights (such as privacy, mental integrity or dignity) may not be used and any fact-finding activity must be lawful, proportionate, and respectful of constitutional guarantees.
The employer must and may take measures to protect the reporter during an internal investigation, based on the general duty of protection and, in cases of workplace harassment, sexual harassment or workplace violence, in accordance with the Karin Act. Such measures must aim to prevent re-victimisation or secondary victimisation, safeguarding the reporter’s physical and psychological integrity, as well as their personality rights.
Under the Karin Act, the employer must adopt immediate protective measures, taking into account the seriousness of the allegations and the working conditions. These may include separation of physical spaces, adjustments to working time, remote work arrangements and early psychological support through the relevant workers’ compensation insurance entity. Such measures may be modified throughout the investigation and are subject to review by the Labour Authority. Failure to adopt appropriate measures may result in administrative and judicial liability, while protective actions must comply with the principle of proportionality. In addition, the reporter benefits from anti-retaliation (indemnity) protection, and any retaliatory conduct may give rise to labour protection claims.
The employer may and should adopt measures to protect the respondent during an internal investigation, particularly regarding their honour, privacy and personality rights, based on the general duty of protection under Article 184 of the Labour Code, the principle of due process and the confidentiality requirements applicable to labour investigations, including those regulated by the Karin Act. Typical measures include strict confidentiality safeguards, restricted access to information, limited internal communications and impartial treatment throughout the procedure. Failure to adopt such measures may expose the employer to claims for violation of fundamental rights, while any protective measures must be proportionate and must not amount to anticipated sanctions or unduly affect the respondent.
As a general rule, the employer should not impose disciplinary measures before concluding the internal investigation, as doing so could undermine impartiality, due process and fundamental rights. Within the framework of the Karin Act, only preventive, proportionate and non-punitive protective measures are allowed (such as separation of workspaces, redistribution of working time or remote work), taking into account the seriousness of the allegations and the protection of the persons involved. Imposing sanctions prematurely may give rise to labour protection claims or employer liability; conversely, failing to adopt protective measures when they were necessary may also result in liability.
The employer must and may adopt measures to protect other employees when the situation under investigation may affect their safety, health or rights, pursuant to the general duty of protection. Such measures may include:
Failure to adopt protective measures may give rise to employer liability for breach of the duty of protection, while adopting such measures must be carried out with caution to avoid infringing fundamental rights or amounting to disguised disciplinary sanctions, thereby avoiding the risk of litigation or fundamental rights claims.
In general terms, any internal investigation must be conducted in accordance with the principles of:
This requires that the procedure be previously regulated in the company’s internal policies, ensuring that:
On this general basis, the Regulation implementing the Karin Act expressly provides that investigations into sexual harassment, workplace harassment, and workplace violence must strictly adhere to the following principles, which apply throughout the entire procedure, as outlined below.
Gender Perspective
This principle requires that, throughout the entire procedure, potential gender-based discrimination affecting the exercise of rights or access to opportunities be duly considered. Its objective is to promote gender equality in the workplace, ensuring equal treatment and equal opportunities in employment and occupational development.
Non-Discrimination
This principle recognises the right of all participants to be treated equally, without arbitrary distinctions, exclusions or preferences based on grounds such as sex, age, marital status, religion, political opinion, sexual orientation, gender identity, personal appearance, social origin or any other similar factor. It also requires special consideration of situations of vulnerability or multiple discrimination, which may exacerbate conditions of inequality affecting a worker.
Non-Revictimisation or Avoidance of Secondary Victimisation
This principle imposes a duty on those receiving complaints and conducting the investigation to prevent the affected person from experiencing renewed harm or additional emotional or psychological distress as a result of participating in the procedure. Accordingly, effective protective measures must be put in place to prevent secondary victimisation.
Confidentiality
obliges all participants to safeguard access to and disclosure of the information obtained during the investigation. In particular, the employer must maintain strict confidentiality over all personal data accessed by virtue of the employment relationship, in accordance with Article 154-ter of the Labour Code. Disclosure is permitted only exceptionally, where required by courts or by the Labour Board in the exercise of their legal powers.
Impartiality
This principle requires that the investigation be conducted with objectivity, neutrality and integrity, both in the handling of the procedure and in the formulation of its conclusions. It entails adopting measures to prevent bias, prejudice or personal interests that could compromise the rights of the individuals involved.
Timeliness (Celerity)
requires that the investigation be conducted diligently and efficiently, actively removing any obstacles that may hinder its prompt conclusion. The aim is to avoid unnecessary delays that could aggravate the situation of those involved, while respecting the legally established timeframes.
Reasonableness
This principle demands that all decisions adopted during the investigation be logical, coherent, proportionate and non-arbitrary, so that they are understandable and justifiable to the participants in the procedure.
Due Process
Requires that the procedure, conducted in a fair and equitable manner, respects workers’ fundamental rights. This includes the right to be clearly and timely informed of the facts affecting them, to be heard, to submit evidence, and to receive duly reasoned decisions. It also entails the right to be informed of the status of the procedure, always in harmony with the other governing principles.
Co-Operation
The principle of co-operation imposes on all persons involved in the investigation a duty to collaborate in its proper conduct by providing useful information that clarifies the facts and, where appropriate, the reported conduct is sanctioned.
Summary
Failure to comply with these procedural requirements may give rise to employer liability, including claims for damages by the affected individual. As these principles form part of the system for protecting fundamental rights within the employment relationship, their infringement may also result in labour protection actions where the employer has acted negligently or wilfully.
Additionally, the investigation may be deemed flawed or invalid, rendering any measures adopted as a result ineffective, and the Labour Board may impose administrative sanctions on the employer for non-compliance with applicable regulations.
Employers may include in their internal regulations procedures and guarantees that go beyond the minimum requirements set out in 5.1 Requirements, as those standards operate as a minimum legal baseline. Such additional safeguards are permissible provided they comply with applicable law, fully respect employees’ fundamental rights and do not impose arbitrary requirements or unjustified restrictions on the right of defence, honour or privacy.
Once incorporated into the internal regulations, these procedural rules are binding on the employer. Failure to comply with them may expose the employer to labour liability, challenges to the validity of the investigation, claims for breach of fundamental rights, and administrative sanctions imposed by the Labour Board.
In internal investigations, each party must submit and substantiate the facts it alleges, and may present any evidence it deems relevant. In matters related to violations of fundamental rights, the Labour Board has established that conclusions may be reached on the basis of circumstantial (indirect) evidence, provided it is properly formulated and reasoned. Where the evidence submitted by the complainant gives rise to sufficient indicia, the burden of proof may be reversed, requiring the respondent to rebut them. The assessment of evidence does not require a standard higher than that applied by courts, but rather a rational evaluation in accordance with the principles of sound judgment, based on logic, experience, and established knowledge, and avoiding bias or subjectivity.
There is no general rule determining when an internal investigation must be concluded; therefore, its closure must follow a reasonable timeframe established in the company’s internal regulations. By contrast, in investigations governed by the Karin Act, the timing of the conclusion is expressly regulated, and the internal investigation must be completed within a maximum period of 30 administrative working days, understood as days from Monday to Friday, excluding Saturdays, Sundays and public holidays.
Once an internal investigation concludes, the company’s internal regulations generally require communication of the closure and, at a minimum, the conclusions to ensure due process.
By contrast, under the Karin Act, the conclusion of the investigation requires the issuance of a written report, the formal communication of its conclusions to the parties, and the submission of the report and its conclusions to the Labour Board within two days of the investigation’s completion. The Labour Board then has 30 days to issue its decision, after which (or if no decision is issued within that period) the employer must implement and notify the applicable measures or sanctions within 15 calendar days. The entire procedure must be conducted and brought to a close within a maximum period of 30 administrative working days, and must be properly documented and safeguarded.
Where the investigation, under the Karin Act, is conducted directly by the Labour Board, or where the employer refers or delegates the complaint to the authority, the procedure may continue beyond the investigative phase. In such cases, Chilean law establishes an additional mandatory mediation stage following the conclusion of the administrative investigation, even though this phase does not strictly constitute an internal investigation. This mediation is mandatory in cases of workplace harassment and violence and aims to reach an agreement between the parties before judicial escalation. If mediation is held and no agreement is reached, or if the agreement is breached, the Labour Board is required to initiate a judicial fundamental rights action before the labour courts. On the other hand, in cases of sexual harassment where there are sufficient indicia of the conduct, mediation is excluded, and the Labour Board must directly file a judicial complaint.
In general terms, the law does not establish a specific form for the conclusion of an internal investigation; it must comply with the company’s internal regulations or internal policies. In the case of investigations governed by the Karin Act, the procedure requires a formal, documented conclusion, typically in the form of a written report that records the steps taken, the facts investigated, and the conclusions reached, ensuring traceability, due process and administrative oversight.
Generally, internal investigations lack a uniform legal regulation establishing mandatory content for final investigation reports. Accordingly, their content is governed by the company’s internal regulations and internal policies. In practice, such reports usually include the identification of the parties, a description of the information gathered, the analysis carried out, and the conclusions of the investigation, serving as the basis for any subsequent decisions by the employer.
By contrast, in investigations governed by the Karin Act, the investigation report must be in writing and must include, at a minimum, the following mandatory contents:
This report forms the basis for the Labour Authority’s review and for the possible adoption of measures or sanctions by the employer, in accordance with the procedure established under the Karin Act.
In the context of an internal investigation, the parties’ right to receive information about the outcome depends on the applicable regime. As a general matter, and in accordance with practice and the provisions of the internal regulations, the employer must inform both the reporter and the respondent of the conclusions of the procedure and the measures adopted, while safeguarding confidentiality and sensitive data.
Under the Karin Act, the employer must notify both parties of the investigation outcome. The notification includes:
Notifications are subject to confidentiality requirements and do not grant parties the right to access third-party data.
The conclusions of an internal investigation into matters other than those regulated by the Karin Act should not be communicated to authorities, unless a legal provision expressly requires it or the employer decides to do so for compliance or strategic reasons (for example, in criminal or compliance matters). In the absence of a legal obligation, the information remains within the internal sphere, subject to the duty of confidentiality.
By contrast, in investigations governed by the Karin Act, the communication of the conclusions to the Labour Board is mandatory, in accordance with the terms and timeframes set out in 6.2 Procedure for Ending an HR Internal Investigation.
As a general rule, information regarding the conclusion of an internal investigation is not communicated to parties other than the reporter and the respondent. Exceptionally, and only where strictly necessary for organisational or compliance reasons, the employer may inform direct managers or other internal areas about the adoption of certain measures, without disclosing factual findings, detailed conclusions or sensitive personal data.
In investigations governed by the Karin Act, the principle of confidentiality reinforces this approach. Accordingly, witnesses, team members or other third parties are not informed of the contents of the report or its conclusions, except to the extent strictly necessary to implement protective or preventive measures, always avoiding unnecessary exposure of the individuals involved.
If the allegations are deemed substantiated, the employer may apply the disciplinary measures provided for in the Labour Code and in the internal regulations, respecting due process and the non bis in idem principle. In particular, depending on the seriousness of the facts, the following disciplinary measures may be adopted:
An employee may not be sanctioned twice for the same conduct; however, a different sanction may be imposed if a subsequent internal investigation establishes additional infringing conduct. Any measure adopted must be proportionate, properly documented, and communicated in accordance with the applicable regulations.
In the event that the investigation results in a disciplinary dismissal, the employee retains the right to challenge the termination before the labour courts, and may submit evidence aimed at rebutting or disproving the facts and conclusions set out in the investigation report, which does not bind the courts nor preclude full judicial review of the dismissal.
In practice, and in compliance with the employer’s duty of protection, it is common for additional preventive or corrective measures to be adopted following an internal investigation, regardless of whether the allegations are ultimately substantiated. These may include:
Such measures must be proportionate, non-punitive, and respectful of the fundamental rights of the individuals involved, and are grounded in the general duties of prevention and protection governing the employment relationship.
The employer may collect personal data in the context of an internal investigation, provided that such processing complies with Law No 19,628. This requires:
In addition, pursuant to Article 154-ter of the Labour Code, the employer must keep confidential all information and personal data accessed in the context of the employment relationship, a duty further reinforced in investigations concerning workplace harassment, sexual harassment or violence at work.
It should also be noted that, as of 1 December 2026, the new Personal Data Protection Law No 21,719 will further strengthen these requirements, recognising employees as the owners of their personal data and employers as data controllers. This law imposes enhanced obligations regarding lawfulness, purpose limitation, proportionality and data security, expands employees’ data protection rights, and requires employers to update their internal policies, establishing significant sanctions and potential liability for breaches of fundamental rights in the event of non-compliance.
In an internal investigation, the processing of personal data must comply with the personal data protection legislation and the duty of confidentiality set out in Article 154-ter of the Labour Code. This requires informing employees of the purpose for which their data will be used, obtaining written authorisation where applicable and using the information exclusively for the stated purposes, with particular care given to sensitive data, especially in investigations involving workplace harassment, sexual harassment or violence at work.
As of 1 December 2026, Law No 21,719 will further reinforce these requirements by imposing principles of lawfulness, purpose limitation, proportionality and security, strengthening employees’ rights over their data and requiring employers to update their internal data processing policies.
The parties may exercise the right of access only in respect of their own personal data collected in the context of an internal investigation, in accordance with data protection regulations. There is no right to access third parties’ personal data or the entirety of the investigation file, and the employer may lawfully restrict such access in order to safeguard confidentiality, protect sensitive data of other individuals, and preserve the integrity of the investigation, particularly in cases of workplace harassment, sexual harassment or violence at work.
In practice, the use of artificial intelligence is neither common nor advisable in labour internal investigations. Where it is used, it should be limited to support functions (for example, organising information or conducting preliminary document analysis), without replacing human assessment. Its use entails significant data protection risks and must therefore strictly comply with confidentiality obligations, purpose limitation, proportionality, and the prohibition of automated decision-making.
In Chile, there is currently no general, comprehensive whistle-blower protection regime that applies cross-cuttingly to the private sector. The legal framework provides partial, fragmented and sector-specific mechanisms, with varying levels of protection depending on the context in which the report is made, which prevents the existence of an autonomous and robust labour-law whistle-blowing statute comparable to those in other jurisdictions.
Public Sector
In the public sector, Law No 21,592 expressly regulates whistle-blowing channels before the Office of the Comptroller General (Contraloría General de la República), in relation to conduct affecting the public interest. This regime establishes a formal whistle-blowing system that includes institutional reporting channels, identity protection, preventive protective measures, anti-retaliation rules, and a reinforced protection framework applicable to civil servants, employees, contractors, trainees and other persons linked to public administration. This system expressly acknowledges the risk of retaliation and establishes specific mechanisms to prevent and sanction it.
Private Sector
By contrast, in the private sector, whistle-blowing has developed mainly from a criminal and compliance perspective, particularly under the Corporate Criminal Liability regime and its expansion following the enactment of the Economic Crimes Act. In this context, internal reporting channels form part of crime-prevention models, allowing the reporting of conduct of public interest – primarily criminal or economic in nature – and enabling internal investigations within a framework often described as corporate justice. However, these mechanisms do not provide a labour-law-based whistle-blower protection statute, nor do they establish specific rights, procedural guarantees or clear safeguards against retaliation. Their primary function is to protect the company, rather than the reporting worker.
Protection of Whistle-Blowers
From a labour-law perspective, Chilean law does not recognise whistle-blowing as a distinct legal procedure, nor does it provide a specific category of “public-interest reporting” within employment law. The labour system is structured around private interest disputes between employer and employee, rather than the protection of the public interest, creating a structural mismatch with whistle-blowing models developed in other legal systems. In practice, employees who report wrongdoing of public interest within the company face significant exposure to retaliation and must seek protection ex post through general mechanisms, primarily fundamental rights protection claims.
This protection is limited and fragmented, as fundamental rights claims were not designed specifically for whistle-blowing, require high evidentiary thresholds, and shift the focus from the public interest to the individual harm suffered by the employee. This demonstrates that, although reporting channels, partial anti-retaliation rules and compliance obligations exist, Chile currently lacks an integrated whistle-blowing system in the private employment context, leaving whistle-blowers in a structurally weak position vis-à-vis the employer’s investigative and disciplinary powers.
Accordingly, whistle-blowing in Chile is incomplete and asymmetrical, with effective protection in the public sector, instrumental development in the criminal-corporate sphere, and the absence of a general labour-law whistle-blower protection framework, which constitutes one of the main structural gaps in the Chilean system in this area.
Chilean legislation provides specific protections against allegations of sexual harassment, workplace harassment, and workplace violence, which have been significantly reinforced and systematised by the Karin Act, in force since August 2024.
The law expressly defines these forms of misconduct in Article 2 of the Labour Code, as follows.
These protections apply to all employees, regardless of position or contract type, and cover conduct occurring both in the workplace and in connection with the provision of services, including interactions with third parties.
Among the additional protections established under this framework are, inter alia:
As regards recent developments, the main change is the entry into force of the Karin Act in August 2024, which expanded the scope of protection, expressly incorporated violence committed by third parties, strengthened the preventive approach, and established more stringent legal standards for the investigation and sanctioning of such conduct.
This Karin Act investigation framework has been addressed throughout the preceding sections, as it currently constitutes the only formally regulated statutory HR internal investigation procedure under Chilean labour law. Accordingly, many of the answers above distinguish between general internal investigations governed by internal regulations and compliance practices, and investigations specifically subject to the Karin Act, which establishes mandatory stages, principles, timeframes, reporting obligations and procedural safeguards governing the investigation process.
In Chile, there are specific protections against other forms of discrimination and harassment, which are now mainly articulated through the legal definition of workplace harassment as incorporated and reinforced by the Karin Act. This definition covers conduct involving harassment, aggression or humiliation, which may occur even as a single act and includes behaviours traditionally referred to as bullying or mobbing. These protections apply regardless of the perpetrator’s hierarchical position and cover any affected employee.
With respect to discrimination, Article 2 of the Labour Code establishes a broad list of protected grounds (including race, sex, gender, age, sexual orientation, gender identity, trade union membership, religion, among others), which is not exhaustive, as the provision expressly includes the wording “among others”. This approach, strengthened by the Karin Act, allows conduct not expressly listed to be classified as discriminatory where its purpose or effect is to nullify or impair equality of opportunity or treatment in employment, unless the distinction is based on objective qualifications required for a specific position.
In addition, alongside the administrative and internal investigation procedures for workplace harassment or discrimination, employees may also resort to the fundamental rights protection action before labour courts. This is a specific judicial mechanism designed to address violations of fundamental rights arising in the context of the employment relationship, further reinforcing the protection framework.
Finally, these protections have undergone a significant recent development with the entry into force of the Karin Act in August 2024, which expanded the scope of protected conduct, strengthened procedural principles, and established the only formal investigation procedure applicable to workplace harassment, sexual harassment, violence at work and discrimination linked to such conduct.
Where the facts under investigation may constitute a criminal offence, the employer must distinguish the applicable legal framework.
In the context of the Karin Act, the employer is required to inform the reporter about the available criminal reporting channels, such as the Public Prosecutor’s Office, the police or the PDI. However, this does not entail an automatic obligation for the employer to file a criminal complaint. The legislation does not establish a general duty for employers to report criminal conduct, without prejudice to specific cases in which a reporting obligation may arise under Article 175 of the Chilean Criminal Procedure Code. In any event, the internal investigation must be conducted in accordance with the procedure set out in Law Karin, applying the relevant protective measures and respecting its governing principles, regardless of whether a parallel criminal process is pursued.
With respect to economic crimes, there is no automatic legal obligation to report the conduct, although doing so may be advisable, particularly as evidence of the effectiveness of a crime prevention model. An internal investigation may provide a sufficient basis for corrective actions and for a potential report to the Public Prosecutor’s Office, provided that evidence is collected lawfully and that confidentiality and proportionality are respected. In such cases, it is recommended that the investigation be conducted by professionals with expertise in criminal law and corporate criminal liability, and that the accused be informed that the information gathered may be disclosed to the authorities.
There are no specific procedures established under Chilean law for multi-jurisdictional internal investigations. In such cases, the employer must adhere to the provisions of its internal regulations and internal investigation policies, applying the general rules of Chilean labour law when the facts or their effects occur in Chile. In any event, the applicable local regulations in each involved jurisdiction must be respected, particularly in labour, confidentiality and personal data protection matters.
Orinoco 90
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Santiago de Chile
Chile
+56 264657043
info@clydeco.cl www.clydeco.comThe Karin Act in Practice: Timeliness, Institutional Capacity, and the Cost of Delay
In Chile, Law No 21,643, known as the “Karin Act”, entered into force in August 2024 and represents one of the most significant recent reforms of Chilean labour law in the areas of prevention, investigation and sanctioning of workplace harassment, sexual harassment and violence at work, including conduct committed by third parties outside the employment relationship. Its enactment responded to the need to strengthen the protection of employees’ dignity and to establish effective, timely and reliable mechanisms to address such conduct in the world of work.
One of the central pillars of the new framework is the establishment of a formal, structured investigation procedure subject to clear rules, whether conducted by the employer or by the Labour Board (Chile’s labour authority). In particular, the legislation places strong emphasis on the prompt handling of complaints, setting a maximum 30-day period for the conclusion of the investigation, and applying principles such as timeliness, confidentiality, impartiality, gender perspective and due process. This regulatory design seeks to avoid the unnecessary prolongation of conflict situations, reduce re-victimisation, and provide legal certainty to all parties involved.
However, more than a year after its entry into force, practical experience has begun to reveal significant tensions between the legal design and its administrative implementation. In particular, where the investigation is conducted directly by the Labour Board – whether following a direct complaint by the employee or a referral by the employer – a growing gap can be observed between the statutory mandate of speed and the actual timeframes of the proceedings. This situation has resulted in significant delays, with concrete legal and economic consequences for both employees and employers, which constitutes the central focus of this analysis.
The Legal Investigation Model Under the Karin Act
The Karin Act establishes, for the first time in Chilean labour law, a formal, standardised legal investigation model for complaints of workplace harassment, sexual harassment and violence at work. The procedure is triggered by the filing of a complaint, which may be submitted either directly to the employer or to the Labour Board, through the in-person or electronic channels available for this purpose.
Where the complaint is filed with the company, the employer must inform the complainant that the company may either initiate an internal investigation or refer the complaint to the Labour Board. Regardless of the option chosen, the employer is required to immediately adopt protective measures to safeguard the affected employee, such as separating workspaces or referring the employee to psychological support, and to inform the Labour Board of that decision within the statutory timeframe. In cases where the complaint is directed against individuals exercising employer functions or senior management roles, the law mandates compulsory referral to the administrative authority.
If the investigation is conducted by the employer, it must strictly comply with the procedure regulated by the Act and its implementing regulation, observing principles such as timeliness, confidentiality, impartiality, gender perspective and due process. The investigation must conclude with the preparation of a written report, the formal communication of its conclusions to the parties, and the adoption of the applicable measures or sanctions, all within the statutory maximum period of 30 days.
Conversely, where the investigation is undertaken by the Labour Board – either following a direct complaint by the employee or by referral from the employer – it is conducted as a special administrative procedure. The Labour Board receives the complaint, verifies compliance with the formal and substantive requirements for processing, adopts or maintains the protective measures, and conducts the investigation, which must also be concluded within a maximum period of 30 days, issuing a reasoned decision and notifying the parties of its outcome.
The key difference between these two scenarios lies not in the existence of a procedure, but in the body responsible for conducting it. In both cases, however, the legislator deliberately chose to concentrate, standardise and temporally limit the investigation, given the particular seriousness of the alleged conduct and the adverse effects that prolonged proceedings may have on the complainant, the respondent and the employer. This normative design seeks to ensure swift responses, prevent re-victimisation and provide legal certainty in a particularly sensitive area of the employment relationship.
Empirical Data: Complaint Volumes and Pressure on the Labour Board
The official data published by the Labour Board allow for a more precise assessment of the context in which delays in the processing of investigations have arisen. Between 1 August 2024 and 30 June 2025, the Labour Board received a total of 44,212 complaints under the Karin Act, including both those filed directly by employees and those referred by employers.
Complaints were submitted through three main channels. First, the digital channel accounted for the highest volume, with 19,285 requests, followed by the in-person channel, with 16,774 complaints. Third, 8,153 cases were referred by employers, meaning complaints initially filed with the company and subsequently forwarded to the Labour Board for investigation. This diversity of channels reflects an intensive use of the system and a significant externalisation of investigative functions towards the administrative authority.
From a temporal perspective, according to official sources, monthly complaint volumes have remained high throughout the period analysed. Although a moderate decrease in the total number of complaints is observed in 2025, this reduction is mainly due to a decline in employer referrals rather than a substantial drop in direct complaints. Overall, the flow of cases remains high and sustained, placing constant pressure on the Labour Board’s operational capacity.
Regarding the characterisation of complaints effectively processed under the Karin Act, the data reveal clear patterns. Approximately 87.5% of cases relate to workplace harassment, while workplace violence and sexual harassment account for significantly smaller proportions. In addition, most complaints were filed by women, who represent close to two-thirds of all cases approved for processing. These figures illustrate not only the prevailing profile of complaints, but also the social and legal sensitivity of the matters involved.
Taken together, these data support the conclusion that the Labour Board is facing a significant structural workload in the implementation of the Karin Act. This context helps explain, albeit not to justify, the practical difficulties observed in the system. While the scale and persistence of complaint volumes shed light on the environment in which delays occur, they do not resolve the underlying legal issue: non-compliance with statutory deadlines expressly designed by the legislature to ensure prompt, effective and timely investigations in particularly sensitive areas of labour law, where the investigation is conducted by the Labour Board.
Delay as a Legal Problem: Breach of the Statutory Time Limit
The gap between the normative design of the Karin Act and its administrative implementation has increasingly been addressed by the Chilean courts, particularly through constitutional protection actions. Recent case law has been consistent in characterising excessive delays by the Labour Board as legally reproachable, reinforcing the mandatory and enforceable nature of the statutory 30-day deadline to conclude investigations.
Among the relevant decisions in this area, the Valparaíso Court of Appeal has ruled on protection actions brought by both employers and employees affected by the undue prolongation of investigations conducted by the Labour Board under the Karin Act. In these judgments, the courts have been emphatic in stating that the maximum 30-day period is not merely indicative or programmatic, but rather an express legal requirement, directly linked to the principles of timeliness and due process governing this type of procedure.
In the cases analysed, the Labour Board kept investigations open for several months without issuing a substantive decision or informing the parties in a timely manner of the status of the proceedings or the validity of the protective measures adopted. In response, the courts characterised such inaction as an illegal and arbitrary omission, emphasising that the failure to close the procedure is neither neutral nor harmless. On the contrary, it creates a prolonged state of uncertainty for the reporting employee, who remains unaware of the outcome of the complaint, and for the employer and the reported individual, who continue to be subject to precautionary measures whose duration is extended indefinitely.
A particularly relevant aspect of these rulings is the explicit rejection of the argument that administrative deadlines are not peremptory. In the specific context of the Karin Act, the courts have held that the seriousness of the conduct under investigation and the effects arising from the mere pendency of the procedure justify a strict temporal compliance standard. Consequently, unjustified delay infringes constitutional guarantees such as equality before the law and due process, affecting all parties involved.
More recently, this line of case law was consolidated by the Supreme Court of Chile, the country’s highest court, in a judgment rendered by its Third Chamber in case No 31,105-2025. In that decision, the Supreme Court examined a protection action filed by an employer in response to the Labour Board’s prolonged inaction in a workplace harassment investigation that had lasted nearly five months, far exceeding the statutory deadline.
The Supreme Court categorically rejected the service’s workload as a valid justification for non-compliance with the legal mandate. It held that the indefinite continuation of the investigative procedure, together with the extension of protective measures such as paid leave, constitutes illegal and arbitrary conduct. In particular, the Court recognised a concrete infringement of the employer’s right to property, as it was forced to bear the costs associated with precautionary measures beyond the period expressly established by the legislature.
The message emerging from this ruling is clear: the 30-day deadline established by the Karin Act is legally enforceable, and its breach is subject to judicial control. Timeliness is not a programmatic aspiration of the system, but a legal obligation, the disregard of which entails responsibility and warrants judicial intervention.
Practical Impact of Delays
Delays in the processing of investigations under the Karin Act, when these are conducted by the Labour Board, do not constitute a merely procedural or formal issue. On the contrary, they generate concrete, practical effects for both employees and employers, affecting rights, costs, and the day-to-day management of employment relationships. In this sense, delay is not neutral: it produces real consequences that strain the balance the legislature sought to establish.
Impact on employees
From the perspective of those who file complaints, the main consequence of delay is prolonged uncertainty. The affected employee may remain for months without knowing the outcome of the investigation or the legal assessment of the alleged facts, which weakens the protective function underlying the Karin Act. This uncertainty is exacerbated when the protective measures initially adopted (such as changes in duties, separation of workspaces, or psychological support) are extended over time without a clear determination as to their duration.
In addition, there is a relevant legal risk: the potential expiry of judicial actions, particularly claims for protection of fundamental rights. In practice, administrative delays may consume critical time limits within which the employee must assess and pursue actions before the labour courts, thereby indirectly affecting access to justice. This risk has been highlighted by legal scholarship and labour-market stakeholders as one of the most problematic consequences of failing to comply with the statutory investigation deadline.
Finally, the psychological impact of keeping an investigation open for a prolonged period cannot be overlooked. Constant exposure to conflict, the absence of closure, and the perception of institutional inefficiency may aggravate the emotional harm associated with the alleged conduct, precisely in a context where the law seeks to prevent re-victimisation and promote timely responses.
Impact on employers
For employers, delays also generate significant effects. First, the indefinite extension of protective measures often entails direct economic costs. Measures such as paid leave, reassignment of duties, or temporary operational adjustments become, in practice, prolonged burdens that exceed the temporal horizon envisaged by the legislature. In addition, employees benefit from a guarantee of protection against retaliation (indemnity protection), meaning that they cannot be dismissed during the course of the investigation; any termination carried out in that period may be characterised as retaliatory conduct.
There is also reputational risk. An investigation that remains open for months without resolution may affect the internal work climate, erode team trust, and project to third parties (clients, suppliers, or authorities) an image of ongoing conflict, even where no conclusion has been reached as to the veracity of the allegations.
Moreover, the inability to close internal conflicts in a timely manner limits the employer’s capacity to manage employment relationships effectively. The lack of definition prevents the adoption of definitive corrective measures, the implementation of organisational learnings, or the clear restoration of normal workplace operations.
The “admissibility control” in administrative practice
A particularly relevant element in the analysis of delays is the Labour Board’s administrative practice, which includes a pre-classification or admissibility control stage for complaints that is not provided for in the law. In practice, the labour authority verifies criteria such as the existence of an employment relationship, the timeliness of the complaint, the subject matter invoked, or its formal alignment with the Karin Act before proceeding to the substantive investigation.
This aspect is problematic from a normative standpoint. Article 12 of the Karin Act Regulations expressly prohibits such a step, stating that “it shall not be possible to consider an admissibility control of the complaint in investigation procedures.” In other words, the legal design deliberately excludes this stage, yet the Labour Board is nonetheless applying it.
From a practical perspective, this unprovided-for stage should, in theory, help to decongest the system. However, experience shows that it has not prevented subsequent delays in the processing of investigations. Moreover, it introduces an additional phase that employers do not face in internal investigations, creating a difficult-to-justify asymmetry and reinforcing the view that the problem lies not solely in the volume of complaints but also in how the administrative procedure is being managed.
Ultimately, delays in investigations conducted by the Labour Board under the Karin Act have significant legal, economic, and human effects on all parties involved. For neither employees nor employers is the prolongation of proceedings innocuous. Even considering the context of the authority’s heavy workload, the existence of stages not provided by the regulatory framework (such as admissibility control) and the failure to comply with the statutory deadline underscore the need to address this issue from a structural perspective, consistent with the legal design and the promise of celerity that underpins the Karin Act.
Critical Assessment and Pending Challenges: Towards an Implementation Consistent with the Legal Design
Undeniable progress during the first year
One year after the entry into force of the Karin Act, it is undeniable that its implementation has generated meaningful progress in Chile’s system of internal investigations and labour relations. First, the legislation has played a decisive role in making visible conduct related to workplace harassment, sexual harassment, and violence at work that historically tended to remain invisible or underreported. The significant increase in complaints not only reflects greater use of formal reporting channels but also a heightened social awareness of the inadmissibility of such conduct in the workplace.
Secondly, the Act has fostered an incipient cultural shift within organisations, reinforcing the idea that the prevention, investigation, and sanctioning of harassment and violence are not optional, but rather legal and ethical obligations. This shift has been accompanied by a high level of corporate adaptation, with employers required to update their internal regulations, design and implement specific protocols, establish formal reporting channels, and develop periodic training programmes for employees and management.
From a practical perspective, these efforts have contributed to the standardisation of practices that were previously heterogeneous or non-existent, providing the system with greater predictability and traceability. In this sense, the Karin Act has fulfilled a relevant pedagogical and structuring function, aligning labour market actors around common standards of conduct and procedure.
Structural limitations of the current model
Nevertheless, the first year of implementation has also revealed significant structural limitations in the model, particularly in investigations conducted by the Labour Board. The main issue identified is the misalignment between a legal design that requires fast, concentrated procedures subject to strict deadlines and the actual operational capacity of the administrative authority responsible for executing a substantial part of the system.
Repeated delays in investigations conducted by the Labour Board do not appear to result from exceptional or isolated circumstances, but rather reflect a structural phenomenon. The sustained volume of complaints, the diversity of intake channels, and the lack of proportional institutional reinforcement have created a permanent state of overload. However, as recognised by the courts, this context neither eliminates nor mitigates the legal obligation to comply with the deadlines expressly established by the legislator.
This situation is compounded by weak public–private co-ordination. While employers have been required to swiftly implement strict internal procedures, administrative investigations have not always been efficiently articulated with prior corporate actions, resulting in duplication of efforts, overlapping protective measures, and a lack of clarity regarding the status of proceedings.
As a consequence, there has been an increase in the judicialisation of the system. Employees and employers alike have resorted to constitutional and judicial actions not to challenge the substance of complaints, but to compel the closure of investigations and enforce compliance with statutory deadlines. In this context, practical experience confirms that the problem does not lie in the Karin Act itself, but rather in the way the administrative procedure is being managed, thereby straining the balance that the legal design sought to achieve.
Conclusion
The Karin Act undoubtedly represents a significant and necessary step forward in protecting employees’ dignity and promoting work environments free from harassment and violence. Its legal design is coherent, structured, and aligned with international standards, and it has generated positive changes in both organisational culture and corporate practices.
However, the credibility and effectiveness of the system depend decisively on its proper execution. Strict compliance with statutory deadlines, rigorous adherence to procedural rules, and coherence between legal design and administrative practice are not mere ancillary considerations but essential conditions for the model’s functioning. Delays in investigations conducted by the Labour Board have become one of the central issues during the first year of the Act’s application and, if left unaddressed, will continue to shape its practical evolution.
Absent structural adjustments that align institutional capacity, administrative management, and legal requirements, the risks are evident: effective protection for employees is weakened, labour relations are unnecessarily strained, and conflicts are displaced from the administrative sphere to the courts. The pending challenge is not normative, but one of implementation, and its resolution will be critical to consolidating the promise of celerity and effectiveness that underpins the Karin Act.
Orinoco 90
Tower 1, 22 Floor
Las Condes
Santiago de Chile
Chile
+56 264657043
info@clydeco.cl www.clydeco.com