Litigation continues to be the primary method of resolving disputes in Malaysia, for both domestic and international disputes. This is not expected to change in the near future.
The Asian International Arbitration Centre (AIAC) has not published its statistics for 2025. Based on the AIAC Annual Report 2024, the AIAC handled 96 domestic cases and 11 international cases in 2024. The number of domestic arbitrations has been increasing in recent years (from 67 domestic arbitrations in 2022 to 92 domestic arbitrations in 2023) and is expected to improve further.
The number of international arbitration registrations at the AIAC has been relatively constant over the last few years.
AIAC statistics indicate that the majority of arbitrations registered in 2024 related to construction contracts (48.60%), followed by shareholder and supply contract disputes. This is largely consistent with the trend in previous years. The authors expect this trend to continue in 2026.
The arbitral institution most used for international arbitration in Malaysia is the AIAC. The AIAC, previously known as the Kuala Lumpur Regional Centre for Arbitration, was established in 1978 under the Asian-African Legal Consultative Organization and rebranded as the AIAC on 7 February 2018.
In 2023, another arbitral institution – ie, the Borneo International Centre for Arbitration and Mediation (BICAM) – was established in Malaysia. The BICAM is currently situated in the Sabah International Convention Centre (SICC).
The AIAC’s Initiatives
The AIAC maintains its own rules of arbitration, known as the AIAC Arbitration Rules. The AIAC takes the initiative to actively upgrade the AIAC Arbitration Rules from time to time in accordance with international trends, to cater for best practices in the global environment. The AIAC Arbitration Rules 2026 have been issued.
The AIAC also released the AIAC i-Arbitration Rules, which offer a practical solution for the settling of disputes arising out of or in connection with Shariah-based commercial transactions, enabling the arbitral tribunal to refer to the relevant Shariah Advisory Council or Shariah expert for opinions on matters related to Shariah principles. The AIAC i-Arbitration Rules 2026, which took effect from 1 January 2026, are the latest i-Arbitration rules.
The AIAC also released its inaugural Asian Sports Arbitration Rules 2026, which cater to the needs of the sports industry and provide an effective and efficient mechanism for resolution of sports-related disputes.
BICAM’s Initiatives
BICAM has a set of arbitration rules – the BICAM Arbitration Rules 2023 – and is seeking to promote arbitration under those Rules.
The High Courts of Malaysia are designated to hear disputes related to international arbitration and domestic arbitrations for matters where they have jurisdiction under the Arbitration Act 2005. There are designated arbitration specialist courts that deal with arbitration-related matters arising typically from construction and commercial-related arbitration disputes.
The Arbitration Act 2005 (the “AA 2005”) governs domestic and international arbitration in Malaysia. Parts I, II and IV of the AA 2005 are mandatory for international arbitration. Part III, comprising Sections 40 to 46, does not apply to international arbitrations unless the parties agree to opt in, in writing.
Comparison With the UNCITRAL Model Law
The AA 2005 is based closely on the UNCITRAL Model Law. Part II of the AA 2005 comprises general provisions and provisions relating to arbitration agreements, the composition of arbitrators, the jurisdiction of the arbitral tribunal, conduct of arbitral proceedings, the making of awards and termination of proceedings, recourse against awards and the recognition and enforcement of awards – closely mirroring the subject headings and sequence of Articles 3 to 36 of the UNCITRAL Model Law.
In the context of international arbitration, there are no significant differences between the AA 2005 and the UNCITRAL Model Law. However, specific powers are provided to arbitrators in several sections of the AA 2005 which are not found in the UNCITRAL Model Law. For instance, the AA 2005 empowers the arbitral tribunal to grant security for costs as an interim measure (see Section 19E of the AA 2005) and to give directions for the speedy determination of a claim if the claimant fails to proceed with the claim (see Section 27(d) of the AA 2005).
Section 21 of the AA 2005 also gives tribunals broad procedural powers, including powers to order particulars, discovery, interrogatories, evidence on oath, security for costs and procedural timetables.
The key recent development is that the Arbitration (Amendment) Act 2024, gazetted on 1 November 2024, came into force on 1 January 2026. The key changes are as follows.
An arbitration agreement must be an agreement by the parties to submit to arbitration all or certain disputes which have arisen or may arise between them in respect of a defined legal relationship, whether contractual or not (see Section 9 of the AA 2005).
Forms of Arbitration Agreement
An arbitration agreement may be in the form of an arbitration clause contained in an agreement, in a standalone agreement or in a reference to another agreement that contains an arbitration clause (see Section 9(2) of the AA 2005).
Arbitration Agreement Must Be in Writing
The arbitration agreement must be in writing (see Section 9(3) of the AA 2005). This requirement of a written agreement may be met if its content is recorded in any form, including situations where the initial arbitration agreement or contract has been concluded orally, by conduct, or by other means (see Section 9(4) of the AA 2005). The requirement can also be met if the existence of an agreement is alleged by one party and not denied by the other in an exchange of statement of claim and defence.
An arbitration agreement is deemed to be in writing if it is evidenced by any electronic communication that the parties make by means of a data message, if the information contained therein is accessible so as to be usable for future reference (see Section 9(4A) of the AA 2005). The signature of the parties is not a prerequisite to an arbitration agreement being enforced (see Ajwa for Food Industries Co (MIGOP), Egypt v Pacific Inter-Link Sdn Bhd [2013] 5 MLJ 625).
No Specific Words or Form Required
No specific words or form are required to be used to constitute an arbitration clause or an arbitration agreement; an electronic transmission referring to or implying the parties’ intention to submit to arbitration suffices, as long as there is an agreement to refer disputes to arbitration and the parties’ intention to arbitrate is clear and unequivocal (see the Malaysian Court of Appeal’s decision in Albilt Resources Sdn Bhd v Casaria Construction Sdn Bhd [2010] 3 MLJ 656).
Any dispute the parties have agreed to submit to arbitration under an arbitration agreement may be determined by arbitration, unless the arbitration agreement is contrary to public policy or the subject matter of the dispute is not capable of settlement by arbitration under the laws of Malaysia (see Section 4 of the AA 2005). The fact that any written law confers jurisdiction in respect of a matter on any court of law but does not refer to the determination of that matter by arbitration does not indicate that a dispute about that matter is incapable of determination by arbitration.
Public Policy
There is no universally accepted test on what public policy is; different courts and different tribunals may have different views as to the enforceability of contracts on the ground of public policy (see the Malaysian Federal Court judgment in Arch Reinsurance Ltd v Akay Holdings Sdn Bhd [2019] 1 CLJ 305).
The AA 2005 does not identify any specific subject matter that cannot be referred to arbitration.
Matters that may have public interest elements have been identified as being non-arbitrable in the Court of Appeal case of Peninsula Education (Setia Alam) Sdn Bhd (previously known as Segi International Learning Alliance Sdn Bhd) v Biaxis (M) Sdn Bhd (in liquidation) [2024] 5 MLJ 388, such as:
In Arch Reinsurance Ltd v Akay Holdings Sdn Bhd [2019] 1 CLJ 305, the Malaysian Federal Court held that the provisions of the National Land Code setting out the rights and remedies of parties under statutory charge over land are exhaustive and exclusive, and any attempt to contract out of these rights is void as being contrary to public policy; hence a dispute triggered by a statutory notice of demand under the National Land Code is not arbitrable under the AA 2005. Based on this decision, the Malaysian courts have taken the position that, where there are statutory provisions that exhaustively set out procedures involving the rights and remedies of parties, that subject matter will most likely not be arbitrable.
Recently, in V Medical Services M Sdn Bhd v Swissray Asia Healthcare Co Ltd [2025] 2 MLJ 744, the Federal Court held that the provisions of the AA 2005 do not purport to extend its reach to the insolvency provisions under the Companies Act 2016; its provisions ought not to be invoked or incorporated into the exercise of discretion in determining whether to grant a Fortuna injunction, or stay, dismiss or allow a winding-up petition, reinforcing the proposition that insolvency proceedings under the Companies Act 2016 are non-arbitrable. However, the Court of Appeal in Hashim bin Abdul Razak and Others v Pembinaan PD Jaya Sdn Bhd (in liquidation) [2026] 2 MLJ 608 recently held that pre-insolvency contractual disputes remain arbitrable despite a party’s liquidation, because it concerned private pre-insolvency contractual rights and did not involve insolvency-specific remedies.
The Tribunal’s Powers to Determine Arbitrability
If the issue of whether a dispute is arbitrable or not is raised by any party, the arbitral tribunal has the power to rule on its own jurisdiction, which includes deciding whether a dispute is arbitrable. Within 30 days of receiving notice of the arbitral tribunal’s ruling that there is jurisdiction, any party may appeal to the High Court to decide the matter (see Section 18(8) AA 2005).
Law of Arbitration Agreement
The AA 2005 now provides that, where parties have not agreed on the law applicable to the arbitration agreement, the default law is the law of the seat of arbitration (Section 5).
The 2024 Amendments are consistent with the conflict-of-laws rules which have been used by Malaysian courts with respect to determining the law governing arbitration agreements. The newly introduced Section 9A of the AA 2005 provides that, where the parties fail to agree on the law applicable to the arbitration agreement, the applicable law shall be the law of the seat of the arbitration.
Enforcement of Arbitration Agreements
Arbitration agreements are frequently enforced by the Malaysian courts. Where court proceedings are brought in respect of a matter that is the subject of an arbitration agreement and a party makes an application to stay the court proceedings, where there is valid agreement to arbitrate, it is mandatory for the court to do so (see the Malaysian Federal Court’s decision in Press Metal Sarawak Sdn Bhd v Etika Takaful Sdn Bhd [2016] 5 MLJ 417). So long as an application to stay the court proceedings is made before any further steps in the court proceedings are taken, there is no discretion for the Malaysian courts to refuse enforcement of an arbitration agreement when the arbitration agreement is not null and void, inoperative or incapable of being performed.
However, where the validity of the arbitration agreement itself is questioned, the Malaysian courts may find that they retain jurisdiction to determine that issue. In Setia Awan Management Sdn Bhd v SPNB Aspirasi Sdn Bhd [2025] 4 MLJ 181, the Court of Appeal considered whether an optional dispute resolution clause was a valid arbitration agreement. The clause provided that disputes “may be referred” either to the Malaysian courts or to arbitration under the AA 2005. The respondent commenced court proceedings, while the appellant applied to stay those proceedings in favour of arbitration. The High Court refused the stay on the basis that the clause was not a binding arbitration agreement, including because the parties had not agreed on the seat of arbitration, number of arbitrators or mode of appointment.
The Court of Appeal reversed that decision. It held that the absence of those details did not invalidate the arbitration agreement because the AA 2005 contains default mechanisms to determine them. The Court also held that an optional clause allowing parties to choose between litigation and arbitration may still amount to a valid arbitration agreement. Once one party elects arbitration under such a clause, the court will hold the parties to that bargain and stay the court proceedings, provided the requirements of Section 10 AA 2005 are satisfied and the arbitration agreement is not null and void, inoperative or incapable of being performed.
Malaysia applies the rule of separability of arbitration clauses contained in invalid agreements. An arbitration clause that forms part of an agreement shall be treated as an agreement independent of the other terms of the agreement in which it is contained. A decision by an arbitral tribunal that the agreement is null and void does not invalidate the agreement to arbitrate (see Standard Chartered Bank Malaysia Bhd v City Properties Sdn Bhd and Another [2008] 1 MLJ 233 – High Court).
The Court of Appeal has reiterated the rule of separability of arbitration clauses in the recent cases of Tumpuan Megah Development Sdn Bhd v Ing Bank N V and Another [2024] 3 CLJ 18 and Peninsula Education (Setia Alam) Sdn Bhd v Biaxis (M) Sdn Bhd [2024] 5 MLJ 388.
There are no limits set by the AA 2005 on the parties’ autonomy to select arbitrators in Malaysia. It is explicitly provided in Section 13 of the AA 2005 that no person shall be precluded by reason of nationality from acting as an arbitrator, unless the parties agree otherwise.
Where the parties’ chosen method for selecting arbitrators fails, the default procedure depends on the number of arbitrators appointed – ie, one or three. In the context of international arbitration, where parties fail to determine the number of arbitrators, the default position is three arbitrators in an international arbitration and one in a domestic arbitration (see Section 12 AA 2005).
Where the arbitration consists of three arbitrators, each party shall appoint one arbitrator, and the two appointed arbitrators shall appoint the third arbitrator as the presiding arbitrator (see Section 13(3) AA 2005). If a party fails to appoint an arbitrator within 30 days of receiving a request in writing to do so from the other party, or if the two arbitrators fail to agree on the third arbitrator within 30 days of their appointment or within such extended period as the parties may agree, either party may apply to the President of the AIAC Court of Arbitration for such appointment (see Section 13(4) AA 2005).
Where the arbitration consists of a sole arbitrator and the parties fail to agree on the arbitrator, either party may apply to the President for the appointment of the sole arbitrator (see Section 13(5) AA 2005).
Where the parties have agreed on the procedure for appointment of the arbitrator(s), and a party fails to act as required under such procedure, or the parties, or two arbitrators, are unable to reach an agreement under such procedure, or a third party, including an institution, fails to perform any function entrusted to it under such procedure, any party may request the President to take the necessary measures, unless the agreement on the appointment procedure provides other means for securing the appointment (see Section 13(6) AA 2005). The decision of the President is final and non-appealable (see Section 13(9) AA 2005).
Multiparty Arbitrations
Where there are multiple parties in an arbitration consisting of a sole arbitrator and the parties fail to agree on the arbitrator, any party may apply to the President for the appointment of the sole arbitrator. The decision of the AIAC is final and non-appealable.
The newly inserted Section 13(3A) provides that, where there are multiple claimants or multiple respondents and the arbitration consists of three arbitrators, all the claimants shall jointly appoint one arbitrator and all the respondents shall jointly appoint one arbitrator. The two arbitrators so appointed shall then appoint the third arbitrator as the presiding arbitrator. This position is also consistent with the AIAC Arbitration Rules 2026 (Rule 20).
Where the President is unable to act or fails to act within 30 days when any party applies to them for the appointment of an arbitrator, any party may apply to the High Court for the appointment of the arbitrator (see Section 13(7) AA 2005). If such an application is made, the High Court is required to have due regard to any qualifications required of the arbitrator by the agreement of the parties, other considerations that are likely to secure the appointment of an independent and impartial arbitrator, and the advisability of appointing an arbitrator of a nationality other than those of the parties. The appointment of the arbitrator by the High Court in this manner is final and non-appealable.
Apart from the aforesaid procedure, the High Court does not have any power under the AA 2005 to intervene in the selection of arbitrators in any other manner.
Grounds for Challenge of Arbitrators
An arbitrator may be challenged in two situations:
Challenge Procedure
Under the default procedure governing the challenge or removal of arbitrators, any party who intends to challenge the appointment of an arbitrator must send a written statement of the reasons for the challenge to the arbitral tribunal, within 15 days of becoming aware of the constitution of the arbitral tribunal or of any of the reasons referred to above (see Section 15 AA 2005). In ZMSB v PSB [2025] 1 MLJ 120, the Court of Appeal held that the timeframe to challenge the appointment of an arbitrator set out above must be complied with; a party cannot reserve its right to challenge the appointment until after the award has been delivered at the conclusion of the arbitration.
Unless the challenged arbitrator withdraws from office or the other party agrees to the challenge, the arbitral tribunal shall decide on the challenge. Where the challenge is not successful, the challenging party may apply to the High Court to decide on the challenge, within 30 days of receiving notice of the decision rejecting the challenge. The High Court’s decision on the matter is final and non-appealable.
A person who is approached in connection with a possible appointment as arbitrator is required to disclose any circumstances that are likely to give rise to justifiable doubts as to their impartiality or independence under the AA 2005 without delay (see Section 14(2) AA 2005).
In the case of Persatuan Kanak-Kanak Spastik Selangor and Wilayah Persekutuan v Low Koh Hwa and another appeal [2023] 1 CLJ 536, the Court of Appeal found that, although the arbitrator did not make the declaration promptly as required by Section 14 of the Arbitration Act (AA), the crucial information regarding his relationship with a witness was disclosed. This disclosure was enough to raise concerns about his impartiality or independence.
The party’s decision not to object to the arbitrator’s continued appointment after this disclosure indicates confidence in the arbitrator’s impartiality. The disclosure averted a breach of public policy.
The principle of competence-competence is applicable in Malaysia following the enactment of Section 18(1) of the AA 2005 – ie, an arbitral tribunal can rule on a party’s challenge to the tribunal’s own jurisdiction. This was affirmed in Press Metal Sarawak Sdn Bhd v Etiqa Takaful Bhd [2016] 5 MLJ 417.
In discussing Section 18 of the AA 2005, the case of Tumpuan Megah Development Sdn Bhd v ING Bank NV and Another [2024] 3 CLJ 18 held that, while an arbitral tribunal may decide on its jurisdiction under the principle of competence-competence, its decision is not final and can be challenged in the court of the seat of arbitration or the enforcement court.
Pursuant to Section 18(7) AA 2005, the arbitral tribunal may rule on a plea that it does not have jurisdiction or is exceeding the scope of its authority either as a preliminary question or in an award on the merits.
Positive Rulings on Jurisdiction
Where the arbitral tribunal rules on such a plea as a preliminary question that it has jurisdiction, any party may appeal to the High Court within 30 days of receiving a notice of that ruling (see Section 18(8) AA 2005). A decision of the High Court thereon is final and non-appealable (see Section 18(10) AA 2005).
On the other hand, if the arbitral tribunal decides to address such plea at the award stage, the parties may apply to the High Court under Section 37 of the AA 2005 to set aside such award made by the arbitral tribunal.
The courts generally show a reluctance to intervene in issues regarding the jurisdiction of an arbitral tribunal. In Capping Corp Ltd and Others v Aquawalk Sdn Bhd and Others [2013] 6 MLJ 579, the Malaysian Court of Appeal held that under the AA 2005 the courts are obliged to take a minimal interference approach, and such approach is reflected in Section 18 of the AA 2005, where the arbitral tribunal is empowered to rule on its own jurisdiction.
Negative Rulings on Jurisdiction
The AA 2005 provides for an appeal against an arbitral ruling that it has jurisdiction. The converse (ie, a negative ruling on jurisdiction) is not referenced as a ground for appeal under Section 18(8).
In PT Asuransi Jasa Indonesia (Persero) v Dexia Bank SA [2007] 1 SLR(R) 597, the Singapore Court of Appeal accepted that, pursuant to Article 16(3) of the UNCITRAL Model Law, a negative jurisdictional ruling by a tribunal is intended to be a final and binding decision between the parties, and is not appealable. While the Singapore International Arbitration Act was amended in 2012 to allow appeals to the High Court on a negative jurisdictional ruling, no such amendment has been made to the AA 2005.
Pursuant to Section 18(8) of the AA 2005, if the arbitral tribunal rules on a plea as a preliminary question that it has jurisdiction, parties have the right to go to court to challenge the jurisdiction of the arbitral tribunal within 30 days of receiving a notice of the arbitral tribunal’s ruling on the issue. If the arbitral tribunal determines such plea in an award on the merits, the parties may, within 90 days from the date of receipt of the award, make an application to the High Court to set aside such award (see Section 37(4) AA 2005).
In Malaysia, the standard of review by the courts on questions of arbitral jurisdiction is generally de novo. In Usahasama SPNB-LTAT Sdn Bhd v ABI Construction Sdn Bhd [2016] 7 CLJ 275, the High Court held that an appeal under Section 18(8) of the AA 2005 involves a full rehearing of all issues afresh and uninfluenced by the prior decision of the arbitrator(s).
When there are court proceedings brought in breach of an arbitration agreement, it is mandatory for the Malaysian courts to stay such proceedings in favour of arbitration, unless it is found that the agreement is null and void, inoperative or incapable of being performed (see 3.3 National Courts’ Approach).
The arbitral tribunal cannot assume jurisdiction over individuals or entities that are neither party to an arbitration agreement nor signatories to the contract containing the arbitration agreement. The AA 2005 does not apply to non-parties to an arbitration agreement (see the Malaysian Federal Court decision in Jaya Sudhir a/l Jayaram v Nautical Supreme Sdn Bhd and Others [2019] 5 MLJ 1).
Pursuant to Section 19 of the AA 2005, unless otherwise agreed by the parties, an arbitral tribunal is permitted to grant the following interim reliefs:
An interim measure issued by an arbitral tribunal shall be recognised as binding and, unless otherwise provided by the arbitral tribunal, enforced upon application to the court, irrespective of the country in which it was issued (see Section 19H of the AA 2005).
The powers of the tribunal under Section 19 of the AA 2005 were further clarified in the case of Malaysia Resources Corporation Bhd v Desaru Peace Holdings Clubs Sdn Bhd [2023] 4 CLJ 91, which affirmed that, by default, arbitral tribunals have jurisdiction to grant interim measures. The phrase “unless otherwise agreed by the parties” in Section 19(1) requires a clear, mutual agreement that interim measures are to be sought exclusively from the courts rather than the arbitral tribunal. A mere refusal to consent or a lack of response does not constitute such an agreement.
The High Court has the power to issue any interim relief before or during arbitration proceedings, and it is only approached to grant an interim remedy which will ultimately support or aid that arbitration (see the Malaysian Court of Appeal decision in KNM Process Systems Sdn Bhd v Lukoil Uzbekistan Operating Company LLC [2020] MLJU 85; [2020] 1 LNS 479 affirmed in the Court of Appeal case of Damai City Sdn Bhd v MCC Overseas (M) Sdn Bhd and other appeals [2023] 1 MLJ 258). This is irrespective of whether the seat of arbitration is in Malaysia (see Sections 11(3) and 19J(1) AA 2005).
Pursuant to Section 11 AA 2005, the High Court may make the following orders:
It should be noted that the powers of the court to grant interim relief are wider than the powers of an arbitral tribunal. In considering an order to provide a means of preserving assets out of which a subsequent award may be satisfied, the High Court has the power to order an arrest of property or bail or other security. Such power is not confined to the admiralty jurisdiction of the High Court; it extends to its civil jurisdiction under the Courts of Judicature Act 1967 (see the High Court decision in JANA DCS Sdn Bhd v TAR PH Family Entertainment Sdn Bhd and other cases [2022] 8 MLJ 201).
Recently, in Malaysia Resources Corporation Bhd v Desaru Peace Holdings Club Sdn Bhd [2023] 4 CLJ 91, the claimant in an arbitration filed an application for security for costs in the High Court instead of the arbitral tribunal. This was opposed by the respondent, who argued that the application should have been made to the arbitral tribunal instead. The High Court held that, in the absence of a prior agreement between the parties to exclude the arbitral tribunal’s jurisdiction to grant interim measures pursuant to Section 19 of the AA 2005, the parties must resort to the arbitral tribunal first to grant such interim measures notwithstanding the court’s parallel jurisdiction. The only exceptions which may justify bypassing the arbitral tribunal’s jurisdiction in granting interim relief are where:
Emergency Arbitrators
The AA 2005 recognises the use of emergency arbitrators. The definition of “arbitral tribunal” under the AA 2005 includes an emergency arbitrator.
Emergency arbitrators are prescribed the same powers as the arbitral tribunal. Accordingly, pursuant to Section 19H AA 2005, decisions of emergency arbitrators are recognised as binding, and can be enforced upon application to the court, irrespective of the country in which they are issued (see CRCC Malaysia Bhd v DSG Projects Malaysia Sdn Bhd [2023] 9 MLJ 713).
The AIAC Arbitration Rules 2026 continue to provide for emergency arbitrators; virtual or documents-only emergency arbitration proceedings are permitted, as are ex parte proceedings. Emergency arbitrators are permitted to rule on their own jurisdiction.
The Malaysian courts do not have the power to intervene in arbitration proceedings once an emergency arbitrator – who has the same powers as any arbitrator under the AA 2005 – has been appointed (see Section 19J(3) AA 2005), except in situations specifically provided by the AA 2005, such as determination of an appeal against the emergency arbitrator’s ruling of an unsuccessful challenge to the arbitral tribunal.
Interim relief by the courts is permissible both before and after an emergency arbitrator has been appointed.
Malaysian law confers concurrent jurisdiction on both courts and arbitral tribunals to make an order for security for costs as an interim measure upon an application for such. As outlined in 6.2 Role of Courts, an application for security for costs should first be made to the arbitral tribunal (Malaysia Resources Corporation Bhd v Desaru Peace Holdings Club Sdn Bhd [2023] 4 CLJ 91).
The parties are free to agree on the procedure to be followed by the arbitral tribunal in conducting the arbitration (see Section 21 AA 2005). Such procedural rules can be ad hoc or institutional. The most commonly adopted institutional rules in Malaysia are the AIAC Arbitration Rules.
If parties fail to agree on the procedural rules, the arbitral tribunal will become the master of the proceedings, upon which it will be empowered to determine matters such as the time and place of proceedings, the time limits for pleadings and written submissions as well as the taking of evidence (see Section 21(2) AA 2005).
Regardless of the applicable procedural rules, the claimant is in law required to submit a statement of claim containing the facts supporting its claim, the points in issue and the relief or remedy sought from the arbitration after the commencement of arbitration and within the period of time agreed by the parties or determined by the arbitral tribunal. The respondent to the arbitration shall then state its defence in respect of the particulars set out by the claimant.
Together with the submissions of the parties’ statement of claim and defence, the parties may further submit any document they consider relevant or add a reference to the documents or other evidence that they may submit.
The arbitral tribunal will then decide whether to hold oral hearings for the presentation of evidence or oral arguments, or to conduct the proceedings on the basis of documents and other materials. If any party applies for the arbitral tribunal to hold oral hearings at an appropriate stage of the proceedings, it is mandatory for the arbitral tribunal to hold such oral hearings (see Section 26 AA 2005).
Powers of Arbitrators
In Malaysia, arbitrators are granted the following powers.
Duties of Arbitrators
When a potential arbitrator is approached in connection with their possible appointment as an arbitrator, that person has a duty to disclose any circumstances that are likely to give rise to justifiable doubts as to their impartiality or independence.
Once the person is appointed as an arbitrator, they have a duty to treat the parties with equality, and to give the parties a fair and reasonable opportunity to present their case. The arbitrator is also under a duty to act in good faith at all times of the arbitration. In making an award, arbitrators are also duty-bound to state the reasons upon which the award is based, unless the parties have agreed that no reasons are to be given, or if the award is on agreed terms pursuant to a settlement.
Generally, parties to arbitral proceedings are permitted to be represented in arbitral proceedings by any representative appointed by the party. Section 37A Legal Profession Act 1976 provides that the restrictions on non-Malaysian qualified lawyers from practising in Malaysia shall not apply to any person representing any party in arbitral proceedings.
However, it must be noted that the above principle is only applicable to arbitrations taking place in West Malaysia. In respect of arbitration proceedings in East Malaysia (Sabah and Sarawak), Sabah and Sarawak advocates are conferred exclusive right to practise in East Malaysia, and such exclusivity includes representation in arbitration proceedings (see Samsuri bin Baharuddin and Others v Mohamed Azahari bin Matiasin and another appeal [2017] 2 MLJ 141 (Malaysian Federal Court)).
In arbitration, the parties are free to agree on the procedure to be followed by the arbitral tribunal, including the approach to the collection and submission of evidence. In the submission of the statement of claim and the defence, the parties are free to submit with their statements any document that they consider to be relevant, or to add a reference to the documents or other evidence that they may submit. One of the examples of such procedural rules includes the International Bar Association (IBA) Rules on the Taking of Evidence in International Arbitration.
Unless otherwise agreed by the parties, the arbitral tribunal retains the power to decide whether to hold oral hearings for the presentation of evidence or oral arguments, or to conduct the proceedings on the basis of documents and other materials. However, if there is an application to hold oral hearings at an appropriate stage of the proceedings, it is mandatory for the arbitral tribunal to do so.
The rules of evidence that apply to arbitral proceedings seated in Malaysia would depend on the applicable rules of evidence agreed between the parties. Where the parties fail to agree on the applicable rules of evidence, the arbitral tribunal may determine the rules of evidence regarding admissibility, relevance, materiality and weight in such manner as it considers appropriate.
It is statutorily stipulated that the Evidence Act 1950 (rules of evidence in courts) does not apply to proceedings before an arbitrator.
With the approval of the arbitral tribunal, the parties are empowered to make an application under Section 29(2) AA 2005 to the High Court for assistance in taking evidence. The High Court has the power to order the attendance of a witness to give evidence or, where applicable, to produce documents on oath or before an officer of the High Court or any other person, including the arbitral tribunal.
Section 41A of the AA 2005 provides that no party may publish, disclose or communicate any information relating to the arbitral proceedings under the arbitration agreement or an award made in those arbitral proceedings. This would include all pleadings, evidence, documents and the award, which will remain confidential and cannot be disclosed in subsequent proceedings. There are three exceptions to this rule:
The confidentiality obligation under Section 41A of the AA 2005 does not, however, extend to non-parties of an arbitration proceeding (see Dato’ Seri Timor Shah Rafiq v Nautilus Tug & Towage Sdn Bhd [2019] 10 MLJ 693).
The arbitral award must be made in writing, be signed by the arbitrator or a majority of all the members of the arbitral tribunal, state its date and seat of arbitration and, unless the parties have agreed otherwise or it is an award pursuant to a settlement, also state the reasons upon which it is based (see Section 33 AA 2005). Following the 2024 amendments, Section 33 now expressly recognises digital and electronic signatures on arbitral awards.
In Telekom Malaysia Berhad v Obnet Sdn Bhd [2024] 6 MLJ 293, the Federal Court held that Section 33 AA 2005 excludes the possibility of an arbitrator making an oral award; an award other than the form prescribed will necessarily be invalid.
There is no statutory time limit provided by Malaysian law on the delivery of the award, but the time for making an award may be limited by the arbitration agreement entered into between the parties. Where such a time limit exists, failure to comply with it may expose the award to a risk of being set aside unless an extension is validly granted (see Ken Grouting Sdn Bhd v RKT Nusantara Sdn Bhd [2021] 2 CLJ 173 (Court of Appeal)).
The High Court may also extend the time limit, unless otherwise agreed by the parties (Section 46 AA 2005). However, the High Court may only do so where there is an application made by the arbitrator or the parties and not on its own volition (see Ken Grouting Sdn Bhd v RKT Nusantara Sdn Bhd [2021] 2 CLJ 173 (Malaysian Court of Appeal)).
In AIAC-administered arbitrations, the AIAC Arbitration Rules 2026 also require draft awards, except emergency awards, to undergo technical review by the AIAC Court of Arbitration before issuance.
The types of remedies that an arbitral tribunal may award are not limited by the AA 2005 or the AIAC Arbitration Rules. However, the types of remedies awarded are necessarily confined to the powers conferred on the arbitral tribunal by the parties in the agreement to arbitrate.
Reliefs that form part of the exclusive jurisdiction of the court pursuant to statute may not be granted by an arbitral tribunal, even if the arbitral tribunal may decide on the subject matter of the dispute (see the UK Court of Appeal decision in Fulham Football Club (1987) Ltd v Richards and another [2011] EWCA Civ 855. The English position is also adopted in the Malaysian Federal Court case of Arch Reinsurance Ltd v Akay Holdings Sdn Bhd [2019] 5 MLJ 186.
Parties are entitled to recover interest and legal costs in an arbitration, especially where such entitlements are expressly provided for in the arbitration agreement. The arbitral tribunal has the discretion to award simple or compound interest from such date, rate and rest as the arbitral tribunal considers appropriate.
The interest granted may also be for:
The AA 2005 does not limit the grant of interest to simple interest or compound interest. This is dealt with in accordance with underlying contract and the substantive law.
The general principle in relation to the award of costs is for the arbitral tribunal to order costs in favour of the successful party and to award all reasonable costs incurred by that party during the arbitration. This would generally include legal fees and disbursements reasonably incurred by the party in respect of the arbitration.
The AIAC Arbitration Rules 2026 expressly recognise the tribunal’s power to determine arbitration costs, legal expenses and apportionment, including in funded arbitrations.
An arbitral award made by an arbitral tribunal pursuant to an arbitration agreement is final, binding and conclusive, and is not appealable based on questions of fact or law. The limited circumstances in which an arbitral award may be set aside are on the following grounds:
These grounds are exhaustive (see Pancaran Prima Sdn Bhd v Iswarabena Sdn Bhd and another appeal [2021] 1 MLJ 1).
In MRCB Builders Sdn Bhd v Thien Hong Machinery (M) Sdn Bhd [2026] MLJU 263, the High Court dismissed an application to set aside an award on jurisdiction and public policy grounds. The applicant argued that the tribunal exceeded its jurisdiction by deciding claims arising from 11 invoices which allegedly fell outside the lease agreements containing the arbitration clauses. The Court rejected the challenge because the invoices formed part of the dispute referred to arbitration, and the applicant had participated in the arbitration and was estopped from denying the tribunal’s jurisdiction.
There is no provision for parties to agree to exclude or expand the scope of challenge to the decision of the arbitral tribunal under the AA 2005.
Judicial review of an arbitral award is not intended to review the merits of the case but instead to confine itself to the limited grounds in the AA 2005. The standard of review is intended to be deferential rather than de novo. That said, in Government of the Lao People’s Democratic Republic v Thai-Lao Lignite Co Ltd, A Thai Co and Another [2017] 9 CLJ 273, the Malaysian Federal Court equally held that its role was not merely to rubber-stamp arbitral awards.
Malaysia has been a signatory to the New York Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards 1958 since 1985. This requires courts of contracting states to recognise and enforce arbitral awards made in other contracting states. The commitment to the New York Convention is reflected in the provisions of the AA 2005.
A party seeking to enforce an arbitral award may make an application to the High Court in Malaysia. Following the 2024 amendments, Section 38(1) of the AA 2005 distinguishes recognition from enforcement. Malaysian-seated and foreign state awards are recognised as binding automatically, but enforcement still requires a written application to the High Court and remains subject to Section 39 AA 2005.
The award to be enforced may be made in respect of an arbitration where the seat of arbitration is in Malaysia or a foreign state. The amendment therefore eliminates the need for a separate recognition step, but it does not eliminate the need to seek enforcement through the High Court where coercive enforcement is required.
The only legal requirement for the enforcement of an arbitral award is the production of a duly authenticated original award or a duly certified copy of the award, and the original arbitration agreement or a duly certified copy of the agreement. As long as this formal requirement is complied with, the court must grant recognition and enforcement of an arbitration award upon such an application being made (see the Malaysian Court of Appeal’s decision in Tune Talk Sdn Bhd v Padda Gurtaj Singh [2020] 3 MLJ 184).
Nevertheless, if the party against whom the enforcement of the award is invoked provides proof that the arbitral award has been set aside or suspended by a court of the country in which the award was made or under the law under which the award was made, the High Court may refuse the recognition or enforcement of the award.
Section 39 of the AA 2005 provides an exhaustive list of grounds on which enforcement of an arbitral award may be refused similar to that of setting aside an arbitral award; see 11.1 Grounds for Appeal. However, Section 39 of the AA 2005 does not mention sovereign immunity as a defence. Therefore, sovereign immunity arguments must be framed within the limited statutory grounds under Section 39, rather than asserted independently.
In Elisabeth Regina Maria Gabriele Von Pezold and Others v Republic of Zimbabwe [2023] MLJU 2657, the High Court recognised and enforced an ICSID arbitration award against the Republic of Zimbabwe. The High Court held that sovereign immunity cannot be used to prevent the recognition of an ICSID award.
The court has a discretion to adjourn the recognition and enforcement of an arbitration award in Malaysia pursuant to Section 39(2) of the AA 2005 where the award is subject to ongoing set-aside proceedings at its seat.
However, the courts do not have the jurisdiction to permanently injunct an application to recognise and enforce an arbitral award on the basis that the award sum is allegedly not due (Southern HRC Sdn Bhd v Danieli Co, Ltd [2023] 2 CLJ 831).
In the recent case of ING Bank NV v Tumpuan Megah Development Sdn Bhd [2025] MLJU 2449; [2025] 8 CLJ 873, the Federal Court clarified that a foreign arbitral award may be enforced in Malaysia through more than one route. The award creditors had obtained a London arbitral award, which was then entered as a judgment of the English High Court under Section 66 of the UK Arbitration Act 1996. They then sought to register that English judgment in Malaysia under the Reciprocal Enforcement of Judgments Act 1958 (REJA). The Federal Court held that they were not confined to enforcing the award directly under the AA 2005. Where an award has been converted into, or confirmed by, a judgment of a court in a reciprocating jurisdiction, that judgment may also be registered and enforced in Malaysia under REJA. The rationale is that the AA 2005 and REJA are separate regimes, and the AA 2005 does not impliedly repeal or override REJA.
The public policy considerations that domestic courts apply in refusing to enforce foreign arbitral awards are based not on domestic public policy but on international norms; conflict with public policy is defined as violating the most basic notions of morality and justice, or as that which would shock the public conscience or be injurious to the public good. Thus, instances such as “patent injustice”, “manifestly unlawful and unconscionable”, “substantial injustice”, “serious irregularity” and other similar serious flaws in the arbitral process and award would fall within the applicable concept of public policy (Jan De Nul (Malaysia) Sdn Bhd v Vincent Tan Chee Yioun [2019] 2 MLJ 413).
In Master Mulia Sdn Bhd v Sigur Rus Sdn Bhd [2020] 12 MLJ 198, the Malaysian Federal Court confirmed that the Malaysian courts may set aside an arbitration award that was made in breach of natural justice, but this would only be done where the breach had material and causative effect on the outcome of the arbitration.
The possibility of class action arbitration or group arbitration remains untested in Malaysia.
It is implicit in the AA 2005 that an arbitrator must be impartial; the requirement to disclose any circumstances that are likely to give rise to justifiable doubts regarding that person’s impartiality or independence makes this clear. Good faith requirements are also mandated by the AA 2005. Arbitrations pursuant to the AIAC are bound by the AIAC’s Code of Conduct for Arbitrators, which references the IBA Guidelines on Conflict of Interest in International Arbitration.
Advocates and solicitors in Malaysia who act as counsel in arbitration proceedings remain bound by the ethical codes and professional standards governing advocates and solicitors contained in the Legal Profession Act 1976.
Third-party funding is now expressly regulated under Sections 46A to 46I of the AA 2005, introduced by the Arbitration (Amendment) Act 2024.
Maintenance and champerty no longer apply to third-party funding of arbitration, and such agreements are not contrary to public policy on those grounds.
Where the funded party has made a third-party funding agreement, the funded party must disclose or communicate to the other party to the arbitration and the arbitral tribunal or the court before which proceedings are brought in respect of the arbitration, as the case may be, the fact that a third-party funding agreement has been made and the name of the third-party funder in the third-party funding agreement. The disclosure or communication must be made, where the third-party funding agreement is made on or before the commencement of the arbitration or court proceedings in respect of the arbitration, upon the commencement of the arbitration or court proceedings or, where the third-party funding agreement is made after the commencement of the arbitration or court proceedings in respect of the arbitration, within 25 days after the third-party funding agreement is made.
The Code of Practice for Third Party Funding 2026 also came into operation on 1 January 2026 and sets standards on matters including capital adequacy, conflicts, confidentiality, control, costs liability, termination and due diligence.
Rule 31 of the AIAC Arbitration Rules 2026 also requires disclosure of the existence of the funding agreement and the funder’s identity, and allows the tribunal to consider compliance when making orders, awards or costs decisions.
An arbitral tribunal may consolidate separate arbitral proceedings, provided that the parties agree to confer such power on the arbitral tribunal. Section 40 of the AA 2005 confers express power on the arbitrator to consolidate proceedings in such circumstances.
The court will not be able to exercise this power to consolidate separate arbitral proceedings under Section 40 of the AA 2005 (Ragawang Corporation Sdn Bhd v One Amerin Residence Sdn Bhd [2020] 1 LNS 895 (High Court)).
For AIAC-administered arbitrations, Rule 8 of the AIAC Arbitration Rules 2026 now provides a detailed institutional mechanism for consolidation before the constitution of the arbitral tribunal.
Generally, an arbitral award pursuant to an arbitration agreement is only binding on the parties to the arbitration agreement. The national court does not have the ability to bind foreign third parties.
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As a signatory to the Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards 1958 (the “New York Convention”), Malaysia has steadily aligned its arbitration framework with the UNCITRAL Model Law through reforms such as the 2024 amendments to the Arbitration Act 2005 (AA) that came into force on 1 January 2026, and the introduction of the AIAC Arbitration Rules 2026. These developments, together with a generally pro-arbitration judiciary, have strengthened Malaysia’s position as an attractive arbitral seat. This paper looks at a set of recent judicial decisions to map out where Malaysian arbitration jurisprudence is currently heading.
Recognition of the “Group of Companies” Doctrine in Arbitration Agreements
Recent case law demonstrates a growing willingness on the part of Malaysian courts to extend arbitration agreements to non-signatory affiliates through doctrines such as the “group of companies” doctrine. In PT Wijaya Karya (Persero) TBK and Another v Zecon Bhd and Another [2025] 6 MLJ 867, the Court of Appeal recognised the “group of companies” doctrine, as outlined in Dow Chemical France and Others v Isover Saint Gobain ICC Award No 4131, YCA 1984, where an arbitration agreement entered into by certain entities may bind other companies within the same corporate group if their conduct in negotiation, performance or termination demonstrates the intention to be bound. This doctrine reflects the commercial reality of modern projects, ensuring that the arbitration agreement applies to related parties.
In this case, Zecon Bhd engaged PT Wijaya Karya to provide project management services, among others. The parties then entered into a project management services agreement (“PMSA1”). Subsequently, Zecon Bhd appointed Zecon Construction Sarawak to act as its nominee and agent, while PT Wijaya Karya appointed Wijaya Karya Perseron as its nominee and agent. A separate project management services agreement was entered into between Zecon Construction Sarawak and Wijaya Karya Perseron.
A dispute arose and PT Wijaya Karya and Wijaya Karya Perseron commenced arbitration pursuant to PMSA1 against Zecon Bhd and Zecon Construction Sarawak. All four parties were brought into the same arbitration despite the two separate agreements governing separate parties. The Court of Appeal held that Zecon Bhd and PT Wijaya were the proper principals, while Zecon Sarawak and Wijaya Karya were their respective agents. Both principals, by conduct, had consented to assigning their obligations under PMSA1 to their agents. As such, the Court of Appeal found that all four entities could be brought into the same arbitration.
Reaffirming the Mandatory Nature of Arbitration Agreements and Their Binding Effect on Downstream Contractors
Malaysia’s pro-arbitration stance was further demonstrated in the Court of Appeal decision in Apex Communications Sdn Bhd v Sumber Khazanah Sdn Bhd (in liquidation) and another appeal [2026] 3 MLJ 152. The dispute arose from a construction project involving multiple tiers of subcontracting. Apex Communications Sdn Bhd (“Apex”), the first-layer subcontractor, appointed Ikatan Engineering Sdn Bhd (“IESB”) as the second-layer subcontractor. IESB subsequently appointed Sumbertech Ventures Sdn Bhd (“SVSB”) as the third-layer subcontractor, whose position was later assigned to Sumber Khazanah Sdn Bhd (“SKSB”). In assuming that role, SKSB agreed to adopt and comply with all the terms and conditions of the second subcontract.
Subsequently, a dispute arose where SKSB initiated court proceedings against Apex for monies unpaid for work done. In response, Apex applied for a stay of the proceedings pursuant to Section 10 of the AA, relying on the arbitration clause contained in the subcontract. The High Court dismissed the stay application, holding that the arbitration clause was optional rather than mandatory and therefore did not prevent SKSB from pursuing litigation in court.
On appeal, the Court of Appeal reversed the High Court’s decision and held that the arbitration clause created a mandatory obligation to arbitrate disputes. The Court rejected a literal interpretation of the word “may” in the arbitration clause and held that it did not provide the parties with a choice between arbitration and litigation. Instead, the choice was between accepting the decision of the appointed officer under the contract or referring the dispute to arbitration. Once a party was dissatisfied with the appointed officer’s decision, arbitration became the exclusive dispute resolution mechanism.
The decision is also significant because it clarifies the binding effect of arbitration agreements on downstream contractors. Although SKSB was not an original party to the second subcontract, the Court held that it had expressly adopted all the rights and obligations under that subcontract when it assumed the position of the original subcontractor. The Court further recognised that arbitration agreements may be incorporated by way of general reference without the strict requirement of specific reference or explicit mention of the arbitration clause.
Holistic Approach in Determining What Amounts to “Any Other Steps in the Proceedings”
The Federal Court in Universiti Malaya v Esa Jurutera Perunding Sdn Bhd [2026] MLJU 2093 provided clarity on what amounts to “any other steps in the proceedings” under Section 10(1) of the AA, which may consequently amount to a waiver of a party’s right to refer disputes to arbitration. Before this decision, the authorities were divided on whether certain procedural steps amounted to a waiver of the right to arbitrate.
The Federal Court held that the issue is not to be determined by a rigid or purely technical rule. Rather, the enquiry is a fact-sensitive and holistic one, directed at whether the defendant’s conduct demonstrates a clear and unequivocal intention to abandon its rights for arbitration and submit instead to the court’s jurisdiction. The Federal Court held that an express reservation of rights is an important indication but does not displace the need to examine the party’s overall conduct in the circumstances of the case. The court also reaffirmed that entering appearance remains a permitted procedural step and does not, by itself, amount to taking a step in the proceedings.
As to the specific acts in question, which involves seeking extension of time to file a defence, the Federal Court held that this does not automatically amount to taking a step in the proceedings. What matters is the surrounding context, including whether the request was made merely to obtain documents, evaluate the claim, or ascertain whether arbitration should be invoked. Likewise, the service of a Notice to Produce Documents Referred to in the Pleadings was held not to amount to a step in the proceedings where it was a necessary but peripheral act, purely investigative in nature, and did not advance the substantive merits of the dispute.
Enforcement of Foreign Confirmation Judgments of Arbitral Awards Through the Reciprocal Enforcement of Judgments Act 1958
The Federal Court case of ING Bank NV and Another v Tumpuan Megah Development Sdn Bhd [2025] 6 MLJ 751 provides significant guidance on the modes of enforcement for foreign arbitral awards. In this case, the appellants obtained an arbitral award in London against the respondent arising from two commercial contracts, which the respondent denied existed. The arbitral tribunal rejected the respondent’s objections on jurisdiction and merits, and issued an award in favour of the appellants. The respondent neither complied with nor challenged the award.
Instead of enforcing the arbitral award directly in Malaysia under the AA, the appellants first converted the award into a judgment of the English High Court and subsequently registered the judgment in Malaysia under the Reciprocal Enforcement of Judgments Act 1958 (REJA). The respondent applied to set aside the registration, alleging that the judgment was obtained without jurisdiction and by fraud. The respondent also sought a trial of issues that had already been determined by the arbitral tribunal.
The High Court dismissed the application as an abuse of process, but the Court of Appeal reversed the decision, holding that allegations of lack of jurisdiction and fraud should be heard afresh by the Court and that enforcement should have been pursued exclusively under the AA pursuant to Section 8 thereof. The appellants then appealed to the Federal Court.
The Federal Court clarified that there are two separate and distinct statutory avenues for the enforcement of foreign arbitral awards in Malaysia:
The Court further clarified that Section 8 of the AA, which limits court intervention in matters governed by the Act, does not displace or impliedly repeal the REJA or relegate the AA as the sole source of enforcement of arbitral awards. The AA only governs domestic and international arbitral awards and does not assume jurisdiction over (and accordingly cannot affect) the registration of foreign judgments, including confirmation judgments based on arbitral awards, which were matters governed by the REJA.
Recognising that the REJA and the AA are separate and distinct statutes providing for different modes of enforcement, the Federal Court held that there is neither conflict nor inconsistency between them that warrants either being made subject to the other. In the Federal Court’s words: “it would be misplaced to subject the REJA to the terms of the AA”. Accordingly, the court hearing an application under the REJA could not exercise the powers and jurisdiction of a court hearing a matter under Sections 37 to 39 of the AA, and the “passive remedy” recognised and used in the setting-aside of arbitral awards under the AA could not be read into the REJA, as the REJA contained its own provisions allowing for the non-registration of a judgment including a confirmation.
Therefore, the Federal Court explained that, when a foreign arbitral award is enforced in Malaysia via a confirmation judgment under the REJA, the grounds for resisting enforcement are limited to those set out in Section 5 of the REJA. These include, among others, lack of jurisdiction and fraud. However, it was emphasised that the Malaysian courts are not to conduct a full de novo rehearing of the issues already determined by the arbitral tribunal or the foreign supervisory court. Instead, the review is confined to the records and evidence already before the tribunal and the foreign court, and the Malaysian court is not to act as an appellate tribunal on the merits of the dispute. In view of the need for finality in international arbitration, the enforcing court should be slow to encourage a full-blown rehearing which would effectively amount to a second bite of the cherry in relation to issues that have been raised and disposed of.
In view of the foregoing, the Federal Court allowed the appeal and set aside the Court of Appeal’s decision.
Relationship Between Limitation-of-Liability Clauses and Arbitral Jurisdiction and Severance of Awards Under the Arbitration
The Court of Appeal in Gumusut-Kakap Semi-Floating Production System (Labuan) Ltd v Sabah Shell Petroleum Co Ltd and another appeal [2026] 1 MLJ 710 addressed a pivotal issue of whether a limitation-of-liability clause in a contract operates as a jurisdictional limit on the arbitral tribunal or merely as a substantive defence on the merits. In that case, a dispute between the appellant (“GKL”) and the respondent (“SSPC”) was referred to arbitration pursuant to their contract. The contract contained a limitation-of-liability clause that capped GKL’s liability at USD200 million. However, the arbitral tribunal awarded SSPC damages exceeding that contractual limit.
GKL applied to set aside the award under Section 37 of AA, arguing that the tribunal had exceeded its jurisdiction by awarding damages beyond the agreed liability cap. The High Court dismissed the application. On appeal, the Court of Appeal was required to determine whether an arbitral tribunal exceeds its jurisdiction when it grants relief that is inconsistent with a contractual limitation-of-liability clause.
The majority of the Court of Appeal allowed GKL’s appeal in part and held that the arbitral tribunal had:
The majority of the Court of Appeal adopted a business common sense interpretation of the contract and found that the parties had expressly agreed to limit GKL’s liability to that amount, subject to certain exceptions.
In reaching its decision, the majority of the Court of Appeal emphasised that the terms and scope of the submission to arbitration are determined not only by the arbitration agreement itself but also by the issues raised in the parties’ pleadings. Since GKL had specifically pleaded that its liability was capped at USD200 million and SSPC had disputed that position, it was held that the High Court erred in not perusing the pleadings so as to ascertain the terms and scope of submission to the arbitration with regard to GKL’s limit of liability under the contract.
Interestingly, the award was not set aside but was varied under Sections 37(3) and 39(3) of the AA to sever the offending portion of the award. As a result, GKL’s liability was limited to USD200 million, and the remainder of the award remained enforceable.
The decision is significant because it demonstrates that Malaysian courts may intervene where an arbitral tribunal exceeds the limits of the parties’ agreed submission to arbitration. At the same time, the Court reaffirmed the principle of minimal judicial intervention by preserving the valid portions of the award rather than setting it aside in its entirety.
The foregoing shows that the Malaysian courts continue to support and uphold arbitration proceedings and awards, demonstrating Malaysia’s commitment to providing a fair and reliable environment for business, including in cross-border trade.
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