New York continues to lead as a global centre for commercial litigation. Its robust creditor remedies and jurisdiction over both domestic and international financial actors make it an especially potent venue for claimants seeking to enforce judgments against fraudulent debtors and to find their concealed assets. Courts have refined New York law governing post-judgment discovery, veil-piercing, sovereign immunity, and the recognition of foreign country judgments.

This article explores those developments in detail, focusing on the issues that are now shaping global asset recovery strategy in New York.

Recognition of Foreign Judgments: New York’s Liberal Policy

Whenever possible, a foreign judgment creditor trying to collect assets against a fraudster should seek to domesticate their judgment in New York. New York banks have ample access to records not only of accounts that debtors may have there, but also of the movement of debtors’ assets worldwide. New York law often allows for post-judgment discovery of assets belonging to judgment debtors’ affiliates, principals, and agents, even if the property is located abroad. And New York courts (as discussed below) often allow for execution on judgment debtors’ property located abroad, so long as the defendant or garnishee is subject to their jurisdiction.

Taking advantage of these procedures is easy when a judgment creditor has a US judgment. New York state and federal law allow for immediate, ministerial confirmation of any such judgments, which are entitled to recognition and enforcement under the Constitution’s Full Faith and Credit Clause.

Foreign country money judgments are not entitled to automatic recognition, by contrast, but must instead be recognised under New York Civil Practice Law and Rules (CPLR) Article 53. Article 53 – New York’s codification of the Uniform Foreign-Country Money Judgments Recognition Act – allows for recognition of foreign final money judgments as US judgments, unless the judgment debtor shows that certain “nonrecognition” grounds apply to the underlying foreign judgment.

For instance, under Article 53, courts cannot recognise judgments rendered by courts that are systemically unfair or by a court that lacked personal jurisdiction over the judgment debtor. By contrast, courts have discretion to deny recognition if the foreign court procedures failed to comply with due process, service was inadequate, the claim was against public policy, and so forth. As written, these nonrecognition grounds may seem capacious, but recent New York cases illustrate that, in fact, New York has a strong bias in favour of recognition that is honoured in both state and federal courts.

In Trejos Hermanos Sucesores S.A. v Verizon Commc’ns Inc., No. 1:21-CV-08928 (JLR), 2024 WL 149551 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 12, 2024), for example, the court recognised a USD50 million Costa Rican judgment and summarily rejected numerous challenges that Verizon had raised because they had been litigated in Costa Rica. When a foreign court hears the same argument and rejects it as a matter of law, the court concluded, that same ground cannot be raised in the United States as a nonrecognition ground.

Similarly, Tianzhu Coal Co. v Ju, 83 Misc. 3d 1270(A), 2024 WL 3869799 (Nassau Sup. Ct. Aug. 12, 2024), ruled that a defendant could not argue that a Chinese judgment was fraudulently procured unless he proved that the alleged fraud deprived him of the opportunity to present his case.

Liu v Guan, 225 A.D.3d 749 (2d Dep’t 2024), in turn, illustrated how difficult it is to prove that a foreign country’s judicial system is systemically unfair. The defendant argued against recognition of a Chinese judgment arising out of a breached loan agreement by contending, based on US State Department Human Rights Reports, that Chinese courts are systemically unfair. The court rejected that argument out of hand, finding that such human rights reports are not sufficient proof that courts are systemically unfair in commercial cases.

Other cases made clear that CPLR Article 53’s grounds for nonrecognition of foreign judgments are exclusive, and declined to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction. In Williams v Fed. Gov’t of Nigeria, No. 23-CV-7356, 2024 WL 3759649 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 12, 2024), for example, the court ruled that a foreign country judgment recognition act cannot, as a matter of law, be dismissed based on forum non conveniens. This takes away a powerful argument that judgment debtors often make to resist recognition and enforcement in New York of foreign judgments that lack any US nexus.

More significant, however, is Cargill Fin. Servs. Int’l, Inc. v Barshchovskiy, No. 24-CV-5751 (LJL), 2025 WL 522108 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 18, 2025). Cargill ruled that, so long as the judgment debtor has no colourable defences to recognition, a federal court can recognise a foreign country judgment even if it lacks personal jurisdiction over the judgment debtor.

Cargill relied on New York state cases that had developed this line of precedent over the last few decades. But this appears to be the first time a New York federal court has embraced this doctrine. It presents numerous opportunities for judgment creditors to domesticate fully litigated judgments from well-respected foreign jurisdictions, like the UK and France, to obtain post-judgment discovery which then can be used for enforcement efforts around the world.

Veil-Piercing: Clarity On Choice-Of-Law

Judgment creditors will often sue corporate affiliates under the theory that they are “alter egos” or agents of the judgment debtor. Several New York cases clarify the law that governs veil-piercing actions that are brought against foreign corporations.

In Citibank, N.A. v Aralpa Holdings Limited P’ship, 714 F.Supp.3d 416 (S.D.N.Y. 2024), the court reiterated that New York will sometimes apply New York law for veil-piercing actions against foreign corporations. The defendant, a Georgia LLC, had argued that under the internal affairs doctrine, Georgia law must govern the veil-piercing claim. The district court disagreed. In New York, the internal affairs doctrine can be overcome if another state has greater connection to the dispute, the district court ruled. In Citibank, New York law applied because the underlying dispute had far more connections to New York than Georgia.

Similarly, Cortlandt St. Recovery Corp. v Bonderman, 215 A.D.3d 446 (1st Dep’t 2023), held that the circumstances militated in favour of applying New York law to a veil-piercing claim, even though the judgment debtors were incorporated in Luxembourg, because the underlying action concerned the enforcement of a New York judgment and New York law has consistently applied throughout prior stages of the litigation. That was true despite the majority of the underlying activities occurring abroad.

G&A Strategic Invs. I LLC v Petróleos de Venezuela, S.A., No. 23-CV-10766 (JSR), 2025 WL 588208 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 21, 2025), involved the choice-of-law rule applicable to actions against foreign states. Forty years ago, in First Nat’l City Bank v Banco Para El Comercio Exterior de Cuba, 462 U.S. 611 (1983) (“Bancec”), the US Supreme Court held that federal common law veil-piercing rules would apply in actions seeking to hold foreign instrumentalities liable for foreign states’ debts. G&A held that the same rule applied to actions to hold companies incorporated in the United States liable for foreign states debts.

In all these cases, the choice-of-law inquiry had real consequences. Citibank relied on more generous New York law allowing veil-piercing whenever LLCs are completely dominated by debtors. It also permitted veil-piercing even though the judgment debtor did not have legal ownership over the defendant but owned a separate entity that itself owned the defendant. The currency of veil-piercing in New York is control, not legal ownership.

But G&A’s holding might be even more significant. The purported alter ego at issue was a Delaware corporation, and veil-piercing is extraordinarily difficult under Delaware law.

Post-Judgment Discovery: Global Enforcement and Veil-Piercing

Judgment creditors in New York are entitled to extremely broad post-judgment discovery under the standard set forth in CPLR 5223 and through the tools of CPLR 5224. In light of New York’s role as a global centre of international finance, a number of important cases explain how these powerful post-judgment discovery tools can be used in support of worldwide judgment enforcement proceedings, as well as to suss out the judgment debtors’ alter egos.

All discovery in transnational judgment enforcement cases takes place in the shadow of Republic of Argentina v NML Capital, Ltd., 573 U.S. 134 (2014), which concerned a judgment creditor’s efforts to take post-judgment discovery from international banks in New York. The case held that judgment creditors are entitled to information that would aid in judgment enforcement worldwide, not just in New York. It also held that foreign states do not have sovereign immunity from post-judgment discovery.

Judgment debtors can face significant risks if they fail to comply with their discovery obligations. In AT&T Mobility Holdings B.V. v Grupo Salinas Telecom, S.A. De C.V., No. 650330/2020, 2024 WL 4711246 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Nov 07, 2024), for example, the judgment creditor had sought discovery from the judgment debtors regarding potential alter egos. After the judgment debtors refused to comply, the court held them in contempt and issued an adverse inference that several of their affiliates were their alter egos.

Creditor’s Remedies: Execution And Turnover

Once judgment enters and a creditor has found the assets it wishes to attach, New York offers extensive creditor remedies to execute and turn over assets to satisfy the judgment. Sometimes that is as simple as directing the defendant to turn over all assets in his or her possession, subject to certain statutory exemptions for property essential to living, like clothing and heating equipment, and memorabilia, like a wedding ring or watch.

Freeman v Giuliani, No. 24-MC-00353 (LJL), 2024 WL 4546883 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 22, 2024), shows how this works in practice, with the court ruling that much of former Mayor Rudy Giuliani’s property was too expensive to qualify for these exemptions. Freeman also appointed a receiver to auction off much of Mr Giuliani’s property, a common device designed to aid collection of cash to satisfy a money judgment.

In addition to seizing personal items and appointing receivers to auction off property, New York also allows a court to direct the judgment debtor to pay the judgment creditor according to an installment plan. Hamway v Sutton, 228 N.Y.S.3d 440 (1st Dep’t 2025), clarified that courts have full discretion under this provision to order the judgment debtor to pay whatever funds from an income stream the judgment debtor can afford.

Intangible property interests, like stock in a company, may also be seized by judgment creditors. In Webber v Dash, No. 19-CV-610 (RWL), 2024 WL 564482 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 13, 2024), for example, the court held that record executive Damon Dash’s stock ownership in Roc-A-Fella Records could be seized, even though the corporation restricted him from selling his stock without board consent. Such restrictions on the sale of stock were contrary to public policy, the court ruled, and therefore the stock could be seized by a genuine creditor.

Cross-Border Enforcement: Global Reach of New York Remedies

Asset recovery also often entails seizing intangible property interests and property rights abroad. A New York court will order collection of the property regardless of where it is located, so long as it has personal jurisdiction over the proper garnishee. That makes New York remedies potentially global in scope, covering assets located abroad so long as the garnishee of those assets is subject to personal jurisdiction in New York.

The global reach of New York’s creditor remedies came up in Attestor Master Value Fund LP v Argentina, 113 F.4th 220 (2d Cir. 2024), cert. denied, No. 24-668, 2025 WL 299527 (U.S. Jan. 27, 2025). There, the Second Circuit held that a New York court had jurisdiction to turn over Argentina’s property interest in approximately USD60 million in Eurobonds held in Germany.

This was so, the court explained, because the bonds were held in a German bank account belonging to the Federal Reserve Bank of New York (FRBNY), which then had a contractual duty to pay Argentina from these accounts. Because Argentina’s rights to the Eurobonds flowed from the FRBNY, the FRBNY was the proper garnishee of Argentina’s property rights, and, as a New York-based company, was subject to jurisdiction and turnover of funds located outside the United States.

Similar cross-border enforcement issues arose in Peterson v Bank Markazi, 121 F.4th 983 (2d Cir. 2024), where judgment creditors injured by Iranian state-backed terrorism sued the Luxembourg financial institution Clearstream Banking seeking turnover of USD1.68 billion in a blocked financial account belonging to Iran’s central bank. Although the account was located and Clearstream was based abroad, the Second Circuit held that the judgment creditors had specific personal jurisdiction over Clearstream to compel turnover of the blocked account.

Critically, the court explained, the blocked account received payments from a correspondent banking account that Clearstream maintained in New York. Peterson thus stands for the broad proposition that a foreign financial institution can be compelled to turn over the proceeds of a foreign bank account so long as that account received some of those proceeds from a US bank account. That holding will expand global collection efforts significantly.

Asset Recovery Against Foreign States: Overcoming Sovereign Immunity

Creditors seeking to collect against foreign states face particular hurdles for enforcement because foreign state assets located abroad are immune from execution and attachment. But enforcement is not impossible. Under the US Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA), foreign states can be sued when, among other things, they have waived sovereign immunity, agreed to arbitrate, or engaged in commercial activity in the United States. Additionally, so long as they have waived immunity or agreed to arbitrate, foreign state commercial property is subject to execution.

New York courts have fleshed out these legal requirements for decades. Several cases from the past year should be of particular interest for those seeking to collect against foreign states.

The Williams case, discussed above, made clear that the FSIA’s waiver exception is a broad one. Williams ruled that Nigeria had waived its sovereign immunity even though it had purported to revoke its prior waiver. Under the FSIA’s plain terms, the court explained, a waiver of sovereign immunity is irrevocable unless that waiver contains advance procedures allowing for the waiver to be revoked. Williams is not an outlier, but rather the third New York district court to endorse this broad understanding of the FSIA’s waiver exception.

Schansman v Sberbank of Russia PJSC, 128 F.4th 70 (2d Cir. 2025), in turn, expanded the FSIA’s commercial activity exception. Schansman held, as a matter of first impression, that a Russian state-owned bank could be sued under the commercial activity exception for materially supporting terrorism. The form of its material support – facilitating money transfers to terrorist organisations – was ultimately commercial in nature and took place in the United States. This opens the door to wide-ranging material-support-of-terrorism charges against foreign states and instrumentalities.

Attestor Master Value, discussed above, also developed the law of execution immunity. Assets that Argentina had pledged as security for a bond issuance were used for commercial activity, the court held, because Argentina had refinanced those bonds and used the collateral as an inducement for participating bondholders. This makes it easier to enforce judgments against foreign states that issue securitised bonds, and raises the stakes of finding such collateral.

Finally, Bank Markazi, also discussed earlier, potentially opens the door for enforcement against foreign states and instrumentalities that have not been joined to proceedings. The Second Circuit held in that case that Iran’s central bank was entitled to sovereign immunity and thus could not be joined formally to the proceedings. But the court left open whether the judgment creditor could nonetheless seek turnover of the central bank’s assets by simply suing the garnishee (Clearstream). Although the court’s sovereign immunity ruling arguably expanded foreign states’ rights, the decision on the whole may leave foreign state assets more exposed.