As a trading and financial hub, there is often an international element to fraud claims in Singapore. The general characteristics of fraud claims in Singapore include:
The principal’s cause of action may be founded on restitution (money had and received) or breach of fiduciary duty (prohibition against secret profits). The latter is relevant if the principal also intends to seek a constructive trust over the bribe and to trace its proceeds.
A principal’s right at common law to recover the bribe or the monetary value of the bribe received by its agent is also statutorily recognised. Section 14 of the Prevention of Corruption Act 1960 provides that a principal may recover, as a civil debt, the amount or value of the bribe received by the agent, or from the person who gave the bribe and no conviction or acquittal of the defendant shall operate as a bar to recovery. The fact that the agent paid fines equal to or exceeding the value of the bribe received is not a bar to the principal’s recovery. The possibility of double disgorgement acts as a further deterrent against corruption.
The party who assisted or facilitated the fraudulent acts of another may be liable in a claim for:
Generally, causes of action grounded in contract and tort are subject to a six-year limitation period (see Section 6 of the Limitation Act 1959).
There are, however, specific provisions that deal with claims based on fraud. For instance:
Generally, a victim of fraud may bring a proprietary claim for misappropriated funds or property and seek a constructive trust over them. The constructive trust will give the claimant priority over other unsecured creditors in an insolvency situation. It also enables the claimant to trace and follow the proceeds of the fraud. Hence, if the proceeds of fraud are invested successfully before they are recovered by the victim, the victim is entitled to trace the fraud proceeds into the investment and claim the full value thereof.
Where the proceeds of the fraud have been commingled, there are specific rules and methods of distribution that the Singapore courts may apply in considering the distribution of such commingled funds, depending on whether the assets were commingled with the assets of the fraudster, or those of other innocent third parties and whether and how the commingled funds have been spent or dissipated. In the case of the former, the courts will apply the rule that is most favourable to the victim. The courts may apply the presumption (which is rebuttable) that the fraudster had spent their own money first and the remaining money is the beneficiary’s (if the victim seeks to claim the remaining funds), or the presumption that the beneficiary’s money was spent first (if the victim seeks to trace the proceeds of the funds). In the case of the latter, the courts may order a pro rata distribution from the commingled assets.
There are no particular rules of pre-action conduct for fraud claims. Pursuant to the terms of the Rules of Court 2021, a party to any court proceeding is under an express duty to consider an amicable resolution of the dispute before the commencement and during the course of the proceedings (Order 5 Rule 1(1)). In addition, prospective claimants are required to make an offer of amicable resolution (which shall be open for acceptance within a reasonable period of time, or for at least 14 days, unless parties agree otherwise) before commencing action unless the claimant has reasonable grounds not to do so (Order 5 Rule 1(2)).
A claimant may seek either a freezing injunction (in personam) over the defendant to prevent them from dealing with or disposing of assets beyond a certain value, or a proprietary injunction (in rem) over a specific asset in which the claimant asserts a proprietary interest. Such injunctions are typically sought on an urgent and without notice (ex parte) basis. Freezing injunctions can be sought in aid of domestic or foreign proceedings, although the legal requirements for each differ.
A claimant may also seek a freezing injunction against a third party (non-cause of action defendant) who is holding on to the defendant’s assets as a nominee.
Exceptionally, a claimant may also seek an interim receivership order requiring the defendant’s assets to be handed over and managed by a court-appointed receiver, pending trial of the action. A receivership order may be granted if the court concludes that the defendant cannot be trusted to obey the freezing order – for example, where the defendant’s assets are held via a complex, opaque and multi-layered corporate structure.
If the defendant does not comply with the court order, they may be liable for contempt of court under the Administration of Justice (Protection) Act 2016, with a fine of up to SGD100,000, imprisonment for a term not exceeding three years or both. Additionally, the court may refuse to hear the defendant until:
Third parties (such as banks) in Singapore are also bound by the freezing order upon receiving notice of the injunction; failure to comply may render them liable for contempt of court.
A claimant seeking a freezing or proprietary injunction will need to pay the filing fees for the application, which may range from SGD2,000 to SGD10,000, depending on the volume and number of documents filed. The fees are not pegged to the value of the claim. The claimant will also be required to provide a cross-undertaking in damages to the court, which may be substantial depending on the nature of the claim and the potential loss and damage the defendant may incur. In certain cases, the claimant may also be required to provide fortification of such undertaking, which would usually be in the form of payment into court, a solicitor’s undertaking or a bank guarantee.
Generally, a claimant can seek a disclosure order as an ancillary order to support the freezing injunction. The defendant will be required to file an affidavit identifying their assets, whether held in their own name or not and whether owned solely or jointly.
If there are reasonable grounds to believe that the defendant has not complied with their disclosure obligations, the claimant may apply for the defendant to be cross-examined on their asset disclosure. Where the defendant is found to have acted in breach of the disclosure order, they may be liable for contempt of court.
A claimant may also rely on the defendant’s failure to comply with the disclosure order as a basis to apply for an interim receivership order requiring the defendant’s assets to be handed over and managed by a court-appointed receiver, pending trial of the action.
In any event, the claimant will be required to provide a cross-undertaking in damages to the court. In certain cases, the claimant may also be required to provide fortification of such undertaking.
The court may grant a search order (formerly known as an “Anton Piller order”) to prevent a defendant from destroying incriminating evidence. Such an order permits certain persons to enter the defendant’s premises to search for, seize and retain documents or other items.
Such an application is usually made by way of a summons without notice (ie, on an ex parte basis). The requirements that must be satisfied to obtain a search order are:
As with an application for a freezing order, the applicant will have to undertake to pay damages that may be sustained by the defendant as a result of the search order, if the court grants it.
In a court application, the applicant may seek disclosure of documents and evidence from third parties, either before the commencement (pre-action) or during the course of proceedings.
In either case, the applicant will be required to specify or describe the documents sought and show how such documents are relevant to an issue arising or likely to arise out of the claim made or likely to be made and that the documents are likely to be in the possession, custody or power of the third party against whom disclosure is sought.
In the cases of fraud and asset tracing, the courts would usually be prepared to grant pre-action disclosure orders in line with the principles for the grant of a Norwich Pharmacal order or a Bankers Trust order – ie, to enable the identification of the wrongdoer or the tracing of misappropriated funds or property.
A party who is given discovery of documents pursuant to an order of court gives an implied undertaking to the court only to use those documents for the conduct of the case in which the discovery is given and not for any collateral or ulterior purpose (also known as the “Riddick undertaking”).
As discovery on compulsion of court order is an intrusion of privacy, the Riddick principle ensures that this compulsion is not pressed further than the course of justice requires. This implied undertaking is sometimes fortified by an express undertaking to the same effect.
A breach of the undertaking amounts to contempt of court. The Riddick principle, however, is not absolute and the court has discretion to release or modify the undertaking.
Generally, an application for a freezing injunction or a search order will be made by way of a summons without notice (ie, ex parte). However, the courts’ practice directions require that, except in cases of extreme urgency or with the court’s permission, the applicant must provide at least two hours’ notice to the other party before the hearing.
In an ex parte application, the applicant must make full and frank disclosure to the court of all facts within their knowledge which are material to the exercise of the court’s discretion whether to grant the relief, even if they are prejudicial to the applicant’s claim.
Generally, the victims of fraud would seek redress concurrently through criminal and civil proceedings. Criminal prosecution and civil proceedings may proceed in parallel. In less serious fraud cases, however, criminal prosecution may take place only after the conclusion of the civil claim.
Singapore has various statutory provisions that would capture different fraudulent acts. For example, the Penal Code 1871 provides for:
The Companies Act 1967 also sets out the following conduct which, if a person is found guilty thereof, may amount to an offence:
A default judgment may be obtained where a defendant fails to enter a notice of intention to contest or not contest the claim, or fails to file a defence within the stipulated timelines.
In cases where it is clear that the defence is wholly unmeritorious, the claimant may seek summary judgment without trial. Generally, summary judgment is argued on affidavit evidence and granted where there are no triable issues.
The Legal Profession (Professional Conduct) Rules 2015 provide that a legal practitioner must not draft any originating process, pleadings, affidavit, witness statement or notice or grounds of appeal containing any allegations of fraud unless the legal practitioner has clear instructions to make such an allegation and has before the legal practitioner reasonably credible material which establishes a prima facie case of fraud (Rule 9(2)(h)(iii)).
In terms of the standard of proof for a fraud claim, the burden remains the same as in other civil cases – that is, the civil standard (ie, on the balance of probabilities). However, the Singapore courts have observed that the more serious the allegation (as in a fraud claim), the stronger or more cogent the evidence required for the claimant to discharge their burden.
The Singapore courts have taken a pragmatic approach and have allowed claims to be brought against unknown fraudsters. In a recent Singapore High Court decision, CLM v CLN [2022] 5 SLR 273; [2022] SGHC 46, it was held for the first time in Singapore that the Singapore court has jurisdiction to grant interim orders against unknown persons where the description of the unknown persons is sufficiently certain as to identify those who are included and those who are not.
A party can apply to the court to issue an order for a witness to attend court to testify, or an order to produce documents. In determining whether to grant the order, the court considers whether the witnesses are in a position to give oral and/or documentary evidence relevant to the issues raised in the case.
An order to attend court or an order to produce documents should not be used to fish for evidence, or to embarrass or inconvenience the witness. Such an application is governed by the Rules of Court 2021. An order to attend court or to produce documents must be served personally within the timeframe stipulated in the Rules of Court 2021. If a witness disobeys an order to attend court or an order to produce documents, the court has jurisdiction to enforce the order by committal.
A company can be made liable for the acts of its directors and officers through the doctrine of attribution. Under this doctrine, the company and its officers are still treated as distinct legal entities, but the acts and the states of mind of the officers are treated as those of the company. There are three types of rules of attribution.
Firstly, there are primary rules of attribution found in the company’s constitution or implied by company law, which deem certain acts of certain natural persons to be the acts of the company. For instance, if the board of directors of a company is aware of acts committed by its employees or agents, knowledge of those acts could be attributed to the company.
Secondly, there are general rules of attribution by which a natural person may have the acts of another attributed to them (ie, the principles of agency) and by which a natural person may be held liable for the acts of another, such as the principles of estoppel, ostensible authority and vicarious liability.
Thirdly, there are special rules of attribution under which, although the primary and general rules of attribution are not applicable, the courts find that a substantive rule of law applies to the company. This would depend on the interpretation or construction of the relevant rule by which the person’s act or state of mind was, for the purpose of the rule, to be attributed to the company.
In particular, the special rules of attribution operate differently depending on the factual matrix. In the case of fraud, the courts have held that, while a company may be bound by the improper acts of its directors at the suit of an innocent third party, that rule of attribution should not apply where the company itself is bringing a claim against the directors for their breach of duty.
In certain exceptional circumstances, courts can look beyond a company’s separate legal personality and to those who stand behind it, ie, shareholders. This is typically referred to as “lifting the corporate veil”.
One scenario in which the corporate veil can be lifted is when the relevant person uses the company as an instrument of fraud. A person who commits a wrongdoing through a company they control cannot evade responsibility by claiming that only the company and not themselves, should be held liable for the misconduct.
The corporate veil can also be lifted where the company is simply an alter ego of the fraudster – ie, where there is no distinction between the company and the fraudster and the company is simply carrying on the business of its controller.
The general rule is that the proper claimant to bring a claim against fraudulent directors is the company itself. Shareholders are typically not allowed to sue on the company’s behalf, but can request the company’s board of directors to take action. The shareholders of the company may also attempt to oust the fraudulent directors by way of a shareholders’ resolution and then have the company bring claims against them.
However, where the wrongdoers are themselves in control of the company and do not allow an action to be brought in the company’s name, the minority shareholders may consider seeking leave from the court to pursue a derivative action under either common law or statute.
Specifically, under Section 216A of the Companies Act 1967, the shareholder may apply to the court for leave to bring an action in the company’s name. The court would need to be satisfied that:
Under the common law derivative action, the action against the fraudulent director is brought in the shareholder’s name. There are two requirements that need to be satisfied before the court may grant leave to start a derivative action, namely:
The idea of “fraud on the minority” is a term of art here and is different from actual fraud under common law. It includes, for example, situations in which a director misappropriates the company’s funds or opportunities, or receives bribes or benefits at the company’s expense.
Bringing a claim against overseas parties requires establishing that the Singapore court:
Whether the Singapore courts assume extraterritorial jurisdiction will depend on the nature of the issue at hand. The Singapore Court of Appeal has held that the Singapore courts do not have jurisdiction to adjudicate on matters concerning immovable property located outside Singapore. In a separate case, it was held that the Singapore courts can order a foreign individual to be subject to examination in judgment-debtor proceedings if the foreign individual is so closely connected to the substantive claim that the Singapore court is justified in exercising jurisdiction over them.
Pursuant to the Rules of Court 2021, to establish that the Singapore court has jurisdiction over the overseas parties or is the appropriate court to hear the action, the claimant needs to show that (Order 8 Rule 1(2)):
Specifically, under paragraph 63(3) of the Supreme Court Practice Directions 2021, the claimant should refer to any of the non-exhaustive list of factors to show that there is a good arguable case that there is sufficient nexus to Singapore.
As for the forum conveniens requirement, the claimant may refer to a non-exhaustive list of common law factors (the Spiliada factors) to show that Singapore is the proper forum for the trial of the claim. Some of the factors include:
The court’s approval is not required if service outside Singapore is permitted under the parties’ contract (Order 8 Rule 1(3)).
In the event that the court’s approval is granted and the claimant is faced with a difficult defendant, the claimant may apply for substituted service (paragraph 65 of the Supreme Court Practice Directions 2021). To do so, two reasonable attempts must first be made at personal service (paragraph 65(2)). Modes of substituted service include AR registered post or electronic means such as email or internet transmission (paragraph 65(3)).
After a judgment is issued, the recovery of lost assets may still be frustrated, as the fraudster may take steps to make enforcement of the judgment difficult. For instance, the fraudster may seek to conceal or dissipate their assets or simply refuse to comply with the judgment order. There are various court remedies available to locate, preserve and procure the assets of the fraudster.
Examination of Enforcement Respondent
Armed with a court judgment, the claimant may apply under Order 22 Rule 11 of the Rules of Court 2021 for an order for the examination of the enforcement respondent against the fraudster. The fraudster would then be compelled to attend court to answer questions relating to their existing property, or property which will become available to them. The fraudster may also be compelled to produce any books or documents in their possession which are relevant to their assets.
Preservation of Assets
Freezing orders, as explained in 1.7 Prevention of Defendants Dissipating or Secreting Assets, are also available as remedies to preserve the fraudster’s assets post-judgment, pending execution. Given that a judgment has already been obtained, an application for a post-judgment freezing order requires only that there are grounds for believing that the debtor intends to dispose of their assets to avoid execution.
Enforcement Orders
Where it is known that properties belonging to the fraudster exist within the jurisdiction, an enforcement order may be issued under Order 22 Rule 2 of the Rules of Court 2021 for the properties to be seized by a public official and sold. The proceeds of the sale will then be paid to the company to satisfy the judgment debt.
Where it is known that the fraudster owes debts to other persons, an enforcement order may also be issued to the other person to pay the debt amount to the claimant, up to the value of the judgment amount. The most common targets of such orders are banks in which fraudsters have deposited money.
Contempt Orders
As a measure of last resort, an application for a committal order may be taken out against the fraudster under Order 23 Rule 2 of the Rules of Court 2021. This entails the threat of criminal sanctions against the fraudster to compel compliance with the judgment issued.
After the repeal of the Reciprocal Enforcement of Commonwealth Judgments Act 1921 on 1 March 2023, there are generally three processes by which foreign judgments may be enforced in Singapore.
Common Law Regime
First, a party that has obtained a foreign judgment may seek to enforce it under the common law. There are several requirements to be satisfied before foreign judgments may be enforced in Singapore. For instance, the foreign judgment must be a fresh money judgment. This means that the foreign judgment to be enforced must be for a definite sum of money; it cannot be a judgment requiring a defendant to perform a specific act.
Another requirement is that the foreign judgment must be final and conclusive. This means that the foreign judgment to be enforced must be one that cannot be varied, reopened or set aside by the foreign court that delivered it. To commence enforcement under the common law regime, a claimant must commence a fresh civil claim in the Singapore courts to enforce the foreign money judgment as a debt against a defendant. A defendant may resist enforcement by arguing, amongst other things, that the foreign judgment was procured by fraud, obtained contrary to natural justice or that enforcement would be contrary to public policy.
Choice of Court Agreements Act 2016
Second, a foreign judgment may be enforced under the regime of the Choice of Court Agreements Act 2016 (CCAA), which gives effect to the Hague Convention on Choice of Court Agreements (the “Hague Convention”). Under the CCAA regime, a foreign judgment from a court of a state party to the Hague Convention may be enforced in Singapore, subject to the requirements and exceptions set out in the CCAA. The broad stages are as follows.
Reciprocal Enforcement of Foreign Judgments Act 1959
Third, foreign judgments may be enforced pursuant to the Reciprocal Enforcement of Foreign Judgments Act 1959 (REFJA). Currently, only judgments from Hong Kong, Brunei Darussalam, Australia, India, Malaysia, New Zealand, Pakistan, Papua New Guinea, Sri Lanka and the UK could be registered under the REFJA. The broad stages of registering a foreign judgment under the REFJA regime are as follows.
The right to silence can be invoked when a person is asked to provide information that may incriminate them. However, the fact that the answer or the document to be provided will expose the person to civil liability is generally insufficient to attract the privilege.
The right is therefore more commonly applied in criminal proceedings. In Singapore, the right to self-incrimination is not a constitutional right under the principles of natural justice. When summoned for an investigation, a person must state what they know about the facts and circumstances of the case, except that they are not required to disclose anything which they think might expose them to a criminal charge, such as admitting or suggesting that they committed a crime.
At the same time, the court has the power under Section 116(g) of the Evidence Act 1893 to presume that evidence which could be and is not produced would, if produced, be unfavourable to the person who withholds it. As a result, courts have drawn adverse inferences against a party who fails to produce documents or call crucial witnesses to testify at trial, both in civil and criminal proceedings.
For the court to draw an adverse inference, there are two main requirements that need to be satisfied:
Note that, in criminal proceedings, Section 261 of the Criminal Procedure Code 2010 expressly provides the Singapore courts with the power to draw an adverse inference from the silence of the accused for failing to mention any fact that they subsequently rely on in their defence which the accused could reasonably have been expected to mention when questioned, charged or informed of their offence.
While communications between a lawyer and a client attract legal advice privilege or litigation privilege, such communications can be stripped of their privileged status on the basis of a “fraud exception”.
In particular, Section 128(2) of the Evidence Act 1893 expressly provides that legal advice privilege will not apply to “any communication made in furtherance of any illegal purpose” or to “any fact observed by any advocate or solicitor in the course of his [or her] employment as such showing that any crime or fraud has been committed since the commencement of his [or her] employment”. The Singapore courts have held that litigation privilege is also subject to the same fraud exception.
The party seeking to lift privilege must at least show some prima facie evidence that the privileged communications were made as part of an ongoing fraud. When determining whether the “fraud exception” applies, the court will conduct a balancing exercise between the protection of privilege and the importance of preventing the commission of such fraudulent and/or criminal acts.
Generally, the Singapore courts have not been willing to award punitive damages in contract law, as the purpose of damages in contract law is to compensate the claimant for their loss, rather than to punish the wrongdoer. Even where fraud is established, the courts are reluctant to:
Punitive damages may, however, be awarded for claims in tort, where the totality of the defendant’s conduct is so outrageous that it warrants punishment, deterrence and condemnation. The courts will also consider whether the defendant has already been punished by criminal law or through the imposition of a disciplinary sanction when deciding whether to award punitive damages. The overarching principle is that the courts will not impose a punitive award when no such award is necessary.
Under Section 47(1) of the Banking Act 1970, the bank is not allowed to disclose customer information to any other persons. However, the Banking Act 1970 also provides exceptions where disclosure is allowed – for instance, where disclosure is necessary to comply with a court order, or to comply with a request made pursuant to written law to furnish information for the purposes of an investigation or prosecution of a suspected offence.
As such, there are recognised exceptions to the banking secrecy laws, such as a Bankers Trust order (see 2.3 Obtaining Disclosure of Documents and Evidence From Third Parties). The customer’s information can also be provided to a police officer or public officer who is duly authorised to carry out the investigation or prosecution.
The Singapore High Court has held that cryptocurrencies are property and, when stolen, can be subject to proprietary injunction. The Court also granted a worldwide freezing injunction against defendants who allegedly stole cryptocurrencies, even though their identities were unknown and disclosure orders against the relevant cryptocurrency exchanges to assist in tracing the stolen assets.
This decision should have implications for cryptocurrency exchanges operating in Singapore as they may now be served with disclosure orders to disclose information relating to user accounts and freezing injunctions to freeze cryptocurrency held in user accounts, notwithstanding any contractual terms between an exchange and its users.
Crypto-assets have also been held to be capable of being held on trust and can constitute debt in some winding-up applications. The Court has also clarified that the situs of crypto assets is the location where they are controlled, as in where the person who controls the private key resides.
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Introduction
Singapore continues to cement its position as a leading centre for cross-border fraud and asset recovery litigation. As a major financial hub with robust rule-of-law institutions, its courts regularly address complex multi-jurisdictional disputes involving asset misappropriation and the increasingly prominent role of digital assets in fraudulent schemes. This write-up surveys the most significant recent judicial developments from 2025 to 2026.
The Mareva Injunction
The Mareva injunction remains the primary tool for preserving assets pending judgment. The requirements for a Mareva injunction are well established:
The precise contours of the “real risk of dissipation” have been significantly refined in recent years.
Continental Shipping Line Pte Ltd v Jonathan John Shipping Ltd [2025] 1 SLR 1191; [2025] SGCA 36 (“Continental Shipping”)
The Court of Appeal’s decision in Continental Shipping is one of the most important recent authorities on Mareva injunctions in Singapore. The case arose from a time charterparty dispute in which the respondent shipowner obtained a worldwide Mareva injunction against the appellant charterer under section 12A of the International Arbitration Act 1994. The appellant applied to set aside the injunction and the Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that no real risk of dissipation had been established.
The Court distinguished between “unjustified” dealings with assets and those for “legitimate commercial reasons” or “in the ordinary course of business,” concluding that the former carried a dissipation risk. The touchstone is the defendant’s “dishonesty or propensity to be untruthful”, demonstrated by “solid evidence” rather than mere speculation. Probative factors include a “pattern of unusual or unexplained movement of funds” and conduct such as “misappropriation of assets or market manipulation”.
The Court identified several indicia of insufficient dissipation risk, namely:
The decision is a reminder that a Mareva injunction is not intended to provide a claimant with security for its claim or to guard against the risk of a defendant’s insolvency. Rather, it is a corrective measure intended to prevent the defendant from abusing the court’s process by deliberately frustrating the enforcement of a prospective judgment or award.
Ser Kang Wei v Salas Porras [2025] SGHC 257 (“Ser Kang Wei”)
The principles in Continental Shipping were considered by the High Court in Ser Kang Wei, a complex cross-border fraud involving an intricate web of transnational entities across multiple jurisdictions, including the UAE, Singapore and Zimbabwe. The claimants alleged that the defendants had perpetrated a fraudulent gold investment scheme, inducing them to transfer USDT to cryptocurrency wallets controlled by the defendants. The scheme involved elaborate representations of lucrative gold-trading opportunities, underpinned by South African and Zimbabwean entities. Upon investigation, these entities turned out to have had no dealings with the defendants’ fund.
The defendants relied on Continental Shipping to argue that the mere ability to move assets does not equate to a real risk of dissipation. However, the Court distinguished the case on its facts, noting that the Court of Appeal had itself observed that the ability to move assets, “when coupled with findings of dishonest conduct on the part of the defendant, can lead to a finding of a real risk of dissipation”. Considering the evidence before it, such as a pattern of companies being “incorporated, restructured and dissolved within a short period of time” for no discernible commercial purpose and the non-disclosure of certain bank accounts and shares, the Court found a real risk of dissipation and maintained the worldwide Mareva injunction, including over cryptocurrency assets.
The case illustrates both the continued willingness of Singapore courts to extend freezing relief to digital assets and the practical reality that cryptocurrency is increasingly the medium through which fraud proceeds are transferred and concealed.
Crypto-Assets
The treatment of cryptocurrency is one of the most dynamic areas of Singapore’s fraud and asset recovery jurisprudence. Given the pseudonymous nature of blockchain transactions and ease of cross-border movement, the ability to assert proprietary rights over cryptocurrency is critical for fraud victims.
The foundations were laid in earlier decisions: in CLM v CLN [2022] 5 SLR 273; [2022] SGHC 46, the High Court granted Singapore’s first worldwide Mareva injunction against “persons unknown” in a cryptocurrency theft case, in ByBit Fintech Ltd v Ho Kai Xin [2023] 5 SLR 1748; [2023] SGHC 199, the Court definitively held that cryptocurrency constitutes a chose in action capable of being held on trust and in Cheong Jun Yoong v Three Arrows Capital [2024] 4 SLR 907; [2024] SGHC 21, the Court established that the situs of a crypto asset is determined by the residence of the person controlling the private key. Building on this framework, the Singapore Courts have, in 2025 and 2026, addressed more granular questions, including the valuation of cryptocurrency for damages assessment and the treatment of digital assets in insolvency.
Kalen, Alexandru v World Exchange Services [2026] SGHC 31 (“Kalen Alexandru”)
The case concerned a representative claim brought on behalf of 85 individuals who held digital tokens and fiat monies on the defendant’s online trading platform. The claimants had previously succeeded in establishing that the defendant breached the applicable user agreement by failing to allow them access to their stored digital tokens and funds. The claimants also succeeded in their claim that the defendant breached the buyback agreement, as it failed to purchase the digital tokens from them.
At the assessment of damages stage, among other issues, the Court was required to determine the appropriate valuation date for the claimants’ losses. The claimants argued that the valuation date should be the trial date, while the defendant contended that it should be the date of breach. The Court held that the correct approach is to assess the valuation date by reference to the time when a claimant is reasonably expected to mitigate their losses. Whether the claimant is reasonably expected to mitigate depends on, among other factors, when the claimant has knowledge of the breach and whether it is possible and reasonable to mitigate. Conceptually, the valuation date may coincide with the date of breach itself if the claimant has knowledge of the breach and it is possible and reasonable to mitigate at that point. On the facts, the Court found that the appropriate valuation date was a reasonable time after the claimants first discovered their inability to control, transfer, or withdraw their digital tokens and funds.
Importantly, the Court rejected the approach adopted in the English authority of Southgate v Graham [2024] EWHC 1692, which suggested that the court was free to fix the valuation date on a date other than the date of breach if the breach-date valuation fails to adequately compensate the claimant. The Court reasoned that such an approach gives the claimant the benefit of perfect hindsight and risks unfairly conferring a windfall. Instead, the formulation adopted in Singapore directly ties the valuation date inquiry to the possibility and reasonableness of the claimant’s mitigation and assumes reasonable rather than best mitigation. As for the valuation method, the Court accepted that the value of cryptocurrency assets could be determined based on real-time prices from established cryptocurrency data websites, which have also been referred to by a number of foreign and Singapore authorities.
These developments demonstrate that Singapore courts will reason from established contractual principles when assessing cryptocurrency damages, rather than treating digital assets as requiring an entirely novel framework.
Re Taylor, Joshua James and another (Official Receiver, non-party) [2025] 4 SLR 1207; [2025] SGHC 104 (“Re Taylor”)
In Re Taylor, the application concerned the distribution of cryptocurrency in the liquidation of Eqonex Capital Ltd, a company that operated a digital asset exchange platform. The central question was whether the cryptocurrencies held by Eqonex Capital were held on trust for its customers.
In analysing the platform’s terms and conditions, the Court concluded that no express, resulting or Quistclose trust had been created over the digital assets. In relation to an express trust, the Court reasoned that although certain clauses referred to digital assets as “custodial assets” held for customers’ benefit, this language did not go so far as to indicate that the assets were held on trust. Rather, the assets could have been held on a pledge or with a level of control less than a proprietary interest. Critically, the terms suggested that legal title to the digital assets was held by the customer, not merely beneficial title and an express exclusion of fiduciary and equitable duties further negated any intention to create a trust.
The Court similarly found no basis for a resulting trust as there was no express trust that had arisen and failed, or a Quistclose trust, as there was no intention for the unclaimed cryptocurrencies to be repaid to customers after the platform’s closure and Eqonex was free to close the account and empty the accompanying digital wallets.
The practical consequence was that the cryptocurrencies were not vested in Eqonex Capital as the legal and beneficial title had remained with the customers. Eqonex Capital was not entitled to the cryptocurrencies, which meant they fell outside the general pool of assets available to the company’s creditors in liquidation.
This decision is of considerable importance for the growing number of fraud and asset recovery cases that intersect with the insolvency of cryptocurrency exchanges. It underscores the need to pay attention to the terms and conditions governing the custody of digital assets on exchange platforms, as the trust language is crucial in determining whether customers’ cryptocurrency assets are protected from creditor claims. Practitioners advising fraud victims who have lost assets through a now-insolvent exchange will need to examine the relevant platform’s terms closely to assess whether a proprietary claim or tracing remedy remains available.
Regulatory Developments: Expanded Licensing Under the Financial Services and Markets Act (FSMA)
Alongside the judicial developments surveyed above, Singapore has also expanded its regulatory framework for digital assets. From June 2025, the Monetary Authority of Singapore (MAS) will require digital token service providers to be licensed under Part 9 of the FSMA. The new provisions apply to individuals and partnerships that carry on a business of providing any type of digital token service outside Singapore or from a place of business in Singapore and to Singapore corporations that carry on a business of providing any type of digital token service outside Singapore, whether from Singapore or elsewhere (Section 138 of the FSMA)
MAS has signalled that it will set a high bar for licensing and will generally not issue licences to digital token service providers whose substantive regulated activities are outside Singapore. The stated rationale is that the money laundering risks associated with such business models are higher and MAS is unable to effectively supervise persons whose operations are substantially conducted abroad.
The introduction of these licensing requirements has two practical implications for fraud and asset recovery. First, the forced wind-down of operations by digital token service providers who are unable to obtain a licence may generate a new wave of litigation regarding breach of contract and the return of customer assets, similar to the issues that arose in the liquidation of Eqonex Capital in Re Taylor. Second, as licensed providers, digital token service providers will be subject to MAS regulatory oversight, which may extend to additional disclosure obligations that could facilitate pre-action discovery applications and other investigative steps by fraud victims in the future.
Conclusion
The recent developments reveal several clear trends.
First, courts are refining the “real risk of dissipation” requirement for obtaining Mareva injunctions, insisting on specific evidence of unjustified dealings rather than generic, speculative factors that may not point to a dissipation risk.
Second, digital asset law has matured rapidly. Cryptocurrency is definitely recognised as a chose in action capable of being held on trust, while situs is determined by the residence of the person controlling the private key. However, the Court still applies established legal principles, even in the face of novel issues relating to cryptocurrency that are on the rise, as seen in:
Regulatory-wise, FSMA licensing will create new compliance challenges and litigation avenues.
These developments confirm Singapore’s continued evolution as a sophisticated jurisdiction for international fraud and asset recovery. When confronted with the novel features of cryptocurrency disputes, however, the courts have reasoned from first principles, applying established doctrines in a principled yet pragmatic manner. Practitioners will need to stay abreast of these rapidly developing principles as traditional fraud remedies, digital asset innovation and expanding regulation continue to generate novel questions of law.
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