International Trade 2026

Last Updated December 16, 2025

Australia

Law and Practice

Authors



Corrs Chambers Westgarth is Australia’s leading independent law firm. It provides exceptional legal services across the full spectrum of matters, including major transactions, projects and significant disputes, offering strategic advice on its clients’ most challenging issues. It is the firm of choice for many of the world’s leading organisations, with its people consistently recognised for providing outstanding client service and delivering exceptional results. Its international trade practice partners with clients to turn geopolitical and supply chain challenges into opportunity. It guides senior leadership and boards on strategic decision-making in a time of accelerating geopolitical change, trade tensions, regulatory reform and supply chain disruption. The firm’s focus is on optimising how goods, services and technologies move across borders. From navigating tariffs and dumping duties, to digital trade, export controls, investment approvals and sanctions, it supports clients with commercially grounded, legally robust strategies aligned to business objectives.

Australia is a party to the Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization dated 15 April 1994 (WTO), which creates the WTO system and binds members to all multilateral agreements.

Australia is also party to the following WTO Agreements concluded after the Marrakesh Agreement:

  • Trade Facilitation Agreement (TFA) 2017; and
  • Agreement on Fisheries Subsidies 2025.

Australia is a party to the following plurilateral WTO Agreements:

  • Government Procurement Agreement (GPA), which Australia acceded to in 2019; and
  • Information Technology Agreement (ITA) 1996 and the Information Technology Agreement – Expansion (ITA-II, 2015), of which Australia is a participant and has bound expanded commitments in its WTO schedule, with phase-out of tariffs on the expanded list completed by 1 July 2021.

Australia has ratified the following free trade agreements:

  • Australia–New Zealand Closer Economic Relations Trade Agreement (ANZCERTA) 1983;
  • Singapore–Australia FTA (SAFTA) 2003;
  • Australia–USA FTA (AUSFTA) 2005;
  • Thailand–Australia FTA (TAFTA) 2005;
  • Australia–Chile FTA (ACLFTA) 2009;
  • ASEAN–Australia–New Zealand FTA (AANZFTA) 2010;
  • Malaysia–Australia FTA (MAFTA) 2013;
  • Korea–Australia FTA (KAFTA) 2014;
  • Japan–Australia Economic Partnership Agreement (JAEPA) 2015;
  • China–Australia FTA (ChAFTA) 2015;
  • Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) – not in force;
  • Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans–Pacific Partnership (CPTPP) 2018;
  • Australia–Hong Kong FTA (A-HKFTA) and Associated Investment Agreement (IA) 2018;
  • Peru–Australia FTA (PAFTA) 2020;
  • Indonesia–Australia Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement (IA-CEPA) 2020;
  • Pacific Agreement on Closer Economic Relations Plus (PACER Plus) 2020;
  • Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement (RCEP) for Brunei Darussalam, Cambodia, China, Japan, Laos, New Zealand, Singapore, Thailand, Vietnam, Republic of Korea and Malaysia 2022; for Indonesia and the Philippines 2023;
  • Australia–India Economic Cooperation and Trade Agreement (ECTA) 2022;
  • Australia–United Kingdom FTA (A-UKFTA) 2023; and
  • Australia-UAE Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement (CEPA) 2025.

Australia is also a member of the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework for Prosperity (IPEF), a United States-led initiative designed to strengthen co-operation across four pillars: trade (including digital trade), supply chains, clean economy (energy), and fair economy (tax and anti-corruption). In late 2024, Australia ratified the IPEF Supply Chain Agreement and commenced domestic treaty-making processes for ratification of the IPEF Clean Economy Agreement. Negotiations on the IPEF Trade Agreement remain ongoing.

Australia operates a Generalised System of Preferences (GSP), under which eligible developing-country exporters receive concessional entry into the Australian market. Australia also extends targeted economic assistance to countries in the region and to those facing particular hardship. This includes:

  • simplified rules of origin and duty-free, quota-free access for least-developed countries;
  • long-standing duty-free or reduced-duty access for Pacific Islands Forum members under the South Pacific Regional Trade and Economic Cooperation Agreement (SPARTECA); and
  • a temporary zero-duty preferential rate for Ukrainian imports.

Australia is currently negotiating the following FTAs:

  • Australia–European Union FTA (A-EUFTA); and
  • Australia–India Comprehensive Economic Cooperation Agreement (CECA), which aims to enhance bilateral trade and economic ties, building on the Economic Cooperation and Trade Agreement (ECTA) signed in 2022.

In 2025, Australia signed and ratified the Australia-UAE Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement (CEPA). The Second Protocol to Amend the Agreement Establishing the Australia New Zealand Free Trade Agreement (AANZFTA) entered into force on 21 April 2025. It introduces three new chapters to the Agreement: Micro-Small-and-Medium Enterprises, Government Procurement, and Trade and Sustainable Development.

The Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade is currently undertaking a comprehensive modernisation review of Australia’s Free Trade Agreements with Southeast Asia. Public submissions to inform the review will close on 31 December 2025. The Department is also undertaking a general review of the China–Australia Free Trade Agreement; public submissions for that review close on 31 March 2026.

Customs matters in Australia are governed primarily by a framework of federal legislation and regulations administered by the Australian Border Force (ABF) under the Department of Home Affairs.

The principal statute guiding this framework is the Customs Act 1901 (Cth) (the “Customs Act”), which provides the legal basis for:

  • the control of goods imported into or exported from Australia;
  • the collection of customs duties and other charges;
  • the licensing of customs brokers, depots and warehouses; and
  • enforcement powers available to the ABF, including inspections, seizures and penalties for non-compliance.

All goods entering or leaving Australia are subject to customs control under the Customs Act.

There are various rules and regulations published under the Customs Act. Other key pieces of legislation include:

  • the Australian Border Force Act 2015 (Cth) – which establishes the ABF and sets out its mandates and functions; and
  • the Customs Tariff Act 1995 (Cth) – which sets tariff classifications and duty rates.

The ABF is the main body responsible for the administration and enforcement of Australia’s customs laws. It operates under the Department of Home Affairs, and its responsibilities extend beyond customs administration to also include Australia’s national security and border protection, immigration control and maritime security.

Some more serious breaches of Australian customs laws may result in criminal prosecution and would be referred to the Australian Federal Police (AFP) and the Office of the Commonwealth Director of Public Prosecutions (CDPP).

Unlike the EU and the US, Australia does not have legislation that provides an express mechanism for importers and exporters to challenge trade barriers imposed by other countries that they allege as being in violation of international trade rules, and for their governments to employ unilateral trade concessions in response.  Australia has not legislated any equivalent investigative processes, or retaliatory powers to respond to trade sanctions in other jurisdictions.  Australia addresses trade disputes through the multilateral WTO system, or otherwise via the dispute resolution provisions included within in its various free trade agreements with individual nations. 

Australia does not employ an express procedure for aggrieved importers and exporters to raise complaints in an equivalent manner to the EU’s Trade Barrier Regulation. However, they are encouraged to report alleged cases of non-tariff trade barriers to the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade.

Developments to Australian customs measures in 2025 have largely focused on streamlining and digitising procedures. 

There are currently no pending amendments to legislation underpinning Australia’s customs framework.

Australia enforces two sanctions frameworks: United Nations Security Council (UNSC) sanctions and an autonomous Australian sanctions regime (the “Australian sanctions law”).

UNSC sanctions are imposed by Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter and are enforced in Australia under the Charter of the United Nations Act 1945 (Cth) in compliance with Australia’s international law obligations.

Australian autonomous sanctions are imposed and enforced by the Australian government as part of its foreign policy and implemented under the Autonomous Sanctions Act 2011 (Cth) (the “Sanctions Act”) and the Autonomous Sanctions Regulations 2011 (Cth) (the “Sanctions Regulations”). Under the autonomous sanctions regime, Australia also imposes thematic (Magnitsky-style) sanctions against human rights breaches, corruption or cyber-crime.

Sanctions measures imposed under both the UNSC and Australian frameworks typically fall into two categories, being:

  • targeted financial sanctions against individuals and entities; or
  • restrictions on goods, services or commercial activities.

Targeted financial sanctions apply to designated persons or entities and involve freezing assets such that no benefit flows to the designated person or entity. Designated persons and entities are specified on the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT) Consolidated List. Targeted financial sanctions can also include banning travel to, from, or through Australia.

Restrictions on goods, services and commercial activities prohibit the import and export of specific goods, the provision of specific services, and engagement in defined commercial activities to, from, or for the benefit of sanctioned countries and territories.

Section 10 of the Sanctions Act empowers the Governor-General to make autonomous sanctions regulations, acting on the advice of the Federal Executive Council and subject to the Minister’s satisfaction criteria, which are set out in that section. Although the Governor-General is the formal maker of the regulations, this function is exercised on ministerial advice and is not discretionary. In practice, the substantive policy development, drafting, administration and implementation of autonomous sanctions is undertaken by the Minister of Foreign Affairs and the DFAT, through the Australian Sanctions Office (ASO). 

The administration and regulation of Australia’s sanctions regimes is the responsibility of the ASO, which exists within DFAT. Enforcement of Australian sanctions laws falls under the remit of the ASO in collaboration with the ABF and the Australian Federal Police (AFP).

Enforcement of sanctions law is handled in the first instance by the ABF and AFP who are responsible for stopping exports to or from sanctioned countries. 

The Department of Home Affairs is responsible for implementing all visa restrictions in respect of travel bans listed under Australian sanctions laws.

From 31 March 2026, AUSTRAC, Australia’s AML/CTF authority, will also have limited enforcement powers over compliance with Australian financial sanctions.

Under the Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth) (the “Criminal Code”), any entity or person found to have engaged in “conduct” that constitutes a contravention of the Australian sanctions laws will have committed an offence if the conduct occurs: partially or wholly in Australia, wholly outside of Australia but leading to a result that occurs partially or wholly in Australia, or wholly outside Australia but by an Australian citizen or company incorporated under Australian law.

Under the UN sanctions regime, “conduct” is assessed by reference to the specific measures required under the applicable UNSC resolution as implemented in Australian law.

The ASO keeps a Consolidated List of designated persons, entities and vessels that are subject to sanctions under Australian sanctions laws. The list is publicly accessible on the DFAT website.

Persons, entities and vessels are added to the Consolidated List when the Minister for Foreign Affairs designates them under Australia’s autonomous framework, or by Australia implementing UNSC designations.

Australia does not maintain comprehensive sanctions or embargoes against countries or regions.

Australia does not maintain other types of sanctions.

Australia does not apply secondary sanctions. Australian sanctions laws only apply where there is an Australian nexus, such as conduct occurring in Australia or conduct overseas by Australian citizens or Australian-incorporated entities.

Pursuant to the Sanctions Act in conjunction with the Criminal Code, the contravention of Australian sanctions laws is considered a serious criminal offence.

An individual found to have contravened Australian sanctions laws may be subject to up to ten years’ imprisonment, and/or a fine of 2,500 penalty units (AUD825,000 as of 7 November 2024) or three times the value of the transaction.

Bodies corporate found to have contravened Australian sanctions laws are subject to a fine of 10,000 penalty units (AUD3.3 million as of 7 November 2024) or three times the value of the transaction.

The Minister for Foreign Affairs or their delegate may issue sanctions permits to authorise activities that would otherwise contravene Australian sanctions laws. Applications for sanctions permits are made online via DFAT’s Pax Portal. To issue a permit under the autonomous sanctions framework, the Minister must be satisfied that granting the permit is “in the national interest”.

UN sanctions frameworks generally permit a narrower range of authorised activities, and in some cases require notification to or approval from the UN Security Council.

The ASO emphasises that permits should be used only where a clear and specific risk of contravention exists. Broader or uncertain sanctions risks should instead be managed through proactive compliance measures, reasonable precautions and due diligence. Permit applications must provide sufficient detail of the precise conduct requiring authorisation to enable proper assessment.

Sanctions offences attract strict liability, meaning that it is not necessary to satisfy a fault element (like intent, knowledge, recklessness or negligence) to prove a contravention of Australian sanctions laws. 

However, a body corporate will not be found to have contravened Australian sanctions laws if it demonstrates that it took reasonable precautions and exercised due diligence to avoid the contravention. The legislation and existing guidance do not prescribe a specific level of due diligence, nor do they define what constitutes “reasonable precautions”. However, ASO guidance makes clear that the level of reasonable precautions and due diligence required to rely on the defence will depend on an entity’s size, industry, risk profile and overall sophistication.

The defence is not available to individuals who are found to have contravened Australian sanctions laws.

Australia does not impose general sanctions-related reporting or blocking requirements. Under Australian sanctions laws, entities that freeze assets must report those assets to the AFP.

Regulated entities may have separate reporting duties under the Anti-Money Laundering and Counter-Terrorism Financing Act 2006 (Cth) to report suspicious matters and matters that would assist in the investigation or prosecution of an offence, which can capture sanctions-related activity. While voluntary disclosure to DFAT is encouraged where a potential breach is identified, Australian sanctions laws themselves do not impose a mandatory reporting obligation.

Australia does not have a blocking statute or anti-boycott law that prohibits compliance with another country’s sanctions (such as US or EU sanctions). Australian law does not penalise companies for choosing to comply with foreign sanctions regimes, even where those regimes go beyond Australia’s own designations. Australian entities must, however, ensure that foreign sanctions compliance does not itself breach Australian law. Businesses may therefore choose to apply international sanctions standards globally as part of risk management, provided this does not contravene other domestic laws.

There have been a number of key judicial developments in respect of Australian sanctions laws. The Full Federal Court’s dismissal of Alumina and Bauxite Company Ltd’s (ABC) appeal in Alumina and Bauxite Company Ltd v Queensland Alumina Ltd [2024] FCAFC 124 (ABC v QAL) entrenched a broad construction of sanctions laws, increasing compliance complexity and uncertainty for regulated entities. In March 2025, the High Court refused ABC’s application for special leave to appeal the Full Federal Court’s decision.

The ASO has also released new guidance and advisory notes in relation to sanctions laws compliance. Advisory notices have highlighted emerging risks, particularly Russian sanctions-evasion typologies and high-priority goods procurement. The ASO has overhauled the Consolidated List to include stronger alias identification, and the addition of new designated vessels to improve data-matching and compliance clarity.

Enforcement expectations have also increased. The ASO’s compliance policy signals a more assertive approach, backed by enhanced funding, active AFP investigations, and Senate recommendations urging Australia to align its enforcement posture with international partners and close sanctions evasion loopholes.

Over the coming year, Australia’s sanctions landscape will continue to shift rapidly. The key issue remains the regulatory uncertainty created by ABC v QAL.

At the same time, sanctions are expanding in scope. Australia is now actively using its cyber-sanctions regime and is likely to make greater use of its thematic (Magnitsky-style) sanctions for corruption and human rights abuses. Advisory notes highlight growing risks relating to cyber-enabled evasion, digital assets and high-priority procurement items linked to Russia and other sanctioned jurisdictions.

Australia is also partway through a broader review of its autonomous sanctions framework, following public consultation and recent senate recommendations, with potential legislative reforms expected ahead of the 2027 sunset of the current regulations.

Key Legislation

Australia’s export control laws and regulations create a framework which governs the export of military and dual-use goods, technology and services nationally. Key legislation includes the following.

  • The Defence Trade Controls Act 2012 (Cth) (DTCA), which regulates the export of intangible controlled technology, the re-export and brokering of controlled goods and technology and the provision of controlled defence-related services outside of Australia.
  • The Customs Act 1901 (Cth) (Customs Act) and the Customs (Prohibited Exports) Regulations 1958 (Prohibited Exports Regulations), which regulate the physical export of controlled goods.
  • The Defence and Strategic Goods List 2024 (DSGL), established under the Customs Act, which sets out a list of controlled goods and technologies (known as “DSGL Goods and Technology”).  The DSGL is split into the following categories:
    1. munitions (both military and lethal non-military); and
    2. ten categories of dual-use goods, technologies and software.

The DSGL reflects the four major multilateral control regimes of which Australia is a member (ie, the Nuclear Suppliers Group, the Australia Group, the Missile Technology Control Regime, and the Wassenaar Arrangement) and extends beyond goods with military purposes to commercial goods that could also serve military purposes.

Permits for Controlled Goods and Technology

Under Australia’s framework, unless an exception applies, a permit is required to:

  • export tangible DSGL goods from Australia;
  • export intangible DSGL technology from Australia to a person outside Australia (including by providing a person located overseas with access to controlled technology). The export of intangible technology is referred to as a “supply” for the purposes of the DTCA;
  • supply controlled technology to a non-exempt “foreign person” located in Australia. This type of export is commonly referred to as a “deemed export”;
  • re-supply certain controlled goods and technology from a location outside Australia to another location outside Australia (where the technology was originally exported from Australia).  This type of export is commonly referred to as a “re-export”;
  • provide controlled services (eg, relating to the design, development and operation of controlled military goods) to a foreign person outside of Australia;
  • publish DSGL military technology; and
  • broker DSGL military goods and technology as an intermediary between individuals outside Australia for the supply of controlled military goods and technology.

Before a permit is issued under the DTCA or the Customs Act, the Minister for Defence through the Commonwealth Regulator Defence Export Controls (DEC), will consider legislative criteria to determine the risk associated with the export and whether the export would prejudice Australia’s security, defence or intentional relations.

A Catch-All Approach for Non-DSGL Listed Goods and Technologies

In addition to the above laws, there are “catch-all” requirements which may result in the control of other goods and technology being exported. 

There are also restrictions on the export of certain goods and technology to individuals, groups or entities subject to Australian sanctions (as discussed in 3. Sanctions).

As described in 4.1 Export Controls, the primary legislative and regulatory authorities are:

  • the Defence Trade Controls Act 2012 (Cth);
  • the Customs Act 1901 (Cth) and the Customs (Prohibited Exports) Regulations 1958 (Cth); and
  • the Defence and Strategic Goods List 2024 (Cth).

These key authorities are supported by a range of subordinate legislation.

Defence Export Controls (DEC), operating within the Department of Defence, is the Commonwealth regulator responsible for administering Australia’s export controls framework and the transfer of defence-related goods, technology and services within and outside Australia. DEC supports entities from the public and private sector and private individuals to meet their Australian export control law obligations, considers and issues permit applications to export, supply, publish, or broker military and dual-use goods and technology listed on the DSGL, and prohibits the export, supply or provision of goods, technology or services that may be used for, or to assist, a WMD programme.

In addition to DEC, the Australian Border Force, the Australian Federal Police, and customs officers are also involved in the administration and enforcement of Australia’s export controls. Exporters must comply with requirements from the Australian Border Force at the border and the Australian Sanctions Office in relation to sanction regimes; with sanctions administered by the DFAT.

See 4.1 Export Controls in relation to the items that are subject to Australia’s export controls.

Australia’s export control framework applies to a broad range of persons and entities who may export, supply, publish, broker or provide certain services in relation to controlled goods, software and technology, including:

  • Australian citizens or permanent residents;
  • body corporates incorporated in Australia or carrying on business in Australia;
  • Australian citizens and permanent residents located outside of Australia; and
  • foreign persons or entities located both in Australia and overseas.

While there is no list of restricted persons designed solely for the purpose of export controls, the Australian Sanctions Office maintains and regularly updates a Consolidated List which includes individuals, entities and vessels subject to Australian sanctions (see 3.5 List of Sanctioned Persons).

As described in 4.1 Export Controls, the DSGL sets out a list of controlled military and dual-use goods, software and technologies.

The DSGL also specifies that certain dual-use goods and technology are “Sensitive” or “Very Sensitive”.

Goods and technologies on the “Sensitive” or “Very Sensitive” lists are subject to additional regulatory obligations, and the DEC will generally undertake a more detailed permit assessment where an export involves these items. 

Items are added to the lists through legislative instruments that amend the DSGL, typically following international regime updates or emerging technology assessments.

As described in 4.1 Export Controls, there are other laws which can impose export controls, including the following.

  • Under Section 112BA of the Customs Act, the Defence Minister may prohibit the export of non-DSGL goods if the goods would or may be for a military end-use prejudicial to Australia’s security, defence or international relations.
  • The WMD Act permits prohibitions on exporting otherwise non-regulated/non-DSGL goods, technology or services that could contribute to a WMD programme, and creates an offence for such conduct without a permit.
  • UN and Australian autonomous sanctions can restrict or prohibit exports of arms and related materials.
  • In addition to restricting the export of tangible DSGL-listed military and dual-use goods, the Prohibited Export Regulations also prohibits or restricts the export of a number of other items, including certain chemicals, drugs and drug precursors, human substances, cat and dog fur, and radioactive waste.

Non-compliance under Australia’s export control framework can lead to significant penalties.

DTCA Penalties

A range of specified penalties apply under the DTCA for breaches of export control provisions. Many of the DTCA provisions controlling exports carry significant criminal penalties of up to ten years of imprisonment, penalties of AUD825,000 for individuals and AUD4,125,000 for body corporates, or both.

Penalty units of AUD4,125,000 for individuals and AUD20,625,000 for body corporates apply to the offence of failing to comply with a Ministerial notice following suspension or cancellation of an approval.

A variety of penalties also apply to breaches of permit and approval conditions, and information-gathering and record-keeping offences.

Additionally, the Federal Court of Australia may grant injunctions to restrain persons from engaging in DTCA offences, and if a person attempts to supply goods in contravention of the DTCA, the goods are forfeited to the Commonwealth.

Customs Act and Prohibited Export Regulations Penalties

Under the Customs Act, similar penalties apply to serious offences, such as intentionally exporting certain prohibited goods.

Other offences, such as smuggling and unlawful importation or exportation offences, depend on factors such as whether the court can determine the amount of duty payable on the smuggled goods or the value of the goods. Where determinable, the penalty is up to five times the amount of that duty or three times the value of the goods (respectively).

Additionally, the Act includes forfeiture, seizure and disposal provisions, as well as an infringement notice scheme whereby the ABF may issue notice penalties if there are reasonable grounds to believe that the person has committed a prescribed offence.

WMD Act Penalties

The WMD Act establishes three primary offences (supplying goods, exporting goods and providing services for the WMD programme) which each carry the same maximum penalty on conviction of eight years of imprisonment. Similarly, a person who supplies or exports goods or provides services to knowingly contravene a Ministerial notice faces imprisonment for eight years.

In addition, the Federal Court of Australia may grant injunctions, and the Act includes forfeiture, seizure and destruction provisions.

A person or entity may apply to DEC for a permit for the export or supply of controlled goods and technology. A permit holder must comply with any conditions listed on the permit.

Recent amendments to the DTCA have also established licence-free environments (in effect from 1 September 2024) which waive requirements for most military and dual-use goods and technology transferred between Australia, the United Kingdom and the United States (AUKUS). 

To use the licence-free environment to export or supply DSGL goods and technology from Australia without a permit, five criteria must be satisfied:

  • the supply must be to an Australian/UK/US citizen or permanent resident, corporation or government/government authority;
  • the supply must be to, or the services received, somewhere in Australia/UK/US;
  • the DSGL goods/technology must not be on the Excluded Goods & Technologies List or Australian Military Sales Program;
  • the exporter/supplier must be registered as an AUKUS authorised user; and
  • defence must have been notified of the export/supply before the activity occurs.

DEC maintains rigorous compliance standards for export control obligations and expects that exporters will implement robust internal compliance frameworks.

DEC generally treats repeated or severe cases of non-compliance more seriously than isolated or unintentional incidents and can refer severe or repeated cases of non-compliance to enforcement agencies for investigations, inspections and punitive action.

DEC does however take a proportionate approach to compliance that considers behavioural components such as whether non-compliance was deliberate, opportunistic or inadvertent, and contextual factors such as the seriousness of a contravention, to determine a proportionate response based on an assessment of the risk of harm. Non-compliance outcomes can range from criminal prosecution or penalties, to a letter of education or warning.

DEC provides in-person and virtual outreach programmes and online training with practical information to help inform and educate stakeholders on how to meet their obligations under Australia’s export control laws, raise awareness, and provide guidance to support compliance.

Australia’s export controls framework requires comprehensive record-keeping for permit holders and certain other exporters. Records must be retained for five years from the date of export, or provision of services, with failure to retain or produce records constituting an offence under the DTCA.

DEC expects that individuals and entities will self-report possible compliance breaches as soon as they are identified so that DEC can assist individuals and entities to rectify the breach and improve compliance measures or enforce proportionate penalties.

Additionally, pre-notification must be given (and records kept) when using the AUKUS exemption for exports.

On 1 March 2025, the compliance transition period for the three new offences introduced in 2024 under the Defence Trade Controls Amendment Act 2024 (Cth) (and the supporting Defence Trade Legislation Amendment Regulations 2024) ended, and the criminal penalty provisions took effect. Exporters must now ensure their compliance with the 2024 amendments.

The following three new criminal offences apply for engaging in certain conduct without a permit unless an exemption applies:

  • supplying controlled technology to a non-exempt “foreign person” located in Australia;
  • re-supplying certain controlled goods and technology from a location outside Australia to another location outside Australia (where the technology was originally exported from Australia); and
  • providing controlled services relating controlled military goods to a non-exempt foreign person outside of Australia. 

Following the commencement of the new provisions under the DTCA and the end of the compliance transition period referred to in 4.12 Key Developments Regarding Exports, the next 12 months may see increased regulatory activity.

The expanded compliance obligations in line with Australia’s national security intentions will likely necessitate increased awareness and training and updated internal export controls policies and practices.

The Anti-Dumping Commission (ADC) is the government body which sits at the apex of the trade remedies system in Australia. Its investigative work underpins the imposition of anti-dumping (AD) and countervailing duties (CVD). The ADC performs AD/CVD investigations pursuant to Part XVB of the Customs Act 1901 (Cth), and the Customs (International Obligations) Regulation 2015 (Cth). The ADC is led by the Commissioner of the Anti-Dumping Commission. The current Commissioner was appointed on a five-year term from 13 January 2025.

Based on the ADC’s findings, the Commissioner may recommend the imposition of AD/CVD to the responsible Minister, which is currently the Minister for Industry and Innovation. The Minister is empowered to impose AD/CVD under the Customs Tariff (Anti-Dumping) Act 1975 (Cth). In addition to AD/CVD investigations, safeguard investigations can be initiated by a formal request from the Australian Treasurer. In terms of frequency, safeguard investigations are less common and are ad hoc. The last safeguard investigation was conducted by the Productivity Commission in 2013.

Moving forward, the Australian Government has announced that responsibility for safeguard investigations will transfer from the Productivity Commission to the ADC (refer to 5.12 Key Developments Regarding AD/CVD Measures). This will make the ADC the sole, specialist government agency with responsibility for all trade remedies in Australia.

The ADC also conducts anti-circumvention inquiries, which are initiated upon application from persons representing an Australian industry, or portion of an industry. The scope of circumvention activities considered is broad and includes where relevant goods do not attract the intended AD/CVD, or where even if a duty is paid, this does not have the effect of removing a material injury caused. Additionally, the Minister has the power to request that the ADC conduct anti-circumvention inquiries in the absence of an application.

The ABF is primarily responsible for the enforcement of AD/CVD duties and safeguard measures. While customs in Australia operates under a system of self-assessment, the ABF’s activities include data auditing and compliance monitoring. The ABF also works closely with the ADC and the Department of Home Affairs to maintain whole-of-government oversight of the enforcement of trade remedies.

A domestic company can apply to the ADC to initiate investigations into dumping or countervailable subsidies, and can also apply, as an “affected party” for a review by the ADC of existing AD or CVD measures. A domestic company needs a certain level of support from the Australian industry said to be injured by the dumping or subsidies before an investigation will be initiated, but for a review of measures it only needs to be directly concerned with exportation or importation into Australia of the goods subject to measures, or to represent a portion of the domestic industry producing like goods.

Both domestic and foreign companies affected by existing AD or CVD measures, as well as foreign governments, can apply to the ADC to conduct reviews of those measures, if they think that the measures need to be changed, or are no longer warranted. They can apply on an ad hoc basis, except that an application for a review cannot be made within 12 months of the measures being imposed, or within 12 months of the completion of the last review of measures. The Minister is also empowered to request such a review at any time.

The scope of the review may be limited to particular exporters, and to variation of measures, or can extend to all exporters, and to consideration of whether the measures should be revoked.

In addition, a “new” exporter affected by measures may apply for an “accelerated review” of the measures in so far as they affect that exporter only. It can do so even if it is less than 12 months since the measures were imposed, or last reviewed.

Non-domestic companies may participate in reviews if they are “interested parties” under Part XVB (Division 1) of the Customs Act 1901 (Cth). Non-domestic interested parties may include representatives of the relevant industry in the country of export, persons directly involved with exportation of the goods to Australia, or with the production or manufacture of those goods, as well as the government in the country of export. The ADC publishes anti-dumping notices (ADNs) on its website inviting interested parties to lodge submissions. There are typically two relevant time periods for interested parties to make submissions – either up to 37 days from initiation of a matter or up to 20 days after publication of a Statement of Essential Facts.

The statutory process and timelines for AD/CVD investigations are as follows:

  • the ADC receives applications and determines if application requirements are met;
  • if requirements are satisfied, the ADC initiates review within 20 days after application received;
  • submissions are due within 37 days of initiation;
  • preliminary affirmative determinations are made 60 days after initiation (at the earliest). Note the recent Statement of Expectations referred to at 5.12 Key Developments Regarding AD/CVD Measures states that preliminary affirmative determinations are to be made “at the earliest opportunity”;
  • the Statement of Essential Facts (SEF) is published within 110 days of initiation;
  • submissions are made in response to the SEF within 20 days of SEF;
  • the Minister receives a final report within 155 days after initiation; and
  • the Minister’s decision and final report publication happens 30 days after the Minister receives it.

The ADC and the Minister have the power to extend these timelines, and it is not unusual for very lengthy extensions to be granted. However, those extensions are mostly directed to the work being undertaken by the ADC, rather than for the submission of information by interested parties. So, for instance, while only limited extensions are provided to exporters to respond to exporter questionnaires at the start of an investigation, it has become very rare for the ADC to publish an SEF within 110 days of initiation, or for the Minister to receive the ADC’s report within 155 days of initiation.

The extensions that the ADC may grant to interested parties are informed by the Customs (Extensions of Time and Non-Cooperation) Direction 2015.

Except for confidential information, there is a fairly high degree of transparency with respect to the process involved in investigations and reviews of AD and CVD measures, including submissions by interested parties and the reasons for the findings. The ADC maintains an electronic public record on its website, where it publishes applications, submissions, responses to questionnaires, SEFs and final reports recording findings, as well as the ultimate decisions. Information on both current cases, as well as archived cases, is available online. Reports issued before 2012 are available on the National Library of Australia’s Trove website.

Australia does not impose AD duties on goods originating from New Zealand.

For AD/CVD duties, unless a review is sought by an affected party, or the Minister, the measures will only be reviewed in advance of their expiry (five years after they were imposed), at which point the ADC needs to recommend to the Minister whether or not the measures should be continued.

There are no safeguard measures in place in Australia, and no requirements in legislation regarding how often any such measures would be reviewed. However, consistently with its obligations under the Safeguards Agreement, the Australian government’s policy is that a safeguard measure can only be imposed initially for four years; it can only be extended once for four years; and the measure must be progressively liberalised over time.

After initiation, the process for a review of AD/CVD duties (including the timeline) is substantially the same as the process for investigation of whether to impose such duties in the first place (as set out at 5.6 Investigation and Imposition of Duties and Safeguards). 

The comments at 5.6 Investigation and Imposition of Duties and Safeguards in relation to extensions apply equally to reviews as they do to investigations.

There are two main appeal routes for AD/CVD decisions.

First, judicial review of the legality of a decision can occur via an application to the Federal Court of Australia. Typically, an application for judicial review should be lodged with the Federal Court within 28 days of the decision of the ADC or the Minister that is being challenged.

Second, an application for review can be pursued with the Anti-Dumping Review Panel (ADRP) in relation to decisions made by the Minister or the Anti-Dumping Commissioner. The ADRP can review the decision on both factual and legal grounds. If the decision challenged is a decision of the Minister, the ADRP can find that the decision made was not the correct or preferable one, and recommend that the Minister make a different decision. The Minister is not obliged to accept that recommendation.

The process and timelines for applications for review by the ADRP are as follows:

  • filing of application – 30 days after reviewable decision is made;
  • initiation of review by ADRP – approximately one month after application;
  • lodgement of interested party submissions – 30 days after initiation;
  • ADRP report and recommendation sent to Minister – 30 days after submissions due; and
  • Minister affirms, revokes or remakes reviewable decision – 30 days after sending report.

The ADRP will sometimes ask the ADC to reinvestigate certain findings that underpinned recommendations. Where that occurs, the timeline is effectively paused until the completion of that reinvestigation.

In 2025, key developments include the Australian Government’s announcement (in August 2025) of its intention to transfer responsibility for safeguard investigations from the Productivity Commission to the ADC. This will mean that responsibility for all trade remedies will be situated within the ADC.

The Minister for Industry and Innovation also signed a Statement of Expectations for the ADC in September 2025. Priorities include expediting investigation timelines and positioning the ADC as a “world-class trade remedies authority”. The ADC issued a Statement of Intent in reply in November 2025, which confirmed these reform priorities.

There is potential for recommendations to changes to the trade remedies system in Australia over the next 12 months. The ADC released a consultation paper in November 2025 titled “Strengthening Australia’s Trade Remedies System” and invited submissions until December 2025. The outcomes from this consultation process are likely to become apparent in 2026.

Australia’s foreign investment laws are primarily contained in the Foreign Acquisitions and Takeovers Act 1975 (FATA), the Foreign Acquisitions and Takeovers Regulation 2015, and the Foreign Acquisitions and Takeovers Fees Imposition Act 2015.

Under the FATA, the Treasurer holds the authority to examine foreign investment proposals that satisfy specified criteria. In operational terms, the Foreign Investment Review Board (FIRB), operating as a non-statutory advisory body, conducts this examination and provides recommendations to the Treasurer regarding whether to permit the proposed investment to proceed.

Treasury oversees the administration of this regulatory framework with respect to foreign investment proposals concerning entities, businesses, agricultural land and commercial land. Separately, the Australian Taxation Office (ATO) handles the review of investment proposals pertaining to residential real estate and administers both vacancy fees and the Register of Foreign Ownership of Australian Assets.

Australia implements a significant review regime, which requires compulsory notifications to FIRB and approval for a notifiable action or a notifiable national security action. These include an action for a direct interest in Australian agribusiness, Australian land, or a substantial interest in an Australian entity. To be notifiable, the action will still need to meet the monetary threshold test. 

An application for approval is made via the foreign investment website.

Applications for proposed foreign investments are generally assessed under a national interest test, while notifiable national security actions are subject to a separate national security test.

The Treasurer has the power to block a foreign investment proposal or to apply conditions on the implementation of the proposal to ensure it is not contrary to the national interest or national security. The range of factors taken into account include: national security, competition, other government policies, impact on the economy, and the character of the investor.

Ultimate decision-making authority for foreign investment into Australia rests with the Australian Treasurer. As outlined in 6.1 Investment Security Mechanisms, the FIRB serves as the principal entity responsible for administering the foreign investment review process.

The application of the FIRB regime depends on whether an action is a “significant action”, “notifiable action”, “notifiable national security action” or a “reviewable national security action”.

Whether the action falls within these descriptions will determine whether it triggers the requirement to notify the Treasurer of the intended action, whether it will be reviewable at the discretion of the Treasurer based on national security concerns, and/or whether the action must be notified to the Registrar of the Register of Foreign Ownership of Australian Assets (being the Commissioner of Taxation).

A requirement to notify also arises where a foreign individual investor acquires an interest in Australian land of any value, or a legal interest in tenements or a registrable water interest.

One of the key features dictating whether an FIRB review is required, is whether the investment will reach specified monetary thresholds. However, for some transactions, this threshold is AUD0, so there is an automatic requirement for FIRB involvement.

See 6.3 Transactions Subject to Investment Security Measures for a discussion on “notifiable actions” and “notifiable national security actions”.

Further, notices must generally be given to the Register of Foreign Ownership of Australian Assets (the “Register”) within 30 days of certain trigger dates.

There are several exemptions, which are provided under Part 3 of the Foreign Acquisitions and Takeovers Regulation 2015. The include:

  • general exemptions applying for all purposes (for example, interests held solely as security for money lending agreements, and most exploration or prospecting tenements);
  • exemptions for specific actions (for example, compulsory acquisitions, and acquisitions from government entities);
  • exemptions for certain Australian land acquisitions; and
  • exemptions for particular investors and circumstances (for example, dividend reinvestment plans).

Notably, some exemptions specifically exclude foreign government investors from their scope, reflecting heightened scrutiny of state-backed investment.

The consequences of failing to notify or meet conditional requirements for investment approval can be severe.

For an individual, failure to give notice of a notifiable action or a notifiable national security action, while prohibited by the FATA, or contravening conditions of a notice or exemption can result in a penalty of up to AUD4.95 million (being 15,000 penalty units at the current penalty-unit rate) and ten years of imprisonment. For a corporation, the total amount increases tenfold to AUD49.5 million.

There are additional and significant penalties relating to residential real investment and other non-compliances with the FIRB regime. Such transactions are best approached with caution and with independent legal advice.

Fees are applicable for various actions required or permitted under the FATA, including for making applications to the FIRB, giving notices, and variations on certain notifications, notices or exemption certificates. The fee generally depends on the value of the transaction and, for most categories, is capped at a maximum of AUD1,205,200. Higher caps apply for some residential acquisitions, including established dwellings.

In addition, all states and territories charge additional stamp duty surcharges on foreign purchasers of property and certain states and territories charge higher rates of land tax on foreign owners where the property is not their principal place of residence.

Following an updated fee guidance note released by FIRB, the government has enacted a competitive bid process which allows for foreign investment applicants to have 75% of their application fees refunded if they were unsuccessful in a competitive bid process. Bidders can choose between a 75% refund or a 100% credit for a subsequent FIRB application that is made within 24 months of the failed bid.

On 31 October 2025, the Australian government issued a discussion paper on foreign investment framework reforms. The paper outlines several law reform proposals which are focused on strengthening and streamlining the foreign investment framework. These reforms are at the proposal stage only and have not yet been implemented. If enacted, they would materially change how low-risk transactions and emerging sectors are treated. The reforms proposed include automatic approvals for low-risk investments; enhanced national security scrutiny; and strengthened enforcement.

The public feedback on the reform discussion paper outlined in 6.8 Key Developments Regarding Investment Security closed on 12 December 2025. The paper outlines several law reform proposals that could be more far-reaching than the policy and process changes the government enacted in 2024.

There are several ways in which the Australian government, both at the federal and the state level, offers industry assistance. These include – but are not limited to – small business capital gains tax concessions, R&D tax concessions and government financing vehicles.

Australian import restrictions are limited and predominantly focused on biosecurity. However, Australia also maintains a prohibition of parallel imports of books under the Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) and domestic content quotas for television. This is in conjunction with new laws requiring streaming services to invest at least 10% of their total programme expenditure for Australia, or 7.5% their revenue, on new local content.

Australia has also continued to expand industry assistance in sectors related to the energy transition and national security, mirroring overseas trends such as the European Green Deal, the Made-in-Canada plan, China’s industrial subsidy programmes and the Inflation Reduction Act in the United States.

In the 2024–25 Federal Budget, the Commonwealth Government allocated AUD22.7 billion over a ten-year period to the Future Made in Australia initiative, as established under the Future Made in Australia Act 2024 (Cth), with the stated objective of enhancing Australia’s domestic manufacturing capacity and industrial capability.

Additional measures supporting domestic industrial capacity include the establishment of the National Reconstruction Fund Corporation which is authorised to provide financing of up to AUD15 billion to industries that support the “priority Areas of the Australian economy”. The priority areas are:

  • renewable energy and low-emission technologies;
  • manufacturing products for mining and processing minerals;
  • advanced manufacturing in the medical science sector;
  • transport sector manufacturing;
  • technology and digital capabilities;
  • defence manufacturing; and
  • agriculture, forestry and fisheries sector advancement.

Australian Critical Minerals Research and Development Hub

In conjunction with these tax measures, the Commonwealth government has appropriated AUD50.5 million for the establishment and operation of the Australian Critical Minerals Research and Development Hub. The Hub is funded through to June 2026, with the aim of working collaboratively to scale up and commercialise Australia’s critical minerals, including through funding high-priority projects.

The Hub’s investment priorities, as outlined in the Australian Critical Minerals R&D Hub presentation, include:

  • scaling-up and commercialising critical minerals research and development;
  • connecting the critical minerals R&D ecosystem, linking industry to R&D solutions, informing policy; and
  • supporting strategic international critical minerals collaboration.

Standards Australia Limited, a non-government organisation, is designated as the peak standards development body for Australia pursuant to a Memorandum of Understanding with the Commonwealth government. Standards Australia is responsible for:

  • the development, publication and maintenance of Australian Standards; and
  • the establishment of technical requirements and specifications across industry sectors,

in accordance with the principles set out in the World Trade Organization Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade.

The Commonwealth of Australia’s obligations under the Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures (the “SPS Agreement”), forming part of the Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, are administered jointly by the Department of Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry (DAFF) and the DFAT.

DAFF exercises primary responsibility for:

  • establishing sanitary and phytosanitary measures pursuant to the Biosecurity Act 2015 (Cth) and associated legislative instruments;
  • administering such measures in accordance with Australia’s international obligations; and
  • maintaining and enhancing technical market access for Australian agricultural and food exports.

Whilst SPS measures are implemented pursuant to Australia’s biosecurity and quarantine obligations under the Biosecurity Act 2015 (Cth) and are not expressly designed to restrict imports or promote domestic production, certain policies directed towards the protection of Australia’s biodiversity have been characterised by trading partners as having protectionist objectives. Australia has been named as a respondent in dispute settlement proceedings before the World Trade Organization concerning alleged breaches of the SPS Agreement.

Australia does not implement competition policies or price control mechanisms that are specifically designed to restrict imports or promote domestic production. Price controls that are in force are limited to:

  • household energy consumption; and
  • natural monopolies.

Notwithstanding the above, the Commonwealth has implemented a price cap on “uncontracted” liquefied natural gas (LNG), being gas not subject to existing export contracts, fixed at AUD12 per gigajoule. This measure was introduced pursuant to Competition and Consumer (Gas Market Code) Regulations 2023 (Cth) and applies to less than 4% of total LNG production. The stated policy objective of the price cap is to reduce gas costs for domestic consumers.

The price cap mechanism is currently subject to statutory review. Preliminary findings indicate a broad consensus amongst stakeholders that the measure has not achieved significant price reductions or enhanced market competition. The final report, including findings and recommendations, is expected to be published by the end of 2025, with any consequential legislative or regulatory amendments implemented in 2026.

During the 1990s, the Commonwealth and state governments implemented a comprehensive programme of multi-sector privatisation affecting financial institutions, transport infrastructure and utilities.

Notwithstanding this structural economic reform, government business enterprises (GBEs) that remain in public ownership are predominantly service-based utilities or entities established to facilitate specific government policy objectives.

Several GBEs operate as specialist investment vehicles pursuant to their enabling legislation, including:

  • Export Finance Australia, which provides financial services and products to support Australian export trade and overseas infrastructure projects that benefit Australia; and
  • the Clean Energy Finance Corporation, which functions as a specialised green investment bank providing finance to the clean energy sector.

State Reserves

Government has taken strong steps to establish domestic caches of resources, including through a Critical Minerals Strategic Reserve, and Western Australia’s Domestic Gas Policy.

Government procurement in Australia operates under distinct regulatory frameworks at the Commonwealth (federal) and state/territory levels. Subject to certain exclusions (including defence and health procurement), Australia maintains reciprocal procurement access obligations pursuant to multiple Free Trade Agreements (FTAs) and is a signatory to the World Trade Organization Agreement on Government Procurement (GPA).

Commonwealth Procurement

Commonwealth procurement is governed by the Public Governance, Performance and Accountability Act 2013 (Cth) (the “PGPA Act”) and the Commonwealth Procurement Rules (CPRs) made pursuant to Section 105B of that Act. In accordance with Australia’s obligations under the GPA, the regulatory framework contains no provisions designed to restrict imports or provide preferential treatment to domestic suppliers, subject to the exceptions noted below.

Defence procurement is administered separately by the Department of Defence pursuant to the Defence Procurement Policy Manual and associated instruments.

2025 Amendments to Commonwealth Procurement Rules

Substantial amendments to the Commonwealth Procurement Rules took effect on 17 November 2025 (2026 CPRs), representing the most comprehensive reform in nearly a decade and the first increase to key procurement thresholds in 20 years.

The stated policy objective of these amendments is to enhance the competitive capability of Australian businesses. Key amendments include:

  • threshold increases;
  • restricted tender requirements;
  • SME requirements; and
  • revised definition of “Australian Business”.

These amendments represent a significant policy shift, balancing support for domestic industry with Australia’s international trade obligations under the GPA and relevant FTAs.

Australian Industry Participation Framework

The Australian Industry Participation (AIP) National Framework applies to major Commonwealth government procurements, grants, investments and payments generally valued at AUD20 million or more. Under this framework, funding recipients are required to prepare and implement an AIP Plan designed to provide a “full, fair and reasonable” opportunity for Australian industry to participate in the supply of goods and services related to the project.

The Australian Jobs Act 2013 (Cth) applies to major projects for specified facilities, including railways, roads, solar and hydro infrastructure, and telecommunications infrastructure, with an estimated capital expenditure of AUD500 million or more.

State and Territory Procurement

At the state and territory level, procurement frameworks tend to be more prescriptive and contain explicit local content requirements.

Geographical indications for wines may be registered under a dedicated regime established by the Wine Australia Act 2013 (Cth). Beyond this regime, geographical indications may be registered through the certification trade mark system under the Trade Marks Act 1995 (Cth).

There are no other significant issues or developments in Australian trade or investment law that have not already been addressed.

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Trends and Developments


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Corrs Chambers Westgarth is Australia’s leading independent law firm. It provides exceptional legal services across the full spectrum of matters, including major transactions, projects and significant disputes, offering strategic advice on its clients’ most challenging issues. It is the firm of choice for many of the world’s leading organisations, with its people consistently recognised for providing outstanding client service and delivering exceptional results. Its international trade practice partners with clients to turn geopolitical and supply chain challenges into opportunity. It guides senior leadership and boards on strategic decision-making in a time of accelerating geopolitical change, trade tensions, regulatory reform and supply chain disruption. The firm’s focus is on optimising how goods, services and technologies move across borders. From navigating tariffs and dumping duties, to digital trade, export controls, investment approvals and sanctions, it supports clients with commercially grounded, legally robust strategies aligned to business objectives.

A Bet Both Ways on Free and Secure Trade

International trade law is undergoing its most significant transformation in decades. For Australian companies, and for foreign businesses seeking to enter or invest in the Australian market, the legal and geopolitical environment is now defined as much by strategic competition and security policy as by market economics. The era of “free trade” as a dominant organising principle has been overtaken by a more complex model centred on secure, resilient and strategically aligned trade. This shift is occurring across multiple legal domains: from the multilateral system to free trade agreements (FTAs), to sanctions enforcement, export controls, climate-related trade measures, modern slavery regulation, foreign investment screening, and the emergence of new environmental product standards.

This article sets out the key international trade law developments affecting companies operating in Australia or accessing Australian markets. The analysis reflects the current position in late 2025.

From free trade to secure trade – the strategic reframing of global commerce

The single most important trend influencing trade law is the geopolitical shift – driven largely by US–China strategic competition – toward “secure trade” rather than purely liberalised markets. Governments across Europe, Asia and Australia are reframing trade, investment and industrial policy through national-security lenses. The cumulative effect is a system in which tariffs, investment screening, export controls, supply-chain restrictions and sector-specific standards operate alongside traditional principles of market access and non-discrimination.

For companies, this reframing means the political context is no longer peripheral to trade strategy; it is determinative. Australian exporters and inbound investors must assume that cross-border flows of goods, technology and capital will be scrutinised for strategic implications. Firms in critical minerals, technology, defence, data, agriculture and advanced manufacturing now face the possibility that political alignment, national-interest considerations or alliance relationships may influence regulatory outcomes as much as commercial logic.

This is evident in the growing willingness of countries, including the United States, to deploy tariffs and industrial subsidies in response to perceived foreign distortions – particularly vis-à-vis China. Australia’s response to new US tariffs has not been reciprocal tariffs, but rather a mixture of trade diversification efforts, domestic capability investments, and the use of trade-remedy tools. Scenario planning for tariff shocks, industrial countermeasures or regulatory divergence is therefore now part of core corporate risk management.

The multilateral system – strained but still structurally significant

Despite the dysfunction in parts of the World Trade Organization (WTO) system – most notably the non-functioning Appellate Body – the WTO framework remains foundational for Australian businesses. It anchors tariff bindings, principles of non-discrimination, and the baseline rules governing trade remedies, subsidies, intellectual property and services.

Australia is a participant in the Multi-Party Interim Appeal Arbitration Arrangement (MPIA), preserving a functioning appellate mechanism for disputes with fellow participants. This matters for companies whose cross-border disputes rely on predictable, rules-based outcomes. Australia remains active in WTO dispute settlement, including in dispute case DS603, which concerned the WTO-consistency of Australia’s anti-dumping and countervailing duty methodologies. Australia notified the WTO Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) of its full implementation of the recommendations and rulings of the DSB in DS603 within the requisite “reasonable period of time”, demonstrating that even in a weakened multilateral system the WTO continues to influence domestic trade-remedy practice.

The WTO has also delivered its first new multilateral agreement in many years: the Agreement on Fisheries Subsidies, which entered into force on 15 September 2025, after reaching the two-thirds ratification threshold. Australia, which accepted the agreement earlier, now implements these new disciplines. The agreement introduces enforceable limits on harmful fisheries subsidies and signals that sustainability-linked trade disciplines – especially environmental ones – are now politically feasible. Companies can expect similar frameworks to emerge for issues such as carbon emissions, plastics and resource extraction.

Australia’s expanding FTA network – commercial imperatives and strategic alignment

Australia’s network of FTAs is both broad and deep. With 19 FTAs covering 31 economies, Australian exporters and importers operate in one of the most preferential trade environments globally. Recent strategic developments include the following.

  • The Australia–India Economic Co-operation and Trade Agreement (ECTA), in force since December 2022, forming the basis for an ambitious “Phase 2” negotiation toward a comprehensive FTA.
  • The Australia–UK FTA (A-UKFTA), in force since May 2023.
  • The Australia–UAE Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement (CEPA), which entered into force on 1 October 2025 and delivers significant tariff liberalisation and expanded market access.
  • Renewed efforts to progress the Australia–EU FTA, after negotiations stalled in 2023 but remain strategically important for diversification and standards alignment.

Australia’s participation in the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP) and the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement (RCEP) provides businesses with broad, rules-based access to key markets across the Indo-Pacific. Together, these agreements deliver tariff reductions, more predictable customs processes, clearer rules of origin, and greater certainty for services, investment and e-commerce. For exporters, the cumulative effect is improved competitiveness and the ability to structure supply chains across multiple member economies using preferential rules. Both agreements are now undergoing upgrade negotiations – the CPTPP to modernise digital trade, investment and environmental provisions, and RCEP (scheduled for 2027) to strengthen commitments on services, intellectual property, and trade facilitation. These updates are expected to expand commercial opportunities further and align the agreements with shifting global standards, making them increasingly important platforms for companies operating in the region.

Australia’s extensive network of FTAs delivers significant commercial advantages for both Australian companies and foreign investors. For Australian exporters, FTAs reduce or eliminate tariffs, simplify customs procedures, provide preferential rules of origin and create more predictable market-access conditions across key markets in the Indo-Pacific, Europe and the Middle East. They also open opportunities in services, digital trade, government procurement and investment, allowing Australian firms to compete on a level playing field with global peers. For businesses investing in Australia, FTAs provide greater certainty through clear rules on services, investment protections in certain agreements, and transparent regulatory frameworks, while also facilitating mobility for skilled workers and enabling integration into regional supply chains. Collectively, Australia’s FTAs lower the cost of doing business, mitigate trade and regulatory risk, and give companies – both domestic and foreign – more options to structure supply chains, investment strategies and market-entry plans efficiently.

Digital trade

Australia has been an early mover in negotiating digital economy agreements that establish clearer, more predictable rules for cross-border digital trade. The Australia–Singapore Digital Economy Agreement (DEA) remains the most advanced model, setting high-standard commitments on data flows, electronic payments, digital identities, fintech co-operation, paperless trading and interoperability of regulatory systems. It is designed to reduce compliance burdens and allow digital-first business models to operate more efficiently across both jurisdictions. Australia has pursued similar commitments in the Australia–UK FTA, and in digital trade chapters in FTAs with Japan, Korea and the UAE. While the scope varies between agreements, their combined effect is greater predictability for Australian and foreign businesses engaged in e-commerce, cloud services, digital services exports and broader technology collaboration across the Indo-Pacific.

Alongside these commercial benefits, the digital agreements include frameworks that shape how companies manage data governance, cybersecurity, privacy, localisation requirements and emerging technologies such as AI. Many of the agreements commit parties to permit cross-border data flows while discouraging data-localisation mandates, subject to legitimate public-policy exceptions – an important safeguard for cloud service providers, financial services, digital health and technology exporters. Provisions on cybersecurity co-operation and standards aim to improve resilience and reduce duplication of compliance, while privacy rules encourage mutual recognition of regulatory approaches where appropriate. Several agreements also include forward-looking co-operation on AI governance, algorithmic transparency and digital standards, signalling that these treaties may increasingly influence the regulatory environment in which digital products are developed and traded. For businesses, these frameworks do not remove compliance obligations, but they help create more consistent expectations across markets, lowering legal risk and enabling more scalable digital operations.

The long-standing WTO moratorium on customs duties on electronic transmissions – which prevents countries from imposing tariffs on digitally delivered products and services – was extended only until the next Ministerial Conference, leaving its future uncertain. If the moratorium lapses, governments could begin applying tariffs to software, digital media, cloud services and other online deliveries, increasing costs and complexity for businesses operating across borders. For companies trading digitally into or from Australia, the key commercial risk is the potential fragmentation of digital markets, new compliance burdens and higher transaction costs. Firms should monitor the negotiations closely, as any shift away from the moratorium would materially affect pricing, supply-chain design and digital-market access strategies.

Sanctions, export controls and the re-weaponisation of regulatory tools

Sanctions and export controls have become core instruments of international economic governance. Australia implements both UN sanctions and a robust autonomous sanctions regime under the Autonomous Sanctions Act 2011 (Cth). The autonomous sanctions framework – expanded significantly since 2021 to include Magnitsky-style measures – is being strengthened further as part of broader regulatory renewal.

Australia has significantly expanded sanctions against Russia, and thematic sanctions relating to corruption, cyber activity and human rights violations are increasingly utilised. This reflects a shift toward more assertive enforcement and alignment with like-minded partners.

In parallel, export controls – particularly for defence and dual-use technology – have become far more stringent. The Defence Trade Controls Amendment Act 2024 (Cth) commenced on 1 September 2024, with key criminal offences (including the supply of controlled technology to foreign persons in Australia or supplying outside Australia) applying from 1 March 2025. These reforms align Australia with AUKUS partners by creating a “licence-free” transfer environment for most technologies shared with the US and UK, while significantly tightening controls for transfers to all other jurisdictions.

Globally, export controls relating to semiconductors, advanced manufacturing equipment and critical minerals have proliferated. Companies in relevant value chains must now assume that compliance obligations arise under multiple jurisdictions simultaneously.

For boards, sanctions and export-control compliance is a core governance obligation requiring documented systems, internal expertise, due diligence processes and continuous monitoring.

AUKUS

AUKUS signals both a material expansion of opportunity and a higher regulatory bar for operating in Australia’s defence-adjacent economy. The partnership is accelerating investment in submarines, advanced manufacturing, cyber, AI, quantum and undersea technologies, creating a pipeline of long-term programmes that will rely heavily on Australian industry participation and trusted international partners. At the same time, Australia’s alignment with US and UK export-control regimes – through reforms to the Defence Trade Controls Act and associated security measures – means that companies engaging in sensitive sectors must meet more rigorous standards for technology governance, data handling, supply-chain integrity and personnel vetting. For foreign investors, particularly from jurisdictions outside the AUKUS framework, transactions involving defence, dual-use technology, critical minerals or critical infrastructure will face increased FIRB scrutiny and may require early and ongoing government engagement. The overall implication for directors is clear: AUKUS expands commercial pathways but demands more structured risk management, compliance capability and strategic positioning to participate effectively.

Critical minerals, industrial policy and foreign investment screening

Few areas demonstrate the intersection of trade, national security and industrial policy as clearly as critical minerals. Australia aims to become a globally indispensable supplier of minerals essential for the energy transition – including lithium, rare earths, cobalt, nickel, vanadium and graphite. The Critical Minerals Strategy 2023–2030 outlines this ambition, backed by concessional finance, strategic partnerships and foreign-policy initiatives.

In February 2025, Parliament legislated the Critical Minerals Production Tax Incentive, a 10% refundable tax offset for eligible processing and refining costs for 31 critical minerals. The incentive is available for up to ten years per project between 1 July 2027 and 30 June 2040. This aligns Australia with global industrial-policy strategies such as the US Inflation Reduction Act and the EU Critical Raw Materials Act.

Foreign investment rules further reinforce the strategic importance of the sector. FIRB’s national-security reforms, introduced in 2021 and strengthened in May 2024, give the Australian government wide discretion to review, condition or block investments in critical minerals, defence, energy, infrastructure and data. Transactions involving entities from certain jurisdictions face heightened scrutiny or, in some cases, effective barriers to approval.

For Australian resources companies, these rules shape capital-raising strategies, governance structures, offtake negotiations and project development. For foreign investors, early FIRB engagement, transparent ownership structures and clear evidence of alignment with Australia’s national-interest and security objectives are essential.

Trade remedies: an expanding component of economic strategy

Trade-remedy instruments – anti-dumping (AD) and countervailing duties (CVD) – are increasingly significant components of Australia’s economic strategy. These measures respond to injury arising from unfair pricing practices or subsidisation, particularly in sectors affected by foreign industrial policy.

Australia continues to apply AD/CVD measures actively, especially in metals, manufactured goods and chemicals. Political narratives increasingly frame these tools as essential for economic resilience and supply-chain security, not merely technical enforcement instruments.

The WTO dispute DS603, in which a panel found elements of Australia’s methodology inconsistent with WTO rules, highlights both the scrutiny applied to trade-remedy practices and the need for robust evidentiary and analytical frameworks. For foreign exporters, the risk of investigation is significant; for Australian exporters, retaliatory measures abroad are becoming more common.

Climate, carbon and the rise of “green trade”

Climate regulation has become an increasingly important trade-law instrument. The European Union’s Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM) entered its transitional reporting phase in October 2023 and will begin imposing carbon charges from 1 January 2026 for specified emissions-intensive goods, including cement, iron and steel, aluminium, fertilisers, hydrogen and certain precursors. For Australian exporters in these sectors, product-level measurement, verification and reporting of embedded emissions is now a market-access requirement.

While the EU will exempt small importers below 50 tonnes, this offers no relief for large industrial exporters. Australian firms must therefore develop robust emissions accounting capacity.

Domestically, the Commonwealth’s Carbon Leakage Review – linked to reforms under the Safeguard Mechanism (Australia’s policy for reducing emissions at large industrial facilities) – explicitly considers border adjustments and other tools to address competitiveness risks for emissions-intensive, trade-exposed sectors. Although Australia has not yet legislated a CBAM, the policy trajectory points toward increasing alignment with major trading partners.

For companies, emissions data is transitioning from a sustainability reporting matter to a core trade requirement.

Developments in cross-border carbon capture and storage (CCS) arrangements are creating new opportunities for co-operation between Australia and several Asian economies, particularly those exploring practical pathways to reduce industrial emissions. Amendments to the London Protocol allowing provisional transboundary movement of CO₂ have enabled governments to examine whether Australian geological formations could, in the future, complement domestic storage options for countries such as Japan, South Korea and Singapore, which face more limited onshore capacity.

Current government-to-government discussions focus on technical standards, liability allocation, monitoring and verification requirements, and the broader regulatory settings needed to support potential CCS supply chains. While these initiatives remain at an early stage, they point toward a gradual alignment of policy frameworks and could, over time, support new forms of co-operation in low-carbon industrial production. For Australia and its trading partners, CCS has the potential to become one of several tools for advancing regional decarbonisation while maintaining stable industrial and trade relationships.

Emerging environmental product standards: plastics and beyond

A major frontier in trade law is emerging through global efforts to regulate plastics and chemical pollution. Negotiations toward a legally binding plastics pollution treaty – under the auspices of the United Nations Environment Programme – have faced significant challenges. The 2025 negotiations were described as in disarray, with the chair stepping down after talks collapsed, though the process remains formally ongoing.

The draft treaty text includes substantial trade-related measures, such as restrictions on specific polymers and chemicals, product-design requirements, reporting frameworks and controls on transboundary movement. Even without a completed treaty, national regulatory action is accelerating.

For businesses in food, fast-moving consumer goods, healthcare, logistics and retail, packaging composition, recyclability, additive content and disclosure obligations are becoming de facto trade requirements. These rules increasingly intersect with customs processes and import standards, further blurring the line between environmental law and trade law.

More broadly, environmental product standards – relating to emissions, biodiversity impacts, hazardous substances or resource efficiency – are poised to shape market access conditions across sectors.

Modern slavery, human rights and supply-chain enforcement

Human rights regulation in supply chains is tightening globally, and Australia is moving in the same direction. The Modern Slavery Amendment (Australian Anti-Slavery Commissioner) Act 2024 (Cth) commenced on 7 November 2024, establishing a federal Commissioner with a mandate to elevate enforcement, oversight and transparency. The first Commissioner commenced his five-year term on 2 December 2024.

Government and independent reviews of the Modern Slavery Act advocate for mandatory human rights due diligence and penalties for non-compliance – moves that would align Australia with emerging global frameworks such as the EU’s Corporate Sustainability Due Diligence Directive (CSDDD) and US forced-labour import restrictions.

The Commissioner has warned that Australia risks becoming a “dumping ground” for goods made with forced labour as other countries adopt strict import bans. Businesses importing into Australia – or exporting into jurisdictions with stringent human rights laws – must therefore conduct meaningful supply-chain mapping, supplier engagement, risk assessment and remediation planning. Investors and lenders increasingly treat human rights diligence as financially material, influencing access to capital and insurance.

What this means for business – strategic and legal priorities

For companies operating in Australia, several strategic priorities emerge.

  • Geo-economic risk mapping – identify exposure to tariff shocks, supply-chain vulnerabilities, sanctions, export-control triggers and strategic-sector restrictions.
  • Regulatory compliance uplift – implement global-standard sanctions, export-control and modern slavery programmes.
  • Carbon and environmental readiness – build capacity for product-level emissions accounting and prepare for alignment with CBAM-style regimes.
  • Foreign investment strategy – treat FIRB as a central component of any sensitive-sector transaction.
  • Trade-remedy preparedness – ensure cost and pricing systems can withstand scrutiny from domestic and foreign investigators.

For foreign companies seeking to enter or invest in Australia:

  • understand the FTA ecosystem and leverage optimal rules-of-origin pathways;
  • prepare for FIRB engagement early, especially in critical minerals, energy, infrastructure, data and technology; and
  • demonstrate strong global compliance cultures consistent with emerging international expectations.

Conclusion – A New Operating Environment

International trade law has become an active field of geopolitical contestation, industrial policy and regulatory evolution. For Australian businesses – and for foreign companies engaging with Australia – the central challenge is to operate confidently within a system where economic and security imperatives intersect, and where regulatory change is rapid, multidimensional and increasingly extraterritorial.

Australia sits at a critical junction: a resource-rich, strategically aligned economy whose trade architecture is being redefined by global competition, climate policy and supply-chain security. Understanding the shifting trade-law landscape is therefore not just a compliance requirement – it is essential to competitive advantage.

Corrs Chambers Westgarth

Level 37, Quay Quarter Tower
50 Bridge Street,
Sydney New South Wales
2000
Australia

+ 61 2 9210 6500

+ 61 2 9210 6500

jane.barrett@corrs.com.au www.corrs.com.au
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Law and Practice

Authors



Corrs Chambers Westgarth is Australia’s leading independent law firm. It provides exceptional legal services across the full spectrum of matters, including major transactions, projects and significant disputes, offering strategic advice on its clients’ most challenging issues. It is the firm of choice for many of the world’s leading organisations, with its people consistently recognised for providing outstanding client service and delivering exceptional results. Its international trade practice partners with clients to turn geopolitical and supply chain challenges into opportunity. It guides senior leadership and boards on strategic decision-making in a time of accelerating geopolitical change, trade tensions, regulatory reform and supply chain disruption. The firm’s focus is on optimising how goods, services and technologies move across borders. From navigating tariffs and dumping duties, to digital trade, export controls, investment approvals and sanctions, it supports clients with commercially grounded, legally robust strategies aligned to business objectives.

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Author



Corrs Chambers Westgarth is Australia’s leading independent law firm. It provides exceptional legal services across the full spectrum of matters, including major transactions, projects and significant disputes, offering strategic advice on its clients’ most challenging issues. It is the firm of choice for many of the world’s leading organisations, with its people consistently recognised for providing outstanding client service and delivering exceptional results. Its international trade practice partners with clients to turn geopolitical and supply chain challenges into opportunity. It guides senior leadership and boards on strategic decision-making in a time of accelerating geopolitical change, trade tensions, regulatory reform and supply chain disruption. The firm’s focus is on optimising how goods, services and technologies move across borders. From navigating tariffs and dumping duties, to digital trade, export controls, investment approvals and sanctions, it supports clients with commercially grounded, legally robust strategies aligned to business objectives.

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