Egypt is recognised as an arbitration-friendly jurisdiction. Having registered more than 1,400 arbitrations (according to the UN Conference on Trade and Development, UNCTAD), Egypt may be regarded as a jurisdiction that welcomes arbitration proceedings.
As a general rule, Egypt has no history of refusing or showing reluctance to enter into bilateral investment treaties (BITs); on the contrary, Egypt is a party to 73 BITs currently in force, all of which contain arbitration provisions.
Since 2000, Egypt has not terminated any of its BITs. This stability reflects a commitment to safeguarding foreign investments – a guarantee consistent with Egypt’s current policy.
In furtherance of this policy, Egypt has no intention of terminating its BITs; rather, it is actively engaged in reviewing and developing them. The new BIT with the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA) bears witness to Egypt’s initiative to develop its international instruments.
Egypt is a state party to 23 multilateral conventions relating to investment and its development (according to UNCTAD), including the New York Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards (the “New York Convention”) and the ICSID Convention.
Egypt is also a member of other major conventions – all containing arbitration as a dispute resolution mechanism – such as the following.
Investor–state arbitration is the prevailing method in Egypt for the resolution of disputes. The Egyptian Arbitration Law No 27 of 1994 (EAL), together with Egypt’s membership in various bilateral and multilateral conventions, and its continuous development of its legal framework – which has resulted in a considerable increase in foreign investments in Egypt in recent years across multiple sectors – makes investor–state dispute resolution through arbitration the most common mechanism, particularly in the context of large government contracts with the state of Egypt.
However, arbitration is not necessarily the sole method, the applicable method of dispute resolution depends on the provisions of each treaty. Some may offer alternatives to arbitration, such as allowing a choice between resolving a potential dispute through arbitration or alternatively before domestic courts.
In such cases, it is for the investor in particular to select the most suitable alternative in light of its needs, bearing in mind that resorting to domestic courts is generally far less costly, though the process may prove more cumbersome.
The choice will thus depend on the investor’s resources and the scale of the investment.
Given that the majority of investments in Egypt are large in scale, both investors and the Egyptian government tend to favour arbitration.
Egypt is currently experiencing exponential development, marked by the implementation of mega projects involving the building materials, construction, energy, infrastructure, and industrial sectors in general. These sectors entail complex and high-value financial transactions and are, consequently, the most affected by investor–state arbitration.
Considering the previously noted industrial sectors experiencing exponential development in Egypt, it is not surprising that investor–state arbitrations in recent years have arisen in these areas.
One of the most significant cases is Heidelberg v Egypt. In this arbitration, the investor’s allegations focus in particular on anti-competition practices and failure to accord national treatment. However, as this case is still ongoing, its outcome remains uncertain.
Another significant case, unrelated to the industrial sectors mentioned in 1.4 Key Industries, is the Al Jazeera v Egypt case. In this matter, the investor claimed under the Egypt–Qatar BIT, that Egypt has allegedly placed the local branch of the investor’s company into compulsory liquidation. The case was ultimately resolved by the withdrawal of the investor’s claim against Egypt.
A further important case is Tantalum International and Emerge Gaming v Egypt. The arbitration was triggered by the cancellation of licences granted to the investor. As with Al Jazeera v Egypt, after negotiations, the investor received a settlement sum.
Also worth mentioning is the case of Gesenu v Egypt. The case involved the expropriation of investments made in Egypt by Gesenu, a waste management company. Once again, the case was discontinued as the parties reached a settlement.
The last case to highlight is Qatar Airways Group Q.C.S.C. v Egypt in which the investor alleged that Egypt blocked the company’s operations by closing the Egyptian airspace for the investor and revoking its licences to operate. Yet again, the dispute was settled.
With the exception of the first case mentioned, which is still ongoing, Egypt shows a pattern of settlement, reflecting a willingness to negotiate in the event of a dispute. While arbitration remains an unavoidable means of dispute resolution, amicable settlement is also an established outcome.
In general terms, Egypt is a member of the New York Convention. Egyptian courts, especially the Cairo Court of Appeal, recognise and enforce arbitral awards, including those made against Egypt or its entities. The Egyptian legal system does not grant immunity to state entities or to public officials, who are therefore required to implement and comply with arbitral awards once they have been recognised and enforced in Egypt.
More specifically, the provisions of the EAL concerning the annulment of arbitral awards (Article 53), is very limited in scope. It sets out an exhaustive list of eight grounds for annulment, such as the incapacity of the parties when entering into the arbitration agreement, the tribunal’s failure to apply the law chosen by the parties, or when the award is contrary to Egyptian public policy, among others.
In a recent judgment rendered by the Egyptian court of cassation, Judge Nabil Omran emphasised that, according to the legislature, the spirit of the annulment regime is precisely to limit the scope of annulment of arbitral awards, and in this respect, the EAL adopts a pro-arbitration stance.
While the general rule is to limit the scope of annulment grounds, there are rare exceptions. One example is the DIPCO case (ICC Case No 21341/MCP/DDA/AYZ), in which the Egyptian court of cassation ruled that since arbitrators are aware of the applicable law, they were required to apply it properly and could not disregard Egyptian public policy. As a result, a misapplication of the law is considered a violation of Egyptian public policy.
According to UNCTAD, Egypt is among the top ten signatories of BITs worldwide with nearly 100 in total with the following countries: Albania, Algeria, Argentina, Armenia, Australia, Austria, Azerbaijan (signed, but not in force), Bahrain, Belarus, the Belgium–Luxembourg Economic Union, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Botswana (signed, but not in force), Bulgaria, Burundi (signed, but not in force), Cameroon (signed, but not in force), Canada, Central African Republic (signed, but not in force), Chad (signed, but not in force), Chile (signed, but not in force), China, Comoros, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Democratic Republic of the Congo (signed, but not in force), Denmark, Djibouti (signed, but not in force), Eswatini (signed, but not in force), Ethiopia, Finland, France, Gabon (signed, but not in force), Georgia (signed, but not in force), Germany, Ghana (signed, but not in force), Greece, Guinea (signed, but not in force), Hungary, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Iran (signed, but not in force), Italy, Jamaica (signed, but not in force), Japan, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Korea, Kuwait, Latvia, Lebanon, Libya, North Macedonia (signed, but not in force), Malawi, Malaysia, Mali, Malta, Mauritius, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique (signed, but not in force), the Netherlands, Niger (signed, but not in force), Nigeria (signed, but not in force), North Korea, occupied Palestinian territories, Oman, Pakistan (signed, but not in force), Poland, Portugal, Qatar, Romania, the Russian Federation, Saudi Arabia (signed, but not in force), Senegal (signed, but not in force), Serbia, Seychelles (signed, but not in force), Singapore, Slovakia, Slovenia, Somalia, South Africa (signed, but not in force), Spain, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Sweden, Switzerland, the Syrian Arab Republic, Tanzania (signed, but not in force), Thailand, Tunisia, Türkiye, Turkmenistan, the UAE, Uganda (signed, but not in force), Ukraine, the United Kingdom, the United States, Uzbekistan, Vietnam, Yemen, Zambia (signed, but not in force) and Zimbabwe (signed, but not in force).
Egypt’s recent entry into the intergovernmental organisation of emerging market economies, BRICS, would suggest a potential collaboration on investment with Brazil, for instance, by ratifying a BIT for the first time with that state. Egypt could also renew its BIT with India, and bring into force the BITs ratified with South Africa and Iran, all of which are founding member states of BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa).
Given Egypt’s history of participation in numerous bilateral and multilateral treaties, and above all its current legal framework, all of this suggests that Egypt maintains and develops an environment conducive to its entry into such agreements as a strategy to attract and protect foreign investments, as seen with the BIT with the KSA which came into force in June 2024.
Egypt has adopted only a couple of model BITs that serve merely as a framework for the negotiation and ratification of a full BIT. It contains only the basic provisions typically found in any model, such as definitions of “investment” and “investor”. It also sets out provisions on the treatment, promotion and protection of investments, most-favoured nation provisions, national treatment, fair and equal treatment, as well as expropriation, compensation for losses, transfer of funds, and dispute resolution.
The model, however, is meant to be refined and further developed during the negotiation of a specific BIT. By itself, the model is not comprehensive; it must be supplemented. For example, the BIT concluded with the KSA includes provisions on the protection of intellectual property, confidentiality, environmental and labour matters, corruption and competition. Furthermore, it addresses matters relating to residence and stays, provisions virtually unknown in previous BIT practice, at least with respect to Egypt.
Such provisions are absent from earlier models, which, as their name suggests, serve only as a basic template. It is left to the contracting states to adapt, supplement, and implement their particular needs and priorities in the final negotiated BIT.
Egypt is a member of several free trade agreements, including the Greater Arab Free Trade Agreement (GAFTA), the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA), the European Union–Egypt Association Agreement, the Egypt–Turkey Free Trade Agreement, and the Egypt–EFTA (European Free Trade Association) Free Trade Agreement.
These agreements grant protection to investors, such as in the COMESA treaty, which sets out provisions concerning protections from nationalisation, potential political unrest, or unforeseen economic setbacks in the host state. Furthermore, investors are entitled to receive fair and equitable treatment and the right to repatriate their funds into their native states.
These same agreements also contain dispute resolution provisions. For instance, Article 41 of the Egypt–EFTA Free Trade Agreement and Article 34 of the Egypt–Turkey Free Trade Agreement establish arbitration as the method of dispute resolution. The COMESA treaty, by contrast, is different in that it establishes a court, but still provides arbitration as an available option.
In these agreements, the protection of investors and their investment, as well as the resolution of disputes through arbitration, are essential components designed to promote cross-border investment, and enhance mutual trust.
To the authors’ knowledge, Egypt does not publish commentaries or exchange of notes as guidance for investment treaties.
Interpretive guidance for investment treaties and their content, even in the absence of official publications by Egypt, may still be found in arbitration jurisprudence, in domestic legislation relating to investment, and in relevant scholarly writings, while Egyptian jurisprudence may also provide additional assistance for the interpretation of laws relating to arbitration and investment.
Egypt’s investment regime is anchored in Egyptian Investment Law No 72 of 2017 (EIL), the principal legislative instrument governing foreign and domestic investment. Among its key substantive provisions, the EIL provides investors with general incentives such as exemptions from stamp duty and notarisation fees, as well as reduced customs duties on imported machinery, and special incentives for projects located in priority regions, with deductions of up to 50% or 30% of investment costs. Additional incentives under the EIL include the establishment of custom ports dedicated to specific projects, coverage of utility connection costs, and in some cases, the allocation of land free of charge. The framework also enables the creation of Public and Private Free Zones, which benefit from extensive tax and customs exemptions. Notably, the EIL introduced the so-called “golden licence”, a one-stop approval that consolidates permits, licences and land allocation, streamlining processes for strategic projects.
The EIL further provides investors with a wide range of dispute resolution and settlement mechanisms. It first considers amicable settlement as the primary mode of resolution. It then establishes a Grievance Committee for decisions issued by the General Authority for Investments and Free Zones (GAFI) – Egypt’s central authority for investment administration and promotion – or any other authority responsible for granting approvals, permits or licences. The EIL also provides for a Ministerial Committee for Investment Dispute Resolution to resolve disputes concerning investors’ claims, complaints or conflicts. In addition, it establishes a dedicated Centre for Arbitration and Mediation for investment-related disputes, making arbitration an option available to investors.
Accordingly, the EIL offers investors a considerable number of avenues to resolve potential disputes. It also sets out the same protections found in most BITs concluded by Egypt, notably, fair and equal treatment, national treatment, protection against arbitrary and discriminatory measures or decisions, residence and stays, respect for enforcement of state contractual obligations, and protection against expropriation and nationalisation.
In parallel with the aforementioned mechanisms, when an investor contracts directly with Egypt or an Egyptian entity, it is relatively common for such contracts, characterised as “administrative contracts”, typically involving large-scale projects, to include an arbitration clause. However, such clause is subject to the approval of the competent minister and to a prior review of the contract by the High Committee for Arbitration and International Disputes before its conclusion. Moreover, the protections guaranteed by BITs are distinct from those contained in such contracts.
This distinction stems from the fact that an arbitration clause provided in a contract governs disputes arising out of that contract. The protection is therefore limited to the rights and obligations established between the parties under the contract.
By contrast, BITs provide a much wider framework of protection, allowing an investor to bring claims from breaches of the BIT itself, claims that naturally extend beyond the contractual terms. Thus, contract-based claims and treaty-based claims are distinct, and a breach of contract is not considered in itself a breach of a BIT.
However, some BITs include an “umbrella clause”, which affords investors an additional layer of protection. This clause requires the state to comply with obligations it has entered into with respect to investments. Consequently, such a clause may potentially elevate and extend a contractual breach to a breach of the BIT itself.
This additional layer of protection may not be necessary in the BITs concluded by Egypt, since under the EIL, Egypt and its entities are already under an obligation to respect and perform their contractual obligations. As the law applicable to such contracts is necessarily Egyptian law, the latter takes the lead by imposing this obligation directly on the state.
Furthermore, the EIL already reflects most of the protections provided in BITs. Therefore, an investor may simply rely on the application of the law governing the contract, without bringing a treaty claim.
The most frequent claims made by investors against states in investor–state arbitration are naturally based on the obligations that states owe to investors and, by analogy, the rights that investors hold against states.
In general terms, claims are most frequently made on the basis of the following:
These claims are made on the basis of the treaty itself, of the obligations that the state has towards investors and the rights that investors hold against the state.
However, an investor may also bring a claim on the basis of a contract. In this case, the investor alleges that the state breached one of its contractual obligations.
Egypt includes in its BITs, and in particular in its model BIT, protections for investors such as expropriation, fair and equitable treatment, as well as most-favoured nation. This reflects the claims most frequently made by investors against a state, and Egypt’s desire to address such complaints by including these protections in its BITs.
There are no limitations on arbitrator selection in Egypt (aside from requirements of independence and impartiality).
The EAL, for instance, does not limit the parties’ autonomy in their selection of arbitrators; quite the contrary, Article 15 of the EAL provides that the tribunal is constituted by agreement of the parties, and the parties are free to agree on the number of arbitrators.
However, the parties’ autonomy is subject to two requirements.
If the parties cannot agree on the constitution of the tribunal, the Cairo Court of Appeal or any other court of appeal as agreed by the parties may intervene, applying the general procedures set out in the EAL.
In rare cases of multi-party arbitrations, the EAL does not prescribe a default procedure for the appointment of arbitrators. Egyptian law provides general default procedures for the appointment of arbitrators and the constitution of the tribunal.
However, alongside the EAL, the Cairo Regional Centre for International Commercial Arbitration (CRCICA) Rules provide that in cases involving multiple parties, the claimants and the respondents will jointly appoint an arbitrator. If the parties concerned failed to do so, the CRCICA will appoint an arbitrator on their behalf.
Aside from the procedure prescribed under institutional rules, under the EAL (Article 17), a court can intervene in the selection of arbitrators. The selection by the court is made in two circumstances:
The court must observe the requirements of the EAL and any conditions agreed upon by the parties when appointing the arbitrators. In addition, the EAL provides that the court must issue its decision on the appointment promptly. After the decision is rendered, this is not subject to appeal.
Certain limitations arise under the EAL regarding the court’s power to appoint arbitrators. The first of these is that the intervention of the court is only triggered if the parties fail to agree, breach the agreed-upon procedure, or if a third party fails in its role. In addition, the court must respect any legal and contractual requirement for arbitrators’ qualifications set by the law and the parties.
Article 18 of the EAL finds that an arbitrator may be challenged only if circumstances exist that give rise to serious doubts about their impartiality or independence. The EAL provides that a party to the arbitration may challenge the arbitrator appointed by it or in whose appointment it has participated, only for reasons of which it becomes aware after the appointment has been made.
If a party wishes to challenge an appointed arbitrator, it needs to file its application within 15 days of becoming aware of the circumstances justifying such a challenge. If the challenged arbitrator does not withdraw, the court (of Article 9) can intervene.
The IBA (International Bar Association) Guidelines on Conflicts of Interest in International Arbitration are not mandatorily followed. While the parties are free to choose whether to apply the IBA Guidelines to a dispute, the guidelines’ effectiveness in deciding challenges for arbitrators would not be guaranteed, considering that the national courts are the competent authorities in this regard, and the Egyptian judiciary is yet to fully adopt the guidelines, which would also need to be translated into Arabic.
It should also be noted that the Egyptian court of cassation has rendered its decisions confirming the views of international arbitration best practice (saying that there should be a real threat of bias).
The EAL sets a benchmark of requirements for arbitrators. In particular, Article 16 of the EAL provides that, upon accepting their mandate, arbitrators must disclose any information that could give rise to doubts regarding their independence and impartiality.
Similarly, the CRCICA Rules of 2024 provide that, within a week of their appointment, arbitrators must disclose any information that could give rise to any justifiable doubts as to their independence and impartiality.
In addition to the EAL and the CRCICA Rules, it is a well-established practice in arbitrations seated in Egypt for both parties and tribunals to rely on the IBA Guidelines.
Article 24 of the EAL provides that both parties to an arbitration may agree to confer upon the arbitral tribunal the power to order, upon request of either party, interim or conservatory measures considered necessary in respect of the subject matter of the dispute and to require any party to provide appropriate security to cover the costs of the ordered measure.
Under the same provision, interim relief granted by arbitral tribunals is binding on the parties. If the party against whom the order was issued fails to comply, the requesting party may be authorised by the arbitral tribunal to undertake enforcement measures against the defaulting party. Further, the provision preserves the requesting party’s right to seek judicial enforcement of the interim measure.
The types of relief that can be awarded are not exhaustively specified in the provision, leaving the arbitral tribunal with the discretion to award any relief it considers necessary in respect of the subject matter of the dispute. Finally, Article 42 of the EAL grants the right to the arbitral tribunal to make interim or partial awards before making its final arbitral award, which terminates the entire dispute.
Domestic courts play a critical role in both the application for and enforcement of interim measures granted in investor–state arbitration.
At the application phase, Article 14 of the EAL empowers the Cairo Court of Appeal to order interim or conservatory measures prior to the commencement of the arbitration proceedings or during the conduct thereof.
In this regard, Article 194 et seq of the Code of Civil and Commercial Procedures (CCCP) allows for ex parte applications and expedited relief. The courts’ involvement at this stage ensures that urgent matters can be addressed even before the arbitral tribunal is constituted or able to act.
At the enforcement stage, Article 24 of the EAL recognises judicial enforcement of interim measures granted by arbitral tribunals, empowering the Cairo Court of Appeal to issue an execution order to enforce such measures.
Notably, in 2017, an enforcement order from the president of the Cairo Court of Appeal was successfully obtained in ex parte proceedings for an interim measure issued by an ICC arbitral tribunal seated in Paris, the first instance of a foreign arbitral interim measure being enforced in Egypt. The Cairo Court of Appeal subsequently upheld this order in adversarial proceedings in 2018, establishing a landmark precedent for the judicial enforcement of arbitral interim measures in Egypt.
Article 24 of the EAL provides that both parties to an arbitration may agree to confer upon the arbitral tribunal the power to order, upon request of either party, interim or conservatory measures considered necessary in respect of the subject matter of the dispute and to require any party to provide appropriate security to cover the costs of the ordered measure.
Egyptian law does not generally regulate third-party funding. Accordingly, there are no restrictions on recourse to such means of funding with respect to investor–state claims, which is commonly used by investors in cases against Egypt.
That said, third-party funding was addressed by the Egyptian legislator in the Egypt–Saudi Arabia BIT (2024), which provides in Article 28 an explicit obligation that parties having recourse to third-party funding must disclose such arrangement, and sets out the consequences of non-disclosure.
No rules exist on third-party funding of arbitral claims. There is no law or regulation that specifically regulates third-party funding under Egyptian laws. Hence, it is not prevented.
From a practical perspective, the institutional rules applicable to the arbitration prevail. However, it should be highlighted that third-party funding is not generally practised in Egypt and is still a novel concept.
Concurrently, the authors are not aware of any impact the existence of third-party funding could have on applications for security for costs, considering that there are no established arbitration or court cases dealing with the practice of third-party funding in Egypt.
The Ministerial Committee for the Settlement of Investment Contract Disputes, as established by Prime Minister Decree No 2432 of 2015 (as amended subsequently), offers investors an optional amicable settlement mechanism for disputes arising from investment contracts involving the state or any of its entities, bodies or affiliated companies.
Under Article 2 of the aforementioned Decree, there is no explicit mention that parties must submit their disputes to the committee before resorting to arbitration, meaning that recourse to the committee cannot be deemed as a mandatory pre-arbitration step per se.
That being said, in practice, the committee has proactively resolved numerous investment disputes prior to escalation to arbitration, namely with the Netherland’s Future Pipe Industries BV, Italy’s Tecnimont, as well as Egyptian private-sector firms Sonker Bunkering Company and Misr Technology Services.
This reflects the government’s aim to settle disputes with investors to attract foreign direct investments, and ensure an investment-friendly environment in the country.
While Article 44 of the EAL prohibits the publication of arbitral awards unless otherwise agreed by the parties, it does not impose a general duty of confidentiality over the proceedings themselves.
That being said, the confidentiality of proceedings in the investor–state context ultimately depends on the provisions of the treaty under which the claim is brought: older BITs (namely, the Egypt–Kuwait 1966 BIT and its 2001 revision) are generally silent on the matter, defaulting to private proceedings, while modern treaties (namely, the Egypt–Saudi Arabia 2024 BIT) and updated rules increasingly require public access to documents, hearings and awards.
With that in mind, parties can balance interests of confidentiality and transparency by agreeing on selective publication of awards and/or pleadings, adopting transparency-oriented rules, and/or issuing joint statements; allowing for protection of sensitive information while ensuring public access to information on disputes involving the public interest.
Under Egyptian law, arbitral tribunals are constrained by Egyptian mandatory public policy, as prescribed in legal provisions or case law, when awarding damages.
Most significantly, tribunals may award by default simple interest within the legal cap of 5% for commercial matters (and 7% per annum maximum for agreed-upon simple interest – Article 227 of the Egyptian Civil Code (ECC)); awards granting interest above this cap, or compound interest, will not be enforced. This limitation is in line with Egyptian public policy, which limits remedies to compensatory measures, and restricts the award of punitive financial remedies (unless specifically authorised by statute).
The Egyptian legal system does not recognise consequential damages.
As for injunctive relief, there is no express statutory limitation on arbitral tribunals’ power to order injunctions under Egyptian law. In practice, however, the power to grant injunctions is generally exercised in the context of interim measures (see 5. Preliminary and Interim Relief), and the issuance of injunctions as part of a final award is rare. Egyptian law does not expressly prohibit injunctions as a remedy, but the courts generally do not render such injunctions, and their issuance remains unregulated and uncommon.
In investor–state arbitration involving Egypt, tribunals typically employ a range of valuation methodologies to quantify damages, depending on the asset and case specifics. The discounted cash flow (DCF) method is widely used, especially for ongoing businesses with predictable future cash flows, such as in the energy sector. Market value approaches, including comparable transactions and publicly traded comparables, are applied when reliable market data exists. Cost-based approaches, such as replacement or net book value, may be used as a floor value, particularly when other methods are impractical. Ultimately, tribunals exercise discretion to select, combine, or cross-check methods, often considering the reasonableness of the parties’ claims and appointing independent experts if needed.
As explained in 8.1 Remedies, parties are entitled to claim interest on the amount in dispute, within the statutory cap of 7% per annum.
While the EAL is silent on costs, reference may be made to Article 184 et seq of the CCCP, recognising that the unsuccessful party bears the costs of the proceedings (including attorneys’ fees) as a matter of principle, in a costs-follow-the-event approach.
That being said, the CCCP provides an exception to the above principle, whereby the successful party may be ordered to bear all or part of the costs if the right was undisputed (ie, the unsuccessful party did not contest the right, and the successful party still brought proceedings), the successful party caused unnecessary expenses, and/or if decisive evidence was withheld.
Finally, the CCCP envisages the scenario where all of the parties fail in some of their claims; in which case, the court (and accordingly, an arbitral tribunal) has the discretion to order each party to bear its own costs, or to apportion costs in the manner it deems fit, namely, by ordering one party to bear all the costs.
The EIL does not impose any explicit statutory obligation on investors to mitigate their losses. However, the principle of mitigation of losses is recognised under the Egyptian Civil Code, specifically Article 221(1), which applies to investors as contracting parties. Under this provision, an investor’s entitlement to compensation is contingent upon demonstrating that the harm suffered was the natural consequence of the opposing party’s conduct, and that such harm could not reasonably have been avoided through the investor’s own efforts.
The first step in enforcing a final award in Egypt is to notify the unsuccessful party by court bailiff by providing a copy of the award duly legalised and notarised. A full translation of the award is not required; however, an official Arabic translation of the award will be required later at the deposit stage described below.
The second step is for the award to be deposited at the registry of the Cairo Court of Appeals. This deposit requires the presentation of the original award or a signed copy thereof, an official notarised Arabic translation of the award, the original agreement containing the arbitration clause along with an official notarised Arabic translation thereof, and proof that the unsuccessful party has been officially notified of the award by a court bailiff.
Once the above items have been submitted, the entire file is transferred to the Arbitration Office at the Ministry of Justice, which must approve the deposit of the award. To this end, it will first verify that the Cairo Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over depositing the award. Secondly, it will ensure that the award does not:
a) conflict with Egyptian public policy or morals;
b) involve an in-kind right to real estate (ie, possession, division and confirmation of ownership, etc);
c) involve any matter as to personal status under the law (ie, matters usually within the domain of family law);
d) involve any criminal matter;
e) relate to a settlement in any of the matters listed in (b) through (d); or
f) relate to any matter in which settlement is not permitted by law.
If the Arbitration Office approves the deposit of the award, the registrar of the Cairo Court of Appeals will issue minutes of the deposit. The unsuccessful party must then be notified with a copy of the minutes of the deposit by a court bailiff.
The third step is exequatur of the award. An exequatur order must be obtained from the competent judge at the Cairo Court of Appeals. This requires the submission of a request addressed to the chief justice of the Cairo Court of Appeals, which must be accompanied by a copy of the minutes of the deposit, a certified copy of the award submitted with the deposit of the award, and a copy of the agreement containing the arbitration clause along with an Arabic translation thereof.
The competent judge will issue the exequatur order once they confirm that:
If the competent judge does not grant the exequatur order, an appeal challenging this decision may be filed before the Cairo Court of Appeals within 30 days.
Where there is no application to set aside the award and the competent judge is satisfied that the award meets the requirements described above, an exequatur order can be issued within 120 to 150 days of issuance of the award.
Once exequatur is granted and notified, enforcement against the debtor’s assets in Egypt may begin.
Notably, both award creditors and debtors may challenge court orders granting or refusing exequatur before the president of the Cairo Court of Appeal – creditors within 30 days of refusal, and debtors within ten days of granting – with adversarial proceedings that typically follow the ordinary appeals timeline (circa one year).
Separately, while the EAL does not contain any provision allowing or barring the enforcement of foreign awards annulled at the seat, and in the absence of court precedents on the matter, reference may be made to the CCCP enforcement regime, particularly Article 298 which explicitly requires the award to have a res judicata effect at the seat in order for it to be enforced in Egypt.
As such, the existence of set-aside proceedings at the seat may constitute serious grounds for challenging the exequatur, and at the least, mandate a stay of enforcement pending the annulment court’s ruling.
Finally, state entities are not immune to enforcement of arbitral awards, provided that the entity concerned has validly consented to arbitration and has obtained the necessary prior approvals in this regard (namely, under Article 1 of the EAL, an arbitration agreement within an administrative contract is valid only if approved by the competent minister or their authorised delegate), and that the matter in dispute is arbitrable.
In practice, arbitral awards are generally enforced in Egypt; however, courts in Egypt are reluctant to recognise and enforce foreign awards that were set aside or nullified at the place or seat.
Separately, with respect to sovereign immunity, as previously explained, state entities may not invoke sovereign immunity to avoid enforcement, if they have validly consented to arbitration and if the matter in dispute is arbitrable. In the absence of court precedents on the matter, it is ultimately left to the courts’ discretion, in light of the specific facts of each case.
Under Article 87 of the ECC, state assets allocated for public benefit are considered public funds and may not be disposed of, seized, or acquired by prescription, and hence, cannot be subject to enforcement.
Accordingly, only state assets in the private domain – ie, used for commercial purposes – can be enforced against, following the ordinary enforcement procedure prescribed under the EAL (see 9.1 Enforcement Procedure).
In terms of identification of assets, the authors note that, although not a formal requirement under the EAL, it is established in Cairo Court of Appeal case law that the admissibility of enforcement proceedings is conditional upon the availability of assets for attachment within the Egyptian territory (Cairo Court of Appeal, Challenge No 10 JY122, session dated 30 May 2005).
The authors further note that award creditors may seek the assistance of asset-tracing firms to identify state assets available for enforcement.
Separately, while the corporate-veil piercing doctrine is not formally recognised by Egyptian courts, the award creditor may initiate a fraudulent conveyance action (or “Pauline action”) to obtain the annulment of the transaction undertaken by the award debtor to dissipate their assets, under Articles 237 and 238 of the ECC. By seeking a judgment of non-enforceability of the fraudulent transaction undertaken by the award debtor, the award creditor may seek enforcement against the former’s dissipated assets.
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Since 2025, Egypt has continued to pursue an ambitious strategy of attracting foreign investment, with significant developments across the energy, infrastructure, logistics and industrial sectors. This investment drive has increasingly focused on projects that support Egypt’s position as a regional manufacturing, energy and trade hub, while also promoting the localisation of industrial production and the development of renewable-energy capacity.
In September 2026, during the Chinese president’s official visit to Egypt, these efforts gained further momentum with the signing of five memoranda of understanding and formal agreements, alongside more than 20 co-operation documents spanning a broad range of economic sectors, including technology, finance, the digital economy, transport and media.
In particular, the Suez Canal Economic Zone (“SCZONE”) has continued to attract substantial and diversified international investment. In April 2026, the Egyptian government reviewed plans by Chinese company Henan Zhongfu Industrial Co, Ltd to establish an aluminum manufacturing complex in the SCZONE, with proposed investments of approximately USD2 billion. Earlier in 2026, the SCZONE also approved manufacturing projects in the chemicals and tyre sectors with combined investments of approximately USD1.29 billion, while a USD165 million pharmaceutical raw-materials project broke ground in the Sokhna industrial zone.
Egypt’s position as a regional logistics and trade hub has likewise attracted investment. In July 2026, DP World launched Egypt’s first integrated Logistics Distribution Centre at Sokhna Logistics Park, following more than USD1.4 billion of investment by DP World in integrated logistics infrastructure in Egypt. The project is intended to strengthen Egypt’s role as a gateway connecting Asia, Africa and Europe, and to support manufacturing, exports and regional supply chains.
The energy sector has also seen significant investment activity and potential transactions. In August 2026, Energean entered exclusive negotiations to acquire certain upstream oil and gas assets of BP in Egypt in a transaction reportedly valued at approximately USD1 billion. In September 2026, Infinity Power, a major renewable energy company operating across Africa, and a leading Egyptian corporation signed a power purchase agreement with the Egyptian Electricity Transmission Company for the development of a large-scale wind-power project in the Red Sea, which contributes to Egypt’s broader objective to accelerate its transition towards renewable energy.
These developments show that Egypt’s investment landscape has become increasingly diversified since 2025, encompassing large-scale industrial and manufacturing projects, renewable energy, logistics and ports, as well as traditional energy investments. Many of these projects involve foreign investors, government entities, economic zones, concessions and other public–private arrangements. Their scale, duration and institutional complexity increase the importance of clear investment protections and effective dispute-resolution mechanisms, particularly where regulatory change, contractual performance or state conduct may affect project viability.
Against this background, this article examines:
The Evolving Legislative Framework Supporting Egypt’s Investment Growth
In recent years, Egypt has undertaken significant legislative reforms to enhance its investment climate, most notably through its Investment Law No 72 of 2017 (EIL), complemented by the Special Economic Zones Law, the Export Subsidy Program, the State Ownership Policy, and – most recently – Law No 147 of 2026 restructuring the Future of Egypt Authority for Sustainable Development.
The restructured Future of Egypt Authority for Sustainable Development – a new sovereign-linked economic actor
One of the most notable developments is Law No 147 of 2026, which restructures the Future of Egypt Authority for Sustainable Development (the “Authority”). Originally launched in 2017 as a desert land-reclamation initiative under the supervision of the Egyptian armed forces and formalised by Presidential Decree No 591 of 2022, the Authority has expanded rapidly beyond its original agricultural and industrial mandate.
Enacted in July 2026, Law No 147 establishes the Authority as a national entity with special legal status reporting directly to the president, with technical, financial and administrative independence and an independent legal personality. Its objectives include strengthening state economic power and resilience; advancing food, water and energy security; supporting sustainable development and sovereign wealth preservation; promoting social equity; and expanding private-sector participation.
The Authority has broad powers over state-owned land and companies, sustainable development zones and investment activities, including incorporating state assets; developing and managing sustainable development zones; exercising regulatory and licensing powers; and investing and reinvesting funds in Egypt and abroad.
The Law also establishes the “Future of Egypt Sovereign Wealth Fund – Pyramids of the Nile”, which is intended to invest funds allocated for investment both domestically and abroad, alongside a parallel “Future of Egypt Service Fund – Da’em”, tasked primarily with supporting social, service and development projects.
For investors, the consolidation of land, corporate assets and investment functions under a sovereign-linked authority is a development to monitor, particularly given its expanding role in agriculture, energy and industry, and its potential interactions with foreign investors through land allocation, joint ventures and asset transfers, which may in time generate the kind of sovereign-conduct issues that have historically underpinned claims against the Egyptian state.
Digitalisation and streamlining of investment procedures
The General Authority for Investment and Free Zones (“GAFI”) announced in September 2025 that a draft Companies Law was expected to require government authorities to complete company-related approvals electronically within 20 business days, mirroring the timeframe already mandated for golden-licence approvals. While not yet enacted, the 20-day timeframe is currently enforced by Prime Minister Decree No 982 of 2022 for the establishment, operation or expansion of investment projects.
GAFI is also developing an integrated digital platform covering approximately 270 economic activities and reducing reliance on paper-based procedures. These reforms are expected to benefit start-ups and complement GAFI’s average customs clearance time of 5.8 days, generating estimated shipping-cost savings of USD1.5 billion.
The central role of the EIL in Egypt’s investment growth
Since 2017, the EIL has reshaped Egypt’s investment landscape, particularly through its “golden licence” initiative, and its free zone and investment zone framework.
Since the launch of the golden licence in 2022, which provides a single Council of Ministers’ approval consolidating permits, licences and land allocations for strategic or national projects, publicly reported figures indicate that the licence has been granted to 54 companies, up from 29 as of March 2024, across sectors including renewable energy, petrochemicals, manufacturing, agriculture, biotechnology, healthcare and logistics.
The EIL has further incentivised investors through tax and customs exemptions offered under its free zones framework, and streamlined licensing and administrative procedures and temporary customs facilities under its investment zones framework. To put this in figures, as of mid-2026, Egypt has nine public free zones and 222 private free zones, alongside 12 operational and seven further investment zones under development – collectively hosting over 1,277 projects, attractingEGP66.3 billion (circa USD1.2 billion) in investment, and generating some 77,500 jobs.
Other legislative initiatives
Alongside the EIL, Law No 2 of 2024 on Green Hydrogen Production Incentives, the Special Economic Zones Law, the Export Subsidy Programme, and the State Ownership Policy have further strengthened Egypt’s investment appeal.
Notably, the SCZone, regulated under the Special Economic Zones Law No 83 of 2002 (as amended by Law No 27 of 2015), benefits from various tax/customs and non-tax incentives, namely subsidised energy, infrastructure refunds, and favourable land allocation for priority sectors. It has attracted over 272 projects since 2023, including major green hydrogen/ammonia, tyre and pharmaceutical projects.
Potential Reform and Institutional Developments in Egypt’s Dispute Resolution Framework
Possible reform of Egypt’s Arbitration Law still under consideration
Egypt’s Arbitration Law (EAL) has remained unchanged for nearly three decades, with the same legislative framework still governing arbitration proceedings today. In light of the country’s broader modernisation plans, which are taking place across various sectors and at different levels of government, the EAL is naturally not being left behind.
In the second half of 2025, the status of the EAL became the subject of parliamentary discussions concerning potential reform of the existing legislation. The proposed reform could bring significant practical benefits to both practitioners and litigants. The discussions reportedly addressed several key aspects of the current arbitration framework. One of the main proposals was to shorten the statutory period for the enforcement of arbitral awards. Such a change could significantly improve the efficiency of the enforcement process. For litigants, a shorter period would provide greater certainty and allow successful parties to obtain the benefit of an award more quickly. For practitioners, it could also reduce delays at the enforcement stage and provide a clearer and more streamlined procedural framework.
The discussions also addressed the possibility of resolving jurisdictional conflicts between the different courts of first instance and the Cairo Court of Appeal. The sources currently available do not disclose the full aspect of the proposed reform or all the issues discussed in detail. However, parliament has emphasised the objective of removing obstacles faced by investors, expressly linking the proposed reforms to the state’s broader plan to attract investments.
In this regard, Egypt’s Minister of Parliamentary and Legal Affairs and Political Communication stressed that “every obstacle we are able to remove brings us closer to a sound investment environment”. This focus on removing obstacles is a positive and encouraging indication of the direction in which the reform may be heading. That said, the available sources do not yet shed full light on the scope or outcome of these discussions, and the full extent of the proposed reform remains to be seen.
Egypt is positioning itself as an institutional centre for UNCITRAL reform
On of the most promising developments for Egypt’s position on the international arbitration stage is its interest in hosting the UNCITRAL Advisory Centre on International Investment Dispute Resolution (the “Advisory Centre”). In 2025, Egypt formally expressed interest in hosting the centre and subsequently submitted a detailed official candidacy to host either the Advisory Centre itself or UNCITRAL’s regional office; a move that would certainly strengthen Egypt’s position as a regional hub for international arbitration and enhance its visibility within the international arbitration community.
For context, UNCITRAL has been pursuing a reform process on Investor–State Dispute Settlement (ISDS) through Working Group III. The process forms part of a broader effort to address the concerns surrounding the existing ISDS system and develop possible solutions. Working Group III was entrusted with a broad mandate to work on the possible reform of the ISDS. The reform process has therefore proceeded in two stages: first, identifying and assessing concerns regarding the existing ISDS system, and second, considering possible solutions to address those concerns.
One of the solutions developed through this process has been the establishment of the Advisory Centre, which is intended to provide legal and technical support in relation to international investment disputes. The Advisory Centre has since moved beyond the stage of a purely conceptual proposal.
As part of this process, the commission invited states interested in hosting the Advisory Centre’s headquarters or a regional office to submit detailed proposals by 20 October 2025. The call required interested states to address, among other matters, their financial and in-kind support, and the proposed host-state arrangements.
It is within this broader reform process that Egypt’s interest in hosting the Advisory Centre formally emerged. Egypt submitted a detailed proposal and a presentation setting out its offer, including its proposed co-operation with UNCITRAL, ICSID and the UN Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD). Egypt’s candidacy is significant, its official proposal states that it meets the UNCITRAL host-state criteria, and presents Egypt’s bid around four main advantages: institutional readiness, geographical relevance, cost efficiency, and strong political commitment to equitable, predictable and effective dispute resolution for developing and transitioning economies. Egypt has consequently presented itself as a strategic, reliable and neutral location for the Advisory Centre.
The geographical case is particularly strong. Egypt sits at the intersection of Africa, the Middle East and Europe, and its proposal presents this position as an opportunity for the Advisory Centre to serve a wide range of states across emerging regions. Egypt further proposes that hosting the Advisory Centre could help create stronger links between these regions, and strengthen their voice in the ISDS reform process.
Egypt’s proposal also goes beyond geography. It links the location of the Advisory Centre to the existing legal and institutional infrastructure available in Egypt. In particular, it points to the presence of the Cairo Regional Centre for International Commercial Arbitration (CRCICA) as providing immediate technical capacity and an established arbitration ecosystem. The proposal also seeks to position Cairo as a regional centre for legal training and as a wider legal and business hub.
Egypt’s proposal is therefore concrete. It combines geographic relevance with existing legal infrastructure, an established arbitration community and specific commitments from the Egyptian state. On this last point, Egypt’s offer is particularly detailed. It commits to providing fully equipped premises in the New Administrative Capital, logistical support during the Advisory Centre’s establishment and operation, and support for the conclusion of a host-state agreement, while expressly undertaking not to interfere with the Advisory Centre’s legal work, staff appointments, or internal governance.
This institutional commitment was subsequently reinforced at a domestic level. On 15 October 2025, the Egyptian Council of Ministers approved Egypt’s hosting of the Advisory Centre in the New Administrative Capital. The decision was expressly presented as part of the state’s efforts to strengthen Egypt’s position as a regional and global hub for investment and to attract influential international organisations to the country. The Council of Ministers also linked the Advisory Centre to the protection of foreign investors’ rights, the rule of law, and the creation of a fair and transparent investment environment.
This development sends a clear signal to foreign investors. Egypt is seeking to position itself within the institutions shaping the future of international investment arbitration.
Egypt’s signing of the Singapore Convention
Egypt’s signing of the Singapore Convention on Mediation reflects a broader shift towards modernising its dispute-resolution framework. In July 2026, GAFI organised a seminar on the prospects and challenges of implementing the Convention in Egypt. However, ratification and implementing legislation remain necessary before the Convention can take effect domestically.
The Convention addresses a key practical difficulty with mediation: although mediation can produce flexible and cost-effective settlements, enforcing those settlements in another state may be more difficult than enforcing an arbitral award. It establishes a harmonised framework for enforcing mediated settlement agreements across states. For foreign investors, this provides an alternative to arbitration that is generally less adversarial, less costly, and capable of producing more flexible solutions.
Egypt’s signing of the Convention therefore forms part of a broader effort to modernise arbitration and dispute resolution, alongside potential reforms to the EAL and Egypt’s engagement with ISDS reform. Nevertheless, the gap between international commitments and domestic implementation remains significant. The effectiveness of these reforms will depend on legislative and institutional measures that create predictable and operational mechanisms.
Once ratified and implemented, the Convention could make mediation a more credible option for disputes involving the state. By providing greater certainty that mediated settlements can be enforced, it may also reduce perceived investment risks and encourage the use of mediation before disputes escalate into investment arbitration.
First emergency arbitration in Egypt and court enforcement of interim relief
Beyond these broader institutional and legislative developments, the first use of emergency arbitration in Egypt provides a more practical indication of how the state’s evolving dispute resolution framework is operating in practice.
In practical terms, emergency arbitration allows a party to seek urgent interim relief before the arbitral tribunal is constituted. The rationale behind this procedure is that certain situations cannot wait for the constitution of the tribunal and require immediate attention, typically to prevent harm that, if suffered, could be irreparable. A key feature of the procedure is the temporary nature of the emergency arbitrator’s mandate. Once the emergency arbitrator issues an interim measure, its mandate comes to an end.
This procedure was introduced in the CRCICA (the “Centre”) Arbitration Rules of 2024, as part of a broader effort to modernise the Centre’s arbitration framework. The 2024 Rules not only introduced emergency arbitration, but also a range of other modern procedural tools, including, among others, expedited arbitration, third-party funding, consolidation and early dismissal.
In 2025, one year after the introduction of the Emergency Arbitration Rules, the emergency proceeding in Egypt was initiated, moving the mechanism from theory to practice. An emergency arbitrator was appointed and issued an interim measure. The measure was subsequently brought before the Egyptian courts, which gave it enforceable effect despite the fact that it was not a final arbitral award. Following the constitution of the tribunal, the tribunal ultimately terminated the emergency arbitrator’s award in the first months of 2026.
Importantly, the procedure was therefore used in practice, an interim measure was issued, and its enforceability was tested before the Egyptian courts, which gives practical meaning to emergency arbitration. The value of emergency relief ultimately depends on whether the relief granted can actually be implemented. In this respect, the case provides an encouraging first indication of the Egyptian court’s receptiveness to emergency arbitral relief.
Egypt’s Current Investor–State Caseload and Prospective Dispute Hotspots
Recent and pending claims against Egypt
As of mid-2026, there have been 48 known treaty-based investor–state cases against Egypt, of which four remain pending. This caseload reflects the continued significance of investor–state arbitration in Egypt, particularly in capital-intensive sectors such as construction, real estate, energy and infrastructure. A notable recent development is Al Oroba for Real Estate Investment Company and Others v Arab Republic of Egypt (ICSID Case No ARB/26/9), registered on 19 February 2026 under the 1997 Egypt–United Arab Emirates Bilateral Investment Treaty.
The case, which concerns a dispute over major construction projects in Egypt, is noteworthy not only as the latest treaty-based claim against Egypt, but also because it illustrates the exposure of Egypt’s large-scale real estate and development projects to investment treaty claims, particularly in connection with the implementation, regulation, or cancellation of major projects by the state.
Energy is likely to become a future hotspot for investor–state disputes
Egypt’s energy sector has been increasingly structured in a way that could make it one of the main sectors for future investor–state disputes. The sector is subject to long-term state planning, substantial capital requirements, and significant reliance on private and foreign investment in strategic projects. Egypt’s sustainable energy policy places renewable energy at the centre of its national electricity strategy, with targets of 42% renewable electricity by 2030 and more than 60% by 2040.
This strategy serves a broader objective; positioning Egypt as a regional energy hub. The projects involved connect Egypt with regional and international partners, including Europe, Japan, Sudan, Libya, Saudi Arabia, Greece, Italy, and the UAE. Several of these projects involve investments worth hundreds of millions, or billions, of US dollars and require implementation over several years.
In this regard, co-operation with Saudi Arabia alone involves approximately USD1.8 billion, while the proposed electricity connection with Italy, which is intended to facilitate the export of green electricity and hydrogen to Europe, could cost up to USD20 billion. This expansion to cross-border energy infrastructure increases the number of state commitments on which investors may rely and adds further layers of regulatory and contractual complexity.
Private investment is already central to the implementation of this energy transition. Since 2025, Egypt has signed 32 power purchase agreements with private renewable-energy developers. At the same time, the government continues to promote the build-own-operate model to attract foreign investment into solar and wind projects. This contractual strategy is particularly relevant from an investment dispute perspective. It places investors in long-term relationships with the state and state-linked entities, where the viability of the investment depends on the continued operation of state policies, payment arrangements, infrastructure delivery and regulatory implementation.
The scale of capital involved further increases the potential exposure. Egypt’s energy transition has already attracted major international investors and financial institutions, including the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) and the International Finance Corporation (IFC), which have financed projects such as the Bendan Solar Park, one of the world’s largest solar-power complexes, alongside other international financial institutions.
Energy is therefore likely to become an increasingly important sector for investor–state disputes in Egypt. The state’s transition is being implemented through long-term strategies and investment models that depend heavily on private and foreign capital, and place investors in sustained interaction with the Egyptian state. Where these relationships extend over many years, the potential for disputes becomes materially more pronounced. This is particularly so given the scale of capital being committed and the strategic importance of the projects involved.
The point is not that these projects will necessarily lead to disputes. Rather, their structure creates a greater number of situations in which changes in regulation, delays, payment difficulties, currency fluctuation, or changes in state policy could have a significant impact on foreign investments. As Egypt moves towards its renewable energy and regional energy hub objective, the energy sector may therefore become an important testing ground for the effectiveness of its evolving investment protection and dispute resolution framework.
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