The core merger control legislation in Australia is the Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (Cth) (CCA), specifically section 50 and Part IVA. This framework was fundamentally overhauled by the Treasury Laws Amendment (Mergers and Acquisitions Reform) Act 2024 (Cth), which transitioned Australia from a voluntary judicial enforcement model to a mandatory and suspensory administrative regime effective from 1 January 2026.
This primary legislation is strictly operationalised by detailed legislative instruments that dictate notification thresholds, procedural requirements, and filing fees. The critical instruments are the Competition and Consumer (Notification of Acquisitions) Determination 2025 and the Competition and Consumer (Notification of Acquisitions) Amendment (2025 Measures No 1) Determination 2025, with the latter introducing highly technical changes that took effect on 1 April 2026.
Significant regulatory guidance is also provided by the Australian Competition and Consumer Commission (ACCC), most notably the ACCC Merger Assessment Guidelines, the ACCC’s interim Merger Process Guidelines 2025, the ACCC Merger Reform: Frequently Asked Questions, and specific interim guidance on the increasingly popular Notification Waiver process, which define the regulator’s day-to-day administrative expectations.
Under the CCA, the minister possesses the power to designate specific sectors for mandatory notification regardless of general financial thresholds. Currently, the major supermarkets (Coles and Woolworths) are subject to bespoke designations requiring them to notify any acquisition of a supermarket business or associated land.
Beyond competition law, foreign investments remain governed by the Foreign Acquisitions and Takeovers Act 1975 (Cth) (FATA), administered by the Foreign Investment Review Board (FIRB). The FATA typically requires foreign investors to obtain no-objection notifications for acquiring certain interests in Australian entities or land. While the ACCC and FIRB operate distinct regimes, FIRB delegates the “competition” limb of its national interest test to the ACCC and will generally not issue a no-objection notification until ACCC clearance is secured.
Other relevant sector-specific ownership limits are included in the Financial Sector (Shareholdings) Act 1998 (Cth) (banking and insurance), the Broadcasting Services Act 1992 (Cth) (media), and the Telecommunications Act 1997 (Cth).
The ACCC is the primary enforcement authority. Under the 2026 regime, the ACCC’s role has transitioned to the first-instance administrative decision-maker for all merger clearances. It conducts Phase 1 and Phase 2 reviews (as well as public benefit assessments) and holds the unilateral administrative power to permit, conditionally permit, or outright prohibit a transaction.
The Australian Competition Tribunal (the “Tribunal”) serves as the appellate body, conducting limited “merits reviews” of the ACCC’s administrative decisions. The Federal Court of Australia’s role in merger control is now strictly confined to judicial review of the Tribunal’s decisions on points of law, and presiding over civil penalty proceedings brought by the ACCC for gun-jumping or procedural contraventions. Merger parties can no longer directly apply to the Federal Court for a pre-emptive or defensive declaration that a transaction does not substantially lessen competition.
Under the regime that commenced on 1 January 2026, notification is strictly mandatory and suspensory. Transactions that satisfy the jurisdictional thresholds and control tests must be notified to the ACCC and cannot be put into effect until formal clearance is granted.
Notification Waiver Process
A prominent feature of the 2026 regime is the “Notification Waiver” process. For transactions that technically satisfy the financial thresholds and control tests but are competitively benign (eg, zero overlap or negligible market shares), parties can apply for an early waiver. If granted within the 25-business-day statutory period, this legally removes the obligation to submit a full notification.
Exceptions are limited and technical
Narrowly drawn statutory exceptions exist, primarily aimed at routine commercial conduct. Safe harbours exist for certain land and property acquisitions, internal restructures with no change in control, and temporary holdings by administrators or underwriters. Additionally, certain acquisitions by financial institutions are exempt to ensure market liquidity and capital provision, alongside carve-outs for specific government-mandated acquisitions, and share purchases in entities governed by Chapter 6 of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) that stay below the 20% voting power threshold. The exceptions can be technical and reliance will be fact-specific.
Voluntary notification
Voluntary notification remains an available option for transactions that do not satisfy jurisdictional thresholds. The ACCC holds a “call-in” power to formally review any transaction that does not meet jurisdictional thresholds if it suspects a substantial lessening of competition. For sub-threshold transactions involving close competitors or concentrated markets, merger parties are recommended to undertake a more substantive upfront competition analysis (as would have been previously done under the ACCC’s legacy informal merger clearance regime) to determine whether a voluntary filing is appropriate for the purposes of securing legal certainty and a statutory “safe harbour” against future challenges.
The penalties for failing to notify (gun-jumping) under the new regime are significant and substantial. A notifiable transaction completed without ACCC approval is automatically void. Failure to obtain approval or taking steps to integrate prior to doing so, can also give rise to cartel risk.
Furthermore, the ACCC can seek substantial civil penalties in the Federal Court. Maximum penalties for corporations are the greater of:
While the mandatory regime is nascent, the ACCC is actively monitoring markets and has publicly indicated a zero-tolerance policy towards gun-jumping. Deal teams must observe the suspensory obligation as maximum penalties are a genuine risk for deliberate circumvention.
When a failure to notify is prosecuted as gun-jumping cartel conduct, separate criminal penalties can also apply.
The regime captures the acquisition of shares, assets, or control of an entity and looks at the substance of the transaction rather than its legal form.
“Assets” Are Defined Broadly
A feature of the 2026 regime is the expansive definition of what constitutes an “asset”, which can include real property and leasehold interests, intangible and intellectual property, plant and equipment, and contractual rights (including options for land development rights or the assignment of specific supplier or customer contracts). While the legislation contains narrow “ordinary course of business” exceptions, the breadth of the asset definition means deal teams must now routinely screen standalone commercial property, IP, and licensing transactions for mandatory merger filing obligations.
Discrete Asset Acquisitions
A critical distinction was introduced on 1 April 2026 between acquiring “all or substantially all” of a business and “discrete asset acquisitions” (eg, purchasing a specific intellectual property portfolio, a single manufacturing facility, or a specific leasehold) that do not constitute all, or substantially all, of the assets of a business. Discrete asset acquisitions are subject to different, transaction-value thresholds to ensure the ACCC only reviews the transfer of assets that are competitively meaningful.
Exempt Transactions
Internal restructures involving related bodies corporate are generally exempt, provided there is no change in ultimate control.
Under the 2026 mandatory regime, assessing “control” requires navigating a dual-layered, concurrent framework. Dealmakers must assess transactions against both a qualitative “practical control” test and quantitative “voting power” thresholds. These tests are not mutually exclusive; triggering either one mandates a formal notification (assuming the financial thresholds are also met).
The Qualitative Test: Practical Control (Section 50AA)
The foundational test relies on a modified version of section 50AA of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth). In this context, “control” is defined as the capacity to determine the outcome of decisions regarding an entity’s financial and operating policies. This requires an assessment of both legal rights and the practical influence an acquirer will be able to exert. Rights that exceed “passive” protection, such as the power to block the annual budget, strategic business plans, or the appointment of senior management, typically satisfy the control test in section 50AA of the Corporations Act 2001. Under this test, an acquisition of a relatively small minority equity stake (eg, 15%) is captured if the accompanying shareholder agreement grants the acquirer board dominance or extensive negative control rights (such as vetoes over strategic direction, CEO appointments, or the annual operating budget). If an acquirer obtains this practical control, the transaction will be considered to satisfy the requisite control test.
The Quantitative Test: Objective Voting Power Thresholds
While the Competition and Consumer Act provides a general exemption (under section 51ABS) if practical section 50AA control is not acquired, the 1 April 2026 legislative amendments introduced hard “voting power” thresholds that act as strict carve-outs to that exemption.
This means that even if a minority stake is entirely passive, and the acquirer successfully proves they completely lack practical control over the target’s policies, notification is strictly required if the acquisition results in the acquirer’s voting power crossing specific statutory lines. These thresholds include:
It is important to distinguish between shareholding and voting power because the mandatory 20% notification threshold is triggered by the aggregate of all relevant interests and associate holdings, meaning an acquisition can satisfy the bright-line thresholds even if the acquirer’s direct legal shareholding remains below the trigger.
Implications for Notification Assessments
This concurrent framework operates as a sophisticated regulatory net. It ensures the ACCC has regulatory visibility over both highly engineered minority control structures (captured by the section 50AA qualitative test) and creeping, purely passive equity accumulations (captured by the quantitative voting power thresholds).
Associate “Minority Shareholder” Carve-Out
Importantly, for private equity, venture capital syndicates, and consortiums, investors will not be deemed “associates” (meaning their voting power is not aggregated) merely because they hold standard “minority shareholder protection rights” designed solely to protect the financial value of their investment rather than exert joint commercial control. This also applies for the purposes of revenue calculation – see 2.7 Businesses/Corporate Entities Relevant for the Calculation of Jurisdictional Thresholds.
The mandatory monetary thresholds introduced in 2026 are multifaceted and utilise a combination of acquirer revenue, target revenue, and transaction value.
General Monetary Thresholds
For the acquisition of shares or assets that comprise all or substantially all of the assets of a business, satisfaction of the following thresholds will give rise to a notification requirement (if control is also acquired):
For the cumulative threshold, only individual prior transactions with a target turnover >AUD2 million count toward this aggregation.
Discrete Asset Acquisition Thresholds
For the acquisition of discrete assets that do not comprise all or substantially all of the assets of a business, satisfaction of the following thresholds will give rise to a notification requirement:
Discrete asset acquisitions with a transaction value of ≥AUD2 million may also be captured where the creeping acquisitions threshold has otherwise been met.
Sector-Specific Thresholds and Ministerial Designations
The Treasurer possesses the statutory power to “designate” specific sectors or classes of acquisitions that will be subject to lower or bespoke jurisdictional thresholds. This mechanism is specifically intended to capture “creeping acquisitions” in highly concentrated markets where incremental transactions would otherwise fall below the general economy-wide triggers.
This power was first exercised via the Competition and Consumer (Notification of Acquisitions–Supermarkets) Determination 2025. Under this instrument, designated “major supermarkets” are subject to a strict zero-dollar notification threshold for the acquisition of any “supermarket business” or land intended for supermarket use. This designation effectively overrides the general monetary and discrete asset thresholds mandating ACCC notification for all such transactions regardless of value or scale. Other sectors that have been identified as priority sectors for potential designation include liquor, fuel retailing, certain health and medical services, and childcare and early learning. Given the dynamic nature of applicable thresholds, regularly checking for updated ministerial determinations is recommended.
The calculation of jurisdictional thresholds requires a technical assessment of Australian revenue and global transaction value, with specific rules governing currency conversion and asset valuation. Both revenue and transaction value must be calculated as of the “contract date” (the date the definitive agreement is executed).
Australian Revenue (Turnover) Test
The “Australian revenue” threshold is calculated based on gross revenue derived from sales to customers in Australia in the last full financial reporting year.
Transaction Value
The transaction value threshold is a “global” test, meaning the total value of the deal is assessed even if only some of the assets or part of the business are located in Australia.
Valuation method
The value is the higher of:
Inclusions
The value must include all cash, equity, assumed liabilities, and the estimated value of contingent consideration, such as earn-outs or deferred payments.
Foreign Currency Conversion
Section 7–40 of the Competition and Consumer (Notification of Acquisitions) Determination 2025 sets out mandatory, bifurcated rules for converting foreign currency to Australian Dollars (AUD) for both revenue and transaction value.
Acquirer Group
Threshold calculations are performed on a consolidated group-wide basis, incorporating the gross Australian revenue (excluding taxes) of the acquirer and all its “connected entities” globally.
Connectivity is primarily determined by the “practical influence” test under section 50AA of the Corporations Act 2001, which captures any entity where a party has the capacity to determine financial and operating policies. This includes ultimate holding companies, sister companies under common control, associates (including anyone acting or proposing to act “in concert”, or anyone who is a party to a relevant agreement for the purpose of controlling or influencing the affairs of another entity), and joint ventures where the acquirer exerts de facto strategic influence.
Associate “Minority Shareholder” Carve-Out
Relationships and voting power arising solely from standard minority shareholder protection agreements (in private companies with 50 or fewer shareholders) are excluded from acquirer group revenue (and voting threshold) calculations that would otherwise be caught by the broad definition of “associates”. Provided an investor holds purely defensive rights, such as standard vetoes over capital reductions or constitutional changes, without the capacity to influence the board composition or financial policies, these entities are not treated as associates, and their independent portfolios are disregarded.
Target Group and Business Assets
For share acquisitions, target revenue is limited to gross annual revenue derived from customers in Australia specifically attributable to the target entity being acquired. While the seller’s retained annual group revenue is excluded, the calculation must include the consolidated annual revenue of the target and any entities it controls.
For asset acquisitions where the assets comprise all or substantially all of the assets of a business, the gross annual Australian revenue attributable to the business is the relevant metric. For acquisitions of discrete business assets, the tests look at the transaction value rather than the target’s revenue.
Reference Period Adjustments
To ensure revenue reflects the business’s current state at the time of notification:
Serial Acquisitions and Aggregation
The “three-year look-back” rule requires the aggregation of revenue from businesses acquired by the acquirer group in the same industry as the target in Australia within the preceding 36 months (from the contract date of the transaction in question). However, specific exemptions apply to:
Foreign-to-foreign transactions are subject to Australian merger control if they meet the thresholds and possess the requisite local nexus. The target must be “connected with Australia”, meaning it is incorporated in Australia, its Australian revenue/assets trigger the specific target-revenue or transaction-value limbs of the tests, or it carries on a business in Australia. Determining whether a business is “carried on” in Australia requires a holistic, fact-specific assessment of the degree of commercial activity within the jurisdiction. For share transactions, the target entity itself must be engaged in Australian commerce, whereas for asset-based deals, the specific assets must be utilised in or integrated into a business operating locally.
Australia does not utilise a market share-based jurisdictional threshold. The regime relies entirely on objective financial and voting-power metrics to provide certainty for transaction planning. Market shares are nevertheless relevant for determining the most appropriate notification pathway and form of application.
Under the 2026 mandatory regime, Australia does not expressly rely on the European “full-function” versus “non-full-function” distinction to determine jurisdiction for a merger filing for a joint venture (JV). Instead, mandatory notification depends entirely on whether the formation or alteration of the JV involves an acquisition of shares, assets, or control that satisfies the statutory thresholds.
Jurisdictional Assessment: Incorporated Versus Unincorporated
Incorporated JVs (share acquisitions)
The creation of, or entry into, a corporate JV vehicle is assessed as an acquisition of shares. If a JV partner acquires practical control (under section 50AA of the Corporation Act 2010 (Cth)) or crosses the new quantitative voting power thresholds (eg, >20% or ≥50%), the transaction is notifiable if financial thresholds are met. Under the 2026 “connected entity” rules, a JV partner’s broader corporate group revenue is aggregated into the threshold test. This means the formation of a brand-new, zero-revenue JV can trigger a mandatory filing if the parent companies are large.
Unincorporated JVs (asset acquisitions)
Unincorporated JVs (UJVs) need to be considered as potential asset acquisitions. Because the 2026 regime utilises a broad definition of “assets” (capturing legal and equitable rights, land and IP), contributing assets to a JV, or acquiring a participating interest in a UJV’s asset pool, can trigger a mandatory filing if the “discrete asset” transaction value thresholds are met. If the formation of a UJV involves the transfer of property, pooling of physical assets or the granting of specific legal rights (such as IP licences) then a threshold assessment should be undertaken. If a UJV is strictly a contractual arrangement involving no transfer of property, no acquisition of legal or equitable rights and no structural integration of assets, it will fall outside the mandatory merger notification regime but will remain subject to the general restrictive trade practices provisions of the CCA.
Substantive Assessment: Fully Functional Versus Non-Fully Functional
While functionality does not dictate whether a business must file, it will affect how the ACCC reviews the competitive risk during the clearance process.
Fully functional JVs
If the JV operates as an autonomous economic entity on a lasting basis (acting independently of its parents), the ACCC assesses it primarily under the traditional section 50 merger test. The focus is structural and will examine whether the removal of the parents as independent competitors, or the creation of the new JV entity, will substantially lessen competition.
Non-fully functional JVs
If the JV is not a standalone business, such as a pure R&D syndicate, a joint purchasing vehicle, or a cost-sharing production JV that passes all output back to the parents to sell independently, the ACCC may view the arrangement as highly susceptible to behavioural co-ordination. While the initial formation of the JV might trigger a mandatory merger filing via the asset or share thresholds, the ACCC will also scrutinise the underlying JV agreements for “spill-over” effects and assess whether the information sharing and operational collaboration required by the non-functional JV breaches Australia’s strict prohibitions against cartel conduct or anti-competitive agreements under Part IV of the CCA.
While below-threshold transactions are not legally required to be notified, they remain fully subject to the overarching prohibition in section 50 of the CCA against acquisitions that substantially lessen competition.
The ACCC retains a “call-in” power and actively monitors unnotified transactions and, if it identifies a potential substantial lessening of competition (SLC), it can seek an immediate injunction in the Federal Court to prevent closing. If the ACCC discovers a completed, unnotified transaction, its enforcement timeline is governed by two distinct statutory limitation periods, alongside a severe indefinite commercial risk:
As such, parties executing high-risk, below-threshold deals (particularly in concentrated markets) often still choose to notify voluntarily to obtain legal certainty.
Under the legislation, any notifiable acquisition completed without clearance is statutorily void by operation of law. This means the legal title to the acquired shares or assets is considered to have never validly transferred. Because this invalidity is automatic, it does not technically “expire”. Even if the ACCC’s six-year window to issue a fine lapses, the transaction remains legally defective. This exposes the merged entity to indefinite commercial risks.
For any transaction meeting the thresholds, implementation is strictly suspended. The transaction cannot be “put into effect” (legal title cannot transfer, and operational control cannot be assumed) until the ACCC grants formal clearance, or the statutory waiting period expires without ACCC intervention. Consequently, M&A transaction documents must now be drafted with robust suspensive conditions and clearly calibrated drop-dead dates.
As noted in 2.2 Failure to Notify, completing a notifiable transaction prior to clearance automatically voids the transaction under Australian law and exposes the corporate groups to significant civil penalties. Even in global, foreign-to-foreign transactions, ignoring the Australian suspensory obligation will invite severe enforcement action and immediate demands for structural unwinding. Given the regime is newly operational in 2026, the ACCC is highly motivated to demonstrate enforcement rigour and is expected to pursue immediate and public enforcement actions against any early gun-jumping violations.
There are no general statutory exceptions to the suspensory effect for standard M&A, private equity buyouts, or public bids.
However, the Notification Waiver effectively acts as a fast-track exemption mechanism. Parties can apply for a waiver for clearly benign deals (eg, combined market shares <5%, no nascent competition issues). The ACCC is statutorily required to determine a waiver within 25 business days, but early 2026 data indicates the ACCC is averaging a decision in approximately 11–12 business days. Once a waiver is granted, the suspensory obligation is extinguished.
In genuine “failing firm” scenarios, the ACCC will typically expedite its Phase 1 review, but the strict prohibition on closing remains until that expedited clearance is formally issued.
The ACCC is sceptical of global closing carve-outs (hold-separate or “ring-fencing” arrangements) designed to permit global closing before Australian clearance. The legislation prohibits the transaction from being “put into effect”. Unless the global transaction mechanics are structured so that the transfer of the Australian-connected entity or assets is legally severed, entirely delayed, and strictly conditional on local clearance, global closing risks exposure to severe gun-jumping penalties. It is recommended that parties engage with the ACCC early if contemplating such structures.
There is no statutory deadline to file a notification after signing an agreement. However, because the regime is suspensory, parties will typically file as early as possible. Notification must occur, and clearance must be received, prior to closing.
A legally binding agreement is not a statutory requirement to notify. Parties can file on the basis of a good-faith intention to proceed, evidenced by a mature memorandum of understanding, a signed letter of intent, or a well-advanced draft term sheet. The ACCC requires sufficient certainty regarding the transaction’s perimeter and structural parameters to conduct a definitive market assessment. If the commercial terms evolve materially between the lodged term sheet upon which the filing was based and the final executed agreement, the ACCC can declare the original notification as “materially incomplete” or inaccurate.
Public takeovers can be formally notified based on a public announcement rather than a definitive agreement, provided the offer includes strict regulatory conditions that prevent the legal transfer of shares prior to ACCC clearance. To manage hostile bids, acquirers can either utilise a specialised confidential waiver process for “surprise” takeovers before they are announced or file publicly using available public data, which may prompt the ACCC to compel the target to produce the required confidential material. These procedures have attracted criticism for being subject to various practical limitations and creating significant strategic challenges for bidders.
Filing fees are significant and increase with the complexity and value of a transaction. Under the 2025 Determination, the fee for an early Notification Waiver is AUD8,300. A standard Phase 1 notification costs AUD56,800.
If a matter proceeds to Phase 2, substantial additional fees apply based on transaction value:
Fees must be paid upfront upon lodgement of the relevant phase for the notification to be deemed valid. Exemptions exist for defined “small business entities”, which have revenues of
The obligation to notify rests with the “principal party”, which is the acquirer. However, target co-operation is practically essential, given the extensive information requirements.
Pathway Criteria and Documentation
Under the Competition and Consumer (Notification of Acquisitions) Determination 2025, the information burden on merging parties is rigidly dictated by the specific filing pathway utilised.
The Notification Waiver (for low-risk transactions)
The Short Form notification (the standard pathway)
The Long Form notification (for complex transactions)
The Public Benefit Application (the “Phase 3” pathway)
Administrative Formalities for Filing
Notarisation not typically required
Unlike many jurisdictions, the ACCC does not require formal notarisation or apostillation of transaction documents, corporate charts, or the notification form itself. The notification must include a formal declaration signed by an authorised officer or director of the notifying party. This declaration legally attests to the truth, accuracy, and completeness of the filing. Providing false or misleading information carries severe civil pecuniary penalties and allows the ACCC to immediately revoke any clearance granted.
Powers of attorney (POAs) not required
A formal, notarised deed of power of attorney is not required if an external legal representative (such as a law firm) is lodging the notification via the ACCC’s online portal on behalf of the acquiring or target entity. Instead, the notification forms require the explicit identification of the legal representative and their contact details.
Translation requirements
The ACCC conducts its reviews exclusively in English. The ACCC’s guidelines mandate that all foreign-language documents must be accompanied by a certified English translation. Failure to provide complete English translations at the time of lodgement will result in the ACCC declaring the notification “materially incomplete”.
If a notification is incomplete, the ACCC will reject it, and the statutory clock will not commence. If a notifying party supplies inaccurate or misleading information, they face severe civil penalties under the CCA and potential criminal prosecution under the Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth). The ACCC also possesses the statutory power to revoke any clearance that was granted on the basis of materially false or misleading information, rendering the completed transaction void retroactively.
The ACCC’s administrative review is strictly time-bound:
Overall timelines can be extended by mutual agreement or suspended via statutory “stop the clock” mechanisms if the parties fail to answer formal information requests promptly.
The legislation imposes a strict 14 calendar-day hold period during which the parties are legally prohibited from putting the transaction into effect, which commences on the date the ACCC publishes its formal reasons for the decision on the public Acquisitions Register.
Pre-notification engagement is highly encouraged, particularly for complex transactions. These discussions are confidential and are vital for agreeing on the scope of required data and narrowing the plausible market definitions before formally starting the statutory review timeline.
Requests for information (RFIs) are frequent and can be extensive, particularly in Phase 2. The ACCC routinely deploys its compulsory information-gathering powers (Section 155 notices) to request vast tranches of internal emails, data sets, and executive examinations. Such requests can be issued to the transaction parties and other market participants. Formal statutory RFIs automatically “stop the clock”, suspending the review timeline until the ACCC determines the merger parties have fully complied with the request.
The regime’s primary accelerated track is the Notification Waiver. Designed specifically for simple transactions lacking horizontal overlaps or vertical concerns, it is a fast, low-cost (AUD8,300) application.
The core substantive test is whether the acquisition would have the effect, or be likely to have the effect, of substantially lessening competition (SLC) in a relevant market in Australia.
As part of the legislative reforms that introduced Australia’s mandatory merger regime, the definition of SLC was expanded to include any transaction that “creates, strengthens or entrenches a position of substantial market power”. This significantly lowers the barrier for ACCC intervention, deliberately targeting dominant firms attempting to make incremental, consolidating acquisitions.
If a transaction fails the SLC test, the ACCC may alternatively clear it via the Phase 3 Public Benefit pathway if satisfied that the transaction generates a “net public benefit” that outweighs the anti-competitive detriment.
The ACCC maps affected markets by analysing horizontal overlaps, vertical supply chain integration, and conglomerate relationships. While there is no definitive statutory de minimis safe harbour that guarantees clearance, the ACCC’s Notification Waiver Guidelines indicate that combined shares below 5% in fragmented markets will rarely attract scrutiny.
The ACCC and the Australian Competition Tribunal primarily rely on domestic jurisprudence and decisional practice. However, they frequently draw upon analytical frameworks, market definition precedents, and economic theories of harm developed by the US Department of Justice (DOJ)/Federal Trade Commission (FTC), the European Commission, and the UK Competition and Markets Authority (CMA), particularly in rapidly evolving global digital, platform, and pharmaceutical markets.
The ACCC investigates traditional horizontal unilateral effects (such as the loss of direct rivalry), vertical foreclosure, and co-ordinated effects (facilitating collusion). The defining trend of 2026 is the ACCC’s aggressive scrutiny of “ecosystem” theories of harm and “killer acquisitions” with a particular focus on the elimination of potential or nascent competition. Furthermore, via the new look-back thresholds, the ACCC rigorously targets the aggregate, cumulative effect of “creeping” serial acquisitions by private equity roll-ups and large corporate groups. Beyond these, the ACCC is increasingly focused on portfolio effects, including how a merger might enable anti-competitive bundling or provide the merged entity with unfair access to commercially sensitive data of its rivals, further entrenching dominant market positions.
Procedurally, the mandatory regime enforces a strict separation: efficiencies are largely excluded from the initial SLC Determination review (Phase 1 and Phase 2) unless they are so significant that they enhance market rivalry. Private corporate synergies cannot be used to “offset” a loss of competition during this stage of the review. If a transaction is deemed anti-competitive, the parties may proceed to the Public Benefit Phase of the review process where the ACCC applies a “Net Public Benefit” test, weighing broader economic gains against the identified competitive harm. Standard operational efficiencies and other private benefits can only be raised during the Public Benefit Phase.
The ACCC is a pure competition and consumer regulator; it does not factor industrial policy, national security, or foreign subsidies into the SLC test. However, if parties seek clearance under the alternative “net public benefit” pathway, the ACCC can consider broader economic benefits, such as significant environmental sustainability gains, export promotion, or the preservation of regional employment. Foreign direct investment (FDI) and national security are strictly the purview of FIRB (see 9.1 Legislation and Filing Requirements).
See 2.10 Joint Ventures. The ACCC first assesses the structural impact of the JV on its specific market. Secondly, it examines the potential for the JV to facilitate illegal “spill-over” co-ordination between the parent entities in markets outside the JV’s scope. Any ancillary restraints restricting the parents from competing must be strictly necessary and proportionate to the JV’s legitimate functioning.
The 2026 regime fundamentally empowered the ACCC. It is no longer required to apply to the Federal Court to block a deal. If, at the end of Phase 2 (or the Public Benefit Phase), the ACCC is not satisfied that the transaction avoids an SLC (or lacks a net public benefit), it simply issues a formal administrative decision refusing clearance. This decision legally prevents the transaction from closing.
Parties can negotiate remedies (undertakings) throughout the review process subject to strict statutory deadlines. The ACCC has an overwhelming preference for structural remedies, specifically the divestiture of overlapping business units. Behavioural remedies (eg, access regimes, price caps, information barriers) are actively discouraged and are only accepted in circumstances where structural remedies are not feasible and the behavioural commitments require minimal ongoing regulatory monitoring. Under the primary SLC review, the ACCC strictly confines remedies to curing competition concerns. If parties apply for clearance under the Public Benefit pathway, the ACCC may accept remedies to guarantee broader non-competition economic benefits.
Remedies must completely and permanently alleviate the identified competition concerns to ensure that a transaction no longer substantially lessens competition in any relevant market. The legal standard is absolute: the remedy must restore or maintain the competitive dynamic that would otherwise be lost. The ACCC will not accept remedies that merely mitigate harm or introduce complex, fragile regulatory structures into the affected market(s).
Under the 2026 mandatory administrative regime, the procedural and legal mechanics of remedies have fundamentally shifted.
Timing of Negotiations and Strict Deadlines
Discussions regarding remedies can begin during the confidential pre-notification phase. However, if formal concerns arise during the review, the legislation imposes strict statutory deadlines for the merging parties to formally propose remedies:
If a proposal is submitted within these timeframes, it typically triggers an automatic “clock stop” to allow the ACCC to market-test the remedy with third parties. If not lodged within these timeframes, the ACCC is not obliged to consider the proposal.
The Power to Propose and Impose Conditions
A defining feature of the new 2026 regime is the shift in administrative power. The ACCC is no longer restricted to merely accepting or rejecting “undertakings” voluntarily offered by the parties. During the review, the ACCC can propose remedies on its own motion if it believes a specific structural fix is required to cure an SLC. The ACCC now holds the unilateral statutory power to grant a clearance subject to conditions. This means the ACCC can effectively impose remedies that were not entirely agreed to by the parties.
Parties’ Recourse to Imposed Conditions
If the ACCC issues a clearance subject to conditions (eg, a highly burdensome divestiture) that the merging parties find commercially unacceptable, the parties are not forced to complete the deal. They have two primary options, to:
The Tribunal, standing in the shoes of the decision-maker, also holds the power to impose conditions. It can affirm the ACCC’s imposed conditions, vary them to be more or less restrictive, or substitute its own clearance conditions entirely.
For transactions with clear and substantive competitive overlaps, deal teams will often initiate remedy discussions during the confidential pre-notification phase. Once the formal review begins, remedy proposals are subject to the statutory deadlines identified in 5.4 Negotiating Remedies With Authorities.
In 2026, the ACCC’s standard practice is to require an “upfront buyer” for any divestiture. The ACCC must approve the specific buyer, ensuring they possess the financial capacity, expertise and intent to be a vigorous competitor, before it grants clearance for the main transaction. If the ACCC permits divestiture post-completion, it imposes strict, confidential timelines (typically 3–6 months), overseen by an ACCC-approved independent divestiture manager.
Non-compliance with an accepted divestiture or behavioural undertaking exposes the relevant party to significant enforcement action and civil penalties as well as the possibility of the ACCC seeking court orders to unwind the transaction.
The ACCC issues formal, written administrative decisions. In the pursuit of transparency, both clearance and prohibition decisions, alongside a detailed statement of reasons, are published on the public Acquisitions Register. The ACCC works carefully with the merging parties to redact genuine business secrets and confidential commercial data prior to publication.
Since the mandatory regime only commenced on 1 January 2026, and Phase 2 reviews statutorily take 90 business days (plus “clock stops” for remedy negotiations), there has not yet been a high volume of completed remedy determinations. However, a number of complex cross-border and domestic transactions have been referred to Phase 2 reviews to resolve competition issues (with parties proposing remedies in some instances). If a foreign-to-foreign transaction triggers Australia’s notification thresholds and presents local competitive overlaps giving rise to competition concerns, the ACCC will routinely seek structural remedies and will not typically accept vague global commitments to resolve local issues post-completion.
An ACCC clearance decision generally encompasses standard ancillary restraints directly related to the transaction (eg, standard, reasonably tailored non-compete clauses on a seller to protect the acquired goodwill). However, the ACCC actively scrutinises these restraints. If it determines a non-compete is excessively broad in duration or geographic scope, it will declare it unnecessary, exposing the parties to prosecution under the CCA’s cartel and anti-competitive agreement provisions if they proceed with it. Highly unusual or restrictive ancillary arrangements should be flagged early in pre-notification.
Crucially, a merger clearance does not grant automatic immunity from the CCA’s cartel prohibitions. If an ancillary restraint is found to be “severable” and not strictly necessary for the protection of the acquired goodwill, it remains subject to independent enforcement. To manage this, parties with highly restrictive or non-standard restraints should consider seeking concurrent authorisation to ensure the entire deal structure is immune from future prosecution.
Third parties (competitors, customers, suppliers) are highly influential in the Australian merger review process. The ACCC actively solicits their views during the investigative and consultation phases, including in respect of remedies proposed by the merger parties. Commercial evidence from third parties regarding market dynamics often informs the ACCC’s SLC assessment. If the ACCC grants clearance, any third party with sufficient standing has a statutory right to appeal the ACCC’s decision to the Tribunal for a limited merits review.
The ACCC actively contacts third parties during the investigative phases of its review (with experience suggesting that this can also occur before a review formally commences). This ranges from informal telephone interviews to extensive written questionnaires. In complex Phase 2 reviews, the ACCC frequently utilises its compulsory powers to force third parties to produce internal data and testify under oath. Furthermore, any remedy proposed by the merging parties is strictly “market tested” with these third parties to verify its viability.
The 2026 regime prioritises transparency. Upon formal lodgement, the fact of the notification and a high-level summary of the transaction are published on the Acquisitions Register (unless strict exceptions for highly sensitive hostile takeovers apply). Information regarding Notification Waivers will not be published until after the ACCC has issued a decision. The ACCC is legally obliged to protect submitted commercial-in-confidence information, ensuring that business secrets, granular pricing data, and strategic plans remain strictly confidential and shielded from competitors. Information over which confidentiality claims are made should be clearly identified and justified in the notification.
The ACCC is deeply integrated into the global antitrust community and co-ordinates closely with the US DOJ/FTC, the European Commission, the UK CMA, and the New Zealand Commerce Commission (NZCC) on cross-border transactions. To facilitate specific, detailed discussions about a transaction’s competitive overlaps or global remedy packages, the ACCC requires the merging parties to provide explicit confidentiality waivers. Providing these waivers is standard practice to align global review timelines.
Parties dissatisfied with an ACCC administrative decision (eg, a prohibition, a rejection of proposed remedies or the imposition, scope or nature of any conditions imposed by the ACCC) can appeal to the Australian Competition Tribunal. This is a limited “merits review” where the Tribunal re-evaluates the economic facts and the law that forms part of the evidentiary record established during the ACCC’s investigation (with limited discretion to admit new material such as updated economic modelling or expert reports). The Tribunal can affirm, set aside the ACCC’s decisions and substitute with its own unconditional clearance, vary the conditions imposed or refer the matter back to the ACCC for reconsideration with directions.
The Federal Court of Australia’s jurisdiction is now strictly limited to judicial review to assess whether the Tribunal has made a fundamental error of law or breached procedural fairness, rather than re-litigating the commercial merits of a transaction.
An application for Tribunal review must be lodged within 14 calendar days after the ACCC publishes its formal statement of reasons on the public Acquisitions Register. Tribunal merits reviews are expedited by statute and must generally be completed within 90 calendar days, though complex matters involving vast economic evidence may see extensions. As the administrative decision-making regime only commenced on 1 January 2026, there is limited precedent regarding appeals under the new framework, though the Tribunal has historically shown a willingness to overturn the ACCC on complex economic definitions.
Under the 2026 mandatory regime, third parties have a direct statutory right to appeal an ACCC clearance decision on its merits to the Tribunal. To lodge an appeal, a third party (eg, a competitor, supplier, customer or industry association) must demonstrate that they have sufficient interest or standing in the matter. The Tribunal will assess whether a third party’s commercial interests or the broader competitive dynamics of their market are materially impacted by the ACCC’s decision to clear a transaction.
Australia operates a stringent, separate FDI regime under the Foreign Acquisitions and Takeovers Act 1975 (FATA). Foreign persons must generally notify FIRB and receive a “no objection” notification before acquiring substantial interests in Australian entities (often triggered at 20%), agricultural land, or sensitive national security businesses. FIRB assesses transactions against a broad “national interest” test, encompassing national security, taxation compliance, and the character of the investor.
While the ACCC and FIRB regimes operate under separate statutory frameworks, their practical interaction was restructured on 1 January 2026 to streamline the “competition limb” of FIRB’s national interest test. While the Treasury delegates the substantive competition assessment to the ACCC, the Foreign Investment Portal was concurrently upgraded (in late 2025) to include an increased scope of mandatory competition questions in the initial FIRB application to serve a specific triage function.
The FIRB application now mandates that foreign investors declare whether the transaction will be formally notified to the ACCC (or if a waiver is being sought). If so, FIRB relies on the ACCC’s assessment, and the newly expanded FIRB questions act merely to establish the parallel processing timeline. If a foreign investor indicates the deal falls below the ACCC’s mandatory thresholds and will not be notified, the expanded FIRB application requires the investor to disclose specific data on horizontal overlaps, target market operations, and major Australian customers. The Treasury uses these new data points to determine if a sub-threshold transaction raises sufficient competition concerns (such as creeping acquisitions or local market entrenchment) to warrant a discretionary referral to the ACCC.
FIRB will generally issue a statutory “Suspension Notice”, pausing its own clock until the ACCC has issued its final administrative clearance. FIRB will not issue a final “no objection” notification until the ACCC process is fully resolved. To avoid unexpected inter-agency referrals late in the deal timetable, foreign investors increasingly utilise the ACCC’s “Notification Waiver” process to proactively secure ACCC sign-off and clear the competition limb for FIRB. Deal teams must align their regulatory conditionality provisions, suspensory timelines, and information disclosures across both agencies from day one.
Level 14, 60 Martin Place
Sydney
NSW 2000
Australia
+61 2 9020 5618
+61 2 8248 5899
mgrime@thomsons.com.au www.thomsons.com.au
Australia’s Mandatory Merger Regime: Execution Risk and Strategy for Global Dealmakers
Introduction
Australia’s shift to a mandatory, suspensory merger control regime from 1 January 2026 marks the most significant overhaul of its competition law in decades. The reform replaces Australia’s long-standing voluntary, informal clearance model with a system that requires notification of transactions that meet prescribed thresholds and prevents completion until the Australian Competition and Consumer Commission (ACCC) has completed its review. The new regime, administered by the ACCC under the Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (Cth), is intended to give the regulator earlier visibility of potentially anti-competitive acquisitions, reduce the risk of harmful transactions completing before scrutiny occurs, and create a more structured and transparent review process.
Under the previous system, parties often engaged with the ACCC on a voluntary basis, but there was no general obligation to notify and no automatic prohibition on closing while review was underway. That approach gave parties flexibility, but it also depended heavily on self-assessment and informal engagement. Critics argued that the model created uncertainty, allowed some transactions to proceed without effective review, and made it harder for the ACCC to address cumulative consolidation, including serial acquisitions and roll-up strategies. The new regime responds to those concerns by introducing mandatory thresholds, a formal waiver pathway, public disclosure and a multi-phase review framework.
Early data and market feedback reveal both successes and emerging challenges: the new system is workable, but it requires more front-end discipline than many parties initially expected. Longer pre-signing workstreams; earlier escalation of competition issues to boards and investment committees; and more detailed diligence on overlaps, governance rights and prior acquisitions are becoming increasingly prevalent matters before transaction documents are settled. Data also suggests that the burden is falling unevenly across sectors. Infrastructure, healthcare, retail and other sectors with local market issues, repeat acquisitions or public sensitivity are seeing the greatest change in process and timing, while clearly low-risk transactions can still move quickly if the filing analysis is prepared well.
Comparative context for global dealmakers
At a high level, Australia now shares with the European Union and the United States a mandatory and suspensory approach for transactions that meet prescribed thresholds. In each of those systems, parties must identify whether a filing obligation is triggered and, if so, must wait for clearance before completing. All three jurisdictions (along with the UK) now expect parties to engage earlier, produce better evidence and anticipate a more sceptical review environment than was common a decade ago. All place increasing emphasis on internal documents, market realities and the possibility that a transaction may affect future competition, not just present market shares. All also create meaningful execution risk where the filing analysis is left too late or where the parties assume that a modest transaction value means low regulatory interest.
However, Australia’s framework retains distinctive features, including its revenue-based thresholds, the prominence of waivers for low-risk transactions, and the specific focus on serial acquisitions through the three-year look-back. The threshold design is one of the clearest points of divergence. Australia’s revenue focus can capture businesses with a limited physical footprint but meaningful Australian sales.
Review timelines also differ in ways that affect transaction planning. Australia’s early experience suggests relatively quick outcomes for straightforward matters, with Phase 1 notifications often resolved within about 20 business days and waivers averaging about 11–12 business days. For global dealmakers, the key point is that formal statutory timetables do not tell the whole story. In all four jurisdictions, the practical timetable depends heavily on preparation time, information quality and the regulator’s appetite for market testing. The ACCC’s Acquisitions Portal and public register make front-end completeness especially important.
In short, Australia’s new regime is neither an outlier nor a replica of overseas systems. For cross-border transactions, those differences matter not only for filing analysis, but also for signing strategy, document preparation, public communications and the allocation of regulatory risk. The practical implications are clear. First, Australian analysis now needs to begin alongside EU and US analysis, not after it. Secondly, serial acquisition records and portfolio mapping are becoming globally relevant, because several regulators are paying closer attention to acquisition patterns over time. Australia’s new merger control regime has heightened scrutiny of private equity and venture capital transactions, particularly where serial acquisitions or minority shareholdings may raise competition concerns. Thirdly, public disclosure settings differ across jurisdictions, so communications strategy must be co-ordinated carefully. Fourthly, transaction documents need enough flexibility to deal with divergent review paths, including the possibility that one regulator clears quickly while another requires a longer or more intensive process. For global dealmakers, the key takeaway is that Australia should now be treated as a core workstream in cross-border merger planning, with its own timing, evidence and execution demands.
Early trends show a surge in filings
In the first quarter of 2026, the ACCC received 50 merger notifications and 108 waiver applications. This volume exceeded expectations, particularly for waiver applications, which averaged 38 per month, more than four times the ACCC’s pre-regime estimate. Most notifications (91%) were resolved within 20 business days, with Phase 1 approvals averaging 18–19 business days and waivers averaging 11–12 business days. Only two notifications progressed to Phase 2 review (Ampol/EG and Coles/Kalgoorlie) during this period. At the time of writing, a further four matters (MicroStar Logistics/Konvoy, Insurance Australia Group/RAC, Peter Warren/Wakeling Automotive and Trescal/TR Calibration) progressed to Phase 2 on 1 April, 16 April, 2 June and 30 June, respectively. Ampol/EG was cleared, subject to remedies, on 2 June 2026, Peter Warren/Wakeling Automotive was withdrawn by the parties on 15 June 2026, and after close to seven months from the notification date the ACCC opposed Coles/Kalgoorlie on 1 July 2026.
The scale of early filing activity appears to reflect several overlapping drivers. First, parties have responded conservatively to a new mandatory regime with uncertain boundaries. Where threshold application, the three-year look-back, or the degree of Australian nexus is not straightforward, many parties appear to be filing defensively rather than relying on self-assessment. Secondly, waiver applications have become an attractive risk-management tool for transactions that are likely to be benign but still raise enough uncertainty to make a no-file position uncomfortable. The fee differential and shorter average review period make the waiver pathway commercially appealing for low-risk transactions, particularly where parties want a formal outcome without incurring the cost and delay of a full notification. Thirdly, advisers appear to be encouraging early engagement while market practice is still forming, especially for PE sponsors, serial acquirers and foreign buyers who are less willing to test the edges of a new civil penalty regime.
Although the early clearance statistics are encouraging, they do not necessarily mean the system is light-touch. A high volume of short-form matters still require triage, information review, market testing in appropriate cases, and internal allocation of staff across notifications, waivers and more complex reviews. ACCC commentary to date has been broadly positive about the regime’s early operation, but the data also suggests that procedural filtering is doing substantial work. The waiver process, in particular, functions as a gatekeeping mechanism that allows the ACCC to separate clearly low-risk matters from transactions that warrant more extensive scrutiny. That may preserve resources for more complex cases, but it also shifts a meaningful evidentiary burden onto parties at the front end.
Procedural gatekeeping and execution risk
Procedural gatekeeping is becoming a defining feature of the new regime. The practical question is no longer only whether a deal raises competition issues. It is also whether the parties can assemble enough evidence, early enough, to satisfy the ACCC’s filing requirements and support the chosen pathway. In practice, that means transaction teams are doing more competition analysis before signing, not after. They are mapping overlaps earlier, testing aggregation issues across portfolio companies, preparing internal documents with greater care, and building longer lead times for data collection and drafting. Parties are increasingly treating waiver applications as substantive advocacy documents rather than as an administrative formality.
That front-end discipline is reshaping deal timetables and transaction strategy. The process now requires parties to engage earlier and more thoroughly, with clear procedural steps and defined review phases. Long-stop dates, regulatory co-operation obligations and risk-allocation provisions are being adjusted to reflect the possibility that a seemingly straightforward deal may need to restart through a formal notification process if the waiver pathway is not available. For auction processes, this can affect bidder credibility and execution certainty, particularly where one bidder has a more complicated overlap profile than another.
The ACCC’s Acquisitions Portal has become central to this gatekeeping function. It standardises intake, structures the information the ACCC receives at the outset, and makes completeness and presentation more important than under the old informal system. It removes a degree of discretion parties once had in terms of shaping the competition narrative. The public register also adds a further strategic dimension. Publication within one business day of lodgement (or more technically, a filing being accepted) materially changes the procedural risk profile. Competitors, customers, suppliers and the media can now identify transactions almost immediately, often before parties would previously have expected market awareness. Parties now need to align ACCC filing strategy with a public announcement strategy, investor messaging and stakeholder management. It has also increased the importance of anticipating third-party complaints at the time of filing and the wording of transaction descriptions, the treatment of confidential information and the sequencing of external communications.
To successfully navigate the ACCC’s formal intake process, deal teams must pivot from post-signing compliance to front-end execution. This includes mapping global revenue streams in a way that specifically segments the location of Australian customers and end-users, and ensuring up-to-date records of all global bolt-ons, minority stakes and asset acquisitions completed by a corporate group or PE sponsor over the preceding 36 months. At a practical level, investors need to assess the cumulative impact of their portfolio holdings and prepare for increased information requests.
Strategic filing choices
While the cost and timeline differentials make the waiver pathway the default starting preference for low-risk deals, the reality of an 8% non-approval rate introduces the risk of a procedural “restart”. Parties must now carefully assess whether to pursue a waiver or proceed with notification, balancing speed and certainty. The new framework makes this decision more consequential, as each pathway has distinct implications for timing and disclosure. For cross-border bidders competing for Australian assets, regulatory certainty is a commercial differentiator.
The evidentiary burden for waivers is also high: applications must affirmatively demonstrate no plausible competition risk, with detailed market and geographic analysis. For example, a PE sponsor with multiple portfolio companies must map all potentially overlapping or vertically related activities in Australia. This is a non-trivial exercise for large, diversified groups. In high-stake settings, filing a comprehensive Phase 1 notification can demonstrate to a seller that a buyer has mapped overlaps, compiled the necessary data, and initiated a more definitive clearance pathway providing greater regulatory certainty relative to the reasonably modest incremental information requirements attached to a Phase 1 filing.
Early transactions illustrate how these choices are playing out in practice. Ampol/EG and Coles/Kalgoorlie are useful public examples because both moved beyond the quick-clearance cohort and into Phase 2 review. Transactions involving obvious local overlaps, concentrated retail catchments or politically visible sectors are less likely to be treated as routine. The practical lesson is that parties should not assume that a transaction is low risk merely because it is modest in value or limited to a small number of sites. If the deal affects a concentrated local market, the safer course may be to prepare from the outset for a full notification, longer timetable and more detailed third-party testing.
By contrast, many low-risk transactions appear to have used the waiver pathway successfully where the parties could present a clear and well-supported no-issues narrative. In practice, that tends to involve a disciplined submission that identifies the relevant products and geographies, quantifies overlaps, explains why customers have credible alternatives, and addresses any vertical links or portfolio effects before the ACCC asks. Early experience suggests that waiver applications work best where the parties do the analytical work upfront and present the transaction as one that can be screened out quickly on objective evidence rather than assertion.
Taken together, these examples show four emerging patterns. First, local concentration and visible overlaps can push even relatively contained transactions into deeper review. Secondly, waivers are most effective where the parties can prove the absence-of-competition concern with concrete evidence at the outset. Thirdly, serial acquirers and diversified groups need repeatable internal processes for threshold testing, look-back analysis and document collection. Filing strategy being treated as a commercial differentiator in deal execution is the fourth. Bidders and buyers who can explain their ACCC analysis clearly, identify likely timing with some confidence and show that they have already gathered the necessary information are viewed more favourably by sellers and financiers.
Ambiguity and legal uncertainty remain
Several areas of the new regime remain under-analysed and continue to present practical challenges for merger parties and their advisers.
“Connection with Australia” test
The boundaries for foreign-to-foreign deals with indirect Australian effects remain a significant source of execution risk. ACCC materials indicate that the regime is intended to capture acquisitions with a real Australian commercial nexus, but they do not yet provide bright-line guidance for all indirect supply models. The focus on revenue rather than physical presence means that asset-light multinationals, such as software-as-a-service and digital businesses, can inadvertently trigger the mandatory thresholds. Determining whether a sufficient nexus exists requires a careful examination of the facts and a cautious approach where Australian revenue, customers or assets can be identified, even if the legal structure is entirely offshore. The implication for deal structuring is that parties may need to do diligence on Australian touchpoints much earlier, expand conditions precedent to cover filing uncertainty, and allow more time for internal revenue tracing and nexus analysis, particularly in a multi-jurisdictional context.
Minority stakes: “control” versus “voting power”
Objective “bright-line” voting power thresholds tests have been introduced alongside the general control test, mandating notification for share acquisitions that cross specified quantitative limits, regardless of whether a qualitative change of control occurs. These thresholds were introduced to capture minority stake-building and creeping acquisitions that were previously difficult to regulate. Although introduced to provide greater clarity, the distinction remains difficult in transactions involving governance rights rather than outright ownership and the expectation is that the ACCC will continue to look closely at governance rights, negative controls and practical influence rather than shareholding percentage alone. That creates uncertainty for deal teams structuring minority investments, joint ventures and staged acquisitions and parties may need to simplify governance rights, ring-fence competitively sensitive information, or separate initial and follow-on investments more clearly if they want to reduce filing risk.
Serial acquisitions and look-back
The mechanics of the three-year look-back and substitutability for aggregation have fundamentally transformed risk assessment for private equity sponsors and platform roll-up strategies. Deal teams should be aware that even non-controlling stakes can trigger review if they confer material influence or are part of a broader investment strategy. The legal ambiguity centres on substitutability. If a decentralised private equity fund acquires a minor European component supplier that has a small Australian market presence, that deal may be aggregated with an entirely separate portfolio company’s Australian acquisition from two years prior. ACCC guidance makes it clear that serial acquisitions are a policy focus, but it leaves substantial room for judgement on how substitutability should be assessed in mixed-service or local-market settings. Parties undertaking such transactions should expect close scrutiny of internal documents, board papers and market descriptions. The practical consequence is that serial acquirers need repeatable compliance systems, centralised records and a disciplined methodology for assessing overlap across prior deals.
Implications for doing deals in Australia
Australia’s new merger regime has also profoundly changed procedural risk associated with doing deals with an Australian nexus.
FIRB and ACCC parallel processing
Foreign investors must now navigate a more complex dual-regulatory pathway where Foreign Investment Review Board (FIRB) and ACCC approvals may both be critical to execution. In many transactions, particularly cross-border acquisitions of Australian businesses or assets, the practical issue is not simply whether each approval is required, but how the two processes interact in timing, information flow and deal certainty. Although dual regulatory requirements also existed under the previous ACCC regime, published guidance on FIRB and ACCC co-ordination remains limited, and there is no single official playbook for dual-track approvals under the two regimes.
Although FIRB and ACCC reviews are different, there is increasingly substantial overlap in the factual material needed to support each application. Consistency of narrative across FIRB and ACCC applications is essential, as regulators increasingly share information. Divergence in submissions can trigger extended reviews or information requests, making alignment critical for efficient processing. Because these two regulators share information behind the scenes and will not always require confidentiality waivers to do so, any divergence in narrative will almost always trigger extended reviews or information requests.
The risk of divergent outcomes is a more difficult issue. A transaction may be acceptable to FIRB subject to conditions, but still face extended ACCC review. Equally, a deal may raise no material competition concern but still attract FIRB scrutiny because of the acquirer’s ownership profile, the nature of the target’s assets or broader policy sensitivities. This means parties cannot assume that clearance from one regulator signals a smooth path with the other. There is evidence of longer deal timelines and more cautious structuring, including the use of conditional agreements and break fees to manage regulatory uncertainty. Deal documentation must also address the possibility that one approval arrives quickly while the other is delayed, conditional or refused. Early engagement with advisers and regulators is critical to mitigate delays and avoid unexpected intervention.
Litigation risk: statements of reasons and follow-on actions
The ACCC now publishes detailed statements of reasons for its merger decisions, increasing transparency but also creating a more usable record for private litigants. In practical terms, a competitor, customer, supplier or class action claimant may seek to rely on the ACCC’s published analysis to frame pleadings, test causation theories, support an interlocutory application or justify targeted discovery. Even where the statement of reasons is not determinative evidence of liability, it can narrow the issues in dispute and give private parties a roadmap to the transaction rationale, market definition issues, internal documents likely to exist, and the third parties the ACCC considered important.
This has significant implications for the way in which merger parties draft submissions, internal documents and advocacy. The management of confidential information must also be precise and well supported by explanations as to why public disclosure would be harmful. Parties should prepare for discovery risk at the time of filing. This means maintaining a clear record of what has been provided to the ACCC, who approved key statements, what data underpins market-share estimates, and how internal documents were selected and explained.
The practical lesson is that merger filings now have a dual audience. They are directed to the ACCC, but they may later be read by courts, private litigants, counterparties and the media. Parties should therefore treat the preparation of submissions, confidentiality claims and public messaging as part of a broader litigation-risk exercise, not only a regulatory approval process. A co-ordinated disclosure strategy and disciplined document management are now central tools for reducing the downstream risk created by detailed public statements of reasons.
Mid-market and asset-light deals
Parties may assume that a business with few Australian employees or assets falls outside the regime, only to find that revenue thresholds are met and the filing analysis is more complex than expected. This has been a particular issue for technology, healthcare services and other sectors where value is driven by contracts, data, brand or network effects rather than brick-and-mortar operations. The implication is that threshold analysis must focus on revenue and commercial activity, not only legal entity structure or asset footprint. For deal structuring, this means parties may need to build merger control diligence into transactions that would previously have been treated as too small or too offshore-facing to raise Australian filing issues.
Conclusion
The new system is workable but demands greater front-end discipline to manage significant evidentiary and procedural burdens. Early experience suggests that the regime is already changing transaction behaviour in durable ways: timetables are longer at the front end, information gathering is more intensive, and risk allocation is being negotiated with greater specificity. Sector experience in infrastructure, healthcare, retail and other revenue-driven or locally concentrated markets shows that the practical burden is highest where overlap analysis, serial acquisitions or public sensitivity are difficult to assess quickly.
The main lesson from the first wave of filings is that execution certainty now depends heavily on preparation. Dealmakers should prioritise early competition analysis, robust evidentiary support, disciplined internal information collection and careful risk allocation in deal documentation. They should also treat ACCC filing strategy, public communications and broader regulatory planning as linked workstreams rather than separate tasks. Ongoing monitoring of ACCC guidance, published decisions and market surveys will be essential as practice develops and parties refine what a well-prepared filing looks like under the new regime.
Level 14, 60 Martin Place
Sydney
NSW 2000
Australia
+61 2 9020 5618
+61 2 8248 5899
mgrime@thomsons.com.au www.thomsons.com.au