As an EU Member State, France implements in its legal system the sanctions decided by the Council of the EU.
The sanctions sector in France has therefore continued to expand over the last 12 months due to the numerous evolutions in EU sanctions in the context of the war in Ukraine, both legally, with new sanctions packages, additional sectors targeted (such as the diamond mining sector in December 2023) and further listings of Russian and Belarusian natural and legal persons, as well as judicially, with decisions of the General Court of the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) regularly published that contribute to defining and framing the notions, principles and rules applicable to sanctions.
Most notably, the Council of the EU created new listing criteria in June 2023, targeting immediate family members of alleged leading businesspersons, persons who allegedly facilitate circumvention of, or significantly frustrate, EU sanctions against Russia, and companies operating in the IT sector that hold a licence from the Russian security service, the FSB.
Regarding ancillary proceedings to sanctions, reporting obligations have become stricter, as detailed below. The EU has also decided to authorise the utilisation of extraordinary profits generated by immobilised assets of the Central Bank of Russia to finance its support to Ukraine’s defence efforts, under Regulation (EU) 2024/1469 from May 2024. Additionally, circumvention of sanctions has become a European criminal offence, pursuant to Directive (EU) 2024/1226 adopted in April 2024.
Hence, the legal framework concerning sanctions both directly and indirectly has developed and expanded throughout the last year.
The top trends in France concerning sanctions in the last 12 months were all due to the expansion and development of tools regarding EU sanctions, including:
All sectors targeted directly by EU sanctions pursuant to Council Decision 2014/512/CFSP and Council Regulation (EU) No 833/2014 are affected in the EU, including in France, such as finance, banking, dual-use goods and diamond mining.
Sectors in which natural persons who are under sanctions are involved or used to be involved are also affected, as third-party actors refuse to work with all natural and legal persons even remotely linked to them, even if these links belong to the past. In particular, this concerns sectors such as fertilisers, oil, coal and IT.
France implements both individual sanctions, targeting natural and legal persons, and sectoral sanctions, decided at the UN, EU and national levels.
Individual sanctions include travel bans and freezing of assets, and sectoral sanctions include embargoes and other restrictions on the export and import of certain goods.
The scope of sanctions applied by France as an EU Member State can be considered quite broad (although less broad than the scope of US sanctions, for example, because the EU does not apply secondary sanctions) as EU sanctions must be complied with in all the following cases:
In France, sanctions are imposed at three different levels:
The primary regulators for sanctions activity in France are:
Within both ministries, sub-entities handle the different aspects of sanctions:
As such, they are the competent authorities to enforce sanctions or grant derogations, and are the primary interlocutors for all sanctions-related issues in France.
In the EU, Member States are responsible for enforcing the sanctions created by the Council.
In France, the authorities responsible for enforcing all sanctions applied by France are the French Treasury, the Directorate General for Enterprise and the French Customs.
At the French Level
Article 459 of the French Customs Code criminalises having “contravened or attempted to contravene the laws and regulations governing financial relations with foreign countries, either by failing to comply with reporting or repatriation obligations, or by failing to observe prescribed procedures or formalities, or by failing to obtain the required authorisations or to meet the conditions attached to such authorisations”, and “contravening or attempting to contravene measures restricting economic and financial relations provided for by Community regulations adopted pursuant to Article 75 or 215 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union or by international treaties and agreements duly approved and ratified by France”.
These provisions encompass the breaching of sanctions as a criminal offence, whether the sanction comes from the French national sanctions regimes or from those ratified by France, ie, from the EU and UN.
Article 459 also provides for the criminalisation of incitement, by means of writing, propaganda or advertising, to commit one of the offences referred to above, whether or not the incited offence is actually carried out.
Potential penalties for breaching sanctions, for natural persons are:
Incitement to breach sanctions is punished by five years’ imprisonment and a fine of between EUR450 and EUR225,000.
Legal persons risk:
Article 459 specifies that “where, for any reason whatsoever, the objects liable to confiscation have not been seized or are not represented by the offender, or where the Minister for the Budget or his representative so requests, the Court must, in lieu of confiscation, order payment of a sum equal to the value of these objects”.
At the EU Level
In April 2024, the EU adopted Directive (EU) 2024/1226, which created the European criminal offence of violation of sanctions. In particular, Article 3 of the Directive provides for the following punishable behaviours:
(a) making funds or economic resources available directly or indirectly to, or for the benefit of, a designated person, entity or body in violation of a prohibition that constitutes a Union restrictive measure;
(b) failing to freeze funds or economic resources belonging to or owned, held or controlled by a designated person, entity or body in violation of an obligation that constitutes a Union restrictive measure;
(c) enabling designated natural persons to enter into, or transit through, the territory of a Member State, in violation of a prohibition that constitutes a Union restrictive measure;
(d) entering into or continuing transactions with a third State, bodies of a third State or entities or bodies directly or indirectly owned or controlled by a third State or by bodies of a third State, including the award or continued execution of public or concession contracts, where the prohibition or restriction of that conduct constitutes a Union restrictive measure;
(e) trading, importing, exporting, selling, purchasing, transferring, transiting or transporting goods, as well as providing brokering services, technical assistance or other services relating to those goods, where the prohibition or restriction of that conduct constitutes a Union restrictive measure, also if committed with serious negligence, at least where that conduct relates to items included in the Common Military List of the European Union or to dual-use items listed in Annexes I and IV to Regulation (EU) 2021/821;
(f) providing financial services or performing financial activities, where the prohibition or restriction of that conduct constitutes a Union restrictive measure;
(g) providing services other than those referred to in point (f), where the prohibition or restriction of that conduct constitutes a Union restrictive measure;
(h) circumventing a Union restrictive measure by:
(i) breaching or failing to fulfil conditions under authorisations granted by competent authorities to conduct activities which, in the absence of such an authorisation, amount to a violation of a prohibition or restriction that constitutes a Union restrictive measure.
Concerning penalties faced by natural persons, Article 5 of the Directive leaves some leeway to EU Member States but gives several indications concerning minimum levels of fine and terms of imprisonment, from one year to five years, as well as maximum terms of three years, depending on the offence committed.
It also provides for accessory criminal or non-criminal penalties or measures, which may include the following:
Concerning legal persons, Article 7 of the Directive provides for the following potential penalties:
Concerning fines, the Directive provides for minimum levels depending on the offence committed.
Although France’s legal system already criminalises the breaching of sanctions, it is likely that it will implement the wording of this new Directive in its own law, in order to make sure it complies perfectly with the Directive. It must do so within 12 months following its adoption, ie, before the end of April 2025.
Article 132-78 of the French Criminal Code provides for two mitigating circumstances that are applicable only to certain offences, when provided by law, namely:
At the EU level, Article 9 of Directive (EU) 2024/1226 provides for two different mitigating circumstances, and requires that Member States implement at least one in their legal system:
As French law is reluctant to take mitigating circumstances into account in general, and already provides for the first mitigating circumstance required by the Directive whereas the second one is a lot broader, it is likely France will not amend its law on this point.
Violations of sanctions, as provided by Article 459 of the French Customs Code cited above, are what is referred to in French law as formal offences, which, as opposed to material offences, are constituted by the mere characterisation of the behaviour, without the prosecution having to prove the underlying intent to actually violate sanctions. The French sanctions regimes therefore operate on the basis of strict liability.
Directive 2024/1226 of last April will not change this, as it also provides for such formal offences and therefore also operates on the basis of strict liability.
France applies the derogations provided by the Council of the EU’s Decisions and Regulations in its different sanctions regimes.
Currently, most of the sanctions-related matters concern Russia. In this regard, Council Decision 2014/145/CFSP and Council Regulation (EU) No 833/2014 of 31 July 2014 concerning restrictive measures in view of Russia’s actions destabilising the situation in Ukraine provide for several derogations to its sanctions, including:
Such derogations must be requested by the persons seeking them to the national competent authorities, ie, the French Treasury, the Directorate General for Enterprise or the French Customs, depending on the derogation sought.
By adopting Council Regulation (EU) 2022/2474 of 16 December 2022 amending Regulation (EU) No 833/2014 concerning restrictive measures in view of Russia’s actions destabilising the situation in Ukraine, the Council of the EU adopted a general prohibition of legal services to the Government of Russia or legal persons, entities or bodies established in Russia, as enshrined in Article 5(n)(2) of Regulation 833/2014.
However, at the time, it already provided for some derogations, and others were added by Council Regulation (EU) 2023/1214 of 23 June 2023 amending Regulation (EU) No 833/2014 concerning restrictive measures in view of Russia’s actions destabilising the situation in Ukraine. The most common ones can be found at paragraphs 5, 6, 9(a) and 9(b) to Regulation 833/2014 and are:
It is to be noted that an action for annulment has been initiated by the Ordre des Avocats à la cour de Paris, filed on 29 December 2022, in which the Geneva Bar intervened afterwards (it bears the case number T-798/22). The decision is strongly awaited by European legal practitioners, who deem this general prohibition on legal services as an infringement of legal professional privilege protected by Article 7 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union and the right to be advised by a lawyer protected by the second paragraph of Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union.
The Council of the EU imposes reporting obligations in its sanctions regimes, whereby such reports are to be made to the national competent authorities. The Council also provides the possibility to address such information directly to the Commission of the EU. In the context of Russia, it has created reporting obligations in both its individual and sectoral sanctions regimes.
Council Regulation (EU) No 269/2014 of 17 March 2014 concerning restrictive measures in respect of actions undermining or threatening the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine provides for reporting obligations, in its Articles 8 and 9, that weigh on both persons sanctioned and central securities depositories (CSDs).
As such, natural and legal persons, entities and bodies sanctioned, as well as CSDs, must:
Such information must contain at least:
In its FAQs, the Commission explicitly states the objective of such reporting obligations, which is to help ensure that those assets are traced effectively, to avoid circumvention of sanctions via evasion schemes. The Commission also recalls that non-compliance with such obligations would be treated as a breach of EU sanctions law, with criminal penalties provided by EU Member States being applicable.
Regarding sectoral sanctions, Council Regulation (EU) No 833/2014 of 31 July 2014 concerning restrictive measures in view of Russia’s actions destabilising the situation in Ukraine provides for some reporting obligations as well, in particular:
In the past three years, the most significant legal and judicial developments in France came from the EU restrictive measures decided against Russia since the beginning of the aggression over Ukraine in February 2022:
1. On 25 February 2022, the day after President Putin announced a military operation against Ukraine, the Council of the EU issued Council Decision (CFSP) 2022/329 amending Decision 2014/145/CFSP concerning restrictive measures in respect of actions undermining or threatening the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine, providing for travel bans and freezing of assets of targeted persons, and Council Decision (CFSP) 2022/331 listing 98 individuals for allegedly having supported the Russian Government’s decision to invade Ukraine, opening the door to what would be an unprecedentedly large sanctions regime, targeting thousands of natural and legal persons, under a dozen different and largely encompassing listing criteria.
2. The first order from the President of the General Court of the CJEU suspended the sanctions decided against Mr Nikita Mazepin, on 1 March 2023, which is significant as it was the first time the Court has granted an interim measure request in a sanctions case.
3. Directive (EU) 2024/1226, adopted in April 2024, criminalised violation and circumvention of sanctions at the EU level, showing the importance of restrictive measures for the EU, which is significant as it usually leaves criminal law and procedural matters for the Member States to decide.
The 14th package of sanctions was adopted on 24 June 2024, strengthening enforcement and anti-circumvention measures, and additional new sanctions packages are expected to be released in the upcoming months, as they have been regularly for the past two years.
On the judicial side, as the Court issues more and more decisions on applications for annulment of sanctions each month, of which some have already been appealed, legal practitioners and sanctioned persons are waiting for the appeal decisions to come out in the upcoming years, which should clarify the applicable rules, principles and notions.
The delisting process varies depending on the source of the sanction:
Concerning French sanctions, the procedures of recours gracieux and recours pour excès de pouvoir aim solely at obtaining removal from the list and do not authorise the judge to grant damages to the applicant. However, pursuant to Article L761-1 of the French Administrative Justice Code, the person concerned can ask the court to condemn the administration to pay them sums in addition to the costs of the proceedings, which resembles damages.
At the EU level, if the delisting is obtained before the Council, the name of the person is taken off the list. Even if the Court annuls someone’s listing, it will remain in place until the Council takes it off.
Once taken off the sanctions list, the person can ask for damages to the Court, under Article 340(2) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, which provides for the right of individuals or legal persons to obtain compensation for damages occurring by the non-contractual liability of EU institutions.
As of the time of writing, only one entity has obtained damages in the context of sanctions before the CJEU: in 2014, the Iranian company Safa Nicu Sepahan obtained EUR50,000 for non-material damage to its reputation (Judgment of 25 November 2014, Safa Nicu Sepahan Co. v Council, T-384/11, EU:T:2014:986).
At the French level, a person wishing to obtain their delisting must first request the Ministry of Europe and Foreign Affairs to reconsider its decision to sanction them (recours gracieux). The person concerned has two months after having been notified of the sanction to exercise their right. The administration then has two months to reply.
If the request is not granted, the person can make a recours pour excès de pouvoir against the administration’s refusal or silence. They then have two months if they are located in France, three months if they are in one of the French territories overseas, or four months if they are abroad, after the refusal of the administration to satisfy their request, to challenge such refusal.
At the EU level, a sanctioned person has two months to oppose their listing before the Court, from the publication or personal notification of the decision to include their name on the lists. Concerning the administrative procedure before the Council, there is no time limit to request reconsideration of its decision to target the person with restrictive measures.
Regarding time limits, there are none in the administrative procedure with the Council, which relists individuals periodically, every six months under its Russian sanctions regime and every year concerning the one for Belarus. In proceedings before the Court, there is no time limit for a ruling to be issued on the action for annulment, and as of the time of writing, delistings before both the Court and the Council have taken around two years.
Economic sanctions against Russia include a ban on providing and buying several services to Russia or Russian persons, including crypto-asset wallets, engineering, IT consultancy and legal advisory, brokering and trade secrets, as provided by Council Decision 2014/512/CFSP and Council Regulation (EU) No 833/2014, of 31 July 2014 concerning restrictive measures in view of Russia’s actions destabilising the situation in Ukraine.
Under Council Decision 2014/512/CFSP and Council Regulation (EU) No 833/2014 of 31 July 2014 concerning restrictive measures in view of Russia’s actions destabilising the situation in Ukraine, several goods are prohibited from being imported from or exported to Russia, such as oil and coal, liquefied propane, dual-use goods and technology for military use, navigational instruments, drone engines, chemicals, cement and asphalt, helium, diamonds and gold.
Under French law, pursuant to Article 1218 of the French Civil Code, three conditions have to be met for force majeure to be characterised as such and justify the suspension of the execution of someone’s contractual obligation:
In 2020, the French Supreme Court, the Cour de cassation, ruled that the freezing of a person’s assets under sanctions did not constitute a case of force majeure, as it did not meet the second condition (Cass., ass. plén., 10 juill. 2020, P+B+R+I, n° 18-18.542 et 18-21.814).
The opposite approach would have offered sanctioned persons the possibility of relying on the restrictive measures to justify non-compliance with their obligations as debtors, which would have hurt the sanctions’ legitimacy.
For French economic actors to avoid all detrimental effects of sanctions decided by France, the EU, the UN or even other countries such as the US whose sanctions are not supposed to bind French persons but tend to be complied with in practice, it is recommended to include a clause foreseeing the imposition of a sanction on them or their co-contractor, and providing for a solution should such a scenario occur.
When sanctions issues arise in cases of enforcement of French or foreign judgments in France, the French courts have adopted a classical approach, ie, examining whether the judge had jurisdiction to issue the decision concerned, whether the decision complies with French public order, and whether the decision does not contravene French law. If any of these conditions is not met, exequatur of the decision will not be given.
As UN, EU and national sanctions prohibit certain behaviours in France, such as the use of frozen assets for example, then a judicial decision that would provide for the transfer of money from a frozen bank account would not be recognised and executed.
A person that wishes to have a decision enforced in France could appeal the initial refusal, but with low chances of success, as the same law would remain applicable. The only recourse would be to ask for a derogation to the Treasury, or to wait for the sanctions to be lifted.
At the French level, it is the Minister for Europe and Foreign Affairs who decides to include names on France’s sanctions lists.
At the EU level, it is the Council of the EU, on the basis of proposals that come from and go through three working committees (COEST, RELEX and COREPER II), that decides which natural and legal persons to sanction.
In both regimes, the process is therefore entirely political.
Under Article 2(1) of Council Decision 2014/145/CFSP and Council Regulation (EU) No 269/2014 of 17 March 2014 concerning restrictive measures in respect of actions undermining or threatening the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine, “all funds and economic resources belonging to, or owned, held or controlled by” sanctioned natural and legal persons shall be frozen.
In its FAQs, the Commission of the EU explicitly states that for companies owned or controlled by listed persons, “it can be presumed that the control also extends to the assets of that entity, and that any funds or economic resources made available to that entity would reach or benefit the listed person”, and that therefore Article 2 would apply to them, which clearly amounts to an indirect designation of persons as a result of them being owned or controlled by another directly designated person, as although the Commission’s FAQs are not binding, they are strictly applied by all EU actors.
At the same time, the Commission recalls that this presumption can be rebutted, “if it can be demonstrated that some or all of its assets are outside the control of the listed person, and/or that funds or economic resources made available to it would in fact not reach or benefit the listed person”.
Concepts of ownership and control have created a lot of disputes before the court since their creation. To guide legal practitioners, the Commission has published two opinions on Article 2, on 19 June 2020 and 8 June 2021. Some guidance can also be found in EU Best Practices.
Article 459 of the French Customs Code provides for the criminalisation of having “contravened or attempted to contravene the laws and regulations governing financial relations with foreign countries, either by failing to comply with reporting or repatriation obligations, or by failing to observe prescribed procedures or formalities, or by failing to obtain the required authorisations or to meet the conditions attached to such authorisations”, and “contravening or attempting to contravene measures restricting economic and financial relations provided for by Community regulations adopted pursuant to Article 75 or 215 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union or by international treaties and agreements duly approved and ratified by France”.
The Code therefore encompasses circumvention of French, EU and UN sanctions, which are the only sanctions implemented in France.
At the EU level, and since April 2024, the circumvention of EU sanctions is also a criminal offence, pursuant to Article 3(h) of Directive 2024/1226, which details the behaviours targeted:
“(i) using, transferring to a third party, or otherwise disposing of, funds or economic resources directly or indirectly owned, held or controlled by a designated person, entity or body, which are to be frozen pursuant to a Union restrictive measure, in order to conceal those funds or economic resources;
(ii) providing false or misleading information to conceal the fact that a designated person, entity or body is the ultimate owner or beneficiary of funds or economic resources which are to be frozen pursuant to a Union restrictive measure;
(iii) failure by a designated natural person, or by a representative of a designated entity or body, to comply with an obligation that constitutes a Union restrictive measure to report to the competent administrative authorities funds or economic resources within the jurisdiction of a Member State, belonging to, owned, held or controlled by them;
(iv) failing to comply with an obligation that constitutes a Union restrictive measure to provide the competent administrative authorities with information on frozen funds or economic resources or information held about funds or economic resources within the territory of the Member States, belonging to, owned, held or controlled by designated persons, entities or bodies and which have not been frozen, where such information was obtained in the performance of a professional duty.”
As cited in 7.3.1 Prohibiting Provisions, Article 459 of the French Customs Code provides for the criminalisation of circumvention of sanctions, which is punished by the same penalties as for other violations of sanctions.
The same is true of Directive 2024/1226, which also considers circumvention of sanctions as a type of violation of sanctions at its Article 3.
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info@wjavocats.com www.wjavocats.com/en/Following the aggression against Ukraine, led by the Government of the Russian Federation, officially declared on 24 February 2022, the international community reacted in an unprecedentedly swift way. Among that community, the European Union, including France, was especially adamant in its desire to respond, condemn Russia and show its support towards its Ukrainian neighbours.
As part of these co-ordinated responses, the Council of the European Union, which gathers the heads of governments of the EU Member States, including France, amended Council Decision 2014/145/CFSP and Council Regulation (EU) No 269/2014 of 17 March 2014 concerning restrictive measures in respect of actions undermining or threatening the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine, initially adopted following the annexation of Crimea in 2014, adding new sectoral listing criteria and adding hundreds of new names to its individual sanctions lists.
Since then, between February 2022 and June 2023, the Council of the EU adopted 47 new Decisions and 47 corresponding Regulations concerning individual sanctions against Russian persons, 12 Decisions and 12 Regulations in the context of individual sanctions against Belarusian individuals and entities (related to Russia), and 22 Decisions and 22 Regulations targeting sectors of the Russian economy. As such, in two and a half years, the Council adopted 162 legal provisions in the context of the war in Ukraine.
Although a prompt response was needed and should be welcomed, such a rushed adoption of an abundance of legal provisions, adopted not even in the immediate aftermath of the event but while it is taking place, has caused legal errors, with many detrimental factual consequences for the natural and legal persons concerned. This is particularly true regarding individual listings, which impose travel bans and the freezing of assets on natural persons.
Faced with the fact that its sanctions did not bring an end to the aggression against Ukraine, the Council of the EU has, for over two years, continually broadened its listing criteria and the range of persons sanctioned, trying to put more and more pressure on the Government of the Russian Federation.
Initially focusing on direct allies of the regime, ie, individuals and entities that actually and directly support or benefit from it, the Council then turned to target more indirect support, such as leading businesspersons involved in sectors providing a substantial source of revenue to the Government of the Russian Federation, and now the immediate family members of said leading businesspersons operating in Russia, pursuant to Council Decision (CFSP) 2023/1094 amending Decision 2014/145/CFSP and Council Regulation (EU) 2023/1089 of 5 June 2023 amending Regulation (EU) No 269/2014 concerning restrictive measures in respect of actions undermining or threatening the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine.
This article will explain the Council’s shift in position from requiring an “association” with a leading businessperson to a simple family relationship (1), before highlighting the issues arising from such a wide criterion from practitioners’ point of view (2), and finally focusing on the expected judicial developments (3).
1. From an “association” to a simple family relationship
Even before this listing criterion was adopted targeting immediate family members, the Council had already included people on its sanctions lists on the basis of their family ties, such as Mrs Violetta Prigozhina, Mr Nikita Mazepin, Mrs Elena Timchenko, Mrs Galina Pumpyanskaya and Mr Alexander Pumpyanskiy.
This use of the criterion of association for family members of sanctioned persons was heavily criticised as breaching a well-established principle of the case law of the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU). Albeit concerning another sanctions regime, the CJEU had held in Tay Za v Council on 13 March 2012 that restrictive measures cannot be applied to natural persons irrespective of their personal conduct and for the sole reason of their family ties with persons associated with the management of the third country concerned. Sanctions can only be imposed on people who have a sufficient link with the targeted third country.
Referring precisely to this decision, on 1 March 2023, the General Court granted interim measures partially suspending the restrictive measures adopted against Mr Nikita Mazepin on the basis of an association with his father, and on 8 March 2023 annulled Mrs Violetta Prigozhina’s listing based on her association with her son. On the latter occasion, the General Court recalled that the criterion of association cannot be based solely on family ties and it must be demonstrated that the two individuals share “common interests”.
The definition was further refined in subsequent judgments, whereby the General Court for instance upheld the listings of Mrs Elena Timchenko and Mrs Galina Pumpyanskaya on 6 September 2023, recalling that the criterion must be understood “as covering natural or legal persons who are generally connected by common interests, without, however, it being necessary for there to be a relationship by means of an economic activity, but which cannot, nevertheless, be based exclusively on a family relationship”.
Most likely in reaction to the decisions of 8 March 2023, and still adamant that it wished to maintain the listings of family members of leading businesspersons operating in Russia, the Council created a new criterion targeting businesspersons’ “immediate family members” at Article 2(1)(g) of Decision 2014/145 (CFSP) cited above.
The rationale for the creation of said criterion is outlined in the Recitals of the Decision: “the Council has also assessed that leading Russian businesspersons have engaged in a systematic practice of distributing their funds and assets amongst their immediate family members and other persons, often in order to hide their assets, to circumvent the restrictive measures and to maintain control over the resources available to them. Therefore, the Council considers that immediate family members or other natural persons, who benefit in such a way from leading businesspersons operating in Russia, should also be designated as appropriate, in order to both increase pressure on the Government of the Russian Federation to bring an end to its war of aggression against Ukraine as well as to avoid the risk of circumvention of the restrictive measures” (Recital 5 of Council Decision (CFSP) 2023/1094 of 5 June 2023).
Until now, the General Court has not had to examine the legality of the sanctions against immediate family members of leading businesspersons in Russia. As of the time of writing, there is one decision that has been published in the case of a leading businessperson’s son, in the judgment of 20 March 2024, Nikita Mazepin v Council. The General Court annulled his listing based on errors of assessment made by the Council, without analysing the arguments related to the illegality of the criterion.
In light of the above, there are doubts as to whether the General Court, and the CJEU when it will inevitably have to deal with the question upon appeal, will validate the targeting of immediate family members of alleged leading businesspersons.
2. Issues from practitioners’ point of view
The creation of a criterion targeting immediate family members has raised many legal concerns, especially since the initial criterion targeting leading businesspersons on which it is dependent is also the source of many debates before the General Court of the CJEU.
The sanctions against leading businesspersons are not specific to the Russian sanctions regime, as the Council had already established a similar criterion targeting “leading businesspersons operating in Syria” in Articles 27(2)(a) and 28(2)(a) of Council Decision 2013/255/CFSP of 31 May 2013 concerning restrictive measures in view of the situation in Syria. The rationale for this criterion was the “close control exercised over the economy by the Syrian regime”, whose consequence is that “an inner cadre of leading businesspersons operating in Syria is only able to maintain its status by enjoying a close association with, and the support of, the regime, and by having influence within it”, as stated in Recital (5) of Council Decision (CFSP) 2015/1836 of 12 October 2015 amending Decision 2013/255/CFSP concerning restrictive measures against Syria.
In the framework of sanctions against Russia, there is no such presumption included in either Decision 2014/145 (CFSP) or Regulation (EU) No 269/2014 (and one could wonder whether such a presumption could indeed apply considering the stark difference between the Syrian and Russian economies and the fact that the latter was until February 2022 reasonably integrated with international and Western businesses).
The General Court nevertheless decided to uphold the legality of the criterion, finding for instance in the case Rashnikov v Council that “criterion (g) contains conditions relating to the personal conduct of the persons concerned, namely their influence, due to their economic activities in certain sectors, which makes it possible to establish a sufficient and subjective link between those persons and the third country concerned, in this case the Russian Federation”.
In the meantime, however, since 5 June 2023 the Council has decided to further broaden its criterion, now targeting “leading businesspersons operating in Russia” and “businesspersons…involved in economic sectors providing a substantial source of revenue to the Government of the Russian Federation”.
Although the possibility to target immediate family members is restricted to the first prong of this amended criterion, ie, to leading businesspersons operating in Russia, this expansion illustrates the quick and large evolution of the Council’s reach, allowing it to sanction more and more people who are seemingly more and more distant from the Russian regime.
The possibility for the Council to target family members of people sanctioned for conducting business activities is criticisable in itself, even if the Council did not make any error in its listings of such businesspersons. Once again, although it is true that the sanctioning of family members is not a novelty of the Russian sanctions regime, as it was already provided for in the sanctions legal framework for Syria, it was there restricted to the family members of Syrian officials, in a country where it had been established that the policymaking powers were held by only two families (Assad and Makhlouf), rendering this presumption acceptable as reflecting factual, close and direct links to the decision-making individuals.
This is not the case in Russia, and the Council, which bears the burden of proof, has not proven otherwise in any of its submissions to the Court in past or ongoing sanctions cases. The targeting of immediate family members of leading businesspersons therefore relies on two unproven presumptions, first, that leading businesspersons in Russia can influence the policymaking officials the way they could in Syria, and second, that they systematically try to circumvent sanctions through their relatives, as exposed in the Council’s Recital cited above. Such a situation cannot be considered as meeting the legal standards that should be met by an institution which has the power to impose legally binding consequences on people and third-party actors that are under the obligation to comply, otherwise facing at least civil penalties, and criminal convictions in most EU Member States. With Directive (EU) 2024/1226 obligating EU Member States to create an offence or adapt their already existing law to criminalise violation and circumvention of sanctions within the next 12 months, these third-party actors will soon be facing criminal convictions in the whole of the EU.
Moreover, the targeting of family members relies on a circumstance that is out of these secondarily sanctioned persons’ control, who are being punished not for an intentional conduct of their own but merely for being related to someone else who happens to be a successful businessperson in Russia. Therefore, they seemingly have no way out of their listing other than cutting ties with their relative, which would obviously be contrary to their fundamental right of a family life, as well as disproportionate. Their alternative is to hope for their relative’s listing to be reconsidered by the Council and/or annulled by the Court, in proceedings that take at least two years and can last a lot longer. This is obviously contrary to the principle of personal liability, which, although a criminal law principle, aims at protecting persons from being punished for conducts of others, which is precisely the case here for family members of leading businesspersons who are prevented from enjoying some of their most fundamental rights, merely for being related to someone else, under the pretext of preventing a simple risk of circumvention from occurring.
In this regard, as the Council has created a criterion that relies on the fear of a mere risk and not a noted reality, it renders the presumption applied to immediate family members of alleged leading businesspersons irrebuttable, as no one can prove the lack of existence of a risk. It makes it impossible for targeted relatives to challenge their listing, except for the ones who do not speak to their family anymore. Indeed, in all other contexts, there would always be a potentiality that family members help each other.
The issues raised by the sanctions on immediate family members of leading businesspersons operating in Russia are not solely legal or theoretical. The consequences on their day-to-day lives are not to be minimised. In practice, sanctioned persons cannot travel to or transit through the EU, and all of the assets they own in EU territory are frozen. For many of them, this means having to move abroad after having lived in Europe for several years, not being able to visit their family established in Europe, or having their real estate and other goods deteriorate without being able to do anything about it. Legally speaking, this constitutes a violation of several of their most fundamental rights and freedoms, such as the right to a private life, freedom of movement within the EU for those who have European citizenship, right to property, and freedom to conduct business.
As the Council likes to assert and repeat, sanctions are only provisional and temporary by nature, ie, these consequences remain acceptable as they are not permanent in time. However, challenging European sanctions takes at least two years, and is rendered almost impossible in the case of family members because of the presumptions used by the Council in its case. Most of the persons sanctioned in February 2022 are still listed today.
Because of the many errors likely to be committed and already committed, as acknowledged by the General Court in several cases in which several listings were annulled, these harsh consequences, which remain in place for several years, create a legally and factually unbearable situation.
3. Expected judicial developments
As mentioned above, the immediate family member criterion has not yet been examined, either by the General Court or by the CJEU. Although it is likely that the General Court will validate the Council’s reasoning and arguments, as it has done for all other listing criteria to date, it is possible that the CJEU, on appeal, might annul the creation of the listing criterion targeting immediate family members of leading businesspersons, for all the reasons explained above.
If it did not, in addition to being highly contestable for the same reasons, it would also be at variance with its own case law, as cited above in Tay Za, which explicitly affirmed its intent to restrict the scope of natural persons who can be sanctioned by the Council to those who have an obvious link to the regime targeted, by their own personal conduct, rendering a listing based solely on family links illegal.
The truth is that because of the combination of the listing criteria targeting leading businesspersons, and now their immediate family members, the Council can target every rich person in Russia. Although the Council claims this broad range is legitimised by its objective to put pressure on Russian decision-makers, and justified by its belief that leading Russian businesspersons have necessarily obtained that status because of a relationship of mutual support with the regime and that they have all at least tried to circumvent sanctions through their relatives, the General Court held that this was untrue, as demonstrated by the counterexamples of Mrs Prigozhina and Mr Mazepin mentioned above.
The recent targeting of Russian leading businesspersons, and now their families, has already started to create an overflow of challenges from sanctioned persons and their counsels. It is only the beginning of a thrilling judicial series, in which the Council’s legitimacy might not get away unscathed.
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