Sanctions 2025

Last Updated August 14, 2025

Belgium

Law and Practice

Authors



ACQUIS is a European law firm headquartered in Brussels renowned for its leading sanctions and compliance practice. ACQUIS offers a global outreach and serves clients across Europe, Asia and the USA. The firm’s sanctions team consists of seasoned sanctions and trade lawyers, compliance experts and government affairs specialists. The team regularly advises clients on global sanctions compliance, risk assessments, divestments, and sanctions-related commercial disputes. Furthermore, the team assists clients in delisting cases, including major multinationals in agricultural, technological or shipping sectors. ACQUIS’ experts are skilled in handling complex transactions and advising clients on optimal strategies for sanctions-related challenges.

Key Developments

The market in Belgium has been affected by EU sanctions developments in relation to the ongoing war in Ukraine. Between June 2024 and June 2025, the EU published six new sanctions packages impacting Russia alone. The 17th sanctions package targeting Russia was published in June 2024 and the 18th sanctions package is being discussed. There are also EU sanctions developments in relation to the conflict in the Middle East.

The latest Russia package includes asset freeze measures targeting state actors, private companies, and individuals linked to Russia and Belarus. It also involves sectoral sanctions measures targeting critical sectors such as LNG and oil, significantly reducing Russian oil and gas exports via the EU. The authors also notice increased restrictions on technology and dual-use goods exports to hinder military and technological advancements.

Impact on European Companies

European companies are facing higher compliance costs, operational challenges, disrupted supply chains, and significant financial losses from operations in Russia and Belarus.

Sanctions Sector Compared to 12 Months Ago

Over the past year, the volume of compliance queries related to Russia has remained steady, but enforcement activity has notably increased as the Russian sanctions regime matures and crosses the three-year mark. Enforcement remains uneven across member states, but there is a clear uptick in investigations, seizures, and asset-freezing measures, particularly in jurisdictions with stronger enforcement capacity.

At the same time, the focus of EU sanctions policy is diversifying. Iran has re-emerged as a priority target, following the adoption of a new sanctions regime, and enforcement attention is now also turning toward third-party entities, such as Chinese entities listed for facilitating circumvention of sanctions against Russia in the latest 16th and 17th sanctions packages.

Businesses have had time to adapt or restructure in jurisdictions such as the UAE and Turkey, and some continue restricted activities through third-country channels (an issue increasingly addressed by the EU in recent sanctions packages). For EU-based companies, novel business models and cross-border structures carry increased circumvention risks, which the Commission and national regulators have been actively highlighting through guidance and outreach.

Increased Use of Targeted Sanctions

Belgium supports sanctions adopted at the EU level. There is a significant shift towards more precise and focused sanctions targeting specific individuals, entities and sectors. This aims to reduce unintended humanitarian impact and adverse effects, while exerting maximum pressure on the designated targets.

Co-Ordination With International Partners

The EU has increasingly aligned its sanctions efforts with international partners, particularly the USA, the UK, and other G7 nations. This enhanced co-ordination is designed to boost the effectiveness of sanctions and limit the scope for sanctions evasion.

Looking ahead, predicting alignment is becoming more complex, particularly as diverging US positions, after the election of the Trump administration, could weaken the EU–US–UK consensus that has shaped sanctions policy (in particular towards Russia since 2022).

Use of Sanctions for Human Rights Violations

Sanctions are being applied more frequently to combat human rights violations. The EU has utilised its Global Human Rights Sanctions Regime – also known as the “EU Magnitsky Act” – to sanction individuals and entities responsible for severe human rights abuses.

Technological and Cyber Sanctions

In response to the growing cyber-threat landscape, the EU has introduced sanctions targeting cyber-attacks and the improper use of digital technologies. These measures are designed to deter both state and non-state actors from engaging in harmful cyber-activities.

With Belgium being the centre of the EU, its jurisdiction has numerous sectors strongly affected by sanctions regulations. These include:

  • financial services;
  • the energy sector;
  • defence and dual-use goods;
  • technology and telecommunications;
  • international trade;
  • maritime and shipping;
  • luxury goods and diamonds; and
  • healthcare and pharmaceuticals.

Belgium was particularly affected by the financial sanctions, owing to the presence of world-leading securities depository Euroclear. The EU’s maximum oil price and ports ban affected the ports of the North Sea. The EU diamond ban affected the Antwerp diamond industry hub.

Belgium supports and implements UN- and G7-agreed sanctions, as well as EU autonomous designations. These include, broadly speaking:

  • sanctions against individuals, such as asset freezes, travel bans under restrictive measures against third states, and horizontal sanctions regimes targeting violations of human rights or terrorism; and
  • generally applicable sectoral sanctions, prohibiting certain commercial transactions with any counterparts from sanctioned jurisdictions or with a link to certain sectors, prohibited goods, or even sector-specific named individuals or entities.

As regards Russia, Belgium and the EU have implemented individual sanctions on natural and legal persons. Belgium has also implemented sectoral sanctions, such as trade restrictions on several types of transactions, as well as prohibitions of certain professional services. In addition, Belgium has reinforced its export control regulations on the export of dual-use goods or defence-related goods to Russia and Belarus.

Public authorities, financial institutions, corporations, and private individuals within this scope must apply EU sanctions.

Generally, EU sanctions apply broadly to all individuals or entities within the territory of the EU. They have a wide reach and also apply:

  • on board any aircraft or any vessel under the jurisdiction of an EU member state;
  • to any person inside or outside the EU who is a national of an EU member state;
  • to any legal person, entity or body ‒ inside or outside EU territory – that is incorporated or constituted under the law of a member state; and
  • to any legal person, entity or body in respect of any business done in whole or in part within the EU.

However, authorities in the EU take the view that EU regulations do not provide for extraterritorial reach.

While the European Union formally maintains that its sanctions do not have extraterritorial application, recent regulatory developments have introduced obligations that produce extraterritorial effects in practice. EU-based companies are now required to ensure that their subsidiaries and business partners outside the EU do not engage in conduct that undermines EU sanctions. For example, Article 12g of Regulation 833/2014 obliges EU exporters to include contractual clauses preventing re-export to Russia, even in contracts with third-country buyers. Similarly, Article 8a requires EU parent companies to make “best efforts” to prevent their non-EU subsidiaries from violating sanctions. These provisions do not directly bind non-EU entities, but they shift the burden onto EU operators to monitor and influence conduct beyond EU borders. In parallel, the EU increasingly uses asset-freeze listings to target companies in third countries deemed to be facilitating circumvention. Together, these trends mark a functional extraterritorial reach of EU sanctions, compelling EU entities to reshape their compliance systems to account for foreign counterparties and group-wide activities, particularly in high-risk jurisdictions.

Belgium predominantly implements sanctions that are adopted by the UN and by the EU. Some international sanctions are adopted by the United Nations Security Council, under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. States must then enact the UN sanctions in their national law. Belgium has adopted a national law (Law of 11 May 1995 on the implementation of UN sanctions) providing for a legal basis in Belgian law to implement UN sanctions. Today, there are 14 ongoing UN sanctions regimes that are implemented by Belgium (eg, in respect of Yemen and South Sudan) and which focus on supporting political settlement of conflicts, nuclear non-proliferation, and counter-terrorism.

As an EU member state, Belgium also implements EU sanctions decisions and regulations adopted by the Council of the European Union in the context of the EU Common Foreign and Security Policy. EU regulations containing economic restrictive measures are directly applicable without the need for a national transposition. Member states are empowered to carry out the enforcement of sanctions domestically. Belgium has adopted a Law of 13 May 2003 to provide for a legal basis in Belgian law to enforce EU sanctions and impose criminal penalties on violations.

Belgium adopted a general Law on 13 May 2003 to provide for a legal basis in Belgian law to implement and enforce EU sanctions. This law foresees a legal basis for decisions on the implementation of EU sanctions in Belgian law by the Council of Ministers, provides general competence to the public prosecutor’s office to detect, investigate and pursue legal action against violations and provides for both administrative and criminal penalties for violations.

This law may be affected by the upcoming implementation of EU Directive 2024/1226 on the definition of criminal offences and penalties for the violation of Union restrictive measures, which was due to be transposed into Belgian law by 20 May 2025. However, at the time of writing, Belgium has not yet transposed this directive into its national law and little is known regarding the policy choices or timing of the implementation.

Nevertheless, EU member states are not prevented from imposing additional sanctions measures against individuals. For example, Belgium has designated distinct individuals or entities in its national lists of asset freezes. Those designations and measures apply in addition to the EU regulations.

In Belgium, the key national competent authorities are the Federal Ministry of Finance and the Federal Ministry of Economy.

However, the competences for specific sanctions-related issues or licences are fragmented among several authorities – each with their own scopes of competences, listed in Annex I to Council Regulation (EU) No 833/2014. Among others, these include:

  • the Belgian Ministry of Finance, which is generally competent for financial sanctions; and
  • the Ministry of Economy, which is generally competent for restrictions on trade in goods.

Depending on the regions of Belgium in which the EU operator is active or the transaction takes place (Flemish Region, Brussels Capital Region, and Walloon Region), authorities may further vary and share competence.

Enforcement of sanctions regulations is shared between several competent authorities, each within their respective competences. The main national competent authorities for sanctions derogation licences are the Ministry of Finance for financial sanctions (including asset freezes), and the Ministry of Economy for economic sanctions.

Each of those administrations monitors the enforcement of sanctions within its scope of competences, may impose conditions for derogation licences and may actively monitor activity within its purview and detect violations that may be grounds for criminal action by the public prosecutor’s office. Additionally, the federal ministry competent for the type of sanctions violation may also decide to impose an administrative penalty.

Additionally, sanctions violations are criminal offences. As a result, they may be investigated and prosecuted through the ordinary criminal enforcement framework involving the police authorities, the public prosecutor’s office, and/or investigating judges.

Sanctions violations are a criminal offence under Belgian law. The legal basis of such penalties may be found in various laws adopted to ensure the implementation of UN and EU sanctions regimes in Belgium, such as:

  • Article 4 of the Law of 11 May 1995 regarding the implementation of United Nations Security Council decisions; and
  • Article 6 of the Law of 13 May 2003 regarding the implementation of restrictive measures adopted by the Council of the European Union against some states, persons and entities.

The provisions of the Belgian Penal Code are generally applicable to these offences – meaning that one may be prosecuted as an accomplice to a sanctions violation for (unsuccessful) attempts to violate sanctions. Funds or assets considered to be illegal proceeds from sanctions violations may be confiscated, notwithstanding any imposed criminal penalties.

Infringements of EU sanctions are punishable by eight days’ to five years’ imprisonment and by a fine of EUR200 to EUR200,000. An administrative fine of EUR2,000 to EUR20 million may also be imposed.

It is important to note that the recent Directive (EU) 2024/1226 on the harmonisation of definitions and penalties for sanctions violations was adopted in April 2024 and must be transposed in the national legislation of all EU member states by 20 May 2025. This directive, once transposed, may significantly alter (and increase) criminal liability for sanctions violations.

Violation of EU sanctions can lead to the imposition of penalties. Sanctions penalties range from administrative fines imposed by the customs authorities, to the imposition of criminal penalties for the most serious infringements. Civil courts do not enforce EU sanctions but do acknowledge EU sanctions in civil or commercial-related disputes, and recognise enforcement actions from Belgium and other EU member states.

The enforcement of EU sanctions through criminal actions is a competence of the general public prosecutor’s office. It is not clear how many criminal convictions have been made in the last years because criminal court judgments are not public.

One of the most notable enforcement actions, although predating the past three-year period, occurred in February 2019. The Criminal Court of Antwerp convicted three Belgian companies and associated individuals for exports breaching EU sanctions on Syria. AAE Chemie Trading was fined EUR346,443 (of which EUR50,000 was effective), Anex Customs was fined EUR500,000 (EUR100,000 effective), and Danmar Logistics was fined EUR75,000 (EUR50,000 effective). Managers received suspended jail sentences: the AAE director was handed four months, and the manager at Anex/Danmar received twelve months.

However, while some of these criminal cases might still be ongoing or unpublished, the Belgian Minister of Finance communicated in February 2023 that 19 reports have been referred to the public prosecutor’s office, and that a further 15 other such reports are being prepared. Also in February 2023, the Antwerp Public Prosecutor’s Office reported that three raids had been carried out, resulting in the seizure of approximately USD1.5 million worth of diamonds suspected of involvement in EU sanctions evasion. A wave of six raids in March 2024 targeted networks involved in trafficking Russian diamonds – over EUR8 million in shipments were seized and four individuals arrested. In December 2023, co-ordinated searches in Knokke‑Heist and Eeklo, prompted by US intelligence, led to six arrests (four in Belgium), concerning suspected illicit exports of controlled goods and technology to Russia.

The prosecution of sanctions violations in Belgium is subject to administrative procedures or judicial criminal procedures. There is no explicit national law framework for aggravating or mitigating circumstances for criminal liability of sanctions violations, other than the applicable EU regulatory framework.

Unlike the USA (and especially unlike the Office of Foreign Assets Controls), the EU does not have a clear framework for mitigating (nor aggravating) factors. It is up to each EU member state’s prosecution authority to decide whether one’s actions are sufficient to avoid or lessen the penalty. The EC provides general and situation-specific guidance for EU operators (eg, importance of internal compliance programmes, as well as performing adequate due diligence in respect of KYC/Know Your Transaction). In Belgium, as in most EU member states, the existence of a robust internal compliance programme could be an argument in favour of mitigating the liability of a company being prosecuted; however, there is no general rule guaranteeing reduction of the penalty.

The upcoming implementation of the EU Directive 2024/1226 into Belgian law may entail the adoption of a clearer framework for mitigating and aggravating circumstances in criminal liability for sanctions violations.

In Belgium, all sanctions violations constitute a “regulatory offence” under the provisions of the law of 13 April 2003 and thus subject to strict liability standard under general criminal law principles. However, it must be noted that some EU Council regulations imposing restrictive measures do contain provisions to ensure that EU operators do not incur liability without intent or reasonable awareness of the possibility of a violation, which can operate to soften the strict liability standard in general Belgian criminal law.

The EU’s sanctions regulations provide for general and special derogations that may be granted by the national competent authorities “under such conditions as they deem appropriate”. The specific grounds are provided in the respective sanctions regulations (eg, Council Regulation (EU) No 833/2014) and are often subject to specific deadlines.

The main national competent authorities for sanctions derogation licences are the Ministry of Finance for financial sanctions (including asset freezes), and the Ministry of Economy for economic sanctions.

The ministry of finance does issue derogation licences for asset freezes provided that the application complies with the conditions.

In Belgium as well as in the EU, the provision of legal services to designated persons or entities is generally prohibited ‒ as are payments for such services from such persons and entities. Although there is no applicable general licence, EU regulations generally provide that national competent authorities may allow the release of funds or the making available of certain frozen funds or economic resources to or from designated persons for reasonable legal expenses.

Accordingly, a licence allowing the compensation of legal services is required on a case-by-case basis. However, note that – under EU sanctions against Russia – it is now prohibited to provide legal services to legal entities in Russia, as an exception from the general freedom of services applicable in Belgium.

Nonetheless, there is an exemption for services that are strictly necessary for the exercise of the right of defence in judicial proceedings and the right to an effective legal remedy under Article 5n (5) of Council Regulation (EU) No 833/2014. Additionally, Article 5n (6) of Council Regulation (EU) No 833/2014 states that the prohibition shall not apply to the provision of services that are strictly necessary to ensure access to judicial, administrative or arbitral proceedings in an EU member state, as well as for the recognition or enforcement of a judgment or an arbitration award rendered in an EU member state – provided that such provision of services is consistent with the objectives of this EU regulation and Council Regulation (EU) No 269/2014.

Therefore, Council Regulation (EU) No 833/2014 excludes certain specific services from that prohibition, such that those services are not covered by the prohibition in this EU regulation. Consequently, in principle, it is not necessary to obtain a licence to perform such services ‒ provided that they remain within the scope of those exemptions. In practice, however, obtaining a licence is advisable to facilitate the co-operation from intervening banks to receive payment for such services. As a result, it is often advisable to seek regulatory licences for such services early on upon opening a client matter.

In Belgium, financial institutions must report immediately to the Ministry of Finance’s Treasury Department the persons or entities detected that are subject to asset freeze measures. The National Bank of Belgium recommends that this reporting be made by the AML Compliance Officer (AMLCO). In such case, the AMLCO provides the General Administration of the Treasury with all the information at its disposal in order to enable the Treasury to carry out the necessary verifications ‒ for example, a copy of the identity card or passport of the person concerned, as well as a reference to the regulation or decision that imposes the sanction and which includes the name of the person or entity that is subject to the sanction.

Besides the asset-freezing measure and its notification to the Ministry of Finance’s Treasury Department, it may also be necessary to make a Suspicious Activity Report (SAR) to the authority in charge of AML ‒ namely, the Belgian Financial Intelligence Processing Unit (Cellule de Traitement des Informations Financières/Cel voor Financiële Informatieverwerking, or CTIF-CFI).

Court Decisions

The Belgian courts generally adhere to the provisions of EU law and EU guidelines issued by the European Commission regarding the implementation and enforcement of EU restrictive measures and may refer preliminary references to the ECJ when in doubt on the proper interpretation of the provisions of EU restrictive measures.

Despite several projects to increase the publication and dissemination of Belgian court’s case law, there is generally little publicly accessible case law on EU restrictive measures and export controls by the civil and administrative courts. As a general rule, disputes involving the impact of sanctions on a business transaction may be litigated before competent civil courts. Infringements are prosecuted before criminal courts, and decisions on licences issued by the national competent authorities, often either the Ministry of Economy or the Ministry of Finance, may be challenged at the highest administrative court (the Council of State).

Notable case law includes a widely reported conviction on appeal in 2019 of three Belgian companies and their directors for the export of large quantities of a chemical compound “isopropanol” between 2014-16 without having obtained the required export licences under the Syrian export controls regulation of 2012. In that case, two directors were ultimately convicted to partially effective prison sentences, fines and asset confiscations. The case is not published, but is reported to also have clarified that the competent authority to criminally prosecute export licence infringements remains the public prosecutor’s office and not the custom’s authority.

There is only limited case law publicly available from the Council of State on appeals against negative licence decisions to release frozen assets.

Legal Developments

EU regulation on the treatment of frozen assets is of particular importance to Belgian practice because one of the world-leading international central security depositories, Euroclear, is based in Belgium.

On 21 May 2024, the Council of the European Union adopted Council Regulation (EU) No 2024/1469, allowing net profits generated from the frozen assets of the Central Bank of Russia held in EU Central Security Depositories (CSDs) to support Ukraine. This regulation amends Article 5a of Council Regulation (EU) No 833/2014 and introduces a new annex (“Annex XLI”) to the regulation. Owing to EU sanctions, more than EUR200 billion worth of Russian Central Bank assets are frozen in CSDs such as Euroclear and Clearstream, with reinvestments generating more than EUR5 billion in profits. As of 15 February 2024, CSDs have been required to segregate these profits and are now mandated to transfer 99.7% of the net profits, after costs and taxes, to the EU budget to support Ukraine. These funds will be used for the EU’s Ukraine Facility, aimed at Ukraine’s recovery and reconstruction, with up to 10% potentially redirected to EU programmes supporting Ukraine’s defence industry. Payments will be made bi-annually for as long as the sanctions are in place, with annual reviews of the allocation.

Additionally, the deadline for implementation of Directive (EU) 2024/1226 of 24 April 2024 on the definition of criminal offences and penalties for the violation of Union restrictive measures passed on 20 May 2025. Belgium has not yet transposed the directive in its national law. These rules ensure that violations – such as failing to freeze assets, breaching travel bans, and circumventing services and goods bans ‒ can be criminally investigated and prosecuted across all EU member states and harmonise the definitions and penalties for both individuals and entities. The rules also strengthen the freezing and confiscation of sanctioned assets and improve co-operation and communication between authorities within and among EU member states. However, member states retain discretion regarding the methodology for calculating penalties, which may influence the scale of fines and criminal sanctions applied from 2025 onwards.

Legal Developments

On 20 May 2025, the Council of the European Union adopted the 17th package of sanctions against Russia, reinforcing the EU’s efforts to reduce Russia’s sources of revenue and military capabilities. This package expands restrictions on dual-use goods and advanced technologies, imposes new listings of individuals and entities involved in Russia’s war economy and circumvention networks, and strengthens enforcement against the so-called shadow fleet. In total, 189 additional vessels were designated for supporting sanctions evasion and illicit oil shipments, alongside several insurance and logistics actors. The package also targets companies operating in Russia’s energy and military sectors, including producers of machine tools and drone components.

The list of asset freeze and travel ban measures has been expanded to include 17 individuals and 58 entities linked to human rights violations, looting of cultural heritage, or supporting the war effort. Export restrictions have been further tightened to cover chemical precursors, high-performance machine tools, and electronic components with military applications. In parallel, the legal frameworks underpinning the EU sanctions have been amended to broaden the listing criteria under various regimes, notably to cover those facilitating circumvention, hybrid threats, or repression within Russia or in occupied Ukrainian territories.

At the time of writing, the 18th package of sanctions is under discussion and expected to be adopted by the European Council on 27 June 2025. According to available information, it should include new measures targeting Russia’s energy revenues, such as a lower oil price cap and restrictions on Nord Stream-related infrastructure, as well as additional financial sanctions and designations of further vessels, intermediaries, and enablers of circumvention.

Administrative Review by the Council of the European Union

The individual or entity designated under EU sanctions may ‒ within a time limit determined by the Council of the European Union – submit observations to the Council of the European Union, asking for a review or removal of their listing. Those observations are submitted only once and could include detailed reasons and supporting evidence explaining why the listing is no longer justified or why the circumstances have changed.

The Council of the European Union reviews the observations and considers the evidence provided as part of a general review for all listed persons from the same third country. If the Council of the European Union finds the arguments justified, it may decide to remove the individual or entity from the sanctions list. If the Council of the European Union rejects the request, the individual or entity remains on the sanctions list.

The Council of the European Union must provide sufficient and concrete reasons for each (re-)listing decision.

Judicial Review by the CJEU

The individual or entity can bring an action for annulment before the EU’s General Court in accordance with Articles 263, paragraph 4 and Article 275, paragraph 2 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU). The applicant must argue that the listing is unlawful, presenting grounds such as violations of fundamental rights, lack of sufficient Council of the European Union evidence, procedural errors, or errors of assessment.

If the General Court finds the listing unlawful, it annuls the individual listing, which – in principle – should result in the individual’s or entity’s removal from the sanctions list. However, the Council of the European Union may find new reasons for maintaining the listing of the successful applicant. If the General Court upholds the listing, the individual or entity remains on the list with the same or updated reasons. Belgian courts follow the judgments of the EU courts.

Compensation of Damages

Alongside or following the annulment action, the individual or entity can file a claim for damages before the CJEU. The claim must demonstrate that the wrongful listing caused financial loss or other harm and establish a causal link between the listing and the damages. If the court finds in favour of the applicant, it awards damages to compensate for the financial and non-material harm suffered. If the court rejects the claim, no compensation is awarded.

In the context of EU law, which is relevant for Belgian law, a de-listing challenge can achieve several significant outcomes.

First, an individual or entity may be delisted by the Council of the European Union. This occurs when the Council of the European Union reviews evidence and decides to remove the individual or entity from the list, finding that the original reasons for listing are no longer valid or were incorrect.

Second, the EU’s General Court may annul the individual listing, which can lead to delisting. If an individual or entity brings an action before the General Court, and the latter finds that the listing is unlawful, it can annul it. This annulment results in the individual or entity being delisted.

Lastly, an individual may file an action for damages to the EU’s General Court. If the General Court determines that the listing was unlawful and caused harm, it can award damages to compensate for the financial loss and other harm suffered due to the wrongful listing. Such damages have rarely been awarded, owing to the difficulty of meeting the legal tests for damages suffered and causality.

In the EU legal system, which is relevant for Belgium, the minimum period in which delisting can occur is six to 12 months from the date of initial listing – something that is relevant for sanctions against Russia and Belarus. This may extend to several years in cases where the individual’s/entity’s listing is renewed at regular reviews and/or is challenged in the EU’s General Court.

Council Regulation (EU) No 833/2014 imposes several service-related bans aimed at restricting trade and economic interactions with Russia. These bans, alongside legal and other professional services prohibitions, include the following.

  • Technical Assistance and Brokering Service: There is a prohibition on the provision of technical assistance, brokering services, or other services related to goods and technology covered by export bans. This includes services associated with the use of dual-use goods and technologies that might contribute to Russia’s military or technological enhancement.
  • Financial Services: There is a ban on providing financial assistance for trade involving prohibited goods and technologies. This extends to credit-rating services and other financial activities that could support Russian sanctioned sectors.
  • Business and Industrial Software Services: The Russia sanctions include a prohibition on providing software for business management and industrial design and production. This covers systems such as Enterprise Resource Planning (ERP) software, which is used for managing supply chains and customer relationships.
  • Transport and Logistics Services: The regulation bans services related to the transportation of goods covered by the sanctions. This includes restrictions on Russian transport undertakings operating within the EU and the use of EU ports and locks for certain Russian vessels.
  • Prohibition on Media Services: Certain Russian media outlets are subject to a broadcasting suspension within the EU. Additionally, advertising on these banned media outlets by any means is prohibited.
  • Cryptocurrency Services: The regulation extends to services involving crypto wallets, crypto accounts, or crypto custody services for Russian nationals and residents. These measures aim to prevent the use of cryptocurrencies to circumvent other sanctions.

Council Regulation (EU) No 833/2014 imposes restrictions on the export and import of several goods to and from Russia. These bans include the following.

  • Dual-use goods and technology, which can be used for both civilian and military purposes, are restricted. Military goods, specifically designed for military applications, are also prohibited. Maritime navigation equipment for maritime use is restricted, as are advanced electronics and components – particularly those intended for military applications. Industrial machinery used in various production processes is also included in the sanctions.
  • The energy sector faces sanctions on equipment and technology related to oil exploration, production, and refining.
  • Aviation and space industry goods, including aircraft and spacecraft, are restricted as well. Motor vehicles ‒ including trucks, buses, and special vehicles, as well as high-end luxury vehicles – are prohibited.
  • High-value luxury goods (eg, luxury cars, jewellery, and high-end fashion items) are banned if they exceed certain value thresholds. Precious metals and stones (eg, gold, silver, platinum and diamonds) are banned.
  • Iron and steel products – both finished and semi-finished – are sanctioned, alongside coal and other solid fossil fuels.
  • Banknotes and securities, which include currency and financial instruments, are restricted under the sanctions.

Belgian courts may consider compliance with sanctions as a case of force majeure. This means that companies may be able to invoke force majeure clauses in their contracts to suspend or terminate performance of obligations as a result of sanctions against Russia. If the performance of a contract becomes illegal owing to the sanctions imposed, Belgian courts may rule that the contract cannot be performed. This can lead to the application of the doctrine of “frustration”, whereby a contract is rescinded because it has become impossible to perform it without breaking the law.

Belgian courts handle the enforcement of judgments involving sanctions by carefully adhering to both domestic law and EU regulations.

Under EU law, judgments rendered by courts in other EU member states generally enjoy automatic recognition and enforcement within all EU member states. It is not required to obtain prior recognition and enforcement by a Belgian court.

However, in practice, EU operators may still refuse enforcement if circumstances that appear to be a violation of EU sanctions become known during enforcement efforts. This is particularly true if they were not addressed by an EU court judgment or if the activity required by the EU operator is subject to licence requirements (such as release of funds by a bank).

In such cases, parties involved may request required domestic licences based on the judgment or address the issue to a specific instance called the Attachment Judge (beslagrechter or juge des saisies), who is competent for disputes arising from conservatory or executionary attachment of assets or the enforcement of judgments on Belgian territory.

Judgments rendered by courts outside the EU can be enforced in Belgium under the rules of the Belgian Code of Private International Law but need to obtain an exequatur. The exequatur is essentially a judgment confirming recognition and enforcement of a foreign judgment on Belgian territory. This is an ex parte procedure within which the Belgian court reviews the outcome of a foreign judgment for compliance with, inter alia, EU sanctions.

Compliance with EU sanctions is considered to fall under the public order exceptions that may lead to non-recognition or non-enforcement of foreign judgments.

The Council of the European Union, which represents the governments of EU member states, adopts legal acts imposing restrictive measures (sanctions) through decisions and regulations. These decisions are typically based on proposals from individual member states, the EC and the European External Action Service (EEAS). Such decisions are binding on EU member states, including Belgium.

Belgian law and its courts generally adhere to the “owned or controlled” criteria set out in the EC and Council of the European Union guidance and best practices. Some confusion may arise in Belgium because of the minor grammatical differences and terminology used in the different language versions of provisions in Council Regulation (EU) No 269/2014.

This interpretation was recently clarified in the Council’s updated Best Practices document of July 2024, which modifies the notion from “more than 50%” to “50% or more” (therefore including the scenario where a designated person or entity owns exactly 50% of another entity). It also explicitly confirmed that the 50% ownership threshold includes cases where multiple designated persons’ shares are aggregated, and that control may be established on the basis of legal rights or factual indicators such as veto powers, nominee structures, or other indirect means of influence.

The criteria to be taken into account when assessing whether a legal person or entity is controlled by a designated person or entity ‒ alone or pursuant to an agreement with another shareholder or other third party – could include:

  • having the right or exercising the power to appoint or remove a majority of the members of the administrative, management or supervisory body of such legal person or entity;
  • having appointed ‒ solely as a result of the exercise of one’s voting rights – a majority of the members of the administrative, management or supervisory bodies of a legal person or entity who have held office during the present and previous financial year;
  • controlling alone ‒ pursuant to an agreement with other shareholders in or members of a legal person or entity – a majority of shareholders’ or members’ voting rights in that legal person or entity;
  • having the right to exercise a dominant influence over a legal person or entity – pursuant to an agreement entered into with that legal person or entity or pursuant to a provision in its memorandum or articles of association – where the law governing that legal person or entity permits its being subject to such agreement or provision;
  • having the power to exercise the right to exercise a dominant influence referred to in the preceding point, without being the holder of that right;
  • having the right to use all or part of the assets of a legal person or entity;
  • managing the business of a legal person or entity on a unified basis, while publishing consolidated accounts; and
  • sharing jointly and severally the financial liabilities of a legal person or entity, or guaranteeing them.

If any of these criteria are satisfied, it is considered that the legal person or entity is controlled by a designated person or entity, unless the contrary can be established on a case-by-case basis.

It should be noted that slight grammatical discrepancies between the English and Dutch versions of provisions in Council Regulation (EU) No 269/2014 have been known to cause confusion in (particularly lower) domestic courts relating to the interpretation of these “owned or controlled” rules.

The Dutch language version of Article 2(2) of Council Regulation (EU) No 269/2014 refers to verbonden ondernemingen (“connected enterprises”), which is a defined term in the  Belgian Code on Companies and Associations. The Belgian Code on Companies and Associations distinguishes between various types of company relations, including “enterprises connected to” and “enterprises associated with”. Connected enterprises are those sets of enterprises that are controlled by, or exercise control over, that other company or with whom those companies are in a consortium. The Belgian Code on Companies and Associations also defines control as the “de facto or legal power to exercise a decisive influence on the appointment of the majority of its directors or on the direction of its management”.

Control is irrefutably presumed by law if it results from:

  • the holding of the majority of the shares in a company;
  • the right to appoint or terminate the mandate of a majority of the directors or managers;
  • controlling power organised by the company statutes; or
  • agreements concluded with the sanctioned shareholder or with other shareholders.

Assessing whether a sanctioned person or entity has a power of control over an entity through shareholder participation must cumulate the percentage in participations through several shareholders to take into account the consolidated power of control resulting from different participations.

By contrast, the French-language version of Article 2(2) of Council Regulation (EU) No 269/2014 refers to the word associé (“associated with”). Under Article 1:21 of the Belgian Code on Companies and Associations, an associated company may be interpreted as any entity linked to the other by virtue of a notable or significant (but not “decisive” and thus “controlling”) influence in the other company. This influence is presumed, albeit rebuttably, if a 20% shareholding is held.

The difference between these equally authoritative versions in the official languages of Belgium has been known to cause some confusion ‒ particularly in courts with less experience of the application of sanctions ‒ when it comes to how to interpret these rules. However, it should be stressed that these terms relating to ownership or control by a directly sanctioned entity in EU regulations should be interpreted autonomously and uniformly throughout the EU member states. Provisions of an EU regulation must be interpreted uniformly in line with their systemic and teleologic meaning within the EU regulation, for which the EC’s FAQs and the Council of the European Union guidance can provide meaningful reference.

There are no specific provisions in Belgian law relating to circumvention because the EU’s sanctions regulations are, as a matter of EU law, directly applicable in Belgium. However, violations of EU sanctions – including the provisions prohibiting circumvention of EU sanctions – fall under the criminal penalties for violations of EU restrictive measures imposed by the Law of 13 May 2003 (as consolidated after legislative adjustments in 2019).

The EU has provisions prohibiting the circumvention of sanctions, ensuring entities and individuals do not undermine sanctions’ effectiveness. By way of example, in the EU regulations targeting Russia:

  • Council Regulation (EU) No 833/2014 prohibits participation in activities to circumvent sanctions (Article 12) and requires compliance information (Article 8); and
  • Council Regulation (EU) No 269/2014 contains a similar prohibition (Article 9).

Other general anti-circumvention provisions are present in many EU regulations, forbidding activities that directly or indirectly bypass sanctions. Compliance with anti-circumventing measures is enforced by EU member states, with penalties for violations.

As per the breach of other EU sanction prohibitions, circumventing EU sanctions can be a criminal offence, with penalties determined by the national laws of EU member states (including fines and imprisonment).

As stated in 2.2.2 Breaching Sanctions, the provisions of the Belgian Penal Code are generally applicable to these offences, meaning that one may be prosecuted as an accomplice to a sanctions violation for (unsuccessful) attempts to violate or circumvent sanctions. Funds or assets considered to be illegal proceeds from sanctions violations ‒ including circumvention ‒ may be confiscated, notwithstanding any imposed criminal penalties.

Under Article 6 of the Belgian Sanctions Law, individuals and/or legal entities found in breach of EU restrictive measures face both administrative and criminal liability in the range of imprisonment from eight days to five years, and criminal fines between EUR25 and EUR25,000, and/or administrative fines ranging from EUR250 to EUR2,500,000. Both administrative and criminal fines are subject to multiplication under the “opdeciemen” system, which currently applies a factor of eight, whereas prison sentences may be converted into monetary fines in accordance with the conversion of criminal sentences in respect of legal entities under Article 41bis of the first book of the Belgian Criminal Procedure.

As discussed in 1.4.3 Domestic and/or Supranational Measures, this may be affected by the upcoming implementation of EU Directive 2024/1226 on the definition of criminal offences and penalties for the violation of Union restrictive measures, which was due to be transposed into Belgian law by 20 May 2025. However, at the time of writing, Belgium has not yet transposed this directive into its national law and little is known regarding the policy choices or timing of the implementation.

ACQUIS

Rue du Trône 98,
1050 Brussels
Belgium

+32 (0) 2 887 94 10

info@acquislp.eu acquislp.eu/
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Trends and Developments


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ACQUIS is a European law firm headquartered in Brussels renowned for its leading sanctions and compliance practice. ACQUIS offers a global outreach and serves clients across Europe, Asia and the USA. The firm’s sanctions team consists of seasoned sanctions and trade lawyers, compliance experts and government affairs specialists. The team regularly advises clients on global sanctions compliance, risk assessments, divestments, and sanctions-related commercial disputes. Furthermore, the team assists clients in delisting cases, including major multinationals in agricultural, technological or shipping sectors. ACQUIS’ experts are skilled in handling complex transactions and advising clients on optimal strategies for sanctions-related challenges.

Evolving Sanctions Landscape in Belgium and the EU

Over the past year, the EU’s sanctions framework has continued to evolve in response to global geopolitical tensions, especially Russia’s ongoing war in Ukraine. Belgium, as an EU member state and home to key institutions such as Euroclear and the European Commission, plays a central role in shaping and implementing these measures. Between mid-2024 and mid-2025, six new EU sanctions packages were adopted against Russia alone, each reinforcing sectoral bans and expanding asset freezes. The most recent, the 17th sanctions package, marked a further tightening of controls on advanced technology, dual-use goods, and transport networks used to circumvent restrictions.

Companies operating in or through Belgium must remain alert to these frequent regulatory shifts. The EU’s approach is increasingly focused on enforcement and closing loopholes, including through measures targeting the so-called shadow fleet, sanctions on insurers and logistics providers, and contractual obligations placed on EU exporters to prevent re-export to Russia via third countries. These developments demand heightened vigilance and compliance from EU-based businesses.

A Stronger Enforcement Climate

While EU sanctions were initially implemented with limited follow-up, recent years have seen a clear rise in enforcement actions. Belgian authorities have increased co-ordination between customs, the Ministry of Finance, and the public prosecutor’s office. Notable actions include seizures of Russian diamonds, timber, technology exports to Russia, and co-ordinated raids involving foreign intelligence services.

Although Belgian criminal court rulings remain unpublished, the volume of ongoing investigations indicates growing prosecutorial momentum. Belgium’s implementation of the 2024 EU Directive on harmonising penalties for sanctions violations is expected to further strengthen the framework. Once transposed, this directive will introduce clearer rules on criminal liability, asset confiscation, and penalties for individuals and entities, bringing Belgium closer to the enforcement standards of partners like the USA.

Compliance Burden and Strategic Risk

As enforcement tightens, the compliance burden on Belgian and EU companies is also increasing. Exporters, banks, logistics operators, and professional service providers are expected to perform detailed due diligence not just on their clients, but also on partners in third countries. EU sanctions now place legal obligations on EU companies to take “best efforts” to prevent their subsidiaries and contractual partners from engaging in sanctions violations. This has a de facto extraterritorial effect, particularly in high-risk jurisdictions such as the UAE, Turkey, or Central Asia.

Companies are adjusting to these risks through internal compliance programmes, legal reviews, and more cautious engagement with cross-border structures. Failure to do so can result in blocked payments, asset freezes, or regulatory investigations, even when the underlying transaction may not appear risky at first glance.

Belgium’s Strategic Role and Exposure

Belgium’s position as host to Euroclear, one of the largest international central securities depositories, places it at the centre of certain financial sanctions measures. The Belgian Ministry of Finance is the crucial national competent authority in relation to derogations for asset freezes on securities frozen in Euroclear. In 2024, the EU authorised the use of windfall profits generated from frozen Russian central bank assets held at Euroclear to fund Ukraine’s reconstruction. This sets a significant precedent, with far-reaching political and legal implications, as it may lead to further pressure on Belgium to maintain high transparency and reporting standards in financial services and asset management.

Moreover, sectors such as maritime shipping, luxury goods (notably diamonds), and energy continue to be particularly exposed to new designations and trade restrictions. Antwerp’s diamond trade has already seen multimillion-euro seizures related to Russian-origin stones, and ports in the North Sea have been affected by bans on certain Russian-linked vessels and cargoes.

Global Alignment and Emerging Divergences

While the EU remains aligned with key partners such as the United States and the United Kingdom, new divergences are emerging. The return of a more unilateralist US administration has led to differing approaches to Russia, China, and Iran. This complicates cross-border compliance strategies for multinational companies operating across both EU and non-EU jurisdictions.

For example, the EU has increasingly listed Chinese companies for facilitating circumvention, a step that the USA had taken earlier. However, EU enforcement standards and licensing frameworks remain less formalised than those of the US Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC). Companies used to operating with OFAC guidance may need to adjust to the more decentralised, member state-driven nature of EU sanctions enforcement.

Outlook for 2025 and Beyond

At the time of writing, the EU is preparing its 18th sanctions package against Russia, which is expected to include stricter restrictions on the energy sector and financial institutions, as well as new measures addressing circumvention. These developments point to an ongoing shift from reactive listing to proactive enforcement and compliance deterrence.

Looking ahead, companies should expect continued complexity and fragmentation in sanctions policy, both within the EU and globally. The trend is moving toward sectoral and behavioural sanctions, targeting specific conduct (such as circumvention) and using indirect pressure to shape business practices beyond the EU’s borders. For companies doing business in or through Belgium, this means compliance must remain high on the agenda.

ACQUIS

Rue du Trône 98,
1050 Brussels
Belgium

+32 (0) 2 887 94 10

info@acquislp.eu acquislp.eu/
Author Business Card

Law and Practice

Authors



ACQUIS is a European law firm headquartered in Brussels renowned for its leading sanctions and compliance practice. ACQUIS offers a global outreach and serves clients across Europe, Asia and the USA. The firm’s sanctions team consists of seasoned sanctions and trade lawyers, compliance experts and government affairs specialists. The team regularly advises clients on global sanctions compliance, risk assessments, divestments, and sanctions-related commercial disputes. Furthermore, the team assists clients in delisting cases, including major multinationals in agricultural, technological or shipping sectors. ACQUIS’ experts are skilled in handling complex transactions and advising clients on optimal strategies for sanctions-related challenges.

Trends and Developments

Authors



ACQUIS is a European law firm headquartered in Brussels renowned for its leading sanctions and compliance practice. ACQUIS offers a global outreach and serves clients across Europe, Asia and the USA. The firm’s sanctions team consists of seasoned sanctions and trade lawyers, compliance experts and government affairs specialists. The team regularly advises clients on global sanctions compliance, risk assessments, divestments, and sanctions-related commercial disputes. Furthermore, the team assists clients in delisting cases, including major multinationals in agricultural, technological or shipping sectors. ACQUIS’ experts are skilled in handling complex transactions and advising clients on optimal strategies for sanctions-related challenges.

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