Over the past 12 months, the most significant development has been the ongoing implementation of Directive (EU) 2024/1226, which requires member states to criminalise the violation and circumvention of EU restrictive measures and to harmonise criminal penalties across the Union. France has taken its first formal step in that direction with the introduction of Bill No 2544 before the National Assembly on 3 March 2026 (see 3.1 Significant Court Decisions or Legal Developments).
Sanctions of the Council of the EU have continued to expand over the last 12 months due to new sanctions packages (the 19th, 20th and 21st sanctions packages) imposed by the EU in the context of the war in Ukraine.
Energy-related sanctions have been expanded, particularly targeting directly liquefied natural gas (LNG) and crude oil, as well as, indirectly, by the intermediary of sanctions against tankers. Restrictions on financial flux have also increased, especially on crypto-assets and bank transfers.
On 23 July 2026, the Council adopted the 21st package of restrictive measures against Russia, significantly expanding trade, financial and energy restrictions. It extended transaction prohibitions to 33 additional Russian banks and financial institutions and creates a new legal basis for a comprehensive ban on transactions with foreign crypto-asset service providers used by Russia. In the energy sector, the automatic adjustment mechanism for the oil-price cap has been suspended until July 2027, while a temporary exemption allows certain pre-2022 long-term contracts for Russian liquefied natural gas (LNG) exports to third countries to continue until July 2027, subject to strict reporting obligations. The package also clarified that the ban on providing LNG terminal services applies to entities indirectly owned or controlled by Russian persons and establishes a framework for future transaction bans on refineries processing Russian crude oil.
The Court of Justice of the European Union, ruling on requests for preliminary rulings and appeals brought against judgments of the General Court of the CJEU, delivered several key and awaited judgments, establishing standards for the framework of sanctions against Russia and Belarus.
The top trends in France concerning sanctions in the last 12 months have all resulted from the expansion and development of tools regarding EU sanctions, including:
The Council of the EU also decided to impose sanctions on individuals identified as responsible for the systematic unlawful deportation, forced transfer, forced assimilation and unlawful adoption of Ukrainian minors in May 2026.
Sectors in France particularly affected by EU sanctions pursuant to Council Decision 2014/512/CFSP and Council Regulation (EU) No 833/2014 include oil, finance, banking and dual-use goods.
Sectors in which natural persons who are under sanctions are involved, or used to be involved, are also affected, as third-party actors refuse to work with all natural and legal persons even remotely linked to them, even if these links are only historic. In particular, this concerns sectors such as fertilisers, oil, coal and IT.
France implements both individual sanctions, targeting natural and legal persons, and sectoral sanctions, decided at the UN, EU and national levels.
Individual sanctions include travel bans and the freezing of assets, and sectoral sanctions include embargoes and other restrictions on the export and import of certain goods.
The scope of France’s sanctions as an EU member state is broad (though narrower than US sanctions, as the EU does not apply secondary sanctions), as EU sanctions must be complied with by:
First, autonomous sanctions imposed by the French authorities (which are not a mere application of EU or UN restrictive measures) do not have extraterritorial effects.
Second, regarding the scope of application of EU sanctions, they must be complied with by:
Although the EU has historically maintained that its sanctions have no extraterritorial effect, this has been called into question since the 11th Russia package (June 2023). The package created the possibility, as an exceptional and last-resort measure, of prohibiting the sale, supply, transfer or export from the Union of certain goods and technologies (in particular sensitive dual-use items and items liable to contribute to Russia’s military and technological reinforcement or to the development of its defence and security sector) the export of which to Russia is already restricted, to third countries found to present a continuing and particularly high risk of being used to circumvent those restrictions.
Article 8a of Regulation 833/2014, in force since June 2024, sets out a “best efforts” obligation: “Natural and legal persons, entities and bodies shall undertake their best efforts to ensure that any legal person, entity or body established outside the Union that they own or control does not participate in activities that undermine the restrictive measures provided for in this Regulation”.
In France, sanctions are imposed at three different levels.
The primary regulators for sanctions activity in France are:
Within both ministries, sub-entities handle the different aspects of sanctions:
They are therefore the competent authorities for enforcing sanctions and granting derogations, and the primary interlocutors on sanctions in France.
In the EU, member states are responsible for enforcing the sanctions created by the Council of the EU. In France, the Ministry for Europe and Foreign Affairs is responsible for the general coordination of EU restrictive measures. The Ministry of Economy of Finance, and in particular the French Treasury, is responsible for all matters related to frozen assets, and financial and sectoral sanctions. The Direction générale des douanes et des droits indirects (DGDDI) is competent for physical exports; and the Direction générale des entreprises (DGE) handles dual-export goods. For access to French ports for Russian vessels, requests for authorisations must be submitted to the préfet de département and the director of the port; information can be requested to the Direction générale des affaires maritimes, de la pêche et de l’aquaculture (DGAMPA)”.
At French Level
At criminal level, Article L. 542-2 of the French Customs Code (formerly Article 459) criminalises the “failure to comply with the restrictions on economic and financial relations provided for under European Union law pursuant to Articles 75 or 215 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union and under international treaties and agreements duly approved and ratified by France”.
These provisions criminalise sanctions breaches regardless of origin – national, EU or UN.
Article L. 542-5 of the Customs Code criminalises inciting, in writing, through propaganda or advertising, the commission of any of these offences, whether or not such incitement was acted upon.
Potential penalties for breaching sanctions for natural persons include:
Incitement to breach sanctions is punished by five years’ imprisonment and a fine of EUR225,000.
Legal persons risk:
For legal persons, the maximum financial penalty is ten times the value of the product of the transaction (Article L. 542-4 of the Customs Code, in conjunction with Article 131-38 of the Criminal Code).
Article L. 542-3 of the Customs Code specifies that: “When the property and assets referred to in paragraphs 1 through 3 of Article L. 542-1 cannot be seized or are not produced by the defendant, or when the Minister of the Budget so requests, the court hearing the case may order the defendant to pay a sum equal to the value of such property and assets”.
There are no civil penalties for violating economic sanctions laws or regulations in France.
In addition to applicable criminal penalties, breaches of sanctions can give rise to administrative sanctions under Article L. 612-39 of the Monetary and Financial Code. These sanctions include:
Furthermore, under Article L. 561-36-1 IV of the Monetary and Financial Code, the Autorité de contrôle prudentiel et de résolution (ACPR) may impose administrative financial penalties of up to EUR100 million or 10% of the entity’s annual turnover, whichever amount is greater.
At EU Level
In April 2024, the EU adopted Directive (EU) 2024/1226, which created the European criminal offence of violation of sanctions. In particular, Article 3 of the Directive provides for the following punishable behaviours:
Concerning penalties faced by natural persons, Article 5 of the Directive leaves some leeway to EU member states but provides several indications concerning minimum fines and terms of imprisonment (from one year to five years or a maximum term of three years, depending on the offence committed).
It also provides for accessory criminal or non-criminal penalties or measures, which may include:
Concerning legal persons, Article 7 of the Directive provides for the following potential penalties:
The Directive provides for minimum fines, depending on the offence committed. The Directive was implemented in France through Decree No 2025-470 of 28 May 2025, which gave competence to the Advisory Board on Combating Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing to ensure co-ordination and co-operation between law enforcement agencies and the authorities responsible for implementing EU restrictive measures (Article D561-51 of the Monetary and Financial Code). As explained above, given that criminal penalties for sanctions violations were already in effect under French law, the transposition of the Directive did not bring any substantial changes at regulatory level. The creation of criminal offences and the determination of applicable penalties fall within the field reserved to the legislature under Article 34 of the Constitution and therefore require transposition by statute; a bill to that effect is currently pending before Parliament (see 3.1 Significant Court Decisions or Legal Developments).
As detailed above, there is no civil enforcement in France. The Autorité de contrôle prudentiel et de résolution (ACPR) exercises administrative enforcement over entities under its supervision, such as banks, insurers and asset managers, especially regarding asset-freeze obligations under UN and EU restrictive measures.
Examples of key criminal enforcement actions in respect of sanctions breaches in France in the last few years include:
More generally, since 2022, several criminal investigations have been launched in France against Russian oligarchs for circumventing EU sanctions, primarily involving money laundering, tax fraud and asset concealment. In March 2024, proceedings targeted Ruslan Goryukhin and Mikhail Opengeym, accused of hiding over EUR70 million in real estate through offshore structures. In 2022, Igor Sechin became the subject of an investigation after his yacht was seized in La Ciotat for attempting to evade asset freezing measures. In 2023, Alexey Kuzmichev was indicted in Paris for aggravated tax fraud and sanctions violations. Assets linked to Artur Ocheretny and Iekaterina Solotsinskaya were also seized in the Basque Country and Paris in similar cases. Since 2023, the French National Financial Prosecutor’s Office and the anti-organised crime unit (Junalco) have intensified their investigative activities targeting individuals and entities under EU sanctions.
Article 132-78 of the French Criminal Code provides for two mitigating circumstances that are applicable only to certain offences, when provided by law, namely:
French law is reluctant to take mitigating circumstances into account in general, and already provides for the first mitigating circumstance required by the Directive. The second one, which is a lot broader, was not integrated into French law when the Directive was implemented.
Under Article L. 542-2 (formerly Article 459), sanctions violations are formal offences in French law, which (unlike material offences) are constituted by the conduct alone, without proof of intent to violate sanctions. The French sanctions regimes therefore operate on the basis of strict liability.
Strict liability does not apply to all offences under French law, but it does apply to sanctions-related offences, which are treated as formal offences. In other areas of law, criminal liability generally requires mens rea (intent or negligence), unless otherwise specified.
France applies the derogations provided by the Council of the EU’s Decisions and Regulations in its different sanctions regimes.
Currently, most of the sanctions-related matters concern Russia. In this regard, Council Decision 2014/512/CFSP and Council Regulation (EU) No 833/2014 of 31 July 2014 concerning restrictive measures in view of Russia’s actions destabilising the situation in Ukraine provide for several derogations to its sanctions, including:
Such derogations must be requested by the persons seeking them from the national competent authorities – ie, the French Treasury, the Directorate General for Enterprise or the French Customs, depending on the derogation sought.
By adopting Council Regulation (EU) 2022/2474 of 16 December 2022, amending Regulation (EU) No 833/2014 concerning restrictive measures in view of Russia’s actions in destabilising the situation in Ukraine, the Council of the EU adopted a general prohibition of the provision of legal services to the government of Russia or legal persons, entities or bodies established in Russia, as enshrined in Article 5(n)(2) of Regulation 833/2014.
However, at the time, it already provided for some derogations, and others were added by Council Regulation (EU) 2023/1214 of 23 June 2023 amending Regulation (EU) No 833/2014 concerning restrictive measures in view of Russia’s actions in destabilising the situation in Ukraine. The most common ones can be found in paragraphs 5, 6, 9(a) and 9(b) of Regulation 833/2014, as follows:
In December 2022, the Paris Bar (Ordre des avocats à la Cour de Paris), supported by the Geneva Bar, filed an action for annulment contesting the ban on providing non‑litigious legal advice to the Russian state and entities in Russia (case T-798/22). By judgment of 2 October 2024, the court dismissed the challenge, holding that Articles 7 and 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU protect access to legal advice only in judicial, administrative or arbitral proceedings, outside which the ban applies, subject to sufficiently broad exceptions. The applicants appealed before the CJEU (case C-866/24); the hearing took place on 14 July 2026. The judgment remains awaited.
The Council of the EU imposes reporting obligations in its sanctions regimes, whereby such reports are to be made to the national competent authorities. The Council also provides the possibility to address such information directly to the Commission of the EU. In the context of Russia, it has created reporting obligations in both its individual and sectoral sanctions regimes.
Council Regulation (EU) No 269/2014 of 17 March 2014, concerning restrictive measures in respect of actions undermining or threatening the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine, provides for reporting obligations in its Articles 8 and 9 that weigh on both persons sanctioned and central securities depositories (CSDs).
As such, natural and legal persons, entities and bodies sanctioned, and CSDs must:
Such information must at least identify:
In its frequently asked questions (FAQs), the Commission explicitly states the objective of such reporting obligations, which is to help ensure that those assets are traced effectively in order to avoid circumvention of sanctions via evasion schemes. The Commission also recalls that non-compliance with such obligations would be treated as a breach of EU sanctions law, with criminal penalties provided by EU member states being applicable.
Regarding sectoral sanctions, Council Regulation (EU) No 833/2014 of 31 July 2014 concerning restrictive measures in view of Russia’s actions destabilising the situation in Ukraine also provides for some reporting obligations, as follows:
In the past three years, the most significant legal and judicial developments in France have arisen from the EU restrictive measures imposed on Russia since the beginning of the invasion of Ukraine in February 2022.
The CJEU has delivered several key judgments in the last few months:
Directive (EU) 2024/1226, adopted in April 2024, criminalised violation and circumvention of sanctions at EU level. The transposition of a directive is carried out in France by decree for matters falling within the regulatory power and by statute for those that Article 34 of the Constitution reserves to the legislature. The regulatory aspects of the Directive were transposed through Decree No 2025-470 of 28 May 2025 (see 2.2.2 Breaching Sanctions); the criminal-law aspects must be transposed by statute. On 3 March 2026, a member of Parliament introduced Bill No 2544 to that effect. The bill defines eight categories of conduct constituting criminal offences, with aggravating circumstances notably for organised crime or dual-use items. It departs from the Directive on several points, and raises constitutional concerns. First, whereas Recital 4 permits gross-negligence liability only for trade in dual-use items, the bill extends it to all trade in goods and creates a strict liability offence punishable by fine and confiscation, difficult to reconcile with the constitutional principles of necessity and proportionality of penalties. Second, the bill adopts an overly broad definition of freezing that includes seizure, conflating a precautionary measure with a coercive one, at odds with the CJEU’s holding that restrictive measures are precautionary in nature (Shuvalov v Council, T-289/22). Third, the bill fails to transpose the Directive’s protection of legal professional privilege and creates a reporting offence applicable to anyone obtaining information on a sanctioned person’s assets “in the course of a professional activity”, broad enough to capture both advisory and litigation counsel, with no carve-out for lawyers. The bill has been referred to the Committee on Legal Affairs, but no date has been set.
At national level, as explained above, relevant recent case law includes the Lafarge trial, the Baltic Leader case and the Arcom decision concerning Eutelsat. Also, on 5 February 2026, in a case concerning assets frozen under Regulation (EU) No 2016/44 (Libya), the Court of cassation held that prior administrative authorisation from the DG Trésor is required before any attachment of debt (saisie-attribution) may be levied on frozen funds. That requirement is not confined to the payment stage but goes to the very validity of the attachment, and it cannot be satisfied by a judicial authorisation from the enforcement judge (JEX) (Cass. 2e civ., 5 February 2026, No 23-15.936 (F-B)).
The focus is expected to remain on oil and tankers, with additional listings of individuals and vessels likely in the coming months.
The introduction of new designation criteria, in particular that targeting individuals allegedly responsible for the abduction of Ukrainian children, is likely to generate further listing challenges and, in turn, future case law.
Further sanctions packages are expected in the next few months, continuing the regular pace of the past four years, introducing new criteria and targeting new sectors of the Russian economy.
The delisting process varies depending on the source of the sanction:
For French sanctions, recours gracieux and recours pour excès de pouvoir (appeal for abuse of power) only target a delisting; the judge cannot grant damages. However, under Article L761-1 of the Administrative Justice Code, the applicant can ask the court to order the administration to pay sums beyond proceedings costs – a remedy resembling damages.
At EU level, if the delisting is obtained before the Council of the EU, the name of the person is taken off the list. Even if the court annuls an individual’s listing, it will remain in place until the Council takes it off.
Once taken off the sanctions list, the person can ask the court for damages under Article 340(2) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, which provides for the right of individuals or legal persons to obtain compensation for damages occurring by the non-contractual liability of EU institutions.
At the time of writing, only one entity has obtained damages in the context of sanctions before the CJEU: in 2014, the Iranian company Safa Nicu Sepahan obtained EUR50,000 for non-material damage to its reputation (Judgment of 25 November 2014, Safa Nicu Sepahan Co. v Council, T-384/11, EU:T:2014:986).
At French level, a person seeking delisting must first ask the Ministry of Economy and Finance to reconsider (recours gracieux). They have two months from notification to do so. The administration then has two months to reply.
If refused (or if no response is received), the person may bring a recours pour excès de pouvoir (appeal for abuse of power). The deadline is two months in France, three months in overseas territories, or four months abroad.
At the EU level, to oppose their listing before the court, a sanctioned person has two months from the publication or personal notification of the decision to include their name on the lists. There is no time limit for a ruling on an annulment action. Concerning the administrative procedure before the Council, which relists periodically (eg, every six months under the Russian regime and every year under the Belarus regime) there is no time limit to request reconsideration of its decision to target the person with restrictive measures. Delistings currently take around two years before both.
There are no time limits in the Council’s administrative procedure; it relists periodically – every six months under the Russian regime and every year under the Belarus regime. Before the court, there is no time limit for a ruling on an annulment action; delistings currently take around two years before both.
Economic sanctions against Russia include a ban on providing to – and buying from – Russia or Russian persons several services, including crypto-asset wallets, engineering, IT consultancy and legal advisory, brokering and trade secrets, as provided by Decision 2014/512/CFSP and Regulation 833/2014.
Under Decision 2014/512/CFSP and Regulation 833/2014, several goods are prohibited from being imported from or exported to Russia, such as oil and coal, liquefied propane, dual-use goods and technology for military use, navigational instruments, drone engines, chemicals, cement and asphalt, helium, diamonds and gold. The 21st package (July 2026) further expanded these prohibitions, adding on the export side specialised metals, alloys, propellants and drone-related equipment, and on the import side certain metals, ores, car parts, glass products and imitation pearls.
Under Article 1218 of the French Civil Code, three conditions must be met for force majeure to suspend a contractual obligation:
In 2020, the French Supreme Court, the Cour de cassation, ruled that the freezing of a person’s assets under sanctions did not constitute a case of force majeure, as it did not meet the second condition (Cass., ass. plén., 10 juill. 2020, P+B+R+I, No 18-18.542 et 18-21.814).
The opposite approach would have offered sanctioned persons the possibility of relying on the restrictive measures to justify non-compliance with their obligations as debtors, which would have undermined the sanctions’ legitimacy.
To guard against sanctions imposed by France, the EU, the UN or third countries (notably the USA, whose sanctions, while not formally binding on French persons, are widely complied with), French parties should include a contractual clause anticipating sanctions on either side and setting out a remedy.
When sanctions issues arise in enforcing French or foreign judgments in France, courts apply a classical approach: examining whether the judge had jurisdiction, whether the decision complies with French public order, and whether it contravenes French law. Exequatur is refused if any condition is not met.
As UN, EU and national sanctions prohibit certain behaviours in France, such as the use of frozen assets, a judicial decision that would provide for the transfer of money from a frozen bank account would not be recognised and executed.
An appeal against the initial refusal is unlikely to succeed, since the same law would apply. The only recourse is to seek a Treasury derogation or wait for the sanctions to be lifted.
At French level, the Minister of Economy and Finance decides on the names to include in France’s sanctions lists. At EU level, the Council, on the basis of proposals from three working committees – COEST (Eastern Europe and Central Asia), RELEX (Foreign Relations Counsellors) and COREPER II (Permanent Representatives Committee – Part II) – decides which natural and legal persons to sanction. In both regimes, therefore, the process is entirely political.
Under Article 2(1) of Decision 2014/145/CFSP and Regulation 269/2014, “all funds and economic resources belonging to, or owned, held or controlled by” sanctioned natural and legal persons shall be frozen.
In its FAQs, the Commission of the EU explicitly states that for companies owned or controlled by listed persons, “it can be presumed that the control also extends to the assets of that entity, and that any funds or economic resources made available to that entity would reach or benefit the listed person”, with Article 2 applying accordingly. This amounts to an indirect designation through ownership or control by another directly designated person. Although non-binding, the FAQs are strictly applied by all EU actors.
At the same time, the Commission recalls that this presumption can be rebutted, “if it can be demonstrated that some or all of its assets are outside the control of the listed person, and/or that funds or economic resources made available to it would in fact not reach or benefit the listed person”.
Ownership and control have generated extensive litigation. The Commission has published two opinions on Article 2 (19 June 2020 and 8 June 2021) to guide practitioners. Some guidance can also be found in the EU best practices, where ownership is defined as “the possession of 50% or more of the proprietary rights of an entity or having majority interest in it”. Where there is no ownership, control is determined based on a non-exhaustive set of criteria.
The French Treasury Department (Direction Générale du Trésor, or DGT) has published a compliance guide in which it defines the notion of ownership as follows:
“Ownership is established by a title of ownership or a debt instrument; in the absence of such a title and in the case of movable property, ownership is presumed if the asset is in the possession of the person subject to a freezing measure”. From this definition, the following can be inferred:
Regarding the notion of control, the guide reads as follows:
“Control is a legal concept or one that can be inferred from the facts:
The French Commercial Code offers further guidance on control and ownership, as follows.
Another guiding instrument is the Joint Guidelines of the Directorate General of the Treasury and the ACPR on the Implementation of Asset Freezing Measures. In addition, French authorities refer to the EU best practices.
Article L. 542-2 of the French Customs Code provides for the criminalisation of the “failure to comply with the restrictions on economic and financial relations provided for under European Union law pursuant to Articles 75 or 215 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union and under international treaties and agreements duly approved and ratified by France”.
The Code therefore encompasses circumvention of French, EU and UN sanctions, which are the only sanctions implemented in France.
At EU level, and since April 2024, the circumvention of EU sanctions is also a criminal offence pursuant to Article 3(h) of Directive 2024/1226, which details the behaviours targeted:
As cited in 7.3.1 Prohibiting Provisions, Article L. 542-2 of the French Customs Code (formerly Article 459) provides for the criminalisation of circumvention of sanctions. This offence is punishable by five years’ imprisonment, confiscations and a fine. Until 12 June 2024, an additional penalty barred those convicted from acting as stockbrokers or as voters or elected members of chambers of commerce, commercial courts or industrial tribunals. Constitutional Council decision No 2024-1096 QPC of 12 June 2024 struck it down as unconstitutional, removing it from what is now Article L. 542-2 (formerly Article 459). The Council found that the automatic, fixed-duration disqualification violated the principle of individualisation of penalties.
Directive 2024/1226, adopted on 24 April 2024 (amending Directive (EU) 2018/1673), establishes (in Article 3) minimum rules on criminal offences and sanctions for violations of EU restrictive measures. These cover the freezing of funds and economic resources, prohibitions on making them available, travel bans into or through member-state territory, as well as sectoral economic and financial measures and arms embargoes.
As explained above, the regulatory aspects of the Directive were implemented in France through Decree No 2025-470 of 28 May 2025. Because the creation of criminal offences and the determination of applicable penalties fall within the field reserved to the legislature under Article 34 of the Constitution, the criminal-law aspects must be transposed by statute: on 3 March 2026, as mentioned above, Bill No 2544 was introduced to that effect, with no date yet set for its entry into force.
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Introduction
Before the two judgments delivered on 21 May 2026 by the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) in Case C-483/23 (T Trust) and joined Cases C-428/24 and C-476/24 (FZ AR and SX), the treatment of trust structures under restrictive measures adopted by the European Union (EU) was something of a legal vacuum. Neither the General Court nor the CJEU had previously clarified, within the specific context of trusts, the meaning of funds or economic resources “belonging to” or being “controlled by” a designated person. Yet both the General Court and national authorities were repeatedly called upon to assess trust arrangements when enforcing asset-freeze measures. In the absence of a coherent framework, enforcement practices created legal uncertainty for trustees, beneficiaries, financial institutions and sanctioned persons alike.
Trusts, by design, bifurcate legal title from economic benefit: the trustee holds the assets, while the beneficiary retains the economic interest. By separating legal ownership from beneficial enjoyment, trusts challenge traditional conceptions of ownership and control upon which restrictive measures are ordinarily premised. Trusts are not inherently opaque or suspicious structures; they are widely used across numerous jurisdictions for legitimate purposes, including estate planning, wealth preservation, charitable activities and business succession. They encompass a broad range of legal arrangements, each allocating powers, rights and benefits differently among settlors, trustees and beneficiaries.
Nevertheless, both judicial and administrative practices in the field of restrictive measures have revealed a degree of discomfort with, and sometimes misunderstanding of, the legal realities of trusts. Against this backdrop, guidance from the CJEU was eagerly awaited. The judgments delivered on 21 May 2026 constitute the CJEU’s first attempt at articulating a coherent framework for assessing assets held through trusts under EU sanctions law.
This article examines, in turn, the background that made these rulings necessary, the factual and legal content of the judgments, and their implications and limits.
Trusts as a Source of Interpretative Difficulty Within the Context of EU Restrictive Measures
Article 2(1) of Regulation (EU) No 269/2014 provides that “All funds and economic resources belonging to, owned, held or controlled by any natural or legal persons, entities or bodies listed in Annex I shall be frozen”. The CJEU has endorsed a broad interpretation, holding that, within the context of restrictive measures, the notions of “belonging to” and being “controlled by” are autonomous concepts. Ownership and control may be direct or indirect and extend to situations in which a person is able to influence the decisions of another person, even in the absence of any legal link between them (eg, see Judgment of 10 September 2019, HTTS v Council, C-123/18 P, EU:2019:694, paragraphs 69 to 71).
A trust, as defined by the Hague Convention of 1 July 1985, is a legal relationship, created by a person, the settlor, where assets are placed under the control of a trustee, for the benefit of a beneficiary, or for a special purpose.
Trusts can take many forms and are shaped for the purpose they are designed to serve (eg, revocable or irrevocable, fixed or discretionary, charitable, protective, bare, etc). Each category has its specificities. Notably, as regards the settlor’s relationship to the trust once constituted, a revocable trust allows the settlor to modify or dissolve the arrangement at any time, while an irrevocable trust permanently severs the settlor’s formal legal title to the assets. As for the beneficiaries’ rights, under a fixed trust, each beneficiary holds a predetermined entitlement defined in the trust deed, whereas, under a discretionary trust, no beneficiary has a vested right and the trustee alone determines if, when and to whom assets are distributed among a defined class of beneficiaries. A further distinction arises where trusts are set up not for identifiable beneficiaries but for the pursuit of a specified objective. Finally, regardless of type, trust deeds may confer additional powers on parties.
The trust is a well-established and widely used legal instrument, particularly in common law jurisdictions and within the context of international private wealth management. High net worth individuals commonly rely on trust structures for a variety of legitimate purposes – eg, estate planning and intergenerational wealth transfer, asset protection in connection with commercial risk, succession planning across multiple jurisdictions, and philanthropic arrangements. Many such trusts were established long before the adoption of restrictive measures by the EU, and have no connection with the geopolitical events that prompted those measures. Importantly, trusts are not opaque by design – the roles of settlor, trustee, beneficiary and, where applicable, protector, are legally defined, documented, and, in properly constituted trusts, readily identifiable.
Nevertheless, like any legal instrument, trusts may, in certain circumstances, be misused. The separation of legal and beneficial ownership may be leveraged to shield assets from creditors, to obscure the ultimate beneficial owner of assets for tax or regulatory purposes, or to circumvent reporting obligations applicable to the direct holding of assets. The flexibility afforded by certain trust regimes can further complicate the identification of the person who ultimately benefits from or controls the trust assets.
The defining feature of the trust, namely the separation of legal and beneficial ownership, is therefore both the rationale for its use and, within the context of restrictive measures, the source of interpretative difficulty. An individual subject to restrictive measures may contend that assets held through a trust no longer fall within the scope of the asset-freeze measures, either because the settlor was a sanctioned individual but the legal title is vested in the trustee or because only one beneficiary among several is subject to restrictive measures, or where a sanctioned beneficiary has been removed from the list of beneficiaries. In its 2023 Guidance for EU Operators, the European Commission identified the use of unjustified complex or corporate trust structures as an indicium of possible circumvention of restrictive measures, and the Commission’s wording is revealing. The concern does not lie in the use of trusts as such, but rather in the recourse to structures whose complexity lacks a legitimate justification. The Commission therefore acknowledges that trusts are not inherently opaque or suspicious, and that they may be an indication of circumvention only where their structure is unnecessarily complex. In any event, such complexity merely constitutes an indicium.
A properly constituted trust is a transparent legal instrument: the identity of the settlor, the trustee, and the beneficiaries, as well as the respective rights and obligations of each party, are documented in the trust deed and governed by a defined body of law. The difficulty that arises within the context of restrictive measures does not stem from a deficiency inherent in the instrument itself but, rather, from the question of how the concepts of “belonging to” and “controlled by” under Article 2(1) of Regulation (EU) No 269/2014 apply to a legal structure in which ownership is, by design, divided between at least two distinct parties, and in which the allocation of powers among the various trust actors may complicate the assessment of control. It must be determined whether, and under what circumstances, assets held through a trust may be regarded as belonging to or being controlled by a person subject to restrictive measures for the purpose of asset-freeze measures.
Against this backdrop, the use of trusts has represented a challenge for the effective enforcement of EU restrictive measures since their creation, and even more since March 2022 and the increase in sanctions against Russia. The ambiguity requires a uniform interpretation both for the national authorities imposing freezing measures and the persons subject to restrictive measures involved in trust structures.
Prior to the 21 May 2026 judgments, the CJEU had scarcely addressed the notions of “belonging to” and “controlled by”. In a judgment issued on 12 March 2026 in Case C-84/24, EM System, the Court held that the freezing of funds covers funds and economic resources of a company not included on the list, provided that those funds and economic resources are owned, held or controlled by a person, entity or body which is included on that list. The Court added that a 50% shareholding in a company gave rise to a presumption of control of that company, but also its funds and economic resources. However, the CJEU never interpreted the concepts of “belonging to” and “controlled by” within the context of trust structures.
The Regional Administrative Court for Lazio in Italy, faced with three cases involving persons subjected to restrictive measures and assets held through trusts, referred preliminary questions to the CJEU, making these the first decisions to address the intersection of trust law and EU asset freeze obligations.
The Court’s Findings in the 21 May 2026 Judgments
Facts and questions referred
The three cases arose within the context of sanctions imposed by the Council of the EU in response to Russia’s aggression against Ukraine, and pertain to assets linked to individuals included in Annex I to Regulation (EU) No 269/2014, and held through Bermudian trust structures.
In Case C-483/23 (T Trust), four Italian companies were controlled by a company established in Bermuda, itself placed in an irrevocable trust governed by the law of Bermuda and whose trustee was a Swiss entity. The trust’s settlor had been removed from the list of beneficiaries prior to his inclusion in Annex I to Regulation (EU) No 269/2014 in 2022. The Italian authorities imposed a freezing measure on assets belonging to the four companies, finding that they were attributable to the settlor, as beneficial owner of those companies.
In Case C-428/24 (FZ AR), an Italian company belonging to an international group was held, indirectly, through an irrevocable and discretionary trust governed by the law of Bermuda (XT Trust). The original beneficiary of the trust (Mr ZU) had been replaced by his spouse (Ms TU), before both of them were included in Annex I to Regulation (EU) No 269/2014 in 2022. In Case C-476/24 (SX), a boat located in Italy belonged to the company SX that was held in an irrevocable and discretionary trust of which Mrs TU was the sole beneficiary. In both cases, the Italian authorities imposed freezing measures on company FZ AR and on the boat on the grounds that the assets and resources remained attributable to Mrs TU as beneficiary of the trust.
In both cases, the companies challenged the freezing measures before the Regional Administrative Court for Lazio.
The questions referred to the CJEU by the Italian court pertained to the interpretation of Article 2(1) of Regulation (EU) No 269/2014 and, specifically, the concepts of “belonging to” and being “controlled by” within the context of trusts. On the one hand, the court wished to ascertain whether it is possible to impose freezing measures on assets and economic resources put into a trust by a settlor subject to restrictive measures when such assets are deemed to belong to or be controlled by said settlor and, on the other, whether assets and economic resources held in a trust could be considered as belonging to or being controlled by the beneficiary of the trust, subject to restrictive measures, even when the national law prohibited the beneficiary from enjoying or disposing of the trust’s assets.
The Court’s holdings: substance over form
The Court clarified for the first time whether funds and economic resources held through trust structures may be frozen when those structures are linked to persons subject to EU sanctions. In both judgments, the Court rejected a formalistic approach to trust structures and held that the existence of a trust does not, in itself, preclude the freezing of assets held through it. Rather than focusing on the formal allocation of rights between settlor, trustee and beneficiary, it made clear that the decisive question is not who holds legal title over the assets under the law governing the trust or the trust deed but who has the power, in practice, to use, benefit from, or dispose of the assets or have influence over them. Ownership and control may therefore be inferred from factual circumstances surrounding the trust arrangement, several of which were identified by the Court as relevant indicators.
To reach this conclusion, the Court first recalled that Article 2(1) of Regulation No 269/2014 encompasses a plurality of legal relationships between the person or entity listed in Annex I to that Regulation and the funds and economic resources concerned. The provision extends beyond situations of formal ownership and covers all circumstances in which the person or entity exercises de facto power over the funds and resources or benefits from them. In doing so, the Court followed the reasoning adopted by the Advocate General in his Advisory Opinion delivered on 10 July 2025 in Case C-483/23 (T Trust).
In that sense, the notion of “belonging to” encompasses both situations in which power over the funds and economic resources can be legally attested, and those in which the person or entity holds de facto power. Likewise, the concept of “controlled by” extends to situations in which a person is able to influence the choices of another person, irrespective of the existence of a legal link. It should be noted that the Court failed to provide a definition and to delineate the contours of the notions of “power” and “influence”, thereby raising concerns regarding legal certainty.
The Court grounded this “substance over form” approach in two imperatives: the requirement to limit transactions involving frozen assets, and the objective of protecting Ukraine’s territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence by preventing any circumvention of restrictive measures.
Consistent with this approach, the Court held that the referring court must undertake a holistic assessment of the trust arrangement. While the law governing the trust may be relevant, it cannot be determinative. Rather, it must consider the broader factual reality, particularly given that trust deeds and their amendments are not subject to publicity requirements and may be modified, making the true nature of the legal relationship difficult to identify from the deed alone.
The Court subsequently identified a series of factual indicia capable of demonstrating that a settlor or beneficiary retains the power to use, benefit from or dispose of the funds and economic resources held in the trust, or to have influence over them or over the decisions made by the trustee in respect of them. Such circumstances include:
Indications that assets belong to or are controlled by the beneficiary or the settlor may also be inferred from the use of unnecessarily complex structures, such as:
Ultimately, the Court concluded that assets held in a trust may be regarded as “belonging to” or being “controlled by” the settlor or beneficiary where they hold “power enabling him, her or it to use, benefit from or dispose of those funds and resources or to have influence over them or over the decisions made by the trustee in respect of the funds and economic resources held in the trust or placed in the trust by the settlor”.
Implications and Limits
The judgments address a legal vacuum in EU sanctions law. For the first time, the Court rendered rulings on the application of asset freeze obligations to trust structures. The key takeaway is that the existence of a trust structure does not, in itself, shield assets from exposure to EU sanctions merely because the legal title is vested in a trustee or because the trust deed incorporates compliance provisions. Formal legal structures cannot place assets beyond the reach of EU sanctions where the factual circumstances point in a different direction.
A significant consequence pertains to asset declaration obligations. The broad interpretation of the notions of “belonging to” and “controlled by” suggests that assets held through trusts over which a designated person exercises de facto power may fall within the scope of assets that must be declared to the authorities, notwithstanding the absence of formal title. This places enhanced due diligence obligations on trustees, corporate service providers, and financial institutions.
Nonetheless, the judgments leave important questions open. The Court relied on the concepts of “power” and “influence” to give substance to the notions of “belonging to” and “controlled by”, yet provided no definition. This is particularly noteworthy in relation to “influence”, a notion that is often used lightly by the Court in sanctions-related cases, without any clear framework. Instead, the Court’s approach is fundamentally case-by-case: rather than establishing a clear presumption akin to the 50% shareholding threshold confirmed in the EM System judgment, it enumerates factual indicia that may support an inference of belonging or control. The standard of proof, the weight to be accorded to each factor, and the threshold at which the inference is established remain unresolved. The judgments also fail to address whether the inference of control is rebuttable and, if so, how the burden of proof is allocated between authorities and the settlor or beneficiary. These shortcomings are all the more problematic given the inherently flexible and multifaceted nature of trust structures. The mere enumeration of factual indicia cannot be sufficient. To that extent, the judgments do not remove all legal uncertainty surrounding trusts, depriving economic operators of a comprehensive framework.
More fundamentally, the Court’s framework will be applied by national authorities across twenty-seven member states operating under different administrative law traditions, which may lead to significant divergence in enforcement practices. This risk is particularly acute within the context of trusts. They are neither recognised nor used uniformly across the EU, and the characteristics of trust arrangements vary considerably depending on the jurisdiction and the type of trust concerned. The factual indicia identified by the Court may therefore be understood and applied differently across member states.
While the judgments provide a methodology for assessing assets held through trusts, they fall short of establishing a genuinely harmonised framework. By relying on open-ended factual indicia rather than clear presumptions or thresholds, the Court has left considerable room for national discretion, and therefore discrepancy. This fragmentation risk is compounded by the near-certain increase in national litigation: trustees, beneficiaries, and underlying companies subject to freeze decisions will challenge those decisions on the basis of the factual criteria laid down by the Court, with each case requiring intensive cross-border factual inquiry.
Ultimately, the significance of the 21 May 2026 judgments depends largely on one’s perspective. For the more optimistic observer, they constitute a step towards a more coherent and harmonised framework governing the treatment of trusts under EU sanctions law. For the more sceptical, they may prove somewhat underwhelming: while the Court has provided a first set of criteria for assessing whether assets held through a trust may be regarded as “belonging to” or being “controlled by” a designated person, it has provided only limited guidance as to its practical application and failed to create a comprehensive framework. The 21 May 2026 judgments are, in this sense, the beginning of a new chapter in the judicial elaboration of EU sanctions law, not its conclusion.
Conclusion
Beyond their implications for trusts, the 21 May 2026 judgments are reflective of a broader trend in EU sanctions law, towards an increasingly expansive interpretation of the concepts linking assets to designated persons. By favouring economic reality over formal legal arrangements, the Court continues to extend the reach of restrictive measures. In doing so, it seeks to limit opportunities for circumvention and to ensure that sanctions remain effective.
Yet the pursuit of effectiveness cannot come at the expense of legal certainty. As the concepts of ownership, control and economic benefit become broader and more fact-dependent, it becomes increasingly difficult for trustees, financial institutions, corporate service providers and other economic operators to assess whether particular assets may be regarded as falling within the scope of asset-freeze obligations. The challenge for future case law will therefore be to strike an appropriate balance between the effectiveness of restrictive measures and the predictability that economic operators require to organise their affairs and comply with their obligations. The lasting significance of these judgments may ultimately lie less in the answers they provide than in the questions they leave open as to where that balance should be drawn.
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