With the Securitisation Regulation in force in Norway as of 2025 (see 1.3 Applicable Laws and Regulations), a securitisation market is beginning to develop. However, established market practice regarding commonly securitised financial assets is still emerging. Based on early transactions and the regulatory framework, it is expected that market practice will align with the established EU securitisation markets, and that the following asset classes will be most commonly securitised:
Norwegian securitisations are expected to follow standard EU structures, including traditional true sale securitisations and synthetic securitisations. The structure chosen will depend on the asset class and the originator’s objectives (funding versus capital relief). Given the regulatory framework now in place, both public and private securitisations are possible, with structures likely to mirror those used in other Nordic and EU jurisdictions.
Securitisation transactions in Norway are primarily governed by:
Though market practice is emerging, Norwegian originators are expected to utilise SPEs established in other EU/EEA jurisdictions with well-developed securitisation frameworks, most commonly Ireland and Luxembourg. These jurisdictions offer established legal frameworks for bankruptcy-remote entities, favourable tax treatment and experienced service providers.
Credit enhancement in Norwegian securitisations is expected to follow standard EU market practice, including:
In a traditional securitisation transaction, the issuer is a bankruptcy-remote SPE which acquires the underlying financial assets from the originator by way of a true sale. The issuer finances the acquisition of the financial assets with proceeds from notes issued by it to investors in the capital markets. In synthetic securitisation, the credit risk associated with the financial assets is transferred to the SPE with the use of financial guarantees or credit derivatives. If it is a funded transaction, the SPE issues credit-linked notes to investors to put up the cash that is required as collateral for the SPE’s obligations as credit protection seller. For further details on SPEs, see 6.2 SPEs.
The original lender, originator, servicer and sponsor will typically be the same entity, normally a bank. In these circumstances, the original lender/originator will normally remain the debtors’ primary point of contact for dealings with their loan after the securitisation.
Under the Securitisation Regulation, it is required that the sponsor either be an investment firm or a credit institution.
The originator/seller is the entity which was involved in the original agreement which created the financial assets being securitised or which has purchased a third party’s financial assets on its own account and then securitised them.
To fund the acquisition of the underlying portfolio in a securitisation, the SPE issues notes in the capital markets. In this process it is assisted by placement agents and underwriters, commonly referred to as arrangers and/or mangers (usually investment banks). They are responsible for structuring the securitisation transaction, marketing the notes and may also act as underwriters. If the originator itself is an investment bank, it may act on its own behalf in this role.
The servicer manages the pool of purchased receivables or the underlying credit exposures on a day-to-day basis. To protect the rights and interests of the debtors under securitised loans, the Norwegian legislation implementing the Securitisation Regulation requires the servicer of a securitised loan portfolio to be either a bank, a non-banking credit institution or a finance company, if the originator is a financial institution. The requirement ensures that the servicer is fit and proper to service and collect the securitised loans.
As a general rule, there are no restrictions on the replacement of the servicer with another entity, for example if the servicer does not comply with its contractual obligations or becomes insolvent. The Norwegian Ministry of Finance (the “Ministry of Finance”) noted in the preparatory works to the Norwegian legislation implementing the Securitisation Regulation that the replacement should be executed in an orderly manner. Among other things, this entails protecting the rights and interests of the debtors and providing for continued reporting under the Norwegian Act on Debt Information following a replacement.
The servicer is under an obligation to take necessary steps to protect the rights and interests of the debtors under the securitised loans and to secure that the debtors are not treated differently than if the underlying loans had been transferred to a financial institution.
To ensure a sound treatment of complaints from debtors under the securitised loans arising after the transfer of the loans to the SPE, the servicer shall represent the SPE in non-judiciary dispute resolution mechanisms organised by the state.
By subscribing for the issued notes, investors of securitisation positions fund the SPE’s acquisition of the corresponding underlying financial assets. Further, the investors assume the credit risk of the securitised portfolio as investors only have recourse to the cash flows generated by the portfolio.
The Securitisation Regulation includes a number of due diligence and monitoring requirements for investors.
The trustee is appointed to safeguard the noteholders’ rights and interests and to be their representative in dealings with the issuer. Further, the trustee monitors the conduct of other parties during the life of the transaction and the distribution of cash flows generated by the underlying pool of assets. In an enforcement scenario, the trustee will act on behalf of the noteholder community.
The role of the security agent is to create, manage and, if necessary, enforce security on behalf of the noteholder community.
As outlined in more detail in 6.1 Insolvency Laws, under Norwegian law, bankruptcy-remote transfers require a legal, valid and binding transfer agreement between the originator and the SPE. Further, the transfer must be considered a “true sale”, meaning that the substantial risk on the underlying financial assets must be transferred to the SPE.
There are no specific requirements to ensure that a transfer of financial assets is valid and enforceable. For a legal charge to be valid it must be established in accordance with the Norwegian Pledge Act. To obtain legal perfection, additional requirements must be met; see 6.3 Transfer of Financial Assets.
As the Norwegian securitisation framework entered into force in August 2025, market practice regarding the principal subject matters covered in documentation for securitisation transactions is still developing. Documentation is expected to follow EU market standards and cover matters such as:
See 3.1 Bankruptcy-Remote Transfer of Financial Assets.
See 3.1 Bankruptcy-Remote Transfer of Financial Assets.
See 3.1 Bankruptcy-Remote Transfer of Financial Assets.
See 3.1 Bankruptcy-Remote Transfer of Financial Assets.
Events of default typically include:
Standard indemnities cover:
Note documentation follows standard EU market practice and includes:
Where derivatives are used (eg, for interest rate or currency hedging, or for synthetic risk transfer), documentation must comply with:
See 4.2 General Disclosure Laws or Regulations.
The Norwegian legislation implementing the Securitisation Regulation includes a requirement to inform the debtors under securitised loans of the identity of the SPE, of the servicer, and of the rights and obligations of the SPE and the servicer towards the debtor. The information must be provided no later than three weeks before the loans are sold and transferred from the originator to the SPE. The rules do not afford the debtors any right to object to the transfer or opt out of the securitisation.
In addition to the legislative acts outlined in 4.1 Specific Disclosure Laws or Regulations, Regulation (EU) 2017/1129 (the “Prospectus Regulation”) has been incorporated in Norwegian law and will be the main source of general disclosure obligations for public securitisation transactions undertaken by Norwegian originators.
Under the Prospectus Regulation, a prospectus shall contain the necessary information which is material to an investor for making an informed assessment of:
The prospectus shall also include risk factors, but only those risks which are material and specific to the issuer and its securities.
The application of the Prospectus Regulation depends on whether the offering or listing of securities in a securitisation requires a prospectus to be published. This is the case where there is a non-exempt public offering or a listing of the SPE’s securities on a regulated market.
The Norwegian legislation implementing the Securitisation Regulation does not contain requirements on credit risk retention above and beyond what is set out in the Securitisation Regulation.
To secure a certain degree of alignment between the investors’ and the originator’s interests in a securitisation transaction, the Securitisation Regulation requires the originator, sponsor or original lender to comply with certain risk-retention requirements. In general, a minimum of 5% of the net economic credit risk related to the securitisation must be retained.
The Securitisation Regulation includes an exhaustive list of five acceptable risk-retention techniques. It is expected that many parties will prefer the less complex risk-retention methods – ie, first loss exposure (where the parties retain a first loss exposure of at least 5% of every securitised exposure in the securitisation) and vertical slice (where the parties retain at least 5% of the nominal value of each tranche sold or transferred to investors).
The Securitisation Regulation also sets out certain exemptions from the risk-retention requirement – eg, in cases where the securities are fully, unconditionally and irrevocably guaranteed by central banks or central governments.
Under the Norwegian Act on Debt Information, Norwegian financial institutions are required to report certain information to an authorised debt registry institution. As the SPE is exempted from the local licensing requirement, and thus not a financial institution for these purposes, the Norwegian legislation implementing the Securitisation Regulation instead imposes the reporting obligation on the servicer of the securitised portfolio (usually the originator).
The transparency requirements under the Securitisation Regulation include periodic reporting obligations. Pursuant to Article 7, the responsible entity in a securitisation transaction shall make quarterly investor reports available or, in the case of asset-backed commercial paper, monthly investor reports.
The activities of rating agencies are regulated in Regulation (EU) 1060/2009 (the “CRA Regulation”), amended by Regulation (EU) 513/2011 (CRA 2) and Regulation (EU) 462/2013 (CRA 3). These regulations provide the regulatory framework for credit rating agencies and are incorporated by reference in Norwegian law. Among other things, credit rating agencies are required to be registered and supervised, and are required to use rating methodologies that are rigorous, systematic, continuous and subject to validation based on historical experience, including back-testing.
Notably, Article 8c in the CRA Regulation requires the issuer in securitisation transactions to obtain a double credit rating, issued by two different credit rating agencies. Further, the issuer should consider appointing at least one credit rating agency which does not have more than 10% of the total market share.
ESMA is responsible for registration and supervision of credit rating agencies in the EU. In Norway, the Financial Supervisory Authority of Norway (FSAN) is the competent authority under the CRA Regulation.
Norwegian credit institutions and investment firms are subject to the regulatory capital requirements under the CRR, which has been amended by the so-called “banking package” consisting of Regulation (EU) 2019/876 (CRR II), Directive (EU) 2019/878 (CRD V) and Directive (EU) 2019/879 (BRRD II).
Norwegian legislation implementing the “banking package” entered into force in June 2022.
Under the CRR, the originator may exclude the underlying exposures in a securitisation from the calculation of its risk-weighted exposure amounts and expected loss amounts if:
If any of these requirements are met, credit institutions and investment firms will only be required to hold regulatory capital for the securitisation positions they retain in the transaction. The retained securitisation positions receive risk-weights which are calculated under the applicable approach set out in the CRR.
As competent authority under the CRR, the FSAN may decide on a case-by-case basis that significant credit risk shall not be considered to have been transferred from the originator to the SPE (the commensurate risk transfer test). However, where the originator is able to demonstrate that the reduction in capital it needs to hold after the securitisation is justified by a corresponding and true credit risk transfer from the originator to third parties, this test will be passed.
The Norwegian legislation implementing the Securitisation Regulation does not include any specific provisions relating to the use of derivatives in securitisation transactions other than what follows from the Securitisation Regulation.
Norway has implemented Regulation (EU) 648/2012 (EMIR).
The key elements of investor protection consist of asset segregation, bankruptcy remoteness, risk retention and disclosure provisions in the Securitisation Regulation as well as the disclosure requirements in the Prospectus Regulation.
Further, the Securitisation Regulation requires a minimum standard of due-diligence measures from institutional investors before investing in securitisation positions. This includes a comprehensive and thorough understanding of the securitisation position and its underlying exposures. The investor is also required to monitor the positions on an ongoing basis and implement written policies and procedures for the risk management of the securitisation position.
Under Norwegian law, there are no specific rules applicable to securitisations performed by banks as compared to other financial institutions. Norwegian banks will be permitted to securitise their financial assets and also invest in securitisation positions. Accordingly, any such transactions will be subject to the same legal framework as described elsewhere in this chapter, with the overriding legal framework being the Securitisation Regulation and the CRR.
There are no special rules that apply to the form of SPEs accomplishing securitisations in Norway. As noted in 6.2 SPEs, Norwegian corporate or similar law is not very well suited for SPEs in securitisation transactions and it is assumed that Norwegian financial institutions wishing to use securitisation would utilise SPEs registered outside of Norway, for instance in Ireland or Luxembourg.
There are no specific provisions under Norwegian law which relate to activities that should be avoided by SPEs in relation to securitisations.
Under the Securitisation Regulation, the SPE may only perform activities appropriate to accomplishing the purpose of carrying out securitisations.
The Norwegian securitisation market is in its early stages of development following the entry into force of the Securitisation Regulation in August 2025. To date, no government-sponsored entities have been established to participate in the Norwegian securitisation market.
The Norwegian legislation implementing the Securitisation Regulation does not contain any particular rules preventing securitisation from being carried out by government-sponsored entities.
Norwegian investors are not restricted from investing in foreign securitisation positions. The impact of the new securitisation framework on the Norwegian capital market is difficult to predict. Generally, the investor base for securitisation positions in true sale securitisations is expected to consist mainly of large and institutional investors, such as financial institutions, pension funds and insurance companies. The riskier tranches of true sale securitisations and synthetic securitisations are expected to be placed with investors demanding a higher rate of return on their investment and who are willing to accept higher risk – eg, specialised funds.
See 1.3 Applicable Laws and Regulations.
Synthetic securitisation is a securitisation whereby the credit risk associated with the underlying financial assets is transferred to an SPE and/or investors without a true sale. This can be achieved either by the use of credit derivatives or financial guarantees.
Compared to traditional securitisation, synthetic securitisation is both more flexible and faster to implement, mostly due to the fact that the underlying financial assets are not transferred by way of a true sale transaction. Thus, the costs related to the transaction may be lower than for a traditional securitisation. In contrast to traditional securitisations, the purpose of a synthetic securitisation is almost always capital management and very rarely funding.
Synthetic securitisation will be subject to the same legal framework as traditional securitisation in Norway. Applicable laws depend on the structure of the transaction. For instance, the provision of a financial guarantee in a synthetic securitisation may trigger a local licensing requirement and the use of credit derivatives to transfer credit risk may be subject to the requirements under EMIR.
Norwegian securitisation is now governed by legislation implementing the Securitisation Regulation, which entered into force in August 2025. This legislation allows Norwegian financial institutions to securitise financial assets under the same legal framework as other financial institutions in the EU.
The legislation provides for both traditional (true sale) securitisations and synthetic securitisations, including the STS (simple, transparent and standardised) framework for both types of transactions. The STS framework was extended to synthetic securitisations through the implementation of Regulation (EU) 2021/557 and Regulation (EU) 2021/558, which amended the Securitisation Regulation and the CRR.
For a transfer of financial assets to be bankruptcy-remote, the transaction must constitute a “true sale”, meaning that substantial risk associated with the underlying financial assets must be transferred to the SPE with legal perfection. Where this requirement is met, the securitised financial assets will not form part of the originator’s insolvency estate as they do not belong to the insolvent originator following the true sale. However, the overriding claw-back provisions in Norwegian insolvency legislation must be observed, which may allow transactions to be unwound if completed shortly before insolvency and in circumstances prejudicial to creditors.
Norwegian corporate or similar law is not particularly well-suited to facilitate the use of Norwegian SPEs in securitisation transactions. Based on feedback received in the legislative hearing, the Ministry of Finance assumed in its legislative proposal that Norwegian financial institutions will likely prefer to use SPEs registered outside of Norway in securitisation transactions, for instance SPEs registered in Ireland or Luxembourg. Consequently, amendments to Norwegian corporate or similar law have not been proposed and adopted at this stage.
There are no specific requirements to ensure a transfer of financial assets is valid and enforceable by the transferee against the transferor under Norwegian law. However, legal perfection rules must be observed to ensure protection against the transferor’s creditors. In case of transfer of monetary claims, the debtor to such claims must be notified, as further described below.
Legal charges must be established pursuant to the terms of the Norwegian Pledge Act. Certain requirements must be fulfilled for the legal charge to be valid between the parties. Notably, it is not permitted to establish a “floating” charge over all the chargor’s assets. Furthermore, the chargor may not grant security over less than the chargor’s entire ownership in the charged asset.
As outlined in 6.1 Insolvency Laws, the securitised financial assets would, as a general rule, not form part of the originator’s insolvency estate as they do not belong to the insolvent originator following a true sale of the assets. To ensure that the underlying assets are bankruptcy remote, it is key that the substantial risks associated with them are transferred to the SPE and that such transfer is legally perfected. Further, the overriding claw-back provisions in Norwegian insolvency legislation must be observed.
See 6.1 Insolvency Laws.
There is no stamp duty or other documentary taxes on the transfer of financial assets. Certain fees must be paid for registering title transfers in the relevant mortgage registers and there are maximum fees for electronic mass-registration of multiple title transfers.
As outlined in 6.2 SPEs, it is expected that Norwegian securitisations will utilise SPEs registered outside of Norway. Generally, Norwegian income tax would not apply to the non-Norwegian SPE’s income which is derived from the acquired underlying financial assets.
Effective from 1 July 2021, a 15% withholding tax applies to interest payments made to related parties in low tax jurisdictions. Payments to entities genuinely established and conducting real economic activity in an EU/EEA member state are exempt from such withholding tax.
The Norwegian legislation implementing the Securitisation Regulation does not address the tax treatment of securitisation transactions. With the securitisation market now developing following the entry into force of the new framework in August 2025, guidance and certainty on the tax treatment of securitisation transactions is expected to emerge through market practice and potential future guidance from the Norwegian tax authorities.
With the securitisation market now developing in Norway, legal opinions in securitisation transactions are expected to follow standard EU market practice, typically covering:
The Norwegian legislation implementing the Securitisation Regulation does not include any securitisation-specific accounting rules.
In general, the accounting analysis would be independent of the legal analysis. Consequently, a securitisation may be considered off-balance sheet from a legal perspective but on-balance sheet for accounting purposes.
With respect to the de-recognition of the underlying financial assets in the originator’s balance sheet, the preparatory work to the Norwegian legislation implementing the Securitisation Regulation refers to the accounting for financial instruments under International Financial Reporting Standards 9 (IFRS 9).
Whilst market practice in Norway is still emerging in relation to securitisation, it is typically not market practice in Norway for legal opinions to also address accounting matters.
The European Union’s comprehensively reformed securitisation legislation has been implemented in Norway as of 1 August 2025, representing a watershed moment for the Norwegian capital markets. This implementation is expected to pave the way for both synthetic and traditional securitisation transactions by Norwegian banks, introducing sophisticated risk management and capital optimisation tools that have been successfully utilised in other European jurisdictions for many years.
Securitisation is widely viewed as a potential significant growth area in the Norwegian capital market, addressing a particular challenge where Norwegian banks suffer from substantially higher capital requirements than comparable institutions in other Nordic jurisdictions and throughout the rest of the European Union. These elevated capital requirements have historically constrained Norwegian banks’ ability to optimise their balance sheets, giving them a regulatory disadvantage against their international peers.
Prior to 2016, Norwegian securitisation rules existed but were widely viewed as inflexible and inadequate to promote an active and liquid securitisation market in Norway. The regulatory framework was considered overly restrictive and failed to provide the necessary legal certainty and operational flexibility required for efficient securitisation structures. In particular, it was difficult to see how any form of capital relief or off-balance sheet treatment could effectively be achieved under these rules. In 2016, the domestic regime was repealed entirely, effectively putting an end to any realistic potential for securitisation of Norwegian portfolios and leaving Norwegian banks without access to these important capital markets tools. Prior to being repealed, the regulatory framework had been used actively by one Norwegian bank for true sale securitisation of auto loans whilst other banks had opted to focus on covered bond funding during this period.
The implementation of the EU’s Securitisation Regulation from 1 August 2025 has thus introduced a powerful and sophisticated new tool in Norwegian banks’ regulatory and capital management toolbox. This development is expected to have significant implications for how Norwegian banks manage their balance sheets, optimise capital allocation and access funding markets.
The implementing legislation in Norway adopts the EU Securitisation Regulation as Norwegian law without any gold plating but also adds certain local law requirements which mainly apply to true sale securitisations. None of these local law requirements are expected to have a negative effect on the ability or attractiveness of such securitisation structures in Norway. In particular, the implementing legislation makes it clear that borrowers will not have a right to withhold their consent or otherwise opt out of a securitisation of their loans and that the securitisation SPV does not need to be licensed in Norway in order to acquire loans and issue tranche securities backed by the cash flows from such loans.
In the short term, market participants expect banks to primarily consider synthetic (“on-balance sheet”) securitisation structures for capital relief and risk-sharing purposes. These structures offer significant potential for capital savings whilst presenting less operational complexity compared to traditional securitisation structures, making them an attractive starting point for banks new to these markets. Indeed, since the passing of the legislation to implement the EU’s Securitisation Regulation in Norway, a handful of Norwegian banks have completed private synthetic securitisation transactions for capital relief purposes, and more banks are expected to follow suit. The deals that have been completed to date include both funded and unfunded transactions with different underlying assets and profiles. All of the deals known in the market have been STS compliant and this trend is expected to continue.
The appeal of synthetic structures is particularly pronounced given their ability to provide meaningful capital relief without the need to transfer assets off-balance sheet, thereby maintaining customer relationships and operational control whilst achieving regulatory capital benefits. As Norwegian banks are subject to more rigorous capital requirements than their peers in the rest of the Nordics and Europe, they have more to gain from synthetic securitisations than banks which are subject to less rigorous requirements. The combination of high capital requirements and concentration of lending to certain sectors, such as commercial real estate, energy and shipping makes synthetic securitisation a useful tool for many Norwegian banks. However, a number of banks will struggle to put together portfolios of loans which are large enough to meet the demands from investors while at the same time being diversified and homogeneous enough to meet STS requirements. This can potentially be alleviated by undertaking synthetic securitisations through jointly owned vehicles, such as covered bond companies, instead of at the individual bank level.
Synthetic structures also typically require less extensive operational infrastructure and can be implemented more quickly than traditional securitisations. Nevertheless, first-time issuers will need to familiarise themselves with the operational, technical and legal requirements pertaining to synthetic securitisation structures, and the first transactions will therefore take more time and require more resources from the issuer bank than subsequent, repeat deals. In order to ensure that the transaction will have the intended capital effect for the bank, it is also necessary to involve the Norwegian FSA at an early stage of the transaction. It will, among other things, consider whether the requirements for significant risk transfer have been met such that the bank can calculate its capital requirements under the CRR rules for securitisation positions.
On the funding side, many Norwegian banks have historically relied heavily on covered bonds and unsecured senior funding for their long-term funding needs, creating well-established and efficient funding channels. Traditional securitisation structures may therefore be somewhat less frequent among these banks initially, unless they prove to be more cost-effective than existing alternatives or offer other significant advantages such as diversification benefits, access to different investor bases, or improved asset-liability matching capabilities. Based on current funding costs for Norwegian banks, it is not obvious that true sale securitisation could offer more attractive terms than the existing funding alternatives. However, when assessing the cost and benefit of a true sale securitisation, the potential for capital relief must be taken into consideration. Securitisation is the only funding tool for banks which also enables the bank to achieve capital relief and hence improve its capital ratios as well as obtain funding on attractive terms. Other sources of funding, such as senior unsecured bonds and covered bonds, can offer attractive funding but will not offer any capital relief for the issuing bank. We therefore believe that some Norwegian banks will consider true sale securitisation as an alternative or supplement to their other available funding sources going forward. The extent of true sale securitisation use in Norway remains to be seen, and the fact that lending is a licensed activity reserved for banks and regulated credit institutions means that there is a limited amount of potential originators of true sale securitisations in Norway for the time being.
However, as the market develops and banks gain experience with these structures, it is anticipated that traditional securitisation will also play an increasingly important role, particularly for banks seeking to diversify their funding sources, access new investor bases, or optimise the funding costs for specific asset classes. The development of a robust securitisation market in Norway could also attract international investors and create new opportunities for cross-border capital flows, further enhancing the depth and liquidity of Norwegian capital markets.
The effectiveness of EU reforms of the securitisation framework will likely have a significant effect on the use of securitisation in Norway. In particular, the proposals set forward by the EU Commission during 2025 have the potential to stimulate the country’s securitisation market, both on the sell side and the buy side. The proposed changes to the Solvency II Framework could stimulate Norwegian insurers and pension funds to invest in securitisations, thereby creating local investor demand for such products, whilst the proposed calibrations to the risk weight floors in CRR could make more portfolios eligible for securitisations.
In order for Norwegian banks to benefit from such reforms, it will be imperative to ensure that Norway implements them simultaneously with the European authorities, thus ensuring a level playing field between Norwegian and other European banks. The signals from the Norwegian legislature and politicians have been positive in that regard, and the current Norwegian government has repeatedly emphasised that effective and timely implementation of EU law in Norway is a priority. However, the structures and processes which currently apply to the implementation process, which include a formal process to transform EU law into EEA law, make it difficult to guarantee simultaneous implementation in Norway and the EU. The Norwegian banking and finance industry has engaged proactively with Norwegian authorities to ensure that the regulatory gap between Norway and the rest of Europe is as small and as short as possible.