Companies in India are primarily incorporated either as private companies or as public companies under the Companies Act, 2013 (the Companies Act). Private companies have a limit of 200 shareholders (other than current and past employees) and provide for share transfer restrictions in their articles of association. Public companies can be either unlisted or listed on one or more Indian stock exchanges. The Companies Act also provides for the formation of 'one person companies'. As the name suggests, such entities cannot have any external investments.
Whilst there are no express qualification criteria for shareholders under the Companies Act, Indian and foreign residents are subject to separate requirements in connection with their investments in Indian companies. All Indian investors, and in certain cases even foreign investors, are required to have permanent account numbers for tax reporting purposes. All foreign investments into India need to comply with the Indian foreign exchange rules administered by the Reserve Bank of India (RBI). For instance, any person who is a citizen of, or any entity which is incorporated in, Bangladesh or Pakistan will require prior government approval to make investments in India.
Foreign investors need to be mindful of relevant sector-specific restrictions and other requirements under Indian foreign exchange laws. Furthermore, whilst investments under the foreign direct investment (FDI) route do not require any prior registration in India, other types of investments (eg, foreign portfolio investments and foreign venture capital investments) are subject to separate eligibility and registration requirements.
All investments in listed companies are subject to the regulations of the Securities Exchange Board of India (SEBI). All listed companies, and pursuant to a recent amendment under the Companies Act, even unlisted public companies, are required to issue securities only in de-materialised form There is a proposal to extend the requirement to certain other classes of unlisted companies. Accordingly, investors seeking to invest in such companies are required to open accounts with Indian depository participants (commonly referred to as 'demat accounts').
There are two main classes of shares issued by Indian companies, equity shares and preference shares. Equity shares can be further classified into equity shares with normal voting or dividend rights and equity shares with differential rights as to dividend, voting or as otherwise prescribed. Preference shares can be further classified based on their associated rights (ie, convertibility into equity shares, participation in surplus funds, assets and profits, and cumulative nature of dividend payable). In general, private companies have greater flexibility compared to public companies in having shares of different classes as part of their share capital. In relation to listed companies, whilst there was previously a general prohibition on issuing shares with superior rights vis-à-vis rights associated with shares that are already listed, SEBI has recently approved a framework permitting 'tech companies' with shares of differential voting rights to go in for an initial public offering.
Whilst equity shareholders are entitled to vote on all matters, unless otherwise provided, preference shareholders are entitled to vote only on matters which either directly affect their rights or relate to the winding up of the company. However, preference shareholders are entitled to a priority over equity shareholders with respect to payment of dividend and repayment of share capital.
Shareholders’ rights are primarily dealt with under the Companies Act (along with additional rules, circulars and notifications issued) and the articles of association of the concerned company. In addition to the Companies Act and the articles of association, in the case of listed companies, the relevant SEBI regulations also have a bearing on shareholders’ rights, mainly:
In addition, foreign shareholders need to be mindful of sector-specific requirements under Indian foreign exchange laws and the relevant sector-related legislations (eg, in certain sectors such as aviation and insurance, effective ownership and control, including board composition, is required to be in Indian hands at all times).
In general, all equity shareholders of an Indian company are entitled to vote on shareholder matters at general meetings or in postal ballots and receive dividends as and when they are declared.
Subject to the company’s constitutional documents and the specific terms of the instrument, the rights attached to a class of shares may be varied with the written consent of the shareholders holding not less than three quarters of the issued shares of that class, or by means of a 'special resolution' (ie, requiring affirmative approval of at least three quarters of the votes cast) passed at a separate meeting of the shareholders of the issued shares of that class. Any such variation of shareholders’ rights will need to be disclosed in a filing to be made with the Registrar of Companies, which is publicly accessible.
Since the constitutional documents and agreements entered into by a company are expressly subject to the provisions of the Companies Act, none of the statutory rights of shareholders can be derogated from by way of constitutional documents or agreements; in the event of any such inconsistency, the corresponding provisions under the relevant constitutional documents and/or agreements would be rendered void. For the sake of clarity, constitutional documents and/or agreements can impose a stricter set of requirements (ie, compared to those statutorily prescribed) on the shareholders as well as the company.
It is common for shareholders in Indian companies to enter into shareholders’/joint venture agreements to record their respective rights and obligations. In order to bolster the enforceability of such arrangements, it is common practice and recommended for the key provisions under such arrangements to be expressly incorporated in the articles of association of the underlying companies.
Where listed companies are concerned, consistent with the requirement under the LODR Regulations mandating all shareholders of the same class to be treated equally, as part of the listing process, companies are usually required to ensure that any shareholders’/joint venture agreements are terminated and that any special rights in favour of certain shareholders under the articles of association are deleted (or significantly pruned down) as a pre-condition to listing. Whilst there are instances of shareholders’/joint venture agreements and articles of association incorporating special rights in favour of certain shareholders in the context of listed companies (particularly in cases where there are two or more groups of significant shareholders), these arrangements are increasingly prone to regulatory scrutiny.
Whilst many shareholder-level matters in an Indian company can be approved by way of an 'ordinary resolution' (ie, requiring affirmative approval of more than 50% of the votes cast), certain matters under the Companies Act and the LODR Regulations require the approval of a 'special resolution' (as mentioned above in 1.4 Main Shareholders' Rights). Therefore, a shareholder holding more than 25% of the shares in a company can effectively block any special resolutions tabled for shareholder approval. Examples of special resolution matters include any alteration of the constitutional documents (other than with respect to authorised share capital), variation of shareholders’ rights, substantial borrowings and disposals in the context of a public company, reduction in share capital, buy-back of securities exceeding 10% of the paid-up capital and free reserves, issuance of debentures convertible into shares, removal of auditors and striking off/winding up of a company.
The specified thresholds for the exercise of certain other key minority protection rights are:
Shareholders are statutorily entitled to have access to and inspect certain records of the company, including the constitutional documents, audited financial statements, statutory registers and minutes books of shareholders’ meetings. In addition, in the case of unlisted companies, shareholders’/joint venture agreements can provide additional information and inspection rights to the shareholders.
As a general matter, the board of directors of a company (the Board) is entitled to exercise all such powers and to do all such things that the company is authorised to do. However, the approval of the shareholders of the company is mandatorily required in respect of matters such as:
In the case of closely held companies, the approval of the shareholders will need to be obtained by way of ordinary or special resolutions, as relevant, passed at a duly convened general meeting of the shareholders. In the case of listed companies and public companies with more than 1,000 shareholders, in order to ensure wider participation, shareholders are required to be provided with remote electronic voting facility to vote on all shareholders’ resolutions. In addition, listed companies, as well as other public companies having more than 200 shareholders, are required to ensure that certain specified matters are approved by way of a postal ballot conducted amongst the shareholders, or alternatively, at a physical meeting subject to the shareholders being provided with electronic voting facility.
Shareholders with at least 10% of the total paid-up share capital in a company are entitled to requisition the Board to call an EGM of the shareholders. The requisition should set out the matters to be considered at this meeting and should be signed and sent to the registered office of the company by the requisitioners. Within 21 days of receiving a valid requisition, the Board should call a meeting, held no more than 45 days after receiving the requisition. In the event the Board does not call such meeting, the requisitioners can call and hold the meeting themselves within 3 months of making a valid requisition, in the same manner in which a meeting is called and held by the Board.
The company is required to give notice to the shareholders of any proposed resolutions which are intended to be passed at the requisitioned meeting and to circulate a statement, if any, with respect to the matters referred to in the proposed resolutions.
A company is required to provide the shareholders with 21 clear days' notice when calling a general meeting of the shareholders. A general meeting of the shareholders may be called at shorter notice (even on the same day of the notice), provided that in the case of an annual general meeting (AGM), the consent of at least 95% of the shareholders entitled to vote is obtained prior to such meeting, and, in case of any other general meeting, the consent of the majority of shareholders entitled to vote and representing at least 95% of the paid-up share capital is obtained prior to such meeting. The notice of the meeting should specify the place, date, day and hour of the meeting and contain a statement of the business to be transacted at such meeting. The notice and consents for shorter notice may be provided either in writing or in electronic form.
Resolutions which are put to vote at a general meeting of the shareholders are decided on a show of hands, unless a poll is demanded or voting takes place through electronic means. Every listed company and every other company having not less than 1,000 shareholders is required to provide its shareholders with an electronic voting facility. Shareholders who are entitled to attend and vote at general meetings are also entitled to appoint another person as a proxy who will attend and vote at the general meeting on the shareholder’s behalf.
As for the quorum requirements, two shareholders personally present shall constitute the quorum in the case of a private company. In the case of a public company:
If the quorum requirement is not met within 30 minutes of the time appointed for the general meeting, the meeting shall stand adjourned to the same day in the following week, at the same time and place (or such other time and place as the Board may decide). However, in the case of a meeting called by requisitioners, if the quorum is not met within 30 minutes of the time appointed for the requisitioned meeting, the requisitioned meeting would stand cancelled, without adjournment. If, at the adjourned meeting, the quorum requirement is not met within 30 minutes of the time appointed, the shareholders present will constitute the quorum.
As a general rule, no items of business other than those specified in the notice can be taken up at a shareholders’ meeting. Therefore, whilst shareholders can specify the matters to be considered at any meeting to be requisitioned by them, once a notice has been issued, no further amendments can be made unless a fresh notice of 21 clear days is issued.
It is common for shareholders in closely held companies to seek a right to participate in the management of the company (ie, by nominating the CEO, CFO and other key managerial personnel) and additionally have nominees on the company’s Board. These rights are invariably provided for in shareholders’/joint venture agreements, and are incorporated in the articles of association of the relevant company. In the case of a private company, subject to having facilitating provisions in the articles of association, the nomination of the relevant key managerial personnel or director nominees by the concerned shareholder could itself serve to complete the appointment.
In some cases, this nomination would need to be followed by resolutions to be passed by the Board and/or shareholders to complete the appointment. Regarding Board appointments, the Board could initially appoint the person as an additional director, whose term would extend until the next AGM of the shareholders at which meeting the shareholders could approve his or her appointment.
As for nomination of key managerial personnel and directors in listed companies, if at all, such rights are provided only to controlling or significant shareholders as part of shareholders’/joint venture agreements and the articles of association of the concerned company. Technically, the Companies Act provides for listed companies to have one director elected by 'small shareholders' (ie, shareholders holding shares having a nominal value of no more than INR20,000 each), subject to receiving a notice to that effect from 1,000 small shareholders or 10% of the total number of small shareholders, whichever is lower.
In practice, however, instances of these appointments are limited, and any such efforts are likely to be resisted by the company. For example, in July 2017, Unifi Capital Private Limited, a minority institutional investor, along with other small shareholders, sought the appointment of a small shareholders’ director on the board of Alembic Limited. This request was rejected by Alembic Limited on the ground that many of the small shareholders were connected to certain large shareholders and that therefore the proposal defeated the intent of electing a small shareholders’ director.
Directors are usually appointed to the Board only with the approval of the shareholders at a general meeting; however, additional and alternate directors may be appointed by the Board for a limited term, if so authorised by the articles of association of the company. Similarly, a director may be removed from the Board before the expiry of his term, after being provided with a reasonable opportunity of being heard, by way of a resolution passed at a general meeting of the shareholders.
If the shareholders of a company decide to remove a director, a special notice (ie, a notice signed by shareholders having at least 1% of the total voting power, or having shares on which an aggregate amount of at least INR500,000 has been paid up) will need to be issued to the company regarding the proposed removal of a director. Immediately following receipt of the special notice, the company is required to provide all shareholders with notice of the resolution prior to holding the general meeting where the resolution is to be given effect.
Shareholders constituting the specified threshold can challenge a decision or action taken by the Board as part of oppression and mismanagement proceedings or class action proceedings (see 3.2 Legal Remedies Against the Company). However, in these proceedings, the shareholders seeking to challenge the Board’s decision or action will have a relatively high bar to clear.
In oppression and mismanagement proceedings, the shareholders will need to satisfy the NCLT that the company’s affairs have been conducted in a manner which is either prejudicial or oppressive to the members or prejudicial to public interest or the interests of the company, but that to wind up the company would unfairly prejudice such members. In the case of class action proceedings, the shareholders will need to establish the Board’s decision or action is either contrary to its constitutional documents, any applicable law or any resolution passed by the members, or based on the suppression of material facts or on any mis-statements made.
The shareholders of a company have the right to approve the appointment of an auditor at an AGM for a term of five consecutive years at a time. An auditor may be removed before the expiry of his or her term, after being provided with a reasonable opportunity of being heard, with the prior approval of the central government. A resolution approving such removal will need to be passed at a general meeting of the shareholders within 60 days of the receipt of the approval of the central government.
Whilst there is no obligation for shareholders of unlisted companies to disclose their interests in the company, under the Companies Act, every company is required to file an annual return with the Registrar of Companies within 60 days from the date of the AGM, including, amongst other matters, details of the shareholders of the company and any changes since the close of the previous financial year.
In cases where a shareholder holds shares in a company for the beneficial interest of another person, both the registered shareholder and the beneficial interest holder are required to make separate declarations in respect of the creation of beneficial interest (and any changes thereto) to the company. In addition, the Companies Act requires every significant beneficial owner in a company (ie, an individual holding ultimate beneficial interest of at least 10% or exercising significant influence or control in the company other than only through direct holdings) to make a declaration to that effect (and any changes thereto) to the company. In both cases, the company is then required to disclose such information in relation to the beneficial interest or significant beneficial ownership to the Registrar of Companies.
For shareholding in listed companies, there are disclosure requirements under separate regulations of SEBI:
Shareholders are entitled to grant security interest over their shares held in Indian companies. However, if the shareholder is a foreign resident, security interest can be granted only in limited circumstances, eg, either to secure the credit facilities extended by an Indian bank or a non-banking financial company to the Indian company in which the shares are held, or to secure the credit facilities extended by an overseas bank to an overseas group company.
If the shareholder providing the security is an Indian company, the security interest must be registered by filing with the Registrar of Companies. Furthermore, if the security interest is in relation to shares of a listed company, the encumbrance is treated as an acquisition (and any release of the encumbrance as a disposal), which would trigger the disclosure obligations under the Takeover Regulations outlined above, see 1.14 Disclosure of Shareholders' Interests in the Company.
The ability of a shareholder to dispose of shares in an Indian company is subject to the terms of any shareholders’/joint venture agreement and the articles of association of the relevant company. As per the Companies Act, the right to transfer shares in a private company is restricted by its articles of association. In relation to a public company, whilst the securities of a company are required to be freely transferable, the Companies Act expressly clarifies that share transfer arrangements (eg, pre-emption provisions, drag-along/tag-along requirements etc) are contractually enforceable between shareholders. In order to bolster the enforceability of such share transfer restrictions under shareholders’/joint venture agreements, it is common practice, and also recommended, for such provisions to be expressly incorporated in the articles of association of the underlying companies.
For foreign investors investing under the FDI route, their ability to transfer shares to Indian residents is restricted by the RBI’s foreign exchange rules. Importantly, the consideration for any such transfer cannot exceed the fair value of the shares, which is to be determined as per any internationally accepted methodology in the case of unlisted shares, and based on the prevailing market price in case of listed shares. Any put option in the hands of the foreign investor can be exercised only after a minimum lock-in period of one year (or any higher sector-specific lock-in period) and cannot provide for an assured return to the foreign investor.
As per the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 (the IBC), in case of a corporate default, only a financial creditor (ie, any person to whom a financial debt is owed by the company), an operational creditor (ie, any person to whom an operational debt is owed by the company) or the corporate debtor itself (ie, the company) are entitled to initiate a corporate insolvency resolution process against the company. Therefore, unless a shareholder qualifies as a financial creditor or an operational creditor, it will not be entitled to initiate a corporate insolvency resolution process. However, if the company itself is initiating a corporate insolvency resolution process (ie, against itself), the shareholders of the company will need to pass a special resolution approving the filing of an application to that effect at a general meeting.
Separately, under the Companies Act, a petition for the winding up of a company may be presented to the NCLT by any shareholder holding fully paid-up shares in the company. Any such petition will need to be supported by a special resolution passed by the shareholders of the company, or alternatively, the NCLT will need to be satisfied that it is just and equitable for the company to be wound up.
In addition to the minority protection rights and corresponding shareholding thresholds outlined in 1.6 Rights Dependent Upon Percentage of Shares, below are certain additional legal and regulatory provisions which have a bearing on shareholder activism in India:
Whilst shareholder activism is still a developing concept in India, in recent years, there is a clear trend of enhanced participation of public shareholders in corporate decision making as well as increased scrutiny of corporate proposals of listed companies.
One of the key reasons behind this changing trend is the slew of legal and regulatory measures introduced under the Companies Act and various SEBI-administered regulations. The mandatory electronic/postal ballot voting requirements and the more recent live AGM webcast requirement (for large companies) have facilitated increased shareholder participation and engagement in members’ proceedings. Whilst institutional investors like mutual funds have been expressly tasked by SEBI to play a more active role, greater internet penetration has ensured an increase in the participation of retail shareholders. The quality and extent of information received by the shareholders has also significantly improved in recent years, aided by the various measures introduced under the Companies Act and the LODR Regulations.
Whilst many of the legal and regulatory changes have contributed to increased shareholder participation and engagement, the introduction of a separate regulatory regime in relation to related party transactions (RPTs) has enabled public shareholders to more directly influence the outcome of shareholder votes. Specifically, the amendments introduced by SEBI to prohibit all related parties (ie, regardless of their interest in the specific transaction) from voting on any material RPTs of the materiality threshold for RPTs is set at 5% of the listed company’s annual consolidated turnover. for RPTs involving brand usage and royalty and at 10% of the listed company’s annual consolidated turnover for all other RPTs. The 'majority of minority' approval requirement has meant that promoters and management are reliant on public shareholders to approve such material RPTs.
Another key factor contributing to shareholder activism in India in recent years is the role of governance intermediaries, specifically proxy advisory firms. Proxy advisory firms analyse corporate proposals and provide their clients, usually institutional investors, with recommendations on how to vote at shareholder meetings. Small investors are also provided with access to the voting recommendations of the proxy advisory firms, invariably free of charge.
Whilst the proxy advisory industry in India has developed only in the last decade, proxy advisory firms have had a significant influence not only in ensuring more effective shareholder participation, but also in persuading companies to improve the quality of their disclosures. Given their considerable influence, proxy advisory firms are separately regulated by SEBI, and enhancements to the compliance requirements of proxy advisory firms are being considered in order to prevent any conflict of interest and thereby maintain the credibility and independence of such firms.
In the recent past, there have been a few notable instances where large companies in India have faced shareholder dissent on a variety of issues, including RPTs, management appointment and remuneration, share issuances and buy-backs, including:
Shareholding in Indian listed companies is usually concentrated in the hands of one or more groups of controlling shareholders who are statutorily referred to as 'promoters', with the public shareholding in many companies being restricted to the statutory minimum of 25%. The concentrated nature of the shareholding enables promoters to control the outcome of most matters requiring shareholder approval, including the appointment of the company’s independent directors and management. Until the introduction of the RPT regime, activist shareholders were mostly restricted to exercising the handful of statutory minority protection rights available to them. The various mechanisms or grievance redress provided an avenue for addressing complaints of small shareholders, but again did not facilitate public shareholders taking on a more proactive or combative stance.
The RPT rules have enabled public shareholders to have a decisive say on the outcome of material transactions involving interested parties. Whilst the recommendations of proxy advisory firms on such matters have a significant influence on the voting pattern, such resolutions also provide an avenue for shareholders to collaborate with each other and to persuade management to provide meaningful disclosures explaining the rationale and proposed benefits for the company.
The prevalence of concentrated shareholding in Indian listed companies, allied with the ongoing shareholding disclosure requirements, makes it difficult for third parties to build their stake in a listed company without the concurrence of the promoters. Other factors, such as the mandatory takeover offer rules, which require an open offer to be made when a shareholder crosses 25% or otherwise acquires 'control', and the annual 'creeping acquisition' facility of up to 5% available to incumbent controlling shareholders, make hostile takeovers even more difficult.
The recent instance of Larsen & Toubro Limited (L&T) acquiring a controlling stake in Mindtree Limited (Mindtree) without the concurrence of the promoters and the management is a rare occurrence, and one made possible because of the specific circumstances involved, including the diffused nature of the shareholding, the single largest shareholder not being a promoter and the acquirer being an Indian company.
Stake building in a listed company is even more difficult for foreign investors, as Indian foreign exchange laws do not allow a foreign party to acquire shares on the floor of an Indian stock exchange unless the party already has a controlling stake in the listed company. Share sales outside the stock exchange mechanism are tax inefficient from the seller’s perspective, and therefore not usually preferred.
Whilst there is no specific trend in India in terms of activist shareholders targeting particular industries, sectors or companies with a specific threshold of market capitalisation, as evidenced by the recent L&T acquisition of Mindtree, companies with a dispersed shareholding are likely to be more susceptible to hostile takeovers.
As compared to retail shareholders, institutional shareholders, are likely to be more active as shareholder groups in listed companies. Amongst institutional shareholders, whilst foreign portfolio investors, and to a lesser extent domestic mutual funds, are more likely to take an independent view on shareholder matters, institutions owned or controlled by the Government (eg, Life Insurance Corporation of India, General Insurance Corporation of India etc) have traditionally sided with management on such matters. It is worth noting that domestic mutual funds, which have been expressly tasked with the responsibility of playing an active role in ensuring better governance of listed companies, have recently come under SEBI’s scanner in the context of 'standstill arrangements' entered into by a handful of mutual funds with the promoters of certain cash-strapped companies.
There are also instances of fellow promoters turning against each other, as well as against the company’s management. Recent examples include Mr Cyrus Mistry’s firms initiating oppression and mismanagement proceedings following his dismissal as the Chairman of Tata Sons Limited in October 2016, the change of CEO and the Board of Infosys Limited in August 2017 following disagreements with certain founder promoters, and the recent public disagreement between the two promoter groups of Interglobe Aviation Limited, which operates 'IndiGo Airlines' brand.
According to a recent analysis conducted in 2017 by InGovern Research Services Private Limited, a proxy advisory firm in India, 45 of the top 100 listed companies in India had at least one proposal in an AGM that was voted against by more than 20% of the institutional and non-institutional shareholders, and, in one instance, by the promoters of the company. Director appointments/re-appointments and director remuneration accounted for 82% of the resolutions that were voted against by investors in 2017.
If an open offer is triggered under the Takeover Regulations, the ability of the Board or the management to frustrate the acquisition is limited. The Board is expressly required to ensure that the company’s business is 'conducted in the ordinary course consistent with past practice' during the offer period, and also to secure approval by way of a special resolution of the shareholders by postal ballot in connection with matters including material disposals and borrowings, share issuances and buy-backs, and execution, amendment and termination of material contracts. In the recent L&T acquisition of Mindtree, the Board declared an unusually high dividend pay-out to shareholders after the open offer had been triggered, though it did not prevent L&T from successfully completing the acquisition.
For other instances of shareholder activism, companies are increasingly resorting to proactive and constructive engagement with the activist shareholders to address their concerns to the extent possible. For instance, in August 2014, a majority of the shareholders of Siemens Limited voted against the proposal to sell its metals technologies business to a wholly owned subsidiary of its parent company on the basis of the valuation being significantly low. Siemens Limited subsequently provided further disclosures and revised the terms of the transaction to be more favourable to the listed company, following which, in November 2014, the shareholders voted in favour of the revised proposal.
Another instance, in May 2014, saw the shareholders of Tata Motors Limited initially vote against the payment of excessive remuneration to three executive directors during a year in which the company had reported standalone losses. Following additional disclosures and explanations by the company, the resolution was eventually approved when it was tabled before the shareholders again in January 2015.
More recently, in September 2018, the minority shareholders of Apollo Tyres Limited voted down the re-appointment of the company’s promoter as the managing director of the company, on the basis of the remuneration being excessive. Again, following the company’s engagement with the institutional investors and a significant reduction in the promoter’s remuneration, the re-appointment was eventually approved by the shareholders.
It is a well settled principle under Indian company law that a company is a separate legal personality, distinct from its shareholders.
Set out below are a few legal remedies available to the shareholders against the company under the Companies Act.
Oppression and mismanagement proceedings can be initiated before the NCLT by:
The NCLT is vested with wide powers to issue such orders as it considers appropriate in such proceedings, including in relation to regulation of the company’s affairs, purchase of the company’s shares, restrictions on share allotments and transfers, removal of or termination of agreements with the company’s management or other persons, and setting aside third-party contracts.
Class action proceedings can be initiated before the NCLT by:
The remedies available to the shareholders by way of a class action suit initiated before the NCLT include restraining the company from acting in a manner that is contrary to its constitutional documents, any applicable law or any resolution passed by the members, and claiming damages or compensation from the company, directors, auditors and/or third parties for any wrongful acts or any incorrect and misleading statements.
The shareholders of a company can pass a special resolution to approach the NCLT to initiate the process of winding up the company.
In addition to seeking statutory remedies against a company’s directors as part of any class action proceedings (see 3.2 Legal Remedies Against the Company), shareholders holding 10% of the paid-up share capital of the company can also convene an EGM to seek the removal of any director. The director concerned can be removed by passing an ordinary resolution (or special resolution in the case of an independent director appointed for a second term) after being provided with a reasonable opportunity of being heard.
As part of any oppression and mismanagement proceedings (see 3.2 Legal Remedies Against the Company), the shareholders can seek remedies against other shareholders, including in relation to transfer of the shares held by such other shareholders in the company.
In addition to seeking statutory remedies against a company’s auditors as part of any class action proceedings (see 3.2 Legal Remedies Against the Company), shareholders holding 10% of the paid-up share capital of the company can convene an EGM to seek the removal of the company’s auditor. The auditor can be removed by passing a special resolution after being provided with a reasonable opportunity of being heard, and subject to obtaining the approval of the central government.
As part of any class action proceedings (see 3.2 Legal Remedies Against the Company), shareholders can bring derivative actions against third parties for any wrongful acts or any incorrect and misleading statements.
In addition to class action proceedings under the Companies Act, a shareholder’s right to initiate other derivative actions on behalf of a company has been recognised under case law. In any derivative action, the concerned shareholders are required to ensure they act with bona fide intent on behalf of the company, not as a personal cause of action, and establish there is no other remedy available.
In practice, shareholders in India have very rarely invoked derivative actions on behalf of companies. Apart from litigation in India being a very time-consuming process, unlike in other jurisdictions where such derivative actions are commonplace, lawyers in India are prohibited from charging contingency fees, resulting in the absence of an active plaintiff bar which can initiate such actions on behalf of shareholders. There are other procedural hurdles, including court fees and stamp duty liability, which make it even more difficult and inefficient for shareholders to initiate derivative actions.
Whilst class action proceedings and other derivative actions have rarely been used in India, oppression and mismanagement proceedings are more common, not least owing to the remedy being long established in the statute book. However, the relatively high statutory threshold required to initiate a claim, as well as the substantive requirements to justify its invocation, makes it more suited to closely-held companies and less relevant to large listed companies with small shareholders.
In cases where the investment is accompanied by a share purchase or subscription agreement and/or a shareholders’/joint venture agreement, investors routinely choose to enforce their rights by way of arbitration, preferably in an offshore venue in order to avoid interference by Indian courts. Daiichi Sankyo's proceedings against the former promoters of Ranbaxy Laboratories Limited is a good example of an international investor successfully pursuing its rights in arbitration.
There are instances of foreign shareholders in Indian companies resorting to other remedies to address their claims. Indian companies listed overseas have faced class actions suits in other jurisdictions from the holders of the underlying depository receipts. Foreign shareholders in listed Indian companies controlled by the Indian Government have the option of pursuing their remedies under the provisions of the bilateral investment treaties entered into by India, a prominent example being the proceedings initiated by the UK-based hedge fund, The Children’s Investment Fund Management, with respect to its stake in Coal India Limited.
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