Shareholders’ Rights & Shareholder Activism 2025

Last Updated September 23, 2025

Brazil

Law and Practice

Authors



Machado Associados has over 35 years of experience, and stands out in the Brazilian legal market for its seamless integration of corporate and M&A expertise with deep tax law knowledge. This multidisciplinary approach is a key differentiator, allowing the firm to evaluate all strategic alternatives in corporate transactions with a comprehensive, tax-efficient perspective – a crucial advantage in Brazil’s tax-oriented business environment. Machado Associados stands out for its unique combination of legal, financial and business expertise among partners and senior attorneys. Many of the professionals have backgrounds in economics, business administration and accounting, with valuable experience in Big 4 consulting firms. This multidisciplinary foundation allows the firm to deliver legal services with a holistic and strategic perspective, ensuring effective co-ordination with accounting and financial advisors. With a deep understanding of tax and financial aspects of corporate transactions, the firm structures efficient, risk-aware solutions. Partners are directly involved in every transaction, guaranteeing high-quality and tailored service.

The main types of companies that can be formed in Brazil are the limited liability company (sociedade limitada, or Ltda) and the corporation (joint-stock company; sociedade anônima, or S/A).

Foreign investors generally prefer to use a limited liability company, as it is commonly perceived as a simpler and more flexible structure. There is no obligation to pay in the capital upon incorporation, and the company may be formed by a single shareholder. In addition, publication requirements are minimal compared to corporations, which are often viewed as more complex and suited to larger enterprises, even though this is not necessarily the case under Brazilian law.

Companies in Brazil may issue common or preferred shares, and each type may comprise one or more classes. Preferred shares may carry limited or no voting rights, but they may grant certain economic preferences, such as:

  • priority in the distribution of dividends (which may be fixed or minimum);
  • priority in the reimbursement of capital in the event of liquidation; or
  • both.

The rights attached to each class of shares must be set out in the company’s articles of incorporation (estatuto/contrato social) and are also subject to the provisions of corporate law.

Shareholders’ rights may be varied through an amendment to the company’s articles of incorporation, approved at a shareholders’ meeting. As a general rule, such amendments require the approval of shareholders representing the majority of the voting capital, unless the by-laws or the law establish a higher quorum. However, any amendment that changes the rights of a specific class of shares must be approved not only by the general meeting but also by a separate meeting of the shareholders of the affected class.

It should also be noted that certain types of preferred shares, particularly those without voting rights, are not admitted to trading on the stock exchange under Brazilian regulations.

There are no minimum share capital requirements for either limited liability companies or corporations. In limited liability companies, there is no legal requirement for the capital to be paid in upon incorporation, although the shareholders remain jointly liable for the full payment of the subscribed capital. In corporations, at least 10% of the subscribed capital must be paid in at the time of incorporation, and such amount must be deposited in a bank account opened under the company’s name before registration of the articles of incorporation with the commercial registry.

There is no minimum number of shareholders for a limited liability company (sociedade limitada), which may be incorporated by a single shareholder. A corporation (sociedade anônima) must generally have at least two shareholders, except in the case of a wholly owned subsidiary (subsidiária integral), whose sole shareholder is another Brazilian company. As a rule, shareholders may be either residents or non-residents in Brazil. However, foreign ownership is restricted in certain regulated sectors, such as aviation, media, and the acquisition of rural land or land located in border areas.

Shareholders’ agreements are not public documents, but based on the firm’s experience, they are very common in Brazil, especially among private companies. Joint venture agreements are also frequently used, but they often lead to the incorporation of a company by the parties. In such cases, the joint venture agreement is typically replaced or supplemented by a shareholders’ agreement governing the relationship between the partners in the new entity.

Typical provisions included in shareholders’ or joint venture agreements relate to voting rights, dividend distribution, restrictions on the transfer of shares or quotas, and purchase and sale mechanisms such as tag-along, drag-along and call/put options. These agreements are enforceable under Brazilian law. However, to be enforceable against the company and third parties, a shareholders’ agreement must be filed at the company’s registered office. Such agreements are generally private instruments, and it is very common for the parties to include confidentiality clauses to maintain their terms undisclosed.

Companies must hold an annual general meeting (assembléia geral ordinária; AGM) within four months following the end of the fiscal year to:

  • review, discuss and approve the financial statements;
  • resolve on the allocation of profits and the distribution of dividends; and
  • elect the managers and members of the fiscal council (conselho fiscal), if applicable.

For closely held corporations, notice of the AGM must be given at least eight days in advance for the first call and at least five days in advance for the second call. For publicly held companies, notice must be published at least 21 days before the first call and eight days before the second call. The notice period may not be shortened, except in very limited circumstances and subject to the consent of all shareholders.

In addition to the AGM, companies may hold extraordinary general meetings (assembleias gerais extraordinárias) at any time to deliberate on other matters of interest to the company that are not reserved for the AGM. There is no limitation on the number of extraordinary meetings that may be held.

The legal notice requirements for extraordinary general meetings (assembleias gerais extraordinárias) are the same as those applicable to AGMs. The minimum notice period cannot be shortened, except with the unanimous consent of all shareholders.

General meetings may be called by the board of directors or, if there is no board, by the executive officers. The fiscal council, if installed, may also call a meeting if the board or the officers fail to do so for more than one month after the end of the legal term for holding the AGM (that is, more than five months after the end of the fiscal year), or whenever there are relevant and urgent reasons to call an extraordinary general meeting.

Shareholders may also call a general meeting if the board, the officers or the fiscal council fail to call the annual meeting within 60 days after the end of the legal term for holding the AGM. In addition, shareholders representing at least 5% of the company’s capital stock may request the calling of a meeting by indicating its agenda. If the board or the officers fail to call the meeting within eight days after such request, the shareholders themselves may call it. The same rule applies to requests for the installation of a fiscal council.

All shareholders are entitled to receive notice of a general meeting. The notice must be published at least three times in a newspaper of wide circulation (for corporations) and the official gazette (for limited liability companies), and must include the date, time and place of the meeting, the agenda and, in the case of proposed amendments to the by-laws, an indication of the subject matter to be discussed. As a result, the information relating to the meeting is made available to all shareholders.

For AGMs, shareholders must receive:

  • the management report on the company’s business and the main administrative events of the fiscal year;
  • a copy of the financial statements;
  • the opinion of the independent auditors, if any;
  • the opinion of the fiscal council (conselho fiscal), including any dissenting votes, if any; and
  • any other documents relevant to the matters included in the agenda.

Shareholders are also entitled to inspect the company’s corporate books and records, as provided by law.

Shareholders’ meetings may be held in physical, virtual or hybrid format. Brazilian law expressly authorises the use of virtual or hybrid meetings for both limited liability companies and corporations, provided that the company ensures the authenticity and security of communications and allows shareholders to exercise their voting rights remotely.

For corporations, a general meeting may be held on first call if shareholders representing at least 25% of the voting capital are present, unless a higher quorum is required by law or by the company’s by-laws. On second call, the meeting may be held with any number of shareholders in attendance. For limited liability companies, the law does not establish a specific quorum for installation, but in practice the meeting is considered valid if partners representing the necessary percentage of the capital to pass resolutions are present. In both cases, the by-laws or articles of association may establish higher attendance requirements for the valid opening of meetings.

In Brazil, corporate law distinguishes between annual (ordinary) and extraordinary shareholders’ meetings, but all decisions taken at such meetings are, in essence, shareholders’ resolutions. The distinction lies in the matters discussed rather than in the type of resolution itself.

For corporations, resolutions at general meetings are generally passed by the majority of votes validly cast. For limited liability companies, resolutions are approved by partners representing more than half of the total capital, unless a higher or qualified quorum is required by law or by the company’s articles of association.

The applicable voting thresholds are set forth primarily by statute, and the company’s by-laws or articles of association may supplement these rules but cannot reduce the statutory requirements.

In Brazil, shareholder approval is required for key corporate matters, including the approval of financial statements, the election and removal of directors and officers, the allocation of profits and distribution of dividends, amendments to the by-laws or articles of association, capital increases or reductions, mergers, spin-offs, dissolutions and other corporate reorganisations.

As a general rule, resolutions are passed by the majority of votes validly cast in corporations, and by partners representing more than half of the total capital in limited liability companies, unless a higher or qualified quorum is required by law or by the company’s by-laws or articles of association.

Under Brazilian law, each ordinary share generally carries one vote. Shareholders may vote in person or by proxy, provided the proxy complies with the formal requirements set out by law. Voting may occur by show of hands, written ballots or electronic means.

Multiple (plural) voting rights are permitted in closely held corporations, subject to statutory limits, but are not allowed in publicly held companies. Electronic voting is expressly permitted, provided that the company ensures the authenticity, security and integrity of the voting process.

Under Brazilian law, shareholders have the right to request that specific matters be included in the agenda of a shareholders’ meeting, provided they meet the applicable ownership thresholds and submit the request before the meeting is convened. Once the notice of the meeting has been published, no new matters may be added to the agenda, and issues not previously included may only be considered if all shareholders unanimously agree.

Shareholders may challenge a resolution passed at a general meeting if it violates the law, the company’s by-laws or articles of association, or constitutes an abuse of rights. Challenges must be brought before the courts and are subject to the relevant statute of limitations.

Institutional investors and shareholder groups influence and monitor companies primarily through active engagement, voting and participation in general meetings. They also exercise influence by engaging with management on governance practices and strategic matters. In addition, they monitor companies through public disclosures, including financial statements, material facts and corporate governance reports required by law and by regulatory authorities, such as the Brazilian Securities and Exchange Commission (Comissão de Valores Mobiliários; CVM).

Brazilian law does not recognise the concept of nominee shareholders as understood in common law jurisdictions. However, in the case of book-entry shares held through the centralised securities depository, investors commonly hold their shares through custodians or brokerage institutions acting as intermediaries for administrative purposes. In such cases, the beneficial owner retains full rights to information and voting, which may be exercised directly or through voting instructions given to the custodian or intermediary.

The possibility of passing written resolutions applies only to limited liability companies, where unanimous written approval by all shareholders may replace a formal meeting. Written resolutions must clearly set out the matters approved and be signed by all shareholders, with the same legal effect as if passed at a meeting. For corporations, all corporate decisions must be formally taken at a general meeting.

Existing shareholders have pre-emptive rights to subscribe for new shares issued in a capital increase, in proportion to the number of shares they already hold. Such rights may be limited or excluded in specific cases set forth by law for corporations, such as public offerings.

In corporations, shares are generally freely transferable, except when the company’s by-laws or a shareholders’ agreement provide for restrictions or rights of first refusal among shareholders. In limited liability companies, the transfer of quotas to third parties requires the approval of the existing shareholders, unless otherwise provided in the articles of association or shareholders’ agreement.

Shareholders may grant a security interest over their shares, unless the company’s by-laws or a shareholders’ agreement provide otherwise.

In limited liability companies, the articles of association are publicly registered with the commercial registry, so the identity of shareholders and their ownership interests are publicly available. In corporations, the share register is not public, except for publicly held companies, where shareholders must disclose significant shareholdings to the company and to the CVM whenever their direct or indirect interests reach, exceed or fall below certain thresholds.

In addition, all shareholders – whether individuals or legal entities – must disclose their ultimate beneficial owner to the Brazilian Federal Revenue Service (Receita Federal do Brasil) and update such information whenever changes occur. Brazilian resident individuals and companies are also required to report their shareholdings in their annual tax filings.

Shares may be cancelled as a result of a capital reduction or partial dissolution – for example, in cases of withdrawal, exclusion or death of a shareholder.

Companies may buy back their own shares, provided that the acquisition is made with funds available from retained earnings or capital reserves, other than the legal reserve. The buy-back must comply with the procedures and restrictions set forth by law and, in the case of publicly held companies, by the CVM.

Dividends may be paid out of accumulated profits, profit reserves, or annual net income, provided that the company has sufficient distributable profits. The payment of dividends is generally approved by shareholders at the AGM but may also be declared at an extraordinary general meeting.

If authorised by the company’s by-laws, the board of directors or officers may declare interim or quarterly dividends based on profits shown in interim financial statements. Companies that prepare semi-annual balance sheets, either by law or under their by-laws, may also declare dividends based on the profits reflected in those statements.

Shareholders have the power to appoint and remove directors at any time by resolution passed at a general meeting.

In corporations, the matter must be included in the meeting’s agenda, and the resolution is approved by the majority of votes validly cast unless the company’s by-laws establish a higher quorum.

In limited liability companies, the appointment and removal of managers follow specific thresholds. If the manager is a partner appointed in the articles of association, both appointment and removal require approval by partners representing more than half of the capital. If the manager is not a partner, the appointment requires the approval of partners representing two-thirds of the capital while it remains unpaid, and more than half once it is fully paid in. These thresholds may be increased by the articles of association or a shareholders’ agreement.

Shareholders cannot directly overrule management decisions but may challenge or seek review of directors’ actions. If a decision taken by the board is unlawful, contrary to the company’s by-laws or detrimental to the company’s interests, shareholders may request that the matter be submitted to a general meeting.

If approved by the general meeting, the company or the shareholders, in case the company fails to do so, may also bring a judicial action to annul the decision or to hold the directors personally liable for losses caused to the company, in accordance with the procedures set forth by law.

The appointment and removal of the company’s external auditors fall within the exclusive powers of the shareholders, who decide the matter at a general meeting, usually the AGM. In the case of publicly held companies, such appointment and removal must also comply with the requirements and procedures established by the CVM.

Directors are not required to prepare a separate report specifically on the company’s corporate governance arrangements. However, they must provide shareholders with information that effectively covers governance-related matters in connection with the AGM.

At least one month before the meeting, management must make available the management report on the company’s business and main administrative events during the fiscal year, the financial statements, the independent auditors’ report (if any), the fiscal council’s opinion (if any) and other relevant documents related to the meeting agenda. The management report must also include the company’s equity policy and, following recent legislative changes, information on gender representation and pay equity within the company.

The controlling shareholders must exercise their power with the goal of ensuring that the company fulfils its corporate purpose and social function. They have duties and responsibilities towards the other shareholders, the company’s employees and the community in which the company operates, whose rights and interests must be loyally respected and observed.

The controlling shareholder is liable for any losses caused by acts performed with abuse of power, including actions that are unlawful or contrary to the company’s best interests.

When a company becomes insolvent, shareholders have very limited rights, as control over the company’s management and assets passes to the court-appointed judicial administrator. Shareholders may monitor the insolvency proceedings and are entitled to receive information, but they cannot influence the company’s day-to-day management or the administration of the estate.

In bankruptcy proceedings, shareholders rank after all creditors in the order of payment and are only entitled to any residual value remaining after all debts have been satisfied.

Shareholders may seek legal remedies against the company if its actions violate the law, the company’s by-laws or shareholders’ rights. They may bring judicial actions to annul unlawful corporate resolutions, claim damages, or protect individual or collective shareholder rights, in accordance with applicable law.

Shareholders may bring legal actions against directors or officers who engage in unlawful acts, act beyond their authority, or cause losses to the company through wilful misconduct (dolo) or negligence.

Shareholders may request that the company file a liability action against its directors or officers. If the company fails to do so within the statutory period, shareholders representing at least 5% of the company’s capital may bring a derivative action on its behalf to seek compensation for losses caused to the company.

Shareholder activism in Brazil is primarily governed by the Brazilian Corporations Law (Law No 6,404/1976) and by regulations issued by the CVM. These rules define the rights and duties of shareholders, the powers of corporate bodies, and the transparency and disclosure obligations of publicly held companies.

While shareholders enjoy important rights – such as voting, requesting information and inspecting corporate documents – they are not allowed to interfere directly in the company’s management or to have unrestricted access to internal information.

The legal and regulatory tools available to activist shareholders include the right to submit proposals for inclusion in the agenda of general meetings, to request information and documents within the limits permitted by law, to call general meetings when management bodies fail to do so, and to challenge corporate resolutions or acts that violate the law or the company’s by-laws.

In Brazil, activist shareholders primarily seek to enhance corporate value and governance by influencing management decisions, capital allocation and strategic direction. Their objectives often include strengthening transparency, board independence and accountability, as well as promoting the efficient use of corporate resources. Activist investors also aim to protect minority shareholders’ rights, and to ensure that controlling shareholders and management act in the best interests of the company and all its stakeholders.

In Brazil, activist shareholders commonly build their stakes through gradual share acquisitions or by forming alliances with other investors to increase their influence. Once positioned, they typically pursue agendas aimed at improving corporate governance, transparency and capital allocation efficiency, often advocating for stronger dividend distributions, enhanced board independence, and better alignment between management performance and shareholder returns.

There are no clear or consistent recent trends regarding specific industries or sectors targeted by activist shareholders in Brazil. Activist activity remains relatively limited and case-specific, generally being concentrated in publicly held companies with dispersed ownership structures or significant state or institutional investor participation.

While no particular market capitalisation range has been consistently targeted, activism tends to be more feasible in mid- to large-cap companies, where liquidity and governance standards facilitate shareholder engagement.

In Brazil, shareholder activism has historically been driven by institutional investors – such as pension funds, asset managers, and development banks – rather than hedge funds, which play a comparatively smaller role than in other jurisdictions.

There are no publicly available or reliable data in Brazil indicating the proportion of activist shareholder demands that were met in full or in part over the past year. Activist campaigns in the country are typically private and case-specific, and outcomes are rarely disclosed.

In responding to an activist shareholder, companies in Brazil typically focus on maintaining constructive dialogue and transparent communication to understand and address the investor’s concerns. Management may also review governance structures, board composition, and strategic or capital allocation plans to respond to legitimate issues and demonstrate accountability.

To minimise the risk of shareholder activism, companies often strengthen their corporate governance practices, enhance disclosure and investor relations policies, monitor shareholder engagement on an ongoing basis, and ensure that decision-making processes are well documented and aligned with market best practices.

Machado Associados

Avenida Brigadeiro Faria Lima, 1656
11th floor
01451-918 São Paulo/SP
Brazil

+55 11 3819 4855

Machado@machadoassociados.com.br www.machadoassociados.com.br/en/
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Trends and Developments


Authors



Loeser e Hadad Advogados was founded in 1989, and the firm now has offices in São Paulo, Campinas, Rio de Janeiro and Brasília. It focuses on business law, particularly corporate, M&A, corporate governance, regulatory, compliance, privacy and data protection, and tax matters. The corporate department, which includes four partners and 16 associates, provides the full gamut of business law advice covering issues such as business implementation, corporate governance, compliance, restructuring, IPO-related matters, divestments, and M&A, including legal due diligence and post-closing advice. Clients include both buyers and sellers from a wide range of sectors, including regulated and non-regulated, private and publicly held companies, such as banking, private equity, food and beverage, retail, automotive, medical devices, life sciences, energy, and real estate. The firm also applies digital upskilling programs to all its professionals, from law clerks to partners, and utilises cutting-edge technology, including AI tools, to bring the utmost digital experience to its clients and allow more efficient deliverables and attractive costs.

Introduction

Over the past few years, Brazil has experienced noticeable growth in shareholders’ awareness of and active involvement in corporate governance matters, reflecting a broader global surge in shareholder activism. This article provides:

  • an examination of Brazil’s evolving shareholders’ rights and activism landscape;
  • an analysis of the legal framework governing shareholder rights;
  • an inventory of the tools available to shareholders; and
  • a breakdown of the defensive strategies adopted by companies to address these developments.

Furthermore, it delves into the complexities of the Brazilian regulatory environment, shedding light on how companies and investors navigate and adapt to these evolving regulatory changes.

The Legal Framework for Shareholders’ Rights in Brazil

The rights of shareholders in Brazil are primarily regulated by two key pieces of legislation:

  • the Brazilian Civil Code (Law No 10,406 of 2002); and
  • the Brazilian Corporation Law (Law No 6,404 of 1976).

These laws collectively provide a comprehensive framework that governs the operations of both public and private companies in Brazil. They outline a wide range of rights and obligations for shareholders, including voting rights, dividend entitlements and protection against unfair treatment. Additionally, these laws emphasise the importance of transparency and fairness in corporate governance, aiming to foster a robust and ethical business environment.

Under this legal framework, shareholders are granted a range of fundamental rights essential for their participation in the company’s governance. Among these are the rights to vote at general meetings, receive dividends, and oversee management actions. The right to vote is particularly significant, as it allows shareholders to influence critical corporate decisions, such as the election of board members, the approval of financial statements, and decisions regarding mergers and acquisitions. By exercising their voting rights, shareholders can play a crucial role in shaping the company’s strategic direction and safeguarding their financial interests.

In Brazil, protecting minority shareholders’ rights is crucial due to the prevalence of concentrated ownership structures in many Brazilian companies. This ownership dynamic often places minority shareholders at a disadvantage compared to controlling shareholders. In response to this challenge, Brazilian legislation has established specific mechanisms to safeguard the interests of minority shareholders. One prominent mechanism is the “tag-along” right, which grants minority shareholders of publicly traded corporations the right to sell their shares, at a minimum price of at least 80% of the price paid to the exiting majority shareholder, in the event of a change in company control.

In addition to the tag-along right, minority shareholders in Brazil can initiate legal actions to defend their individual or collective rights. For instance, shareholders can file liability actions against directors who act in a manner detrimental to the company’s interests. This legal recourse provides an essential avenue for minority shareholders to hold management accountable and protect the value of their investments.

The Rise of Shareholder Activism in Brazil

Although shareholder activism is still in its early stages in Brazil compared to more mature markets such as the United States, it has gained significant traction in recent years. This increase in activism is also driven by a growing awareness of environmental, social, and governance (ESG) issues, which have become increasingly important to investors worldwide. In Brazil, shareholders use their influence to pressure companies to adopt more sustainable and transparent practices. Through engagement with companies and voting on shareholder resolutions, they contribute to a broader movement toward responsible corporate governance. This trend reflects a shift in investor priorities and a recognition of the importance of sustainable and ethical business practices.

Characteristics of shareholder activism in Brazil

In Brazil, shareholder activism takes various forms, such as participating in general meetings and organising public campaigns to influence company management. Activist shareholders often aim to bring about strategic changes within the company, such as replacing board members, reevaluating executive compensation policies, or adopting more rigorous corporate social responsibility practices.

A recent example of shareholder activism in Brazil is the pressure exerted by institutional investors on large companies to adopt more transparent policies regarding their carbon emissions and other environmental impacts. This type of activism, often led by investment funds with a clear sustainability agenda, has significantly changed how Brazilian companies approach their ESG responsibilities. In many cases, these changes have been implemented in response to direct shareholder pressure, highlighting the growing influence of activism on the Brazilian corporate landscape.

Comparative Analysis: Brazil v Other Markets

While shareholder activism is increasing in Brazil, it still faces significant challenges, especially when compared to more developed markets such as the United States. In the USA, shareholder activism is a well-established practice, with major hedge funds and other institutional investors frequently spearheading campaigns to influence company management. These efforts often succeed in bringing about changes in corporate strategy, governance and operations.

In contrast, the corporate culture in Brazil remains relatively conservative, characterised by traditional business practices and decision-making processes. Shareholders, particularly those holding minority stakes, encounter substantial hurdles when attempting to exert significant influence within companies. This is primarily due to the prevalent concentrated ownership structure, where a small number of large controlling blocks hold substantial sway over corporate decision-making. As a result, minority shareholders often find it challenging to form alliances and coalitions, which hinders their ability to effectively launch activist campaigns and drive meaningful change within the companies in which they have invested.

Despite these challenges, there are signs that shareholder activism in Brazil is on the rise. The increasing importance of ESG practices, coupled with pressure from international investors, is driving a shift in the Brazilian corporate landscape. As more companies recognise the value of engaging with their shareholders and addressing their concerns, shareholder activism will likely become a more prominent feature of the Brazilian market.

Tools and Strategies for Shareholder Activism

In order for shareholders to effectively engage in activism, it is crucial that they possess a thorough understanding of the legal tools and strategies available to them in Brazil. The country’s corporate governance framework offers a range of mechanisms that empower shareholders to influence corporate decisions. These mechanisms include, but are not limited to, voting rights, shareholder resolutions, and engagement with company management. However, it is important to note that the effectiveness of these tools can be influenced by factors such as the extent of shareholding, the level of support from other investors, and the regulatory environment. Therefore, shareholders must carefully assess these factors when considering their activist initiatives in the Brazilian market.

Suggesting actions at general meetings

One of the key methods employed by shareholders in Brazil to advocate for their interests is to suggest actions or resolutions during general meetings. This avenue is open to any shareholder, provided they adhere to the deadlines and requirements outlined by the law and the company’s bylaws. This mechanism proves to be especially beneficial for minority shareholders who aim to highlight concerns that the management may not prioritise.

For instance, shareholders who are focused on enhancing corporate governance may introduce resolutions aimed at implementing more stringent transparency policies or reevaluating executive compensation practices. Even if these proposals do not receive approval, they can exert pressure on the management and bring crucial issues to the attention of fellow shareholders. This form of activism can be particularly effective in shedding light on governance issues and compelling companies to reevaluate their practices.

Calling extraordinary general meetings

Shareholders who own at least 5% of a company’s share capital are entitled to exercise their right to request the convening of an extraordinary general meeting (EGM). This meeting allows them to address specific issues that they believe require urgent attention or are not being adequately handled by the company’s management. The EGM serves as a powerful tool for shareholders to voice their concerns and take action when they feel that the company’s best interests are at stake.

One common scenario where this right is exercised is when activist shareholders use the EGM to advocate for the replacement of certain board members or to vote on a merger proposal that they deem unfavourable. By leveraging the EGM mechanism, shareholders can exert significant pressure on the management and influence decision-making in a manner that aligns with their interests, ultimately bringing about changes they believe are necessary for the company’s welfare.

Proxy voting

Recent legislative changes and regulatory developments that may encourage shareholder activism include the introduction of proxy voting. The Brazilian Securities and Exchange Commission (Comissão de Valores Mobiliários, or CVM) has implemented regulations facilitating proxy voting, making it easier for shareholders who cannot attend in-person meetings to participate and vote.

Regulatory Challenges and the Need for Reform

Despite the escalating prevalence of shareholder activism in Brazil, activists encounter substantial regulatory challenges. While Brazilian legislation has made significant advances in some areas, it still imposes barriers that impede the full exercise of shareholder rights, particularly for minority shareholders.

Costs and complexity of activist campaigns

One of the main challenges faced by activist shareholders in Brazil relates to the high cost and intricate nature of organising impactful campaigns. The country’s legislation imposes a series of formal requirements for proposing actions and convening meetings, which can be overwhelming for small investors or groups with limited resources. Additionally, navigating the intricate web of legislation and corporate mechanisms requires a profound level of understanding, presenting a significant barrier, particularly in a country where financial education and investor participation culture are still in development.

Furthermore, many shareholders, especially minority ones, may find themselves lacking access to the necessary resources or knowledge to effectively mobilise campaigns. This restriction significantly diminishes the potential for activism in Brazil, as shareholders might be deterred from pursuing their objectives due to the perceived difficulty and expense associated with initiating a campaign.

Nevertheless, investors are using social media, virtual forums and proxy solicitation platforms to organise coalitions, influence other shareholders and pressure management. These tools have reduced the cost and complexity of activism, particularly for smaller investors with fewer resources to challenge controlling groups.

Concentrated ownership structure

The structure of concentrated ownership in Brazil, characterised by the prevalence of large controlling blocks, poses a significant obstacle to shareholder activism. Within many Brazilian companies, controlling shareholders possess a substantial stake that affords them significant sway in corporate decision-making, thereby creating barriers for minority shareholders seeking to exercise influence. Consequently, the concentrated power held by controlling shareholders can curtail the efficacy of activist campaigns, as they have the ability to dismiss proposals and resolutions put forth by minority shareholders.

In cases where the interests of controlling shareholders align with those of activist investors, or when there is significant pressure from institutional or international investors, shareholder activism can be more impactful. For instance, if controlling shareholders recognise the long-term benefits of embracing ESG practices, they may be more open to considering the demands of activists. This alignment can ultimately lead to positive changes within the company.

Need for legal reforms

To overcome these challenges, Brazil must continue to promote legal reforms that facilitate shareholder activism and strengthen the protection of minority shareholders, such as reducing the shareholding thresholds required to propose meetings or measures. This adjustment would effectively empower minority shareholders, making it more feasible to exercise their rights and influence corporate decisions. By lowering these thresholds, a broader spectrum of shareholders would be empowered to actively participate in corporate governance, ultimately bolstering management oversight.

One important reform is to simplify the procedures for acquiring corporate information. By implementing measures that enable shareholders to access essential information quickly and easily, these reforms will foster more informed decision-making and promote greater shareholder activism. Moreover, advocating for greater transparency in corporate operations and governance would break down barriers to active shareholder participation, ensuring that every shareholder, irrespective of their stake, has the opportunity to contribute meaningfully to the company’s strategic direction. This commitment to transparency and open communication bolsters shareholder trust and engagement, fostering a more inclusive and accountable corporate environment.

Corporate Defence Mechanisms

As shareholder activism becomes more prevalent in Brazil, companies are developing strategies to protect themselves against activist campaigns. These strategies range from preventive measures to reactive responses, depending on the nature of the activist campaign and the interests at stake.

Governance shielding

One of the frequently employed corporate strategies is referred to as “governance shielding” and encompasses the inclusion of specific clauses in the company’s bylaws. These clauses are intended to restrict the voting power of shareholders and establish additional conditions for the approval of certain measures. By doing so, companies seek to prevent minority shareholders from exerting influence without majority shareholder support.

Despite its widespread use, governance shielding has been subject to criticism. Many argue that it can perpetuate poor governance practices and serve as a safeguard for existing management against legitimate challenges. Therefore, companies must navigate a delicate balance, ensuring protection against activist interference while upholding transparent and responsive corporate governance principles. It is incumbent upon companies to carefully monitor governance shielding to avoid its potential misuse as a means of increasing management authority to the detriment of shareholder rights.

Active dialogue with shareholders

Another fundamental strategy for companies is maintaining an active and ongoing dialogue with their shareholders. This involves responding to shareholders’ concerns during general meetings and proactively engaging throughout the year, seeking to understand investors’ expectations, and adjusting corporate practices as necessary.

By maintaining open lines of communication with shareholders, companies can anticipate and mitigate potential activist movements before they become public. This proactive engagement can reduce the risk of confrontations damaging the company’s reputation and value. Moreover, by building trust with their shareholders, companies can secure their support during times of crisis, ensuring that they have the backing of their investors when faced with challenging decisions.

Reactive responses to activist campaigns

When an activist campaign is already underway, companies need to be able to respond effectively. This may involve a variety of strategies, from direct negotiation with the activists to mobilising support among other shareholders to defeat activist proposals.

In some cases, it may be prudent for the company to consider embracing some of the demands put forth by the activists, particularly if these demands are poised to yield long-term benefits for the company. For example, if activists advocate for enhanced transparency or better ESG practices, aligning with these requests can strengthen the company’s corporate reputation and appeal to a broader investor base.

In other cases, companies may need to adopt a more defensive stance, using all available legal tools to resist the proposed changes. This could involve challenging the legality of the activists’ proposals or rallying support from other shareholders to oppose the activists’ agenda. Ultimately, the effectiveness of the company’s response will depend on its ability to navigate the complex dynamics of shareholder activism and align its strategy with the long-term interests of all shareholders.

Conclusion

Shareholder activism in Brazil has experienced notable growth, which aligns with the global trend of increased investor participation in corporate governance. Although the country still faces regulatory and cultural hurdles, the existing legal frameworks and a dynamic governance environment suggest a promising future for advancing shareholders’ rights in Brazil. This trend reflects a broader movement towards greater shareholder empowerment and influence on corporate decision-making processes.

In light of the rapidly changing business landscape, companies must adjust to this new reality by implementing defensive strategies and actively engaging with shareholders. The ability to navigate this increasingly dynamic and competitive environment will ensure their resilience and success. Moreover, as shareholder activism advances, the future of corporate governance in Brazil will hinge on the collaborative efforts of shareholders and companies in establishing sustainable value. This will necessitate a delicate balance between the short-term and long-term interests of all parties.

This collaborative approach, supported by ongoing legal reforms and a commitment to transparency, will be key to fostering a robust and vibrant corporate governance landscape in Brazil. The continued growth of shareholder activism, coupled with these legal reforms, will not only enhance the accountability of companies but also contribute to the broader development of the Brazilian capital market.

Loeser e Hadad Advogados

Francisco Matarazzo Avenue, 1400
15 floor
Sao Paulo
Brazil

lh@lhlaw.com.br lhlaw.com.br
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Law and Practice

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Machado Associados has over 35 years of experience, and stands out in the Brazilian legal market for its seamless integration of corporate and M&A expertise with deep tax law knowledge. This multidisciplinary approach is a key differentiator, allowing the firm to evaluate all strategic alternatives in corporate transactions with a comprehensive, tax-efficient perspective – a crucial advantage in Brazil’s tax-oriented business environment. Machado Associados stands out for its unique combination of legal, financial and business expertise among partners and senior attorneys. Many of the professionals have backgrounds in economics, business administration and accounting, with valuable experience in Big 4 consulting firms. This multidisciplinary foundation allows the firm to deliver legal services with a holistic and strategic perspective, ensuring effective co-ordination with accounting and financial advisors. With a deep understanding of tax and financial aspects of corporate transactions, the firm structures efficient, risk-aware solutions. Partners are directly involved in every transaction, guaranteeing high-quality and tailored service.

Trends and Developments

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Loeser e Hadad Advogados was founded in 1989, and the firm now has offices in São Paulo, Campinas, Rio de Janeiro and Brasília. It focuses on business law, particularly corporate, M&A, corporate governance, regulatory, compliance, privacy and data protection, and tax matters. The corporate department, which includes four partners and 16 associates, provides the full gamut of business law advice covering issues such as business implementation, corporate governance, compliance, restructuring, IPO-related matters, divestments, and M&A, including legal due diligence and post-closing advice. Clients include both buyers and sellers from a wide range of sectors, including regulated and non-regulated, private and publicly held companies, such as banking, private equity, food and beverage, retail, automotive, medical devices, life sciences, energy, and real estate. The firm also applies digital upskilling programs to all its professionals, from law clerks to partners, and utilises cutting-edge technology, including AI tools, to bring the utmost digital experience to its clients and allow more efficient deliverables and attractive costs.

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