Shipping 2026

Worldwide Conflicts

A ceasefire between Hamas and Israel came into effect on 9 October 2025, following President Trump’s 20-point “Comprehensive Plan to End the Gaza Conflict”, halting the most recent round of the ongoing conflict, which began with Hamas attacks on 7 October 2023. The Sumud Flotilla, comprising approximately 50 vessels, attempted to breach the naval blockade imposed on January 2009 on the Gaza shore, which led to a confiscation claim brought by the state of Israel before the Haifa Maritime Court. The court was asked to use the authority vested in it as a prize court by the Colonial Court’s Act 1890 and the Naval Prize Act 1864, through a King’s Order in Council in 1937 rendered during the British Mandate over what was called Palestine-Israel at that time.

The Haifa Maritime Court’s authority as a prize court was invoked by the State of Israel’s application for the confiscation of the small vessel named Estelle (2012), and has thereafter been exercised on the vessels Marianne (2016), Zaytuna Olivia (2019) and Freedom (2021). In those cases, the vessels were sold, and the remaining proceeds were awarded to the Israeli Ministry of Treasury. The present application for confiscation of the Sumud Flotilla vessels seems to mark another development in this aspect of maritime law, which always evolves according to either the reality of commerce and trade or naval warfare.

While confiscation proceedings before the Haifa Maritime Court are brought before the courts’ adjudication “forthwith, and without bulk broken” in accordance with clause 16 of the Naval Prize Act, the US bombing of vessels described as “Venezuelan drug boats” seems contrary to the principle of freedom of navigation under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), which orders that “the high seas are open to all states” (Article 87) and guarantees the right of innocent passage even through territorial seas (Article 17). UNCLOS indeed recognises the right of hot pursuit of a foreign vessel that has violated the laws and regulations of the pursuing state, provided that such pursuit is commenced when the foreign ship is within the territorial sea or the contiguous zone (Article 111). It also recognises the right of seizure of a pirate ship on the high seas (Article 105) but does not provide any further drastic measures. Moreover, the US Navy’s Commander’s Handbook on the Law of Naval Operation 2007 requires, under clause 7.10, that “captured vessels... are sent to port under belligerent jurisdiction as a prize for adjudication by a prize court” and presents a scheme that seems different from the bombing of vessels carried out by US forces.

Protests against the Iranian regime could result in a reduction in Iran’s support for its proxies, including the Houthis, who have control of the Bab al-Mandab strait and of navigation in the Red Sea, and who were responsible for more than 100 attacks on navigating vessels between October 2023 and 2025. Although these attacks were intended to disrupt Israel’s shipping trade, the main party affected was the Suez Canal itself, which suffered revenue losses amounting to billions of dollars as vessels diverted to an alternative, longer route around Africa.

Latest Developments in Autonomous Ships and the MASS Code

The technological and legal evolution of autonomous ships is continuing at a rapid pace, particularly for military use.

After sinking the Russian ships Ivanovets (on 1 February 2024) and Tsezar Kunikov (on 14 February 2024), Ukraine naval drones sunk Sergey Kotov, a patrol ship of the Russian Navy, on 5 March 2024. On 31 December 2024, for the first time, a Ukrainian naval drone, Magura 5, reportedly successfully hit and downed an air target – a Russian Mi-8 helicopter on Crimea’s west coast. On January 2025, Ukraine launched FPV drones via naval drones and hit the Russian air defence system Pantsir-S1 in Kherson region. In May 2025, a world-first event occurred when, reportedly, Ukrainian Magura naval drones succeeded in shooting down two Russian fighter aircraft. These naval drone attacks mark a maritime revolution, with Ukraine leading; it brought naval drones to the world stage in early 2023, with the Sea Baby and Magura V5, and it has recently introduced new variants of naval drones with extended range and arms.

Development of the autonomous shipping industry is evident across both the military and commercial domains. For example, the USX-1 Defiant autonomous warship of the US Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) was completed in August 2025, with a length of 180 feet (55 metres) and a weight of about 240 tons. The vessel is unmanned, with self-fuelling capabilities, and is able to complete missions without humans. In the commercial sphere, an autonomous cargo vessel has been developed by the California-based company Clippership, while Ocean Infinity has built a fleet of 14 robotic vessels known as the “Armada Fleet”.

The International Maritime Organization (IMO) continues to adapt its regulatory framework to technological developments in autonomous shipping. On 17 June 2025, a symposium titled “Maritime Autonomous Surface Ships as a reality: the need for the IMO MASS Code” was held. During the 110th session, the committee agreed on a revised roadmap for the MASS Code: adoption of a non-mandatory code by May 2026, development of an experience-building framework by December 2026 and the expected adoption of a mandatory code by July 2030, with entry into force anticipated in 2032.

Sanctions Against Russia and Russia’s Sanction Evasion Attempts

EU sanctions against Russia under Regulation No 833/2014 (particularly the port ban on Russian-flagged vessels (Article 3ea) and restrictions on navigation goods and technologies (Article 3f)) have significantly affected Russia’s fleet of approximately 3,300 vessels (by December 2025).

As reported by Kpler, the “Shadow Fleet” transports around 3,733 million barrels of oil, representing roughly 6–7% of global crude oil trade. To counteract the sanctions imposed by EU countries and the USA, in December 2022 Russia adopted a legal mechanism, through Presidential Decree No 961 and Government Resolution No 118, prohibiting the sale of oil if a price cap is applied (within sanction regulations). Advocate Konstantin Krasnokutskiy advises that the Russian customs authorities demand proof of non-application of the price cap, which means that oil supply contracts cannot abide by the sanctions against Russia if they wish to buy Russian oil, thus forcing buyers to use the Russia fleet to bypass Western sanctions.

Nevertheless, strict Russian legislation does not appear to mitigate the effects of the sanctions; instead, reports indicate that Russian oil tankers have millions of barrels of oil without a buyer. The sanctions, combined with Ukrainian attacks on Russia’s energy infrastructure, have led to a sharp decline in oil production. Coupled with the inherent issues of the ageing, poorly maintained Russian Shadow Fleet vessels, it is unlikely that Russia’s oil issues will be resolved soon.

The EU Deforestation Regulation

The implementation of EU Regulation 2023/1115 (the “EU Deforestation Regulation”; EUDR) – which aims to minimise global deforestation and forest degradation, thereby reducing the associated greenhouse gas emissions and other environmental effects – has been postponed for one more year, pushing the deadline to 30 December 2026. The EUDR cannot be discussed without consideration of the melting glaciers and sea ice, which led to a battle of control between Russia and China against the USA over a northern sea route (the Polar Silk route), which became available year-round due to climate change – and where it seems unlikely that the ice and glacier will return to their previous form.

This “battle” is accompanied by another struggle involving Russia, which continues to apply the methods of catching and dragging (dropping anchor and dragging to cut undersea cables); on 25 December 2024, the Russian-linked Cook Island-flagged Eagle S vessel dropped its anchor and dragged it, cutting the undersea electricity cable Estlink 2 connecting Estonia and Finland. Recently (on 31 December 2025), Finland detained the vessel Fitburg, a vessel sailing from Russia, on suspicion that it had been “sabotaging infrastructure” – ie, damaging an undersea telecoms cable running from Helsinki to Estonia. As well as deliberately damaging infrastructure using its shadow vessels, Russia also breaches Article 113 of the UNCLOS, which mandates that states pass laws to investigate and prosecute “breaking or injury” of undersea cables. M/V Fitburg was later released and continued its voyage and arrived at Israel.

Seafarer Abandonment and the Limits of Legal Protection

In Standard A2.5.2 of the Maritime Labour Convention, 2006, “a seafarer shall be deemed to have been abandoned where, in violation of the requirements of this Convention or the terms of the seafarers’ employment”. Seafarer abandonment is deemed to have occurred if the ship-owner fails to cover repatriation costs; leaves seafarers without the necessary maintenance and support; or severs ties with seafarers, including by not paying their wages for at least two months. The data shows that seafarer abandonment has been a real issue in the maritime industry. In 2025, seafarer abandonment cases surged by 30%, where at least 2,286 seafarers on 222 vessels were left stranded, compared to 172 vessels and 1,838 seafarers in 2024. Unpaid wages of seafarers is a recognised maritime lien under Article 4 of the UN Convention on Maritime Liens and Mortgages, 1993, but in practice it is unlikely that seafarers will have the financial means to initiate legal proceedings to enforce maritime lien proceedings – especially when employed on Shadow Fleet vessels, where the value of these old, poorly maintained vessels is often lower than the legal cost of initiating the proceedings.

The Limited Range of Limitation on Owner’s Liabilities

Under the mutual understanding that a marine voyage is ultimately an adventure for the vessel’s owners, the cargo and the freight interests, the delegates of the conference that took place at the Hague in August 1924 took it upon themselves to set rules that allocate responsibilities between carriers and cargo interests. Carriers are responsible for loss or damage caused by matters within their direct control (sometimes called “commercial fault”), such as the seaworthiness and manning of the ship at the commencement of the voyage. They are not, however, responsible for loss or damage having other causes, including acts or omissions of the Master and crew during the voyage (“nautical fault”).

The allocation of risks between the carrier and the cargo interests “promotes certainty and provided a clear basis on which the parties can make their insurance arrangements, and their insurers can set premiums” (Tasman Orient v New Zealand China Clays [2020] NZSC [paragraph 18]). Accordingly, under Article IV (2) (a)–(q) of the Hague Rules, updated at the 1968 Hague Conference to become known as the Hague-Visby Rules, neither the carrier nor the ship shall be responsible for loss or damage arising or resulting from:

• an “act, neglect or default of the master… or servant of the carrier in the navigation or management of the ship”;
• a “fire”;
• “perils of the sea”;
• an “act of God”;
• “arrest or restraint of princes”; or
• “any other cause arising without the carrier... or of the agents or servant of the carrier”.

Article IV was described by Sir Norman Hill, representing British ship-owners at the Hague Conference, as the “ship-owner’s clause”, and he insisted that the words relating to the “navigation point”, which “from time immemorial have certainly appeared in the British bill of lading”, should remain (“we would ask Sir, in our clause to have our old words”). Accordingly, the British ship-owners’ wording is the wording of the ship-owner’s clause, providing carriers with exemption from liability for “navigation faults” taking place outside of the owner’s reach and control.

The same logic with regard to risk allocation is imposed by Article III (6) of the Hague Visby-Rules, which stipulate a one-year time bar in The Taikoo Brilliance [2025]. The Commercial Court of England and Wales held that the objective of Article III (6) is to allow carriers to “clear their books”; and for this reason, only proceedings capable of determining liability on the merits to establish liability are considered “suits” capable of stopping the time bar. Security claims such as ship arrests are not considered suits capable of stopping the time bar because substantive claims on merits may follow in the future, meaning that the “books should be kept open”, which undermines the commercial purpose of the time bar.

The Roman Law principle of noxalis actio means that if a slave causes injury, the Master of the slave can either pay damages or surrender the offender to the injured – and by surrendering this “offending property”, the Master is no longer liable for the damages caused by the slave (George Long, Noxalis Actio; in Smith’s Dictionary, 1875, page 807). According to Nicolai Lagoni in Maritime Transport (Global Limitation of Liability), this principle is the legal origin of limitation of liability in shipping, which appeared in Consolato del Mar (1494), the French Ordinance of 1861 and the English Responsibility of Shipowners Act 1733, limiting the ship-owner’s liability up to the value of his or her share in the vessel – or exempting the owner if he or she has handed the ship to the injured.

However, it seems that the sinking of the Titanic in 1912, and the high costs of compensation for loss of life and injury, prompted unification of the rules relating to limitation on owners’ liability. A Comité Maritime International (CMI) committee established in 1913 resulted in a convention, adopted 11 years later, named the “International Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to the Limitation of Liability for Shipowners of Seagoing Vessels” (also known as the “Brussels Convention 1924”). This Convention was amended and updated in 1957 (also in Brussels).

In 1976, following the work of the Inter-Governmental Maritime Consultative Organization (IMCO) and the CMI, a new Convention on the Limitation of Liability for Maritime Claims (LLMC) was introduced to the shipping industry. This Convention was updated in the Amending Protocol of 1996, and by Resolution LEG 5 (99) (2012) of the IMO’s legal committee. By ordering (for example) that claims for oil pollution damages be excepted from limitation (Article 3 of the Amending Protocol of 1996), the updated 1976 Convention is considered better suited to the shipping industry’s requirements and has been described as a “package deal” where, on the one hand, limitation amounts are raised (in favour of the injured), while on the other hand owners are deprived of their entitlement to limit liability only “if it is proved that the claim resulted from the ship owner’s personal act or omission, committed with the intent to cause such loss, or reckless and with knowledge that such loss would probably result” – in fact rendering the limitation on liability unbreakable (Christiaan Sheyouyuni Fikunawa, Law on the Limitation of Liability for Maritime Claims (IMO, 2021)).

The common concept of the Conventions is clear. Owners can apply to limit their liabilities towards a list of claims listed in the Convention(s) (such as loss of life or personal injury, damage to property, wreck removal, damage caused to harbour works, basins and navigable seaways), and their liability will be capped at an amount calculated according to the injuring vessel’s tonnage. Owners lose this privilege if the incident resulted from the “actual fault or privity of the owner” (according to the 1957 Convention), or from a much higher threshold of liability (from the point of view of breaking the limitation) as set out in the 1976 Convention. Both Conventions permit states to exclude specific categories of claims, such as wreck removal and damage to harbour works, basins and navigable waterways, from the scope of limitation.

Accordingly, in the case of M/V Goliath, which collided with two tugs at the port of Devonport, Tasmania, causing an incident requiring wreck removal, oil pollution and other economic damages were dealt with by the Australia Federal Court in accordance with the owner’s application to limit liability under the 1976 Convention (aiming to cap its liability towards claims amounting to about USD23 million to USD15.7 million). TasPorts (the injured port) argued that the relevant claims (listed in Article 2 1 (d) of the 1976 Convention) are excluded from limitation of liability following Australia’s ratification of the Convention in 1989, in which the relevant (allowed) reservations covered by Article 2 (d) and (e) of the 1976 convention were not applied. The owners, on the other hand, argued that the wreck removal claims were captured by the wording of Article 2 (1) (a) of the Convention – “claims in respect of loss of or damage to property” (which were not excluded) – and that the fact that they might also fall within the scope of Article 2 (1) (d) is irrelevant. After the first-instance court approved the owners’ argument, the full court overturned the decision.

Turning to the Hong Kong Court of Final Appeal, which dealt with similar facts in the case of The Star Centurion [2024], the full court accepted the conclusion that it would be incoherent to allow a contracting state to not apply Article 2 (1) (d) (relating to wreck removal claims) when, at the same time, the claim fell within the scope of Article 2 (1) (a) and would be limited. Exclusion of the claims listed in Article 2 (1) (d) can only be achieved if claims for wreck removal will not be included even though the expenses associated with wreck removal may also be captured by the language describing other kinds of claims in Article 2 (1) of the 1976 Convention.

Clause 1 (d) uses the wording “claims in respect of” (a ship that is wrecked), and there is nothing in the legislative history of the 1976 Convention to suggest that Article 2 (1) (d) was intended to cover only wreck claims that do not fall within the meaning of the claims listed in Article 2 (1), (a)–(c) of the 1976 Convention. As a result, the owner’s application was denied (Tasmanian Ports Corporation v CSL Australia, 29 April 2025).

In the case of MSC Flaminia, the Supreme Court dealt with the charterer’s (MSC) application to limit its liabilities towards the claims of the owners, which were eventually awarded compensation of USD200 million in a 2022 arbitration, for damages and costs that arose during the vessel’s navigation in July 2012 through the Atlantic Ocean. Huge explosions occurred on three of the containers, which were laden with 80% divinylbenzene (DVB), causing the loss of life of three seafarers, destruction of hundreds of containers and extensive damage to the vessel. A claim was filed by MSC in 2020 to limit its liability at EUR26.5 million. This was countered by the owner’s argument that limitation of liability is possible only towards “external” claimants and not towards “indoor” claimants, such as claims by owners against the charterers. The Supreme Court opened its judgment by stating that “the principle of limited liability for maritime claims is an established feature of international maritime law” and that “its roots lie in a recognition of the importance of maritime trade and the need to encourage investment in it”.

It was held that the 1976 Convention uses the word “claims” with no reference to the role of the entity filing the claim, and that the 1924 Convention provides a defence to parties other than the owners – ie, the “principal charterer” (the “charterer, manager or operator of the ship” in the 1957 Convention and also the “salvors and insurers” in the 1976 Convention).

Bearing in mind that charterers invest money in relation to the employment and operation of a vessel, there is no reason why they would not be protected under the Conventions. Therefore, MSC was entitled to limit its liabilities, but only towards the claim for the costs of discharging sound and damaged cargo at the shelter port of Wilhemshaven – as this is related to “removal” and “rendering harmless of the cargo of the ship”, as worded in Article 2 (e) of the 1976 Convention, limitation was allowed (Msc v Conti, 9 April 2025).