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Luxembourg tax legislation does not provide for any integrated transfer pricing legislation. Instead, according to different tax provisions and concepts applicable under Luxembourg domestic tax law, transfer pricing adjustments can be made in order to restate arm’s length conditions.
Luxembourg Tax Law and Administrative Guidelines
Article 56 of the Luxembourg Income Tax Law (LITL)
Article 56 of the LITL formalises the application of the arm’s length principle under Luxembourg tax law in accordance with Article 9 of the OECD Model Tax Convention and provides a legal basis for transfer pricing adjustments (upward and downward adjustments) when associated enterprises deviate from the arm’s length standard.
Article 56bis of the LITL
Article 56bis of the LITL formalises the authoritative nature of the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines. It provides definitions of several terms that are relevant in a transfer pricing context (eg, controlled transaction, comparable uncontrolled transaction, arm’s length price) and guiding principles in relation to the application of the arm’s length principle which closely follow some of the key paragraphs of Chapter I (Arm’s length principle) of the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines. It clarifies that the arm’s length principle has to be met whenever a Luxembourg company enters into a controlled transaction with an affiliate. This requires a calculation of the taxable income that may reasonably be expected if the parties are dealing with one another at arm’s length. It does this by contrasting the choices made and the outcomes achieved by the taxpayer with those that would have resulted from market forces.
Article 56bis explicitly addresses transactions that may not be observed between independent enterprises. It provides that the fact that a specific transaction cannot be observed between independent enterprises does not mean that a transaction does not adhere to the arm’s length standard. This is a provision of great importance as related parties may, in practice, enter into transactions that are not undertaken by independent enterprises. Article 56bis of the LITL introduces the concept of the comparability analysis through a replication of some of the guidance provided in the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines. Article 56bis of the LITL also deals with circumstances in which a transaction, as structured by a taxpayer, may be disregarded because there is a lack of valid commercial rationality, and a third party would not have entered into a specific transaction. Nevertheless, the non-recognition of a transaction should only occur in very exceptional situations.
Circular 56/1 – 56bis/1 of the Luxembourg tax Authorities (LTA) on the tax treatment of intra-group financing activities
The Circular of the LTA, dated 27 December 2016, provides guidance on the practical application of the arm’s length principle to intra-group financing activities. It also details some specific formal requirements applicable to financing companies when requesting an APA.
Concepts of hidden dividend distributions and hidden capital contributions and their interaction with Article 56 of the LITL
The concepts of hidden dividend distributions (Article 164 (3) of the LITL) and hidden capital contributions (Article 18 (1) of the LITL) also play an important role in ensuring that associated enterprises adhere to the arm’s length standard.
According to Article 164 (3) of the LITL, hidden dividend distributions arise when a shareholder partner or interested party receives advantages directly or indirectly from a company that a third party would not have received. Article 164 (3) of the LITL states that such profit distributions have to be included in the company’s taxable income, meaning that they are not deductible for tax purposes and may be subject to withholding tax if no exemption applies.
A hidden capital contribution refers to an advantage shifted by a shareholder to a company. While the concept is not defined in Luxembourg tax law, hidden capital contributions bear the following characteristics in accordance with the relevant case law:
In principle, contributions increase the net equity in the receiving company’s balance sheet. The object of a hidden capital contribution should therefore directly relate to balance sheet items, namely an increase in assets or a decrease in liabilities. In contrast, any advantage (including free services) shifted by the company to its shareholder(s) should be classified as a hidden dividend distribution. Consequently, the scope of hidden capital contributions and that of hidden dividend distributions do not mirror each other, though both concepts share the same objective, namely the separation of the realm of the company from its shareholders.
Article 56 of the LITL and the concepts of hidden dividend distributions and hidden capital contributions operate independently of one another and may apply concurrently. In case of an overlap, however, the concepts of hidden dividend distributions and hidden capital contributions should take precedence over Article 56 of the LITL. This is because the only tax consequence of Article 56 of the LITL is an adjustment of the taxable income of the company (in order to restate arm’s length conditions), whereas the concepts of hidden dividend distributions and hidden capital contributions may require additional tax adjustments at the level of the company and the shareholder.
Transfer pricing documentation
Duty of co-operation of taxpayers – since the introduction of Section 3 of paragraph 171 of the Luxembourg General Tax Law (LGTL), the duty of co-operation of taxpayers set out in paragraph 1 thereof has been expressly extended to transactions between associated enterprises. This means that transfer pricing documentation is identified in Luxembourg tax law as information which taxpayers should provide to the LTA upon request in order to support the positions they take in their tax returns.
Country-by-country reporting – the law of 23 December 2016 implemented the provisions of EU Directive 2016/881 of 25 May 2016 into Luxembourg law which extended administrative co-operation in tax matters to country-by-country (CbC) reporting. MNE groups with a consolidated revenue exceeding EUR750 million are required to prepare a CbC report. The entity of the group in charge of the reporting is either the Luxembourg resident ultimate parent entity of the MNE group or, in certain circumstances, any other reporting entity (a Luxembourg subsidiary or a Luxembourg permanent establishment) as defined in Annex 2 of the law. The CbC report follows the OECD recommendations provided in Chapter V of the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines.
Article 164ter of the LITL – transfer pricing aspects of the Controlled Foreign Company (CFC) rule
Article 164ter of the LITL, which implemented the CFC rules of the EU Directive 2016/1164 into Luxembourg tax law with effect as from 1 January 2019, includes some transfer pricing-related aspects. This is because Luxembourg is one of the few EU member states which decided to opt for the transactional approach when introducing the CFC rules. Article 164ter of the LITL provides that a Luxembourg corporate taxpayer or a Luxembourg permanent establishment (PE) of a non-Luxembourg tax resident entity will be taxed on the non-distributed income of an entity or PE which qualifies as a CFC, provided that the non-distributed income arises from non-genuine arrangements which have been put in place for the essential purpose of obtaining a tax advantage. An arrangement or a series thereof will be regarded as non-genuine if the entity or PE does not own the assets or has not undertaken the risks that generated all or part of its income if it were not controlled by a Luxembourg corporate taxpayer when the significant people functions, which are relevant to those assets and risks, are carried out and are instrumental in generating the CFC’s income. While no further clarification is provided on the concept of significant people functions and the interaction between the Luxembourg transfer pricing rules and the CFCs rules, in Circular 164ter/1 of 17 June 2022, the tax authorities are imposing an additional documentation requirement, not required by the law, according to which a transfer pricing analysis following the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines has to be performed for each of the CFCs of the taxpayer and has to be updated on an annual basis. Based on the circular, even though the taxpayer does not assume any people function generating the CFC’s income, transfer pricing documentation needs to be available and updated on an annual basis.
Luxembourg Double Tax Treaty Network
Almost all Luxembourg double tax treaties are based on the OECD Model Tax convention and thus include the arm’s length principle, as further defined in the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines.
OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines
As a member of the OECD, Luxembourg adheres to the organisation’s Transfer Pricing Guidelines which reflect the consensus of OECD member countries towards the application of the arm’s length principle, as provided in Article 9 (1) of the OECD Model Tax Convention. Since the Luxembourg legislation does not provide for any integrated transfer pricing legislation, the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines play an extremely important role for Luxembourg taxpayers, when analysing their transactions from a transfer pricing point of view. Reference to these guidelines is made in both the parliamentary documents (such as the ones related to the draft laws introducing Article 56 and Article 56bis of the LITL) and in Circular 56/1 – 56bis/1 of the LTA on the tax treatment of intra-group financing activities.
Over the past few years, transfer pricing and the need for related documentation have become increasingly important in Luxembourg. Before 2011, Luxembourg domestic tax law did not provide any specific transfer pricing rules or documentation requirements. On 28 January 2011, the LTA issued the first circular dealing with transfer pricing, Circular 164/2, which provided guidance on how Luxembourg companies performing financing activities should determine their arm’s length margin. This circular already explicitly referred to the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines.
The law of 19 December 2014 amended Article 56 of the LITL in order to formalise the application of the arm’s length principle and provided a legal basis for transfer pricing adjustments when associated enterprises do not meet the arm’s length standard. The same law also amended Paragraph 171 of the LGTL in order to explicitly extend the duty of co-operation of taxpayers to transactions between associated enterprises, reflecting the increasing importance of transfer pricing documentation.
The law of 23 December 2016 introduced Article 56bis of the LITL which provided, for the first time, definitions and guiding principles in relation to the application of the arm’s length principle. These definitions and guiding principles are in line with the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines. In order to reflect the changes introduced by Article 56bis of the LITL, on 27 December 2016, the LTA released a new circular, Circular 56/1 – 56bis/1, on the tax treatment of intra-group financing activities, which provides guidance on the practical application of the arm’s length principle to intra-group financing activities and repealed and replaced the former Circular of 28 January 2011 with effect from 1 January 2017.
Further changes are in the pipeline with draft law No 8186, presented to Parliament on 28 March 2023, which would introduce a new procedure for requesting an advanced bilateral or multilateral agreement on transfer pricing pursuant to the double tax treaties concluded by Luxembourg and additional transfer pricing documentation requirements (master file and local file, in line with Action 13 of the BEPS Action Plan).
The scope of Article 56 of the LITL is limited to transactions between associated enterprises and does not apply to transactions between individual shareholders and Luxembourg companies. Article 56 of the LITL further applies to both cross-border transactions and transactions between Luxembourg companies.
Article 56 of the LITL defines “associated enterprise” in accordance with Article 9 (1) of the OECD Model Tax Convention, namely:
Thus, Article 56 of the LITL includes a flexible definition, which is not defined further (neither in the related parliamentary documents, nor in the related Circular 56-56bis of the LTA).
As far as the concepts of hidden dividend distributions and hidden capital contributions are concerned, they apply not only to shareholders but also to related parties of the shareholder.
“Associated enterprise” is also defined in other provisions of Luxembourg tax law, such as the CFC rules of Article 164ter of the LITL and the anti-hybrid rules of Article 168ter of the LITL, which, for some of them, include more technical control criteria of 50% or 25% as the case may be).
The Luxembourg transfer pricing provisions of Luxembourg tax law do not include any specific lists of transfer pricing methods to be applied. However, paragraph 6 of Article 56bis of the LITL defines general principles to be followed in respect of the transfer pricing method to be used: the methods to be used to determine the appropriate comparable price must take into account identified comparability factors and must be consistent with the nature of the transaction precisely defined. The price thus identified, by comparing the precisely defined transaction with comparable transactions on the open market, will be the arm’s length price applicable to the transaction under analysis, in order to comply with the arm’s length principle. The choice of comparison method must be the one that provides the best possible approximation of the arm’s length price.
The parliamentary documents related to the draft law which introduced Article 56bis of the LITL state that paragraph 6 of Article 56bis L.I.R. implements Chapters II and III of the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines into Luxembourg tax legislation. Chapters II and III set out the various techniques and methods to be used, the transaction having been analysed in accordance with the instructions in Chapter I of the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines, in order to determine the arm’s length price. Thus, reference first has to be made to the five methods, as defined in the guidelines, that can be used to establish whether a controlled transaction adheres to the arm’s length standard and which are divided into two groups, namely the traditional transaction methods and the transactional profit methods. However, in addition to these five methods, as stated in the commentary to the draft law introducing Article 56bis of the LITL, the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines also allow any other method to be applied, as long as it enables a price to be set that satisfies the arm’s length principle. In such case the taxpayer will have to evidence why this other method is the most appropriate method.
As a principle, the most appropriate method has to be applied, using either one of the methods defined in the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines or any other method which enables a price to be established that is in line with the arm’s length principle.
Since the Luxembourg legislation only refers to the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines without specifying the different methods, the only principle which should be followed is that the most appropriate method should be applied, meaning there is no hierarchy of methods. In practice the most commonly used method is the comparable uncontrolled price (CUP) method, mainly for a wide range of financial transactions and license fees. However, other methods such as the cost-plus method (for low value-adding services) as well as the profit split method (eg, for highly integrated fund management activities) are regularly relevant in practice as well.
The Luxembourg legislation does not require the use of ranges or statistical measures. However, since the LTA follow the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines, reference has to be made to these in this respect.
Based on paragraph 4 of Article 56bis of the LITL, transactions are sufficiently comparable when there are no material differences between the transactions being compared that could have a significant methodological influence on the determination of the price, or when reasonably reliable adjustments can be made to eliminate the impact on price determination. Thus, comparability adjustments have to be reliable and reasonable and may be performed (“in accordance with internationally recognised standards”, as Circular 56-56bis states) if they are necessary to improve the reliability and quality of the comparability analysis.
Luxembourg tax legislation does not include any specific rules relating to the transfer pricing of intangibles. Thus, reference has to be made to Chapter VI of the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines in this respect. However, Circular 50ter/1 of 28 June 2019 dealing with the Luxembourg intellectual property regime (ie, 80% corporate income tax and municipal tax exemption of the net qualifying income and capital gains derived from eligible IP assets and 100% exemption of qualifying IP assets for net wealth tax purposes) specifies that the arm’s length principle defined in Article 56 and Article 56bis of the LITL apply in case of application of the IP regime.
Luxembourg tax legislation does not include any specific rules relating to hard-to-value intangibles (HTVI), so the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines have to be followed in this respect. Based on the Luxembourg questionnaire on the Implementation of the HTVI Approach included in the Luxembourg country profile released by the OECD, even though the HTVI approach defined in Chapter VI is to be considered as not implemented in domestic legislation, the general provisions of Chapters I-III can be used for audit purposes with regard to transactions on intangibles.
Attention should be paid to the fact that arrangements involving the transfer of HTVI between associated enterprises belong to the transfer pricing arrangements which may have to be reported under the Luxembourg Law of 25 March 2020 implementing EU Directive 2018/822/EU (so-called “DAC6”), as amended, regarding reportable cross-border arrangements. HTVI are defined in Part 2 of the Annex to the law of 25 March 2020, which deals with the “hallmarks” (ie, characteristics or features of a cross-border arrangement that indicate a potential risk of tax avoidance) as follows: “Intangibles or rights in intangibles for which, at the time of their transfer between associated enterprises, (a) no reliable comparables exist and (b) at the time the transaction was entered into, the projections of future cash flows or income expected to be derived from the transferred intangible, or the assumptions used in valuing the intangible, are highly uncertain, making it difficult to predict the level of ultimate success of the intangible at the time of the transfer.”
Luxembourg tax legislation does not include any specific rules relating to cost sharing or cost contribution arrangements. Therefore, the guidance included in the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines in this respect (ie, Chapter VIII) has to be followed.
While both upward and downward adjustments may be made in application of the arm’s length principle, according to the LGTL, amended tax returns may only be filed (or may even have to be filed) by taxpayers under certain limited conditions and circumstances.
There is a multitude of legal instruments for exchanging information on Luxembourg taxpayers with foreign tax authorities. The exchange can take place upon request, automatically or spontaneously.
Exchange of Information Upon Request
As far as exchange of information upon request is concerned, it can mainly take place either on the grounds of the double tax treaty (Luxembourg has an extensive tax treaty network and almost all tax treaties include a provision on exchange of information in line with Article 26 of the OECD Model Tax Convention) concluded by Luxembourg with the jurisdiction of the foreign requesting authority or based on EU Directive 2011/16/EU of 15 February 2011 on administrative co-operation in the field of taxation (so-called “DAC”) if the exchange is requested by an authority of another EU member state. The procedure for exchanging information on request in these cases, as well as under the law of 26 May 2014 approving the Convention on Mutual Administrative Assistance in Tax Matters, is governed by the Law of 25 November 2014. In order to avoid so-called “fishing expeditions”, only “foreseeably relevant” information can be exchanged. In 2023, the Luxembourg authorities received 911 requests from other jurisdictions, compared to 1189 requests in 2021 and 1038 requests in 2022. Thus, the number of requests has been decreasing since 2021, which is most probably due to the fact that foreign authorities already receive an ever-increasing amount of information automatically.
Automatic Exchange of Information
The scope of information to be exchanged on a mandatory and automatic basis has been increasing consistently over the past few years through several amendments of the DAC, each of them having been implemented into Luxembourg law.
The most important scope extensions for transfer pricing purposes are as follows.
Spontaneous Exchange of Information
The LTA may also exchange information spontaneously with other jurisdictions based on the DAC (in an EU context) or based on the Convention on Mutual Administrative Assistance in Tax Matters (which 147 jurisdictions have signed as of today). Information can only be exchanged if the LTA have grounds for supposing that there may be a loss of tax in the other jurisdiction.
Circular 56/1 – 56bis/1 of the LTA on the tax treatment of intra-group financing activities states that companies which opted for the simplification measure that may apply to Luxembourg companies acting as mere intermediaries will be subject to spontaneous exchanges of information.
Unilateral APAs – with effect as from 2015, Luxembourg has formalised its procedure applicable to tax rulings, including those related to transfer pricing (unilateral APAs). This procedure is included in paragraph 29a of the LGTL, as well as in Grand Ducal Regulation of 23 December 2014. On top of the requirements applicable under the procedure of paragraph 29a, Luxembourg companies performing intra-group financing activities have to provide additional information listed in Circular 56/1 – 56bis/1 of the LTA dated 27 December 2016.
Bilateral or Multilateral APAs – based on the legal provisions currently in force, no formal programme has been implemented by Luxembourg for bilateral and multilateral APAs and Luxembourg considers that these can be concluded by its competent authority based on the first sentence of Article 25(3) of the OECD Model Tax Convention. Circular L.G. - Conv. D.I. No 601 of the LTA dated 11 March 2021 provides guidance in this respect.
Draft law No 8186 introduces a new procedure (new paragraph 29c of the LGTL and related Grand-Ducal Regulation) for requesting an advanced bilateral or multilateral agreement on transfer pricing pursuant to the double tax treaties concluded by Luxembourg. However, it is uncertain at this stage whether this draft law will ever become law since the draft provision on bilateral and multilateral APAs belongs to a broader piece of draft legislation which has been giving rise to discussions and criticism over the legislative process on many of its aspects.
Still, Luxembourg taxpayers are able to request bilateral or multilateral agreements in transfer pricing based on the EU Arbitration Convention, the law of 20 December 2019 implementing EU Directive 2017/1852 of 10 October 2017 on tax dispute resolution mechanisms in the EU, or based on a double tax treaty.
APA requests have to be sent to the head of the tax office in charge of the taxpayer. However, if the APA request deals with company taxation issues, the request will first be submitted for opinion to the advance tax clearance commission (Commission des décisions anticipées).
Based on Circular L.G. - Conv. D.I. No 601 of the LTA dated 11 March 2021, transfer pricing mutual agreement procedures (MAP) requests have to be sent to the economic division of the LTA (which is the authority in charge of transfer pricing cases) or to the Comité de Direction of the LTA, which is in charge of all MAP cases.
While there is no provision dealing with this question, in practice, there should be co-ordination between the APA process and the MAP, even though the competent authorities administrating the two are not the same. Co-ordination between the MAP procedure and other procedures (such as a legal procedure before the administrative courts) is also covered in Circular L.G. - Conv. D.I. No 601 of the LTA dated 11 March 2021.
An APA can be requested by any type of taxpayer and can deal with any type of transaction.
Unilateral APA requests have to be filed before the transaction takes place. As far as bilateral and multilateral APAs are concerned, they generally have to be requested within three years starting from the first notification of the action resulting (i) in taxation not in accordance with the provisions of the covered tax agreement, (ii) in the question in dispute or (iii) in double taxation, depending on whether the request is made during a MAP initiated based on a double tax treaty, based on the law implementing the EU Directive on tax dispute resolution mechanisms in the EU, or based on the EU Arbitration Convention.
In the same was as any other advance tax clearance dealing with company taxation issues, unilateral APAs are subject to a fee which is determined by the LTA upon receipt of the request and ranges between EUR3,000 and EUR10,000, depending on the complexity and the amount of work required. In practice, in transfer pricing matters, the fee very often reaches EUR10,000. The fee is payable within one month.
Based on the legislation in force, no fee applies to bilateral or multilateral APAs. However, should draft law No 8186 (introducing a new procedure for requesting an advanced bilateral or multilateral agreement on transfer pricing pursuant to the double tax treaties) become law in its current form, a fee ranging between EUR10,000 and EUR20,000 (depending on the level of complexity and the amount of work required) would apply.
The APA is valid for a time period of maximum five tax years and has a binding effect on the tax authorities, except in the following situations: (i) the situation or operations described are not accurate, (ii) the situation or operations performed differ from the ones described in the APA request, or (iii) it appears that the APA is not, or no longer, in line with Luxembourg, EU or international tax law.
Given that unilateral APA requests have to be filed before the transaction they relate to takes place, in principle, there is no possible retroactive effect.
Luxembourg legislation does not provide for penalties which are transfer pricing specific or which are linked to the preparation and maintaining of transfer pricing documentation. If a transaction has been priced in such a way that it does not reflect the arm’s length principle, the tax authorities will perform an adjustment based on Article 56 of the LITL.
However, penalties might apply in the context of mandatory reporting requirements, which include transfer pricing data, such as under the CbC reporting requirements, where the LTA may levy, on a discretionary basis, a fine of up to EUR250,000 in cases of non-filing, late filing or incomplete or incorrect filing of the CbC report, as well as in cases of non-compliance with the filing rules. The same level of penalties also applies in case of breach of the reporting requirements under the law implementing DAC6, which also covers transactions which are transfer pricing related.
As far as transfer pricing documentation is concerned, based on paragraph 171 of the LGTL, it only has to be provided to the tax authorities upon request and there is no general obligation to prepare such documentation. However, given that taxpayers have to be in the position to justify the positions they take in their tax returns, including when they enter into transactions with related parties, they have to be in the position to present, upon request, documentation illustrating how the arm’s length price of these transactions was determined. Therefore, from a practical point of view, even if it is not required by the law, taxpayers should prepare their transfer pricing documentation upfront.
Finally, the general administrative penalties which apply in any other tax matters – ie, in case of late filing of the tax returns, late payment of the tax due or in case of fraud, might also apply.
There is a requirement to file CbC reports, based on the the law of 23 December 2016 implementing EU Directive 2016/881 of 25 May 2016. This obligation applies to MNE groups with a consolidated revenue exceeding EUR750 million, whereby the entity of the group in charge of the reporting is generally the ultimate parent entity of the group. Luxembourg entities that are members of an MNE group are also required to notify the LTA of the identity and tax residence of the reporting entity (whether this reporting entity is the Luxembourg entity itself or any other entity of the group).
Based on the legislation currently in force, there is no requirement to prepare a master file or a local file, as defined in Action 13 of the BEPS Action Plan. However, a draft law (No 8186) complements paragraph 171 of the LGTL, adding that associated enterprises are required to present, on request, documentation justifying the transfer pricing policy they applied. The scope, content and extent of the documentation referred to in this new draft provision is laid down in a draft Grand-Ducal regulation which refers to the local file and the master file and details their content, in line with the standards defined in Action 13 of the BEPS Action plan. Thus, as soon as this draft law is in force, master files and local files will have to be prepared by taxpayers and will have to be provided to the tax authorities upon request.
Since Luxembourg legislation does not provide for any integrated transfer pricing legislation, the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines play an extremely important role for Luxembourg taxpayers when analysing their transactions from a transfer pricing point of view and for tax authorities to assess the transfer pricing policy of taxpayers. Reference to these guidelines is made in the parliamentary documents related to the Luxembourg transfer pricing legislation, as well as in the related guidance of the LTA. Therefore, the position of the LTA should be fully aligned with the OECD guidelines and taxpayers should use these guidelines as a reference.
Luxembourg tax law follows the arm’s length principle.
The development of the Luxembourg transfer pricing legislation as from 2015 is the direct impact of the outcome of the BEPS project in transfer pricing matters. As such, the BEPS project has impacted Luxembourg legislation significantly. The wording of Article 56bis of the LITL closely follows some of the key paragraphs of Chapter I (Arm’s length principle) of the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines, which were updated in order to reflect the outcome of Actions 8-10 of the BEPS Action Plan.
Luxembourg has implemented the EU Pillar Two directive by means of the law of 22 December 2023, so the Pillar Two rules of the Directive are now in force in Luxembourg.
As far as Pillar One is concerned, its impact will mainly depend on the scope of exclusions for the financial services industry.
A Luxembourg entity may bear the risk of another entity’s operations, to the extent that the transaction is concluded under arm’s length conditions providing the risk-bearing entity with an arm’s length remuneration. Explicit guarantees in financial transactions have to be remunerated in line with Chapter X of the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines.
While the UN Practical Manual on Transfer Pricing may be used as a source of information (reference is even made to it in the commentary to draft law 6722 introducing Article 56 of the LITL), in practice, it is not relevant since Luxembourg closely follows the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines.
Luxembourg tax law does not include any transfer pricing related safe harbours. However, as far as Luxembourg companies performing intra-group financing activities are concerned, Circular 56/1 – 56bis/1 provides for the following simplification measure for Luxembourg companies acting as mere intermediaries – ie, on-lending funds received without bearing any significant risks: transactions entered into by these companies are deemed to comply with the arm’s length principle if the analysed entity realises a minimum return of 2% after tax on the amount of the financing volume. In practice, this simplification measure is never applied as the 2% after-tax margin is significantly higher than the arm’s length remuneration for such activity.
Attention should be paid to the fact that arrangements involving the use of unilateral safe harbour rules belong to the specific arrangements concerning transfer pricing which may have to be reported under the Luxembourg Law of 25 March 2020 implementing DAC6 regarding reportable cross-border arrangements. However, given that Circular 56/1 – 56bis/1 of the LTA on the tax treatment of intra-group financing activities states that companies which opt for the simplification measure that may apply to Luxembourg companies acting as mere intermediaries will already be subject to spontaneous exchanges of information, reporting under DAC6 in this specific situation would mean that the information would be exchanged twice (once under the spontaneous information exchange and once under the automatic exchange of DAC6).
Luxembourg does not have any specific rules governing savings that arise from operating in Luxembourg.
Luxembourg does not have any notable unique rules or practices applicable in the transfer pricing context.
While there is no specific provision in Luxembourg law in respect of the arm’s length value for customs duty purposes, Article 70-3 (d) of the Union Customs Code applies the arm’s length principle in order to determine the customs value, stating that the transaction value shall apply provided that “the buyer and seller are not related or the relationship did not influence the price”.
The law of 19 December 2008 provides a legal framework for the exchange of information between the different LTA – ie, the direct tax authorities (Administration des contribution Directes), the indirect tax authorities (Administration de l’Enregistrement, des Domaines et de la TVA) and the customs and excise duties administration (Administration des Douanes et Accises), as well as with other public authorities, such as the supervisory authority of the financial sector (Commission de Surveillance du Secteur Financier). However, in practice, to date, the use of transfer pricing documentation for customs duty purposes is uncommon.
There is no dedicated procedure applicable to transfer pricing matters, meaning that the same procedure as for any other direct tax matters applies when it comes to transfer pricing audits or to legal proceedings.
In a first step, the tax authorities may consider performing a tax audit which can take the form of either a general information request or a more formal tax audit, including several steps. In practice, we are seeing an increasing number of tax audits (in the form of a general information request) performed, especially when it comes to intra-group financing transactions. The tax audit is performed by the local inspector in charge of the taxpayer. Besides the statute of limitations (of five years in principle), there is no timeline for performing a tax audit and the tax authorities set the deadline for the taxpayer to provide the information requested (generally two to four weeks). The taxpayer has the obligation to provide the information requested and must answer any additional questions the tax authorities may ask during the audit process. In practice, the tax authorities request the transfer pricing documentation supporting the intra-group transactions performed by the taxpayer as well as the related agreements. They often also request information related to substance.
Once the audit is completed, the tax authorities will release a tax assessment (or a revised tax assessment if the taxpayer has already been taxed automatically based on its tax return in a first place, as it is the case for companies, in principle). If the tax assessment differs from the position taken in the tax return, the tax authorities will first have to send a notification to the taxpayer explaining that they will deviate from the position taken in the tax returns and briefly explain the rationale behind this deviation. The taxpayer is able to take position on the envisaged deviation. Then, the tax assessment is released. The taxpayer then has three months to challenge the tax assessment before the Director of the direct tax authorities. Even though the tax assessment is challenged, the tax fixed in the tax assessment must be paid. The Director can then either issue a new tax assessment, reject the claim of the taxpayer or even remain silent. If the Director remains silent, the appeal is deemed to be rejected after six months. As soon as the appeal is rejected or deemed to be rejected, the taxpayer has the possibility to appeal against the decision (or deemed decision) of the Director of the tax authorities before the Administrative Tribunal (first instance in direct tax matters). The taxpayer can appeal against the decision of the Administrative Court (second instance in direct tax matters) within 40 days following the notification of the decision. The decision of the Administrative Court is final and cannot be appealed as the Administrative Court is the highest instance in direct tax matters.
Draft law No 8186 aims to simplify and modernise the rules governing the direct tax procedure in Luxembourg and amends, among others, some aspects of the formal conditions to challenge tax assessments.
Luxembourg does not recognise the rule of precedent so the Luxembourg courts are not bound by decisions handed down in other cases, even when these cases are very similar. Still, decisions of the Director of the tax authorities very often make reference to the case law of the administrative courts, which is generally followed by the tax authorities.
Besides the rulings of the administrative courts regarding hidden dividend distributions and hidden capital contributions which are very numerous, the Luxembourg case law in transfer pricing matters is rather limited. There is some case law on the computation of interest rates on financing activities, but their relevance is reduced since these rulings concern tax years prior to 2015, so before Luxembourg introduced its transfer pricing legislation. There is, however, some recent case law on intra-group financing transactions and the qualification (as debt v equity) of the related instruments, including, in particular, one case regarding the qualification of an interest-free loan.
Administrative Court No 48125C, 23 November 2023 and Administrative Tribunal No 44902, 23 September 2022 – Interest-Free Loan (IFL)
On 23 November 2023, the Luxembourg Administrative Court held a decision in a case concerning an IFL which was granted by a Luxembourg company to its wholly-owned Luxembourg subsidiary. The case involved a company resident in the Cayman Islands (CayCo) that invested via a Luxembourg investment platform into (distressed) debt owed by third parties. CayCo financed its Luxembourg subsidiary (LuxParentCo) by a mixture of equity and a profit-participating loan (PPL). LuxParentCo used the funds received to finance its Luxembourg subsidiary (“LuxSubsidiary”, the taxpayer) by a mixture of equity and (mainly) an IFL. LuxSubsidiary (the borrower) invested the funds received from LuxParentCo (the lender) mainly into distressed debt instruments.
In its corporate tax return, in accordance with Article 56 of the LITL, LuxSubsidiary performed a downward adjustment in relation to the IFL in order to account for deemed interest expenses that would have been due at arm’s length. LuxParentCo recognised deemed interest income in its corporate tax return (corresponding to the amount of the deemed interest expenses reflected in the corporate tax return of LuxSubsidiary). The upward adjustment was also performed in accordance with Article 56 of the LITL.
Both the LTA and the Administrative Tribunal denied the downward adjustment on the grounds that the IFL was to be considered as an equity instrument. The equity qualification by the tax authorities and the Tribunal was mainly based on the fact that the IFL included a limited recourse clause providing for no or limited risk in case of default. One additional element was that the loan was only formalised several months after the cash had been made available, so, according to the Administrative Tribunal, the intention of the parties was to make a hidden capital contribution.
The Administrative Court overturned the judgment of the Tribunal and recalled that the classification of a financing instrument follows the economic approach (so-called wirtschaftliche Betrachtungsweise). This approach involves, for tax purposes, the economic reality prevailing over the legal form (also referred to as the “substance over form” principle). The Administrative Court performed an overall analysis of the transaction and an analysis of all relevant features of the IFL. Since most of the relevant features of the IFL were debt features, the Administrative Court classified the loan as a debt instrument. As the subject matter of the case was the classification of the IFL as debt or equity and the Administrative Court is limited by the grounds on which it has been involved, it could not itself review the downward (and upward) adjustment in principle (ie, notional interest) and the arm’s length nature of the notional interest rate declared by the borrower. However, the Administrative Court stated that it is led to hold that it was wrong to recharacterise the IFL as equity and to refuse to admit the amount put forward as notional interest. Hence, the Administrative Court re-established long-standing principles with respect to the classification of financial instruments as debt or equity (ie, economic approach, substance over form).
The Luxembourg legislation does not include any restrictions on payments relating to uncontrolled transactions. There are only restrictions on the tax deduction of payments, which, in certain cases, like in the case of the interest limitation rules of the EU Anti Tax Avoidance Directive (ATAD), also apply to payments to third parties.
Luxembourg legislation does not restrict the possibility to make payments relating to controlled transactions. However, certain limitations exist on the possibility to deduct such payments from a tax point of view. This is the case, for example, of interest and royalty payments made to entities located in a jurisdiction considered as non-co-operative, based on the list released and updated twice a year by the EU Council. Restrictions may also apply when the anti-hybrid rules of the ATAD, as implemented into Luxembourg law, apply. Finally, restrictions will apply to the part of the remuneration which exceeds the arm’s length price or when a payment is requalified into a hidden distribution. In such case, withholding tax might also apply on the payment.
In Luxembourg, there are no specific rules regarding the effects of other countries’ legal restrictions.
According to the Grand-Ducal Regulation of 23 December 2014 (related to paragraph 29a of the LGTL), advance tax agreements, including those covering transfer pricing aspects – ie, unilateral APAs – are published in a summarised and anonymised form in the annual report of the direct tax authorities. However, in practice, the information published only includes the number of decisions taken on APA requests and whether the decision was positive or negative. Luxembourg taxpayers usually do not rely on the APA procedure but rather on the preparation of robust transfer pricing documentation supporting the positions they take in their tax returns. The very low number of APAs (one single APA in 2023 based on the 2023 annual report of the direct tax authorities) illustrates this quite well.
As far as bilateral MAPs are concerned, the annual report of the direct tax authorities also indicates the number of MAPs launched and closed during the year, including those related to transfer pricing. However, no information is included on the content, outcome, etc. Finally, in line with its commitment under Action 14 of the BEPS Action plan (“Making Dispute Resolution Mechanisms More Effective”), Luxembourg provides data and statistics to the OECD on its MAP procedure on a regular basis, including on bilateral APAs. This information is then analysed and published in the form of a peer review report by the OECD.
Luxembourg does not use secret comparables for transfer pricing assessment purposes.
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As transfer pricing (TP) continues to be a hot topic domestically, at EU level and in the international scene, from Luxembourg and European Union (EU) legislation to domestic and EU case law, in this article we analyse the main TP-related developments that took place during 2023.
Public Country-by-Country Reporting
Background and timeline
Bill No 8158 transposing the provisions of directive 2021/2101 on public country-by-country reporting (CbCR) into Luxembourg domestic law was published on 22 August 2023, in the Memorial A of the Official Gazette under number 532 (the “Law”). As part of EU’s initiatives to enhance corporate and tax transparency and public scrutiny, public CbCR is a global action requiring multinational enterprises (MNEs) to publicly disclose data of their tax activities to different stakeholders.
Scope of application
Who should disclose?
The Law provides for four categories of companies that are required to publish and provide certain information. These include EU-based MNEs and non-EU based MNEs conducting a business activity in Luxembourg through a subsidiary or a branch with a consolidated annual turnover at the balance sheet date of at least EUR750 million for each of the last two consecutive years.
The in-scope entities shall be covered by the EU accounting directive and should be organised under the following legal forms:
Thus, any entity organised under another legal form (such as special limited partnerships – Société en Commandite Spéciale – SCSp) falls outside the scope of the Law.
Carve-out for banks
Considering that groups engaged in the banking sector are already required to publish a CbCR pursuant to the Capital Requirements Directive IV, the Law avoids the double reporting in this sector, by providing a general carve-out, subject to conditions.
What information to disclose?
The public CbCR for the financial year concerned should include, among others, a list of all subsidiaries included in the consolidated accounts, a brief description of the nature of their activities, the number of full-time equivalent employees, the turnover, the amount of profit or loss before tax and the amount of corporate income tax and withholding tax paid.
Omission from disclosure
Luxembourg chose to permit in-scope entities to defer, under certain conditions, the disclosure of commercially sensitive information. In cases where the disclosure of one or more of the required pieces of information would constitute a serious prejudice to the commercial position of the reporting entity, their temporary omission is allowed. Any omission shall be clearly indicated in the CbCR and accompanied by an explanation. Nevertheless, any omitted information shall be published in a subsequent CbCR within a maximum period of five years from the date of its initial omission.
To date there is no administrative guidance as to which information is considered commercially sensitive capable of constituting a serious prejudice to the commercial position of the reporting entity. It remains to be seen whether the Luxembourg Tax Administration (LTA) will issue a guidance and the Luxembourg courts will take position in their judgements.
How to disclose?
In-scope entities shall file and publish the public CbCR with the Luxembourg Trade Register (RCS) and make available its content in one of the official EU languages on their website free of charge for a minimum period of five consecutive years. Entities are exempt from publication on their website provided that the CbCR is accessible to the public free of charge. The entities shall also inform the public by including on their website the reasons for the exemption and by making reference to the RCS website.
Sanctions
Failure to comply with the provisions of the Law may lead to fines of between EUR500 and EUR25,000. A distinction is drawn between the responsibility of the administrative, management and supervisory bodies of UPEs and standalone undertakings, which are required to prepare and publish the public CbCR in accordance with the Law, and the responsibility of the administrative, management and supervisory bodies of subsidiary undertakings and branches, which are expected simply to ensure, to the best of their knowledge and ability, that the public CbCR is prepared and published.
Auditor’s statement
Statutory auditor(s) or approved audit firm(s) auditing financial statements shall state in their audit report whether the taxpayer was required by the Law to publish a public CbCR for the financial year preceding the financial year being audited and whether the public CbCR was indeed prepared and published.
Entry into force
The Law will be applicable to financial years starting on or after 22 June 2024. The public CbCR shall be published within 12 months of the closing of the financial year for which it is drawn up. For entities whose financial year follows the calendar year, the reporting obligation will only start with respect to the financial year 2025 and the public CbCR shall be published by 31 December 2026 at the latest.
Conclusion
The public CbCR will be a supplementary obligation for MNEs besides the existing CbCR reporting that is applicable since 23 December 2016. Given the publication of the information and the managers’ personal liability, a timely review might be necessary to determine whether an adoption of a data capture processes is required.
Master File and Local File Obligations
On 28 March 2023, the Luxembourg government presented a bill of law as well as the related project of grand-ducal regulation (the “Grand-Ducal Regulation”), to reform certain tax administrative and procedural aspects, as well as TP documentation requirements.
The draft Grand-Ducal Regulation on TP documentation provides that there will be a Local File and Master File obligation for Luxembourg “constituent entities” as defined in the Luxembourg CbC law. Therefore, Luxembourg constituent entities that are part of an MNE group having a consolidated revenue exceeding EUR750 million shall prepare a Local File describing the TP analysis of their transactions with related parties.
An additional threshold is also foreseen for the Master File obligation. Luxembourg resident constituent entities with a net turnover of at least EUR100 million or with a balance sheet total of at least EUR400 million, shall prepare a Master File type of documentation.
Both the Local File and the Master File shall be available to the LTA at all times.
The Grand-Ducal Regulation is in line with OECD’s BEPS Action 13 and the OECD TP Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises and Tax Administrations (the “OECD Guidelines”) and provides a list of information as well as the content of the Local File and the Master, which overall is in line with the OECD Guidelines.
The bill of law has not been voted yet. To date, the legislative proposal has faced much criticism, both from stakeholders and the Conseil d’ Etat. It remains to be seen whether the proposal will be adopted, or it will undergo any amendments. In any case, the intention to align TP documentation with the BEPS Action 13 Report is set and taxpayers should make sure that all controlled transactions are supported by ad hoc TP documentation.
Advanced Pricing Agreements (APAs)
Under the same legislative proposal, the government also proposed a draft Grand Ducal regulation introducing a new bilateral and multilateral APA (BAPA or MAPA) procedure, based on the provisions of Article 25(3) of the OECD Model Tax Convention. A BAPA or a MAPA is concluded between the competent tax authorities. While it is already possible to request a BAPA or a MAPA, following this draft regulation, the procedure would be formalised and the application would be subject to a fee ranging from EUR10,000 to EUR20,000.
Proposal on a TP Directive
Introduction
As part of the BEFIT package, on 12 September 2023, the European Commission (EC) presented the proposal for a Directive that integrates key TP principles into EU law (the “TP Directive”). The draft TP Directive aims to increase tax certainty, reduce compliance costs, mitigate the risk of double (non) taxation and harmonise TP rules throughout the EU with the adoption of the arm’s length principle into EU law and the clarification of the role and status of the OECD Guidelines. To ensure a common application of the arm’s length principle, the latest version of the OECD TP Guidelines will be binding when applying it and a common definition of what should be considered a controlled company has been included in the TP Directive.
TP methods
The TP Directive provides the five TP methods already included in the OECD Guidelines. The arm’s length prices shall be determined by applying the most appropriate method and any other valuation method or technique can be applied only if it can be demonstrated that (i) none of the approved methods can be reasonably applied, and (ii) such other method produces a result consistent with that which would have been achieved by independent enterprises. Hence, the draft TP Directive is more restrictive than the OECD Guidelines and the current practice in many member states with respect to the obligation to apply the most appropriate TP method and the burden of proof in applying other methods.
Arm’s length ranges
Further, the TP Directive contains rules on the application of the comparability analysis and the arm’s length ranges. According to the TP Directive, a taxpayer is not subject to adjustment if its results fall within the interquartile range, unless it can be proven that a different point within this range is justified by the underlying facts and circumstances. If the result of a controlled transaction falls outside the arm’s-length range, it shall be adjusted to the median of the range unless it can be proven that another point in the range provides an arm’s length price. This contradicts with the OECD Guidelines, which state that any point within the range (ie, not just the interquartile range) is arm’s length.
TP documentation
Pursuant to the TP Directive, member states shall ensure that taxpayers avail of sufficient information and analysis to prove that their controlled transactions respect the arm’s length principle. The TP documentation requirements will apply to all taxpayers in the absence of a revenue threshold. The EC can also supplement the TP documentation prerequisites by adopting common templates, language requirements, defining the type of taxpayer to abide by these templates and the deadlines to be respected.
TP adjustments
The TP Directive also provides for a mechanism enabling member states to make a corresponding adjustment when a primary adjustment is made in another EU or treaty country. More precisely, member states may not limit the granting of such corresponding adjustments only in the context of a double tax treaty or a mutual assistance procedure (MAP). Pursuant to the TP Directive, member states will have at their disposal a “fast-track” procedure when there is no doubt that the primary adjustment is well founded, or in case such adjustment results from a joint audit. Such “fast-track” procedure shall be concluded within 180 days, without the need to open a MAP. Compared to MAPs, a term of 180 days would be a tremendous improvement. Hence, this fast-track procedure is a very welcome but also ambitious development.
In the absence of a primary adjustment, member states are allowed to perform a downward adjustment provided that an amount equal to the downward adjustment shall be included in the profit of the associated enterprise in the other jurisdiction and that such downward adjustment shall be communicated to the tax authorities of the other jurisdiction.
The TP Directive also provides strict conditions under which EU member states should recognise a compensating adjustment, which is initiated by the taxpayer and differs from the price that is actually charged between the associated enterprises.
Entry into force
If passed, member states shall adopt and publish the necessary laws to comply with the TP Directive by 31 December 2025 at the latest, which shall apply as from 1 January 2026.
On 14 November 2023, it was proposed to amend the TP Directive, among others, by shortening the deadline for its adoption to 31 December 2024 and subsequently its entry into force to 1 January 2025 instead of 2026 (the “Draft Report”). The Draft Report was adopted by the European Parliament’s Economic and Monetary Affairs Committee on 22 February 2024. The European Parliament’s plenary will vote on the Draft Report on 11 April 2024, which will then pass to the European Council for consideration. However, the European Parliament’s opinion is not binding for the European Council.
It remains to be seen how member states will respond to the content of the TP Directive. Provided the TP Directive has formally been approved, member states would have to include the provisions of the TP Directive in their domestic legislation, and both tax authorities and taxpayers may have to adjust their TP practices, which may impact their support to the TP Directive.
Case Law
In 2023, there has been further progress in the judicial review of significant cases involving tax rulings dealing with TP matters.
Interest-free loans case law
Administrative Court No 48125C of 23 November 2023
In 2016, a Luxembourg company financed its subsidiary with an interest-free loan (IFL). The involved companies imputed notional interest applying TP rules, leading to a deduction at borrower level and a corresponding income at the level of the lender. The LTA initially denied the deduction and requalified the IFL into equity. LTA’s decision was confirmed by the administrative tribunal but was annulled on appeal on 23 November 2023.
Case law in recent years has consistently listed a range of criteria, largely derived from parliamentary documents and doctrine, to classify a financial instrument for Luxembourg tax purposes, but also the need for a holistic assessment of the transaction and its economic circumstances, stressing that no single feature of the loan is determining. The transaction should rather be analysed according to its economic conditions (substance over form). In the case at hand, the court applied these criteria to an IFL granted to a debtor by its sole shareholder. The key takeaways are the following.
This decision offers valuable clarifications regarding the classification of financial instruments as debt or equity and is pertinent for evaluating the tax implications not only of IFLs but also various other financial instruments used in Luxembourg. It also offers useful guidance for analysing specific criteria which remained largely open to interpretation.
Administrative Court No 48127C of 21 September 2023 and No 47754C of 14 November 2023
In its decision 48127C of 21 September 2023, the Administrative Court of Appeal criticised LTA’s position in its attempt to reverse the burden of proof regarding the level of interest rates (that should be) charged on interest free shareholder loans. The LTA referred to its 1998 circular that basically prescribes an interest rate of 5% to shareholders’ current accounts. However, the court found that the mere demonstration of the existence of a hidden distribution of profits (due to the shareholder loan in the case at hand being interest free) should not entail a reversal of the burden of proof as otherwise, the LTA would be free to impose any interest rate, however unreasonable. In cases of hidden distribution of profits, to determine whether the transaction was carried out in accordance with the arm’s length principle, the LTA shall accurately define the transaction it intends to requalify and also has the burden of determining the amount of hidden distribution, and cannot merely refer to the rate stated in the 1998 circular, which is not binding on taxpayers. The court applied the interest rate sustained by transfer pricing analyses submitted by the taxpayer, that it analysed as adequate.
Similarly to the above, the Court confirmed these principles for an interest-bearing loan in its decision No 47754C.
Administrative Court No 48281C of 26 September 2023
The Administrative Court, in its decision No 48281C of 26 September 2023, dealt with payments under a total return swap (TRS) paid by a Luxembourg corporate taxpayer (the “LuxCo”) to its non-resident individual shareholder (the “Individual”). LuxCo’s subsidiary in fiscal unity (the “Subsidiary”) distributed to Russia and Kazakhstan pharmaceutical products manufactured in France through Russian and Kazakh related entities, respectively. The group’s beneficial owner was the Individual. The Subsidiary’s role in the chain was administrative, involving the receipt of orders from the Russian and Kazakh companies and their transmission to the manufacturer, as well as the import of the pharmaceuticals into the aforementioned countries. This particular distribution activity that had a high margin for the Subsidiary was not possible without the central role performed by the Individual.
The TRS on the one hand entitled the Individual to 85% of the net profits of the Subsidiary, and on the other hand LuxCo to a small annual amount and possibility to borrow interest free. LuxCo claimed that the TRS arrangement was at arm’s length, remunerating the Individual for his central role and leaving the Subsidiary/fiscal unity with a return that was commensurate or in excess of usual margin as a low-risk distributor.
The court recognised that the margin made by the Subsidiary on the distribution activity seemed high in light of the functions it performed. However, the overall margin on the distribution activity realised by the three related entities in Luxembourg, Russia and Kazakhstan should be allocated among them in an arm’s length manner, and not between them and the Individual, that was not employed by and had not entered into any services agreement with these entities. Instead, the Individual benefitted in an indirect way from the high margin activity of the group, namely as shareholder. Absent any indication of the Russian and Kazakh margin being challenged in Russia and Kazakhstan, there should be no reason to doubt the remaining margin realised by the Subsidiary. The obligations of LuxCo under the TRS being in no proportion with its entitlements under the TRS, the court sided with the LTA and confirmed the latter’s treatment of the payments to the Individual as hidden dividends.
Transfer pricing-related state aid case law
Amazon case law
The case concerned the arm’s length nature of royalties paid by a Luxembourg operating company (the “LuxOpCo”) to a Luxembourg partnership for the use of certain intangibles.
In a tax ruling issued in 2003, the LTA confirmed the arm’s length nature of the deductible royalty payments. LuxOpCo provided supporting TP analysis determining its arm’s length remuneration for the provision of the royalties. The EC argued that LuxOpCo’s tax base was unduly reduced and made its own calculation to determine the appropriate amount of the royalty charge using a different TP method, thus arriving at a lower royalty charge. The General Court then annulled the EC’s decision.
The CJEU, with its decision No 985/2023 of 14 December 2023, confirmed the General Court’s conclusions, albeit on different grounds. In line with its landmark Fiat judgment of November 2022, the CJEU repeated that in the absence of EU harmonisation, taxation remains within the authority of member states, which shall exercise their discretion within the framework of EU rules, including those regarding state aid. CJEU stressed member states’ exclusive right to choose their own tax policy and their own standards, and that the OECD Guidelines are not legally binding if not incorporated into domestic law.
As such, CJEU ruled that the OECD Guidelines could not form part of the “reference framework”, leading to the annulment of the EC’s decision due to an error of law. The CJEU finally noticed that, although the General Court also relied on a wrong reference framework, it results in a correct outcome. The CJEU, thus, ruled in final instance and dismissed EC’s decision.
Impact on other cases and taxpayers
The Fiat and Amazon judgments confirmed that the EC, under the legal framework, is not entitled to enforce the non-binding OECD Guidelines to the extent they are not implemented in national law. Instead, it should focus on the arm’s length principle as implemented in the domestic law of the member states. Note that Luxembourg has implemented part of the OECD Guidelines in article 56bis of the LIR.
The TP Directive discussed above may come to fill in the gap of the binding nature of the OECD Guidelines.
Developments on TP-related audits
Over the past few years, TP has become the main point of attention in Luxembourg taxation. The decrease of tax rulings and APAs has resulted in an increased scrutiny on behalf of the LTA, which has started more systematically questioning taxpayers’ intercompany transactions and the application of the arm’s length principle.
While in most cases the LTA limits itself in requesting the supporting TP documentation for intragroup financing activities, cash pooling and services, some tax inspectors have not hesitated to review in detail and challenge the methodology applied and the underlying calculations performed.
Experience shows that the LTA can challenge easier taxpayers’ intercompany transactions when no TP documentation is prepared. In an environment where more and more tax scrutiny is observed, taxpayers should make sure that all controlled transactions are duly documented and supported by ad hoc TP documentation.
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