In the USA, transfer pricing is regulated primarily under Section 482 of the Internal Revenue Code (the “Code”). Section 482 allows the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) to allocate income, deductions, credits and allowances among related business entities for all taxpayers. The statute itself is brief; detailed rules to govern transfer pricing are provided in the Treasury Regulations promulgated by the Treasury Department. These regulations set forth the arm’s length standard and provide guidance on how to determine arm’s length prices for intercompany transactions. Additionally, the IRS provides other guidance such as revenue rulings, revenue procedures, and agency directives. Finally, there is extensive case law governing transfer pricing.
The basic statutory underpinning of the current regime was instituted in the Revenue Act of 1928; the first sentence of Section 482 of the Code is largely unchanged from Section 45 of the 1928 legislation. Additional statutory language, dealing primarily with intangible property, was added in 1986 and 2017.
In the early 1960s, the IRS began to recognise the need for more structured transfer pricing rules. This led to the first significant developments in transfer pricing. In 1968, the Treasury Department promulgated detailed regulations that included methods (comparable uncontrolled price, resale price, and cost-plus) for evaluating transactions.
The Tax Reform Act of 1986 revised Section 482 of the Code by providing more formal requirements for transactions involving intangible property, instituting the “commensurate with income” standard. This was followed by a 1988 White Paper that initiated a review and overhaul of the transfer pricing regulations. The overhaul was completed with final regulations in 1994.
In 2017, Congress passed the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act (TCJA), which made additional changes to the Tax Reform Act of 1986 (addressing aggregation of intangible property with other property or services). The TCJA also introduced new tax rules that impact transfer pricing, such as the Global Intangible Low-Taxed Income and Foreign Derived Intangible Income provisions.
Transfer pricing rules apply whenever there is a controlled transaction. Section 482 of the Code defines a controlled transaction as “any transaction or transfer between two or more members of the same group or controlled taxpayers”. These rules are primarily concerned with ensuring that intercompany transactions (ie, transactions between related parties) are at arm’s length – that is, on terms that would have been agreed to by unrelated parties under similar circumstances. The transfer pricing rules do not require technical ownership for entities to be “controlled” but allow the IRS to apply a flexible test to determine the existence of a controlled transaction.
Several transfer pricing methods are specified in the US transfer pricing regulations. The options available are dependent on the type of service or property involved in the transaction, as follows.
Taxpayers are allowed to use unspecified methods if they are justifiable and appropriate.
There is no hierarchy of methods established in US transfer pricing regulations. Instead, the “best method” is to be used. However, the method applied may differ depending on the type of transaction or the facts at issue (see 3.1 Transfer Pricing Methods).
The USA does not have set ranges or statistical measures that are used in transfer pricing regulations. However, statistical measures are used in the arm’s length transactions. These statistical measures are generally used to help assess the reliability of CUTs, calculate profit margins, and analyse financial data in the context of the transfer pricing methods.
The IRS requires comparability adjustments to ensure transactions comply with the arm’s length standard under Section 482 of the Code. The Treasury Regulations require that these adjustments account for differences between related-party transactions and the comparables being used. If the differences are material and affect the pricing of the transaction, adjustments are necessary to improve comparability in the intercompany transaction.
The USA regulates transfer pricing of intangibles under Treasury Regulation Section 1.482-4. As mentioned in 3.1 Transfer Pricing Methods, the following methods are used for transfer pricing of intangibles:
Section 482 of the Code also provides that income from a transfer or licence must be commensurate with the income attributable to the intangible property.
The USA applies the commensurate with income rules to all intangibles, including hard-to-value intangibles, because these items may be difficult to accurately value. In cases where an intangible is transferred at a price that is not consistent with the arm’s length standard, the IRS may make transfer pricing adjustments. These adjustments can involve increasing or decreasing the reported taxable income of the parties involved in the transaction.
Cost sharing arrangements (CSAs) are governed by Treasury Regulation Section 1.482-7. This regulation provides detailed rules that define CSAs, set the conditions for their application, and specify how costs and benefits should be shared between parties. For a CSA to exist, each controlled participant must:
That is, in a CSA, the participants divide up the interests in the cost-shared intangible (typically by territory, but potentially by field of use or on another basis). This division is not subject to the arm’s length concept, with interests divided however the participants choose – so long as they are exhaustive and mutually exclusive ‒ and the division generally cannot be challenged by the IRS. However, the participants must share costs in proportion to their reasonably anticipated benefits (“RAB shares”). Further, the participants must make payments to each other for any platform contribution transactions (PCTs). A PCT is the contribution of any intangible that will be used to help develop the cost-shared intangible.
The sharing of development costs and payments for PCTs must generally adhere to the arm’s length principle (ie, the terms of the arrangement reflect those that independent parties would have agreed to under similar circumstances). The regulations, however, provide some specific rules on what is considered arm’s length, even where independent parties would not have reached the same agreement. Most notable among these is the requirement to share stock-based compensation costs. The US tax rules allow for adjustments if it is found that the CSA does not reflect these modified arm’s length requirements.
Taxpayers in the USA are allowed to make upward transfer pricing adjustments after filing their tax returns only under very limited conditions. As a general rule, taxpayers may not make transfer pricing adjustments after filing tax returns. There are exceptions when the IRS asserts adjustments, particularly that the taxpayer may assert a “set-off” adjustment relating to a different controlled transaction between the same controlled entities. Further, once the IRS asserts an adjustment to a transaction, the courts may determine an arm’s length allocation even if that would result in a taxpayer-favourable adjustment.
The US transfer pricing regulations provide rules for both correlative adjustments (adjusting the results for other parties to the transaction adjusted by the IRS to match that adjustment) and conforming adjustments (adjusting accounts to address the portion of a payment that was not at arm’s length).
There are several methods available to the USA to further co-operation in the sharing of taxpayer information across jurisdictions. The USA has signed bilateral tax treaties with numerous countries, creating a vast treaty network. These treaties allow for the exchange of taxpayer information (eg, information related to income, assets, and financial transactions) between the USA and agreeing countries.
Further, tax information exchange agreements (TIEAs) allow the USA to request information from and send information to other countries on individuals or entities suspected of evading taxes.
Additionally, the USA can also operate through multilateral treaties such as the Convention on Mutual Administrative Assistance in Tax Matters and the Hague Evidence Convention.
In certain circumstances, the USA will co-operate with other tax authorities to conduct a joint audit. Although there is no widespread framework for joint audits in the USA, the IRS will participate in joint audits that involve transfer pricing, multinational enterprises (MNEs) and other cross-border tax issues under the established rules for those issues. The USA co-operates in joint tax audits, particularly through frameworks such as competent authority procedures, advance pricing agreements (APAs), and multilateral agreements such as the OECD’s base erosion and profit shifting (BEPS) framework.
The USA created the APA programme. The programme is well established for unilateral (a single taxpayer and the IRS), bilateral (the taxpayer, the taxpayer’s affiliate, the IRS, and a foreign tax authority), or multilateral (the taxpayer, the taxpayer’s affiliate(s), the IRS, and multiple foreign tax authorities) agreements. An APA identifies the entities and transactions that are covered and can be limited to select portions of a taxpayer’s operations. The APA process is set out in Revenue Procedure 2015-41.
The APA programme is administered by the Advance Pricing and Mutual Agreement Program (APMA) group. The APMA is overseen by the Director of Treaty and Transfer Pricing Operations, who reports to the Deputy Commissioner of the Large Business and International (LB&I) Division.
The APA programme and mutual agreement procedures (MAPs) are both administered by the APMA and the same IRS personnel staff both programmes to resolve transfer pricing matters. The APMA is comprised of team leaders, economists, managers, and assistant directors.
APAs are available to US taxpayers for “coverable issues”. Coverable issues include issues arising under Section 482 of the Code and other issues impacted by transfer pricing principles. Examples of other issues include:
The APMA’s acceptance of a taxpayer’s request for an APA is discretionary. In April 2023, the IRS issued additional internal guidance instructing APMA personnel on how to evaluate whether to accept an APA or renewal request. The guidance provides for a new optional pre-submission review process designed to identify roadblocks to successfully concluding an APA and encourages taxpayers to obtain preliminary advice from the IRS as to whether an APA is an appropriate resolution to a taxpayer’s transfer pricing issues.
APAs are generally intended to apply primarily to prospective years but can also cover rollback years (see 7.8 Retroactive Effect for APAs). The APMA normally expects an APA request to cover at least five prospective years and, for a unilateral APA, the APMA must receive a complete APA application by the date the US return is timely filed for the applicable prospective year.
To better co-ordinate the timing of discussions on bilateral and multilateral APAs, a taxpayer must file a bilateral or multilateral APA request no later than 60 days after a corresponding bilateral or multilateral request is filed with a foreign competent authority.
APA user fees must be paid through the Pay.gov website. For APA requests received after 1 February 2025, the fees are as follows:
There is no upper limit on the number of years an APA can cover. The APMA generally requires that an APA application cover at least five prospective years. The APMA aims to have at least three prospective years remaining in the APA term upon the execution of the APA. In its most recent Annual APMA Statutory Report, dated 27 March 2025, the term length of APAs executed in 2024 ranged from one year to 15 years and averaged six years.
As mentioned in 7.5 APA Application Deadlines, an APA can cover prospective years as well as prior (rollback) years. Typically, a taxpayer requests that an APA cover rollback years, but the APMA may consider a rollback at its discretion even in the absence of a taxpayer’s request.
The penalties in transfer pricing cases can be onerous and are either 20% or 40% of the amount of the tax underpayment, depending on the degree of non-compliance. In Section 482 cases, penalties most often result from valuation misstatements, but accuracy-related penalties for understatement of income tax, disregard of rules or regulations, or transactions lacking economic substance can also apply. Penalties do not stack and, as such, the maximum accuracy-related penalty is 40% ‒ except for in instances of fraud, where the penalty can be 75%.
Penalties potentially applicable to transfer pricing cases are provided for in Section 6662 and include the following.
Mitigating Risk of Transfer Pricing Penalties
The net adjustment penalty is most seen in practice. Although penalties can be onerous, taxpayers can mitigate exposure or defend against transfer pricing penalties. Where a taxpayer discovers errors in its tax return before being contacted by the IRS, it can file an amended return. If the amended return corrects the issues giving rise to the tax underpayment and pays all associated taxes, the amended return mitigates much of the penalty exposure. However, in the context of transfer pricing penalties, it is often difficult to anticipate IRS adjustments on audit.
Defending against penalties on audit focuses on pre-emptively maintaining quality documentation. Section 6664(c)(1) of the Code provides that an accuracy-related penalty will not be imposed on any portion of an underpayment if the taxpayer shows there was reasonable cause for that portion and the taxpayer acted in good faith with regard to that portion. The extent of a taxpayer’s effort to assess its tax liability properly is generally the most important factor. The IRS also considers the following factors:
Documentation should explain the taxpayer’s business and its intercompany transactions, provide an analysis of methods and explain why the chosen method was selected, and provide an economic analysis.
The Code provides specific documentation requirements to avoid the net adjustment penalty. Section 6662(e)(3)(B) of the Code requires that a taxpayer’s use of the chosen method was reasonable, the taxpayer has documentation on the application of its chosen method, and the taxpayer provides the documentation to the IRS within 30 days of a request. Treasury Regulation Section 1.6662-6(d) further describes the documentation needed to meet the Section 6662(e)(3)(B) exception to the net adjustment penalty. If a taxpayer meets the requirements of Treasury Regulation Section 1.6662-6(d), it is deemed to have established reasonable cause with regard to a transactional penalty or a substantial understatement penalty as well.
The USA has some limited country-by-country reporting (CbCR) requirements. It does not require taxpayers to prepare master or local files. CbCR requirements apply to US persons that are the ultimate parent of a US MNE and have revenue of USD850 million or more for the reporting period. Under Section 6038A of the Code, impacted taxpayers must file a Form 8975 annually by the extended due date of income tax returns (October 15th for calendar year corporate groups).
The USA views its Section 482 transfer pricing rules as consistent with the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines. The most recent 2022 United States Transfer Pricing Country Profile provided by the USA to the OECD states that “US transfer pricing regulations are consistent with the [Guidelines]”. Although they are broadly in alignment, there are differences between the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines and the Section 482 rules. For instance, the USA does not require taxpayers to file master or local file CbCR.
Section 482 transfer pricing rules provide a variety of specified methods for determining whether an intercompany transaction was conducted at arm’s length. In general, the rules do not depart from the arm’s length principle, but there are certain exceptions where the rules provide some flexibility to minimally deviate from a strict arm’s length standard. These exceptions include certain safe harbours, which are discussed in 11. Safe Harbours or Other Unique Rules. Another example is in the context of CSAs, which are provided for in Treasury Regulation Section 1.482-7. The regulation provides specific guidelines and, so long as the entities’ CSA is within the confines of the regulation guidelines, the arrangement will be considered arm’s length.
As mentioned in 9.1 Alignment and Differences, the USA views its Section 482 transfer pricing rules as consistent with the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines. Tax practitioners are not universally in agreement. Differences in domestic and foreign transfer pricing landscapes are generally resolved in proceedings with the APMA.
At the time of publication (April 2025), the USA’s perspective on the OECD’s BEPS 2.0 initiative, including Pillar One and Pillar Two, is in flux. Prior to the administration change in January 2025, BEPS 2.0 was supported by President Biden’s administration, but not Congress. Currently, neither President Trump’s administration nor Congress support BEPS 2.0. Shortly after taking office, the Trump administration issued a statement that the OECD global tax deal has “no force or effect within the United States absent an act by the Congress adopting the relevant provisions of the Global Tax Deal”. The long-term impact of BEPS 2.0 in the USA remains to be seen.
One entity in an intercompany transaction can bear the risk of another related entity’s operations by guaranteeing the other entity a return, so long as the entity bearing the risk is compensated appropriately for that risk. Provided there is economic substance in the underlying transactions, the IRS will respect contractual risk allocation.
The United Nations Practical Manual on Transfer Pricing does not significantly impact US transfer pricing practice or enforcement. Transfer pricing laws in the USA are derived from the Code ‒ specifically, Section 482 – and the regulations promulgated thereunder, IRS administrative guidance (eg, revenue rulings and revenue procedures), and case law.
US transfer pricing rules contain a few safe harbours applicable in certain specific situations. For instance, Treasury Regulation Section 1.482-2(a)(2)(iii) contains a “safe haven interest rate” for certain loans and advances between members of a group of controlled entities, so long as the rate is not less than 100% of the applicable federal rate and not more than 130% of the applicable federal rate.
There is also a safe harbour for certain low value-adding intra-group services in Treasury Regulation Section 1.482-9(b). This safe harbour provides for the SCM (see 3.1 Transfer Pricing Methods) – under which, low value-adding intra-group service scan be charged out at cost in certain circumstances. The method evaluates whether the amount charged is arm’s length by reference to the total services costs with no mark-up. So long as the taxpayer applies the SCM in accordance with the regulation, the method will be considered the best method and any IRS allocations will be limited in the adjustments it can make. To qualify for the SCM, the service must:
Treasury Regulation Section 1.482-1(d)(3)(iv)(E) contains the rule governing savings that arise from operating in the USA (as well as any other location). The rule does not dictate how savings should be treated but, rather, takes location-specific costs into consideration in determining the degree of comparability between controlled and uncontrolled transactions when evaluating the economic conditions that could affect pricing or profit.
The USA does not have any unique rules disallowing marketing expenses by a local entity that is a licensee claiming local distribution intangibles.
The USA has specific rules governing intercompany loans. Treasury Regulation Section 1.482-2 provides methods for determining an arm’s length interest rate on bona fide indebtedness between related parties. The regulation provides safe harbour provisions under certain circumstances.
There are many other Code sections that could impact the tax treatment of intercompany financial transactions. They are too numerous to cover here, but include Section 163(j) of the Code (limitation on business interest) and Section 267A of the Code (certain related party amounts paid or accrued in hybrid transactions or with hybrid entities).
The co-ordination of tax and customs obligations has long frustrated taxpayers and authorities. Transfer pricing and customs laws and regulations operate in mostly separate frameworks and are not always in alignment. Under Section 1059A of the Code and its regulations, federal income tax law requires that ‒ where related parties import property directly or indirectly into the USA ‒ the transfer price used for income tax purposes generally must not exceed the declared value for customs purposes, subject to certain exceptions discussed here. Specifically, the customs value generally caps the amount a US taxpayer may claim as a basis or inventory cost of the imported property. That is, customs value generally provides a ceiling on transfer pricing valuation for federal income tax purposes. Although some compensating adjustments are allowed, Section 1059A of the Code and Treasury Regulation Section 1.1059A-1 prohibit taxpayers from making upward adjustments to the transfer price after the customs entry has liquidated. Notably, Section 1059A of the Code does not limit the IRS’s authority under Section 482 of the Code and the IRS can determine that the transfer price is lower than the customs valuation if the customs valuation exceeds the arm’s length price.
Section 1059A of the Code does not apply to any portion of the value of an imported good that is not subject to customs duties on an ad valorem basis or has a duty rate of zero. Factors not included in customs valuations include:
All such amounts must independently satisfy the arm’s length standard if they are paid to related parties. These exceptions allow the Section 482 transfer pricing value to exceed the customs value in certain circumstances.
The transfer pricing controversy process includes the availability both of administrative appeal proceedings and judicial review. Transfer pricing controversies are not treated differently from other tax controversies.
Within the IRS there is an Independent Office of Appeals, which is empowered to settle tax controversy cases at the administrative level, including based on the hazards of litigation. In addition to the standard appeals process, other ADR options within the IRS may be available.
If the taxpayer is unable to resolve the controversy at the administrative level, there are three options for judicial review:
Either the taxpayer or the government may appeal a trial court decision as of right to a federal circuit court panel. Further appeals to an en banc circuit court or the US Supreme Court are discretionary for the courts.
There is significant judicial precedent on transfer pricing in the USA, with ongoing development of case law. Challenges to transfer pricing regulations will likely increase given a recent US Supreme Court decision weakening judicial deference to regulations generally.
Some recent court rulings with a significant impact on US transfer pricing rules include:
The USA does not restrict outbound payments relating to uncontrolled transactions.
The USA does not restrict outbound payments relating to controlled transactions.
There are detailed regulations addressing when other countries’ legal restrictions will be respected in determining transfer pricing allocations. The validity of these regulations are currently being challenged in court.
Statistical information on APAs is published annually. The information includes the number of executed and pending APAs, as well as number of APAs by jurisdiction, industry, controlled party relationship, type of transaction, method used, and similar metrics.
Secret comparables are not used.
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www.whitecase.comImpact of Recent Decline in Deference to Federal Agency Regulations on US Transfer Pricing Regime
Given that the majority of US transfer pricing guidance takes the form of Treasury Regulations, recent case law reducing the level of deference afforded to federal agency pronouncements could have far-reaching implications for the future of the US transfer pricing regime. This article examines the new, less deferential posture recently adopted by the US Supreme Court in the context of pending transfer pricing cases and considers the impact on the transfer pricing regime more generally.
In the USA, the transfer pricing rules are governed by Section 482 of the Internal Revenue Code (the “Code”). Section 482 of the Code grants the US Internal Revenue Service (IRS) broad discretion to allocate income, deductions, credits, and allowances among related persons “to prevent the evasion of taxes or clearly to reflect the income” of such persons. Section 482 of the Code also mandates that the income with regard to the transfer or licence of an intangible be commensurate with the income attributable to that intangible and provides high-level standards for valuing such transfers.
Despite its central importance to the US transfer pricing regime, Section 482 of the Code is only three sentences long and provides no technical guidance, including on key questions such as comparability, selection of transfer pricing methods, and similar fundamental topics. Instead, the substantive transfer pricing rules are explained in the Treasury Regulations promulgated under Section 482 of the Code. Although the current Section 482 regulations were introduced in the early 1990s, the US Department of the Treasury (the “Treasury”) has issued regulations implementing Section 482 and its predecessors that date back to the 1930s. The Treasury has also amended and added to the current regulations throughout the past 30 years. The regulations presently in effect are extensive, spanning hundreds of pages, and providing detailed rules to comply with Section 482 of the Code.
Understanding and defining the position of agency regulations in the hierarchy of law has been a persistent issue in the USA, spawning thousands of court decisions and countless academic articles. However, until very recently, the Section 482 regulations have enjoyed the substantial deference afforded to federal agency pronouncements by Chevron, USA Inc v National Resources Defense Council, Inc, 467 US 837 (1984) (“Chevron”) and its progeny. Thus, successful challenges to the Section 482 regulations have been few and far between.
This landscape changed dramatically with the US Supreme Court’s recent watershed decision in Loper Bright Enterprises v Raimondo, 603 US 369 (2024) (“Loper Bright”). Loper Bright expressly overruled Chevron, opening the door to new regulatory challenges. Taxpayers have already begun to leverage Loper Bright to challenge Treasury Regulations outside of Section 482 of the Code (with mixed success) and there are currently two challenges to a provision of the Section 482 regulations pending before different US federal appellate courts.
Chevron and Loper Bright
Under the US Constitution, the federal courts exclusively are assigned the function of interpreting the law. “It is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is” (Marbury v Madison, 5 US 137, 177 (1803)). Even still, federal courts have long afforded federal agencies’ interpretations of the law some level of deference. The courts have given “the most respectful consideration” to such interpretations because “[t]he officers concerned are usually able men, and masters of the subject” (United States v Moore, 95 US 760, 763 (1878)).
However, the level of “respectful consideration” that was appropriately afforded was often inconsistent and unclear. Chevron and its progeny ultimately provided (or attempted to provide) a more uniform standard for courts to employ.
40 years of Chevron deference
Chevron directed a two-step analysis to determine if a federal agency’s interpretation of a statute should be afforded deference. Under Chevron, a court first determined whether the statute being examined was ambiguous. “If the intent of Congress is clear, that is the end of the matter; for the court, as well as the agency, must give effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of Congress” (Chevron at 842–843).
If the statute “is silent or ambiguous with respect to the specific issue, the question for the court is whether the agency’s answer is based on a permissible construction of the statute” (Id). That is, the second step of the Chevron analysis required a court to determine if the agency’s interpretation of an ambiguous statute was reasonable. If so, the “court may not substitute its own construction of a statutory provision for a reasonable interpretation made by the administrator of an agency” (Id at 844) and was required to defer to the agency’s interpretation.
In the 40 years following Chevron, the US Supreme Court and other federal courts added various glosses and exceptions to the basic two-step framework. Arguably the most important of these glosses was a threshold analysis (often called Chevron “Step 0”) of whether “Congress delegated authority to the agency generally to make rules carrying the force of law, and that the agency interpretation claiming deference was promulgated in the exercise of that authority” (United States v Mead Corp, 533 US 218, 226–227 (2001) (“Mead”). Only where there was such a delegation were courts to engage in the two-step Chevron analysis. This generally limited Chevron to “the fruits of notice-and-comment rule[-]making or formal adjudication” pursuant to the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) (5 United States Code (USC) Sections 551 et seq), which provides procedural rules for agency rulemaking (Mead at 230).
Loper Bright’s reversal
The sole question considered by the US Supreme Court in Loper Bright was “whether Chevron should be overruled or clarified” (Loper Bright at 384). The US Supreme Court was clear that “Chevron is overruled” (Id at 412). Loper Bright explains that “[c]ourts must exercise their independent judgment in deciding whether an agency has acted within its statutory authority” (Id). Courts are no longer allowed to defer to a reasonable agency interpretation under Chevron; instead, courts must determine whether an agency rule or regulation is consistent with the “best reading” of the law.
Loper Bright’s holding primarily rests upon the premise that Chevron is inconsistent with the APA. The US Supreme Court reasoned that, while the statute requires courts to deferentially review “agency policymaking and factfinding”, the APA directs courts to decide “all relevant questions of law” (Id at 392 (citing 5 USC Section 706)). The US Supreme Court also reasoned that the fact that the APA directs courts to “‘interpret constitutional and statutory provisions’ without differentiating between the two makes [it] clear that agency interpretations of statutes – like agency interpretations of the Constitution – are not entitled to deference” (Id) (quoting 5 USC Section 706) (internal citation omitted) (emphasis in original). Loper Bright describes the APA as “incorporat[ing] the traditional understanding of the judicial function, under which courts must exercise independent judgment in determining the meaning of statutory provisions” (Id at 394) and concludes that “[t]he deference that Chevron requires of courts reviewing agency action cannot be squared” with that aspect of the APA (Id at 396).
While courts should “use every tool at their disposal to determine the best reading of the statute” (Id at 400), Loper Bright acknowledges that “the statute’s meaning may well be that the agency is authori[s]ed to exercise a degree of discretion” (Id at 394). Thus, agencies may continue to promulgate rules and regulations where authorised by Congress, and the courts are tasked with “recogni[s]ing constitutional delegations, ‘fix[ing] the boundaries of [the] delegated authority’, and ensuring the agency has engaged in ‘reasoned decision[-]making’ within those boundaries” (Id at 395 (quoting Henry P Monaghan, Marbury and the Administrative State, 83 Colum L Rev 1, 27 (1983) and Michigan v EPA, 576 US 743, 750 (2015)) (internal citations omitted) (alterations in original)).
A notable feature of Loper Bright is that, even though the decision overrules Chevron, it expressly does not overrule prior decisions that relied upon Chevron. “The holdings of those cases that specific agency actions are lawful… are still subject to statutory stare decisis despite our change in interpretive methodology. Mere reliance on Chevron cannot constitute a special justification for overruling such a holding, because to say a precedent relied on Chevron is, at best, just an argument that the precedent was wrongly decided” (Id at 412 (internal quotations omitted)).
Post-Loper Bright challenges to tax regulations
At the time of writing (March 2025), Loper Bright is only about nine months old. All the same, federal courts have already cited Loper Bright more than 600 times. Litigants, including taxpayers, have been quick to use Loper Bright to challenge (or more effectively challenge) unfavourable federal agency rules and regulations. Some cases involving tax regulations have already been decided and two significant appeals challenging transfer pricing regulations are currently pending.
Challenges to non-transfer pricing regulations
Taxpayers have not uniformly succeeded in using Loper Bright to challenge Treasury Regulations. While at least one court has relied on Loper Bright to invalidate a Treasury Regulation, other courts have concluded that the regulations before them provided the best reading of the law.
i) Regulation held to be invalid: FedEx Corp v United States
In FedEx Corp v United States, 2025 US Dist LEXIS 48392 (WD Tenn 13 February 2025) (“FedEx”), the taxpayer challenged aspects of the Section 965 regulations providing guidance for the computation of foreign tax credits. The district court considered the Loper Bright decision and found in favour of the taxpayer. At the time of writing (March 2025), the FedEx decision is still subject to appeal.
Relying on Loper Bright’s holding that prior decisions based upon Chevron need not be revisited, the FedEx court first declined to revise an earlier holding that other aspects of the relevant regulations were invalid under step one of the Chevron analysis (FedEx at *17). “Because [this court] never reached Chevron [S]tep 2, it never deferred to an agency interpretation, the deference the [US] Supreme Court deemed impermissible in Loper Bright” (Id at *18).
Next, the court rejected the government’s argument that Loper Bright stands for the proposition that “where Congress has delegated power to an agency to promulgate regulations, courts have ‘circumscribed’ powers of review and must enforce the regulation as written” (Id at *19). Instead, the court reviewed the relevant regulatory provisions and concluded that they “contradict the plain language” of the statute (Id at *20). Observing that “[p]romulgating a regulation that contradicts statutory language is outside the boundaries of the authority delegated to the IRS” (Id), the court ruled that the relevant Treasury Regulations were invalid as applied to the facts before the court (Id at *26).
ii) Regulation held to be valid: Lissack v Commissioner
Lissack v Commissioner, 125 F4th 245 (DC Cir 2025) (“Lissack”) illustrates a contrary outcome. There, the US Court of Appeals for the DC Circuit had previously held that Treasury Regulations promulgated under Section 7623 of the Code were entitled to deference under Chevron (Lissack at 249). The US Supreme Court vacated the DC Circuit’s original opinion (Lissack v Commissioner, 68 F4th 1312 (DC Cir 2023)) and remanded the case “for further consideration in light of Loper Bright” (Lissack v Commissioner, 144 S Ct 2707 (2024) (No 23-413)).
On remand, the DC Circuit “reconsidered the statutory issues de novo” and held that the regulations were a “proper exercise of the Treasury Department’s authority” under the statute (Lissack at 256). The Lissack court on remand began by reviewing the plain language of the statute and concluded that the statute was ambiguous (Id at 257). The court then used customary tools of statutory construction to resolve the ambiguity (Id). Looking to the “IRS’s statutory analysis for its persuasive value” (Id at 259), the DC Circuit concluded that the relevant regulations “correctly interpreted and applied” the statute (Id at 249). Like the FedEx decision, Lissack is still subject to appeal at the time of writing.
Challenges to transfer pricing regulations: 3M Co v Commissioner and Coca-Cola Co v Commissioner
There are currently two separate challenges to the so-called blocked income regulation of Treasury Regulation Section 1.482-1(h)(2) pending before the US Courts of Appeal for the Eighth and Eleventh Circuits. Both challenges are appeals from the US Tax Court.
Treasury Regulation Section 1.482-1(h)(2) provides rules for determining when foreign legal restrictions on payments to related parties will be taken into account in a transfer pricing analysis. The regulation lists criteria, all of which must be met for the foreign legal restrictions on payments to be taken into account, and also describes a “deferred income method of accounting” that taxpayers must elect in order to defer recognition of amounts that should have been paid absent the foreign legal restrictions.
3M Co v Commissioner, No 23-3772 (8th Cir) (“3M”) and Coca-Cola Co v Commissioner, No 24-13470 (11th Cir) (“Coca-Cola”) both involve the application of Treasury Regulation Section 1.482-1(h)(2) to allocations of royalties that the IRS alleged should have been paid by Brazilian subsidiaries to the US parent companies. Both appeals address the validity of the IRS’s Section 482 allocations and, by extension, the validity of Treasury Regulation Section 1.482-1(h)(2).
i) 3M case
The validity of Treasury Regulation Section 1.482-1(h)(2) was squarely before the US Tax Court in 3M (see generally 3M Co v Commissioner, 160 TC 50 (2023)). The court engaged in a Chevron analysis, concluding that the regulation’s interpretation and application of Section 482 of the Code was entitled to deference (Id at 255–288). The court also considered and rejected the taxpayer’s arguments that Treasury Regulation Section 1.482-1(h)(2) was procedurally defective for failing to comply with the APA when promulgated (Id at 288–296). The US Tax Court’s rules allow for a judge’s opinion to be reviewed by the full court. This occurred with the US Tax Court’s 3M decision and the outcome was fractured: seven of 17 judges joined the opinion of the court, two of 17 judges concurred in the result only, and the remaining eight judges dissented.
The court’s opinion began with a comprehensive review of the history of Section 482 of the Code, other relevant statutes (such as the APA), prior regulatory provisions, the current regulations, and relevant case law (Id at 105–245). This informed the court’s Chevron step one analysis, where it concluded that the plain language of Section 482 of the Code was ambiguous as to the correct treatment of foreign legal restrictions on payments (Id at 275–276). The court likewise concluded that the legislative history of Section 482 of the Code did not explain how Congress intended foreign legal restrictions to be treated (Id at 276–278).
The court then turned to step two of the Chevron analysis. The court examined certain of the criteria contained in Treasury Regulation Section 1.482-1(h)(2) and concluded that they represented permissible interpretations of Section 482 of the Code (Id at 279–288). The court declined to examine all of the criteria but, rather, focused on the criteria that the court concluded were not met under the facts of the case. Applying the regulation to the taxpayer’s facts, the court held that the Brazilian legal restrictions at issue should not be taken into account in computing the Section 482 allocations (Id at 298).
On appeal, the parties’ initial briefing was very typical of a challenge to a regulation under Chevron. Both parties argued that Section 482 of the Code unambiguously supported their respective positions. The taxpayer argued that – should Section 482 of the Code be determined to be ambiguous – Treasury Regulation Section 1.482-1(h)(2)’s interpretation of the statute should be rejected as impermissible, whereas the government naturally made the opposite argument. The parties also continued to dispute the regulation’s procedural validity under the APA.
However, after briefing in the case had concluded, the US Supreme Court issued its Loper Bright opinion. The Eighth Circuit invited the parties to submit supplemental briefing, with the taxpayer arguing that “Loper Bright eviscerates the [US] Tax Court plurality’s sole rationale for upholding” Treasury Regulation Section 1.482-1(h)(2) (Appellant’s Suppl Brief at 9, 3M Co v Commissioner, No 23-3772 (8th Cir 2 October 2024)). The taxpayer stated that “[t]he [US] Tax Court plurality never suggested that the IRS’s position represents the best reading of Section 482” of the Code (Id) and urged the Eighth Circuit to adopt the taxpayer’s reading of the statute (Id at 9–10). The thrust of the taxpayer’s argument is that prior US Supreme Court precedent conclusively established that Section 482 of the Code may not be used to allocate income the payment of which is prohibited by law. The taxpayer also renewed its arguments concerning the procedural invalidity of Treasury Regulation Section 1.482-1(h)(2) (Id at 15–26).
The government primarily relied on its argument that the allocation was mandatory under the plain language of Section 482 of the Code, such that the court need not reach the question of the validity of the regulation (Suppl Brief for the Appellee at 2–3, 3M Co v Commissioner, No 23-3772 (8th Cir 2 October 2024)). The government argued that, should the court reach that question, Loper Bright supports the validity of the regulation (Id at 13). The government stated that “courts have long recogni[s]ed” that Section 482 of the Code delegates discretionary authority to the IRS and the Treasury (Id at 15). Given the discretionary grant of authority, the government argued that the court must only “ensure that [the] Treasury acted within ‘the boundaries of the delegated authority’ and ‘engaged in reasoned decision[-]making within those boundaries’ in promulgating [Treasury Regulation Section] 1.482-1(h)(2)” (Id at 17) (quoting Loper Bright at 395). The government then explained how the regulation was consistent with government’s reading of Section 482 of the Code and made arguments in response to the taxpayer’s position concerning the procedural validity of Treasury Regulation Section 1.482-1(h)(2) (Id at 17–31).
Oral arguments in 3M took place in October 2024. At the time of writing (March 2025), the court’s opinion has not been issued.
ii) Coca-Cola case
The issue of blocked income in Coca-Cola was decided after the US Tax Court issued its opinion in 3M. Noting that the court had already upheld Treasury Regulation Section 1.482-1(h)(2) as valid in 3M, the US Tax Court simply applied the regulation to the taxpayer’s facts (see Coca-Cola Co v Commissioner, TC Memo 2023-135 at 14 (“[B]ecause the [US Tax] Court sustained the regulation’s validity [in 3M], we proceed to consider how the regulation applies here…”)). The court concluded that the relevant Brazilian legal restrictions would not be taken into account under the regulation (Id).
On appeal, the taxpayer advanced arguments similar to those offered by the taxpayer in the 3M appeal (see Opening Brief for Petitioner-Appellant the Coca-Cola Co & Subsidiaries at 53–57, Coca-Cola v Commissioner, No 24-13470 (11th Cir 12 March 2025)). The taxpayer argued that Section 482 of the Code unambiguously provides that no allocations of blocked income are permissible and also argued that the US Tax Court’s Chevron analysis in 3M is “untenable” under Loper Bright (Id at 54–55). The taxpayer also raised arguments concerning Treasury Regulation Section 1.482-1(h)(2)’s procedural invalidity under the APA (Id at 55–56).
At the time of writing (March 2025), the government has not yet submitted its brief in Coca-Cola.
Consequences of Loper Bright, 3M, and Coca-Cola
Following Loper Bright, additional challenges to the Treasury Regulations seem certain. Given the less deferential standard that now applies, it seems likely that such challenges will succeed more often, as demonstrated by FedEx. However, such challenges are far from guaranteed to prevail, as shown in Lissack. Loper Bright’s acknowledgement that Congress may grant agencies discretion in issuing rules and regulations will likely be an important feature of any decision.
The ultimate outcomes of 3M and Coca-Cola are unlikely to dramatically change this new paradigm. However, those two cases do present an interesting litmus test for the Section 482 regulations. If both cases are decided in favour of the government, then challenges to Treasury Regulation Section 1.482-1(h)(2) may become less attractive to taxpayers. On the other hand, if one or both cases are decided in favour of the taxpayers, then the regulation may be significantly revised (or effectively withdrawn).
Depending upon the bases for the courts’ decisions, this effect also could apply to the transfer pricing regulations more generally. By way of example, a conclusion that the Treasury and the IRS have no or limited discretion under Section 482 of the Code could call the entire US transfer pricing regime into question. It is worth remembering that both cases give the appellate courts effective safety valves – ie, means of resolving the disputes without expressly passing on the substantive validity of Treasury Regulation Section 1.482-1(h)(2). By way of example, a conclusion that the regulation is procedurally invalid under the APA – while still highly significant – might not reverberate as far.
Regardless, companies with transfer pricing issues should remain aware of the potential for challenging the Treasury Regulations. Loper Bright provides another tool in the toolbox for taxpayers who see their transfer pricing challenged by the IRS. How effective that tool will prove to be remains to be seen.
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