France is a signatory to several international conventions on bribery and corruption, including:

• the Convention drawn up on the basis of Article K.3 of the Treaty on European Union, on the protection of the European Communities’ financial interests dated 26 July 1995, ratified by France on 4 August 2000;
• the Convention drawn up on the basis of Article K.3 (2) (c) of the Treaty on European Union on the fight against corruption involving officials of the European Communities or officials of Member States of the European Union dated 26 May 1997;
• the OECD Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions dated 21 November 1997 (ratified on 29 September 2000);
• the Council of Europe’s Criminal and Civil Law Conventions on Corruption (both ratified on 25 April 2008 with an entry into force on 1 August 2008);
• the United Nations Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime, also called the “Palermo Convention” (ratified on 29 October 2002); and
• the United Nations Convention against Corruption, also called the “Merida Convention” (signed in New York on 31 October 2003 and ratified on 11 July 2005).

France’s main anti-corruption legislation can be found in the French Criminal Code (FCC), where all relevant offences are laid down over different sections depending, primarily, on the identity of the bribe-taker (French official, foreign official, judge, etc). Related offences such as book-keeping fraud can be found in other codes, such as the Commercial Code or the General Tax Code.

The “Sapin II” Law of 9 December 2016 is France’s main legislation with respect to anti-corruption compliance. It has brought major changes to transparency and anti-corruption compliance. These include the following legal requirements and dedicated innovations to prevent and prosecute corruption, while promoting greater transparency in both public and private sectors:

• new compliance obligations for large companies which have more than 500 employees and a turnover exceeding EUR100 million, such as the implementation of corruption prevention programmes, risk mapping, employee training, etc;
• a protective status for whistle-blowers;
• the strengthening of anti-corruption enforcement with the creation of the crime of influence-peddling to obtain a favourable decision from a foreign official;
• the creation of the French Anti-Corruption Agency (Agence française anticorruption or AFA), an independent agency tasked with monitoring the implementation of the above-mentioned compliance obligations; and
• the creation of the French Deferred Prosecution Agreement (Convention Judiciaire d’Intérêt Public or CJIP).

There are no official guidelines for the interpretation of criminal legislation concerning corruption and related offences, which is the role of French criminal courts.

Several public bodies, however, have issued guidelines on other matters pertaining to the enforcement of France’s anti-corruption legislation.

• The AFA has issued general recommendations to public and private actors with respect to preventing and detecting corruption and related offences. In addition to these general recommendations, the AFA has also issued practical guides, which are generally subject to public consultation.
• The Financial National Prosecutor Office (Parquet National Financier or PNF), which is tasked with investigating the most complex white-collar crimes including corruption, has issued guidelines (sometimes jointly with the AFA) on different matters related to France’s anti-corruption legislation. On 16 January 2023, the PNF updated its guidelines on deferred prosecution agreements (CJIP) to bring greater transparency, clarity and predictability to companies considering entering into such agreements. The guidelines clarify the factors taken into consideration by the PNF to enter a deferred prosecution agreement with a company, and the mitigating and aggravating factors taken into consideration for calculating the fine. In March 2023, the PNF and the AFA issued guidelines on internal anti-corruption investigations.
• The High Authority for Transparency in Public Life (Haute Autorité pour la Transparence de la Vie Publique or HATVP), which is responsible for monitoring French public officials’ and lobbyists’ activities, also issues guidelines on matters pertaining to its mandates.

The Sapin II Law has been the most significant change brought to France’s legislation in recent years. Since then, only smaller amendments have been made to France’s legislation, like the 2022 “Wasserman” Law, which strengthened the protection of whistle-blowers under French law.

Both in 2021 and in 2024, a “Sapin III” bill was tabled in the Parliament. However, it failed each time to gain traction in Parliament.

The crime of bribery under French law consists in the direct or indirect offer of promises or advantages for the benefit of a public official or a private actor in exchange for the performance, refrain or delay of an action in relation to or facilitated by their office, duty or mandate. “Direct or indirect” implies that the crime can be committed through intermediaries. Furthermore, the person whose actions are sought does not need to be the ultimate beneficiary of the bribe, which can benefit third parties (relatives, political allies, etc).

The French criminal code (FCC) differentiates between “active” and “passive” bribery. “Active” bribery offences target the briber, while “passive” bribery targets the bribe-taker.

Bribery, whether “active” or “passive”, is committed by the act of offering, soliciting or agreeing to a bribe regardless of whether the bribe is actually paid, or the requested act performed. 

Expenses related to hospitality, gifts, travel, meals, promotional activities or facilitation payments may constitute an undue advantage if they are offered or received with the intention of bribing someone in their professional duties. The offence requires the briber’s awareness and intent to monetise the position or prerogatives of the bribe-taker (general intent), as well as knowledge of the objective pursued (specific intent).

The FCC establishes further distinctions depending on the identity of the bribe-taker. For instance, Article 433-1 of the FCC incriminates active bribery of French officials, while Article 435-3 of the FCC incriminates active bribery of foreign public officials.

“Public officials” under French anti-corruption law encompasses elected official, public servants, as well as any person discharging a public service mission. The French supreme court (Cour de Cassation) has held that an individual is discharging a public service mission where they are required, directly or indirectly, to perform acts in the general interest (Crim., 30 January 2013, No 11-89.224).

As such, employees of state-controlled companies may fall within the scope of bribery of a “public official” under French law.

Bribery between private individuals is also punishable and concerns any person exercising, in the course of their professional or social activities, a management function or performing work for another person or entity (FCC, Art. 445-1).

Failure to prevent bribery is currently not a crime under French law.

Influence-peddling is a crime under French law. It consists in the direct or indirect offer of promises or advantages for the benefit of a person in order for such person to use its real or alleged influence in view of obtaining from public bodies or administrations, distinctions, employment positions, tenders or any other favourable decisions. As for the crime of bribery:

• French law differentiates between “active” and “passive” influence-peddling;
• the crime is committed by the act of offering, soliciting or agreeing; and
• the influence-peddler does not have to be the ultimate beneficiary of the benefits.

The FCC incriminates influence-peddling to obtain a favourable decision from French public officials, judges, members of international organisations, or foreign public officials.

Influence-peddling to obtain a favourable decision from a private actor is not a crime under French law.

Willingly undermining the accuracy of corporate books and records or the reliability of financial information are criminal offences under French law.

Pursuant to Article 1743, 1° of the French General Tax Code, to knowingly omit to record certain entries or make inaccurate or fictitious entries in corporate books and records is a crime which carries a maximum of five years’ imprisonment and a maximum fine of EUR500,000 or up to double the proceeds of the crime.

Article L242-6 of the Commercial Code also punishes with five years’ imprisonment and a fine of EUR375,000 the president or directors of a public limited company for publishing or presenting to shareholders annual accounts that do not give a true and fair view of the results of operations for the financial year, the financial position and assets at the end of that period, with a view to concealing the true situation of the company.

Specific penalties also apply in cases involving the publication or communication of false or misleading information concerning the situation or prospects of a listed company (Articles L. 465-3-2 et seq. of the French Monetary and Financial Code).

These offences are punishable by two years’ imprisonment and a fine of EUR1.5 million which may be increased to up to ten times the amount of the gain obtained.

Embezzlement of public funds (FCC, Article 432-15), unlawful taking of interest (FCC, Article 432-12 and 432-12-1) and favouritism (FCC, Article 432-14) are crimes under French criminal law.

The crime of embezzlement of public funds is defined as the destruction, misappropriation or purloining by a public official of a document or security, of private or public funds, papers, documents or securities representing such funds, or of any object entrusted to them as part of their function or tasks, committed by a person holding public authority or discharging a public service mission, a public accountant, a public depositary or any of their subordinates.

The crime carries out a maximum of ten years’ imprisonment and a maximum fine of EUR1 million, which can be increased to EUR2 million or twice the proceeds of the crime when committed in an organised group.

The crime of unlawful taking of interests is defined as the taking, receiving or keeping of any interest in a business or business operation, either directly or indirectly, by a person holding public authority or discharging a public service mission, or by a person holding a public electoral mandate who at the time in question has the duty of ensuring, in whole or in part, its supervision, management, liquidation or payment.

The crime carries a maximum of five years’ imprisonment and a maximum fine of EUR500,000, which may be increased to twice the proceeds of the crime.

The crime of favouritism targets any person holding public authority or discharging a public service mission or holding a public electoral mandate or acting as a representative, administrator or agent of central government, local government, public establishments, national semi-public companies discharging public service missions and local semi-public companies, or any person acting on behalf of any of the above-mentioned persons, who obtains or attempts to obtain for others an unjustified advantage by an act breaching the statutory or regulatory provisions designed to ensure freedom of access and equal treatment for bidders in tenders for public contracts and delegated public service.

The crime carries a maximum two years’ imprisonment and a maximum fine of EUR200,000, which may be increased to twice the proceeds of the crime.

The FCC provides that bribery and influence-peddling can be carried out directly or indirectly, which covers the commission of the offences through an intermediary.

Furthermore, the FCC provides liability for any person instructing, aiding or abetting any crimes under French law, which are all construed as complicity, and which incur the same penalties as those incurred by the main offender.

Lobbying activities have been regulated in France since the 2016 Sapin II Law.

The “High Authority for Transparency in Public Life” (HATVP) is the agency responsible for monitoring lobbyists and ensuring their compliance with all applicable regulations.

The HATVP defines “lobbying” or “interest representation” as the activity of taking the initiative to contact persons responsible for drafting and voting on public decisions or conducting national or local public action in order to influence their decisions.

All sectors of economic activity may therefore be affected by this regulation.

To be considered an interest representative, three cumulative conditions must be met:

• a legal entity (a director, employee or member) or a person (who carries out a professional activity on an individual basis, for example a consultant or independent solicitor);
• who carries out lobbying activities and takes the initiative to contact public officials in order to influence public decisions; and
• carries out this activity on a principal or regular basis.

Thus, any person seeking to influence the content of a public decision by communicating with a public official must register in the register of interest representatives and declare their lobbying activities and the resources devoted to them.

When registering, interest representatives must provide information on the identity of their organisation (contact details, identity of managers and persons employed for interest representation, clients, etc) and on the subjects covered by their interest representation activities.

“Interests representatives” are required to submit an annual declaration of activity to the High Authority. This must contain:

• the issues on which the lobbying activities focused, in particular their purpose (ie, a description of the issue on which the activity focused) and the area of intervention;
• the type of public decisions targeted (laws, regulatory acts, certain public procurement and concession contracts, local public decisions, etc);
• the type of lobbying activities carried out (organising meetings, sharing expertise with the aim of persuading others, etc);
• the categories of public officials with whom the lobbyist has communicated (members of the Government, elected representatives, etc); and
• lobbying expenses (remuneration, costs related to the organisation of events, expert fees, gifts and benefits granted to public officials, etc).

Offences punishable by up to ten years’ imprisonment (délits) are subject to a six-year limitation period, running from the day on which the offence is committed.

However, for certain categories of offences, the starting point of the limitation period can be postponed:

• continuing offences – where the unlawful situation persists over time, the six-year period runs only from the day on which it comes to an end. This is for example the case of unlawful taking of interest; and
• complex offences – where the actus reus is made up of several distinctive actions, the six-year limitation period runs only from the day on which the last constituent action is carried out.

Furthermore, French criminal law provides that when the offence is inherently occult or deliberately concealed, the limitation period only runs from the day the offence becomes “apparent” (and can therefore be prosecuted). This deferred starting point is, however, subject to a cut-off of 12 years after the starting point of the limitation period and cannot, in any event, be postponed.

In practice and in most cases, the Supreme Court has construed misappropriation of public funds, unlawful taking of interest, bribery and influence-peddling as inherently occult.

French criminal law primarily applies to offences committed on French territory. However, it also has notable extraterritorial reach. French courts may assert jurisdiction in a range of situations.

Offences Committed on the French Territory

French criminal law applies to any offence committed on the French territory, regardless of the nationality of the perpetrator or the victim.

An offence is deemed to have been committed in France if any constituent element of its actus reus happened on French territory. Case law tends to construe the latter broadly. For instance, French criminal courts have asserted jurisdiction in one complex international corruption case based on the fact that one of the schemes had been discussed during one meeting held in Paris.

French criminal law also applies to any act of complicity on the French territory in relation to an offence committed abroad, provided that (i) the offence is punishable under both French and the law of the state where the acts were committed, and (ii) the offence has been established by a final judgment of the foreign court.

Recent reforms have significantly limited the scope of these requirements for corruption and related crimes. French courts may now prosecute persons who, on the French territory, act as accomplices to offences of bribery or influence-peddling committed abroad by a French national, a resident of France, or a person carrying out all or part of its economic activity in France, without the need for a final foreign judgment. The same exemption applies to accomplices in France to certain offences affecting the financial interests of the European Union (including bribery and money laundering). In those cases, French criminal law applies even if the acts are not punishable in the state where they occurred.

Offences Committed Outside the French Territory

As a principle, French criminal law does not apply to offences committed outside the French territory.

In practice, however, there are several important exceptions. French law may apply in the following situations.

• “Indivisibility” – where an offence committed abroad is strongly linked to another offence committed in France. In such cases, a French criminal court will assert jurisdiction of the crime committed outside of France.
• French nationality of the perpetrator – French criminal law applies to offences committed abroad by a French national if (i) the offence is punishable under the law of the state where the acts were committed (ii) the perpetrator of the offence has not been definitively tried abroad for the same offence or, in the event of conviction, that the sentence has not been executed nor time-barred and (iii) prosecution in France is initiated by the public prosecutor, preceded by a complaint from the victim or an official report by the authorities of the country where the acts were committed.
• French nationality of the victim – French criminal law applies to offences committed abroad to the detriment of a French national at the time of the offence if (i) the offence is punishable by imprisonment under the law of the country where the acts were committed, (ii) the perpetrator of the offence has not been definitively tried abroad for the same offence or, in the event of conviction, that the sentence has not been executed nor time-barred, and (iii) prosecution in France is initiated by the public prosecutor, preceded by a complaint from the victim or an official report by the authorities of the state where the acts were committed.
• Specific extraterritorial offences – French law applies in all circumstances to a number of offences committed abroad by a French national, a habitual resident of France, or a person carrying out all or part of their economic activity in France. These include bribery and influence-peddling and offences affecting the financial interests of the European Union (such as bribery and money laundering). In these cases, French courts will assert jurisdiction regardless of whether or not the prosecuted conduct is a crime in the foreign country where it was committed.

Corporate criminal liability may arise in respect of any offence committed on a company’s behalf by its bodies or representatives. Until recently, the notions of bodies and representatives were confined to the persons formally designated by the company and only within that company. Recent case law broadened these notions to include de facto bodies and representatives, irrespective of formal titles or legal ties, even when these bodies operate as group-level bodies rather than within a single entity.

In a famous case dated 16 June 2021, the French Supreme Court reversed its previous position and considered that a holding company could be found criminally liable for bribery of foreign public officials based on acts committed not by its legal representatives but by employees of a branch – who did not even hold formal delegations of authority – and by the holding company’s risk committee. In this instance, the court considered that the corrupt acts were “the expression of a group policy determined by the establishment of a complex organisation”.

For offences such as bribery, influence-peddling and the publication or presentation of inaccurate financial statements, a company may be held directly liable as perpetrator, provided the statutory elements are satisfied.

On the contrary, for offences such as embezzlement of public funds, unlawful taking of interest and favouritism – offences which require a principal perpetrator who is a public official, entrusted with a public service mission, or holding an elected mandate – a private company cannot be prosecuted as perpetrator. In such circumstances, however, a company may still be prosecuted as accomplice, or for benefiting from or handling the proceeds.

The criminal liability of a company does not preclude the prosecution of individuals as perpetrator or accomplices in respect of the same acts.

As a general rule, fines imposed on companies may be up to five times those applicable to individuals.

French law does not provide for specific defences for the above-mentioned offences. However, the gradual expansion over 15 years of the repressive corpus provided for by the French Criminal Code has led to the development of specific defences, reinforced by France’s choice to enact separate legal bases for bribery, influence-peddling or embezzlement of public funds, further distinguishing between “active” crimes (targeting the person who bribes) and “passive” crimes (targeting the person who is bribed), as well as whether the bribe taker is a French official, a French judge, a member of an international organisation or a foreign official.

For example, active bribery of foreign officials became an offence under French law in 2000. However, it was not until the Sapin II Law of 9 December 2016 that influence-peddling to obtain a favourable decision from a foreign official also became one. As French criminal law is not retroactive, it was not unusual in international bribery cases dealing with events prior to the said law, in which financial flows to an intermediary were identified, for the defendants to argue that the prosecution failed to evidence that a foreign official had benefited from the financial flows, and that they were therefore to be construed as lobbying or, at worst, as influence-peddling, none of which were illegal under French law at the relevant time.

Although the French Criminal Code now covers most scenarios, two notable exceptions remain. First, the offence of embezzlement of public funds only applies to French public funds. Second, influence-peddling to obtain a favourable decision from individuals belonging to the private sector is not a crime under French law.

Against such specific defences, French prosecutors have often elected to fall back on other criminal offences provided for under French law, in particular tax fraud and money laundering.

For instance, in a case pertaining to mining rights in Western Africa where prosecutors had identified wires of more than USD10.5 million from the company which had secured the rights to an agent, who was publicly known to be a close friend of the president of the African country in question, but where the facts took place before December 2016, prosecutors dropped the bribery charges while securing a guilty plea from the agent for money laundering of the proceeds of tax fraud.

Money laundering has also allowed prosecutors to bypass the remaining limitations mentioned above, thanks to a creative – and questionable – 2012 decision by the Criminal Division of the Cour de cassation (France’s judicial Supreme Court). The case pertained to kickbacks received by a minister of petroleum of an African country in the late 1990s. He was prosecuted in France for money laundering of bribery, although the crimes of bribery of foreign agent (both “active” and “passive”) did not exist at the time under French law. The defendant argued that no crime of money laundering could have been committed in the absence of a predicate offence under French law. The Paris Court of Appeal upheld his conviction, finding that “the funds, which were deposited into Dan Z’s Swiss accounts before being transferred to France where they were laundered, were compensation for acts he performed in Nigeria in his official capacity; such acts are criminal offences under French domestic criminal law and are classified as passive bribery of a public official” (ie, passive bribery of a French public official, which did exist at the time). This reasoning was upheld by France’s Cour de cassation. In other words, in cases of money laundering in France of the proceeds of predicate offences committed abroad (and usually not prosecuted themselves for lack of jurisdiction), case law holds that prosecutors and criminal courts can reason “as if” the said non-prosecuted predicate offences had been committed in France and involved, as the case may be, French officials and/or French public funds.

In its latest Mutual Evaluation of France, the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) noted about this case: “it is interesting to note that the judges disregarded the obligation imposed on them by the Criminal Code to make precise judicial findings regarding the commission of the principal offence. The absence of a primary offence was glaringly obvious but was ignored” (§ 320).

This solution has since been used in several money laundering cases, including in the high-profile trial of the Vice-President of a Western African country, or in cases where the laundered proceeds came from embezzlement of public funds from foreign countries such as Brazil, Russia or China. In its recent judgment against former French President Nicolas Sarkozy, the Paris High Court acquitted several defendants of the charges of embezzlement of Libyan public funds on the grounds that the crime of embezzlement of public funds of foreign states does not exist under French law, while sentencing the same defendants for money laundering of embezzlement of Libyan public funds.

De minimis exceptions for the above offences do not exist under French law. However, French criminal procedure relies on the principle of discretionary prosecution. With some exceptions, prosecutors are free to choose whether or not to investigate, and, once investigations are completed, to prosecute (either by referring the case to a criminal court or by entering into a guilty plea), to enter into DPAs (for legal persons only), to enter into non-prosecution agreements (compositions pénales, which is however only possible when the purported crime is punishable by a maximum of five years’ imprisonment), or to close the case. As such, the amount at stake is a factor that affects the prosecutors’ decisions.

As mentioned above, influence-peddling to obtain favourable decisions from individuals belonging to the private sector is not a crime, as opposed to bribery in the private sector, which has been a crime under French law for decades.

French law provides that prison terms for perpetrators or accomplices of bribery and influence-peddling shall be reduced by half when they have informed the authorities in due time, and have contributed to halting the offence and/or identifying its perpetrator or accomplices. In 2025, this threshold was raised to two-thirds for international bribery and influence-peddling.

Bribery and influence-peddling committed by or involving a person entrusted with a public service mission are punishable by ten years’ imprisonment and a EUR1 million fine, which may be increased to EUR2 million or twice the proceeds of the offence in the case of an organised gang (432-11 FCC, 433-1 FCC).

When bribery and influence-peddling are committed through private individuals, the offences are punishable by five years’ imprisonment and a EUR500,000 fine, which may be increased to twice the proceeds of the offence (433-2 FCC).

Bribery committed by or involving international public administration is punishable by the same penalties as those applicable to national public officials, namely ten years’ imprisonment and a EUR1 million fine, which may be increased to EUR2 million or twice the proceeds when committed by an organised gang (435-1 FCC).

Similarly bribery committed by or involving foreign magistrates or arbitrators is punishable by ten years’ imprisonment and a fine of EUR1 million, which may be increased to twice the proceeds of the offence (435-7 FCC, 435-9 FCC).

Regarding active influence-peddling involving international public administration, sanctions are lower as they are punishable by five years’ imprisonment and a fine of EUR500,000, which may be doubled depending on the proceeds of the offence (435-10 FCC).

It must be noted that prison sentences shall be reduced by half if, having notified the administrative or judicial authority, the perpetrator has enabled the offence to be stopped or the other perpetrators or accomplices to be identified.

The misappropriation of public funds (embezzlement) is punishable by ten years’ imprisonment and a fine of EUR1 million, which may be increased to EUR2 million or twice the proceeds of the offence when the offence is committed by an organised gang (432-15 FCC).

The unlawful taking of interest committed by persons exercising a public function is punishable by five years’ imprisonment and a fine of EUR500,000, which may be increased to twice the proceeds of the offence (432-12 FCC).

The granting of an unjustified advantage in the context of public procurement or concession contracts (“favouritism”) is punishable by two years imprisonment and a EUR200,000 fine, which may be increased to twice the amount of the proceeds (432-14 FCC).

With regard to accounting and false documents, forgery and use of forged documents are punishable by three years’ imprisonment and a fine of EUR45,000 (441-1 FCC), while forgery of public or authentic documents can result in up to ten years’ imprisonment and a fine of EUR150,000 (441-4 FCC). Furthermore, the deliberate omission of entries or the making of inaccurate or fictitious entries in accounting documents intended to defraud the tax authorities is punishable by five years’ imprisonment and a fine of EUR500,000 (amount which may be doubled to the proceeds of the offence), and seven years’ imprisonment and a fine of EUR3 million (which may be doubled to the proceeds of the offence) in case of organised crime or the use of specific fraudulent means (1743 GTC, 1741 GTC).

Finally, legal entities found guilty of these offences are liable to a fine of up to five times the amount applicable to individuals, as well as various additional penalties such as dissolution, prohibition from directly or indirectly carrying out certain activities, placement under judicial supervision, closure of establishments, or confiscation of property used to commit the offence or constituting the proceeds thereof (131-38 FCC, 131-39 FCC).

There is no minimum sentence for crimes against integrity. Judges are free to determine the sentence within the limits set out in each article of the Criminal Code.

Repeat Offences

The Criminal Code contains provisions on repeat offences.

When a natural person who has already been convicted of a serious crime or offence commits a new offence within a certain period of time, the maximum prison sentence and fine are doubled. This doubling applies within ten years if the new offence is punishable by ten years’ imprisonment, within five years if it is punishable by a sentence of between one and ten years, or when it is the same offence or a similar offence according to the rules on repeat offences (132-9 and 132-10 of the Criminal Code).

In addition, when a legal entity that has already been convicted commits a new offence within a certain period of time, the maximum applicable fine is doubled. This doubling applies if the new offence is committed within ten years of the previous sentence when it is punishable by the same fine, or within five years if it is punishable by a fine of more than EUR15,000, or when it is the same offence or a similar offence according to the rules on repeat offences (132-13 and 132-14 of the Criminal Code).

CJIP

When legal entities enter public interest judicial agreement (CJIP), the fine, which is set in proportion to the benefits derived from the breaches found, may not exceed 30% of the average annual turnover, calculated on the basis of the last three annual turnovers. The National Financial Prosecutor’s Office has issued guidelines which touch upon the assessment of these fines and lists the mitigating and aggravating factors which may be taken into account (see 7.4 Discretion for Mitigation and Aggravation).

There is no general duty for individuals or companies to report bribery and corruption violations.

However, the law imposes such duty on limited categories of persons, namely public officials who become aware of a crime or an offence, companies’ auditors (commissaires aux comptes) and via the money laundering compulsory alert system (mainly on banks and transactions advisers) (Article 40 of the Criminal Procedure Code).

Self-disclosure is construed, along with general co-operation with the investigations carried out by enforcement bodies, as a positive factor when determining a sanction.

For instance, prison sentences shall be reduced by half in domestic corruption cases if, having notified the administrative or judicial authority, the perpetrator has enabled the offence to be stopped or the other perpetrators or accomplices to be identified.

Voluntary self-disclosure is also expressly mentioned in the Guidelines on the Implementation of the CJIP (Deferred Prosecution Agreement – DPA) issued by the National Financial Prosecutor’s Office and the French Anti-Corruption Agency (AFA), as a mitigating factor.

Also, French law offers strong protection to whistle-blowers. These elements are likely to encourage reporting or self-disclosure.

There is no specific procedure for companies and individuals to apply for the information or documentation for self-disclosure.

When a company or an individual identifies facts that may constitute an offence, they may take the initiative to report them directly to the public prosecutor. This step may be preceded or accompanied by an internal investigation or by a report to the AFA.

The status of whistle-blowers was established in French law by the Law of 9 December 2016 (Sapin II Law) and was updated and strengthened by the Law of 21 March 2022 (Waserman Law), which transposed the European Directive 2019/1937 on the protection of persons who report breaches of Union law.

Whistle-blowers benefit from enhanced protection, notably since the Waserman Law. For instance, the list of prohibited retaliatory measures (including, among others, dismissal, demotion, deterioration of working conditions, damage to reputation, or wrongful termination of a contract) has been expanded. The Waserman Law also introduced a new ground for exemption from criminal liability (as set out in Article 122-9 of the French Criminal Code) and established a principle of exemption from civil liability for whistle-blowers.

Whistle-blowers benefit from a protective framework designed to encourage them to report violations.

The internal whistle-blowing systems that the management of certain companies are required to implement facilitate reporting anonymously. Furthermore, whistle-blowers can now address the authorities directly (external reporting).

Whistle-blowers cannot receive direct financial compensation for their report, as implied by the definition of a whistle-blower (a person “who reports or discloses, in good faith and without direct financial gain”). However, the Waserman Law has introduced the possibility for judges to grant an advance payment covering legal costs to whistle-blowers when the proceedings brought against them are intended to hinder their report or public disclosure. It also provides that the authorities may ensure the implementation of psychological support measures for whistle-blowers.

Enforcement of anti-corruption laws is primarily a criminal matter in France, even though if criminal offences cause harm to third parties, civil damages may be claimed either before the criminal court or separately before a civil court.

Enforcement of anti-corruption laws is also an administrative matter when it comes to breaches of compliance rules which do not amount to criminal offences. The French Anti-Corruption Agency is in charge of these administrative controls over compliance issues and may impose certain sanctions in case of violations, including fines.

Criminal anti-corruption laws are usually enforced by specialised bodies, whether prosecutors, police services or criminal courts.

In Paris, the National Financial Prosecutor's Office (parquet national financier or PNF) has national jurisdiction over serious economic and financial crimes including corruption, in all cases that appear highly complex with regards to the large number of perpetrators, accomplices or victims, or the geographical area over which they extend.

Apart from the PNF, local specialised divisions of the Public Prosecutor’s Office handle corruption cases across French territory: either economic and financial divisions or interregional divisions specialising in most severe financial crimes (JIRS).

Alternatively, investigations may be led by independent investigating magistrates, specialised in economic and financial matters or in organised crime.

Corruption-related investigations are generally entrusted to specialised services of the French Judicial Police Department: either national police departments – ie, the Central Office for Combating Corruption and Financial and Tax Offences (OCLCIFF) and its police units – or interregional police departments and units.

On 5 June 2025, the creation of the Financial and Anti-Corruption Squad (BFAC) was announced, resulting from the merger of two emblematic services — the Financial Brigade (BF) and the Brigade for the Suppression of Corruption and Tax Fraud (BRCF). A “digital evidence” unit, led by investigators specialising in cybercrime, will assist police officers in managing digital data and identifying crypto-assets.

If the investigations lead to a trial, then these cases are heard by specialised judges in specialised chambers of the court. PNF’s investigations are referred to a specialised Chamber: the 32nd Criminal Division of the Paris Judicial Court.

The public prosecutor’s office also has sole authority to negotiate and sign deferred prosecution agreements. Once accepted by the legal entity, the agreement is submitted to the president of the court for approval during a public hearing before being published.

Besides the enforcement of criminal anti-corruption laws, the French Anti-Corruption Agency has the power to conduct administrative controls in companies and assess their implementation of the compliance requirements under the Sapin II Law.

As outlined in 3.2 Geographical Reach of Applicable Legislation, since 2016 and the enactment of the Spain II law, French anti-corruption law has extraterritorial jurisdiction over facts committed outside the French territory by persons of French nationality, persons who reside on the French territory or who carry out economic activity on the French territory.

Therefore, enforcement bodies also have extraterritorial reach over facts committed outside the French territories, following the same conditions.

The French PNF’s Office works closely with other European offices such as the Serious Fraud Office in the UK.

The public prosecutor has discretion to adjust the criminal response in bribery and influence-peddling cases, in particular through the CJIP and the assessment of mitigating or aggravating factors. This power is not unlimited: the judge remains responsible for reviewing the penalty when an agreement is signed or when a sentence is handed down.

Several mitigating factors are recognised and cited in the joint PNF–AFA guidelines on the implementation of the CJIP:

• spontaneous disclosure;
• full co-operation with the authorities;
• uniqueness of the occurrence;
• implementation or strengthening of a compliance programme;
• relevance of internal investigations;
• reparation of damages/restitution of illicit gains; and
• internal disciplinary measures.

On the other hand, the guidelines cite as aggravating factors:

• any form of obstruction to the investigation;
• late declaration;
• lack of a compliance programme or inadequacies in the compliance programme;
• repeat offences/previous offences; and
• use of the legal entity’s resources to conceal creation of tools to conceal.

The Airbus matter in 2020 is a landmark case with regards to its international scope, to the collaboration of the PNF’s Office, the British Serious Fraud Office and the US Department of Justice and to the amount of the fine imposed on the European group – EUR3.6 billion.

More recently, in July 2025, former Renault CEO Carlos Ghosn and former member of the European Parliament Rachida Dati were referred to the Criminal Court of Paris on bribery and influence-peddling counts for a trial to be held in September 2026. Mrs Dati, who was also at the time a lawyer, is suspected of having disguised as lawyer fees EUR900,000 she received from Renault-Nissan, in exchange for lobbying inside the European Parliament.

In September 2025, former French President Nicolas Sarkozy, who was being prosecuted for his diplomatic favours to defunct Libyan President Kadhafi in exchange for illegal financing of his presidential campaign, was acquitted of passive bribery but sentenced to a five-year imprisonment for criminal conspiracy.

He has appealed this sentence and will be judged before the Court of Appeal in 2026.

The level of sanctions is the highest in international corruption cases.

So far, the highest level of sanctions that has been imposed on a legal entity was EUR3.6 billion on the European Group Airbus which signed prosecution agreements in 2020 with the French PNF’s Office, the British Serious Fraud Office and the US Department of Justice, of which EUR2.8 billion were paid in France.

Fines imposed on individuals, on the other hand, are much lower – ie, generally tens of thousands of euros.

French law provides for compliance duties to prevent and detect corruption for companies meeting certain thresholds. Pursuant to Article 17 of the Sapin II Law, companies having more than 500 employees, their registered office in France, and a turnover exceeding EUR100 million are required to implement a risk-based, anti-corruption programme.

The law defines eight measures that such programme must implement, including a code of conduct, internal controls and internal whistle-blowing system; risk mapping, and employee training.

The French Anti-Corruption Agency (AFA) monitors compliance with these requirements. It is to that effect vested with auditing and vesting powers.

Although failure to prevent corruption is not a crime under French law, failures in implementing the compliance requirements in question can lead to regulatory proceedings before the AFA’s Sanctions Commission and results in fines up to EUR200,000 (for individuals) or EUR1 million (for legal entities), with the possibility of publication.

French agencies and enforcement bodies have published guidelines and recommendations outlining their expectations for an effective compliance programme meeting the legal requirements under French law.

The AFA has released non-binding guidelines, which detail the procedures for implementing programmes for preventing and detecting corruption. The AFA emphasises risk mapping (identifying, assessing and prioritising risks; formalising scenarios by process; and defining action plans) as the “cornerstone” on which an effective compliance programme ought to rely.

The AFA has also released non-binding recommendations for private companies as well as public organisations. These recommendations deal with an array of issues, including governance and auditability, or the proper implementation of the eight measures mentioned above. These recommendations play a significant role during AFA’s audits.

Beyond the fundamental recommendations, the AFA publishes practical guides that translate expectations into concrete controls and processes.

In parallel, the PNF has its own sets of non-binding guidelines and recommendations, in particular with respect to DPAs’ negotiations and resolution.

Prosecutors may require compliance monitoring as part of a corporate resolution, and courts may impose it when sentencing.

Under Article 41-1-2, I, 2° of the Code of Criminal Procedure, a CJIP may require the company to “submit to a compliance programme for a maximum period of three years under the supervision of the AFA”. The AFA provides supervision and may call on external experts, with the company bearing these costs up to a ceiling set in the CJIP. The AFA publishes a periodic monitoring report and a final report to the public prosecutor at the end of the mandate. Failure to comply with the CJIP may result in its termination by the public prosecutor (with the resumption of proceedings) and the monitoring costs will not be reimbursed.

In addition, Article 131-39-2 of the Criminal Code allows the court to impose a “compliance programme” for a maximum period of five years, again under the supervision of the AFA.

In this case the AFA’s role is to assess the existence, quality and effectiveness of the programme (risk mapping, third-party due diligence, accounting controls, training, discipline, internal control), to carry out on-site work and to make recommendations; it also co-ordinates with the public prosecutor throughout the measure.

Failure by the company’s bodies or representatives to comply with this programme constitutes a separate criminal offence (punishable by a maximum sentence of two years’ imprisonment and a fine of EUR50,000).

In France, the first example is the CJIP concluded by Société Générale in 2018, in which the bank undertook to have the AFA assess the quality and effectiveness of its measures for two years.

More recently, in 2020, Airbus signed a CJIP in which it undertook to have the AFA assess the effectiveness of its compliance programme for three years.

France’s anti-corruption legislation is periodically assessed, both internationally and domestically, by government agencies.

In 2024, the OECD Working Group on Bribery released its follow-up report on its 2021 Phase 4 review. The report assessed that out of the 44 recommendations made in 2021, 13 had been fully implemented by France, 19 had been partially implemented, and 12 remained to be implemented. As regards the improvements highlighted in the report, the OECD Working Group on Bribery noted that France had been proactive in investigating and sanctioning foreign bribery cases while the average fine imposed had greatly increased, in great part thanks to the increasing use of DPAs. As a source of concern, the report listed the statutory independence of prosecutors, which it called to be further strengthened. The report also noted that sanctions for natural persons remain weak, with low fines and prison terms which are often suspended in part or in full. The report stressed that confiscation of ill-gotten assets appear to remain rare. 

Also in 2024, the Group of States against Corruption (GRECO) released it Second Compliance Report assessing the implementation of the 18 recommendations it made to France in the 2019 Fifth Round Evaluation Report. GRECO concluded that France had fully complied with one of its 18 recommendations (pertaining to the confidentiality of advisory procedures with ethics advisers/correspondents and the training of the latter), had partially implemented nine, and had not implemented eight. As far as enforcement of France’s anti-corruption policy goes, the report cautioned that, although additional resources had been allocated (in particular to France’s PNF), France had not done enough to consider that GRECO’s recommendation had been fulfilled.

Earlier in 2025, the PNF released a summary of its activities for 2024, revealing that almost half of its 766 ongoing investigations deal with corruption and related offences. While it noted a small decrease in active investigations compared to 2023, the report stressed that “the number of cases handled by the PNF remains high, with an average of 42 proceedings per prosecutor”.

No significant changes to the applicable legislation or the enforcement are being discussed at the moment. In 2021, some Members of Parliament led a joint effort to enact a new law designed to expand the scope of the current Sapin II law. However, their project failed to gain traction in Parliament. An amended version of the bill was again submitted in 2024.