Antitrust Litigation 2024

Last Updated September 19, 2024

Mexico

Law and Practice

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Aziz & Kaye Business Law offers excellent advice and permanent attention to its partners. Its priority is to add value to companies and their executives, who require top-notch professionals with solid legal knowledge and business focus for decision-making. The firm is focused on strategic work that integrates experienced specialists in corporate, transactional, financial and antitrust law. Its expertise in each of the areas that make up the firm’s practice allows it to accurately identify the obstacles and challenges in the legal and business environment of its clients, in order to generate a practical and efficient alternative that achieves success. The closeness with which it attends to its clients’ calls has strengthened and consolidated the firm at national and international level. Its strategic legal advice model is aimed at all those individuals, companies and/or associations seeking advice and solutions in corporate, transactional, financial and antitrust law.

In Mexico, there is no legislative framework for private antitrust litigation.

Pursuant to the Mexican Constitution and the Federal Antitrust Law, only the Federal Economic Commission (COFECE) and, for the broadcasting and telecommunications sectors, the Federal Telecommunications Institute (IFT), may investigate and sanction anti-competitive practices.

However, individuals may report conduct that constitutes a violation of the Federal Antitrust Law. The competition authority will then analyse the reports or complaints to determine if there are elements to initiate an investigation.

If, after an investigation and trial-form proceedings are concluded, the Board of Commissioners sanctions an economic agent for having carried out anti-competitive conduct, the economic agent may file a constitutional appeal (amparo lawsuit). The purpose of this appeal is to determine whether the competition authority’s actions and decisions are in accordance with the Constitution; specifically whether the decision violates the fundamental rights of economic agents.

Likewise, if the complainant does not agree with the sense of the decision of the Board of Commissioners, they may file an amparo lawsuit in order to challenge the decision of the competition authority.

In this regard, unlike other countries, Mexican courts do not determine whether a violation of the Federal Antitrust Law has been committed.

However, as will be described in 8. Damages, individuals may seek compensation for damages arising from anti-competitive practices by approaching federal courts specialised in antitrust matters.

In an amparo trial, it is noteworthy that for the most part, judges and courts choose to grant deference to antitrust authorities, not going into the merits of the cases. This approach harms the development of antitrust law and the creation of precedents.

In this sense, when there are resolutions favourable to individuals, these are mostly granted on matters of form rather than substance. The authors hope that with the recent changes in US Supreme Court precedents (Chevron doctrine), the courts in Mexico will move away from the deference that, to date, has been given to antitrust authorities.

With respect to claims for damages, notwithstanding the recent approval of the National Code of Civil and Family Procedures, the procedure for claims and class actions has not been modified.

It should also be noted that, despite the possibility of claiming damages derived from the commission of anti-competitive practices, there have been few lawsuits of this type, which have not concluded with a guilty verdict or have not yet concluded, so there are no judicial precedents that have motivated the modification of legislation regarding claims derived from antitrust cases.

As mentioned in 1.1 Current Framework for Private Antitrust Litigation, there are no private antitrust claims in Mexico. The statutory basis for a claim for damages for breach of competition law is Article 134 of the Federal Economic Competition Law. In Mexico, only when legal procedures have been exhausted to challenge the resolutions of the antitrust authorities, is that it is possible to go to the specialized antitrust courts to claim damages.

Thus, it is important to note that only when a resolution of the antitrust authorities is unappealable, is it possible to initiate a claim for damages. This means that there are no private actions.

All cases are heard, without exception, by specialised competition judges and courts.

In the event of recusal or excuse, cases are transferred to a different judge or court, but always specialised in antitrust, through an expedited procedure. It is clarified that it is not possible and therefore there is no procedure for a non-specialised court or tribunal to hear a case in which the Antitrust Law is applied regarding claims for damages.

The NCA’s decisions are not binding on the courts, nor do they create precedent for the courts. The function of specialised judges and courts is to control legality and determine whether the decisions of the Mexican Antitrust Authorities violate the fundamental rights of economic agents.

Regarding claims for damages, the decision of the competition authorities must be considered by the courts as conclusive proof of the existence of the unlawful act. The courts cannot ignore the decision or accept evidence to discredit it.

The antitrust authorities can intervene and may, in fact, legitimately file class actions claiming damages. However, to date, no NCA has exercised this power, which is a matter of concern from the point of view of consumer rights protection. This is notwithstanding the multiple decisions sanctioning cartels or economic agents for abuse of dominance.

On the other hand, the resolutions of foreign antitrust authorities do not have any legal impact on the specialised antitrust courts regarding lawsuits for damages claims, however, in the absence of a sufficient number of domestic precedents, the decisions of foreign NCAs have been used as a “guide” or as doctrine.

There have been few cases regarding claims for damages, and these have not been resolved in favour of the plaintiff or are still pending resolution. Consequently, no judgments have been issued for damages against those who have violated the antitrust law.

In a lawsuit in which damages are claimed for the commission of anti-competitive conduct, the plaintiff must demonstrate the following.

  • The realisation of anti-competitive conduct; an unchallengeable decision of the NAC.
  • The damages derived from such unlawful conduct.
  • The causal nexus – ie, it must be proven that the damage is a direct and immediate consequence of the unlawful act.

In this sense, the probative value of the decision of the competition authority is conclusive – ie, in relation to the unlawfulness of the conduct – and no contrary evidence is admissible.

On the other hand, from the perspective of the authors, there is no legal presumption applicable to claims for damages. Thus, the burden of proof lies with the plaintiff, who must demonstrate, through direct evidence, the damage caused by the anti-competitive conduct and that such damage is a direct and immediate consequence of the unlawful act.

In Mexico the “pass-on” defence is regulated by the Federal Civil Code and the Federal Code of Civil Procedure. These establish that the claimant for damages must prove that the alleged damage was caused to them, that there is a causal link between the wrongful act and the damage, and that the damage is directly attributable to the party held liable by the antitrust authority. Thus, the burden of proof lies with the plaintiff and the standard of proof is high.

For example, it is possible for the defendant to allege that the plaintiff did not suffer any damage as a result of an anti-competitive practice, having transferred the overcharge to the next link in the production chain.

Antitrust authorities have ten years to initiate an investigation of an anti-competitive practice, counted from the date the practice was committed or ceased.

On the other hand, to initiate a claim for damages, there is a period of two years from when the damage was caused, or from when the affected party became aware of the existence of the damage.

This limitation period shall be interrupted from the time the competition authority initiates the investigation and until the NCA’s decision is unchallengeable. 

In Mexico, there is no private antitrust litigation. Regarding “public” procedures, in the experience of the authors, the processing of a case before the Mexican antitrust authorities, from the filing of the complaint to the issuance of the resolution, can take at least three-and-a-half years. In addition, the trial before a specialised judge could take two years and the review by the superior specialised court could take at least one more year. If the Supreme Court reviews matters of constitutionality of the Antitrust Law, it could add at least one more year, and in total the procedures could take approximately seven-and-a-half years.

Article 134 of the Antitrust Law states that claims for damages may be filed until the decisions of the antitrust authorities are final. It is clarified that the limitation period to claim damages is only two years, from the time the violation of the Antitrust Law is committed or from when the affected party became aware of the existence of the damage. However, this period is suspended from the time the antitrust authorities initiate an investigation and resumes when the resolution is unappealable. There is no possibility for the parties to request the antitrust authorities to suspend the proceedings.

On the other hand, considering that trials for claims for damages are comprised of two instances, one before a federal specialised judge, as well as, where appropriate, the amparo lawsuit that is promoted against the judgment of the court, claims for damages may have a duration of at least three years.

Currently, the Federal Code of Civil Procedures and, once it enters into force, the National Code of Civil and Family Procedures, establish the procedural rules for claims for damages and evidentiary issues.

An opting-in system has been adopted – ie, any person who does not join a class action, despite having suffered some damage derived from an anti-competitive conduct, will not be able to obtain any compensation from the exercise of the class action.

Although persons who have not joined the class action may still claim damages individually, the small amount of compensation often available on an individual basis can serve as a disincentive to pursue legal action against the economic agent declared liable by the competition authority.

As noted, there are no antitrust damages verdicts in Mexico to date. However, both directly and indirectly affected parties – ie, any other person, can file claims for damages, provided that the damage is an immediate and direct consequence of the anti-competitive conduct.

The basis for this is Article 134 of the Antitrust Federal Law, which establishes that individuals who suffered damages or losses due to anti-competitive conduct may go before specialised courts to defend their rights, until the decisions of the antitrust authorities are final.

The opinion of the authors is that anyone can file complaints because the legislature deemed it important to broaden the scope for pursuing such cases. Therefore, regardless of the influence of the offenders on those directly or indirectly affected, illegal practices can be denounced, and these do not go uninvestigated.

The Federal Code of Civil Procedure states that the person who exercises the common representation must be part of the collectivity consisting of at least 30 people. Civil associations or non-profit organisations, legally constituted, at least one year prior to the time of filing the action, whose corporate purpose includes the promotion or defence of the rights and interests of the matter in question and that comply with the requirements established in the Federal Code; the Office of the Attorney General of the Republic; and the Federal Institute of Public Defender’s Office may be certified.

According to the Federal Code of Civil Procedure, at the certification stage, the judge must determine whether the claim complies with the requirements established in that norm (for example, the precision of the diffuse, collective or homogeneous individual right that is considered affected and the considerations and facts that support the convenience of substantiation by collective means instead of individual action).

Also, during this stage, the judge must analyse whether or not certain legitimation requirements were met, for example: (i) whether the acts complained of have harmed the consumer due to anti-competitive conduct based on the resolution issued by the antitrust authorities; (ii) whether there is a coincidence between the object of the action brought and the affectation suffered; and (iii) whether the action is not time-barred.

If the judge determines that these requirements have not been met, the class action will be dismissed.

A collective action may be brought by a community, such as consumers, or by companies, who were directly or indirectly affected, namely direct competitors or companies in the value chain.

In Mexico, there is only one Antitrust Law, the Federal Economic Competition Law, which it is applicable to the entire national territory and only the Federal Economic Competition Commission and the Federal Telecommunications Institutes have jurisdiction over antitrust cases.

The Antitrust Law addresses concentrations (M&A), anti-competitive practices (abuses of dominance and cartel activity), investigations to determine the existence of essential inputs and barriers to competition, as well as conditions of effective competition. It also includes provisions for issuing opinions on cross-participation and for the participation in public tenders.

According to the Mexican Constitution, the only means of defence against the Antitrust Law and the acts of the antitrust authorities is provided for by the Amparo Law, through amparo proceedings before specialised judges and courts.

On the other hand, as mentioned above, only federal specialised antitrust courts can hear claims for damages arising from anti-competitive behaviour.

The applicable laws for processing the lawsuit and deciding on the merits are the Federal Civil Code and the Federal Code of Civil Procedures.

In the Mexican Antitrust Law, there are no discovery procedures, however, in the experience of the authors, and following the US authorities’ practice, the competition authorities, informally, have initiated requests with the characteristics of a discovery.

The attempts of the antitrust authorities to carry out discovery proceedings have not succeeded, since the law firms of the economic agents have successfully exercised the defence that discovery does not exist in Mexican law.

For their part, in proceedings in which damages are claimed, the parties may request the courts to require documents in the possession of any person, subject to certain limitations. This is as long as (i) they are not protected by professional secrecy or are communications that are considered private and, (ii) such communications are related to the claim for damages.

Legal professional privilege is a constitutional right, provided for in Article 16 of the Mexican Constitution.

However, one of the two competition authorities, specifically the Federal Economic Competition Commission, has issued provisions that seek to regulate this constitutional and human right. These provisions establish a procedure through which it is determined whether certain documents that are requested, or that were obtained during a verification visit, are indeed protected by professional secrecy.

As far as it is public and the authors are aware, this regulation has not been challenged in the constitutional courts and it remains pending for the Supreme Court of Justice of the Nation to determine if that authority has the power to issue such regulation.

Regarding claims procedures, the Federal Code of Civil Procedure provides that those individuals required to maintain professional secrecy are not obliged to present documents related to the party with respect to whom the professional privilege exists.

Leniency and/or settlement agreements are protected in the Antitrust Law and in the guidelines and regulations that the antitrust authorities have issued. However, there have been situations, especially when other authorities are involved, such as prosecutors’ offices responsible for investigating the commission of crimes or those responsible for combating corruption, in which the identity of leniency agreements has been revealed. Therefore, antitrust authorities should be pressured to properly safeguard the information of those seeking immunity, when they provide information to other authorities.

However, under Mexican law, proving crimes related to violations of the Antitrust Law requires a higher standard of proof than that required to prove a violation of the Antitrust Law.

Testimonies are subject to examination and cross-examination. If someone refuses to testify, without reasonable cause, they may be fined or even subject to administrative arrest. 

While there are certain parameters for factual witnesses to be considered reliable, it is generally necessary for testimony to be bolstered by the existence of other evidence for factual witnesses to support liability for antitrust violations.

Since the Mexican Antitrust Law provides for the opinions of expert witnesses as evidence, in the authors’ experience, in 99% of cases, the Mexican antitrust authorities do not validate expert testimony. It is not taken as evidence that can contribute to demonstrate the arguments of the investigated party or that aims to prove its point.

These testimonies are submitted in writing and in response to questions from companies and antitrust authorities and prosecutors.

In court, experts (who must only prove that they are experts in the field), present their testimonies separately and there are no alternative methods for presenting expert evidence.

In Mexico, there are no verdicts for damages, either in individual actions or in class actions. In addition to the above, exemplary or punitive damages are not available in current Mexican laws.

However, in civil matters, there is at least one precedent in which the Supreme Court of Justice of the Nation condemned a company with the payment of punitive damages, so there is the possibility that in antitrust matters, this criterion of the Supreme Court is applied as an exceptional measure in those cases that are considered particularly harmful (as may be the case with cartels).

Mexican laws do not provide for the payment of interest, nor is it known what the criteria of the courts are, since in Mexico there have been no verdicts for damages derived from violations of the Antitrust Law.

However, the authors believe that there is a possibility that the amounts for damages that have been generated must be updated due to the passage of time, in order to bring to present value the damages that the anti-competitive conduct has generated.

Liability is not solidary. It is interesting to note that in the case of the liability of applicants for immunity, this is only reduced by the fine and criminal immunity. However, immunity does not prevent its applicants from being sued for damages, nor is any type of discount applied to this amount, on the grounds that the offender has been granted immunity.

There is no legal basis/procedure for claiming contributions from third parties in Mexican law, nor is there clarity on the criteria used by the courts, as there have been no judgments for damages related to violations of the Antitrust Law in Mexico.

The Antitrust Law and Regulations to the Antitrust Authorities Act, provide for injunctive relief measures during the investigation.

In the judicial procedure for claiming damages, provisions are made for precautionary measures, such as the attachment and seizure of property and conditions necessary to preserve the claim and ensure the effective execution of the judgment, provided that:

  • things remain in the state in which they were on the date of service of the order;
  • the public order and interest or that of third parties are not affected; and
  • rights are not constituted in favour of the applicant, equivalent to those that would be obtained in the case of obtaining a favourable final judgment. This includes, in addition to the possible debtor, those who have the quality of partners and administrators of other people’s assets.

There are no alternative methods to resolve disputes for damages, however, there are some authors who point out the possibility of resorting to arbitration.

In no way will alternative dispute resolution methods be considered as mandatory when deriving from a non-contractual liability, that is, for the violation of antitrust law.

There is no litigation funding in Mexican law. However, in certain cases the payment of expenses and costs may be requested from the party who lost the trial for a claim for damages.

Whether the payment of costs can be awarded is determined in the respective judgment. The need to guarantee expenses and costs is not specifically foreseen in advance. The amount of costs can be determined based on the fee established by law, or based on the fees that the prevailing party has paid to its attorneys during the trial of claim for damages.

In effect, the challenge of the decisions of the Antitrust Authorities is made through the amparo trial before federal specialised judges and courts (appeal through review appeal).

On the other hand, appeals for damages are reviewed by appellate courts, which will only determine whether the respective judgment adequately analysed the existence of the damage, the causal link between the violation of the antitrust law and, if so, whether the amount of the sentence was properly determined. Subsequently, the parties have the possibility of challenging this decision via amparo proceedings, so that a higher court may analyse the constitutionality of the appeal resolution; an amparo trial that, under certain conditions, may be heard by the Supreme Court of Justice of the Nation.

It is expected that the process for electing Supreme Court justices, magistrates and judges will be reformed, potentially allowing them to be elected by citizen vote. The impact of the reform in the designation process is uncertain, but it will be closely monitored, as it requires individuals with sufficient knowledge to determine the existence of damages derived from such a complex matter as economic competition.

Regarding Antitrust Law and its regulations, practising lawyers are waiting for the issuance of a sufficient number of criteria and regulatory provisions that provide certainty, for example, in the determination of relevant markets, market power, etc.

No specific matters focused on digital markets, for the claim of damages for cartel or abuse of dominance are currently foreseen. However, there are ongoing investigations in digital markets that could lead to damages claims in both Mexico and the USA.

Aziz & Kaye Business Law

Paseo de la Reforma 2620-304
Lomas Altas
Miguel Hidalgo
Ciudad de México
11950
Mexico

+52 555 985 6605

+52 555 985 6605

administración@azizkaye.com www.azizkaye.com
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Trends and Developments


Authors



Mijares, Angoitia, Cortés y Fuentes, S.C. was founded in 1994, and has established itself as a leading firm in the Mexican legal market. With a team of highly qualified lawyers, it focuses on providing professional legal services of the highest quality to meet its clients’ business needs. Over the past 30 years, it has built a reputation for excellence and responsiveness, making it one of the most prominent and best-recognised law firms in the country. The firm consists of a fully integrated and fast-growing team of business lawyers, accountants, and professionals offering a wide range of legal services. Many of the firm’s lawyers and professionals have completed graduate studies at foreign universities and have worked at law firms in the US or UK, giving it a broad perspective on international legal systems and its clients’ needs. The firm leads the legal field in Mexico with indisputable excellence.

Mexico’s Possible New Competition Landscape

Following the overwhelming win by the ruling party in the 2024 Mexican general elections, President Lopez Obrador’s ongoing effort to dissolve the autonomous constitutional agencies through a constitutional amendment is expected to pass in the newly elected Congress and States legislatures (the “Constitutional Amendment”). The proposed amendments include eliminating the two Mexican competition agencies, the Federal Economic Competition Commission (COFECE) and the Federal Institute of Telecommunications (IFT).

The Constitutional Amendment intends to transfer the functions of COFECE and IFT to the Executive Branch, specifically, to the Ministry of the Economy and the Ministry of Communications, respectively. These changes would create a new landscape for the legal framework in Mexico, revisiting the centralised administration model that was in force from the enactment of Mexico’s Competition Law (the “Previous Law”) in 1992 until 2014, and subsequently, when the current Competition Law entered into force (the “Law”).

Ten years ago, Mexico was celebrating the creation of autonomous and independent competition authorities. Since then, neither the President nor political bodies could question or modify their decisions. This may no longer be the case.

The potential loss of the status of COFECE and IFT as autonomous constitutional bodies raises significant concerns. Constitutional autonomy has been critical in allowing both agencies to make impartial decisions, free from political and economic pressures. Without this autonomy, there is a risk that this independence could be compromised, leading to increased susceptibility to external influences. Such a shift could undermine the credibility of work in the competition field and weaken Mexico’s competitive landscape.

This Article delves into the main changes and effects to be expected from the Constitutional Amendment and open items yet to be determined once the amendments to the Law or issuance of a new legal framework is enacted by Congress.

Politics Behind the Scenes

President Lopez Obrador’s longstanding campaign to dismantle the Mexican autonomous constitutional bodies has been justified on two primary grounds: their cost and their functions (more specifically, the alleged duplication of functions and lack of effectiveness).

According to the Constitutional Amendment, these bodies impose unnecessary costs on the government, with resources being squandered in bureaucratic schemes consisting of bonuses, economic privileges, and benefits for public servants, all of which are seen as detrimental to the population. The argument is that, in President Lopez Obrador’s view, the functions of these agencies could be handled by existing departments within the Executive Branch, without the need for specialised and technical bodies’ dedicated to competition, telecommunications and broadcasting, transparency, and hydrocarbons. The Constitutional Amendment bill does not provide any elements that allow a verification of whether recentralising the functions of COFECE and IFT will render any savings.

In addition, the initiative suggests that these agencies were established primarily for the benefit of private companies (vis-à-vis state-owned companies), thereby increasing the influence of certain private actors to the detriment of Mexican public entities and the State’s capacity to guarantee public welfare.

The above-mentioned reasons and the country’s political context – including the explicit references in the Bill arguing that certain decisions by COFECE have affected state-owned companies – suggest that the Constitutional Amendment seeks to allow the Executive Branch influence over competition law matters which would in turn hinder technical analysis and add political considerations to decision-making. This is to avoid friction between the Executive Branch and COFECE such as that which resulted from COFECE’s multiple opinions since 2020 reflecting a concern about certain energy sector policies to strengthen the state-owned companies Pemex and CFE and distort competition.

Potential Red Flags in the Amendment

In 2013, the Mexican Federal Constitution was amended to, inter alia, enact the Law; create COFECE and IFT as autonomous constitutional agencies with the authority to issue regulations under the Law; give new powers to the antitrust agencies to be further detailed in the Law; and eliminate the possibility of challenging the antitrust agencies’ decisions by administrative means (ie, the motion of reconsideration).

The Constitutional Amendment’s only modification of the amendment of 2013 – concerning the antitrust legal framework – is to eliminate COFECE and IFT and transfer their powers to the Ministries of the Economy and Communications, respectively. Accordingly, the Constitutional Amendment does not modify the additional enforcement powers created in 2013, including the possibility of determining the existence of essential facilities and barriers to competition and imposing regulations to tackle them, or the possibility of only challenging antitrust decisions through an amparo lawsuit – a constitutional trial where the claimant argues before a federal district court that an authority’s action is unconstitutional – which remain intact and, if not modified, could result in the potential major interference of the state in the competitive landscape of the market.

The Constitutional Amendment assumes that this unprecedented shift of authority can be smoothly achieved by a mere transfer of functions between governmental bodies, without considering any further legal implications. Furthermore, the Bill and discussion process of the Constitutional Amendment does not provide any guidelines as to how the transfer will occur and how the intended savings will be achieved.

For instance, it is as yet unclear which specific department within the Ministry of the Economy will assume COFECE’s functions, including its internal departments. President Lopez Obrador has stated that COFECE’s public servants will be absorbed by the Ministry of Economy, but the tenure of COFECE’s Board of Commissioners will end. From a public policy perspective, in the absence of autonomous constitutional bodies, it may be preferable to have collegiate decision-making bodies within the ministries that ensure a better assessment of cases, and thus the creation of commissions within the ministries would be preferable to having a single public servant (eg, the Minister) deciding unilaterally.

While the Constitutional Amendment mentions that Congress and the Executive Branch will issue the respective legal and administrative framework, it is silent on whether a new competition law will be issued. If not abrogated, the Law will need to be substantially modified to give consistency to the proposed changes, at least in the section that currently determines the main structure of COFECE and IFT. Moreover, the regulatory framework of the Law currently in force is the regulations issued by COFECE and IFT, which will certainly be abrogated and substituted by regulations to be issued by the Executive Branch.

Another key concern is whether, without an autonomous competition agency, the powers of the investigative authority – which arose from the need to ensure due process in competition proceedings without the agency being both judge and party – may now be compromised with the centralisation of functions. It remains to be seen if adequate measures will be implemented to maintain the necessary separation between prosecutorial and adjudicatory functions within the Ministries of the Economy and Communications.

At this stage, it has not yet been proposed to eliminate substantive items and defence mechanisms created with the 2013 constitutional amendment, such as the concepts of essential facilities and barriers to competition, challenging decisions through the constitutional procedure (amparo), without suspension of the decision being challenged, before specialised courts, among others. Notwithstanding the foregoing, the proposed Constitutional Amendment is still subject to modifications by the Mexican Congress, hence a greater degree of definition is expected in the near future.

There is also a concern about the compatibility of the Constitutional Amendment with the United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement (USMCA). The initiative mentions that it does not have an adverse impact on the USMCA since it does not fail to guarantee free competition. However, the situation may be more complex.

Chapter 21 of the USMCA requires the existence of governmental bodies that secure equal and due process, meaning that an independent competition authority is needed, although it does not require a specific institutional design. Furthermore, Chapter 22 calls for equal impartiality and competition between private and state-owned companies to prevent the latter from gaining any undue advantage.

However, as noted above, any form of centralisation in the Executive Branch threatens institutional independence. The challenge will be to define how the required independence and impartiality will be preserved to ensure compliance with the USMCA, and what procedural safeguards will be put in place to maintain confidence in the Mexican competition system.

With respect to IFT, Chapter 18 specifically establishes that for Mexico, the telecommunications regulatory body is autonomous from the Executive Branch of government, is independent regarding its decisions and functioning, and has the purpose of regulating and promoting competition and efficient development of telecommunications, as set out in existing Mexican law.

Will the coming revisions to the USMCA address these issues?

Beyond the Constitutional Amendment: Collective Damages Claims, Non-compete Provisions and More

In recent years, COFECE has focused on promoting collective damages claims, identifying and penalising, for example, possible “gun-jumping” cases, and scrutinising non-compete and non-poaching provisions.

Earlier this year, COFECE’s Chairperson, Andrea Marvan, stated that COFECE was about to file the first damages claim against Mexican companies and their representatives for cartel behaviour and that it was also working on collective actions. As of now, there is no public information on these statements.

While COFECE is empowered to initiate collective actions, it has acknowledged that these powers have been underutilised or entirely overlooked. However, COFECE’s recent intention to give priority to a set of actions in 2024, leveraging its legal powers, including the creation of a strategy to file complaints continuously and consistently, with the aim of collaborating closely with the Attorney General’s Office, is clearly signalling its commitment to protect the interests of affected consumers, seek restitution for any harm done, and send a strong message that it will not tolerate practices that harm citizens.

Another critical area on COFECE’s agenda is detecting and fining “gun-jumping” infringements. COFECE’s scrutiny of past transactions has increased exponentially over the last few years. This is reflected in both the increasing number of verification process files to detect potential “gun-jumping” cases (in 2019 only one investigation was opened, whereas in 2023, five investigations were opened), and the increasing number of questions from past transactions raised by COFECE while assessing a new matter.

A concentration notice is a preventive procedure that requires fulfilling a set of obligations. It begins with the submission of a merger notification and concludes with a ruling by COFECE’s Board of Commissioners, which may approve, object to, or conditionally authorise the transaction. Specifically, the Law requires that parties must wait to obtain approval before closing a transaction.

However, given that competition involves highly specific technical, economic, and legal knowledge, there are several reasons why economic agents fail to give notice of transactions. Among the main reasons are a misunderstanding of the merger control thresholds and requirements, as well as the execution of complex transactions without proper legal guidance. Additionally, many companies are unaware that if COFECE has already approved a transaction, the parties must adhere to the terms of the ruling, as any deviation may result in fines.

Finally, following international experience, COFECE has been recently very active in analysing in detail non-compete and non-poaching provisions, sparking debates over their validity and the extent to which they may stifle competition.

In case the Constitutional Amendment enters into force, it is yet to be seen whether the new competition watchdogs will continue focusing on these topics or will pursue different priorities.

Final Remarks

The dissolution of COFECE and IFT, and the transfer of their functions to the Ministries of the Economy and Communications, respectively, would introduce the risk of increased political influence in the decision-making process. This shift could compromise the impartiality and effectiveness of competition regulation, potentially undermining the progress made in promoting fair competition in Mexico. For example, this may be particularly relevant in cases involving barriers to competition or injunctions or stay orders in amparo proceedings.

The lack of clarity in the proposed amendments regarding the implementation of these changes further exacerbates these concerns, leaving critical questions unanswered about the future structure and operations of the country’s competition framework.

Moreover, the compatibility of these changes with Mexico’s international obligations, particularly under the USMCA, remains uncertain. The centralisation of competition authority in the Executive Branch could challenge the independence and impartiality required under the agreement, potentially leading to disputes with trade partners.

In light of these possible developments, the future of competition enforcement in Mexico appears uncertain. The possible new landscape may give priority to different regulatory objectives, potentially shifting away from the rigorous enforcement seen under COFECE’s tenure. The potential rollback of key protections and enforcement mechanisms could have lasting implications for market dynamics and consumer welfare in Mexico.

In case the country embarks on this new path, it will be crucial to monitor the implementation of these reforms closely. Ensuring that competition regulation remains robust, transparent, and free from undue influence will be vital to preserving the integrity of Mexico’s competition landscape. Whether the Ministries will rise to the challenge of maintaining the standards set by their predecessors or whether the centralisation will lead to a dilution of enforcement effectiveness is yet to be seen.

Finally, separately from the Constitutional Amendment, COFECE is currently focusing on promoting collective damages claims, identifying and penalising potential cases of “gun-jumping”, and closely scrutinising non-compete and non-poaching provisions. Therefore, it is essential to proceed with caution in these matters.

Mijares Angoitia Cortés y Fuentes S.C.

Javier Barros Sierra 540
4th floor, Park Plaza I
Santa Fe, Álvaro Obregón, C.P
01210
Mexico City
Mexico

+52 55 5201 7400

comunicacion@macf.com.mx www.mijares.mx
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Law and Practice

Authors



Aziz & Kaye Business Law offers excellent advice and permanent attention to its partners. Its priority is to add value to companies and their executives, who require top-notch professionals with solid legal knowledge and business focus for decision-making. The firm is focused on strategic work that integrates experienced specialists in corporate, transactional, financial and antitrust law. Its expertise in each of the areas that make up the firm’s practice allows it to accurately identify the obstacles and challenges in the legal and business environment of its clients, in order to generate a practical and efficient alternative that achieves success. The closeness with which it attends to its clients’ calls has strengthened and consolidated the firm at national and international level. Its strategic legal advice model is aimed at all those individuals, companies and/or associations seeking advice and solutions in corporate, transactional, financial and antitrust law.

Trends and Developments

Authors



Mijares, Angoitia, Cortés y Fuentes, S.C. was founded in 1994, and has established itself as a leading firm in the Mexican legal market. With a team of highly qualified lawyers, it focuses on providing professional legal services of the highest quality to meet its clients’ business needs. Over the past 30 years, it has built a reputation for excellence and responsiveness, making it one of the most prominent and best-recognised law firms in the country. The firm consists of a fully integrated and fast-growing team of business lawyers, accountants, and professionals offering a wide range of legal services. Many of the firm’s lawyers and professionals have completed graduate studies at foreign universities and have worked at law firms in the US or UK, giving it a broad perspective on international legal systems and its clients’ needs. The firm leads the legal field in Mexico with indisputable excellence.

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