In Türkiye, private competition law claims constitute the private law remedies available alongside public antitrust enforcement. These private claims serve a different purpose from the administrative investigations conducted by the Turkish Competition Authority (TCA): while the TCA focuses on preserving effective competition in the market and sanctioning infringements, private litigation aims to compensate injured parties for the economic losses they have suffered.
The primary statutory basis for private antitrust actions under the laws of Türkiye is found in Act No 4054 on the Protection of Competition (“Competition Act”), Articles 56 to 59 of which set out the core provisions governing the private law consequences of antitrust infringements. Pursuant to these provisions, agreements and practices that prevent, distort or restrict competition give rise to legal liability, enabling affected individuals and legal entities to seek compensation for the losses they have incurred.
For many years, the number of private antitrust lawsuits in Türkiye remained relatively limited. The primary reasons for this included rights holders’ lack of awareness of their entitlement to seek damages arising from competition law infringements and the lengthy nature of judicial proceedings. Today, however, the number of damages actions being brought is steadily increasing.
One of the most critical aspects of private antitrust practice in Türkiye is that a finding of infringement by the TCA is considered a prerequisite for filing a compensation lawsuit. Indeed, as emphasised by the 3rd Civil Chamber of the Court of Appeals, for a court to award damages resulting from a restriction of competition, the violation of the Competition Act must first be established by a final decision of the TCA (Judgment dated 15 January 2024 and numbered E.2023/2234, K.2024/174). Similarly, the 45th Civil Chamber of the Istanbul Regional Court of Justice stated that an infringement decision by the TCA – as the specialised authority – is decisive in establishing whether an inter-undertaking relationship is unlawful (Judgment dated 18 December 2024 and numbered E.2024/833, K.2024/1690).
However, requiring a decision from the TCA does not mean that the harmed plaintiff must have personally filed a complaint before the TCA prior to bringing a lawsuit. In other words, even if the plaintiff is not the party who reported the infringement to the TCA, they can directly apply to the court for damages; neither the Competition Act nor general provisions set a prior application to the TCA as a mandatory condition for filing a lawsuit. As stated by the 11th Civil Chamber of the Court of Appeals, as long as a TCA decision establishing the infringement exists or has become final, any third party who suffered loss has the right to file an independent compensation lawsuit, even if they were not a party to the initial proceedings (Judgment dated 24 May 2023 and numbered E.2022/495, K.2023/3224).
Another critical and debated issue in practice is how many times the damages can be calculated under Article 58 of the Competition Act, as well as the limits of the judge’s discretion in this regard. Pursuant to the relevant provision, those who suffer loss from a competition law infringement may request compensation equal to three times the actual loss incurred or the profit generated by the infringers. In judicial decisions, this rate is generally not accepted as a mandatory or automatic multiplier, but rather as an upper limit that allows the judge to make an assessment based on the specific facts of the case. The 4th Civil Chamber of the Istanbul Regional Court of Justice stated that Article 58 of the Competition Act sets a maximum limit for the compensation amount and grants the judge discretion to determine the final figure within this limit; however, it does not grant free discretion regarding the multiplier rate itself. In the same ruling, it was emphasised that the judge may award either one or three times the damages according to the circumstances of the case, provided that the award stays within the statutory upper limit and is not less than the hypothetical loss suffered by the plaintiff (Judgment dated 08 November 2021 and numbered E.2021/305, K.2021/2178).
No significant legislative updates have recently been introduced in the field of private antitrust litigation. Some high-profile damages actions remain pending before the courts, with the vast majority still subject to ongoing judicial scrutiny and appellate review.
In Turkish law, the statutory basis for private disputes arising from antitrust violations is established under the private law provisions set forth in Articles 56 to 59 of the Competition Act. Accordingly, any party that violates the law and thereby restricts competition is liable for any damages suffered by the injured parties. In such competition-related damages claims, plaintiffs may seek compensation for both their actual losses and the loss of profits. Furthermore, under the “triple damages rule”, the court may award compensation of three times the actual damages suffered or three times the profits gained, or likely to be gained, by the infringers.
In the Turkish judicial system, there is no specialised court designated exclusively to hear antitrust disputes. Instead, the competent court is determined by the nature of the dispute and the legal status of the parties involved. In this regard, the commercial courts of first instance have jurisdiction over disputes related to the parties’ commercial enterprises. If a claim is brought by consumers, the consumer courts have jurisdiction; the civil courts of first instance hear all other non-commercial disputes.
TCA decisions do not constitute res judicata and are not binding on the courts, but they are of critical importance in damages claims. Although this is not expressly regulated as a prerequisite under the legislation, under the settled jurisprudence of the Court of Appeals, courts either dismiss damages claims filed before a final TCA decision has been rendered or hold the proceedings in abeyance by treating the TCA decision as a preliminary issue. In practice, TCA decisions are regarded as strong evidence of the existence of an infringement and are given significant weight by the courts. Accordingly, the existence of a TCA decision issued against the defendant significantly alleviates the claimant’s burden of proving the competition law infringement.
Decisions of other national competition authorities are not binding on Turkish courts. However, there is no legal impediment to the parties submitting such decisions as evidence.
Under the Code of Civil Procedure, claims for damages arising from competition law infringements are subject to the general rules governing tort liability and the rules of evidence. Pursuant to the fundamental principles of Turkish law, as a general rule the burden of proof lies with the party making the allegation. Accordingly, a claimant asserting that it has suffered damages as a result of a competition law infringement must prove the following elements:
Since competition law infringements are generally carried out in secrecy, it is extremely difficult for a claimant to obtain evidence that directly establishes the infringement. However, Article 59 of the Competition Act introduces a broad principle of freedom of evidence, allowing anti-competitive agreements, decisions and practices to be proven by any type of evidence. Furthermore, if the claimant submits evidence giving rise to a presumption of the existence of an agreement or a distortion of competition (such as market sharing, price stability in the market, or simultaneous price increases by competitors), the burden of proof shifts to the defendant. In such a case, the defendant must prove that it has not engaged in a concerted practice.
Please also see 2.3 Impact of Competition Authorities regarding the probative value of TCA decisions.
There is no explicit provision regarding the “passing-on” defence under Turkish competition law. However, there is no legal impediment to raising such a defence in judicial proceedings.
As the Competition Act does not prescribe a specific statute of limitations for competition law infringements, claims for damages are governed by the general provisions set forth in Article 72 of the Turkish Code of Obligations No 6098, which provide for three distinct limitation periods:
Indeed, competition law infringements are classified as “administrative offences” (misdemeanours) that carry administrative fines, so the “extended statute of limitations” rule mentioned above applies to compensation lawsuits. This rule ensures that the longest limitation period prescribed by law for the action also applies to the compensation claim. Law No 5326 on Misdemeanours sets an eight-year statute of limitations for such administrative fines. In this regard, the Court of Appeals also held in its rulings that this eight-year period must be taken as the basis for compensation lawsuits (Judgment dated 28 March 2022 and numbered E.2021/7383, K.2022/2486).
The limitation period begins to run on the date the claimant becomes aware of both the damage and the identity of the person liable for the damage. Accordingly, where the claimant becomes aware of these elements at different times, the limitation period commences on the date of the later discovery.
In applying the general rules governing the commencement of the limitation period to damages claims arising from competition law infringements, determining the point in time at which the damage is deemed to have been discovered is of critical importance. In practice, the publication date of the TCA’s decision is regarded as the key reference date for determining when the claimant became aware of both the damage and the identity of the liable party.
Antitrust-related damages claims brought before the courts of first instance are generally resolved within two to four years. However, if the judicial review of the underlying TCA decision has not yet been completed, the court of first instance treats the finalisation of that decision as a preliminary issue; as a result, the proceedings are prolonged.
Furthermore, both the claimant and the defendant may appeal the judgment of the relevant court. Consequently, the final resolution of such cases often takes between five and seven years.
The concept of a class action does not exist under Turkish law.
However, pursuant to Article 113 of the Code of Civil Procedure, associations, consumer organisations, chambers of commerce and other legal entities may bring an action to protect the interests of their members or the groups they represent. However, the remedies available under this provision are limited, and it is not possible to seek damages.
As stated in 4.1 Statutory Basis, Turkish law does not recognise a class action regime, and therefore does not feature an “opt-in” or “opt-out” mechanism. Nevertheless, pursuant to Article 57 of the Code of Civil Procedure, multiple parties harmed by the same competition law infringement (such as a cartel) may join together to file a joint action for damages or intervene in a pending lawsuit.
Under Turkish competition law, no statutory distinction is made between direct and indirect purchasers with respect to private damages actions. In this regard, the critical issue is whether a causal link can be established between the anti-competitive conduct and the loss suffered by the claimant.
The concept of a class action does not exist under Turkish law.
There is no provision in the Competition Act governing the determination of the competent court for damages claims arising from competition law infringements; accordingly, the general rules apply. Plaintiffs may therefore bring an action before the courts of:
With respect to the applicable law, Article 38 of the Private International and Procedural Law provides a specific rule under which damages claims arising from the restriction of competition are governed by the law of the country in which the market directly affected by the restriction is located. Accordingly, Turkish law applies to infringements affecting the Turkish market.
Article 59 of the Competition Act stipulates that anti-competitive agreements, decisions and practices may be proven by any type of evidence, establishing a broad principle of freedom of evidence. Within this framework, the parties are required to submit all evidence supporting their claims and defences during the pleadings stage. Where relevant documents are not in the parties’ possession but are held by third parties or public authorities (such as the TCA), the court may issue an official request ordering the production of such documents. Furthermore, a party may request the court to order the opposing party to produce specific documents in its possession, provided that the request is supported by sufficient justification.
The principle of attorney-client privilege is expressly recognised under Turkish law. Pursuant to the Legal Practitioners’ Act No 1136, attorneys are prohibited from disclosing any information obtained in the course of their professional relationship with their clients. Furthermore, pursuant to the general principles of law, judges are required to ensure that appropriate measures are taken to safeguard attorney-client privilege, including with respect to documents and electronic communications.
On the other hand, legal professional privilege is interpreted and applied quite narrowly by the TCA. According to TCA decisions, legal professional privilege protection is granted only for correspondence with an independent lawyer (external counsel) as long as it is directly related to an ongoing investigation for the exercise of defence rights. In contrast, communications with in-house counsels or general legal advice received from external counsel before an investigation are not protected, and can be used by the TCA to identify violations. Therefore, such communications that appear in TCA decisions can also be submitted as evidence by plaintiffs in private antitrust damages claims.
Turkish competition legislation does not provide direct or absolute protection for documents submitted during leniency and settlement proceedings.
However, pursuant to the TCA’s Regulation on Active Cooperation for Detecting Cartels (“Leniency Regulation”), critical information regarding a cartel may also be submitted orally to the TCA, including details such as the products affected by the cartel, the geographic market, the duration of the infringement, and the parties involved. These statements are transcribed by the TCA’s experts and kept as “internal correspondence”. Communiqué No 2010/3 on the Regulation of the Right of Access to the File and Protection of Trade Secrets explicitly refers to the Leniency Regulation, stipulating that information and documents obtained through this method shall be classified as internal correspondence.
A similar provision is set forth in the Settlement Regulation of the TCA, whereby an undertaking settling with the TCA may submit its statements acknowledging the existence and scope of the infringement orally. In such cases, the prepared settlement text is likewise stored as “internal correspondence”.
This practice of the TCA may create a practical difficulty, particularly for plaintiffs who file compensation lawsuits. Since documents classified as internal correspondence are excluded from the scope of the right to access the file, plaintiffs’ access to this information and the evidence necessary to establish the infringement becomes effectively restricted.
The procedure for examining witnesses is governed by the general rules of civil procedure, under which the parties may rely on witness evidence within the legally prescribed time limits. Accordingly, the court must be provided with the identity and contact details of the proposed witnesses, as well as the specific facts on which they are to testify. At the hearing, witnesses are examined by the judge, and the parties’ legal counsel are also entitled to put questions to them.
Under Article 266 of the Code of Civil Procedure, the court may decide to obtain an expert opinion in cases requiring specialised or technical knowledge. The parties have the right to object to the expert report, and the court may order the preparation of a supplementary report.
In private competition law litigation, expert evidence is used primarily for the quantification of damages. Although the judge is not legally bound by the conclusions of the expert report, in practice, courts largely rely on the findings set out in the report.
The scope and method of calculating damages are governed by Article 58 of the Competition Act. In damages actions arising from competition law infringements, injured parties may claim compensation for both their actual damages and loss of profits. In determining the amount of lost profits, the profits that the injured undertaking could reasonably have expected to earn are assessed, taking into account its financial statements from previous years, among other things.
The general rule under Turkish law is that only the actual damages suffered by the injured party are recoverable. However, Turkish competition law provides an exception to this principle, whereby persons who suffer harm as a result of a competition law infringement may claim compensation of three times their actual damages or three times the profits gained, or likely to be gained, by the infringers (the “triple damages rule”). This mechanism constitutes a special rule intended to enhance deterrence.
There is no explicit provision regarding the “passing-on” defence under Turkish competition law, but there is no legal impediment to raising such a defence in judicial proceedings.
In damages actions arising from competition law infringements, the claimant may also seek interest accruing from the date of the infringement. Accordingly, the claimant must expressly request the award of interest.
Under Turkish competition law, where damage is caused by the conduct of multiple persons, those persons are jointly and severally liable for the damage. Accordingly, the claimant may bring an action against all jointly and severally liable parties, or against any one of them, and is entitled to recover the full amount of its damages from one, several or all of the liable parties.
Under Turkish competition law, no exception is granted to undertakings applying for leniency in order to protect them from civil damages claims.
As stated in 9.1 Joint and Several Liability, where multiple parties participate in a competition law infringement, any one of them may be held solely liable for the entire amount of the resulting damages. In such a case, a defendant who has paid the claimant more than its own share is legally subrogated to the rights of the injured party to the extent of the excess amount paid. Consequently, that party is entitled to bring a recourse claim against the other liable parties.
In damages actions, it is possible to apply for an interim injunction in order to prevent prejudice to the applicant’s rights during the proceedings. An interim injunction may be requested before or during the proceedings where the enforcement of a right would become significantly more difficult or impossible, or where a delay would result in serious or irreparable harm. The applicant is not required to establish its claim conclusively; rather, it is sufficient to present prima facie evidence demonstrating the merits of the claim to the extent that it creates a sufficient level of conviction in the judge’s mind. Where an interim injunction is granted before an action is commenced, the claimant must file the action within two weeks from the date on which enforcement of the injunction is requested.
In urgent cases where delay would create a risk, the court may also grant an interim injunction without hearing the other party. In such a case, the other party may object to the decision within one week from the enforcement of the injunction granted in its absence or from the date of its notification.
The court requires the applicant to provide security against any loss that the opposing party or third parties may suffer if the applicant is ultimately unsuccessful on the merits. The amount of the security is determined by the court on a case-by-case basis.
The parties may resolve their dispute through voluntary mediation as an alternative dispute resolution mechanism. They may also refer the dispute to arbitration, provided that the contract contains an arbitration clause or the parties subsequently agree to submit the dispute to arbitration. Recourse to these alternative dispute resolution mechanisms is not mandatory.
This should not, however, be confused with the mandatory mediation requirement (as a condition precedent to litigation) applicable to certain commercial disputes under Turkish law.
Under Turkish law, there is no legislative provision prohibiting third-party litigation funding or the assumption of the financial risks associated with litigation. Nevertheless, such arrangements remain uncommon in practice.
When the court renders its final judgment on the merits of the case, it also rules on the allocation of litigation costs. As a general rule, litigation costs are borne by the unsuccessful party.
The defendant may request that the claimant provide security for litigation costs in the following circumstances:
The court may also order security for litigation costs on its own motion where the statutory requirements are met. The court determines both the amount and the form of the security. However, where the parties have agreed on the form of the security in a contract, the court will determine the security accordingly. If the required security is not provided within the time limit set by the court, the action will be dismissed on procedural grounds.
Where the monetary value of the dispute exceeds the applicable statutory thresholds, the relevant court decisions may be appealed. In this regard, judgments rendered by the court of first instance may first be appealed before the competent Regional Court of Appeals. Subsequently, the decisions of the Regional Court of Appeals may be further appealed before the (High) Court of Appeals. Such appeals may be based on both errors of fact and procedural deficiencies.
The number of antitrust damages actions in Türkiye is expected to increase in the near future, due in part to the growing awareness among injured parties of their right to seek damages. The availability of triple damages (three times the actual harm suffered) under Turkish law makes such actions particularly attractive.
Beyond the financial incentives, however, the settlement mechanism introduced into the Competition Act in 2020 has become a significant driver of private damages litigation. An undertaking that chooses to settle expressly acknowledges that it has committed a competition law infringement, and this admission substantially reduces the claimant’s burden of proving the infringement in subsequent damages actions. Furthermore, although there is no explicit legal requirement, under the established approach of the Court of Appeals, courts generally treat a final TCA decision as a prerequisite for damages actions. Since settlement decisions cannot be appealed and therefore become final rapidly, subsequent damages proceedings before the courts may progress more quickly. It is important to note that reaching a settlement with the TCA does not shield an undertaking from civil damages actions or liability. Likewise, Turkish competition law does not provide any exemption from potential private damages claims for leniency applicants.
The TCA’s recent infringement decisions imposing administrative fines are also expected to generate further damages actions. In particular, the TCA has recently imposed substantial fines in relation to labour market infringements, including no-poach agreements as well as information exchanges on compensation and benefits across a wide range of sectors. Moreover, cartel cases continue to account for a significant proportion of the administrative fines imposed by the TCA. Consequently, it is likely that parties harmed by such infringements will increasingly pursue damages actions to recover their losses.
Finally, there are currently no ongoing legislative studies or official draft laws regarding private antitrust damages actions. Consequently, it can be stated that private damages claims will continue to be governed within the framework of the existing provisions of the Competition Act and general legal principles.
Kerim Bey Köşkü, Göztepe Mah. Tanzimat Sok. No: 63/1
Kadıköy/İstanbul
Türkiye
+902166884643
+902166884643
info@ozay.av.tr ozay.av.tr
Introduction
One of the most prominent recent developments in Turkish competition law has been the increasing number of investigations into anti-competitive practices in labour markets, which can be split into two categories:
The Turkish Competition Authority (TCA) imposed its first fine in human resources (HR) related infringements on 30 December 2021. Since then, the total amount of fines imposed on nearly 150 undertakings operating across a broad range of industries – including banking, construction materials, education, fashion, food, healthcare, IT, online commerce, food delivery and marketplaces, pharmaceuticals, telecommunications, transportation, TV series producers and tyres – has approached USD100 million. Undertakings sanctioned by the TCA include Alibaba, Delivery Hero, Ericsson, Vodafone, Amgen, AstraZeneca, GSK, Merck, Novartis, Novo Nordisk, Pfizer, Sanofi, Bridgestone, Goodyear, Hankook, Pirelli and QNB.
Similar investigations are ongoing against more than 100 undertakings operating in sectors such as agriculture, banking, construction materials, independent auditing, insurance and shipbuilding. These investigations also involve a number of internationally recognised companies, including Deloitte, Ernst & Young, KPMG, PwC, BBVA, Emirates NBD, HSBC and ING.
Such investigations expose undertakings not only to significant fines, reaching 10% of their annual turnover, but also to reputational risks and private damages actions brought by employees. Indeed, reasoned decisions published on the TCA website occasionally reveal negative remarks made by relevant company executives against employees negotiating job offers with other companies and/or requesting an increase in their C&B (see, for example, Kocaeli Private Schools decision dated 04 April 2024 and numbered 24-16/391-157), thereby resulting in negative publicity against these companies in the (social) media. In addition, much like the Silicon Valley case where US tech firms paid over USD400 million to their employees in settlements, employees in Türkiye can claim triple compensation for their losses or the wrongdoers’ profits if they are harmed by anti-competitive agreements and information exchanges.
At first glance, it may seem that HR-related competition law risks primarily concern large multinational corporations, such as those listed above. However, as will be explained below, the TCA’s decisions demonstrate that small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) operating in fragmented markets with numerous competitors face risks that are no less significant than those encountered by large undertakings.
Against this background and in light of the TCA’s Guidelines on Competition Infringements in Labour Markets (the “Guidelines”) and decisions, this article examines:
The Concept of “Competitor” in Labour Markets
In cases of HR-related infringements, the concept of a “competitor” is defined independently of the markets in which the relevant undertakings offer goods or services. Instead, it encompasses any undertaking competing to recruit or employ the same workforce. Accordingly, undertakings operating in entirely different industries, which would not ordinarily be regarded as competitors, may nevertheless be considered competitors in the labour market. For instance, a company operating in the retail sector and an IT company providing services to it are considered competitors in the labour market, and certain agreements and/or information exchanges between them may constitute an infringement. This broad interpretation of the concept of competitor is one of the principal reasons behind the significant increase in the number of HR-related investigations.
Conduct Constituting Competition Law Infringements in Labour Markets
As noted above, competition law infringements in labour markets may broadly be classified into two categories: “no-poaching agreements” and “agreements and/or information exchanges on C&B”.
No-poaching agreements
The Guidelines define no-poaching agreements as “agreements entered into directly or indirectly whereby one undertaking agrees not to make employment offers to, or hire, the employees of another undertaking”. The Guidelines further state that:
Although relatively uncommon, no-poaching agreements may be incorporated into written and executed contracts, particularly where a supplier-customer relationship exists. One example is the TCA’s Borusan/Testinium decision dated 30 March 2023 and numbered 23-16/287-100. The investigation was concluded by way of settlement, under which the parties admitted the infringement in exchange for a reduction in the fine.
In that case, the TCA found that the following provision contained in an agreement between a logistics company and a small-sized software company providing services to it constituted an infringement: “During the term of their engagement and for a period of two years thereafter, the parties may not make employment offers to each other’s personnel without the prior consent of the other party.” Due to this provision, the fine imposed on the logistics company reached approximately USD1.6 million. The imposition of such a substantial fine on the basis of a single contractual provision, which had been included at the request of the software company but had never been implemented, illustrates both the magnitude of the risks faced by undertakings and the ease with which such risks may arise.
In practice, no-poaching agreements more commonly take the form of unwritten and unsigned arrangements, referred to as “gentlemen’s agreements” in competition law terminology. Indeed, the TCA may impose a fine solely on the basis of, for example, an internal WhatsApp message proving an anti-competitive agreement and/or exchange of information (see, for example, Pharmaceuticals decision dated 11 September 2025 and numbered 25-34/810-474).
As also stated in the Guidelines, a finding by the TCA that a no-poaching agreement exists is not limited to circumstances in which two undertakings agree that they will not hire each other’s employees under any circumstances. Agreements among companies on matters such as giving courtesy notice to a current employer before an employee’s transfer to another company, or requiring an employee to apply for a job only after resigning from their current position, may constitute an infringement in the eyes of the TCA, no matter how “gentlemanly” they may seem at first glance.
Furthermore, in the presence of internal or external communications, companies’ defences stating that they did not implement the alleged agreement are often rejected by the TCA since it considers no-poaching agreements to constitute restrictions of competition by object; accordingly, the absence of anti-competitive effects does not preclude a finding of infringement by referring the concept of a “restriction by object” under European Union (“EU”) law and a “per se violation” under US law.
Notwithstanding the TCA’s strict approach, there are also examples in which certain employee non-solicitation arrangements have not been characterised as infringements. One such example is the Human Resources-II decision dated 27 February 2024 and numbered 24-10/170-66, in which fines were imposed on certain undertakings, but 12 undertakings were not fined. The assessment leading to this outcome was based on the concept of ancillary restraints. Under the ancillary restraint doctrine, certain agreements restricting employee mobility may, exceptionally, be regarded as falling outside the scope of a competition law infringement. Such arrangements are encountered particularly in service agreements concluded within the context of vertical relationships. For example, where an undertaking procures HR, IT, consultancy or similar services from another company, an agreement between these parties not to recruit, either unilaterally or mutually, employees assigned to the relevant project may not constitute an infringement under certain conditions, where the restriction is intended to protect trade secrets, safeguard investments or ensure the uninterrupted provision of the relevant services.
According to the TCA’s Guidelines, a restriction may be regarded as an ancillary restraint only if it satisfies all three of the following cumulative conditions, namely that it is directly related, necessary and proportionate to the implementation of the principal agreement.
Although the Guidelines set out the principles summarised above, they do not provide any examples of contractual clauses or similar arrangements that have been treated as ancillary restraints, which partially overshadows the guiding nature of the Guidelines. This lack of guidance increases the importance of following the TCA’s decisions closely.
Another instance where the TCA does not find an infringement when investigating alleged no-poaching agreements is when the relevant undertakings prove that their decision not to hire employees from another company is based not on an agreement, but entirely on their own independent and unilateral HR policies or commercial choices (see, for example, decisions of Human Resources-I dated 26 July 2023 and numbered 23-34/649-218, Human Resources-II dated 27 February 2024 and numbered 24-10/170-66, and Pharmaceuticals dated 11 September 2025 and numbered 25-34/810-474). However, cases where companies escape fines based on this argument are clearly exceptions.
Agreements and/or information exchanges on C&B
The Guidelines define “wage-fixing agreements” as “agreements whereby undertakings jointly determine working conditions applicable to their employees, including wages, salary increase rates, working hours, benefits, compensation and leave entitlements”, and emphasise that such agreements constitute restrictions of competition by object and are classified as cartels. However, as well as wage-fixing agreements, information exchanges on C&B also constitute infringements of competition law, which the Guidelines exemplify through salary increase rates, working hours, benefits, payments and leave entitlements.
The Guidelines also provide explanations regarding exchanges conducted through independent market research and HR consultancy companies such as Korn Ferry, Mercer and WTW. In this respect, the Guidelines state that the sharing of information that is disaggregated, current and/or forward-looking, non-public and capable of revealing the source of the data may constitute an infringement of competition law. By contrast, information exchanges satisfying all of the following conditions will, as a general rule, not give rise to a competition law infringement:
In practice, the TCA’s approach to agreements and/or exchanges of information on C&B is just as strict as its approach to no-poaching agreements. One particularly striking example is Private Hospitals decision dated 24 February 2022 and numbered 22-10/152-62. In that case, some undertakings argued that they had not shared any information in the relevant WhatsApp groups or during the meetings in which alleged anti-competitive communications had taken place. The TCA rejected these arguments by adopting an approach comparable to the concept of public distancing under EU competition law. It stated that communications containing competitively sensitive information may constitute an infringement even if the information is disclosed unilaterally. Accordingly, an undertaking receiving such information must immediately and unequivocally inform the disclosing party that it does not intend to participate in any anti-competitive arrangement. Failing this, the recipient may be deemed to have tacitly expressed its consent to the arrangement and may therefore become a party to the infringement. The TCA reasoned that an undertaking receiving competitively sensitive information from its competitors cannot realistically avoid taking that information into account when determining its own commercial policies.
Another striking example is TV Series Producers decision dated 20 November 2025 and numbered 25-43/1044-596. The investigation was concluded by way of settlement, with the parties admitting the infringement in exchange for a reduction in fines. In that case, the TCA imposed fines of approximately USD1.8 million and USD1.1 million on Ay Yapım and Med Yapım, respectively. The conduct giving rise to these fines consisted of a single WhatsApp communication between two executives containing general information regarding prospective salary increases for employees.
When the TCA’s strict approach is combined with the high inflation in Türkiye, the risks for companies increase even further. For many years, Türkiye has had the highest inflation rate among OECD countries, reaching levels up to 70%. Compared to countries with low inflation, this situation increases both the necessity and frequency of benchmarking regarding C&B for companies in Türkiye. Indeed, in such high-inflation environments, the real income level of employees depreciates rapidly, leading to increased dissatisfaction being conveyed to company management and HR departments.
Under these circumstances, company executives and/or HR professionals contact friends at other companies (including those that are not direct competitors) to obtain C&B information, either verbally or through channels like WhatsApp. Although the intention behind these information exchanges is often not to suppress C&B but, on the contrary, to improve them for the benefit of employees, such exchanges can still be deemed an infringement because they influence policies that undertakings must determine unilaterally and independently (see, for example, French High Schools decision dated 24 April 2024 and numbered 24-20/466-196). Therefore, it is of paramount importance to train critical employees on how and from which sources they can acquire C&B information, and how they can lawfully report related benchmarking studies within the company.
Competition Compliance Programmes
Driven by its access to virtually unlimited human and financial resources, the TCA conducts dawn raids on a new sector and/or company almost every single day, performing inspections on telephones, computers, desks and bags, including the personal devices of employees. Accordingly, it can be argued that the TCA is currently one of the most active competition authorities in the world, if not the most active. Combining this dynamism with its practice of imposing fines based on even a single internal WhatsApp correspondence, it is not difficult to predict that investigations and penalties will continue to rise.
However, a review of TCA cases reveals another striking statistic: the number of companies where dawn raids were conducted within the framework of HR-related infringement allegations but no investigation was opened, or where an investigation was opened but no fine was imposed, exceeds the number of companies that received penalties. Indeed, although not as sensational as the striking fines, the number of companies that did not face an investigation or a penalty over the past five years despite undergoing a dawn raid by the TCA can be counted in the hundreds.
These figures demonstrate both the importance and the practical value of implementing an effective competition compliance programme in order to mitigate the risks. The principal measures that may be adopted under such a programme are, in order of importance, internal audits, training and contract review.
Internal audits
Unlike the US and the EU, internal competition compliance audits are common in Türkiye. As part of such audits, communications made via e-mail, WhatsApp and similar channels by critical employees are reviewed to determine whether they may evidence a competition law infringement. Such audits are carried out on computers, mobile phones, etc, through keyword searches modelled after the TCA’s dawn raids upon obtaining the employees’ oral consent, or written consent if deemed preferable by the undertaking. These audits help identify potential risks for companies. In addition, based on these findings, companies can take tailored measures like specialised training or IT policies, and decide whether to make a leniency application to the TCA.
Training
The second step consists of training programmes, which should, where possible, be conducted following the internal audit and designed in light of its findings. Such training should explain, through practical examples, the types of conduct employees may and may not engage in, the matters requiring particular attention in internal and external communications, the lawful sources from which C&B data may be obtained, and the manner in which such information and related benchmarking studies may be reported internally. Internal audits and training programmes also prepare employees for the TCA’s dawn raids, which may reduce the risk of substantial fines being imposed for obstructing or hindering an on-site inspection – in recent years, nearly 100 undertakings have been fined on this basis, with a fine corresponding to 0.5% of their annual turnover.
Contract review
In contracts that companies execute with suppliers, customers, agents, and IT or consultancy firms, for example, there may be provisions preventing employee transfers. Therefore, it is of paramount importance to review the relevant contracts and make the necessary amendments.
Conclusion
The TCA has imposed nearly USD100 million in fines on approximately 150 companies since 30 December 20221 when it issued its first penalty in its investigations into allegations of “no-poaching agreements” and/or “information exchanges on C&B”. Meanwhile, investigations concerning more than 100 undertakings are currently ongoing.
These investigations pose a risk of serious damages lawsuits against the relevant companies, in addition to reputational loss and fines that can reach up to 10% of their annual turnovers. Indeed, just as in the example of Silicon Valley companies in the US paying over USD400 million in settlements to their employees, employees in Türkiye can also file lawsuits to claim compensation amounting to three times the loss suffered or three times the profits obtained or likely to be obtained by the infringing parties.
Furthermore, the targets of these risks are not only large companies, but also SMEs operating in markets comprised of hundreds of players of all sizes. One of the most critical reasons for this is that undertakings from different sectors, which are not normally considered rivals, are deemed competitors in the labour market regardless of their respective industries. Consequently, a non-solicitation agreement between a global giant in the retail sector and an SME software company providing services to it, or a simple information exchange on C&B between the HR staff of these two companies, can constitute an infringement. This, in turn, leads to an increasing number of investigations focusing on the labour market.
Similarly, the TCA’s access to virtually unlimited human and financial resources enables it to conduct dawn raids on a new sector and/or company almost every single day, regardless of whether they are local or small. Indeed, the TCA is arguably one of the most active competition authorities in the world, if not the most active.
Other factors that elevate the risk include the TCA’s broad interpretation of both no-poaching agreements and competitively sensitive information, its practice of imposing penalties based on a single internal communication via channels like WhatsApp even in the absence of any implementation, and companies’ growing need to conduct benchmarking on C&B in an inflationary country like Türkiye.
Against this background, it is not difficult to anticipate that the number of investigations, fines and damages actions arising from alleged HR-related competition infringements will continue to increase in the coming period.
Nevertheless, the TCA’s decisional practice also reveals another noteworthy statistic: although not as sensational as the striking fines, the number of companies that did not face an investigation or a penalty despite undergoing a dawn raid by the TCA is significantly higher than those that it actually penalised.
All of this clearly demonstrates the importance and benefit of implementing an effective competition compliance programme that specifically includes components such as “internal audits”, “training” and “contract reviews” to mitigate competition law risks.
Kerim Bey Köşkü, Göztepe Mah. Tanzimat Sok. No: 63/1
Kadıköy/İstanbul
Türkiye
+902166884643
+902166884643
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