Art & Cultural Property Law 2026

Last Updated April 14, 2026

USA – California

Law and Practice

Authors



Pillsbury Winthrop Shaw Pittman LLP is a global full-service law firm with approximately 700 lawyers across 20 offices in the United States, Europe and Asia, including major offices in New York, Washington, DC, London, Los Angeles and San Francisco. The firm advises clients ranging from emerging companies to the largest public and private corporations on complex legal, regulatory, transactional and dispute matters across key sectors such as technology, energy and infrastructure, financial services, real estate and construction, media and entertainment, life sciences and digital health. Pillsbury lawyers are known for their multidisciplinary approach and deep industry insight, delivering tailored solutions that align with clients’ strategic objectives. The firm’s market-leading practices span corporate transactions, intellectual property, litigation and enforcement defence, regulatory compliance and public policy advocacy and its work is consistently recognised for excellence by Chambers & Partners, Best Lawyers and other guides. Pillsbury’s integrated platform supports clients with innovative, commercially driven legal services around the world.

In the United States, art law is an interdisciplinary field that incorporates multiple legal disciplines, such as intellectual property, contracts, property, commercial and constitutional law.

The legal framework is shaped by federal and state statutes and regulations, as well as case law.

Copyright rights under Title 17 of the United States Code are the primary legal framework that protects an artist’s rights in their original works (as described in more detail below). The Uniform Commercial Code (the “UCC”) provides default rules for common business transactions and risk allocation. Article 2 governs the sale of goods, such as art, and addresses contract formation requirements, implied and express warranties, risk of loss and remedies for breach. Article 9 governs secured transactions and determines how interests in art would be perfected and which party has priority when there are competing claims. Article 12 governs certain digital assets (such as NFTs) and sets out rules for how rights can be transferred and protected.

Copyright rights under Title 17 of the United States Code give the artist legal rights to “original works of authorship” that are “fixed in any tangible medium of expression” (17 U.S.C. Section 102(a)). Those rights arise automatically upon fixation and include exclusive rights to:

  • display;
  • create derivative works;
  • reproduce;
  • sell; and
  • transfer the work. The artist must register the copyright before bringing an infringement lawsuit and registration can allow the artist to have access to certain remedies that would not otherwise be available.

The artist also has property rights. An artist’s rights in a work of art can be understood as two separate forms of property rights. First, the artist may have property rights in the physical work of art, including the rights to possess it, exclude others from it, transfer it by sale or gift and seek state-law remedies if it is taken or withheld. Second, the artist may hold the copyright ownership. Under the Copyright Act, ownership of the copyright is a property right. Even if the artist sells the physical work, the artist may retain the copyright and would retain the exclusive rights to reproduce the work, authorise derivative works, distribute copies and publicly display the image, unless those rights are expressly transferred. In other words, the physical artwork and the underlying copyright are distinct “property” interests and an artist can retain ongoing control over many uses of the artwork’s image even when someone else owns the physical piece.

An artist may also have moral rights, such as rights of attribution and integrity, under the Visual Artists Rights Act of 1990 (17 U.S.C. § 106A).

Under Section 101 of the Copyright Act, a “joint work” is “prepared by two or more authors with the intention that their contributions be merged into inseparable or interdependent parts of a unitary whole.” When a work qualifies as a joint work, the authors are generally co-owners of the copyright in the entire work. A “collective work” is a work where a number of contributions are assembled into a collective work, such as an anthology or periodical issue. In that case, the copyright in the individual contribution stays with each contributor.

Violating copyright in art can lead to civil and, in some cases, criminal penalties. Remedies typically include injunctions (17 U.S.C. Section 502), impoundment of the infringing materials (17 U.S.C. Section 503) and damages (actual damages and profits, or statutory damages) (17 U.S.C. Section 504). The court, in its discretion, may also award costs for attorney’s fees. Willful infringement, such as if the infringement was committed for purposes of “commercial advantage or private financial gain,” can be prosecuted criminally under 17 U.S.C. Section 506. Statutory damages are generally USD750 to USD30,000 per work and may be increased up to USD150,000 per work for willful infringement. However, registration of the copyright is a procedural prerequisite for the artist to bring a lawsuit and affects the remedies available to the artist.

Under 17 U.S.C. Section 408, to register the artwork, the copyright owner should file an application with the US Copyright Office, submit the required deposit and pay the filing fee. Registration of the work creates a written record of the copyright ownership and is “prima facie evidence of the validity of the copyright” (if made before or within five years of first publication). Under 17 U.S.C. Section 410, if the Copyright Office accepts the claim, it will issue a certificate of registration. The effective date of the copyright registration is the date the application, deposit and fee were accepted by the US Copyright Office.

A resale right is a legal right that allows artist to receive a royalty when their art is sold while their copyright is in effect. With the exception of California and Georgia, US federal and state law does not recognise resale rights. However, the California Resale Royalty Act (Cal. Civ. Code § 986) has been held invalid for most sales after the effective date of the 1976 Copyright Act on the basis of federal pre-emption. Therefore, the resale rights in the United States are limited and not broadly available.

The ownership of the copyright is a property right that is separate from the ownership of the physical expression of the underlying work. Although the physical work may be transferred, the copyright rights do not transfer. However, permission to use images of artworks protected by copyright may be obtained by securing permission from the copyright owner or by obtaining a license from the copyright owner, which may be exclusive or non-exclusive. Although a non-exclusive license may be granted by written or oral agreement, it should be in writing to ensure enforceability. The individual seeking to use work they did not create should first determine the work's copyright status. Once the copyright owner’s identity has been determined, the individual should contact the copyright owner for permission to use the work. The individual seeking to use the work should specify facts about the use, including the specific work, the duration and their intended use.

There is no standalone exclusive right to authenticate an artist's work after the artist’s death. Generally, after an artist’s death, the artist’s estate or a foundation may authenticate their artworks.

US courts have generally approached catalogue raisonnés and authenticity opinions as matters of scholarly discretion. Therefore, courts are reluctant to order the inclusion or exclusion of a work or compel the authenticator to alter an attribution. For example, New York courts have emphasised that the market and not the court ultimately decides how much weight a catalogue raisonné carries (see Thome v Alexander & Louisa Calder Found., 70 A.D.3d 88 (N.Y. App. Div. 1st Dep’t 2009) and Mayor Gallery Ltd v Agnes Martin Catalogue Raisonne LLC, No 655489/2016, 2019 BL 269316 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2 July 2019)).

A buyer who later learns that the artwork they purchased is inauthentic may pursue contract and tort theories, subject to the governing state law and any contractual disclaimers or limitations. The buyer may assert breach of express warranty by showing that the seller made an affirmation of fact regarding the work's authenticity, which became part of the basis of the transaction. If not effectively disclaimed, the buyer may also assert breach of implied warranties, such as merchantability and fitness for a particular purpose. The buyer may argue negligent misrepresentation by alleging that the seller supplied false information that the buyer relied on and suffered a pecuniary loss. The buyer may also seek rescission based on mutual mistake where both the seller and buyer were mistaken about a basic assumption (ie, authenticity), the mistake materially affected the agreed exchange and the buyer does not bear the risk of the mistake.

The United States does not have a single definition of “cultural heritage.” Generally, cultural heritage is understood to mean items or practices/customs that a community or society inherits and passes on to future generations. While the United States has announced it will withdraw from UNESCO effective December 31, 2026, under the 1970 UNESCO Convention on the Means of Prohibiting and Preventing the Illicit Import, Export and Transfer of Ownership of Cultural Property “cultural property” is defined broadly to include property designated as being important to archaeology, prehistory, history, literature, art or science, including categories of property of artistic interest The United States also enacted the National Historic Preservation Act (54 U.S.C. § 300101 et seq) which defines “historic property” as any prehistoric or historic district, site, building, structure, or object listed on or eligible for the National Register, including “artifacts, records and material remains” related to it. Additionally, the Native American Graves Protection and Repatriation Act (25 U.S.C. §§ 3001–3013) regulates particular categories of “cultural items,” including human remains, funerary objects, sacred objects and objects of cultural patrimony.

Adverse possession is primarily a property doctrine under which a possessor can acquire ownership of real property by holding it for the statutory period in a manner that is actual, open and notorious, exclusive, hostile (ie, without the owner’s permission) and continuous. Generally, ownership disputes over cultural objects in the United States would not be addressed under adverse possession. Additionally, where an object was stolen, a later good-faith purchaser for value typically would not be able to obtain good title under the Uniform Commercial Code.

For instance, in United States v Schultz, 333 F.3d 393, 395 (2d Cir. 2003), the court held that the National Stolen Property Act treats antiquities as “stolen” where a foreign nation has a valid patrimony law that vests ownership of certain cultural objects in the state. In Kunstsammlungen zu Weimar v Elicofon, 678 F.2d 1150, 1165 (2d Cir. 1982), the court found that the possessor lacked a superior title and granted relief to the museum that sought the return of two Dürer paintings stolen during/after WWII that later appeared in the hands of a New York collector. The court, applying New York law, stated that a “purchaser cannot acquire good title from a thief.”

When a private individual discovers a cultural heritage item in the United States, the state’s rights primarily depend on (i) where the item is found and (ii) what type of item it is. On federal or tribal land, federal statutes can limit private acquisition. For example, the Archaeological Resources Protection Act (16 U.S.C. §§ 470aa–470mm) generally prohibits excavating or removing archaeological resources on public or Native American lands without a permit and authorises civil/criminal enforcement. For Native American human remains and certain cultural items discovered on Federal or tribal lands, NAGPRA provides an ownership/control hierarchy (prioritising lineal descendants and affiliated tribes/Native Hawaiian organisations), which can vest ownership/control in those parties rather than the finder. Although on private land, ownership is typically governed by state property law (including landowner-versus-finder principles), the closer the object is to a protected cultural heritage item, the more likely there will be regulatory and ownership constraints.

An art sale contract typically covers:

  • the parties and the transaction structure (ie, identity of the seller and buyer and whether the sale is private, through a gallery or by auction);
  • a clear identification of the art (ie, the artist, title, medium, dimensions, date); and
  • the purchase price and payment mechanics (ie, deposit, timing, wire instructions, consequences of non-payment).

Agreements may also cover condition and inspection procedures, provenance and authenticity documentation and the seller’s representations and warranties (such as good title and absence of liens). Finally, they may address intellectual property and permitted image use, as well as remedies if either party breaches the agreement.

When art moves across borders, regulatory compliance is important, as misstatements can lead to the detention and seizure of art. US Customs and Border Protection has authority to impose penalties on any merchandise entered – or attempted to be entered – into the United States through materially false statements, fraudulent documents or material omissions, including falsified invoices, altered provenance records or inaccurate entry data. Criminal exposure can also arise where someone knowingly uses false, forged, or fraudulent invoices or documents or otherwise imports goods “contrary to law.” A failure to properly declare the merchandise can result in penalties and/or forfeiture. In addition, art and antiquities taken unlawfully may be treated as stolen property, making them vulnerable to government seizure under the National Stolen Property Act (18 U.S.C. §§ 2314–2315) and related laws.

Title and provenance risks can compound once the object is abroad. In the United States, the baseline rule is that a buyer generally acquires only the title the seller had; if the seller’s title is void because the work was stolen, the buyer typically cannot improve on it by purchasing in good faith. Other jurisdictions may apply rules, which means an artwork with provenance gaps may become harder to sell, be detained or be claimed and recovered in a forum whose rules are less favourable to the current holder.

Finally, logistics and risk allocation are central because many losses occur in transit. Practically, collectors and dealers often reduce exposure by using specialist art shippers (packing/crating, climate controls, secure handling) and by documenting condition before and after shipment (photos/condition reports) so any claim is provable.

Gallery owners and auction houses can face liability if they sell works that are inauthentic. When a gallery or auction house sells a work on consignment, a consignment agreement may govern. The consignment agreement may include the consignor’s representations and warranties about authenticity.

A purchaser of an inauthentic work may have several remedies under contract and tort law, including under the Uniform Commercial Code. Under Uniform Commercial Code Section 2-313, a seller’s affirmation of fact, promise, or description regarding authorship or authenticity can create an express warranty if it becomes part of the basis of the bargain. If the work is later determined not to be authentic, the buyer may seek contract remedies for breach of that warranty. These default protections, however, are frequently shaped by the parties’ agreement – particularly in gallery invoices and auction “conditions of sale” – which may limit, disclaim, or define the scope of authenticity warranties and remedies.

Additionally, buyers may have some protection under the implied warranty of merchantability under Uniform Commercial Code Section 2-314 when purchasing art from prominent dealers or galleries who are considered a merchant dealing in “goods of that kind.” However, as sellers can modify the express warranties through contract and it is difficult for buyers to prove a prima facie case for an implied warranty of merchantability, the remedies provided under the Uniform Commercial Code may be inadequate.

A good-faith buyer may also bring a tort claim for fraud, or actions for negligent and/or fraudulent misrepresentation, such as by claiming that the auction house was negligent in providing that the work was authentic. Contract law, particularly the doctrine of mutual mistake, may provide some protection for a good-faith buyer. The buyer may claim that authorship is an important provision of an art purchase contract and that the contract is unenforceable because both the buyer and seller were mistaken about a material term (ie, that the artwork was the authentic work of a specific artist).

There is no statutory or regulatory provision requiring auction houses to authenticate works that are sold. Nevertheless, an auction house’s duty to authenticate works of art is driven by the potential liabilities it may face under its contracts with buyers and under tort law, as well as the significant reputational damage that can result from selling inauthentic works. Reputable sellers will typically:

  • conduct title and provenance due diligence;
  • undertake an authenticity review;
  • prepare condition and restoration disclosures;
  • and conduct other due diligence checks.

An art adviser acts as a client’s representative in the art market, typically assisting the client with art acquisitions, serving as a consultant for art collections, and offering art investment advice, such as when to sell or purchase art.

The United States currently lacks a comprehensive regulatory framework for money laundering in the art market and is largely under-regulated. Most anti-money laundering/counter-terrorism financing regulations primarily apply to regulated financial institutions, such as banks and do not appear to be imposed on art market participants. The Money Laundering Control Act, which criminalises money laundering, could expose art market participants to criminal liability, for example, when illegally obtained funds are used to purchase artworks.

Art market participants do have compliance duties, such as cash-transaction reporting, which require any person engaged in a trade or business to file a report if they receive more than USD10,000 in cash in a single or in related transactions.

The Anti-Money Laundering Act of 2020 amended the Bank Secrecy Act to bring certain antiquities market participants within the definition of “financial institution” and directed FinCEN to issue implementing regulations; the associated AML program, customer due diligence and suspicious activity reporting obligations apply as of the effective date of the final regulations, not automatically upon enactment.

Collections can be treated as “cultural heritage” when they are valued for more than their market price, such as for their historic, artistic, scientific, religious or social significance to a community or nation. The legal consequences of that status are still largely determined by the domestic law of the place where the collection is located (and sometimes the place of origin), but several international laws may be applicable. For instance, the 1954 Hague Convention establishes protections for cultural property and cultural institutions during war and the 1970 UNESCO Convention prevents the illegal import, export and transfer of cultural property. As discussed above, the United States also has laws that include a range of measures intended to deter the illicit trafficking of cultural property. Additionally, state and local governments likewise protect historic and cultural assets through preservation boards/commissions, ordinances and permitting requirements.

The 1976 Copyright Act extends to originators of creative works, including photographers, if the work is an “original work of authorship” that is “fixed in any tangible medium of expression”, including pictorial works and satisfies the originality and fixation requirements. In Feist Publications, Inc. v Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 US 340, 345 (1991), the Court stated that the originality requirement requires the work to be independently created, rather than copied and to possess a minimal level of creativity. The court further stated that the creativity requirement is a low threshold that would be met by a majority of works.

In photography, a photographer can show originality through creative and artistic choices, such as selecting and arranging the subject matter, posing, camera placement and angle, framing, lighting decisions, lens selection and timing. Courts have treated these creative choices as protectable. For example, in the case Rogers v Koons, 960 F.2d 301 (2d Cir. 1992), the court held Rogers’ expressive elements, such as composition and lighting, were protected. The fixation requirement requires the work to be “fixed” in a way that is sufficiently permanent, rather than transitory in duration. For photographs, the fixation requirement is generally met when the image is captured in a digital file or film/print.

In the United States, even if a photograph is not eligible for protection under the 1976 Copyright Act, the photograph may be protected under other legal principles that may restrict the photograph’s use or dissemination. For instance, contracts and licensing can limit the reproduction or posting of the photograph through contractual terms, without relying on copyright. Photographs depicting identifiable individuals may be governed by privacy tort and right of publicity/appropriation doctrines, which may protect individuals against nonconsensual uses of their likeness. Federal trademark law can also apply when an image is used in advertising or promotion.

In the United States, “NFT” (non-fungible token) is commonly understood as a digital asset recorded or stored on a blockchain and associated with a specific asset, such as digital art or media. An NFT differs from other fungible assets, such as cryptocurrency, because each NFT is distinct and not interchangeable. The NFT is usually not the actual asset itself, and purchasing an NFT does not automatically confer ownership rights in the underlying asset. Although not common, the NFT and the underlying asset can be sold together. Typically, the sale of the NFT does not include the underlying asset or any intellectual property rights in the underlying asset. The intellectual property rights in the underlying asset can also be licensed for certain purposes.

It is possible for inauthentic or counterfeit NFTs to circulate. For instance, NFT scammers may create counterfeit NFTs, fake listings for sale or a fake NFT marketplace that mimics established platforms. Blockchain records do not automatically verify that the minter had legal rights or authorisation to tokenise the associated artwork, brand or collection. As a result, NFT scammers can mint and sell unauthorised NFTs.

Estate planning for art should consider whether to transfer the art during the lifetime or at death. The owner should also consider whether they wish to retain control over the art during their lifetime and provide for a disposition of the art under their will or revocable trust. This would result in the inclusion of the art in the owner’s gross estate for federal estate tax purposes, although it may offer administrative benefits. If the owner holds the art until death, the art receives a step-up in basis to fair market value as of the date of death (or if elected, the alternate valuation date). Any lifetime-gifting should consider federal gift, estate and GST tax exposure, along with income tax consequences for both the donor and donee. An owner may consider making a lifetime gift to prevent inclusion in the owner’s gross estate, particularly if they expect the art to appreciate significantly in value between the time of the gift and the owner’s death. Although the owner may have to pay gift tax, the owner is not subject to transfer taxes on the post-gift appreciation. Lifetime gifts may qualify for the annual exclusion under Internal Revenue Code (“IRC”) Section 2503(b) as well. The owner may also consider making a gift to a grantor trust and holding a substitution power, which would allow the owner to exchange the gifted art with an asset of equivalent value without any income tax consequences.

However, there are other factors that makes a testamentary transfer more favourable, especially if the owner wishes to retain assets for use during their lifetime, the owner does not wish to make inter vivos gifts, the owner’s gross estate at death is not expected to exceed the lifetime exemption amount, or if the owner is married and lives in a community property state, the surviving spouse may lose the benefit of the step-up in estate tax values on the surviving spouse’s one-half of the community property. Additionally, if the art is held in trust, the owner should consider appointing a trustee or adviser with expertise in art who can oversee the administration, valuation, conservation, sale and promotion of the art. The owner of the art should consider whether to appoint the specialist as an executor or trustee, or as an adviser to assist the trustee. The owner of the art may also consider whether the trustee should have exclusive authority to make decisions regarding the sale, license or use of the art.

If the deceased individual does not leave a Will or trust that directs the disposition of the art, intestacy under state law would determine how the art is distributed. Under intestate and/or testamentary succession, the art collection can be fragmented among multiple heirs under state probate rules, which may lead to disputes, including but not limited to control, possession, or conservation. Title to the art may become contested. Additionally, if the individual owns art that consists of cultural property from other nations, a foreign nation can assert ownership and seek to recover the art on the grounds that they were stolen. Similar rules may apply with respect to collections of Native American cultural property.

Fiscal issues centre on federal estate tax valuation. Artwork is included in the gross estate at date of death value under IRC § 2031 (with possible alternate valuation under § 2032). If the estate, gift or income tax return has been selected for audit and includes art valued at USD50,000 or more, it faces heightened scrutiny through the IRS Art Advisory Panel process.

Gifts of art would be taxed to the donor and not the recipient. An individual donee generally does not recognise income upon the receipt of the gift artwork because the value of the property acquired by gift is excluded from gross income under Internal Revenue Code (“IRC”) Section 102(a).

A donor can make a gift up to the annual exclusion amount per donee (for example, USD19,000 in 2026) without using the donor’s lifetime exemption. Gifts above the annual gift exclusion will use the donor’s lifetime exemption and the gift must be reported on a gift tax return. In 2026, each individual may gift up to USD15,000,000 in assets before being subject to gift tax. Under current law, the gift tax is 40% on transfers over the donor’s available exemption amount.

Although the donee does not recognise income upon receipt of the gifted art, the transfer is not advantageous for the donee as the donee typically receives carryover basis, subject to adjustments under IRC Section 1015.

A donor who donates the art to a qualified charitable organisation may receive an income-tax charitable deduction, subject to certain limitations. There are specific rules regarding appraisals for gifts of art.

Artwork may be excluded from transfer taxes when the transfer falls under statutory deductions or exclusions. Transfers of art to qualifying charitable organisations, such as museums, are deductible for estate tax purposes under IRC Section 2055 and for gift tax purposes under IRC Section 2522. Transfers to a surviving spouse may qualify for the marital deduction under IRC Section 2056 and IRC Section 2523. Lifetime gifts of artwork may qualify for the annual exclusion or fall under the lifetime exclusion amount (currently, USD15,000,0000). If a transfer of artwork does not qualify for an exclusion from transfer taxes and the value of such artwork exceeds the transferor’s available exclusion amount, then the transfer would be subject to gift tax (if the transfer is an inter vivos gift) or an estate tax (if the transfer is testamentary). The gift tax and estate tax rates are 40%. Gift and estate taxes are paid by the transferor and not the transferee. The US does not have a separate inheritance tax. In addition to gift and estate taxes, the US applies a “generation-skipping transfer” (GST) tax on transfers to individuals more than one generation below the transferor (called “skip-persons”). The tax is in addition to any gift or estate taxes that apply to the transfer. Each individual has USD15,000,000 of GST exemption. Transfers to skip persons in excess of USD15,000,000 are subject to a 40% GST tax.

Artwork can be placed in an irrevocable trust by gift or bequest, which may provide advantages over an outright gift or bequest of the art. Holding art in trust allows for the professional management of the art and also provides creditor and divorce claim protection. Additionally, by holding art in trust, the donor may have more control over directing who may possess or enjoy the art following the transfer. A purpose trust is a trust that is designed to hold assets for a specific purpose, rather than for the benefit of individual beneficiaries. A gratuitous transfer of an art collection to a non-charitable purpose trust would be a gift if the transfer is a completed gift, but retained powers may cause estate tax inclusion. In addition to transferring artwork to an irrevocable trust, which is a completed gift for gift tax purposes, individuals may also transfer artwork to a revocable trust. A revocable trust functions as a “will substitute” in that the trust provides direction for the distribution of the artwork upon the owner’s death. Transfers to a revocable trust are not a gift because the transferor retains full domination and control over the trust assets during the transferor’s lifetime. Importantly, assets held in a revocable trust avoid a court-supervised “probate” procedure upon the transferor’s death, which can be time-consuming and is generally available for public viewing.

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The Coopersmith Law Firm, LLP is a boutique San Diego law firm representing business entities and high net-worth individuals in a wide range of business and corporate matters, including those stemming from corporate and partnership dissolutions, securities and financial fraud violations, bet-the-company litigation, and executive-level business employment disputes. In addition, our fine art law practice also includes representation of auction houses, art galleries and dealers, collectors, and both buyers and sellers. Fine art law is the intersection of a number of different legal areas, including intellectual property, business and corporate law, commercial law, as well as law specific to art transactions. The firm often serves as a trusted advisor to clients concerning fine art disputes, contracting and business matters, and general legal advice regarding a wide range of matters arising from the business of art.

When Choice of Law Decides Justice: California’s AB 2867 and Nazi-Looted Art

California Assembly Bill 2867 represents a decisive break from the legal status quo governing Holocaust restitution claims. Its enactment signals escalating frustration with federal and foreign frameworks that have proven ill-suited to deliver just and fair outcomes for claims rooted in Nazi-era dispossession.

Historical context leading up to AB2867

The Holocaust was not only a campaign of physical extermination. It also involved the systematic dismantling of Jewish economic, cultural, and communal life. The Nazi campaign extended beyond individuals to encompass property, businesses, religious institutions, and works of art. This process unfolded gradually. One early example was the Reich Flight Tax imposed on Jews seeking to immigrate from Germany. These financial restrictions operated as pressure mechanisms, stripping families of assets before they could escape.

As the regime intensified, economic pressure continued. Following Kristallnacht, heavy fines were imposed on Jewish communities, coerced sales of homes and businesses became widespread, and bank accounts were seized. Nazi seizures did not end at financial and personal assets. They continued to the very end, including in extermination camps, where the victims were stripped of their humanity and ultimately their lives. (Elazar Barkan, The Guilt of Nations: Restitution and Negotiating Historical Injustices)

The scope of Nazi confiscations surpassed tangible property and extended into intellectual property. This process of dispossession was formalised through the policy known as "Aryanization," under which Jewish-owned businesses, assets, and cultural property were systematically transferred to non-Jewish control. Although often presented as voluntary transactions, Aryanization functioned through legal and economic coercion, forcing Jewish owners to sell assets – including art collections – at a fraction of their value or to surrender them outright. Aryanization stripped Jewish collectors and dealers of both physical possession and legal title, embedding coerced transfers within ostensibly lawful commercial frameworks.

These pressures were compounded by exit taxes, most notably the Reich Flight Tax mentioned above, which the Nazi regime repurposed into a mechanism of partial expropriation aimed at Jewish emigrants. Jews seeking to flee Germany were required to liquidate assets to satisfy punitive tax assessments, frequently leaving art collections among the few portable stores of value available. As a result, artworks were often sold under extreme time pressure and at distressed prices, not as market transactions but as a prerequisite for escape.

Taken together, Aryanization and exit taxation transformed art into a tool of survival for persecuted families while simultaneously providing the regime with a means to launder coerced transfers through the appearance of legality – an ambiguity that continues to complicate restitution claims today. By the late 1930s, these policies had become systematic, and Jewish authors and business owners were compelled to relinquish their intellectual property, thereby depriving them of economic benefits. (Marilyn Creswell, The Seizure of Jewish Intellectual Property Ahead of World War II)

These mechanisms intensified the dispossession of art and cultural heritage, producing a campaign aimed at the destruction of Jewish identity . Approximately 600,000 to 650,000 works of art were seized or sold under coercive conditions. An estimated 100,000 of those works remain unrecovered. Some works were taken outright, while others were sold under duress by Jewish owners creating complex and contested ownership histories that complicate restitution claims. (Thérèse O’Donnell, The Restitution of Holocaust Looted Art and Transitional Justice: The Perfect Storm or the Raft of the Medusa?; Alexander Stanfield, The Choice of Law for Nazi-Looted Art Restitution: Cassirer v. Thyssen-Bornemisza Collection Foundation and California Assembly Bill 2867)

Even during the war, Jewish refugees and international organisations began grappling with how to achieve restitution. Early restitution discussions defined what property was recoverable and who the proper claimants were, generally identifying private property, heirless property, and communal property as recoverable categories.

Restitution and its limits

Although the need for restitution was recognised early, postwar systems were fractured and politically constrained. Jewish survivors lacked meaningful representation at the Paris Reparations Conference, and early Allied frameworks prioritised intergovernmental transfers rather than individualised compensation. This same tension between legal principle and practical enforcement was evident even during the war. The 1943 London Declaration rejected recognition of wartime transfers in Nazi-occupied territories, reflecting the principle that many Nazi-era "sales" were legally invalid because they were the likely product of coercion or extortion. (Charles Cronin, Ethical Quandaries: The Holocaust Expropriated Art Recovery Act and Claims for Works in Public Museums)

By the immediate post-war period, the consequences of this gap became even more apparent. In 1946, the US Department of State warned that stolen art was entering the United States. Nevertheless, most families lacked the resources, documentation, or capacity to pursue recovery. Subsequent initiatives, including the Roberts Commission, the Monuments, Fine Arts, and Archives program, and the 1998 Washington Conference on Holocaust-Era Assets, made meaningful efforts to address looted art, but they did not create binding legal remedies. The Washington Principles on Nazi-Confiscated Art similarly articulated eleven voluntary guidelines but relied entirely on good-faith compliance rather than compulsion. (Gideon Taylor & Ruth J. Weinberger, Seeing the Humanity in Each Object: Finding Justice Amid the Law; Abigail Greenberger Rosovsky, Note, The Greatest Art Theft in History: How Bipartisan Legislation Attempts to Redress Nazi Looted Art)

In the absence of any central or binding framework in the United States, Holocaust-era property claims have therefore proceeded through ordinary civil litigation mechanisms. This allows museums and foreign institutions to rely on statutes of limitation, laches, and adverse possession, often resolving disputes on procedural grounds rather than on the merits. This reliance on ordinary litigation reflects a broader reality: existing legal frameworks have proven functionally inadequate to govern Holocaust-era art disputes.

The turn to US courts

Beginning in the 1990s, Holocaust heirs increasingly turned to US courts as European legal systems faced territorial limits and strict time bars. By contrast, US procedural doctrines, including class actions and unjust enrichment, initially made recovery more realistic. (Leora Bilsky, Transnational Holocaust Litigation)

One of the most consistent obstacles in the US, however, was the statute of limitations. Before federal statutory involvement, claims were governed by varying state limitation periods and accrual rules. In many jurisdictions, a claim accrued at the time of the wrongful taking, meaning it could lapse decades before heirs even located the artwork. Without reform, many Holocaust-era claims would never reach the merits.

Congress responded by enacting the Holocaust Expropriated Art Recovery Act of 2016 (the "HEAR Act"). The HEAR Act created a uniform six-year filing period running from the claimant’s actual discovery of the Nazi-looted artwork’s identity and location, along with sufficient information to assert a claim. The goal was simple: prevent timing from blocking claims before heirs could pursue them.

But the HEAR Act is limited. It does not alter substantive property laws or override sovereign immunity, and it contains a sunset provision, causing it to expire on 1 January 2027. In March 2026, the US Congress unanimously passed the Holocaust Expropriated Art Recovery (HEAR) Act of 2025, extending the 2016 HEAR Act beyond its scheduled December 2026 expiration, prohibiting defences such as laches and statutes of limitations, and allowing claims within six years of discovery. On 13 April 2026, the HEAR Act of 2025 was signed into law. And yet the sunset provision in the original HEAR Act shows how limited federal uniformity in this area really is and heightens the significance of state-level legislative responses.

At the same time, federal jurisdiction narrowed. In Republic of Germany v Philipp, the Supreme Court held that Nazi seizures of property from German Jews constituted "domestic takings" beyond US jurisdiction under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act. Taken together, sovereign immunity doctrine and the impending HEAR sunset left federal avenues increasingly constrained. It is against that backdrop that California enacted AB 2867.

Cassirer as catalyst to AB 2867

The long-running litigation in Cassirer v. Thyssen-Bornemisza ("Cassirer") illustrates the ongoing structural tensions in practice. The facts there involved, Camille Pissarro’s Rue Saint Honoré, Après midi, Effet de Pluie which was originally acquired in 1900, and later inherited by Lilly Cassirer, who lived in Berlin. After the Nazis took over in 1939, Lilly Cassirer, sold the painting under duress to secure an exit visa from Germany. Decades later, the painting resurfaced in Spain, and ultimately became part of the Thyssen-Bornemisza Collection.

By the time the case reached its final stages, the coercive nature of the 1939 sale was not the dispositive issue. Instead, the dispute centred on which jurisdiction’s law governed ownership. After more than 20 years of proceedings, the Ninth Circuit concluded that under California’s choice of law test, Spanish law controlled. Under Spanish law, which permits acquisition of title through prescription, the court determined that the Foundation had obtained valid title to the painting.

Cassirer thus illustrates a significant weakness in Holocaust restitution litigation: even where timing barriers are addressed and historical coercion is recognised, choice-of-law principles can determine the outcome. The application of foreign law, rather than statutes of limitation, proved dispositive for justice.

AB 2867: A state-level intervention in Holocaust restitution

In response to cases like Cassirer, California enacted AB 2867 in 2024. The statute provides that, California substantive law applies in actions seeking recovery of artwork or personal property taken as a result of political persecution. By requiring application of California substantive law, AB 2867 displaces reliance on foreign property doctrines. In Cassirer, the Ninth Circuit explained that under Spanish law, a possessor may acquire title through prescription, whereas under California law "a thief cannot pass good title." AB 2867 therefore ensures that California ownership rules apply in covered cases.

AB 2867 operates in a fundamentally different register from the HEAR Act. Whereas the HEAR Act addresses only procedural timing by extending statutes of limitation, it leaves untouched the substantive property law that ultimately governs ownership disputes. As a result, even timely claims brought under HEAR have frequently failed once courts applied foreign law recognising title acquired through prescription or good-faith purchase.

AB 2867 responds directly to that limitation by mandating application of California ownership principles, thereby shifting the focus from procedural access to substantive adjudication on the merits. In this respect, AB 2867 reflects a legislative judgment that procedural access alone is insufficient where substantive choice-of-law rules continue to validate transfers rooted in persecution.

AB 2867 is highly unusual in the American legal landscape because it represents a rare instance in which a state legislature has intervened directly in the choice-of-law analysis governing historical property disputes. Rather than adjusting procedural access to courts, the statute mandates application of California substantive ownership law in a defined class of cases, displacing foreign property regimes that would otherwise control under ordinary conflicts principles. In doing so, California has departed from the prevailing judicial reluctance to legislatively override choice-of-law outcomes, particularly in cases involving foreign sovereign interests and extraterritorial conduct.

AB 2867 has already impacted the Cassirer litigation. After the Ninth Circuit applied Spanish law and concluded that the museum had acquired valid title under that framework, the Supreme Court vacated the judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings. (Parsa Zaheri, Rehearing with a Chance of Restitution: The Effects of Rainfall and Recent Developments on Rue Saint Honoré)

AB 2867 thus represents a deliberate shift in how Holocaust-era ownership disputes are resolved. Rather than allowing foreign doctrines to control the outcome, the statute leans the analysis toward California’s substantive property rules.

Notwithstanding its remedial purpose, AB 2867 is likely to invite constitutional scrutiny. Critics may argue that the statute impermissibly applies California substantive law to conduct and transactions that occurred entirely outside the state, raising due process concerns regarding the requisite nexus between California and the disputed property. Others may contend that the statute interferes with foreign relations or burdens interstate and international commerce by displacing foreign ownership regimes through state legislation. While California has articulated a strong interest in ensuring that claims rooted in Nazi-era persecution are resolved under principles that do not legitimise coerced transfers, the statute’s durability will ultimately depend on how courts balance that interest against constitutional limits on extraterritorial application of state law.

Where do we go from here?

As a direct result of AB 2867 Courts have taken an assertive step to address choice-of-law barriers that have been plaguing heirs for decades. This shift is significant but does not eliminate the deeper challenges that Holocaust restitution cases face.

AB 2867 also has significant implications for forum selection in Holocaust-era restitution litigation. By mandating application of California substantive ownership law, the statute creates a strong incentive for claimants to file suit in California whenever jurisdiction can plausibly be established. This shift may concentrate restitution litigation in California courts, particularly in cases involving foreign museums or collections with even minimal contacts with the state. While critics may characterise this effect as forum shopping, supporters argue that it reflects a deliberate legislative effort to ensure that claims rooted in Nazi-era persecution are adjudicated under legal principles that do not validate coerced transfers.

In practice, the disputes reaching courts are rarely about newly uncovered theft. Instead, they involve artworks that museums or other institutions have long-held, despite histories rooted in Nazi-era persecution. AB 2867 addresses legal barriers to restitution, but it does not – and cannot – resolve the ethical divide between lawful title and moral legitimacy that increasingly confronts museums.

The Emil Bührle Collection at the Kunsthaus Zurich illustrates this dilemma. The collection is closely linked to its founder, Emil G. Bührle, whose wealth was largely derived from arms exports to Nazi Germany during World War II, and later to the post-war West. Several works in the collection were later identified as having been looted by the Germans during the war. In 1948, the Chamber for looted property of the Swiss Federal Supreme Court in Lausanne required the restitution of certain paintings, and Bührle later repurchased several of the returned works. More recently, the Kunsthaus Zürich has revised the presentation of the collection to address artworks, provenance, historical context, and social responsibility together, explicitly situating the works within their wartime history. (E.G. Bührle Collection Foundation, The Bührle Collection: One of the Great Modern Art Collections (1936–1959))

The controversy surrounding the Bührle Collection has also prompted a broader institutional response in Switzerland. In 2023, the City of Zurich and the Kunsthaus commissioned an independent expert report, led by historian Raphael Gross, to assess the collection’s provenance and restitution framework. The resulting report recommended the establishment of an interdisciplinary commission to evaluate disputed works not solely on formal legal ownership, but also in light of historical persecution, coercive sales, and the moral imperatives articulated in the Washington Principles’ call for "just and fair solutions." This approach reflects an emerging European model in which restitution determinations incorporate ethical and historical judgment alongside traditional legal analysis. (Catherine Hickley, Bührle Foundation’s Provenance Research is Inadequate, Report Finds)

The Bührle controversy demonstrates that even where courts clarify governing law, institutions must still confront the ethical and historical elements of wartime acquisitions. AB 2867 thus reshapes the legal framework for ownership disputes, but it does not eliminate the practical and moral complexities that continue to define Holocaust-era restitution.

Although AB 2867 applies equally to private collectors and museums, its impact is likely to be felt most acutely by institutional holders, which more frequently invoke foreign law, prescription, or good-faith acquisition defences to justify long-held collections, whereas private collectors are less often positioned to rely on those doctrines in restitution litigation.

Conclusion

AB 2867 should be understood as more than a state-level policy statement or a narrow corrective to a single litigation outcome. It is a litigation-shaping intervention aimed at a recurring structural problem that has repeatedly decided Holocaust-era restitution claims without reaching the merits: once plaintiffs clear timing hurdles, conventional choice-of-law analysis can still route the dispute into foreign property doctrines that validate coercive transfers through prescription or comparable mechanisms.

In that sense, AB 2867 is best viewed as California’s attempt to move Holocaust-era cases out of the procedural cul-de-sac that Cassirer made vivid, and into a forum where the governing rule of decision is California’s substantive ownership law.

From a litigator’s perspective, the statute’s practical significance is amplified by the federal landscape that surrounds it. The HEAR Act meaningfully improved access to courts by standardising the accrual of limitations, but it did so largely in the procedural context. It did not alter substantive property rules, and it did not prevent courts from applying foreign ownership doctrines once the case was timely. It also sunsets at the end of 2026, after which claim viability will again depend heavily on state-by-state limitation rules and accrual doctrines. At the same time, sovereign-immunity doctrine has narrowed federal avenues in certain categories of cases.

Against that backdrop, AB 2867 functions as a strategic re-centring device: it does not merely extend time to sue, but seeks to control the substantive ownership analysis – thereby reshaping pleading decisions, forum selection, and the leverage points that drive settlement posture. By requiring courts to apply California substantive law and rejecting defences based on foreign property systems, AB 2867 provides an alternative pathway for restitution.

The statute, therefore, represents more than a change to court procedures. It reflects a broader shift in Holocaust restitution policy, from reliance on federal uniformity toward state-level action.

The statute’s influence will likely be felt most immediately in litigation behaviour. By mandating California law in a defined class of persecution-based takings, AB 2867 creates incentives to file in California whenever jurisdictional hooks can plausibly be established, and it may concentrate restitution litigation in a single forum.

That shift will sharpen threshold disputes – personal jurisdiction, forum non conveniens, and choice-of-law framing – because the governing-law determination now carries even more weight. At the same time, AB 2867’s durability is not guaranteed: its design invites constitutional challenge on extraterritoriality and nexus grounds, and defendants can be expected to test those limits early.

The longer-term question, therefore, is not only whether AB 2867 survives those challenges, but whether it catalyses broader legislative experimentation elsewhere or prompts courts to recalibrate how they apply conflict principles in persecution-based property claims. In short, AB 2867 is poised to become a bellwether – both for how Holocaust-era restitution cases are litigated after HEAR’s sunset, and for whether US courts will increasingly be asked to reconcile traditional property doctrines with the distinctive features of Nazi-era dispossession.

The Coopersmith Law Firm, LLP

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Pillsbury Winthrop Shaw Pittman LLP is a global full-service law firm with approximately 700 lawyers across 20 offices in the United States, Europe and Asia, including major offices in New York, Washington, DC, London, Los Angeles and San Francisco. The firm advises clients ranging from emerging companies to the largest public and private corporations on complex legal, regulatory, transactional and dispute matters across key sectors such as technology, energy and infrastructure, financial services, real estate and construction, media and entertainment, life sciences and digital health. Pillsbury lawyers are known for their multidisciplinary approach and deep industry insight, delivering tailored solutions that align with clients’ strategic objectives. The firm’s market-leading practices span corporate transactions, intellectual property, litigation and enforcement defence, regulatory compliance and public policy advocacy and its work is consistently recognised for excellence by Chambers & Partners, Best Lawyers and other guides. Pillsbury’s integrated platform supports clients with innovative, commercially driven legal services around the world.

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The Coopersmith Law Firm, LLP is a boutique San Diego law firm representing business entities and high net-worth individuals in a wide range of business and corporate matters, including those stemming from corporate and partnership dissolutions, securities and financial fraud violations, bet-the-company litigation, and executive-level business employment disputes. In addition, our fine art law practice also includes representation of auction houses, art galleries and dealers, collectors, and both buyers and sellers. Fine art law is the intersection of a number of different legal areas, including intellectual property, business and corporate law, commercial law, as well as law specific to art transactions. The firm often serves as a trusted advisor to clients concerning fine art disputes, contracting and business matters, and general legal advice regarding a wide range of matters arising from the business of art.

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