Aviation Disputes 2025

Last Updated May 21, 2025

UK

Law and Practice

Authors



Penningtons Manches Cooper is a leading international law firm operating across several offices in the UK, Singapore, Piraeus, Paris, Antibes and Madrid, with a focus on the key industry sectors of aviation and aerospace, shipping (2025 being the 200th year of this practice), international trade, commodities, (re)insurance and construction. There are 12 aviation and aerospace specialists with extensive experience in contentious and non-contentious matters, with a recognised track record in insurance and re-insurance coverage disputes, and high value and complex multi-jurisdictional claims. The team advises (civil and military) aerospace and aviation industry undertakings across a variety of transactions and disputes in non-insurance matters. Recent cases include the defence of an insurer in Russian aviation litigation in a number of English High Court actions, and representing a maintenance organisation in a complex technical matter concerning a high-profile fatal helicopter accident.

The legal framework in England and Wales is rooted in common law and develops through court rulings over time. The doctrine of precedent applies.

An adversarial system is employed by the courts in civil litigation. Inquisitorial processes include coronial inquests, public enquiries, and regulatory enforcement processes. 

There is no provision for routine pre-trial depositions. However, depositions may be ordered, typically to obtain evidence from a witness unable to attend trial.

The framework involves both written submissions and oral argument before the courts. Each disputing party must usually submit written arguments (including legal authorities) before a court hearing. Cases are then presented and expanded orally during the hearings. Witness testimony is permitted and commonly required to addresses factual disputes.

Courts

England and Wales do not have a federal or state court system. The court system is hierarchical. There is a distinction between trial and appellate courts. The overall structure is as follows.

  • the Magistrates’ Courts – hearing minor criminal, family and some civil matters;
  • the Crown Courts – hearing serious criminal matters;
  • the County Courts – inferior to, and having narrower jurisdiction than, the High Court, hearing civil matters of moderate value or complexity;
  • the High Court – a superior court, consisting of three divisions (King’s Bench Division, Chancery Division and Family Division) having broad jurisdiction in civil matters of significant value or complexity;
  • the Court of Appeal – hearing appeals from the High Court and Crown Court; and
  • the Supreme Court – the highest appeal court.

There are no dedicated aviation courts, but the following have historically presided over aviation disputes:

  • the County Courts – for passenger or cargo claims.
  • the Business and Property Courts (“B&PCs”) (part of the King’s Bench Division) - for aviation commercial disputes;
  • the King’s Bench Division – for death or major personal injury claims;
  • the Admiralty Court (part of the King’s Bench Division) – for aviation disputes overlapping with maritime law; and
  • the Technology and Construction Court (part of the King’s Bench Division) for disputes involving significant technical aspects.

Judges – Case Management and Rulings

There are detailed rules addressing case management. Cases are actively managed by judges, usually through Case Management Conferences (CMCs), at which progress and procedural requirements are reviewed. Judges actively manage the conduct of hearings (including trial), and will intervene to ensure efficient and proper process.

Rulings on procedural applications are often immediate, or follow quickly after the hearing. Substantive judgment is usually reserved. Detailed written judgments are issued in the majority of cases within three months.

Timelines

The time from filing a claim to trial varies depending on the complexity and urgency of the case. In major aviation disputes it will be more than 12 months; 18 months is considered the norm and, for complex cases, it could be approximately two years. Expedited trial may be ordered where there is sufficient urgency and importance, although that is unusual in aviation disputes. Trial duration depends upon the complexity of the case, and in the B&PCs can (unusually) exceed three months.

ADR (Alternative Dispute Resolution)

ADR is not mandatory, but is encouraged. The disputing parties are usually expected to explore ADR options before proceeding to trial. The courts are empowered, where they consider it appropriate, to stay proceedings and order parties to engage in ADR (including where the parties oppose it). A court may consider failure or refusal of a party to so engage as unreasonable, which may result in costs sanctions against that party.

The core legislation is the Arbitration Act 1996 (AA). The AA is considerably influenced by the Model Law, but does not adopt it in its entirety. Examples of departures from the Model Law include the AA’s application to all arbitrations (national or international) and the flexibility under the AA inherent in the court’s power to support arbitration.

The Arbitration Act 2025 has recently been enacted, modernising and amending the AA. It is set to come into force “as soon as practicable”. Some of the key changes include:

  • clarification of governing law (the seat of arbitration, unless the parties expressly agree otherwise);
  • providing arbitrators with summary disposal powers;
  • empowering emergency arbitrators to issue enforceable orders; and
  • a duty of disclosure on arbitrators regarding circumstances that might raise doubts about their impartiality.

International arbitration process is established and prominent. It is routinely used by local parties in commercial aviation disputes and the jurisdiction remains important in international aviation community. Key reasons are:

  • confidentiality;
  • the ability to choose arbitrators with specialised expertise;
  • enforcement of awards under the New York Convention in important contracting states; and
  • the limited grounds under the AA to appeal an arbitral award.

Jurisdiction may be founded:

  • under the Civil Jurisdiction and Judgments Act 1982 and the Brussels I Regulation (as retained in UK law after Brexit), based on the defendant’s domicile;
  • on the defendant’s physical presence in the jurisdiction, when served with legal proceedings;
  • on contractual choice of jurisdiction;
  • on the defendant’s agreement to submit to the jurisdiction; and
  • on the basis of the tort in question having occurred in the UK.

The remedy in a cause of action for breach of contract or in tort is barred after six years from accrual of cause of action. A cause of action for breach of contract accrues upon breach; a cause of action in tort accrues upon damage. A claim in tort for personal injury is a special case: the remedy becomes barred three years from injury or knowledge of the cause of action. The court has discretion to remove the limitation period for personal injury or death if it is equitable to do so.

The Carriage by Air Act 1961 gives effect to the Warsaw and Montreal Conventions, and the extinction of rights upon expiry of the two-year limitation period under those conventions. 

The running of the limitation period can be postponed if a fact relevant to the claimant’s right of action has been deliberately concealed by the defendant (Section 32(1)(b) of the Limitation Act 1980). It may be extended in cases of legal disability of the claimant (Sections 28 and 50(1) of the Limitation Act 1980).

The limitation period may be extended by written declaration of the carrier (in carriage by air regimes). In English law, agreements between disputing parties will not have the effect of tolling, but can have effect as a promise not to rely upon a limitation defence.

Practice Direction on Pre-Action Conduct and Protocols

While they are not mandatory, the guidelines contained in the Practice Direction on Pre-Action Conduct and Protocols set out the steps the court will usually expect the parties to take before issuing a claim (including the claimant providing concise details of the claim and the defendant responding within a reasonable time).

There is no aviation-specific protocol, but the parties should follow the guidelines in the general Practice Direction and any other protocol that they believe is most appropriate to their claim.

Sanctions for non-compliance with the Pre-Action Conduct Protocols

The court may address non-compliance when giving case-management directions, including a stay of proceedings (until steps are completed), and may impose adverse costs or interest awards (up to 10% above base rate).

Commencing an Aviation Disputes Claim

The claimant is required to issue a Claim Form (in prescribed form, identifying the parties to the claim and setting out brief details of the claim, the remedy sought and a statement on the value of the claim). The claimant is required to file the Claim Form at court and pay a court fee. The Claim Form is issued on the date entered on the form by the court.

If issued for service within the jurisdiction, the Claim Form is valid for (and must be served within) a period of four months from the date of issue. Where it is permitted to serve the Claim Form out of the jurisdiction, this must take place within six months of the date of issue.

Amending the Claim Form

The claimant may amend their Claim Form, removing, adding or substituting a party, at any time before it has been served on any other party. However, if the Claim Form has been served, the claimant may only amend it with: (a) the written consent of all the other parties; or (b) the court’s permission.

Serving the Claim Form

An opposing party is formally notified of the claim when they are served with the Claim Form.

The Civil Procedure Rules (CPR) provide that the court will serve the Claim Form subject to certain exceptions. Where a Claim Form is issued electronically, there is a presumption that the claimant will serve it. However, in the High Court (including the B&PCs and the King’s Bench Division), the claimant is expected effect service.

Methods of Service

Methods allowed under the CPR include:

  • service by first class post;
  • use of a document exchange or other service providing for next-business-day delivery;
  • delivery of the document to, or leaving it at, a permitted place under the rules – eg a company’s registered office or a principal place of business;
  • personal service; or
  • email (if the other party has consented in writing to be served by email). Service of a Claim Form may be effected by contractually agreed method.

Serving a Defendant Located Outside of the Jurisdiction

A defendant outside the jurisdiction may be served without permission in circumstances specified in the CPR; otherwise, permission of the court is required for service, and the requirements for the application and accompanying evidence are set out in the CPR.

Measures Available if a Defendant Does not Respond After Being Served

If a defendant fails to file an acknowledgment of service or a defence within the time limits prescribed by the CPR, the claimant may apply for default judgment. Default judgment is the early determination of the claim without consideration of the merits. A defendant can apply to set aside a default judgment.

Rights of Audience

A barrister holding a suitable practicing certificate from the Bar Standards Board and registered with the Bar Council has rights of audience in any court of England and Wales. Solicitors and registered European lawyers may be granted rights of audience in some courts, subject to requirements for “Higher Rights of Audience” (in the High Court or above). There is no general provision for foreign lawyers (not entitled as above) to have rights of audience. The court may (unusually) in its discretion allow a foreign lawyer to address it in the interests of justice in a particular case.

Legal Professional Privilege

The English legal system recognises legal advice privilege and litigation privilege. Legal advice privilege applies irrespective of whether litigation is contemplated or pending, whereas litigation privilege only applies when litigation is contemplated or pending. Legal advice privilege applies to communications between a lawyer and client for the dominant purpose of seeking or giving legal advice. Litigation privilege attaches to communications between parties or their solicitors and third parties, made for the dominant purpose of conducting litigation.

Legal privilege principles do not distinguish between the communications involving in-house or external counsel.

The CPR and the associated case law set out a detailed body of law on costs. What follows is a general summary.

Commonly, the prevailing party can seek to recover a portion of their legal fees and disbursements (including court fees) from the losing party. That is subject to the court’s discretion.

Costs orders may be made at various stages in a case, eg, upon determination of an interim or procedural application, as well as following judgment at trial. The court may have regard to the conduct of the parties, as well as which party prevailed. In substantial disputes, it is common for the judge to hear legal arguments concerning the costs orders to be made.

Except in simple matters, the costs order will be followed by formal assessment by the court, if the amount of costs is not agreed between the parties. Subject to the precise terms of the costs order, a party may then contest amounts claimed by the prevailing party. The most usual test to be applied is whether the cost was reasonably incurred and proportionate to the matters in issue.

The court may order the claimant to provide security against potential costs that the defendant may incur in the litigation. The court must be satisfied, with regard to all the circumstances of the case, that it is reasonable for the order and one or more of the conditions specified in the CPR to apply, including where the claimant:

  • is resident outside of the jurisdiction and not in a 2005 Hague Convention state;
  • is a company or other body (whether incorporated inside or outside of Great Britain) and there is reason to believe it will be unable to pay the defendant’s costs if ordered to do so;
  • has taken steps in relation to their assets that would make it difficult to enforce an order for costs against them.

Parties may file interim applications before trial or a substantive hearing. Such motions may extend beyond case management and encompass remedies. A party may seek summary resolution of particular issues/claims or seek to summarily dismiss an opposing party’s claim in part or entirely:

  • Summary judgment determines specific issues of a case, without a full trial. A claimant may apply for this after the defendant has filed an acknowledgment of service or a defence (unless the court gives permission or a specific rule or practice direction states otherwise). A defendant may apply for summary judgment at any time. The applicant is required to file an application notice with a witness statement. The court may give summary judgment on the whole of a claim or on an issue if: (a) it considers that party has no real prospect of succeeding on the claim, defence or issue; and (b) there is no other compelling reason why the case or issue should be disposed of at a trial.
  • The court may, on its own initiative or following an application by a party, strike out all or part of a party’s statements of case. The application can be made at any time, but should be made promptly and ideally in the early stages of the proceedings.

The applicant must file an application notice. A witness statement may be required, depending on the grounds for strike-out. A hearing will often be necessary to determine the application, but not always, and some applications are determined “on the papers”.

The court may strike out a statement of case (or part) if it appears that: (a) the statement of case discloses no reasonable grounds for bringing or defending the claim; (b) the statement of case is an abuse of the court’s process or is otherwise likely to obstruct the just disposal of proceedings; or (c) there has been a failure to comply with a rule, practice direction or court order.

The courts may award injunctive relief as either interim relief or final relief at trial. It broadly falls into two categories: (a) mandatory injunctions (requiring a party to carry out a specified act); or (b) prohibitory injunctions (requiring a party to refrain from carrying out a specified act).

Interim Injunctions

A range of interim injunctions may be ordered, including:

  • freezing injunctions (restricting dealings with assets);
  • anti-suit injunctions (restraining legal proceedings);
  • orders for disclosure of information (including location of assets or property);
  • search orders (for preserving evidence or property); and
  • orders requiring delivery up of property.

If the application for an interim order is granted, the applicant is usually required to give an undertaking to the court in damages to compensate the respondent for losses incurred as a result of the injunction if it is later found that the injunction was unjustifiable.

Urgent Relief

Urgent relief is available when the applicant demonstrates urgency and necessity of the relief sought. The King’s Bench Division (of the High Court) provides out-of-hours duty judges, and hearings of applications may be conducted remotely.

Applications for urgent interim injunctions may be heard ex parte where there is urgency or, for example, there is a risk that, if they learn of the application, the respondent will seek to put assets beyond reach or to destroy evidence.

Worldwide Assets and Third Parties

Injunctions may be ordered in respect of assets located outside the jurisdiction and where appropriate to restrain entities subject to the jurisdiction of the court from dealing with or disposing of assets worldwide.

If a third party is in the jurisdiction, they are bound by a freezing injunction provided they are notified of the same. Third parties based outside the jurisdiction tend not to be under any legal obligation to comply with the injunction.

Consequences of Disregarding an Injunction

If a respondent is under an obligation to comply with an injunction but disregards it, the court may make a finding of contempt of court and order:

  • confiscation of assets;
  • fines; or
  • imprisonment.

Disclosure in Civil Proceedings in England

The production of documents in English proceedings is known as “disclosure”. Disclosure is fundamental to civil proceedings and governed by detailed mandatory rules under the CPR. Certain courts (eg, the B&PCs) have additional rules and procedures for disclosure. Parties are generally required to disclose documents relevant to the issues of the case, irrespective of whether they assist or harm their case, or are confidential.

Disclosure may be the most time-consuming and expensive stage of litigation.

Failure to comply with disclosure obligations (including preservation of documents) is taken seriously by the court, which may then impose sanctions, including adverse costs orders, timetable adjustments or, for severe non-compliance, strike-out of a claim or defence.

Mechanisms and Scope of Disclosure

The procedure for disclosure differs depending on whether the case is proceeding within the B&PCs. Cases in the B&PCs are subject to detailed disclosure provisions under Practice Direction 57AD. For cases outside of the B&PCs, “Standard Disclosure” (under CPR 31) applies.

Standard disclosure

Parties are required to disclose documents they rely on, documents that adversely affect their own case or support another party’s case, and documents that are required to be disclosed by a relevant practice direction.

Standard Disclosure is managed by the disputing parties, with the courts overseeing compliance.

Disclosure must be proportionate to the issues in the case, considering the value of the claim, the importance of the case and the complexity of the issues.

Disclosure in the B&PCs

Parties are required to disclose key documents with service of their statements of case (“Initial Disclosure”), unless certain exceptions apply. As part of its case management role, the court can order “Extended Disclosure” (in addition, or as an alternative to Initial Disclosure) which offers five different models according to the needs of the case:

  • Model A: disclosure confined to known adverse documents;
  • Model B: limited disclosure;
  • Model C: disclosure of particular documents or narrow classes of documents;
  • Model D: narrow search-based disclosure;
  • Model E: wide search-based disclosure – only ordered in “an exceptional case”.

The court will usually make appropriate orders for disclosure at (if there are several, the first) CMC. Model D and or E disclosure tends to be ordered in major and/or complex cases.

The court plays an active role in supervising and approving the scope of disclosure, ensuring it remains focused on the key issues.

Disclosure and witness testimony

The disclosure exercise is distinct from that concerning factual and opinion witness (expert) evidence.

In the B&PCs, witnesses of fact are required to list all documents that the witness has referred to or been shown. The CPR provides that expert reports are to list all documents that the expert has been shown and has relied upon in forming their opinions.

Factual and opinion witness statements are generally required to be exchanged among the parties well in advance of trial. It is usual for factual witnesses to attend trial to give testimony; the written witness statement serves as the evidence-in-chief of the witness, who is then (“cross-") examined by representatives of the parties excluding the party producing/relying upon that witness. Opinion (expert) witnesses are not always required to attend trial, but they are commonly subject to cross-examination.

Trial Overview

Civil trials involve a combination of written and oral argument.

In advance of trial, written submissions are filed and served, summarising: (a) the issues to be addressed; (b) the party’s arguments in respect of each issue; and (c) the legal authorities relied upon.

The usual order of proceedings at trial is as follows:

  • the claimant’s opening submissions;
  • the defendant’s opening submissions;
  • the factual and expert witnesses for the claimant give evidence and are cross-examined;
  • the factual and expert witnesses for the defendant give evidence and are cross-examined;
  • the defendant’s closing submissions; and
  • the claimant’s closings submissions.

Civil claims in England do not proceed before a jury (except certain claims for libel and slander).

Admissibility of Evidence

The rules of evidence are extensive and detailed. In general terms, there is reduced scope to contest admissibility of factual evidence. Rules preventing admissibility on grounds of “hearsay” in civil proceedings have been abolished.

Opinion evidence (and expert testimony) is common in B&PC aviation disputes (where relevant to the issues). Reliance requires permission of the court, which must be sought by the party seeking to use it for support, and is usually addressed at the CMC. Permission will often be limited to predefined questions.

The court may order that the parties rely upon a single expert for a given expert discipline, although that is dependent on the particular issues to be addressed and is relatively unusual in aviation cases. If a single expert is permitted in a discipline, each party is usually permitted (subject to the court’s order on scope) to pose their own questions for the generation of the expert’s written report. 

Public Access to Court Documents and Hearings

CPR 5.4(C)(1) allows a person who is not a party to proceedings to obtain statements of case (without accompanying documents), judgments and orders made in public without seeking court permission. Any other court documents require court permission to obtain.

Most hearings in England and Wales are heard in public. The circumstances in which they may be private are set out in CPR 39.2.

Settlement terms may remain confidential. Confidentiality clauses are commonly included in settlement agreements. Court approval is generally not required unless the settlement involves a child or other protected party.

Settlement agreements are interpreted, given effect and enforced as legally binding contracts. If the settlement is embodied in an agreement, a new action must be commenced to seek an order to set it aside or a declaration of invalidity. If the settlement is embodied in a final order or judgment, it may be set aside with the consent of all parties, or in a new action brought for that purpose.

Grounds for setting aside are as follows:

  • the agreement was entered into based on fraudulent information or misrepresentation;
  • a party was coerced or unduly influenced into entering the agreement;
  • lack of capacity of a party;
  • fundamental mistake rendering performance impossible; or
  • illegality of agreement or involved activities, under statute or common law.

A successful litigant may obtain:

  • compensatory damages;
  • punitive (known as “exemplary”) damages;
  • injunctive relief;
  • declaration of rights or obligations.

There are no aviation-specific restrictions on recoverable amounts. Pre-judgment interest may be ordered for the loss of use of money from a specified time to the judgment; post-judgment interest accrues from the time of judgment until payment.

Exemplary damages may be available in specific circumstances. The circumstance most likely to be relevant will be where the defendant’s conduct is calculated to make a profit that exceeds the compensation payable to the claimant.

Aviation cases often involve complex calculations. Courts require specific and detailed initial disclosures regarding damages, which may be the subject of expert reports (eg, from forensic accountants). The courts are well versed in managing such complexities.

Civil appeals in England and Wales are governed by CPR 52 and the associated Practice Directions.

Permission to appeal is required, either from the court issuing the order from which appeal is sought or the relevant appeal court. Permission is granted when it is demonstrated that the appeal has a real prospect of success or there is another compelling reason for it to be heard. Grounds for appeal must be based on errors of the law or procedural irregularities.

Appeals are not retrials but reviews of the lower court’s application of the law. While the appeal court has discretionary power to consider new evidence, it will not hear oral evidence or (usually) any evidence that was not available to the lower court.

Appeals from the County Court usually go to the High Court or Court of Appeal, depending on the importance of the issue to be tried. Appeals from the High Court go to the Court of Appeal, and further appeals are made to the Supreme Court.

The appellant must file an appeal notice (or application for permission) for appeals to the Court of Appeal within 21 days from the date of lower court decision, although that period may be varied by the lower court. For appeals from the Court of Appeal to the Supreme Court, the period is 28 days from the date of decision or (if later) when reasons for the decision are given.

Arbitration agreements must be in writing (Section 5 of the Arbitration Act 1996 (“AA”)), and may be:

  • made by an exchange of written communications; or
  • a written record of an agreement made otherwise than in writing.

An arbitration agreement must be consented to by the subject parties as a matter of contract. The written requirement is not especially formal.

An arbitration agreement may be a freestanding agreement created after the event. More frequently, it is an arbitration clause in an underlying contract. If terms containing an arbitration agreement are incorporated by reference into the parties’ contract, the incorporating words must specifically refer to the arbitration clause.

Any civil dispute may be arbitrated, provided the parties have agreed to submit the dispute to arbitration. Matters falling beyond the scope of the parties’ arbitration agreement cannot be arbitrated, as there is no jurisdiction.

The UK recognises the doctrine of separability whereby an arbitration clause within a contract is treated as a separate contract which survives the demise of the main contract. Separability encompasses all matters of contract validity – eg, whether the contract is voidable for misrepresentation or terminated for repudiatory breach, and even whether the main contract is void for illegality. However, separability does not extend to questions of contract formation, namely whether the parties ever consented to the subject contract in the first place.

An express choice of law to govern an arbitration agreement would be given effect to by the English Court. If the main contract is stated to be governed by English law, ordinarily, that would be interpreted as encompassing the arbitration agreement also and causing it to be governed by English law (Enka v Chubb [2020] UKSC 38). The Arbitration Act 2025 would cause the law of the seat of the arbitration to govern the arbitration agreement in those circumstances.

The principle of “competence-competence” forms part of English law (Section 30 of the AA). The tribunal may rule on its own substantive jurisdiction, namely:

  • whether there is a valid arbitration agreement;
  • whether the tribunal is properly constituted; and
  • which matters have been submitted to arbitration.

If a party participates in an arbitration, then any objection that the arbitral tribunal lacks substantive jurisdiction must be raised by them not later than when they take the first step in the arbitration to contest the merits of any matter in relation to which they challenge the jurisdiction. It is acceptable for a party to appoint an arbitrator without raising any objection.

A party may apply to court to determine any question as to the jurisdiction of the tribunal (Section 32 of the AA). This application may be brought at any time during the arbitration, and the arbitrators have the discretion to stay the arbitration pending the outcome of the application. A party may also challenge an arbitral award on grounds that the tribunal lacked jurisdiction (Section 67 of the AA). The jurisdictional objections must be raised “forthwith” in the arbitration, once the party ought reasonably to be aware of it, or the right to object is lost.

Any party who takes no part in the arbitral proceedings may bring court proceedings challenging the jurisdiction of the tribunal at any time (Section 72 of the AA).

The UK is a popular jurisdiction for arbitration and the courts are generally supportive of arbitration, being inclined to uphold the validity of arbitration agreements. Where possible, the courts tend to interpret arbitration clauses broadly as encompassing all disputes arising under the subject contract – ie, a presumed commercial intention for one-stop adjudication.

Third parties who have not consented to arbitration cannot be compelled to arbitrate.

Any arbitration agreement governed by English law is subject to a common law implied term that the arbitration is confidential. Arbitral pleadings, evidence and awards are all protected by confidentiality. Documents obtained through disclosure in arbitration may be used only for the purposes of the arbitration.

Documents obtained in a confidential arbitration may be relied on if permitted or ordered by the court, or where reasonably necessary to protect a party’s legal rights or in the interests of justice.

Parties are free to make an express agreement that curtails, modifies or excludes their duty of confidentiality.

The arbitrators only have power to make provisional orders if the parties have agreed to give the arbitrators such power – eg, by agreeing to a set of institutional rules.

To the extent that the arbitrators have no such power, Section 44 of the AA confirms that the court has the power to make orders regarding any of the following:

  • the taking of witness evidence;
  • the preservation of evidence;
  • orders relating to property that is the subject of the proceedings or is relevant to the proceedings (eg, the inspection, preservation or detention of property);
  • the sale of any goods the subject of the proceedings;
  • the granting of an interim injunction or the appointment of a receiver.

It is normally necessary to seek the intervention of the court in respect of preliminary measures concerning third party evidence or property.

The English court may entertain applications for preliminary or interim relief in support of a foreign arbitration, but will not exercise its powers if it would be inappropriate.

Only the arbitral tribunal may order security for costs (Section 38(3) of the AA).

In determining whether to make such an order, the arbitrators will normally consider the likelihood that the claimant will fail to pay an adverse costs award, eg:

  • the claimant is impecunious;
  • there would be difficulties enforcing an adverse costs order; or
  • the claimant has a history of failing to pay judgments or arbitration awards, and their assets are easily transferred between jurisdictions.

It is not enough to merely show that the claimant is resident outside the UK.

The operative legislation is the Arbitration Act 1996 (“AA”). The Arbitration Act 2025 will insert some additional provisions and revised wording into the AA, but it is not yet in force.

The AA is generally flexible regarding the conduct of arbitration. The tribunal shall act fairly and impartially and adopt procedures suitable to the particular circumstances of the case. The arbitrators will decide all procedural and evidential matters, subject to any agreement by the parties. Similarly, the parties may agree on the powers exercisable by the tribunal.

To the extent that the parties have not agreed on the procedure for the conduct of the arbitration, the arbitrators are free to determine that procedure, subject to the above duties.

The AA states (Section 36) that, unless otherwise agreed by the parties, a party may be represented in the proceedings by a lawyer or other person chosen by them.

There are accordingly no formal qualifications or requirements for legal representatives appearing in (domestic or international) arbitration proceedings in the UK.

Arbitration operates on the basis that costs follow the event and the losing party must therefore pay the successful party’s reasonable costs in relation to the issue in question. The tribunal determines the extent to which a successful party may recover their reasonable costs.

The parties are free to agree on the powers of the tribunal with regards to awarding interest, and institutional rules agreed by the parties may provide for this. The tribunal otherwise has complete freedom to award simple or compound interest both before and after the date of the award over such periods and at such rates as the tribunal considers would be just for the case.

Arbitrators decide all procedural and evidential matters, subject to any agreement by the parties. The AA states that procedural and evidential matters include:

  • when and where any part of the proceedings is to be held;
  • the language or languages used in the proceedings;
  • what form of written pleadings will be used;
  • whether, and if so, which documents should be disclosed, and at what stage;
  • whether, and if so, what questions should be put to and answered by the parties, and when;
  • whether to apply strict rules of evidence as to the admissibility, relevance or weight of material tendered on matters of fact or opinion, and when and how such material should be exchanged and presented;
  • whether and to what extent the tribunal should take the initiative in ascertaining the facts and law; and
  • whether and to what extent there should be oral or written evidence or submissions.

English arbitration affords flexibility to arbitrators to tailor the procedure according to the requirements of the case, subject to the duty to act fairly and impartially. Applicable institutional rules agreed may impose obligations concerning the production and discovery of evidence.

It is not possible for the arbitrators to issue any effective orders or exercise any powers over third parties to the arbitration. Pursuant to Section 44 of the AA, the court has the power to make orders in support of the arbitration regarding the taking of witness evidence and production of evidence, which may extend to third parties.

It is open to the arbitrators to order the parties to the arbitration to produce a disclosure document, file and serve pleadings, give evidence or make an appearance. If the party does not comply, the arbitrators are free, within the limitations prescribed by any institutional rules, to order whichever procedural consequences or cost implications they deem appropriate in the case. If a party wishes to utilise the sovereign power of the state to compel disclosure of a document from a party, they would need to bring an application to court.

The tribunal is required to decide the dispute in accordance with the law chosen by the parties. There is no time limit for issuing an award, unless this has been agreed by the parties. The AA requires that the award shall be in writing, shall state the seat of the arbitration and the date of the award, shall be signed by all the arbitrators, and shall contain the reasons for the award, unless the parties have agreed to dispense with reasons.

The parties are free to agree on the powers exercisable by the tribunal as regards remedies. To the extent there is no agreement, the tribunal has the following powers:

  • to make a declaration as to any matter in the proceedings;
  • to order the payment of money, in any currency;
  • the same powers as the court to order a party to do or refrain from doing anything, to order specific performance of a contract (except contracts relating to land), and to order rectification, setting aside or cancellation of a deed or other document.

If the tribunal's orders are disobeyed, the innocent party would need to bring an application to Court to enforce the award.

If the governing law of the contract is English law, the arbitrators would not normally order exemplary damages, as damages under English law follow the compensatory principle. However, please see 2.13 Damages and Judgments.

UK arbitral awards may be challenged on grounds of serious irregularity or a point of English law. It is not possible to appeal a finding of fact or the arbitrator’s decision on a point of foreign law.

Leave of the court is required to challenge an award, and must be sought within 28 days of the date of the award, or, if there has been any arbitral process of appeal or review, of the date when the appellant was notified of the result. The court may extend this time limit.

“Serious irregularity” involves one or more of the following resulting in substantial injustice:

  • the tribunal failing to act fairly and impartially;
  • the tribunal exceeding its powers;
  • failure to comply with the agreed procedure;
  • failure by the tribunal to deal with all the issues;
  • any arbitral or other institution or person vested by the parties with powers in relation to the proceedings or the award exceeding its powers;
  • uncertainty or ambiguity as to the effect of the award;
  • the award being obtained by fraud or contrary to public policy;
  • failure to comply with the requirements as to the form of the award; or
  • any admitted irregularity in the conduct of the proceedings or in the award.

Leave to appeal on a point of law will only be granted if the court is satisfied that:

  • determination of the question will substantially affect the rights of one or more of the parties;
  • the question is one the tribunal was asked to determine;
  • on the basis of the findings of fact, the decision of the tribunal is obviously wrong, or the question is one of general public importance and the decision of the tribunal is at least open to serious doubt; and
  • despite the agreement of the parties to resolve the matter by arbitration, it is just and proper in all the circumstances for the court to determine the question.

Applications for leave to appeal on a point of law are often decided on paper.

It is possible for parties to agree to exclude any opportunity of an appeal on a point of law, but not on serious irregularity. An agreement that the tribunal may deliver an award without reasons will constitute an agreement to exclude any right of appeal on a point of law.

The appellant has the burden of proof in any appeal.

Publicly accessible sources of information, include:

  • Companies House, which provides information about UK company or UK limited liability partnership assets, directors and financial statements;
  • the Insolvency Register, which provides details on bankruptcies and insolvencies;
  • the Land Registry, for details on land;
  • the Civil Aviation Authority, which maintains registers containing information on aircraft registration and aircraft mortgages.

Orders may be obtained from the court for:

  • freezing orders;
  • asset-related disclosure orders; and
  • search orders.

(As to which, please see 2.9 Injunctive Relief.)

A freezing order may be made against the respondent’s general assets or against specific assets. Disclosure orders can be obtained against third parties, as may search orders.

Procedures available following a judgment or arbitral award to determine the assets held by a defendant, and their location, include:

  • an order under for examination of a judgment debtor (or its officers, if a company), in court to provide information needed to inform a judgment or order (CPR 71). The debtor need not be in breach of an order to pay; and
  • an order for the disclosure of assets both within and outside the jurisdiction under Section 37 of the Senior Courts Act 1981.

A party may apply to court for enforcement of a judgment debt if the judgment debtor fails to make payment by the date set by the court. The procedure for enforcement of a domestic judgment varies dependent on the enforcement method sought, for example:

  • a charging order obtained may be used when the judgment debtor has substantial equity in property;
  • orders for seizure or sale of assets;
  • third-party debt orders against funds or assets held by a third party.

Upon application, the details of the judgment, the judgment debtor’s information alongside the selected enforcement method must be shared with the court.

Applications for enforcement of domestic judgments may be heard by the County Court or the High Court, although such applications generally proceed in the High Court for high-value judgments. Applications may be made and heard ex parte, albeit with later hearings involving the debtors, in certain instances, such as applications for third-party debt orders, or orders to take control of and sell goods within the jurisdiction.

Each enforcement method’s efficiency depends on the judgment debtor’s asset profile and the specifics of the judgment. Mobile assets owned by the debtor (eg aircraft) may require ex parte applications for restraint and seizure.

The timing and cost of enforcement is largely dependent on the profile and behaviour of the judgment debtor and the nature of the assets against which enforcement is sought and varies significantly.

Enforcement may be challenged if:

  • the defendant was not served with the legal documents initiating proceedings (CPR 6); or
  • service of proceedings was not carried out in the correct manner or within the required timeframe.

In the event of improper service, the court may set aside the judgment or stay its enforcement.

If default judgment has been entered, then CPR 13 sets out instances where the court must set aside the default judgment (CPR 13.3), and instances where they may do so (CPR 13.4). 

Grounds include lack of proper notice of the proceedings, procedural irregularities, and a reasonable prospect of successfully defending the claim.

If there is an appeal from the judgment, a stay of enforcement may be sought from the court while the appeal is pending determination. Such a  stay may also be sought in order to prepare an appeal or to make arrangements to comply with the judgment.

Judgments that are not subject to enforcement may include those:

  • handed down by a court that had no jurisdiction in respect of the matter;
  • that are not final and binding (eg, subject of an appeal or other further proceedings);
  • obtained by fraudulent means or based upon false information presented to the court;
  • violating public policy or natural justice.

The applicable regimes are as follows.

  • For judgments from Scotland and Northern Ireland, set out in Sections 18 and 19 and Schedules 6 and 7 of the Civil Jurisdiction and Judgments Act 1982 (see CPR 74.14-74.18 and Practice Direction 74A).
  • For judgments from most commonwealth countries, the Administration of Justice Act 1920 or the Foreign Judgments (Reciprocal Enforcement) Act 1933 (depending on the country of origin). This may apply to some EU and EFTA states for proceedings commenced after 31 December 2020.
  • For judgments from EU and some EFTA countries in proceedings commenced pre-31 December 2020: a) the Recast Brussels Regulation; b) the 2001 Brussels Regulation; c) the Brussels Regulation; and d) the Lugano  Convention. Since Brexit, this regime has been replaced by the Hague Convention on Choice of Court Agreements, or the common law regime set out below. As of 1 July 2025, the Hague Judgments Convention will apply to proceedings commenced after this date. 
  • For judgments from countries not covered by any of the above regimes, the common law regime.

To enforce it, the judgment must be recognised by the court. A certified copy of the judgment (with translation, if not in English), and proof of its enforceability in the country of origin, must be filed with the application.

Once recognised, judgment may be enforced as set out in 4.2 Enforcing Domestic Judgments. The cost of, and time required for, this process will vary widely depending on the complexity of the case.

A foreign judgment may be challenged on the grounds that:

  • the foreign court lacked proper jurisdiction (including regarding service of foreign proceedings);
  • the foreign judgment is contrary to public policy (eg, in contravention of the Human Rights Act 1998 or principles of natural justice, or for fraud); or
  • the claim is time-barred.

A foreign judgment must be final and conclusive before UK courts will enforce it. A party can seek to set aside the enforcement order.

The UK has ratified the 1958 New York Convention (NYC) under reservation that it applies to awards made only in other contracting states.

Enforcement is governed by Part III of the AA, which incorporates the provisions of the NYC. Application is required to the High Court or County Court and, if granted, it will be enforced as if it were a judgment or order from the court. The grounds for refusal of such an application are set out in Section103(2) and (3) of the AA and include:

  • and invalid arbitration agreement;
  • a procedure that is inconsistent with the agreement;
  • an award not yet binding or set aside at the seat; and
  • enforcement contrary to public policy.

Domestic and foreign arbitral awards from contracting states are subject to similar enforcement procedures under the AA, but there are fewer grounds for refusal for domestic awards (Section 66 of the AA).

Awards from NYC non-contracting states are enforced via common law or bilateral treaties, and may face greater scrutiny.

Given the risk of dissipation of assets in aviation disputes, urgent relief may often be sought from the court in support of enforcement – eg, orders for seizure and injunctions. Please see above.

The UK is party to the Cape Town Convention (Aircraft Protocol) offering a streamlined international enforcement regime for certain aviation assets.

The Civil Aviation Authority may become involved in implementing awards which impact aircraft registration, ownership, or leasehold interests.

Under the AA, the finality of an award is a core principle. If an arbitral award is appealed or challenged at the seat of arbitration, its enforcement in the UK may be delayed or denied. The courts do not re-examine the merits of the award but may examine issues concerning:

  • jurisdiction (Section 67 of the AA);
  • serious irregularity or procedural grounds (Section 68 of the AA); and
  • discrete points of law (Section 69 of the AA).

Section 69 of the AA may be excluded by agreement between the parties; Sections 67 and 68 cannot.

If the award breaches fundamental principles of UK law or international treaties, such as those relating to aviation safety or environmental regulations, the award may be challenged (Section 103 of the AA). However, the courts take a restrictive approach to public policy exceptions.

A party may apply to the court to set aside an award on the limited grounds set out above. The court may refuse to enforce the award if it has been set aside by a court in the country where it was made, unless the set-aside decision is overturned or the award is reinstated. The court may consider whether the annulment was based on legitimate grounds, and, in some cases, if the set-aside decision was manifestly flawed, they might still enforce the award.

A state or state-owned entity may invoke sovereign immunity to resist enforcement of an arbitral award. This immunity is not absolute, and may be waived – eg, where a state or state-owned entity agrees to an arbitration clause, or is to be construed as having done so by reason of its commercial activities. Generally, enforcement may then be effected against assets used for commercial purposes, but not those used for sovereign or diplomatic purposes.

Some Notable Judicial Developments

In FW Aviation (Holdings) Limited v Vietjet Aviation Joint Stock Company ([2024] EWHC 1945 (Comm)), the B&PC confirmed that (equitable) relief from forfeiture of an aircraft lease with a “call option”, was in principle available to a lessee. That relief was denied due to the lessee’s “egregious conduct” (as the Court found).

RTI Ltd v MUR Shipping BV ([2024] UKSC 18) concerned a contractual provision that an event would be considered force majeure if it could not be overcome by reasonable endeavours from the party affected. It was held that the clause did not require the affected party to agree to non-contractual performance.

In AerCap Ireland Capital DAC and others v PJSC and others ([2024] EWHC 1365 (Comm)), the B&PC stayed English claims against reinsurers of aircraft grounded in Ukraine. The war in Ukraine was insufficient reason not to enforce the exclusive jurisdiction clauses (“EJCs”) (requiring Ukrainian jurisdiction). In Zephyrus Capital Aviation Parties 1 D Limited and Others v Fidelis Underwriting Limited and Others ([2024] EWHC 734 (Comm)), the EJCs (requiring Russian jurisdiction) were not enforced because the aircraft owners and lessors were unlikely to receive a fair trial in Russia.

Some Notable Legislative Developments

The Arbitration Act 2025 will amend the Arbitration Act 1996. (see 1.3 Arbitration Framework).

The Hague Convention of 2019 on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments in Civil or Commercial Matters (the “Convention”) is expected to have effect in English law from 1 July 2025. This should (among other things) facilitate enforcement and recognition of UK (/foreign) judgments in other contracting states (/UK). It expands the grounds for recognition and enforcement. At the time of writing, all EU member states have ratified the Convention except Denmark.

Penningtons Manches Cooper

125 Wood Street
London, EC2V 7AW
UK

+ 44 (0)1483 411449

louise.high@penningtonslaw.com www.penningtonslaw.com
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Trends and Developments


Authors



Penningtons Manches Cooper is a leading international law firm operating across several offices in the UK, Singapore, Piraeus, Paris, Antibes and Madrid, with a focus on the key industry sectors of aviation and aerospace, shipping (2025 being the 200th year of this practice), international trade, commodities, (re)insurance and construction. There are 12 aviation and aerospace specialists with extensive experience in contentious and non-contentious matters, with a recognised track record in insurance and re-insurance coverage disputes, and high value and complex multi-jurisdictional claims. The team advises (civil and military) aerospace and aviation industry undertakings across a variety of transactions and disputes in non-insurance matters. Recent cases include the defence of an insurer in Russian aviation litigation in a number of English High Court actions and representing a maintenance organisation in a complex technical matter concerning a high-profile fatal helicopter accident.

AI – A Changing Landscape for Legal Risk and Liability Considerations

The aviation industry, like many others, is increasingly affected by Artificial Intelligence (AI) technologies. AI offers significant benefits in safety, reliability and efficiency. However, there are challenges and potential liabilities to be considered concerning this revolutionary class of technologies. The pace of the change driven by AI has, in many instances, exceeded the expectations of industry pundits, and it is accelerating, bringing those challenges into sharper focus. This article highlights some – but certainly not all – of the considerations that may impact liability considerations, and thus future disputes.

Applications and Risks

For many decades, human oversight, particularly in connection with the operation and management of aircraft in flight, has been a central tenet of aviation safety philosophy.

That tenet remains extremely important, but, as technology has developed, functions relating to the control of aircraft in flight have increasingly been assisted or augmented by automated – although not AI – systems, both in terms of flight control and – “protections” against adverse conditions or pilot error. It remains the case that human error is the dominant (or an important contributory) cause in the majority of aviation accidents.

The rapidly evolving boom in unmanned aircraft should also be considered. The current focus is on integrating remotely (human) piloted aircraft into the civil aviation system, but developments are also afoot advancing fully autonomous aircraft piloted by AI. Without wishing to overstate the current position or the rate of change, the role of the human pilot looks set to decrease as time goes by.

Moreover, AI is a truly disruptive technology with the prospect of touching on almost every aspect of the aviation industry, including operators’ broader commercial activities, other stakeholders’ operations, and the supporting industries and supply chains in the aviation ecosystem.

AI is expected to offer benefits in processing aircraft data to detect and predict maintenance needs and trends, and thus increase efficiency. It may be used to assist in optimising air-traffic flow and control in crowded skies. It may enable optimised fuel consumption in an industry renowned for sensitivities to costs, and, while doing so, may assist in meeting environmental and sustainability targets.

The supporting industries and supply chains in this ecosystem include customer services, catering supplies, aircraft ground handling and baggage and cargo processing. The industry is renowned for its complexity; an airline executive commented many years ago that they were amazed that the majority of passengers flying between major airports were reunited with their baggage at their destination as often as they are.

AI offers the prospective means to maintain that expanding, complex ecosystem, and to do so more efficiently and reliably.

So far, so good. However, there are risks attached to these technologies. Some are likely to be transitional, but others may endure. In either case, it will be essential to identify those risks and the legal issues they present. At this point, it is perhaps worth noting that a given undertaking (eg, airline, caterer, maintenance provider, etc) may soon feel pressured to use or accept the use of AI to ensure commercial competitiveness. And AI might also be used in its supply chains, whether it knows it or not. The legal risks are not then attached simply to whether it wishes to use AI.

AI systems require data to train, and, when deployed, optimise, their decision-making processes. Their performance is sensitive to the data they receive and “bad” data may result in a profound fragility within the AI system. The reliance on large volumes of data and complex internal processes may make the inner workings of an AI system increasingly opaque. This combination of factors raises the risk of unforeseen outputs of the system and also incremental “drift” in its workings.

A renowned global employer was reportedly forced to scrap the use of AI in its recruiting tools after its system displayed a bias penalising female applicants, a behaviour it had unfortunately learned from its training data. That may, of course, be a very simplistic example compared with the huge complexities involved in AI use in aviation systems.

There is cause for caution in the use of AI in safety critical activities for the above reasons. Since the AI is a learning system, its responses may change. It may also fail to provide the requisite outputs where novel situations arise. As noted above, it is not yet used in, for example, flight control or management. However, it is instructive that there have been some tragic results from the use of automated systems that are not AI-based and do not “learn” – eg, accidents involving the operation of Boeing’s “manoeuvring characteristics augmentation system” on its “737 Max” variant aircraft. Those accidents happened without the complication of having to assess the behaviour of adaptive learning systems.

Other examples might involve the use of AI systems by catering suppliers. Mistakes in this context may have dire consequences – eg, if the system does not identify or action serious allergies flagged in passenger data. The breadth of risks is potentially very wide. Another example might involve the disclosure or misuse of passengers’ personal data, which would give rise to questions of liability for an airline, as well as contractors in its supply chains.

There are potentially some more subtle risks to be considered. Human oversight of AI decisions may not get around all risks; in safety-critical applications, such as traffic control, AI-driven augmentation may produce problems for human supervisors, particularly if they do not identify a problem in time, or cannot understand how it arose.

Generally, AI processing is energy intensive and so, in many cases, has a significant carbon footprint. Some AI service operators may identify solutions to reduce the environmental cost, but many will not for the foreseeable future. Over the last decade, there has been an increase of litigation initiated by environmental activists against “polluters”. While that has met with varying degrees of success to date, and been focused primarily on other industries, it is not difficult to envisage such actions applying to those who depend significantly upon AI.

We should also touch upon cyber protection in the face of the ever growing assault by criminals, terrorists and (some suggest) state actors. AI is increasingly used in such protection. It is likely that criminals and terrorists will step up their use of AI to counter such protections, leading to the cycles of an escalating “arms race”, raising the question of the extent to which targets (an airline, maintenance organisation, air traffic controller, etc) will be expected to keep abreast of this race and the potential consequences if, by some measure, they do not. It also raises the prospect that the opacity resulting from the intended use and effect of AI makes it more difficult for the human supervisors to discern malicious interference in the event of a cybersecurity breach.

There is perhaps an analogy here with some aviation entities’ adoption or otherwise of (non-mandated) security and protection measures in their operations. Failures to implement available threat detection technology, or to install available countermeasures against attack have drawn criticism, and sometimes featured in litigation. The failure to process intelligence concerning risks to aircraft and passengers has been raised in connection with some high-profile claims; would a defendant have a defence on the basis that it depended on an AI system which did not identify a threat?

Regulatory Environment and Standards

The UK does not yet have comprehensive AI-specific aviation regulations. This leaves gaps in a framework that requires AI systems to comply with existing aviation safety laws, standards, and protocols. The UK CAA has published a paper, last updated in November 2024, outlining its strategy for regulating AI. In effect, the CAA will take a back seat in the short term, scoping the landscape and assessing specific regulatory challenges before stepping in. While the CAA’s framework may be considered a prudent strategy to promote the adoption of AI in the industry, it currently offers little clarity on what an airline’s duty of care should entail when utilising AI.

Aviation is of course a global industry, and AI technologies will therefore need to be compliant with both UK and international aviation regimes in many instances. The US currently has no comprehensive federal legislation or regulations governing the development of AI. The Federal Aviation Agency has produced a road map for AI safety assurance. However, it is also taking a reactive approach, monitoring how AI technologies interact with existing regulations and guidance before determining whether additional regulation is needed in the industry.

Notably, the EU appears to be taking a more proactive approach, with the EU AI Act set to become effective from August 2026. This legislation sets out differing compliance requirements according to the level of risk associated with the relevant AI technology. Guidance from the European Aviation Safety Agency states that systems used in aviation are likely to fall into the “high-risk” category. As a result, airlines will have to satisfy a series of stringent obligations to prove compliance with the act. Airlines will need to demonstrate, for each AI system they deploy, that:

  • a risk management system is in place;
  • appropriate data governance frameworks are established;
  • accurate technical records are kept;
  • transparency requirements are followed;
  • human oversight is maintained appropriately; and
  • cybersecurity measures are set up.

While technical requirements and standards will be developed to satisfy, for example, the human oversight requirement above, there are none at present and the obligation to put in place “appropriate and proportionate” oversight measures and fail-safes into their AI systems falls on developers. However, there is no official EU guidance on what exactly constitutes “appropriate and proportionate” in the realm of aviation systems.

Legal Issues and Liability

Contractual allocation of risk and liability amongst commercial parties may offer greater certainty. Commercial parties are generally free to contract as they see fit. The actual analysis of legal liability risks in each scenario will be fact specific, and subject to terms actually agreed. But it is perhaps worth making a few general observations.

Where parties are contemplating use of AI, they might adopt a fairly simplistic approach of, for example, excluding liability arising from AI usage or relying upon limits of liability. However, that may not be commercially realistic or satisfactory – eg, where one party has no control over its exposure to events that may arise out of another party’s use of AI.

More specific and detailed contractual terms may be required. If those depend upon some stipulated acceptable or anticipated performance of the AI system, the parties must find some definition of requirements and standards. There is a dearth of industry accepted (or regulatory) detailed requirements and standards at present. If contracting parties adopt a given provider’s standards, it may transpire that those are insufficiently comprehensive or detailed, and leave room for argument in certain circumstances.

If the parties fall back on contractual terms using concepts of “reasonableness” or “state of the art”, they may find themselves in the same difficulties that arise for non-contractual obligations.

Non-contractual obligations (and related liability) may arise in a variety of ways. In the case of an airline conducting international carriage, under the international conventions (eg, the 1999 Montreal Convention), it may be strictly liable for passenger death or personal injury up to a convention limit (100,000 Special Drawing Rights). Thereafter, the airline may avoid liability if it can prove that the incident was not due to its own wrongdoing or negligence. When will it not be wrong or negligent to rely upon an AI? That question will involve further questions about what an airline should have known or done concerning the use of AI, perhaps by others. Also, how can an airline prove its case based on that defence (as it has the burden under the convention)?

More generally, when considering non-contractual obligations, the requisite standard of care that entities must demonstrate in connection with the use AI technology will be the really important legal issue. As noted above, that may concern the entity’s use of AI, or it may concern the use of AI by others.

To demonstrate that a party has been negligent (if they have sufficient relationship to the victim), it must be proved that they breached their duty of care to the injured party. However, with emerging technologies such as AI, the scope of this duty is as yet ill-defined. Typically, a party’s duty will be to exercise reasonable care to ensure no harm comes from the use of their services. Understanding what “reasonable care” means in this context is not simple. The situation is not assisted by the paucity of standards in this field.

That would not prevent a court from determining whether and where liability lies in a claim based on the causal involvement of AI in damage or loss. However, the judge would have to consider factual and expert evidence, which, in all circumstances, might well cover a broad spectrum of possible views and outcomes. That will translate into a high degree of unpredictability when it comes to early cases involving these kinds of issues.

The above considerations, and those concerning the type of relationship that exists between the entities – is it firm enough to permit non-contractual obligations? – also involve the question of whether, and when, an entity is accountable for an AI-generated output.

Who is responsible, if an AI makes a “bad” decision leading to harm? When it is inherently difficult to identify why AI may have come to a poor decision, where will the liability fall? Would software developers be liable for not putting effective safeguards in place or using inappropriate or incomplete training data? Could an airline avoid liability by claiming that it cannot be held accountable for the AI’s output or “decision”?

The answers are not clear, and no doubt will remain the subject of learned writing and, eventually, judicial consideration. In respect of that last question above, there is some guidance to be drawn from a decision by the British Columbia Civil Resolution Tribunal (Moffatt v Air Canada, 2024 BCCRT 149). Mr Moffat sought compensation for misrepresentation from Air Canada after its chatbot gave him incorrect information regarding available fares. Air Canada argued, among other things, that it was not accountable for the output of the chatbot.

The Tribunal rejected this defence, finding that Air Canada had breached its duty to ensure its representations are accurate and not misleading, despite the claimant being aware that they were dealing with a chatbot. It is likely that Air Canada could not reasonably have foreseen the specific output of the chatbot, particularly in these circumstances where the chatbot contradicted information on the airline’s website. Nevertheless, the Tribunal ruled that Air Canada had failed to explain why the chatbot should not have been viewed as trustworthy by Mr Moffatt, and why he should have double-checked the information given by the chatbot against information presented on the airline’s relevant webpages. Although this is only a small claim before a lower Canadian tribunal, it illustrates an approach that may lead courts to find that, by deciding to adopt AI technologies, companies are accepting a duty of care which requires consideration of unpredictable data outputs. This may impose a burdensome standard of care, particularly when the progress of AI technology outpaces the development of recognised industry standards.

Conclusion

Despite the complexities and potential liability considerations, AI technologies will no doubt continue to evolve and find use in multiple facets of the aviation industry. The prospective benefits appear to considerably outweigh the risks. As with other disruptive technologies, as they and the applicable regulatory and legal systems mature, the legal risks will become clearer, and more efficiently manageable.

However, for now, it would be prudent for all stakeholders to be aware of potential risks, the difficulties in dealing with disputes that may arise out of those risks, and to consider the scope of their due diligence concerning where in their activities, and those of their suppliers, AI is used. That may not be readily apparent in some instances, particularly as the outputs of AI or human beings become less distinguishable.

This article was not generated by AI.

Or….was it?

Penningtons Manches Cooper LLP

125 Wood Street
London, EC2V 7AW
UK

+ 44 (0)1483 411449

Louise.high@penningtonslaw.com www.penningtonslaw.com
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Law and Practice

Authors



Penningtons Manches Cooper is a leading international law firm operating across several offices in the UK, Singapore, Piraeus, Paris, Antibes and Madrid, with a focus on the key industry sectors of aviation and aerospace, shipping (2025 being the 200th year of this practice), international trade, commodities, (re)insurance and construction. There are 12 aviation and aerospace specialists with extensive experience in contentious and non-contentious matters, with a recognised track record in insurance and re-insurance coverage disputes, and high value and complex multi-jurisdictional claims. The team advises (civil and military) aerospace and aviation industry undertakings across a variety of transactions and disputes in non-insurance matters. Recent cases include the defence of an insurer in Russian aviation litigation in a number of English High Court actions, and representing a maintenance organisation in a complex technical matter concerning a high-profile fatal helicopter accident.

Trends and Developments

Authors



Penningtons Manches Cooper is a leading international law firm operating across several offices in the UK, Singapore, Piraeus, Paris, Antibes and Madrid, with a focus on the key industry sectors of aviation and aerospace, shipping (2025 being the 200th year of this practice), international trade, commodities, (re)insurance and construction. There are 12 aviation and aerospace specialists with extensive experience in contentious and non-contentious matters, with a recognised track record in insurance and re-insurance coverage disputes, and high value and complex multi-jurisdictional claims. The team advises (civil and military) aerospace and aviation industry undertakings across a variety of transactions and disputes in non-insurance matters. Recent cases include the defence of an insurer in Russian aviation litigation in a number of English High Court actions and representing a maintenance organisation in a complex technical matter concerning a high-profile fatal helicopter accident.

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