The applicable legal basis for challenging cartel conduct in Italy is Article 2 of Law 10 October 1990, No 287 on the “Protection of Competition and Market” (“the Law”), which provides for a general prohibition of any anti-competitive agreements, concerted practices and decisions by associations that have as their object or effect the substantial restriction of competition within the national market or a substantial part of it.

In relation to conduct affecting trade between EU member states, Article 101 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) can also be applied in parallel.

The Italian Competition Authority (ICA or “the Authority”) is the public authority entrusted with the enforcement of Article 2 of the Law and Article 101 of the TFEU in Italy. The ICA can impose administrative fines of up to 10% of the company’s total annual worldwide turnover.

In the event of conduct amounting to “bid rigging”, the public prosecutor is also empowered to initiate a criminal investigation against the parties involved.

Additionally, under civil law, any decision or concerted practice violating the prohibition on cartels is to be considered automatically null and void.

Any legal or natural person (companies and/or consumers) affected by cartel behaviour can claim damages arising from the infringement before the national courts.

Following the national implementation of the EU Directive on damages (Directive 2014/104/EU) by Legislative Decree No 3/2017, private enforcement has been on the rise in the past few years.

Moreover, a recent legislative reform (Law No 31/2019) entitles undertakings (in addition to consumers and consumer associations) to bring class actions. However, no such class action has to date been brought before the civil courts with reference to cartels.

The types of conduct typically viewed as a cartel include agreements or arrangements on price fixing, bid rigging and market sharing.

According to ICA’s decisional practice, the exchange of competitively sensitive information may also be considered a type of infringement.

A narrower definition applies in the context of leniency applications. This regime applies only in relation to “secret cartels”, which are defined as agreements or concerted practices between two or more competitors, the existence of which is wholly or partly concealed, with the aim of co-ordinating their competitive conduct on the market or influencing the relevant parameters of competition through practices consisting, among other things, of:

• fixing or co-ordinating purchase or selling prices or other trading conditions, including in relation to IP rights;
• allocating production or sales quotas;
• sharing markets and customers through, among other things, the manipulation of tenders;
• restricting imports or exports; or
• taking anti-competitive action directed against other competing undertakings.

The fact that an agreement or concerted practice between competitors also contains vertical elements does not preclude its classification as a “secret cartel” for the purposes of applying the regime set forth for leniency applications.

Public Enforcement

The ICA’s power to impose fines for infringements of Article 2 of the Law is subject to a limitation period of five years.

If other EU national competition authorities or the EC start an investigation on the same conduct, the limitation period is interrupted until the investigation is concluded.

Private Enforcement

The right to bring a suit before a civil court claiming compensation for damages caused by an infringement of competition law must be exercised within a limitation period of five years.

This term starts from the termination of the infringement, provided that the claimant knows or can reasonably be presumed to be aware of the following:

• the conduct constitutes a competition law infringement;
• the infringement caused the claimant damages; and
• the identity of the infringer(s).

The limitation period is suspended when the ICA or the EC initiates an investigation or a preliminary inquiry into the infringement to which the action for damages refers, until one year from the date on which the infringement decision becomes final or after the proceedings have otherwise been concluded. In particular, the infringement is considered as definitively established in respect of the infringer in the event a decision is no longer subject to appeal.

The ICA’s powers follow the well-established EU “effects doctrine”, according to which the application of Article 2 of the Law is also extended to conduct that occurred outside Italy if this conduct has an effect on the Italian market or a part thereof.

No specific principles of comity are set forth under the Law. However, the ICA regularly co-operates with the EC and other European national competition authorities (NCAs) through the European Competition Network (ECN) with regard to case allocation, mutual investigative assistance, and consistent enforcement outcomes.

Moreover, at the international level, the ICA participates in the International Competition Network (ICN), the OECD Competition Committee, and the Intergovernmental Group of Experts on Competition Law and Policy of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD). It also maintains bilateral co-operation with other authorities, such as those of Australia, Brazil, France, Greece and Spain, with a particular focus on cartel enforcement.

The ICA’s cartel enforcement typically focuses on classic anti-competitive behaviour such as price fixing, bid rigging and exchange of sensitive information. In particular, the ICA is expected to continue to tackle cartels that pass on inflation-driven cost increases to consumers by means of higher prices, or that undermine environmental goals, or that affect labour markets through wage fixing and no-poach agreements.

The ICA’s most recent case load indicates that cartel investigations are mainly triggered by tip-offs received via its whistle-blowing platform, with an increasing number of proceedings being initiated through leniency applications.

The main guidelines issued by the ICA include:

• Guidelines on Leniency Programme;
• Guidelines on Fines; and
• Guidelines on Antitrust Compliance.

The ICA can start investigations:

• on its own initiative – eg, based on the information gathered as a result of its monitoring activities;
• after receiving a complaint, even anonymously, via the whistle-blowing platform available on the ICA’s official website; or
• following the submission of a leniency application by a cartel participant.

Typically, unless in the case of a leniency application, parties do not have visibility on the pre-investigation phase.

Following the assessment of the evidence collected, the ICA has wide discretion as to whether to open the proceedings. Usually, when the ICA notifies the decision to open the proceedings, it also carries out dawn raids at the premises of the undertakings allegedly responsible for the cartel.

The ICA is entitled to carry out dawn raids at any premises, or on any land and means of transport of the interested undertakings.

If there are reasonable grounds to suspect that documents linked to the undertaking that are relevant to the investigation are stored elsewhere, the dawn raid may also be held at the private premises of directors, managers and other members of staff, subject to the issuing of a warrant by the public prosecutor.

During the dawn raid, the ICA is generally assisted by the Italian tax police (Guardia di Finanza) and can:

• view and take copies of business documents and data, whether in paper or electronic format;
• seal off any business premises, records and documents as needed for the investigation; and
• request any representative or employee to provide information on the facts or documents related to the subject matter and purpose of the inspection.

At the end of the inspection, all the ICA’s investigatory activities carried out during the dawn raid are included in a report which is jointly signed by the ICA and the legal representative of the interested undertaking.

In the event an inspection is carried out by the ICA, it is of the utmost importance that no documents or other evidence are destroyed. In this respect, any such conduct, if considered to be an obstruction of the investigation, is subject to a substantial sanction of up to 1% of the total annual worldwide turnover of the undertaking under investigation. Moreover, the ICA may consider such conduct as a legitimate reason to reject any proposed leniency application.

Legal counsel plays a crucial role from the outset of the investigations by:

• overseeing the conduct of the ICA to prevent illegal conduct (eg, out-of-scope dawn raids);
• advising the undertaking or its employees of their rights and obligations during dawn raids, information requests, or interviews; and
• beginning to develop a defence strategy even by means of considering any potential leniency application or settlement discussion.

Officers or employees have the right to legal counsel during interviews carried out by the ICA. This right stems from general principles of due process and legal defence, as protected under Article 24 of the Italian Constitution and Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights.

In-house counsel may attend the interviews, even if it is preferable to be assisted by external counsel, especially in the event of potential conflicts of interest (eg, where the personal liability of the employee is at stake).

The ICA allows counsel to be present, although it retains discretion over how the interview is conducted.

There are some limitations with reference to counsel’s assistance. In this respect, counsel:

• cannot suspend the dawn raid, even if the ICA officials usually wait for the counsel to start the inspection;
• cannot interrupt the interview or answer on behalf of the interviewee;
• may request clarification on questions, or object to certain lines of questioning (eg, if the ICA infringes the legal privilege or self-incrimination rights).

In conclusion, the legal counsel should undertake the following steps during the initial stage of the investigation:

• monitor the ICA’s authorisation on the scope of the investigation and ensure the ICA operates within this;
• ensure proper conduct during dawn raids, including checking warrants, scope of search, and protecting privileged documents;
• advise employees and executives of their rights and responsibilities, including what they must disclose and what they are entitled to withhold;
• assess internal risks by conducting a preliminary internal investigation;
• preserve and collect relevant evidence and communications for the defence;
• consider whether a leniency application or settlement is appropriate; and
• monitor deadlines for responses to requests for information, document submission, and other procedural steps.

During the investigation, the ICA may obtain documentary or testimonial evidence by means of (i) requests for information; (ii) hearing summons; and/or (iii)dawn raids. It may also order appraisals and economic and statistical analyses, as well as consult experts regarding any element relevant to the investigation.

The attorney-client legal privilege covers any communication between an undertaking and its external lawyers. This protection includes: (i) the internal preparatory documents drawn up with the aim of seeking such legal advice; as well as (ii)the internal notes prepared by the undertaking which report on the content of the legal advice/communications with the attorney.

The undertaking may object to any request for seizure of the above-mentioned materials.

The protection cannot be extended to communications or notes between the undertaking and in-house counsel.

The privilege against self-incrimination can also be invoked in response to the ICA’s request for information, since the latter does not oblige the interested parties to admit their responsibility in relation to their alleged participation in the cartel.

Undertakings and individuals usually comply with the ICA’s requests for information since non-cooperation may result in the imposition of severe pecuniary sanctions of up to respectively 1% of the annual worldwide turnover or EUR25,823, as well as default indemnities.

All news, information, or data regarding companies under investigation by the ICA are protected by professional secrecy, even with respect to public administrations.

Parties can safeguard the confidentiality or secrecy of the information provided or seized during the investigation from access by the other parties admitted to participate in the proceedings, by submitting a confidentiality request to the ICA.

Legal and factual arguments can be brought forward at any time in writing and orally (eg, during a hearing with the case team). Following the notification of the ICA’s statement of objections, parties can submit their defence briefs and request to be heard before the ICA’s board.

Italian law provides for a leniency programme that grants full immunity from fines to the first applicant and substantial fine reductions to subsequent applicants. The legal basis is Article 15-bis (1) of the Law, which empowers the ICA to establish the conditions under which fines may be waived or reduced. These conditions are detailed in the ICA’s leniency notice (Comunicazione sulla non imposizione e sulla riduzione delle sanzioni ai sensi dell’art. 15-bis, comma 1, della legge 10 ottobre 1990, n 287), the adoption of which, in 2007, formally inaugurated the first national leniency regime in Italy.

Full Immunity

The ICA may grant full immunity from fines to the first cartel participant that voluntarily comes forward to disclose its participation in a cartel and submit evidence, provided the following conditions are met:

• in the ICA’s view, the evidence submitted is decisive in proving the existence of an infringement, possibly by enabling the Authority to carry out targeted dawn raids; and
• the ICA does not already have sufficient evidence, and no undertaking has already been granted immunity in relation to the same conduct.

General Requirements for Immunity or Fine Reduction

In addition, to benefit from immunity or fine reduction, the leniency applicant must also:

• immediately cease its involvement in the cartel; and
• fully, genuinely, expeditiously and continuously co-operate with the ICA, which in practice entails:
1. providing all the relevant information and evidence in its possession or that comes into its possession regarding the cartel;
2. responding promptly to any request from the ICA that may contribute to the establishment of the facts;
3. ensuring that current and previous managers, directors and employees remain available for interview;
4. refraining from concealing, falsifying or destroying relevant documents or information, including during the period in which it plans to submit the leniency application to the ICA; and
5. not disclosing the existence or content of the application before the ICA has issued the statement of objections.

Procedural Aspects

Leniency is granted conditionally and only confirmed – or revoked – by the ICA in the final decision. In other words, the immunity will be confirmed only if the above-mentioned requirements are met, both at the moment of application and throughout the whole proceeding.

If, at the time of the application, one or more of the conditions for immunity are not satisfied, the ICA will reject the request and notify the applicant. The undertaking may then either withdraw the evidence submitted or request that its application be considered for the purpose of a fine reduction.

Conversely, if the ICA initially accepts the application but later ascertains that one of the conditions is not complied with during the proceeding, the undertaking will be excluded from any benefit. In such case, the evidence already submitted remains in the case file and may be used by the ICA.

Reductions of Fines

If full immunity is not granted, as anticipated, the application can be considered for the purpose of a fine reduction. The ICA can grant a fine reduction if an applicant submits information and evidence that adds significant value for the purpose of establishing an infringement.

The Authority will consider the evidence provided as having significant added value when the evidence produced, due to its nature or level of detail, materially strengthens the evidentiary framework already available, contributing appreciably to the Authority’s ability to prove the infringement.

The reduction of the fine under the leniency programme can be up to 50% of the amount that would have been imposed without co-operation. The amount of the reduction depends on the order in which the applications are submitted:

• between 30% and 50% for the first applicant;
• between 20% and 30% for the second; and
• up to 20% for subsequent applicants.

In determining the reduction, the ICA gives special consideration to evidence that both refers to the same time period and is directly relevant to the conduct under investigation. It also takes into account the speed and quality of the undertaking’s co-operation, as well as the strength of the evidence provided.

Limited Use in Practice

Since its introduction in 2007, the Italian leniency programme has not been particularly successful. To date, only 11 infringement decisions have been based on leniency applications. However, in recent years, the ICA has been actively promoting leniency as a complementary tool to whistle-blowing.

Markers

The ICA, upon a suitably substantiated request by an undertaking wishing to benefit from immunity, may, at its discretion, grant an order number (so-called marker) and set a deadline for finalising the leniency application. The marker protects the applicant’s place in the queue for a specified period of time and allows it to conduct the internal investigations necessary to gather information and evidence in support of its immunity application.

In 2021, a provision was introduced to bridge the gap between the granting of leniency to undertakings and the potential criminal liability of individuals involved in cartel conduct that also constitutes a criminal offence (eg, bid rigging).

The new provision extends the effects of the leniency application to natural persons and sets out the conditions under which access to the leniency programme results in immunity from criminal sanctions.

This exemption applies to current and former directors, officers, and other staff members of an undertaking that has submitted a leniency application to the ICA, the EC or other NCAs within the EU in relation to the same cartel, provided that such individuals:

• actively co-operate with the competition authority conducting the proceeding; and
• actively co-operate with the prosecutor, by providing useful and factual information to help establish the facts and identify those responsible.

It is also worth noting that, in order to benefit from the exemption, the leniency application must have been submitted before the individuals concerned became aware that they were under investigation in connection with the relevant conduct.

Since February 2023, the ICA has made an antitrust whistle-blowing platform available on its website, allowing any individuals to report suspected infringement of competition law (with a particular focus on cartels, though not limited to them).

The tool is intended to enhance the detection and deterrence of cartels and is primarily aimed at individuals, complementing the leniency programme.

The platform guarantees full anonymity, making it especially suitable for individuals who, by virtue of their work, have become aware of non-public information concerning antitrust violations and for whom maintaining anonymity is essential. Such information may also come from competitors, suppliers or customers of the alleged infringer. These individuals may also seek anonymity to avoid jeopardising ongoing business relationships or facing potential commercial retaliation.

In 2024, 194 reports submitted through the antitrust whistle-blowing platform were assessed. According to the ICA, since its launch, the platform has proved a valuable enforcement tool in detecting cartels and uncovering other conduct relevant to competition and consumer protection.

The ICA is empowered to request information and/or documents from individuals who hold information relevant to an investigation. This may occur through requests for information, during hearings or in the context of dawn raids, which may also be carried out at private residences.

Individuals may be assisted by legal counsel and are required to co-operate; however, they retain the right not to answer questions that could amount to an admission of an infringement.

Since 2021, the legal framework has been strengthened with the introduction of a system of sanctions applicable to individuals. Under this regime, the ICA may impose financial penalties and periodic penalty payments directly on natural persons who, wilfully or negligently:

• obstruct an inspection;
• provide false, incomplete, or misleading information in response to a request; or
• unjustifiably fail to appear at a hearing.

The ICA may obtain documentary evidence directly from the company under investigation through dawn raids or requests for information.

The ICA’s jurisdiction covers conduct capable of having an effect on the Italian market, regardless of the geographic location of the undertakings involved. As a result, the Authority may request information from companies established outside of Italy, following the same procedure applicable to requests addressed to undertakings located in Italy.

Requests for information may also concern evidence located in third countries or stored in cloud environments, in so far as such evidence is accessible to the addressee of the request.

The ICA regularly engages in co-operation and information sharing with other regulatory authorities and has the right to request their co-operation in the performance of its functions, in application of the general principles of loyal co-operation between public bodies and the good functioning of public administration.

Throughout the years, the ICA has entered into several memorandums of understanding (MOUs) to formalise such co-operation — including with the Institute for the Supervision of Insurance (Istituto per la Vigilanza Sulle Assicurazioni, or IVASS), the National Anti-Corruption Authority (Autorità Nazionale Anticorruzione, or ANAC), the Transport Regulation Authority (L'Autorità di Regolazione dei Trasporti, or ART), the National Commission for Companies and the Stock Exchange (Commissione Nazionale per le Società e la Borsa, or CONSOB), and the Communications Authority (Autorità per le Garanzie nelle Comunicazioni, or AGCOM), among others.

At the European level, the ICA co-operates with the EC and the other NCAs through the ECN. The implementation of Directive (EU) 1/2009 (“ECN+ Directive”) has strengthened the co-operation of NCAs. Within this framework, the ICA is empowered to conduct dawn raids and investigations at the request of NCAs from other EU member states, and officials of NCAs from other member states may be authorised to actively participate in and assist the ICA staff in inspections and hearings. The possibility of mutual assistance is envisaged to ensure cross-border notification of essential procedural documents and, following the adoption of a decision, to provide assistance with the cross-border enforcement of decisions.

In 2024, the ICA requested investigative assistance from the NCAs of the Netherlands (Case I868) and Ireland (Case A568) in conducting inspections. Moreover. beyond formal requests for investigative assistance, on several occasions the ICA exchanged information contained in case files with other NCAs, reflecting the increasing co-operation in investigations within the ECN.

At the global level, the ICA is also a member of the International Competition Network, which is part of the Steering Committee – the Competition Committee established within the OECD and the Intergovernmental Group of Experts on Competition Law and Policy of the UNCTAD. It participates proactively in these forums devoted to fostering competition law enforcement and co-operation on competition policy implementation.

The ICA does not have the power to seek a criminal indictment for cartel conduct – however, it will promptly inform the Public Prosecutor’s Office if evidence of criminal activity emerges from the inspections conducted. In this sense, for example, there is an MOU between the ICA and the Milan Public Prosecutor’s Office.

There is no civil enforcement by the ICA. Civil cases in cartel matters only refer to private litigation.

During the proceeding, the ICA might request expert opinions, statistical and economic analyses, as well as consultation with experts, with reference to any element relevant to the investigation.

Parties may also engage their own experts to provide technical input and reinforce the reasoning behind their arguments.

The ICA is the sole authority empowered to publicly enforce competition law in Italy and, therefore, it is not possible to have multiple public enforcement proceedings involving the same or related facts.

However, if the cartel conduct under investigation by the ICA also amounts to a criminal offence under Italian criminal law, there might be a simultaneous proceeding pending before the ICA and a criminal court. In this case, evidence obtained in one proceeding may, in principle, be shared or used in the other. For instance, in the past, the ICA has initiated proceedings based on information and documents transmitted by the Public Prosecutor’s Office.

Multi-defendant cases are common in antitrust proceedings before the ICA, as the Authority generally investigates all undertakings allegedly involved in the same or related facts with a single proceeding, without separating cases by defendant.

The ICA has the authority to impose administrative fines for cartel infringements. Under Article 15 of Law No 287/1990, the ICA can impose fines of up to 10% of the undertaking’s total worldwide turnover achieved in the last financial year prior to the notification of the statement of objections.

The ICA has set out detailed criteria for setting the amount of fines in its 2025 “Guidelines on Fines” (see 1.9 Guides Published by Governmental Authorities) following a structured approach similar to the EC’s methodology.

The base amount is calculated starting from the value of sales of goods or services subject to the infringement in the relevant market during the last full year of participation. A gravity percentage is then applied to this value of affected sales – with a maximum of 30% and typically not less than 15% for secret cartels – and multiplied by the duration of participation in years.

An additional “entry fee” of 15–25% of the value of affected sales may be added for the most serious competition restrictions.

Aggravating and mitigating factors may be taken into account to adjust the base amount of the fine. However, the total impact of these adjustments cannot exceed 30% of the calculated base. An exception applies in cases of recidivism: undertakings that committed similar infringements within the five years preceding the investigation may be subject to an increase of up to 100% of the base amount.

As mentioned previously, the final amount of the fine cannot exceed 10% of the undertaking’s total worldwide turnover in the last financial year prior to notification of the statement of objections. If the calculated amount exceeds this threshold, it must be reduced accordingly to remain within the legal cap.

While most cartel investigations by the ICA result in findings of infringement, it is not unusual for the Authority to close cases without imposing sanctions. In nearly every year over the past decade, at least one investigation has ended without a finding of violation. The proportion of cases ending without sanctions varies annually depending on the complexity of cases under investigation and the quality of evidence available. In such cases, the ICA typically concludes that there is insufficient evidence to confirm the existence of an anti-competitive agreement or to establish a breach of Article 101 of the TFEU.

In 2022 a settlement procedure was introduced in Italy through Article 34 of Law No 118/2022 (“Annual Law for Market and Competition 2021”). The ICA adopted an implementing communication in 2023 (Decision No 30629 of 16 May 2023), establishing the framework for the first formal settlement mechanism in Italian competition enforcement.

The settlement procedure is at the discretion of the ICA: parties do not have a right to settlement, rather, it is the Authority that decides whether to explore this route based on the specific circumstances of each case.

Settlement discussions can be initiated at any stage of the proceedings, but only after the expiry of the three-month deadline for submitting commitments and before the issuance of the statement of objections. The procedure applies to all types of competition law infringements, including cartels.

Settlement Procedure

The purpose of settlement discussions is to achieve a shared understanding of the scope and content of the charges that the undertakings are prepared to acknowledge in exchange for the fine reduction. The procedure is structured in five phases:

• exploratory proceedings, where the ICA assesses whether the case is suitable for settlement and, if appropriate, invites parties to express their interest in writing within at least 15 days;
• verification of parties’ interest in settlement through written declarations that do not imply admission of liability;
• formal settlement proposals to be submitted by the parties within a term of at least 15 days defined by the Authority, containing acknowledgement of liability and agreement on the maximum fine amount;
• statement of objections issued by the ICA reflecting the settlement terms, followed by the parties’ written confirmation that the statement is consistent with their settlement proposals and that they maintain their commitment to the settlement procedure; and
• the final decision incorporating the agreed terms.

Benefits and Implications

In exchange for acknowledgement of responsibility for the infringement, the ICA may grant a discount on the fine amounting to 10% for secret cartels and 20% for any other antitrust infringement.

Companies cannot be fined or penalised for refusing settlement discussions or for failed negotiations.

Settlement decisions may still facilitate subsequent civil damages litigation, as the finding of infringement remains established, though the simplified reasoning may provide a less detailed factual basis for follow-on actions.

An ICA decision establishing an undertaking’s liability for cartel conduct has significant effects for subsequent damages claims. Under Article 7 of Legislative Decree No 3/2017, private parties can rely on final ICA decisions (no longer subject to appeal or confirmed by final court judgment) as definitive proof of anti-competitive conduct, including its nature and material, personal, temporal and territorial scope. In cases of damages caused by a cartel, moreover, a rebuttable presumption concerning the existence of damages also applies. These implications in terms of evidence apply whether the ICA decision follows normal proceedings or a settlement.

Italian law does not provide for criminal sanctions in respect of competition law infringements, which are formally treated as administrative violations.

Bid rigging is the only anti-competitive conduct which may trigger criminal liability under Italian criminal law.

Italian law does not provide for criminal sanctions in respect of competition law infringements, which are formally treated as administrative violations. The highest cumulative fine ever imposed by the ICA for cartel conduct was in Case I811 – Finanziamenti Auto (2018), where the total sanctions reached EUR678,386,031.

The ICA’s 2025 “Guidelines on Fines” explicitly identify the adoption of an effective compliance programme as a possible mitigating circumstance that may result in a reduction of the administrative fine imposed for competition law infringements.

In order to qualify for a reduction, antitrust compliance programmes must meet a set of requirements, including:

• a tailored risk assessment based on the company features and market context;
• integration into corporate culture, with the active involvement of top management;
• the appointment of an antitrust compliance officer granted with adequate resources;
• regular training and auditing systems; and
• internal reporting channels supported by a system of incentives and sanctions.

However, under the new “Guidelines on Antitrust Compliance” adopted by the ICA in 2025 (see 1.9 Guides Published by Governmental Authorities), the fundamental benchmark in assessing the effectiveness of a compliance programme for the purpose of granting a mitigating circumstance is its actual ability to prevent antitrust violations.

In this regard, a compliance programme is deemed effective if it is adopted before the initiation of the investigation and allows the prompt detection and interruption of the infringement prior to the notification of the initiation of investigative proceedings. In such cases, a reduction of up to 10% of the fine may be granted, provided that the company has submitted a leniency application, when applicable.

A discount of up to 5% is, instead, granted for programmes that, while not manifestly inadequate, were adopted before the start of the investigation but did not allow infringement detection, provided that the company adequately integrates and implements improvements within six months from the investigation opening.

No reduction applies in cases of manifestly inadequate programmes that show:

• serious deficiencies in content;
• absence of evidence of actual implementation;
• involvement of top management in the infringement; or
• failure to promptly terminate the infringement and seek leniency, when applicable.

Italian competition law does not empower the ICA to impose mandatory consumer redress or restitution obligations on companies found liable for cartel conduct.

Decisions issued by the ICA may be challenged before the Regional Administrative Tribunal of Lazio (Tribunale Amministrativo Regionale, or TAR Lazio) within 60 days of the decision’s notification.

Judgments rendered by TAR Lazio may be further appealed before the Council of State (Consiglio di Stato). The appeals must be notified within 30 days of the first-instance ruling’s notification, or, if not notified, within three months of its publication.

Judicial review of ICA decisions is not uncommon. Courts may overturn or amend decisions, either entirely or in part. While full annulments do occur, partial modifications are more frequent, particularly with regard to the amount and severity of fines.

The duration of cartel investigations may vary significantly depending on the specific circumstances of the case, the amount of evidence collected and the number of parties involved. However, the overall timeline from investigation to final judicial determination typically spans four to six years.

While the proceeding before the ICA may take one to two years, if judicial review follows, the combined appeal process before TAR Lazio and the Council of State tends to require an additional three to four years.

Private firms and/or individuals may claim damages resulting from cartel behaviour before the specialised sections for business matters of the courts of Milan (for the judicial districts of Northern Italy), Rome (for the judicial districts of Central Italy and Sardinia) or Naples (for the judicial districts of Southern Italy and Sicily).

The claim may follow an infringement decision of the ICA or the EC (follow-on cases) or it can be brought without a previous finding of a competition law infringement (standalone cases). Standalone damage claims are less common compared to follow-on claims since, in accordance with the general rules of Italian civil procedure, in the first case the claimant bears the full burden of proof for the cartel infringement. Follow-on claims, by contrast, benefit from the binding effect of final (no longer subject to appeal) ICA or EC decisions on national courts in relation to the nature of the infringement and its material, personal, temporal and territorial scope. In the case of damages caused by a cartel, moreover, Italian law provides for a rebuttable presumption concerning the existence of damages. The claimant, however, still needs to demonstrate the causal link between the infringement and the damages, as well as the quantification of the damages.

The right of action for cartel damages compensation expires five years from the date on which:

• the infringement has ceased; and
• the claimant is aware, or it can reasonably be presumed that it is aware, of –
1. the conduct and the fact that such conduct constitutes competition law infringement;
2. the fact that the infringement has caused harm to the claimant; and
3. the identity of the infringer(s).

The limitation period is suspended if the ICA opens an investigation into the same infringement to which the compensation action relates, until one year after the ICA infringement decision becomes final or the proceedings are otherwise concluded.

In Italy, collective actions are possible. Following a recent class action reform (implemented by Law No 31/2019), for infringements occurring after 19 May 2021, class actions can now be brought by every type of class (including companies and professionals) that shares homogeneous individual rights and not just by consumers and end-users. Non-profit organisations and associations whose statutory objective includes the protection of homogeneous individual rights may also bring these class actions, if they satisfy certain requirements and are listed in a special public register held by the Ministry of Justice.

Compensation for damages resulting from an infringement of competition law can be claimed by anyone who has suffered such damage, regardless of whether they are a direct or indirect purchaser of the infringer. The burden of proof lies with the claimant. However, a legal presumption that damage has been passed on applies when the indirect purchaser demonstrates that:

• the defendant has committed an infringement of competition law;
• the infringement of competition law has resulted in an overcharge for the defendant’s direct purchaser; and
• the indirect purchaser has purchased goods or services that were the subject of competition law infringement or derived from or incorporate them.

The defendant can rebut this presumption by demonstrating that the overcharge was not passed on in whole or in part to the indirect purchaser.

If the claim is brought by a direct purchaser, the defendant can prove that the claimant passed on the overcharge in whole or in part (so-called “passing-on defence”). The burden of proof in this case lies with the defendant.

Leniency statements and settlement submissions cannot be disclosed under any circumstances, while other documents relating to ICA investigations can only be disclosed when the investigations are over.

Once a damage claim is brought before the court, the parties are unlikely to reach a settlement agreement. The timeframe for private litigation can differ significantly from case to case since it largely depends on the legal and factual complexity of the case (particularly in the case of standalone claims) and on the workload of the competent courts. In general, a first-instance case can take from two to three years.

Contingency fees are generally prohibited under Italian law.

In Italian civil litigation, the losing party is typically required to reimburse the winning party’s costs, unless the courts decide that each party should cover their own expenses, especially if there is no clear winner or loser, or if the case concerns novel or controversial legal issues. These costs include attorneys’ fees (determined according to an official tariff outlined in a ministerial decree), court fees, and other related expenses (such as fees for court-appointed experts). Courts have considerable discretion in determining the amount of costs to be awarded.

First-instance judgments rendered by the specialised sections of the courts of Milan, Rome or Naples can be appealed before the respective appeal courts. The appeal can be based on a wrong application of the law or an erroneous finding of the facts. Judgments of appeal courts may be further appealed before the Italian Supreme Court only on specific grounds of law.

According to the ICA, the exchange of commercially sensitive information between competitors may amount to a cartel offence and may be regarded as a restriction by object, even in the absence of evidence of subsequent parallel behaviour in the market.

When assessing the anti-competitive nature of such exchanges, the ICA applies the analytical standards adopted at the EU level, taking into account factors such as the nature of the information shared, the frequency and duration of the exchange, the level of aggregation and the age of the data.

The ICA often investigates cases involving the exchange of sensitive information, either as a standalone infringement or as part of broader anti-competitive practices such as price fixing or market allocation.

The ICA has been actively monitoring the use of pricing algorithms in potential cartel behaviour since 2017, when it launched a sector inquiry on big data in co-operation with the Italian telecoms authority (Autorità per le Garanzie nelle Comunicazioni, or AGCOM) and the data protection regulator (Garante per la Protezione dei Dati Personali, or GDPD).

In 2023, the ICA investigated allegations of price collusion in airfares to and from Sicily during the holiday season, where pricing algorithms were suspected to have facilitated co-ordination. Although the case concluded without a finding of infringement, the Authority launched a follow-up market study to examine algorithmic pricing in passenger air transport more broadly.

The same year, the ICA contributed actively to the OECD’s ongoing reflections on algorithmic competition. In its “Algorithmic Competition – Note by Italy” (June 2023), the Authority highlighted how pricing algorithms may facilitate or reinforce collusive outcomes, particularly by increasing market transparency and reducing strategic uncertainty. The document also addressed challenges posed by AI, marking a broader concern about digital tools and their impact on market dynamics.

Further, ahead of the G7 Competition Summit on Artificial Intelligence (Rome, October 2024), the ICA co-ordinated a working group and published a technical paper highlighting some particularly critical competition issues within the AI supply chain (ICA Discussion Paper – “Competition in the Artificial Intelligence Tech Stack: Recent developments and emerging issues”, 4 October 2024).

Under Italian competition law, while cartel enforcement targets co-ordinated behaviour between undertakings, unilateral monopolistic practices may trigger scrutiny under abuse of dominance rules, notably Article 102 of the TFEU and Article 3 of the Law.

The ICA has investigated cartel conduct across a broad range of industries, without a predominant focus on specific sectors. However, in the current economic climate, the ICA is particularly vigilant in sectors where firms may attempt to exploit inflationary market conditions to raise prices unjustifiably and transfer costs to consumers.

The ICA has not issued specific guidance about the preservation of ephemeral communications. However, companies are expected to preserve and provide all relevant communications during dawn raids.

No-poach agreements between competitors are deemed a restriction by object under both Italian and EU competition law. Although the ICA has not yet formally investigated this type of conduct, growing attention is being paid to such agreements, particularly in the context of M&A transactions.

In 2024, the ICA carried out eight cartel investigations. Of these, two were based on leniency applications, four arose from anonymous reports submitted through the Authority’s whistle-blowing platform and the remaining two proceedings were triggered by formal submissions from public bodies rather than initiated ex officio.

While leniency applications remain limited in number, the ICA is actively promoting leniency as a complementary tool to whistle-blowing. Driven by the risk that employees may report violations anonymously to the Authority, companies should be increasingly incentivised to apply for immunity or reductions in fines.

Cartel investigations carried out by the ICA are mostly domestic in nature.

However, on several occasions, the Authority has exchanged information contained in case files with other competition authorities, pursuant to Article 12 of Council Regulation (EC) No 1/2003, reflecting an increasing level of co-operation in investigations within the ECN.

Italy has not issued national guidance specifically addressing cartel behaviour in the context of ESG co-operation. However, the ICA – as part of the ECN – actively contributed to the draft of the EC’s 2023 Guidelines on horizontal co-operation agreements, which include criteria for assessing any horizontal co-operation that pursues a sustainability objective under Article 101 of the TFEU.

While the ICA recognises that certain ESG goals may necessitate co-operation between firms – such as aligning environmental standards – it has stressed that such collaboration must not become a pretext for collusive practices aimed at price fixing or market exclusion. The Authority has emphasised the importance of ensuring that sustainability-driven agreements remain fully compatible with competition law.

Economic crises may create conditions in which firms, under pressure from falling margins, are more likely to resort to anti-competitive co-ordination to maintain profitability. In the current climate of energy market instability and inflationary pressure, the ICA is actively investigating several cases where price increases have been justified by vague references to rising costs and general inflation. The Authority is assessing whether these increases may conceal unlawful alignment among competitors.