Florida’s “parental responsibility” is set out in Section 61.13 of the Florida Statutes. The statute identifies several areas that fall within parental responsibility, including education, health care, and any other responsibilities the court finds unique to a particular family, though the list is not exhaustive. Under Section 61.13(2)(c), the court must order shared parental responsibility, meaning both parents retain full rights and responsibilities toward the child, unless doing so would be detrimental to the child. If the court finds that shared parental responsibility would be detrimental to the child, the court can instead order sole parental responsibility, giving one parent sole decision-making authority without the other parent’s input. Florida courts can also order ultimate decision-making authority, effectively naming one parent the “tiebreaker” if the parents deadlock on a parental-responsibility issue.
A woman who gives birth in Florida is the child’s legal parent by operation of law and she automatically obtains parental responsibility. She is a “parent” under Section 61.13001(1)(d) of the Florida Statutes, which extends to a person reflected as a parent on a birth certificate. Further, Florida Statute § 63.032(12) defines “parent” to include “a woman who gives birth to a child and who is not a gestational surrogate”. Once a dispute arises between the parents concerning a child that that requires court intervention (ie, a dissolution of marriage action, or a paternity action, etc), a court can and must address parental responsibility pursuant to the Section 61.13 framework, as noted in 1.1 Parental Responsibility.
Determination of parentage is governed by Chapter 742 of the Florida Statutes. A man married to the birth mother at the time of the child’s birth obtains parental status automatically, through the marital presumption of paternity (Fla. Stat. § 382.013(2)(a)). When the mother is married at birth, the husband’s name goes on the birth certificate as the child’s father, unless a court of competent jurisdiction has already determined paternity otherwise (Fla. Stat. § 382.013(2)(a)).
An unmarried biological father, by contrast, has no automatic parental rights at birth. Florida law requires him to take affirmative steps to establish both legal paternity and parental responsibility (Fla. Stat. § 63.053; Fla. Stat. § 742.011). Florida Statute § 742.10(1) lays the foundation for establishing paternity for children born out of wedlock. For challenged paternity actions, establishing paternity alone is not enough; under § 742.10(5), parental responsibility must be established through a separate action under § 742.011. From there, the court applies the § 61.13 framework discussed in 1.1 Parental Responsibility. However, where the acknowledgement of paternity is unchallenged, and the parties voluntarily execute an affidavit or stipulation of paternity, no judicial or administrative proceeding is needed to ratify the paternity status (Fla. Stat. § 742.10(5)).
Non-genetic parental requirements turn on what type of “non-genetic parent” is seeking parental responsibility. A stepparent’s only path to parental responsibility is through stepparent adoption under Chapter 63 of the Florida Statutes. That requires the other biological parent’s rights be terminated first, either through that parent’s voluntary consent and waiver or by a court order terminating rights on statutory grounds (Fla. Stat. §§ 63.062, 63.082, and 63.089). The stepparent and the biological parent-spouse then file a joint petition for adoption (Fla. Stat. § 63.087(3)), and the court enters a final judgment of stepparent adoption under Section 63.172. Once that judgment is entered, the stepparent becomes the child’s legal parent with full parental responsibility.
For a preplanned adoption, the biological mother has 48 hours after the child’s birth to rescind her consent and assume maternal rights (Fla. Stat. § 63.213). If the biological mother does not do so, the intended parents obtain parental responsibility through a final judgment of adoption once the remaining statutory requirements are satisfied (Fla. Stat. § 63.172; Fla. Stat. § 63.213).
See 1.3 Requirements for Fathers above. In short, when a child is born during a marriage, Florida law recognises the husband as the child’s legal father pursuant to Section 382.013(2)(a), Florida Statutes.
Following Obergefell v Hodges, 576 U.S. 644 (2015), same-sex married couples are entitled to the same parental rights and legal recognition as opposite-sex married couples under Florida law.
If the couple was married at the time of adoption, or one parent already has a child from a prior relationship, see 1.4 Requirements for Non-Genetic Parents. Excluding same-sex couples from adopting is unconstitutional. Fla. Dep't of Child. & Fams. v Adoption of X.X.G., 45 So. 3d 79 (Fla. 3d DCA 2010).
Where a couple is married at the time of the child’s birth (conceived via assisted reproduction during the marriage), if they jointly consent in writing to artificial insemination, in vitro fertilisation, donated eggs, or donated pre-embryos, the child is legally considered the child of both spouses (Fla. Stat. § 742.11). This applies even when the child is not genetically related to one or both spouses because of the use of donor genetic material. The written consent of both spouses is therefore significant in establishing their legal parental relationship to the child (Fla. Stat. § 742.11).
Courts in Florida must have clear and convincing evidence to terminate the biological relationship, which can be established in many ways. After 48 hours have passed following the child’s birth, a biological mother may sign a consent for adoption and voluntarily surrender her parental rights to the child. In this case, the birth or legal father may also execute an affidavit of non-paternity at any time waiving any rights to the child. Adoptive parents obtain full parental responsibility through a final judgment of adoption under Section 63.172 of the Florida Statutes. That judgment terminates the legal relationship between the child and the birth parents, except a birth parent who is the adopting parent’s spouse, and creates a parent-child relationship as though the child had been born to the adoptive parent. The Florida Bar provides a comprehensive pamphlet on adoptions and the steps required to facilitate an adoption.
Florida’s relocation statute is Section 61.13001, Florida Statutes. However, the relocation statute only applies once a petition is filed to establish or modify time-sharing of a child, meaning that if there is no case pending or if there is no judgment or order establishing or modifying time-sharing previously entered, a parent can theoretically relocate anywhere in the world with their child without the consent of anyone, subject of course to kidnapping statutes and other applicable statutes.
Once the relocation statute applies, however, a parent may not relocate further than 50 miles away from their residence for 60 consecutive days or longer. Once the relocation statute applies, the parent seeking to relocate further than 50 miles away for 60 days or longer must obtain a court order upon a petition for relocation and/or must obtain consent from the other parent and every other person entitled to access or time-sharing with the child. Please note that this applies to whichever parent seeks to relocate, regardless of which parent has more time-sharing. Such “relocation by agreement” is addressed in Section 61.13001(2) of the Florida Statutes, and, by statute, such agreement must contain specific items to be enforceable.
Assuming the relocation statute applies at the time relocation is sought, the parent seeking relocation without an agreement must file a verified petition to relocate and serve it on the other parent and every person entitled to access or time-sharing (Fla. Stat. § 61.13001). The verified petition must contain information and statutory language required by this statute to properly effectuate the relocation request. Otherwise, it is not a valid relocation petition.
If the non-relocating parent fails to file a timely written objection, the court, absent good cause, presumes the relocation is in the child’s best interests and enters an order adopting the time-sharing schedule in the petition, without an evidentiary hearing (Fla. Stat. § 61.13001). If a timely objection is filed, the relocating parent may not move with the child and must proceed to a temporary hearing or trial to obtain court permission (Fla. Stat. § 61.13001).
See 2.3.9 Time Taken by an Application for Relocation.
If the relocation is contested, the relocating parent bears the initial burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that relocation is in the child’s best interests. If that burden is met, the burden shifts to the non-relocating parent to show by a preponderance of the evidence that the proposed relocation is not in the child’s best interests (Fla. Stat. § 61.13001).
Under Florida law, when both parents have time-sharing with a child, neither parent may unilaterally relocate beyond the statutory distance and duration without a court order, except as provided in 2.1 Whose Consent is Required for Relocation?
Section 61.13001(7) of the Florida Statutes expressly provides that no presumption arises in favour of or against a request to relocate, even when the move will materially affect the current time-sharing schedule. The court must evaluate all 11 statutory factors, including but not limited to: the child’s relationship with each parent, siblings and other significant persons; the child’s age, developmental stage and needs; the feasibility of substitute arrangements to preserve the relationship with the non-relocating parent, including logistics, finances and the likelihood of compliance once the relocating parent is beyond the court’s jurisdiction; the child’s preference; enhancement of the quality of life of both the relocating parent and the child; each party’s reasons; employment and economic circumstances and whether the move is necessary to improve them; good faith and whether the objecting parent has met their financial obligations; the opportunities available to the objecting party; any history of substance abuse or domestic violence; and any other factor affecting best interests or set out in Section 61.13 – parental relationship with the child and co-operation, parental responsibilities, child’s needs, stability and continuity, practicability of the parenting plan, parents’ fitness and health, child’s preferences, parental involvement, safety and wellbeing, domestic violence, protection from litigation, and other relevant circumstances.
The child’s preference is expressly recognised as a statutory factor under § 61.13001(7)(d), but the weight given to this factor depends on the child’s age and maturity. Florida courts do not assign a fixed age at which a child’s preference becomes determinative. Under § 61.13001, the older and more mature the child, the more weight the court will give to the child’s expressed preference, but the preference is never automatically dispositive nor is it a “super factor” for the court.
See, 2.3.2 Wishes and Feelings of the Child, as the wishes and feelings of the child tie directly to their age and maturity.
Section 61.13001(7)(a) of the Florida Statutes expressly requires the court to consider the child’s relationship with siblings and half-siblings as part of the nature, quality, extent of involvement and duration of the child’s relationships with significant persons in the child’s life. However, this is just another statutory factor under Fla. Stat. § 61.13001(7). In all practicality, courts are loath to separate siblings unless dictated by the specific circumstances of the family, always considering the best interests of the children as the polestar consideration.
The feasibility of preserving the relationship between the non-relocating parent and the child is addressed in § 61.13001(7)(c), which requires the court to consider the logistics of contact, access and time-sharing; the financial circumstances of the parties; whether substitute arrangements are sufficient to foster a continuing meaningful relationship; and the likelihood of compliance with substitute arrangements by the relocating parent once he or she is out of the jurisdiction of the court (Fla. Stat. § 61.13001(7)).
This factor carries particular weight in international relocation cases, as seen in Ward v Waters, 389 So. 3d 652 (Fla 3d DCA 2024). In Ward, even though not an international case, the court affirmed the denial of a father’s petition to relocate to Hawaii, citing findings that transportation costs between Key West and Hawaii were overly burdensome and that differing time zones precluded the mother from meaningfully communicating with the child.
There is no one reason for relocation that the courts appear to be the most sympathetic towards. Rather, the courts are statutorily required to consider all enumerated factors, at a minimum. Ultimately, “the concern in a relocation determination is whether the relocation is in the best interests of the child” (Rossman v Profera, 67 So. 3d 363, 365 (Fla. 4th DCA 2011)).
However, Florida courts have consistently viewed the following reasons for relocation favourably: (i) a job opportunity/offer that materially improves the family’s financial circumstances (Orta v Suarez, 66 So. 3d 988 (Fla. 3d DCA 2011)) and (ii) relocation to an area offering a higher standard of living and an improved quality of life (Harman v Alonso, 425 So. 3d 674 (Fla. 3d DCA 2025)).
The relocation statute requires a holistic approach analysing all statutory factors in determining the best interests of the child. There is no one ground for opposition that the courts appear to be the most sympathetic towards. However, courts have viewed opposition to relocation favourably where: (i) the non-relocating parent has a strong, active, ongoing relationship with the child that would be substantially curtailed by the move (Flint v Fortson, 744 So. 2d 1217 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999); Harris v Migliore, 789 So.2d 477 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001); (ii) relocation would serve primarily the relocating parent’s interests rather than the child’s (Rossman v Profera, 67 So. 3d 363 (Fla. 4th DCA 2011)); and (iii) the child has deep roots in the current community (school, friends, extended family) (Mehler v Mehler, 555 So. 2d 1295 (Fla. 3d DCA 1990).
Filing fees vary depending on whether relocation is raised as part of an original petition or by supplemental petition. As of August 2026, the Miami-Dade County Clerk of Courts filing fee is approximately USD300 for an initial action. Reopening an existing case carries a separate, lower fee of USD50.00.
An uncontested relocation, where both parents agree to the move and its terms, typically involves a lower cost, driven mainly by how quickly the parties can reach an agreement. A contested relocation can cost significantly more, particularly where the case involves custody evaluations, expert witnesses, extensive discovery or a trial.
In the authors’ view, a contested relocation case can be one of the more costly litigations in family law because the binary result (relocation versus non-relocation) tends to preclude settlement as a resolution.
The relocation statute mandates priority scheduling. A temporary relocation hearing must occur, absent good cause, no later than 30 days after the filing of the motion for temporary relief. If a notice of non-jury trial is filed, the final hearing must occur, absent good cause, within 90 days thereafter (Fla. Stat. § 61.13001). In practice, the statute often comes into conflict with the court’s and attorney’s calendar availabilities.
There is no presumption for or against relocation, and the “primary care giver” does not receive any automatic advantage (Fla. Stat. § 61.13001(7); Hull v Hull, 273 So.3d 1135 (Fla. 5th DCA 2019)). Neither parent may relocate beyond the statutory distance and duration without a court order, except as provided in 2.1 Whose Consent is Required for Relocation?
In practice, however, the primary care giver’s role is not irrelevant. The nature, quality, extent of involvement and duration of the child’s relationship with the parent is directly addressed in § 61.13001(7).
As noted above, the relocation statute only applies to rather permanent moves over 50 miles away from the then-current residence or residence at the time of the last time-sharing order or judgment. The mileage is calculated in a straight line rather than over and through man-made roads and highways. If the intended move is less than those 50 miles, the relocation statute does not apply. In such a scenario, a petition for relocation would not be filed and the parties would simply litigate time-sharing and parental responsibility under the enumerated factors in Section 61.13 of the Florida Statutes, not under 61.13001. If the intended move is greater than 50 miles, Fla. Stat. § 61.13001 is triggered.
Like most legal questions, the honest answer to the question, is it illegal to take a child out of the jurisdiction without the relevant consent, is: it depends.
If there has never been a custody case between the child’s two parents, meaning no parenting plan has ever been ordered, both parents generally have the freedom to travel with the child, including out of state or out of the country. That freedom narrows the moment a case is filed or a parenting plan is entered. From then on, the parenting plan’s own travel terms control, whether the trip is a week at the beach or a move across the country.
That’s true whether the matter involves a short trip or a permanent relocation.
“Generally free to travel” does not mean “risk free”. Florida has criminal laws that can turn a family dispute into a felony charge.
Under Florida Statute 787.03, it is a third-degree felony to knowingly or recklessly take, entice or help someone else take a minor away from a parent, guardian or other lawful custodian, without legal authority to do so. Even when no custody order exists yet, a parent, step-parent, guardian or relative who hides or lures a child away with the intent to cut off another parent’s custody rights can also face a third-degree felony charge, whether the child is kept in Florida or taken elsewhere, including abroad.
A related but separate law, Florida Statute 787.04, makes it a third-degree felony to take a child beyond Florida’s borders in violation of a court order, or during a pending custody case after the parent has been given notice of that case, without the court’s permission. It is also a crime to take a child out of state with the court’s permission and then fail to bring the child back when required.
Federal law adds another layer. The International Parental Kidnapping Crime Act makes it a federal crime to remove a child under the age of 16 from the United States, attempt to do so, or keep a child outside the country with intent to interfere with someone else’s parental rights. A conviction can mean a fine, up to three years in prison, or both.
The takeaway: before a parent books a flight, especially if there is any custody dispute in the picture, they must call a family law attorney. The rules shift quickly once a case is filed, and the criminal exposure is real.
Steps taken to return abducted children depend on where the child is being taken.
If the country is one of the roughly 100 nations that have signed the 1980 Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction, the parent left behind has a real tool available: the Convention’s return remedy. In the United States, that remedy is carried out through a law called ICARA, the International Child Abduction Remedies Act, found at 22 U.S.C. § 9001 and following.
To use it, the left-behind parent can either file an application with the US Central Authority or go straight to court, filing a petition wherever the child is located. Both state courts and federal district courts can hear these cases; Congress gave them concurrent jurisdiction under 22 U.S.C. § 9003(a).
To win, the parent has to show, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the child was “wrongfully removed or retained” as the Convention defines that term. In practice, that means proving three things: the child was living in another signatory country as their habitual home right before the removal, the removal or retention broke that country’s custody laws, and the left-behind parent was actually exercising custody rights at the time, or would have been if not for the wrongful removal. Courts deciding these cases apply the Convention itself, and can order provisional measures, such as steps to protect the child or prevent them from being moved again, under 22 U.S.C. § 9004.
It is worth knowing that establishing wrongful removal does not automatically end the case. The parent who took the child can still raise defences built into the Convention itself, such as a grave risk of harm to the child, a mature child’s own objection to returning, or the case having gone unaddressed for so long that the child is now settled in the new country. Those defences are often where these cases are actually won or lost, and that nuance is worth including if readers are to understand this is not a rubber stamp.
Florida is a state within the United States, and it is a contracting state to the 1980 Hague Convention, implemented by the International Child Abduction Remedies Act. International child abduction cases are inherently complex and emotional. It is important to seek experienced legal assistance and to do so quickly. What follows is the position in Florida courts.
Hague Convention Articles 7(g) and 25
Article 7(g) of the Convention requires Central Authorities to provide or facilitate the provision of legal aid and advice. Article 25 requires Contracting States to provide applicants with the same legal aid available to their own nationals. In practice, referrals to pro bono attorneys and to organisations such as the National Center for Missing & Exploited Children (NCMEC), which maintains a network of pro bono attorneys for Hague cases, exist. Florida does not have a dedicated state-funded Hague legal aid programme, but parents may access pro bono networks through the Florida Bar’s referral services and NCMEC.
Hague Convention cases are designed to be resolved quickly, typically within weeks to a few months in US federal courts, which prioritise these cases. The Convention anticipates that cases will be resolved within six weeks. Specifically, Article 11 of the Convention says that the central authority of either country or the parent who is requesting return of the child may request a statement for the reasons of the delay if not done within six weeks. ICARA cases are bench trials (no jury), and courts are expected to act expeditiously given the Convention’s prompt return mandate.
See the Travel State website for detail.
As the Supreme Court stated in Abbott v Abbott, 560 U.S. 1 (2010), the Convention’s primary function is to provide a process for the prompt return of a child wrongfully removed to or retained in another country. Congress confirmed in 22 U.S.C. § 9001(a)(4) that wrongfully removed or retained children are to be promptly returned unless one of the narrow exceptions set forth in the Convention applies. The Convention’s defences are to be narrowly construed to effectuate the Convention’s purposes, and even if proven, do not automatically preclude an order of return (Baran v Beaty, 526 F.3d 1340 (11th Cir. 2008)).
In the case where a party is seeking the return of a child from a non-Hague country, the first and most important step is to contact local law enforcement to report the child’s abduction. Where a country is not a party to the convention, the process becomes a bit more complicated as actions may need to be filed in both Florida and the non-Hague country. Non-Hague cases are likely far more expensive and time-consuming, as actions may need to be filed in both countries. Further, the provision in 22 U.S.C. § 9007(b)(3) requiring the respondent to pay the petitioner’s costs, applies only to cases brought under the Hague Convention.
As the United States is a signatory, this 3.4 Non-Hague Convention Countries section is not applicable.
Practice tip: If the children are travelling to a non-Hague country, it is wise to have orders in place in the trial court that grant as many Hague-type rights as possible.
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