As with much of United States law, the United States class action regime has its roots in Early Modern English common law. Over the course of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, English law evolved to accommodate actions in which numerous parties’ interests were involved in order to more consistently and efficiently adjudicate disputes. These early mechanisms included bills of peace, which aggregated multiple suits premised on a common question, and creditor bills, which sought to jointly resolve the claims of multiple creditors against a single debtor. (Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr et al, “An Historical Analysis of the Binding Effect of Class Suits”, 146 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1849, 1861–68 (1998).) Although United States legal institutions inherited these tools for claim aggregation, they were seldom utilised by United States courts (ibid at 1882, 1886).
Over the course of the nineteenth century, United States legal institutions gradually came to develop a more robust programme of representative adjudicatory mechanisms. In 1844, the United States Supreme Court issued its landmark decision in Smith v Swormstedt, clarifying that “where the parties interested are numerous, and the suit is for an object common to them all, some of the body may maintain a bill on behalf of themselves and of the others” (57 U.S. 288, 298, 14 L. Ed. 942 (1853)). In the ensuing decades, the frequency with which American courts heard class actions and their willingness to bind absent parties increased. This culminated in the 1912 revision to the Federal Equity Rules, which established that “[w]hen the question is one of common or general interest to many persons constituting a class so numerous as to make it impracticable to bring them all before the court, one or more may sue or defend for the whole.” (Rules of Practice for the Courts of Equity of the United States Rule 38, at 11, reprinted in 226 U.S. 627, 659 (1912).) This regime remained in place until 1938, when the Federal Equity Rules were replaced with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and Rule 38 was replaced with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 (“Rule 23”).
In Rule 23’s earliest form, class actions bound absent class members only under certain circumstances, often requiring members to affirmatively opt in to the class in order to reap the benefits of the suit and be bound by its resolution. In 1966, Rule 23 was substantially overhauled in an effort to simplify its framework and align it with contemporary developments in decisional law. The single most impactful innovation was the addition of Section (b)(3), which permits class actions when “the questions of law or fact common to class members predominate over any questions affecting only individual members, and that a class action is superior to other available methods for fairly and efficiently adjudicating the controversy”. (David Marcus, “The History of the Modern Class Action, Part i: Sturm Und Drang, 1953–1980”, 90 Wash. U. L. Rev. 587, 603–09 (2013).) In contrast with the prior version of Rule 23, the revised Section (b)(3) did not require class members to opt in, facilitating large class actions in areas such as securities fraud, where prospective class members “are in a poor position to seek redress, either because they do not know enough or because the cost of suit is disproportionate to each individual claim”. (Charles Alan Wright, “Class Actions”, 47 F.R.D. 169, 179 (1970).)
The amendment of Rule 23 transformed the landscape of representative adjudication in United States law, and, naturally, it did not do so without controversy. Over the last sixty years, both critics and champions have continued to advocate for class action reform, animated by concerns such as the impact of class actions on commerce and individual litigants’ ability to co-ordinate a collective response to common injuries (Marcus at 611–14). While the regime established by the 1966 amendments to Rule 23 governs class actions to this day, this persistent tension has led to occasional changes and compromises regarding class action policy. For example, in 1995, the United States Congress passed the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act (PSLRA), which sought to deter frivolous securities fraud claims by shifting bargaining power in favour of securities class action defendants. For example, the PSLRA requires that discovery is stayed during the pendency of a motion to dismiss, provides a safe harbour for forward-looking statements such as certain projections and estimates, and caps monetary damages for certain claims. Perhaps most notably, in 2005 the United States Congress enacted the Class Action Fairness Act (CAFA), which made federal courts more available to litigants pursuing class actions as a means of ensuring that disputes affecting the citizens of multiple states are resolved within the federal system (and, in the view of certain observers, reining in state adjudicators who favoured class action plaintiffs). (Kristen L. Wenger, “The Class Action Fairness Act of 2005: The Limits of Its Text and the Need for Legislative Clarification, Not Judicial Interpretation”, 38 Fla. St. U. L. Rev. 679, 689–90 (2011).)
While the body of United States law governing class actions has developed independently for nearly 250 years, it has its origins in the framework provided by English common law.
The early 21st century has seen a parallel rise in robust multi-claimant litigation regimes internationally, particularly in Europe and Latin America, which are largely modelled on the common law class actions that have evolved in the United Kingdom and United States over the last several centuries. (Mark A. Behrens et al, “Global Litigation Trends”, 17 Mich. St. J. Int’l L. 165, 167–68 (2009).) While these younger systems of representative adjudication continue to develop, at present they remain less robust than their Anglo-American analogues; some commentators have suggested that their gradual development is animated, at least in part, by an interest in avoiding the frivolity and predation sometimes associated with United States class actions. (Jason Rathod and Sandeep Vaheesan, “The Arc and Architecture of Private Enforcement Regimes in the United States and Europe: A View Across the Atlantic”, 14 U.N.H.L. Rev. 303, 353 (2016).) For example, in contrast with many European regimes, United States class actions are unrestricted as to subject matter, may be brought by a private individual, and may seek a broad range of remedies (including substantial statutory punitive damages under certain circumstances).
Not applicable to the United States of America.
Class actions that proceed in United States federal courts are governed by Rule 23, which sets forth the threshold requirements and procedures for bringing a class action, as well as the framework for appeals of class certification decisions, appointment of class counsel, and other facets of class action litigation. Most state laws mirror Rule 23, whether through a parallel state statute or through state common law. In particular, Rule 23 sets forth the basic requirements that a suit must meet in order to proceed as a class action, as well as the procedures for certifying a class and conducting the class action once those requirements have been met. Rule 23 also provides the basic legal structure for assessing proposed settlements, voluntary dismissals, and compromises with respect to ongoing class actions, as well as appeals or certification decisions, the appointment of class counsel, and motions for attorneys’ fees. Class actions under this regime generally reflect an opt-out model, under which class members must affirmatively opt out of participation in the suit in order to avoid being bound by the judgment. Prospective class members routinely exercise this right, for example, by providing written notice memorialising this decision.
Although Rule 23 sets forth the core framework within which class actions are brought, many further federal and state statutes shape the nature and progression of class actions; over time, this legislation has been enacted towards the end of further articulating and adjusting this general structure, often with the aim of curbing what some view as the excesses of class actions in the United States. Some of these statutes are concerned with class actions as a general matter. For example, the 2005 Class Action Fairness Act was a programmatic legislative intervention aimed at managing the number and character of class actions permitted to proceed in federal court. Numerous other statutes address narrower and more targeted aspects of class actions. For example, the 1995 Private Securities Litigation Reform Act governs certain elements of securities fraud claims brought as class actions, such as the process for selecting a lead plaintiff, governing pleading standards, and the calculation of damages. Also, a number of statutes pursuant to which class actions are often brought, such as the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (governing certain consumer protection actions) and the Sherman Antitrust Act (governing antitrust actions), provide for heightened damages, incentivising litigants to bring class actions under these laws.
Conversely, certain statutes governing particular claims or subject matter create express statutory exceptions to Rule 23 by barring any class actions from proceeding under that Rule with respect to causes of action for which they provide. For example, plaintiffs may not certify a class under Rule 23 with respect to certain claims brought pursuant to the Fair Labor Standards Act, the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, and the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act (respectively, barring class certification of certain claims for violation of employment law and asylum).
As a general matter, any claim may be brought as a class action so long as it satisfies the requirements of Rule 23 and no statutory or common-law exception applies. Class actions are common in particular areas where the nature of the claim lends itself to aggregation, such as:
These kinds of claims often involve allegations of harms that affect large numbers of potential claimants in similar ways.
Under United States law, the definition of a class action turns on the requirements contained in Rule 23 and its state law analogues. Under federal and state law alike, the core rules set forth no express definition of a class action; rather, they provide the set of features that must be present in order for a suit to proceed as such. For example, Article 9 of New York’s Civil Practice Rules and Laws, a state analogue to Rule 23 that tracks its structure, identifies requirements that must be satisfied in order for a litigation to proceed as a class action under New York law, but does not otherwise provide a definition for the term.
The same is reflected in major federal statutes governing class actions: CAFA expressly bases its definition of a “class action” on Rule 23: “any civil action filed under rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure or similar State statute or rule of judicial procedure authorizing an action to be brought by 1 or more representative persons as a class action” (28 U.S.C. Section 1332(d)(1)(B)). Rule 23’s requirements include four mandatory prerequisites as well as three broader criteria, at least one of which must be satisfied; these constraints are discussed in greater detail in 3.2 Overview of Procedure.
Class actions are initiated by the filing of a complaint. A single named plaintiff may bring a putative class action complaint, but a class has to be certified (generally later in the case after the named plaintiff files a motion for class certification) before the case can actually proceed on a class-wide basis.
In the United States, class actions may be brought in federal district courts or in trial-level state courts, depending on whether the appropriate jurisdictional requirements are met and which body of law applies. A class action may be brought in federal court if there is federal subject matter jurisdiction over the case, which may arise if either (i) the case asserts claims arising under federal law in accordance with United States Code (USC) Chapter 28, Section 1331, or (ii) there is diversity jurisdiction under USC Chapter 28, Section 1332. Diversity jurisdiction arises where the parties are citizens of different states and where the matter in controversy exceeds USD75,000.
If federal courts lack jurisdiction, a class action may be brought in any state court with jurisdiction to hear the case.
Claims asserted in class actions remain subject to limitation periods. The limitation period for any such claim, and any related tolling rules, vary depending on the claim and applicable law. The substantive legislation that creates a cause of action that can be brought on a class basis, such as the federal securities laws, may also include a statute of repose. Statutes of repose cannot be equitably tolled, and therefore impose an absolute bar against asserting a claim once the repose period has run.
The general framework for bringing a class action where a named plaintiff (or plaintiffs) brings claims on behalf of a group of absent plaintiffs is outlined below. Class actions where claims are asserted against a class of defendants are possible, but rare. Such “defendant class” actions are intended for situations where separate lawsuits against each individual defendant would be impractical or lead to inconsistent rulings, such as in cases involving numerous parties with a shared responsibility.
Filing of Complaint and Class Certification
The plaintiffs’ counsel files a complaint as a putative class action and lists one or more named plaintiffs who sue on behalf of a proposed class (or classes) of similarly situated plaintiffs. As noted in 3.1 Mechanisms for Bringing Collective Redress/Class Actions, in order for a litigation to proceed as a class action, the class must first be certified at a stage following the filing of the complaint. There are no particular rules for when certification has to be considered by the court, but a United States court will typically first consider motions to dismiss based on the adequacy of the pleadings and the legal adequacy of plaintiff’s theory, and only proceed to consider class certification if the motion to dismiss fails to dispose of the claims.
To obtain class certification, a plaintiff must show by a preponderance of the evidence that all four requirements of Rule 23(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure are met, and that the action meets the requirements of at least one of the three types of classes under Rule 23(b). Many jurisdictions also impose a requirement that the class be “ascertainable”, meaning that the members of the class may be identified by objective criteria and, in some jurisdictions, that there is a reliable and feasible way of determining who fits the criteria.
The four requirements of Rule 23(a) are:
The three types of class actions under Rule 23(b) are:
Courts frequently permit discovery into issues relevant to certification. Such discovery can be part of overall discovery in the case, but sometimes proceeds in a separate phase before merits discovery takes place. As part of class certification discovery, the parties typically seek discovery of evidence that would establish or rebut that the class meets the requirements of Rule 23 and that the proposed named plaintiff can properly represent the proposed class.
It should be noted that most class actions are certified not for litigation, but for settlement. In a settlement class, the defendant and would-be class counsel negotiate a resolution of class members’ claims before class certification. If negotiations are successful, the defendant and would-be class counsel move jointly for class certification and court approval of the settlement.
Selection of Lead Plaintiff and Class Counsel
A class action might be filed by a law firm that represents a named plaintiff (or a set of named plaintiffs), but multiple class actions alleging substantially similar claims might be filed by different law firms that represent different plaintiffs. In the latter scenario, the different cases get consolidated and the court must appoint class counsel unless a statute provides otherwise. Class counsel must fairly and adequately represent the interests of the class. Rule 23(g) presents explicit criteria and a procedure for appointing counsel to represent the class. The court must also appoint a lead plaintiff who is chosen to act on behalf of the entire class. Under the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, which governs federal securities class actions, lead plaintiffs are selected based on objective criteria including the size of their financial interest in the case.
Opt-Out Mechanisms
In a class action seeking monetary damages and certified under Rule 23(b)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, class members do not affirmatively “opt in”. Instead, any class members who do not wish to participate in the lawsuit must take affirmative steps to remove themselves from the class upon receiving notice. In other words, they must “opt out” by providing notice to the court that they decline to participate.
Once the deadline to opt out has passed, all class members who have not opted out are considered to be part of the class, and the court can adjudicate their claims despite their absence.
Settlement
Any settlement, voluntary dismissal or compromise of claims, issues, or defences of a certified class – or a class proposed to be certified for settlement – requires court approval. In most jurisdictions, the court must approve any proposed class action settlement.
Whenever there is a proposed settlement in a class action case, Rule 23 requires the court to direct notice “in a reasonable manner” to every member of the class who would be bound by the settlement. Any class member may object to a proposal requiring court approval; the objection must state whether it applies to the objector, a subset or the entire class, and state with specificity the grounds for objection.
Under federal law, class action standing requirements mirror the standing requirements under Article III of the United States Constitution.
Plaintiff(s) must have:
The standing requirement applies both to the named plaintiff(s) and absent class members. The Supreme Court recently confirmed in TransUnion LLC v Ramirez (2021) that, to recover damages in a class action, every class member must satisfy the standing requirements of Article III.
One becomes a member of a class by satisfying the specific criteria defined by the court for the class in the class certification order, which essentially requires having experienced the same harm or having the same grievance as other class members. There is no specific numerical floor or ceiling as to the number of members in a class action, but the proposed class must meet the “numerosity” requirement under Rule 23(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedures, as noted in 3.2 Overview of Procedure. In the Second Circuit, numerosity is presumed if the class contains at least 40 members. (Ansoumana v Gristede’s Operating Corp, 201 F.R.D. 81, 85 (S.D.N.Y. 2001), quoting Consolidated Rail Corp v Town of Hyde Park, 47 F.3d 473, 483 (2d Cir.1995).)
Under Rule 23 and the rules of most states, class actions generally proceed on an opt-out basis. Whether a class member may opt out of a class depends on the relief being sought.
Procedurally, plaintiffs can move to join additional defendants through the following.
Procedurally, defendants can move to join additional defendants through the following.
The court has broad discretion to manage class actions and determine whether additional parties should be joined. It is generally easier to join parties early in the litigation, before significant discovery has occurred. It is necessary to determine whether jurisdiction may be acquired over the additional parties before trying to join them in a lawsuit. All standard jurisdictional requirements must be met for any additional parties.
In addition to the broad inherent authority that courts have to manage the litigations that are before them, as noted in 3.5 Joinder, courts have broad discretion to manage specific aspects of class actions, including in the following ways:
The length of a class action proceeding will depend on the types of claims involved and the court in which the case is brought. As many class actions are settled before reaching a final adjudication on the merits, they may be concluded within a broad range of time, from a few months to a few years. Reaching finality generally takes a significant amount of time, including because there may be appeals at multiple stages.
Courts have extremely broad discretion to manage the schedule of a class action proceeding, and can set leisurely or aggressive schedules for discovery, briefing and trial. Courts can also require potentially dispositive issues to be briefed sua sponte. Parties can request that the court set deadlines for dates that the parties request or agree to, and can also ask that existing deadlines be modified or extended. Requests for reasonable extensions are usually granted.
The parties can seek summary judgment to avoid trial. A motion for summary judgment tests whether, based on all the evidence (including evidence obtained during discovery), there are any genuine issues of material facts and whether the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
In the United States, named plaintiffs seeking to represent a class often enter into contingency fee arrangements with their attorneys. If plaintiffs recover monetary damages – either through a judgment or settlement – their attorneys recover a portion of that amount consistent with Rule 23(h) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Typically, a contingency fee arrangement provides for a percentage of the total recovery to be paid to plaintiffs’ attorneys, or for a multiple of fees incurred based on the number of hours worked.
Third parties also sometimes fund class action litigation (or fund class members who opt out to pursue their claims separately). The practice has been rapidly growing, and is expected to continue its growth over the next several years. There is no current federal legislative restriction limiting commercial funding for class claims. Federal law prohibits the Legal Services Corporation, a non-profit corporation that is the largest single funder of civil legal aid in the country, from funding class action lawsuits, and some states have adopted similar restrictions on public funding for class actions. (See 42 U.S.C. 2996–2996l.)
As in any other civil litigation, parties to a class action or putative class action may also attempt to shift the costs of expenses and attorneys’ fees to the opposing party. Costs not including attorneys’ fees – such as travel expenses, filing fees, and other costs or fees – may be allowed to the prevailing party under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(d)(1).
Attorneys’ fees are considered separately. Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(h), the court may award reasonable class action attorneys’ fees that are authorised by law or the parties’ agreement. A class member, or a member of the party from whom payment is sought, may object to the motion for attorneys’ fees, and the court may hold a hearing on the motion or refer the amount of the award to a special master or magistrate judge as provided in Rule 54(d).
United States discovery is conducted pre-trial, during a specified phase. Discovery in class actions lawsuit follows the same rules as in other civil litigation cases. Under Rule 26 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, discovery must be relevant and proportional to the needs of the case, but the scope of relevance is typically interpreted broadly by United States courts. The traditional rules of privilege and confidentiality apply. A broad range of discovery mechanisms are permitted, including:
Parties are also allowed to seek discovery on the specific issue of class certification. Courts generally set limitations on whether and how discovery may be sought from absent class members, but named class members are subject to the same discovery requirements as any other party to a litigation.
A class action plaintiff is typically entitled to the same remedies as would be available for claims brought as individual actions. Those remedies may include:
However, state law may sometimes limit the recovery available through class action lawsuits, depending on the jurisdiction and applicable law.
Settlement and other alternative means of dispute resolution are available for class action litigants, just as they are for individual claimants. However, settlements entered into in a class action case must be approved by the court, pursuant to Rule 23(e) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The court will hold a hearing to determine whether the settlement is the product of an “arm’s length” negotiation between the parties and whether the settlement is “fair, reasonable, and adequate”. Class members may object to a proposed settlement, and such objections will be considered by the court. Objections may be resolved through individual settlement(s). In “opt-out” class actions, class members may also choose to opt out of any settlement and file separate claims against the defendant.
Mediation is also often ordered by the court as part of the litigation process. Though parties are required to participate in court-ordered mediation, if applicable, the parties are not required to resolve their disputes through the mediation process – though some parties do so. If parties ultimately arrive at a settlement agreement through the mediation process, the court still must approve the settlement agreement as discussed above.
A final judgment in a class action with a certified class binds all class members. Class members bound by a judgment are precluded from asserting claims brought in the class action case, as well as any claims that arise from the same nucleus of operative facts.
If the class was not certified, only the named plaintiff(s) are bound by the judgment; other potential plaintiffs may bring further litigation claims.
Judgments delivered by the trial court may be appealed as of right, as with any other judgment in a civil litigation. Enforcement of a final judgment likewise follows the same procedures as non-class action litigation, subject to state law. Parties may levy an attachment or writ of execution against assets of reluctant debtors.
Over the last decade and a half, the United States Supreme Court has gradually tightened the standards around class certification. Recently, the Supreme Court clarified that all named plaintiffs must show Article III standing in order to recover damages, which has made certifying some classes more difficult.
Federal appeals courts have taken differing approaches on some of the most consequential recent class certification questions, including:
The United States Supreme Court has recently declined to resolve all three of these outstanding issues, leaving them ripe for future legislation or Supreme Court action.
As discussed above, class action waivers in arbitration agreements have traditionally been considered enforceable, particularly after a recent United States Supreme Court decision clarified that the Federal Arbitration Act pre-empts state law to the contrary. In response, recent legislative efforts to bar pre-dispute arbitration agreements in the employment context have emerged, as well as efforts to end class action waiver agreements, though they have not so far succeeded.
Despite efforts from some courts to create more rigorous class certification standards, class actions continue to proliferate, and cumulative settlement values for class action litigation have also been increasing over time. Third-party litigation funding has emerged as part of the narrative around class actions; the commercial litigation market continues to grow, and more companies face class action litigation in recent years than had previously.
Traditional types of class action activity remain key, including employment and labour class actions, and consumer protection class actions. Other areas have also been main drivers of growth, including class action litigation around PFAS, data breach or data privacy class actions, and class actions pertaining to ESG and “reverse discrimination” class action suits. Class actions with claims based on generative AI tools are also an emerging area, and likely to see further growth in future years.
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Class Actions Today
Class actions have long been a hallmark of the American legal system. The past few years have seen a marked rise in class actions advancing novel claims, larger classes and higher stakes. No industry has been spared as class actions continue to proliferate, reaching technology, finance, consumer goods and more. With courts tackling these cases more frequently, the class action legal landscape is evolving rapidly. This publication highlights select developments and trends in class action litigation in the USA, with a concluding spotlight on consumer class actions alleging false advertising.
Notable Cross-Discipline Legal Developments
Article III standing: the US Supreme Court limits class action scope
Article III of the US Constitution establishes the standing requirements for any litigant seeking to bring a case in federal court. Recently, the US Supreme Court clarified the contours of Article III standing in the class action context. In TransUnion LLC v Ramirez, 594 US 413 (2021), the Court considered whether a class seeking damages for purported violations of the Fair Credit Reporting Act was properly certified where only a fraction of the class members had inaccurate credit reports that were disseminated to third parties. In holding that the class members whose inaccurate credit reports were not provided to third parties lacked a concrete injury sufficient to confer Article III standing, the Supreme Court confirmed that “[e]very class member must have Article III standing in order to recover individual damages”. Id at 431. The Court also confirmed its holding in Spokeo, Inc. v Robins, 578 US 330, 340 (2016) that a bare procedural violation of a law alone is insufficient to show a “concrete and particularized” injury required to establish Article III standing. In contrast to tangible harm (like physical injury or monetary loss), the Court observed that showing a “concrete” injury from an intangible harm (like reputational harm or disclosure of private information) is not as obvious, and requires courts to assess whether a plaintiff’s alleged injury resembles or has “a close relationship to a harm that has traditionally been regarded as providing a basis for lawsuits in American courts”. Id at 341. The Court in TransUnion also held that the “mere risk of future harm” alone – in that case, the risk that some class members’ inaccurate credit reports would be disseminated to third parties – is not a concrete injury, unless that risk of harm materialises into an actual harm or a plaintiff is harmed by the risk itself. 594 US at 437.
Post-TransUnion, circuit splits have emerged as courts grapple with TransUnion’s mandates – particularly in the technology space. One difference between the circuits concerns whether, in applying TransUnion’s harm-analogue test, courts must employ an elements-based approach under which a plaintiff’s alleged harm cannot lack any element of the comparator tort essential to liability at common law, or whether courts may employ a “less rigid” standard focused on the comparison of the harms themselves. Popa v Microsoft Corp., 153 F.4th 784, 790 (9th Cir. 2025). In Holmes v Elephant Ins. Co., --- F.4th ----, 2025 WL 2907615 (4th Cir. Oct. 14, 2025), the Fourth Circuit employed the latter approach in assessing whether intangible harm suffered in a data breach constitutes a concrete injury sufficient to confer standing. Applying TransUnion’s “harm-analogue test”, the Fourth Circuit held that the harm from having one’s driver’s licence number listed on the dark web resembled that traditionally recognised by common law – the tort of public disclosure of private information – and was thus sufficient to confer standing. Id at *5. The Fourth Circuit acknowledged its split from the Seventh Circuit’s decision in Baysal v Midvale Indem. Co., 78 F.4th 976, 980 (7th Cir. 2023), where that court employed an elements-based approach to dismiss putative class claims for lack of standing and held that the leak of driver licence numbers did not satisfy TransUnion because “the disclosure of a [driver license] number in common use by both public and private actors does not correspond to any tort”. The Eleventh Circuit has likewise adopted an elements-based approach, whereas the Second, Third, Sixth and DC Circuits recently have employed a harm-based approach. In Popa, the Ninth Circuit declined to adopt either approach and assessed the elements of the comparator torts and the broader harm – in that case, whether the harm caused by a website’s data collection was analogous to the traditional tort of intrusion upon seclusion – to find that plaintiff lacked standing.
TransUnion (which was decided after class certification) also magnified another existing circuit split: whether a class with uninjured members who lack Article III standing can be certified. The Second and Eighth Circuits have held that certification is improper under such circumstances, whereas the First, Ninth, Seventh, Eleventh and DC Circuits have affirmed class certification even where some class members lack standing. Among the circuits that permit class certification where some members suffered no concrete injury, courts are further fractured as to the permissible amount of uninjured class members. For example, the First and DC Circuits permit class certification where uninjured members comprise only a de minimis portion of the class, whereas the Ninth, Seventh and Eleventh Circuits permit class certification where more than a de minimis number – but less than a “large portion” – of class members are uninjured. The Supreme Court was set to address this circuit split in Lab’y Corp. of Am. Holdings v Davis, 605 US 327 (2025), but dismissed the action due to a procedural error, leaving the circuit split unresolved.
Regulatory impact
The class action landscape is shaped by federal and state regulators, who have long influenced litigation strategies employed by both plaintiffs and defendants; recent years have been no exception.
Plaintiffs increasingly cite enforcement activities or regulatory guidance in support of their claims, and defendants conversely point to compliance with regulatory guidance or rules to defend class action suits. For example, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) promulgates the “Green Guides”, which do not have the force and effect of federal law, but have increasingly been cited by plaintiffs in putative class action complaints to attempt to meet their burden of adequately alleging that an environmental advertising claim is false and misleading; defendants have cited compliance with the Green Guides to show that their advertising is not plausibly false or misleading as a matter of law. The Green Guides are especially important in cases alleging violation of state consumer protection laws where that state has codified the Green Guides into law; California is one example. In Whiteside v Kimberly Clark Corp., 108 F.4th 771, 785 (9th Cir. 2024), the Ninth Circuit affirmed dismissal as to some environmental advertising claims that it found to be qualified in accordance with the Green Guides, citing a California statute providing “a defense to any suit... that the person’s environmental marketing claims conform to the standards or are consistent with the examples contained in the Green Guides”.
Regulatory activity by the federal Food & Drug Administration (FDA) similarly is often cited in putative class action complaints. For example, in 2023, the FDA issued Reformulating Drug Products That Contain Carbomers Manufactured with Benzene, Guidance for Industry, which reduced the amount of benzene recommended to be used in certain types of products when total exclusion of the compound was impossible. This guidance has recently been referenced in many putative class action complaints alleging that products containing more than the recommended amount of benzene were deceptively marketed as “safe for use” or otherwise caused plaintiffs’ injury. Additionally, related product recalls have prompted class action litigation. For example, a lawsuit was recently filed against a defendant following its voluntary recall of its benzene-contaminated testosterone gel product. See Complaint, Painter v Strides Pharma, Inc., No 7:25-cv-04189 (S.D.N.Y. May 19, 2025). And as long has been the case, Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) investigations continue to prompt securities class action suits.
The doctrine of pre-emption continues to provide a powerful defence to class actions in cases where putative class actions allege a violation of state law that conflicts with federal law. This defence often arises in the context of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FDCA), which prohibits any state law claim “that is different from or in addition to, or that is otherwise not identical with, a requirement under this chapter”. See 21 U.S.C. Section 379r(a)(2). For example, in Collaza v Johnson & Johnson Consumer Inc., 2025 WL 2233746 (2d Cir. Aug. 6, 2025), the Second Circuit affirmed dismissal of a putative class action alleging that defendant marketed its Tylenol “rapid release” products as more effective and efficient than other acetaminophen products. The court found that plaintiff’s claims were expressly pre-empted by the FDCA because plaintiff “does not dispute that the Gelcaps meet the criteria established by the FDA to be labeled as a ‘rapid release’” product... if [plaintiff] were to prevail on such claims, it would impose additional labeling requirements beyond those required by the FDA”. Id at *4.
Even where a federal law does not contain an express pre-emption clause, state law claims are impliedly pre-empted by federal law where pre-emptive intent is implicit in the law’s structure and purpose. Very recently, in Conti v Citizens Bank, N.A., --- F.4th ----, 2025 WL 2693215 (1st Cir. Sept. 22, 2025), the First Circuit applied the Supreme Court’s implied pre-emption test for the National Banking Act articulated in Cantero v Bank of Am., N.A., 602 US 205, 219-20 (2024), which instructs courts to “make a practical assessment of the nature and degree of the interference caused by a state law” by engaging in a “nuanced comparative analysis” of the state law’s interference with the National Banking Act. The First Circuit reversed the district court’s dismissal of a putative class action, alleging that the defendant failed to pay interest in violation of Rhode Island’s interest-on-escrow law. After conducting Cantero’s “comparative analysis”, the First Circuit determined that Congress did not intend federal banking regulations to have pre-emptive effect over the state law because Congress previously mandated compliance with state interest on escrow laws. Conti, 2025 WL 2693215, at *5. Notably, the Supreme Court may again consider the doctrine of implied pre-emption in an appeal from Durnell v Monsanto Co., 707 S.W.3d 828 (Mo. Ct. App. 2025), cert. filed (US Apr. 9, 2025); specifically, that case presents the question of whether the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act impliedly pre-empts a state-law failure-to-warn claim where the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) has repeatedly concluded that the warning at issue is not required, and cannot be added to a product label without that agency’s approval.
Efforts to avoid class action waivers
In the years since the Supreme Court confirmed in AT&T Mobility LLC v Concepcion, 563 US 333 (2011) and Epic Sys. Corp. v Lewis, 584 US 497 (2018) that class action waivers in arbitration agreements are generally enforceable, consumers have tried to sidestep the class action waiver by filing putative class action complaints in court and opposing motions to compel arbitration on the ground the arbitration provision is unenforceable. Many courts have addressed this issue in the past year. For example, in Sudakow v CleanChoice Energy, Inc., 153 F.4th 280, 283 (2d Cir. 2025), the court affirmed an order denying defendant’s motion to compel arbitration in a putative class action, holding that the arbitration provision was not presented “in a clear and conspicuous way” and, even if it were, consumers did not implicitly assent to the provision by mailing scheduled payments. A common attack is purported unconscionability of the arbitration agreement, with multiple courts recently addressing this issue. Compare Whalen v NBA Props., Inc., 2025 WL 3013144 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 28, 2025) (granting defendant’s motion to compel arbitration in a putative class action, finding that defendant’s arbitration provision was not procedurally or substantively unconscionable) with Rios v HRB Digit. LLC, 2025 WL 3003768, at *12 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 27, 2025) (denying defendants’ motion to compel arbitration, holding that arbitration provision was unconscionable, in particular a mass arbitration and bellwether protocol resulting in “protracted delays and uncertain tolling”).
Increased amount and scrutiny of class-wide settlements
In recent years, class-wide settlement amounts have increased; see, for example, In re: Philips Recalled CPAP, Bi-level PAP, and Mech. Ventilator Prods. Litig., MDL No 3014 (W.D. Pa. Apr. 25, 2024), Dkt. No 2736 (USD1.1 billion settlement approved to resolve personal injury class action); Jien v Perdue Farms, Inc., No 1:19-cv-02521 (D. Md. June 5, 2025), Dkt. No 1011 (reaching USD398.05 million settlement in wage-fixing class action); Nnebe v Daus, No 1:06-cv-04991 (S.D.N.Y. May 7, 2025) Dkt. No 744 (USD140 million settlement preliminarily approved in taxi licence suspension class action). At the same time, district courts have been held to their duty to scrutinise a settlement to ensure it is fair, reasonable and adequate. For example, in Kurtz v Kimberly-Clark Corp., 142 F.4th 112, 121 (2d Cir. 2025), the Second Circuit vacated a district court’s approval of a class-wide settlement agreement where defendant agreed to pay up to USD20 million in class compensation and over USD3 million in attorney fees, but the class members ultimately claimed a little under USD1 million. The panel held that district courts must consider the allocation of recovery between counsel and the class before approving the settlement and remanded for the district court to evaluate the settlement under the clarified standard. See also In re Zoom Sec. Litig., 2025 WL 3078702 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 4, 2025) (after granting final approval of a USD150 million class-wide settlement in securities class action, the court awarded less than half of the amount of requested attorney fees).
Sectoral Trends in Class Actions
Securities, technology and AI
Securities class actions continue to compose a large percentage of class action litigation, with increasing filings against companies engaged in AI and cryptocurrency. For example, “AI washing” is a budding niche of securities class actions, where companies are targeted for misrepresenting the capabilities or reach of their AI technologies. In In re GigaCloud Tech. Inc. Sec. Litig., 2025 WL 307378 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 27, 2025), for example, the court declined to dismiss the plaintiffs’ claims alleging that the defendant falsely stated that its operations used AI and other sophisticated technologies when it actually used more outdated systems. In October 2025, the court approved a class-wide settlement providing USD2.75 million for the class and over USD1 million in attorney fees.
Data security and privacy
As companies increasingly face data breaches and other online security incidents, class action filings have likewise increased. However, data security class actions – often alleging only intangible harms – are particularly ripe for challenge on standing grounds considering the Spokeo and TransUnion cases discussed above. Since TransUnion, the First, Second, Third and Eleventh Circuits have held that a plaintiff who alleges an imminent risk of future identity theft or fraud can sue for damages where s/he separately establishes a present, concrete harm arising from the data breach. By contrast, the Seventh Circuit has held that the risk of future data misuse confers standing to seek injunctive relief only, and not damages.
As new technology and privacy legislation are introduced at the state level, more class action filings can be expected in this area. Currently at the forefront of such litigation is California, where plaintiffs often allege violation of the California Consumer Privacy Act (CCPA), which codifies consumer privacy rights and obliges businesses to protect consumers’ personal information, or the California Invasion of Privacy Act (CIPA), a law enacted last century that has more recently been interpreted to regulate the use of online cookies and other tracking technologies. For example, in Shah v Cap. One Fin. Corp., 768 F. Supp. 3d 1033 (N.D. Cal. 2025), the court denied dismissal of a putative class action alleging that a defendant violated CIPA and the CCPA by disclosing personal and financial information to third parties through data tracking technologies embedded on its website. Notably, in response to the rise in litigation under CIPA, the California legislature introduced a bill in 2025 amending CIPA to exempt from liability the use of internet tracking technologies that serve a commercial business purpose.
Spotlight on Consumer Class Actions Alleging False Advertising
Putative class actions alleging violations of state consumer protection laws – in particular, those alleging class members have suffered economic harm by purchasing a product that was mislabelled – have comprised an increasing percentage of the class actions filed over the past several years. Notable developments and trends have emerged, discussed below.
Reasonable consumer: clarification of the contextual analysis required at the pleading stage
For years, district courts faced with putative consumer class actions alleging mislabelling refused to find, as a matter of law, that a statement on the back label of product packaging dispels the alleged misinterpretation of a claim on the front label. Recently, however, panels in the Second and Ninth Circuits have clarified the circumstances under which a district court can consider the back and side labels to find that no reasonable consumer can be misled by a challenged front-label claim as a matter of law. For example, in La Rosa v SPD Swiss Precision Diagnostics GmbH, 2025 WL 841687, at *2 (2d Cir. Mar. 18, 2025), the Second Circuit affirmed dismissal of a putative class action alleging false labelling, rejecting the plaintiff’s argument that “the sides and back of the packaging of Defendants’ products are irrelevant to the District Court’s inquiry of whether the front packaging was deceptive”, and holding that courts must “consider the full context of an advertisement so long as the front-label statements are not affirmatively inaccurate”. And in Whiteside v Kimberly Clark Corp., 108 F.4th 771, 780 (9th Cir. 2024), the Ninth Circuit instructed that the back label can be considered where a front label is “ambiguous”. See Daniels v Eagle Fam. Foods Grp., LLC, --- F. Supp. 3d ----, 2025 WL 1993208, at *4 (E.D. Cal. July 17, 2025) (applying Whiteside and dismissing putative class action alleging that “real cheese” label claim misled consumers into believing food products contained more than a minimal amount of real cheese; ambiguity on the front label was clarified by the ingredient list on the back label).
Consumer protection, product liability and allegedly harmful substances
Plaintiffs with claims sounding in product liability have increasingly attempted to invoke false advertising theories to seek class-wide relief under state consumer protection laws. The increase in class actions concerning the presence of allegedly harmful substances, like benzene and per- and polyfluoroalkyl substances (PFAS), exemplifies this trend.
In In re: E.I. du Pont de Nemours and Co. C-8 Pers. Inj. Litig., 87 F.4th 315 (6th Cir. 2023), the Sixth Circuit vacated certification of a class of individuals allegedly injured by PFAS exposure because the plaintiff failed to establish standing, as he could not prove that his alleged injury – the presence of PFAS in his bloodstream – was caused by the defendant. In apparent response, plaintiffs increasingly are alleging economic injuries under state consumer protection statutes alleging that certain advertising is false on account of the presence of allegedly harmful substances in consumer products. For example, in Bowen v Energizer Holdings, Inc., 118 F.4th 1134, 1147 (9th Cir. 2024), the Ninth Circuit declined to dismiss a putative class action alleging that a plaintiff suffered an economic injury after purchasing a sunscreen product contaminated with benzene, holding that the plaintiff’s allegations that she relied on the defendant’s safety representations when purchasing the product (and would not have purchased the product absent those representations) “qualif[y] as an injury in fact under established Article III standing caselaw”. However, courts will dismiss these cases where a plaintiff fails to adequately allege that the product s/he purchased contained the allegedly harmful substance. For example, in Ward v J.M. Smucker Co., 2025 WL 2613489 (6th Cir. Sept. 10, 2025), the court affirmed dismissal where the plaintiffs failed to plausibly allege that products they purchased actually contained salmonella, because their only proffered evidence – the fact that the product had been recalled – was insufficient to show that contamination was not just possible, but plausible.
Trending false advertising claims
Challenges to certain types of advertising claims have been trending over recent years, including the theory that a label claim communicates that the product contains more of, or a different kind of, ingredient than is included in the product (eg, “all butter” allegedly misleads consumers into believing that a product does not contain any other flavouring ingredient), allegedly deceptive pricing (eg, illusory discounts or hidden fees), geographic origin claims (eg, “Made in USA” claims), greenwashing (eg, “sustainable”), product efficacy claims, health-related claims on products containing high amounts of sugar and claims allegedly conveying the absence of synthetic ingredients in a product.
Conclusion
These trends will continue to develop over time, and new ones will emerge, shaping the future of class action lawsuits. Companies should work with outside counsel to develop robust compliance programmes and practical risk mitigation strategies to address the increasing volume and sophistication of class action lawsuits, and to keep current with evolving class action theories.
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