International Arbitration 2026 Comparisons

Arbitration has had constitutional recognition in Ecuador since 1998. Article 190 of the 2008 Constitution recognises it as a method of resolving disputes in matters capable of settlement (controversias susceptibles de transacción).

Its use has grown steadily at both the domestic and international levels due to its speed, confidentiality and the flexibility of the procedure.

At an international level, arbitration is the usual mechanism for solving disputes between the state and foreign investors. In 2025, the Office of the Attorney General (PGE) recorded 78 active international proceedings: 11 commercial arbitrations, five investment arbitrations, eight proceedings before foreign courts, 47 notices of dispute and seven proceedings before international tribunals and dispute boards.

Domestically, the PGE was notified of 23 arbitral proceedings commenced in 2025. Outside the public sector, the ordinary courts remain the predominant avenue for resolving disputes, as they are free of charge by constitutional mandate.

Arbitral activity in the mining and hydrocarbons industries is common, particularly in disputes in which the state is a party.

Both industries involve large-scale investments, long-term projects and contractual relationships subject to constant interaction with the state. Those conditions generate disputes in response to regulatory changes, shifts in the economic conditions of projects or disagreements over the performance of contractual obligations. In mining, the trend is also linked to the state's interest in developing the country's mining potential.

The matters that concentrate the state's international disputes are taxes, public procurement, hydrocarbons and other non-renewable resources, the environment, public infrastructure and electricity.

In 2025, five international arbitrations concluded with an outcome favourable to the state. The PGE reported that, taken together, those outcomes avoided 94% of the total amount claimed.

In disputes involving the state, the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID) predominates in investment matters, and the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC) in international commercial arbitration.

Domestically, the most active centres are the Arbitration and Mediation Centre of the Quito Chamber of Commerce (CAM CCQ) and the Arbitration and Mediation Centre of the Ecuadorian-American Chamber of Commerce (CAM AMCHAM).

We understand no new arbitral institutions have been established in the last twelve months.

There are no courts specialised in arbitration. Jurisdiction is divided between the provincial courts and the Constitutional Court.

The presidents of provincial courts hear applications to set aside awards rendered in arbitrations seated in Ecuador, pursuant to Article 31 of the Arbitration and Mediation Law (LAM).

The Constitutional Court hears extraordinary protection actions (EPAs) against awards. In its judgment 323-13-EP/19, the Court said that awards can be challenged via EPAs when constitutional rights have been affected and the challenge does not fall within a ground for annulment.

On the scope of both forms of review, see 11.1 Grounds for Appeal and 11.3 Standard of Judicial Review.

The LAM governs domestic and international arbitration, and was enacted in 1997 and codified in 2006. Its Regulations (RLAM) were issued in 2021.

The LAM partially adopts the UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration. It embraces principles such as party autonomy, separability of the arbitration agreement, kompetenz-kompetenz and minimal judicial intervention.

The grounds for annulment set forth in Article 31 of the LAM are entirely procedural: infringements to the right of due process, extra and ultra petita decisions, and violation of the procedures for appointing arbitrators or constituting the arbitral tribunal. Those grounds do not include arbitrability or public policy infringements, unlike Article 34 of the Model Law.

The LAM also differs from the Model Law in other respects. For example, it does not contain its own catalogue of grounds for challenging arbitrators or a complete regime for the taking of evidence, matters that the Model Law does develop. The General Organic Code of Procedure (COGEP), which is more formalistic in nature, applies on a subsidiary basis.

On those differences, see 7.2 Procedural Steps, 8.3 Rules of Evidence and 11.1 Grounds for Appeal.

There have been no legislative reforms to the LAM in the past year. The Constitutional Court has, however, carried out a constitutionality review of the RLAM and there are also debates on future reforms.

Constitutionality Review of the Regulations

In judgment 74-21-IN/25, of February 2025, the Constitutional Court decided six joined public actions of unconstitutionality against the RLAM.

The Court reviewed the arbitration and mediation rules, but did not declare any arbitration provision of the regulations unconstitutional.

Draft Legislative Reform

A bill to reform the Organic Code of the Judicial Function, which includes amendments to the LAM, is being considered by the National Assembly. The bill proposes amendments relating to the enforcement of arbitral awards.

The most significant proposal grants arbitral tribunals powers to enforce their own awards, with powers analogous to those exercised by judges at the enforcement stage. If enacted, it would alter the division of competences between arbitral tribunals and the ordinary courts described in 8.3 Powers of Compulsion and 12.2 Enforcement Procedure.

Article 5 of the LAM requires the arbitration agreement to be in writing. Article 4 requires capacity to settle (transigir), and Article 1 requires the dispute to concern a matter capable of settlement.

Agreements With the Public Sector

Article 4 of the LAM adds four requirements where a public-sector entity is involved: that the agreement be entered into before the dispute arises or, in the alternative, that the Attorney General be consulted (whose opinion is binding); that the legal relationship be contractual; that the agreement set out the method for selecting the arbitrators; and that it be signed by the person authorised to contract on behalf of the institution. Failure to meet any of these requirements renders the arbitration agreement void.

On the additional requirements applicable to international arbitration with public entities, see 7.1 Governing Rules.

Article 1 of the LAM allows disputes capable of settlement to be submitted to arbitration. Capacity for settlement depends on the parties being able to dispose freely of the rights at issue.

Between Private Parties

In judgments 2342-18-EP/23 and 2520-18-EP/23, the Constitutional Court held that it is for the legislature to define which matters are capable of settlement. Disputes over disposable rights are arbitrable, save where expressly prohibited by law, such as criminal liability or issues pertaining to the civil status of individuals.

With the Public Administration

The test is more restrictive. In judgment 74-21-IN/25 the Constitutional Court stated that the concept of a matter capable of settlement, proper to relations between private parties, does not transfer automatically to disputes involving public entities. State entities act subject to the principle of legality and exercise non-disposable powers. Arbitrability depends on the existence of constitutional or statutory authorisation to submit a dispute to arbitration.

Who Decides Arbitrability

In judgment 2520-18-EP/23 the Constitutional Court distinguished between objective arbitrability, concerning the subject matter, and subjective arbitrability, concerning the parties, and held that the assessment of both falls to the arbitral tribunal at the sustanciación hearing under Article 22 of the LAM. On the scope of that criterion in an annulment action, see 11.1 Grounds for Appeal.

Ecuadorian judges apply arbitration agreements consistently, in line with constitutional case law.

In judgment 707-16-EP/21 the Constitutional Court held that the power to rule on the validity and scope of an arbitration clause belongs to the arbitrators, by application of the kompetenz-kompetenzprinciple, and that in case of doubt the pro arbitri principle prevails. In judgment 1758-15-EP/20 it specified that judges must not rule on the validity or scope of the arbitration agreement, but only verify whether the dispute falls within the scope of the agreement.

In judgment 1010-18-EP/23 the Court identified the two effects of the arbitration agreement. The positive effect confers on the arbitrators the power to rule on their own jurisdiction. The negative effect forbids submitting the dispute to state courts and requires judges to decline jurisdiction once they verify the existence of the agreement.

Law Applicable to the Arbitration Agreement

The LAM contains no conflict-of-laws rule on the law applicable to the arbitration agreement. The parties may agree on it. Absent such agreement, in practice the agreement is governed by the law of the seat of the arbitration. We are not aware of any case law establishing a different criterion.

An arbitral clause can be considered valid irrespective of the validity of the contract in which it is included. Article 5 of the LAM enshrines the principle of separability expressly.

The parties’ autonomy to select arbitrators is broad and subject to few restrictions.

Article 3 of the LAM requires arbitrators to be lawyers where the arbitration is not ex aequo et bono. Article 19 of the LAM excludes those who lack capacity to appear in court on their own behalf.

In administered arbitrations, Article 16 of the LAM allows the parties, by common agreement, to appoint arbitrators from outside the centre’s roster. Absent agreement, the centre’s rules may require the appointment to fall on members of its roster.

Article 16 of the LAM provides for a draw as the default mechanism for appointment. It applies where the parties do not make the appointment or fail to agree on it, and is conducted before the president of the arbitration centre. In practice, this method applies in most cases.

The same rule governs multiparty arbitrations, unless the arbitration agreement provides otherwise.

The ordinary courts do not intervene in the appointment of arbitrators.

Article 16 of the LAM assigns that function to the parties and, in administered arbitrations, to the arbitration centre.

In ad hoc arbitrations, the appointment falls to the parties under the arbitration agreement.

The RLAM provides that, where the parties have entered into an arbitration agreement without reference to a specific arbitral institution or to the procedural rules governing the proceedings, the arbitration is deemed to be administered. The claimant may apply either to the centre nearest to the place where the effects of the act or contract occurred, or to its place of business.

Article 21 of the LAM refers to the grounds for challenge applicable to judges, set out in Article 22 of the COGEP. Most of the grounds set out in the COGEP are not suitable for arbitration. For that reason, in practice, centres and tribunals resort to the International Bar Association Guidelines on Conflicts of Interest in International Arbitration to identify and assess conflicts. The guidelines are not binding absent the parties’ agreement.

Article 20 of the LAM governs the replacement of a disqualified arbitrator.

On the standards of conduct applicable to arbitrators, see 4.5 Arbitrator Requirements.

Article 1 of the RLAM provides that arbitral tribunals shall have full independence and autonomy, and prohibits any state authority from interfering in their functions. Neither the LAM nor the RLAM develop a catalogue of standards of conduct. That development falls to the codes of ethics that Article 40(e) of the LAM requires each centre to issue.

Arbitration and Mediation Centre of the Quito Chamber of Commerce

Its Code of Ethics requires arbitrators to maintain a relationship of trust with the parties and to observe confidentiality in perpetuity over the case documents and deliberations, and to act with impartiality and independence. The code further imposes the duty to disclose any fact that gives rise to justifiable doubts as to the arbitrator’s integrity.

Arbitration and Mediation Centre of the Ecuadorian-American Chamber of Commerce

Its bylaws require arbitrators to undertake the role with impartiality and neutrality, subject to the principles of confidentiality, impartiality, independence and probity. Article 3 requires immediate written disclosure, to the centre and to the parties, of any circumstance that may cast doubt on the arbitrator’s independence or give rise to reasonable doubts as to their impartiality.

Article 22 of the LAM recognises the kompetenz-kompetenz principle. It is for the arbitral tribunal to rule on its own jurisdiction and on pleas concerning the existence, validity or scope of the arbitration agreement.

The Constitutional Court has confirmed this in the judgments discussed in 3.3 National Courts’ Approach.

The decision on jurisdiction is taken at the sustanciación hearing, before the tribunal hears submissions on the merits.

Judicial intervention on questions of arbitral jurisdiction is exceptional.

Article 31 of the LAM does not provide for the tribunal’s lack of jurisdiction as a stand-alone ground for annulment. Judicial review reaches only those defects that can be brought within one of the exhaustive grounds, in particular that of subparagraph (d), concerning a ruling on matters not submitted to arbitration.

In judgment 2520-18-EP/23 the Constitutional Court held that the arbitrators’ decision on their own jurisdiction is conclusive and cannot be reviewed by the annulment judge, and that lack of arbitral jurisdiction cannot be raised under the ground in subparagraph (d).

Negative rulings on jurisdiction are likewise not subject to review. In judgment 638-17-EP/21 the Constitutional Court held that a declaration by the arbitral tribunal that it lacks jurisdiction is not amenable to an EPA, as it does not constitute a final decision.

A judicial challenge to the arbitral tribunal’s jurisdiction is available only once the award has been rendered.

Before that point, the question falls to the tribunal itself, pursuant to Article 22 of the LAM. Once the award is rendered, the avenue is the annulment action under Article 31 of the LAM, with the limitations noted in 5.2 Circumstances for Court Intervention and 11.1 Grounds for Appeal.

The standard is deferential.

Article 31 of the LAM establishes limited, procedural grounds, and Article 22 of the LAM assigns the decision on its own jurisdiction to the arbitral tribunal. Judges do not review the arbitrators’ decisions on jurisdiction or admissibility, in line with the criterion of judgment 2520-18-EP/23 cited in 5.2 Circumstances for Court Intervention.

On the content of that standard, see 11.3 Standard of Judicial Review.

Judges generally decline jurisdiction when the defendant raises the defence of the existence of an arbitration agreement.

Article 7 of the LAM requires judges to decline jurisdiction over claims concerning legal relationships submitted to arbitration and provides that, in case of doubt, the in dubio pro arbitri principle applies.

Arbitration agreements are understood to have been waived where the defendant fails to object to the judge’s jurisdiction.

Where the defence is raised, the judicial examination must be limited to verifying whether the dispute falls within the scope of the agreement, in accordance with the case law cited in 3.3 National Courts’ Approach. Judges may not rule on the validity of the agreement.

There is no legal rule that empowers a tribunal to assume jurisdiction on individuals or entities that are not a party to an arbitration agreement. Nonetheless, the Constitutional Court in ruling 74-21-IN/25 said that third parties could have the right to participate in an arbitration procedure if failure to do so could curtail their rights (without elaborating further).

Article 6 of the RLAM extends the effects of the arbitration agreement to non-signatories in three scenarios:

• to those who consented to submit to arbitration in accordance with the precepts of good faith, through their active and decisive participation in the negotiation, conclusion, performance or termination of the transaction;
• to those who seek to derive rights or benefits from that transaction, such as successors or assignees; and
• to the administrative bodies that originated the administrative acts, in the case of arbitrations with public entities.

The provision does not distinguish between domestic and foreign parties, and survived constitutionality review in judgment 74-21-IN/25.

In practice, arbitral tribunals apply these rules with caution and are reluctant to draw into the arbitration those who did not sign the agreement.

On the effects of the award vis-à-vis third parties, see 13.5 Binding of Third Parties.

Article 9 of the LAM and Article 8 of the RLAM empower the arbitral tribunal to order interim measures. They are binding on the parties.

Article 8 of the RLAM lists their purposes:

• to maintain or restore the status quo, to prevent the continuation of present harm or the materialisation of imminent harm;
• to preserve the assets that are the subject of the proceedings or those of the debtor or creditor; and
• to preserve evidence, to secure the performance of obligations and to preserve the jurisdiction of the arbitral tribunal.

The list is not exhaustive, the tribunal may order any measure it considers necessary.

The same article recognises that power in the emergency arbitrator provided for in the centres’ rules.

Article 9 of the LAM allows arbitrators to enforce interim measures directly where the parties so stipulate in the arbitration agreement, requesting the assistance of the public, judicial, police and administrative officials required.

Ordinary courts may grant interim measures even where the dispute is submitted to arbitration, without this affecting the arbitral tribunal’s jurisdiction or implying a waiver of the agreement.

Article 8(2) of the RLAM allows the interested party, before the tribunal is constituted, to request the interim measures set forth in the COGEP or any other measure provided for in that article. Such measures may be sought from the civil judges who would have had jurisdiction absent the arbitration agreement.

Emergency Arbitration

Emergency arbitrationis recognised in Article 8 of the RLAM and developed in the rules of the leading centres. Its decisions are binding and their scope is as described in 6.1 Types of Relief. The appointment of an emergency arbitrator does not preclude subsequently applying to the ordinary courts for interim relief.

Article 9 of the RLAM allows the arbitral tribunal, once constituted, to modify, suspend or revoke measures ordered by a judge or by the emergency arbitrator.

Neither the LAM nor the RLAM provides for security for costs, though they do not prohibit it.

An arbitral tribunal may order it in exercise of the general power to order interim measures under Article 8 of the regulations. In practice, it is not a common measure in domestic arbitration.

Article 9 of the LAM provides for a different form of security: the one the tribunal may require from the party requesting an interim measure, to cover the compensation for harm to the opposing party if the claim is found unfounded in the award. The party against whom the interim measure is ordered may request its suspension upon posting sufficient security. On the allocation of costs, see 10.3 Recovering Interest and Legal Costs.

Domestic Arbitration

Domestic arbitration is governed by the LAM, the RLAM and, on a subsidiary basis, the COGEP. Article 38 of the LAM provides that the applicable procedural rules may be those established by law, those of the relevant arbitration centre, those stipulated in the arbitration agreement, or those chosen by the parties.

Article 10 of the RLAM provides that the parties may freely set the rules of procedure, directly or by reference to arbitration rules, and that, absent agreement, the tribunal determines them. The same article makes subsidiary application of the COGEP conditional where the tribunal considers it appropriate and where such application does not contravene the principles of arbitration. In practice, tribunals are increasingly reluctant to apply the rules of the COGEP.

International Arbitration

Article 42 of the LAM provides that international arbitration is governed by the treaties, conventions, protocols and other instruments of international law signed and ratified by Ecuador. It further recognises the freedom of the parties to agree, directly or by reference to a set of rules, on the constitution of the tribunal, the conduct of the proceedings, the language, the applicable law, the jurisdiction and the seat.

Limit Applicable to the Public Sector

Article 42 of the LAM requires, for public entities to submit to international arbitration, the express authorisation of the institution’s highest authority and a favourable report from the Attorney General, unless the arbitration is provided for in international instruments in force. Article 3 of the RLAM requires prior authorisation from the Attorney General to agree on a seat abroad, limited to verifying that the agreement does not contravene the law of the place of the seat. On the other requirements of agreements with public entities, see 3.1 Enforceability.

Article 422 of the constitution prohibits assigning sovereign jurisdiction to international arbitration bodies, through treaties or international instruments, in contractual or commercial disputes between the state and private natural or legal persons. In judgment 74-21-IN/25 the Constitutional Court specified that this prohibition operates only where all the factual elements of the provision concur.

Articles 10 to 29 of the LAM govern the procedural stages of the main arbitration, including the filing of the notice of arbitration and the reply, the mediation hearing prior to the constitution of the tribunal, appointment of arbitrators, the sustanciación hearing at which the tribunal rules on its own jurisdiction, the evidentiary phase, and the award.

A party’s failure to attend the mediation hearing does not suspend the arbitration proceedings.

In any event, the parties generally have flexibility in designing their procedure. Article 42, which concerns international arbitration, allows the parties to determine the procedure in its entirety.

In domestic arbitration, the Constitutional Court has accepted the adaptation of the procedural rules in judgments 177-15-EP/20, which upheld resolving the dispute without an oral-argument hearing, and 2573-17-EP/21. In judgment 2822-18-EP/23 it held that the rules on evidence in arbitration are more flexible than those applied in the ordinary courts.

Where the public sector is involved, the authorisation requirements described in 3.1 Enforceability and 7.1 Governing Rules apply.

The arbitrator conducts the proceedings with powers equivalent to those of a judge, except for coercion.

Powers

Arbitrators have power to rule on their own jurisdiction. Article 23 of the LAM addresses the power to admit new evidence. Article 33 of the LAM empowers the arbitrator to reject requests aimed at delaying the proceedings. The arbitrator’s powers in relation to interim measures are described in 6.1 Types of Relief and 6.2 Role of Courts.

Duties

Article 18 of the LAM obliges the arbitrator who accepts the appointment to carry out the mandate and to answer to the parties for the harm arising from its breach. Article 7 of the RLAM limits that liability to wilful misconduct or gross negligence, and extends it to the arbitral institutions, their directors and employees. Article 12 of the RLAM applies the same standard to delay in rendering the award.

Article 29 of the Civil Code defines gross negligence as the lack of the care that even negligent and imprudent persons employ in their own affairs, and equates it to wilful misconduct (dolo) in civil matters. Wilful misconduct consists in the positive intention to cause harm.

The duty of independence and impartiality is governed as indicated in 4.4 Challenge and Removal of Arbitrators and 4.5 Arbitrator Requirements.

There is no express regulation in the LAM or the RLAM regarding particular qualifications for legal representatives.

Article 324 of the Organic Code of the Judicial Function (COFJ) requires, in order to act as counsel before the courts and tribunals of the Republic, a law degree, enjoyment of political rights, registration with the Bar maintained by the Judiciary Council, and the absence of the incompatibilities set forth in Article 328. Article 36 of the COGEP requires the parties to appear in proceedings with the representation of counsel, save for a few exceptions.

The application of those rules to arbitration has not been resolved by case law. The arbitral tribunal is not part of the Judicial Function (although it exercises “conventional jurisdiction”), the LAM contains no equivalent requirement, and Article 10 of the RLAM admits the COGEP only as a subsidiary source.

In practice, attorneys acting in domestic arbitrations are always authorised to practise law in Ecuador. There is no rule that demands attorneys acting in international arbitrations seated in Ecuador to be able to practise law in Ecuador.

Documentary evidence is submitted with the initial pleadings. Witnesses and expert witnesses are heard at the evidentiary hearing. In practice, there is no document production or discovery (although disclosure of specific documents held by the other party is often requested and admitted by tribunals). The use of written witness statements is pervasive in international arbitrations but rare in domestic ones. There are no specific rules for the examination or cross-examination of witnesses.

Attorney-client privilege is not regulated as an autonomous evidentiary category. Its protection rests on the duty of professional secrecy enshrined in the constitution.

IBA Rules

The IBA rules on the taking of evidence are used in both international and domestic arbitrations by agreement of the parties or by decision of the tribunal under Article 10 of the RLAM. The application of (or at least part of) the IBA Rules in domestic arbitrations is increasingly frequent.

In judgment 2822-18-EP/23, the Constitutional Court set the hierarchy of sources on evidentiary matters: first, the rules agreed by the parties or the centre’s rules; then those adopted by the tribunal (such as the IBA Rules); and the ordinary procedural rules on a subsidiary basis, provided they do not contravene the nature of arbitration.

There are no mandatory rules of evidence in arbitration as long as the tribunal respects the parties’ right to due process. The parties are free to determine the evidentiary rules and, absent their agreement, the tribunal is tasked with doing so.

The rules set forth in the COGEP apply on a subsidiary basis, as long as they do not contravene the principles of arbitration.

In practice, tribunals hearing domestic arbitrations show greater flexibility in the taking of evidence than they would if they relied solely on the rules of the COGEP.

In court proceedings, the COGEP applies mandatorily.

Arbitrators have no powers of compulsion over third parties for the production of documents or the attendance of witnesses. The LAM provides no mechanism of judicial assistance for the taking of evidence equivalent to that of Article 27 of the UNCITRAL Model.

The proposed amendments described in 2.2 Changes to National Law would affect the arbitrator’s powers of compulsion.

Arbitrations are confidential if the parties so agree, according to Article 34 of the LAM. When the arbitration is confidential, copies of the record are given only to the parties, their lawyers and the judge hearing the annulment action.

Centres’ Rules

Article 6 of the CAM CCQ Rules obliges parties, lawyers, arbitrators, secretaries, mediators and experts to refrain from disclosing information about the arbitrations administered by that centre. Article 25 of the CAM AMCHAM governs confidentiality and privacy in equivalent terms. The arbitrators’ confidentiality duties are described in 4.5 Arbitrator Requirements.

Publication and Annulment Action

Article 11 of the RLAM allows the centres to publish statistics and arbitral decisions without identifying the parties. If the parties have agreed the arbitration to be confidential, they are entitled to request the president of the provincial court to take any measure to preserve the confidentiality of sensitive information.

No provision governs the disclosure of the confidential information in subsequent proceedings. Nonetheless, in practice, tribunals are wary of using parts of the record of previous arbitration unless the parties to the original arbitration agree.

The award must be in writing, reasoned and rendered by majority vote.

Article 26 of the LAM requires all the arbitrators to sign the award and the dissenting arbitrator to provide its dissent. An arbitrator’s refusal or inability to sign does not void the award. Article 29 of the LAM provides that the award be notified to the parties at a hearing and that a copy be given to each party.

Time Limits

Article 25 of the LAM grants the tribunal a term of 150 days, counted from the sustanciación hearing, to render the award. The term may be extended by up to an equal period. Article 12 of the RLAM provides that expiry of the term does not entail loss of the tribunal’s jurisdiction, on the terms indicated in 7.3 Powers and Duties of Arbitrators.

Article 30 of the LAM allows a party, within three days of notification and before the award becomes final, to request that it be clarified or supplemented, and allows the arbitrators to correct numerical or typographical errors. These applications are resolved within ten days and are the only remedies available within the arbitration itself.

There are no statutory limits on the type of remedy a tribunal is empowered to grant. The limits are found in the applicable substantive law and the scope of the arbitration agreement.

Tribunals rule inter alia on requests for damages, specific performance or contract termination, the enforcement of which is governed by Articles 366 to 369 of the COGEP.

Punitive Damages

Punitive damages are not permitted under Ecuadorian law.

Rectification and Injunctions

Rectification does not exist as an autonomous remedy. A divergence between the parties’ intention and the text of the contract is resolved by the rules of interpretation in Articles 1576 et seq. of the Civil Code.

Mandatory injunctions are allowed in some circumstances. Generally, contractual breaches are remedied through a damages order.

Costs

The allocation of interest and costs falls to the arbitral tribunal. Neither the LAM nor the RLAM governs the matter; instead, it is governed by the arbitration agreement, the centre’s rules and the tribunal’s decision. According to the COGEP, the general rule is that each party bears its own costs, unless one party has acted in bad faith.

Arbitral tribunals in domestic arbitrations usually follow the COGEP in decisions on costs: the claimant bears the costs of the arbitration, and each party bears its own lawyers’ fees.

In international arbitration, tribunals more frequently apply the “costs follow the event” approach.

According to the COGEP, public entities cannot be ordered to pay costs. In judgment 1573-15-EP/21 the Constitutional Court set aside the costs decision contained in an award because the tribunal did not identify the legal basis allowing it to impose them, nor characterise the conduct of a public company as reckless or in bad faith. The dissenting opinion argued that no provision prohibits ordering costs against the state in arbitration.

Interest

Interest is governed by the applicable substantive law and, absent an agreed rate, by the rates set forth by the Central Bank of Ecuador. At the enforcement stage, an expert liquidates the principal, interest and costs.

Article 30 of the LAM declares awards non-appealable and provides that they are not subject to any recourse other than that established by that law. There is no review of the merits.

The horizontal remedies available within the arbitration are described in 10.1 Legal Requirements.

Annulment Action

Article 31 of the LAM regulates annulment action as the sole means to challenge an award. It does not allow a review of the merits of the case and is filed before the arbitrator or arbitral tribunal within ten days of the award becoming final. The tribunal transmits the file within three days and the president of the provincial court, who has to rule on the application within 30 days (in practice, the annulment stage can take more than 12 months).

The grounds for annulment are exhaustive: violations of the parties’ right to due process; a ruling on matters not submitted to arbitration or an ultra or extra petita award; and violations of the procedure for appointing arbitrators or constituting the tribunal. In judgments 323-13-EP/19 and 31-14-EP/19, the Constitutional Court confirmed that exhaustive character of those grounds. In judgment 2520-18-EP/23, the Court confirmed that questions on the tribunal’s jurisdiction cannot be raised in the annulment stage. Most annulment applications are rejected.

The annulment action does not suspend enforcement of the award. Article 31 of the LAM allows a request for suspension upon the posting of security.

Constitutional Avenue

The EPA is permissible when the award breaches constitutional rights and no ground for annulment applies. EPAs are heard by the Constitutional Court. Most EPAs are rejected. Its limits are described in 12.3 Approach of the Courts.

The grounds in Article 31 of the LAM are exhaustive and do not admit contractual expansion. Whether the parties are allowed to exclude the scope of an annulment is open to debate.

Article 30 of the LAM excludes any recourse not provided for in that law. Article 34 of the LAM refers to the judge hearing the annulment action “or any other recourse to which the parties have submitted” (a reference invoked to support the possibility of agreeing on an additional instance). The majority view rejects this as regards recourse before state judges.

In judgments 1703-11-EP/19 and 1059-15-EP/20 the Constitutional Court held that the annulment action is not an ordinary challenge (as opposed to an appeal) and that no other challenge is permissible.

There is no provision enabling an advance waiver of the annulment action. Article 13(5) of the RLAM provides that public-sector entities are not obliged to bring it, save where there are clear grounds for a ground that may affect the validity of the award.

The incorporation of a second arbitral instance agreed by the parties is debated, but there appears no reason to deny its permissibility under Article 38 of the LAM.

The standard is deferential. Judicial review does not reach the merits of the award.

The president of the provincial court does not review the application of substantive law, does not reassess the evidence, and does not reinterpret the merits. The examination is limited to verifying whether the ground invoked by the party is sustained, on the basis of the facts that party alleges, and operates with a presumption of the award’s validity. The same standard governs questions of jurisdiction, as indicated in 5.4 Standard of Judicial Review for Jurisdiction/Admissibility.

Rules of Article 13 of the RLAM

That provision imposes the principles of procedural flexibility, minimal intervention, specificity, conservation, validation, preclusion and materiality, and instantiates them in some rules, including the following: the affected party must have objected unequivocally and in a timely manner before the arbitral tribunal; annulment is confined to the affected decisions and not necessarily to the entire award; etc.

Constitutional Case Law

In judgment 2520-18-EP/23, the Constitutional Court ruled that if the president of the provincial court resolves matters relating to the arbitrability of the subject matter under the ground set out in Article 31(d) of the LAM, he or she violates the right to due process.

In judgment 2822-18-EP/23, the Court held that the president of the provincial court violates due process by assessing the admissibility of the evidence taken in the arbitration. In judgment 1057-19-EP/24, it held that this review cannot be exercised sua sponte. In judgment 1301-21-EP/24, it set aside a decision that had annulled an award on the basis of an argument introduced by the judge and not raised by the parties.

Subsequent constitutional review likewise does not reach the merits of the arbitral decision.

Ecuador is a party to the 1958 New York Convention (NYC), with the reciprocity and commerciality reservations of its Article I.3. It deposited the instrument on 3 January 1962, and the Convention has been in force for the country since 3 April of that year.

The reservations have no practical effect. Article 42 of the LAM and Article 15 of the RLAM equate international awards to domestic ones without distinguishing the state of origin or the commercial character of the relationship. Hence, the domestic regime applies pursuant to Article VII of the NYC because it is more favourable than the regime established by the NYC.

Ecuador is also a party to the 1975 Inter-American Convention on International Commercial Arbitration. In investment matters, it denounced the ICSID Convention in 2009 and became a party once again in 2021.

The award is enforced as a final judgment and without prior recognition, whether the arbitration is seated in Ecuador or abroad.

Article 363 of the COGEP recognises the award as an enforcement title (título de ejecución). Article 15 of the RLAM provides that international awards, whether seated within or outside Ecuadorian territory, are enforced before the same judge and in the same manner as domestic ones, without any prior exequatur. In judgment 3232-19-EP/24, of 9 May 2024, the Constitutional Court held that requiring prior recognition of an award violates the rights to legal certainty and to effective judicial protection.

Requirements and Competence

Article 15 of the RLAM requires only a certified copy of the award. Article 14 of the RLAM confers competence on the civil court of first instance of the domicile of the debtor or of the place where the debtor’s assets are located.

Opposition and Awards Set Aside at the Seat

The debtor may resist enforcement mainly by showing the award has been complied with in full. Other grounds for resisting enforcement, according to the RLAM, are the suspension of the award by competent authority or that the award has been set aside. Hence, an annulment action pending at the seat does not of itself suspend enforcement. There does not appear to be any cases of enforcement of awards set aside at the seat of the arbitration.

Sovereign Immunity Defences

Ecuadorian public entities do not raise immunity defences against the enforcement of awards; payment is subject to the budgetary rules applicable to State obligations. There is no specific legislation on the immunity of foreign states from enforcement of awards.

The draft reform described in 2.2 Changes to National Law would alter the competence regime for enforcement.

The courts adopt an approach favourable to recognition and enforcement. There is no public-policy review.

Public policy is not among the grounds for annulment in Article 31 of the LAM, nor among the grounds for opposing enforcement in Article 15 of the RLAM. The enforcement judge does not undertake the examination provided for in Article V(2) of the NYC since the local regime is more favourable than the NYC.

Excluded Avenues of Challenge

In judgments 308-14-EP/20 and 481-14-EP/20, the Constitutional Court held that ordinary protection actions (not to be confused with EPAs) against arbitral decisions are inadmissible, since ordinary protection actions are not applicable in the case of jurisdictional decisions.

In judgment 74-21-IN/25, the Constitutional Court dismissed the unconstitutionality actions directed against Article 15 of the RLAM that refers to the grounds to resist the enforcement of international awards. Article 15(4) of the RLAM provides that no judge shall admit any action whose object is to delay, obstruct or impede the enforcement of an international award.

The Ecuadorian legal system does not regulate collective or class arbitration, and there is no practice to that effect. Moreover, the Constitution appears to prohibit class actions.

Articles 1 and 5 of the LAM require an arbitration agreement and a matter capable of settlement. No provision empowers an arbitral tribunal to decide on behalf of absent members of a group. Article 6 of the RLAM allows non-signatories to be bound by consent derived from good faith, not by collective representation, as indicated in 5.6 Jurisdiction Over Third Parties.

Collective actions before the courts are limited and concentrated in diffuse rights, environmental matters and consumer protection, areas in which arbitrability is debatable given the settlement requirement described in 3.2 Arbitrability.

There is no single code of ethics applicable to arbitration. The regime combines general professional rules and institutional codes. Some centres have their own rules of conduct.

The standards applicable to arbitrators are described in 4.4 Challenge and Removal of Arbitrators and 4.5 Arbitrator Requirements.

Lawyers

Lawyers’ conduct is governed by the COFJ, specifically in Articles 330 and 335, which establish the duties and prohibitions in professional practice. There is also the Code of Professional Ethics approved in 1969 by the National Lawyers’ Federation of Ecuador.

There is no specific body of professional conduct rules for acting as counsel in arbitration.

There are no legal rules or restrictions on third-party funding. Neither the LAM nor the RLAM refers to it, and no provision prohibits it. The doctrines of champerty and maintenance do not form part of Ecuadorian law.

There is no legal duty to disclose the funding or the identity of the funder. Disclosure occurs where the centre’s rules impose it (certain institutional rules require disclosure of the existence of funding and the identity of the funder), where the tribunal orders it to check for conflicts of interest on the terms indicated in 4.5 Arbitrator Requirements, or where the funded party offers it. There is no judicial ruling specifying the effects of a failure to disclose on the challenge of arbitrators or on the allocation of costs.

Neither the LAM nor the RLAM govern the consolidation of arbitral proceedings. The consolidation rules of Articles 15 to 21 of the COGEP apply to court proceedings.

Article 86 of the CAM CCQ rules empowers the centre’s directorate or the arbitral tribunal to consolidate two or more arbitrations, of its own motion or at a party’s request, where the parties have expressly agreed to it, where all the claims are brought under the same arbitration clause, or where the disputes arise between the same parties in relation to the same legal relationship. Consolidation takes place in the arbitration commenced first, unless otherwise agreed. Outside those situations, separate proceedings cannot be consolidated.

The extension of the arbitration agreement to non-signatories is provided in Article 6 of the RLAM, described in 5.6 Jurisdiction Over Third Parties. There is no distinction between domestic and foreign non-signatories.

The award produces effects only between the parties to the arbitration, in accordance with the principle set out in Article 97 of the COGEP.

A national court’s powers to bind third parties are the same irrespective of the nationality of those parties.