Anti-Corruption 2026 Comparisons

Singapore is a signatory to the United Nations Convention against Corruption (signed on 11 November 2005, ratified on 6 November 2009), and to the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime (signed on 13 December 2000, ratified on 28 August 2007).

In addition, Singapore has been a member of the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) since 1992 and is one of the founding members of the Asia/Pacific Group on Money Laundering (APG).

Singapore’s Corrupt Practices Investigations Bureau (CPIB), the agency responsible for the investigation and prevention of corruption in Singapore, also represents Singapore at various anti-corruption fora, such as:

• the Asian Development Bank (ADB) – the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and the Development (OECD) Anti-Corruption Initiative for Asia and Pacific;
• the Asia-Pacific Economic Co-operation (APEC) Anti-Corruption and Transparency Experts’ Working Group (ACTWG);
• the Economic Crime Agencies Network (ECAN);
• the G20 Anti-Corruption Working Group (ACWG);
• the International Association of Anti-Corruption Authorities (IAACA); and
• the South-East Asia – Parties Against Corruption (SEA-PAC).

The primary legislation governing bribery and corruption in Singapore is the Prevention of Corruption Act 1960 (PCA). The main offences under the PCA are set out in Sections 5 and 6, which apply to both the private and public sector, and prohibit both active and passive bribery.

The Penal Code 1871 (Penal Code) contains further provisions relating to bribery and corruption. This includes offences related to the bribery of domestic “public servants” under Sections 161 to 165 of the Penal Code. In practice, however, the offences under the Penal Code are rarely used for the prosecution of corruption offences. Prosecutors usually rely on the offences under the PCA instead.

The Corruption, Drug Trafficking and other Serious Crimes (Confiscation of Benefits) Act 1992 (CDSA) is another legislation aimed at combating corruption. The CDSA criminalises the acquisition, possession, use, concealment and/or transfer of the benefits from criminal conduct (such as corruption) and allows for the confiscation of such benefits.

There are no official guidelines on the interpretation and enforcement of Singapore’s anti-corruption legislation.

However, the CPIB has published on its website some answers to frequently asked questions relating to anti-corruption and bribery laws in Singapore: CPIB FAQ Corruption Related.

In 2016, the CPIB and SPRING (now Enterprise Singapore – a government agency championing enterprise development) also launched the Singapore Standard (SS) ISO 37001 on anti-bribery management systems. This voluntary standard is based on internationally recognised good practices. It provides guidelines to help Singapore companies strengthen their anti-bribery compliance systems and processes and ensure compliance with anti-bribery laws.

Further, also in 2017, the CPIB published PACT – its Practical Anti-Corruption Guide for Businesses in Singapore. PACT provides guidance for business owners on how to develop and implement an anti-corruption system. The elements of an effective corporate compliance programme as stated in PACT include:

• setting the tone from the top to promote a corporate culture of compliance;
• implementation of clear, visible and easy to understand anti-corruption policies and a code of conduct;
• guidance on common corruption risk areas, including corporate gifts and entertainment, conflicts of interests, and contributions and sponsorship;
• conducting bribery and corruption risk assessments;
• the implementation of effective internal controls;
• the availability of effective reporting and whistle-blower systems; and
• regular monitoring of the compliance system.

One of the key amendments to the national legislation was the introduction of the Deferred Prosecution Agreements (DPA) regime in 2018. 

A DPA is a voluntary alternative in which a prosecutor agrees to grant amnesty in exchange for a defendant agreeing to fulfil certain requirements and specific conditions, such as implementing compliance programmes, and/or co-operating in investigations into wrongdoing by individuals. 

Under this regime, corporations can potentially enter into DPAs with Singapore’s Attorney-General’s Chambers in respect of certain corruption and corruption-related offences.

Other key amendments to the national legislation were the amendments to the CDSA and the Computer Misuse Act 1993 (CMA). The purpose of these amendments was to curb the facilitation of scams and the financial crime ecosystem by criminalising  so-called rash and negligent money laundering, among others.

Bribery is defined very widely under the PCA.

Section 5 of the PCA provides that it is an offence for anyone to:

• “ corruptly solicit or receive, or agree to receive for themselves, or for any other person; or
• corruptly give, promise or offer to any person whether for the benefit of that person or of another person, any gratification as an inducement to or reward for, or otherwise on account of:

1. any person doing or forbearing to do anything in respect of any matter or transaction whatsoever, actual or proposed; or
2. any member, officer or servant of a public body doing or forbearing to do anything in respect of any matter or transaction whatsoever, actual or proposed, in which such public body is concerned […]”

Further, Section 6 of the PCA provides that it is an offence for an agent corruptly to accept or obtain any gratification in relation to the acts or performance of their principal. This may, for example, involve an employee corruptly accepting or obtaining gratification in the course of their employment with their company and/or in relation to the actions of their company.

Sections 11 and 12 of the PCA also provide that it is an offence to offer gratification to domestic public officials (such as members of parliament or members of a public body). In turn, a public body is defined as any corporation, board, council, commissioners or other body which has power to act under and for the purposes of any written law relating to public health or to undertakings or public utility or otherwise to administer money levied or raised by rates or charges in pursuance of any written law.

Hospitality Expenditures, Gifts and Promotional Expenditures

Under the PCA, “gratification” has a very wide definition, which includes:

• money or any gift, loan, fee, reward, commission, valuable security or other property or interest in property of any description, whether movable or immovable;
• any office, employment or contract;
• any payment, release, discharge or liquidation of any loan, obligation or other liability whatsoever, whether in whole or in part;
• any other service, favour or advantage of any description whatsoever, including protection from any penalty or disability incurred or apprehended or from any action or proceedings of a disciplinary or penal nature, whether or not already instituted, and including the exercise or the forbearance from the exercise of any right or any official power or duty; and
• any offer, undertaking or promise of any gratification within the meaning of the bullet points set out above.

Hospitality expenditures (travel expenses, meals), gifts and promotional expenditures are therefore likely to fall under this very wide definition of gratification under the PCA. Whether or not the giving or acceptance of such gratification amounts to the offence of bribery will therefore depend on the state of mind of the giver/receiver and the purpose for giving/receiving such gratification.

Facilitation Payments

Facilitation payments may be defined as payments which are made to public officials to speed up an administrative process where the outcome is already pre-determined.

Where such payments are concerned, these are not specifically regulated in Singapore – in particular, there is no exemption or defence applicable to such payments similar to that provided under the United States Foreign Corrupt Practices Act 1977 (FCPA). 

However, regard should be had to Section 12 of the PCA. That section prohibits, among others, the giving, solicitation and/or accepting of gratification for a member of a public body’s performing or abstaining from performing, or their aid in procuring, expediting, delaying, hindering or preventing the performance of any official act.

Bribery of a Public Official

The primary corruption offences under Sections 5 and 6 of the PCA apply to both the private and public sectors.

However, the law distinguishes between bribery of a public official and private persons in that there is a presumption of corruption in certain cases involving the bribery of public officials. In this regard, Section 8 of the PCA provides as follows:

“Where in any proceedings against a person for an offence under Section 5 or 6, it is proved that any gratification has been paid or given to or received by a person in the employment of the government or any department thereof or of a public body by or from a person or agent of a person who has or seeks to have any dealing with the government or any department thereof or any public body, that gratification shall be deemed to have been paid or given and received corruptly as an inducement or reward as hereinbefore mentioned unless the contrary is proved.”

Aside from this, the law also distinguishes between bribery of a public official and private persons in that there are specific offences under the PCA and the Penal Code that relate to the public sector.

In particular, under the PCA it is an offence to:

• corruptly procure the withdrawal from a government tender (Section 10 of the PCA);
• bribe a member of parliament, or to accept such a bribe as a member of parliament (Section 11 of the PCA); and
• bribe a member of a public body, or to accept such a bribe as a member of a public body (Section 12 of the PCA).

Further, under the Penal Code, the following are offences (amongst others):

• the acceptance by a public servant of a gratification or anything of value as a reward for doing any official act, outside of legal remuneration (Section 161 of the Penal Code);
• the acceptance of a gratification by any person in order to influence or to exercise personal influence over a public servant (Sections 162-63 of the Penal Code); and
• the acceptance by a public servant of a gratification or anything of value without any or adequate consideration (Section 165 of the Penal Code).

In this regard, it should be noted that a “public servant” is defined differently from the definition of a “member of a public body” under the PCA. Whereas the definition of the latter is set out above, the former is defined under Section 21 of the Penal Code as including:

• an officer in the Singapore Armed Forces;
• a judge;
• an officer of a court of justice;
• an assessor assisting a court of justice;
• an arbitrator or other person to whom any cause or matter has been referred for decision;
• an office holder who holds powers to confine other persons;
• an officer of the Singapore government;
• an officer who acts on behalf of the government; or
• a member of the Public Service or Legal Service Commission.

Bribery of Foreign Public Officials

There are no legislative provisions that specifically deal with the potential bribery of foreign public officials. 

However, Section 37 of the PCA states that if a Singapore citizen commits an offence under the PCA in any place outside of Singapore, they may be dealt with in respect of that offence as if it had been committed within Singapore. Section 4 of the Penal Code also provides that public servants who commit offences outside of Singapore are deemed to have committed that offence in Singapore.

The sum total of this is that the various prohibitions for corruption-related offences under the PCA and Penal Code can apply to cases involving foreign public officials and, in some cases, even apply where the acts of corruption occur outside of Singapore.

In fact, it should also be noted that the Singapore courts have held that the fact that a corruption offence involves the corruption of foreign public officials is an aggravating factor: see PP v Tan Kok Ming Michael [2019] 5 SLR 926 at [73]-[93].

As stated at 2.1 Bribery, the PCA defines gratification very widely and includes “any office, employment or contract”, as well as “any other service, favour or advantage of any description whatsoever, including protection from any penalty or disability incurred or apprehended or from any action or proceedings of a disciplinary or penal nature, whether or not already instituted, and including the exercise or the forbearance from the exercise of any right or any official power or duty”.

Therefore, influence-peddling (ie, the use of one’s positional or political influence in exchange for undue advantages) is likely to constitute an offence under Sections 5 or 6 of the PCA. Further, influence-peddling by citizens of Singapore of foreign public officials is likely to come within Section 12 of the PCA, read with Section 37(1) of the PCA.

Apart from the PCA, Section 161 of the Penal Code (PC) provides that it is an offence for a person, being or expecting to be a public servant, to accept or obtain (or agree to accept or obtain) any gratification other than a legal remuneration as a motive or reward for, among others, doing or forbearing to do any official act.

In a similar vein, Section 163 of the PC provides that it is an offence for a person to accept or obtain gratification for exercising personal influence on a public servant to do or forbear to do any official act.

Obligation of Companies in Respect of Record-Keeping

Under Section 199(1) of the Companies Act (CA), every company is required to keep accounting and other records that “sufficiently explain the transactions and financial position of the company and enable true and fair financial statements and any documents required to be attached thereto to be prepared from time to time”. 

Such records must be kept for a period of not less than five years from the end of the financial year in which the transactions or operations to which those records relate are completed.

If a company fails to do so, the company and every officer of the company who is in default will be guilty of an offence under Section 199(6) of the CA.

Falsification of Accounts/False Documentation

Section 477A of the PC criminalises the falsification of accounts. The section provides as follows:

“Whoever, being a clerk, officer or servant, or employed or acting in the capacity of a clerk, officer or servant, intentionally and with intent to defraud destroys, alters, conceals, mutilates or falsifies any book, electronic record, paper, writing, valuable security or account or a set thereof which belongs to or is in the possession of their employer, or has been received by them for or on behalf of their employer, or intentionally and with intent to defraud makes or abets the making of any false entry in, or omits or alters or abets the omission or alteration of any material particular from or in any such book, electronic record, paper, writing, valuable security or account or a set thereof, shall be punished with imprisonment for a term which may extend to 10 years, or with a fine, or with both.”

Aside from this, the PC also sets out various offences relating to documents and electronic records (such as forgery under Section 463 of the PCA and making a false document or false electronic record under Section 464 of the PC). These offences can also potentially apply to situations involving inaccurate corporate books and records.

Dissemination of False Information

As for the dissemination of false information of a harmful thing, Section 268A of the PC criminalises the communication of information containing a reference to the presence in any place or location or in any conveyance or means of transportation of anything that is likely to cause hurt or damage to property by any means which the person knows to be false or fabricated.

As for the dissemination of false information online, Singapore recently enacted the Protection from Online Falsehoods and Manipulation Act 2019 (Act No 18 of 2019) (POFMA). 

Amongst other things, the POFMA criminalises the doing of an act within or outside Singapore in order to communicate in Singapore a statement, knowing, or having reason to believe, that the statement is a false statement of fact; and its communication of that statement in Singapore is likely to:

• be prejudicial to the security of Singapore or any part of Singapore;
• be prejudicial to public health, public safety, public tranquillity or public finances;
• be prejudicial to the friendly relations of Singapore with other countries;
• influence the outcome of an election to the office of President, a general election of members of parliament, a by-election of a member of parliament, or a referendum;
• incite feelings of enmity, hatred or ill will between different groups of persons; or
• diminish public confidence in the performance of any duty or function of, or in the exercise of any power by, the government, an organ of state, a statutory board, or a part of the government, an organ of state or a statutory board.

Under Section 405 of the PC, any person who misappropriates property they are entrusted with will be liable for criminal breach of trust. Where such a breach of trust is committed by, inter alia, a public servant, Section 409 of the PC provides for enhanced penalties, namely, imprisonment for life, or imprisonment for a term which may extend to 20 years, and liability to a fine.

There are, however, no specific provisions which relate to the unlawful taking of interest by a public official and/or favouritism by a public official. In such situations, the general provisions under the PCA and PC would potentially apply.

Under Section 5 of the PCA, it is an offence for any person to give or receive bribes “by themselves or by or in conjunction with any other person”. This is wide enough to cover situations where a person commits a bribery offence through an intermediary.

Further, under Section 6 of the PCA, it is an offence for an agent corruptly to accept or obtain any gratification in relation to the acts or performance of their principal. For example, this may involve an employee corruptly accepting or obtaining any gratification in relation to the acts of their company. In addition, Section 6(b) also criminalises the giving or agreement to give any gratification to any agent.

Lobbying activities in Singapore are primarily regulated through the Political Donations Act 2000 (PDA).

Under the PDA, political associations and candidates can only accept contributions from permissible donors – that is, Singapore citizens not less than 21 years of age, Singapore-controlled companies carrying on business mainly in Singapore, or a candidate’s political party. If donations come from anonymous donors, those donations from anonymous donors may not exceed SGD5,000 per financial year.

Further, Section 12 of the PDA mandates that every political association must prepare and send a donation report to the Registrar of Political Donations.

Donation reports should state details such as the identity of donors, value of donations and circumstances in which donations were made. Further, donation reports must also contain details of every donation where:

• the donation is not less than SGD10,000; or
• if added to any other donation from the same permissible donor, the aggregate amount of the donations is not less than SGD10,000.

Under Singapore law, there is no limitation period for enforcing or prosecuting criminal offences.

Section 37 of the PCA provides extraterritorial reach for the provisions of the PCA, provided that the offences in question are committed by a citizen of Singapore overseas.

In addition, under Section 4 of the PC, every public servant who, being a citizen or a permanent resident of Singapore, when acting or purporting to act in the course of their employment, commits an act or omission outside Singapore that if committed in Singapore would constitute an offence under the law in force in Singapore, is deemed to have committed that act or omission in Singapore.

Separately, under Section 108A of the PC, a person can be found to have abetted an offence under the PC even if that offence was committed “without and beyond Singapore”. In a similar vein, under Section 108B of the PC, a person can also be found to have abetted an offence under the PC in Singapore, notwithstanding that any or all of the acts constituting the abetment were done outside Singapore.

Both individuals and corporate entities may be held liable for bribery. The primary bribery offences under Sections 5 and 6 of the PCA apply to all “persons”. The term “person” is defined in the Interpretation Act 1965 as including “any company or association of body of persons, corporate or unincorporated.”

In practice, however, the authorities’ enforcement efforts have focused predominantly on individuals, with prosecutions against corporate entities for corruption offences being rare to date.

There are no statutory defences to bribery under the PCA. The accused will therefore need to rely on negating each element of the charge against them.

Chapter IV of the PC sets out the various general defences available against a charge under the PC. However, these defences are unlikely to be applicable in the vast majority of corruption offences.

Several of the general defences under Chapter IV of the PC are subject to exceptions (such as the defence of duress). However, as stated at 4.1 Defences, these defences are unlikely to be applicable in the vast majority of corruption offences.

The general defences in Chapter IV of the PC include a defence of de minimis. The relevant section is Section 95 of the PC, which states as follows: “Nothing is an offence by reason that it causes, or that it is intended to cause, or that it is known to be likely to cause, any harm, if that harm is so slight that no person of ordinary sense and temper would complain of such harm.”

It is unlikely that this general defence will be applicable to corruption offences, as the strict policy approach taken by lawmakers and the CPIB towards the implementation and enforcement of corruption offences in Singapore means that any bribe, no matter how small, will not be considered de minimis. There is also some doubt as to whether the defence of de minimis applies to offences outside of the PC in any event.

However, the issue has yet to come before the Singapore courts.

There are no sectors or industries exempt from bribery and corruption offences under the PCA.

Further, under Section 23 of the PCA, in any civil or criminal proceedings under the PCA, evidence to show that any gratification is customary in the profession, trade, vocation or calling shall not be admissible

There is no safe harbour or amnesty programme based on the self-reporting of corruption offences.

However, the DPA scheme may allow companies to highlight effective anti-bribery compliance programmes as part of their negotiations on any DPA to be entered into with the Attorney General’s Chambers (AGC). At present, there are no publicly available guidelines on when the AGC will enter into a DPA with a corporate entity.

In general, the maximum penalties prescribed under the relevant statutes are as follows:

• Section 5 of the PCA – a fine not exceeding SGD100,000 or imprisonment not exceeding five years, or both;
• Section 6 of the PCA – a fine not exceeding SGD100,000 or imprisonment not exceeding five years, or both;
• Section 7 of the PCA (increase of maximum penalty in cases where the offence related to a contractor is a proposal for a contract with the government or any department thereof or with any public body or a subcontract to execute any work comprised in such a contract) – a fine not exceeding SGD100,000 or imprisonment not exceeding seven years, or both;
• Section 10 of the PCA (corruptly procuring withdrawal of tenders) – a fine not exceeding SGD100,000 or imprisonment not exceeding seven years, or both;
• Section 11 of the PCA (bribery of member of parliament) – a fine not exceeding SGD100,000 or imprisonment not exceeding seven years, or both; and
• Section 12 of the PCA (bribery of member of public body) – a fine not exceeding SGD100,000 or imprisonment not exceeding seven years, or both.

In addition, where the offender has received a bribe, under Section 13 of the PCA, the court may order the person to pay a penalty equivalent to the amount of gratification received, in addition to the penalties stipulated above.

Further, in the Court of Appeal’s recent decision in Chang Peng Hong Clarence v PP [2024] SGCA 58, the Court of Appeal added that the Court has the power to impose more than one penalty under Section 13 of the PCA where an individual has been convicted of two or more offences for the acceptance of gratification in contravention of the PCA. In fact, the Court of Appeal went so far as to state that the Court must impose one penalty for each charge on which the individual was convicted.

In PP v Tan Kok Ming Michael [2019] 5 SLR 926, the High Court of Singapore (now the General Division of the High Court of Singapore) held that the main overarching sentencing considerations in corruption cases are deterrence and retribution (at [99]).

Further, in Takaaki Masui v PP [2020] SGHC 265, the High Court also observed that there were four broad categories of corruption under the general offences set out in Sections 5, 6 and 7 of the PCA.

• Category 1 – corruption in the public sector which involves government servants or officers of public bodies. A custodial sentence is the norm for such cases in the light of the strong public interest in stamping out corruption in the public sector.
• Category 2 – corruption in the private sector which engages the public service rationale. For clarity, this refers to the “public interest in preventing a loss of confidence in Singapore’s public administration”. This sentencing principle is presumed to apply in cases of public sector corruption but has been extended to cases where private agents handle public money, supply public services or are involved in government contracts. This category also includes private sector offences that concern regulatory or oversight roles such as marine surveying. In such cases, a custodial sentence is often the norm.
• Category 3 – corruption in the private sector which does not engage the public service rationale, ie, private sector agents performing purely commercial functions. While there is no norm in favour of non-custodial sentences in such cases, the general trend indicates that where private sector agents performing purely commercial functions are concerned, offences which register a lower level of overall criminal culpability may be dealt with through the imposition of fines. However, whether or not the custody threshold is breached will depend greatly on the specific nature of the corruption.
• Category 4 – corruption cases for which there are established sentencing guidelines. This is an open category that has been included to accommodate any present and future judgments that provide sentencing guidelines tailored to a specific type of fact scenario. At present, the only types of cases falling within this category are:
1. those relating to sports-betting and match-fixing; and
2. cases involving offenders prosecuted under Section 6 read with Section 7 of the PCA.

Nonetheless, these are not immutable or fixed categories. There are no prescribed sentencing formulae, and the issue of sentencing in corruption cases will often turn on the specific facts of each case.

Under Section 424 of Criminal Procedure Code (CPC), individuals are obliged to report the commission of, or the intention of any other person to commit, certain offences under the PC. These offences include some offences under the PC which relate to the corruption of public servants (ie, offences under Sections 161 to 164 of the PC).

The PCA itself, however, does not criminalise a person’s failure to disclose violations of anti-bribery and anti-corruption provisions at the outset. That said, Section 27 of the PCA obliges an individual or company required by the CPIB to give information on any subject of inquiry by the CPIB.

In addition, under Section 39 of the CDSA, individuals and companies may be liable for failing to report a suspicion that any property represents the proceeds of, or was used in connection with, any criminal offence.

There are no specific legislative provisions that provide for incentives for companies and individuals to engage in voluntary self-disclosure of potential violations of anti-bribery and anti-corruption provisions of which they become aware.

However, disclosure is encouraged through the statutory protection afforded to whistle-blowers: see 6.4 Protections Afforded to Whistle-Blowers.

As stated in 4.5 Safe Harbour or Amnesty Programme, there is no safe harbour or amnesty programme based on the self-reporting of corruption offences. Consequently, there are also no specific provisions and/or procedures in relation to the self-disclosure by companies and individuals of bribery and corruption offences.

There is currently no specific omnibus legislation to provide protection to whistle-blowers in Singapore.

However, some protection is offered by the PCA – in particular, Section 36 of the PCA renders any complaints under the PCA inadmissible as evidence in any civil or criminal proceedings. Further, no witness is obliged or permitted to disclose the name or address of any informer or state any matter which might lead to their discovery.

There is growing pressure for the introduction of such specific legislation.

There are no specific legislative provisions that provide for incentives for whistle-blowers. Nonetheless, if criminal charges are brought against a whistle-blower, the Singapore courts may potentially give mitigating weight to the fact that the whistle-blower voluntarily gave information to the authorities at the outset.

Both criminal and civil enforcement are statutorily provided for under the PCA. 

Criminal Enforcement

Offences under the PCA (for example, those set out in Sections 5-7 of the PCA) are punishable by imprisonment, fines or both (see 5.1 Penalties on Conviction).

Civil Enforcement

As for civil enforcement, pursuant to Section 14 of the PCA, where a bribe has been given by any person to an agent, the agent’s principal may recover the value of the bribe as a civil debt. This would allow, for example, a company to seek damages from a former director or employee who paid corrupt payments on account of their dealings on behalf of the company. Any such civil liability would be in addition to any penalty or fine imposed as part of a criminal sentence.

In addition to the civil recovery proceedings permitted by the PCA, other types of civil actions are available. For example, in certain circumstances, it is possible for a company to bring a civil action for conspiracy against its employee(s) who orchestrated and/or participated in the giving/receiving of bribes.

The CPIB is the agency responsible for the investigation and prevention of corruption in Singapore. The CPIB is under the Prime Minister’s Office (PMO) and reports directly to the Prime Minister. The Attorney General’s Chambers (AGC) is the agency responsible for the prosecution of offences. 

The CPIB can investigate offences committed by any person within Singapore. For Singaporean citizens, the CPIB is empowered, by virtue of Section 37 of the PCA, to investigate offences committed outside Singapore.

Where offences committed outside Singapore are concerned, the CPIB can potentially work with the relevant jurisdiction to investigate the matter. In this regard, the Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters Act 2000, provides that Singapore may, in some circumstances, request legal assistance from a foreign country. Such assistance includes the taking of evidence, search and seizure, and locating or identifying persons of interest.

The Attorney General has the power, exercisable at their direction, to institute, conduct or discontinue any proceedings for any criminal offence. This is provided for in Article 35(8) of the Constitution of the Republic of Singapore and Section 11 of the CPC.

Accordingly, the AGC has unfettered discretion to extend any plea or sentencing offer to the offender concerned. The same would apply to any plea or sentencing agreement arrived at, subsequent to negotiations with the offender or their legal counsel.

There are no published or standard guidelines on the factors that may be taken into account by the AGC in such offers or negotiations. That being said, however, the AGC has the discretion to consider both mitigating and aggravating factors when deciding whether to extend any plea or sentencing offer(s) and, if so, the terms of such offer(s).

One of the fairly recent introductions in enforcement is the DPA regime. As stated at 1.4 Recent Key Amendments to National Legislation, a DPA is a voluntary alternative in which a prosecutor agrees to grant amnesty in exchange for a defendant agreeing to fulfil certain requirements and specific conditions, such as implementing compliance programmes, and/or co-operating in investigations into wrongdoing by individuals.

For now, there are no publicly available prosecution guidelines on when the AGC will enter into a DPA with a corporate entity, and it remains to be seen how the DPA regime will affect trends in investigations. Nonetheless, this is a new option that the AGC can consider in exercising its prosecutorial discretion.

However, the introduction of DPAs in Singapore may be an indication of an increased focus on corporate entities by the Singapore government. This is since the Singapore Ministry of Law stated that the DPA regime serves two main purposes: (i) to encourage corporate reform to prevent future offending, and (ii) to facilitate investigations into wrongdoing both by the company and by individuals.

In 2024, one of the most high-profile decisions involving bribery or corruption in Singapore was the decision by the General Division of the High Court in PP v S Iswaran [2024] SGHC 251. In that case, a former Minister of Singapore pleaded guilty and was convicted of, among others, charges under Section 165 of the PC for receiving various gifts in connection with his public office. These gifts included but were not limited to Formula One tickets, a private jet flight to and accommodation in Doha, Qatar, whisky, wine and even a foldable bicycle.

Since the PC was introduced in its original form in 1871, Mr Iswaran was the first reported individual to have been charged and convicted under this provision. For all intents and purposes, this can be seen as being akin to a conviction against Mr Iswaran for corruption in his capacity as a public servant.

Following Mr Iswaran’s conviction, the individual who had given Mr Iswaran the various gifts in question, Mr Ong Beng Seng, was charged and convicted (although the charge that he was eventually convicted of was not a corruption charge per se, but for abetting the obstruction of justice in relation to Mr Iswaran’s case).

The effects of Mr Iswaran’s and Mr Ong’s cases are significant as they raise important issues about the conduct of public servants who necessarily have to deal with private sector stakeholders in the course of their employment.

There are also ongoing concerns about individuals who double-hat – that is, who hold appointments in both the public and private sector. Such individuals may receive gifts in their capacity as a private sector stakeholder but may still be concerned that they cannot de-link these gifts from their concurrent appointment(s) in the public sector.

Another high-profile anti-bribery and corruption matter concerns Seatrium Limited. In 2025, Seatrium Limited entered into a DPA with the AGC in relation to corruption offences in Brazil (under which Seatrium Limited agreed to pay a financial penalty of USD110 million, among other terms). The DPA has yet to be approved by the Singapore Courts, and it remains to be seen how the Singapore Courts will approach and analyse any potential DPA. This is certainly a landmark development, as this is the first DPA entered into by any company under Singapore’s DPA regime since its inception in 2018.

The courts determine each case on its unique facts, taking into account a myriad of factors. Amongst other things, the courts will take into account the offender’s level of culpability, as well as the harm caused by the act.

There is no national legislation which prescribes duties to prevent corruption by setting up compliance programmes(s) within a company.

Further, the mere failure to prevent bribery is not an offence, in and of itself. This is unlike jurisdictions such as the UK and US where the failure by a commercial organisation to prevent bribery by those acting on their behalf can potentially constitute an offence.

As stated in 1.3 Guidelines for the Interpretation and Enforcement of National Legislation, in 2016, the CPIB and SPRING (now Enterprise Singapore – a government agency championing enterprise development) also launched the Singapore Standard (SS) ISO 37001 on anti-bribery management systems.

As previously stated, this voluntary standard is based on internationally recognised good practices. It provides guidelines to help Singapore companies strengthen their anti-bribery compliance systems and processes and ensure compliance with anti-bribery laws.

Further, the CPIB published PACT in 2017 – that is, its Practical Anti-Corruption Guide for Businesses in Singapore – in order to provide guidance for business owners on how to develop and implement an anti-corruption system.

As mentioned in 1.4 Recent Key Amendments to National Legislation, one of the key amendments to the national legislation was the introduction of the DPA regime in 2018. 

A DPA is a voluntary alternative in which a prosecutor agrees to grant amnesty in exchange for a defendant agreeing to fulfil certain requirements and specific conditions, such as implementing compliance programmes, and/or co-operating in investigations into wrongdoing by individuals. 

In fact, Section 149E of the CPC expressly stated that the requirements that a DPA may impose on a defendant can include the appointment of a person to assess and monitor the defendant’s internal controls and to report any misconduct in the implementation of the defendant’s compliance programme or internal controls to the Public Prosecutor.

The CPIB publishes an annual report which, amongst other things, highlights the key developments and trends in Singapore for the previous year in the field of anti-corruption. 

Based on statistics that were released on 28 May 2025, the CPIB received 177 corruption-related reports in 2024 – 18% fewer reports than in 2023. This continued the downward trend in terms of corruption-related reports.

Interestingly, of the corruption-related reports received by the CPIB in 2024, the CPIB noted an overall increase in the percentage of those reports which were made anonymously (34% versus 23% in 2023).

These same statistics also showed that of the 177 corruption-related reports received by the CPIB, the CPIB registered 75 reports as new cases for investigation. That is, the CPIB considered the information in these 75 reports to be pursuable. This was a decrease from the 81 registered cases in 2023.

Further, these same statistics also showed that in 2024, the conviction rate for CPIB cases stood at 97%. While this represented a 2% decrease from 2023, the statistics nonetheless show that nearly all CPIB cases that were prosecuted still resulted in a conviction. 

In separate statistics released by the Transparency International Corruption Perceptions Index (TI-CPI), Singapore was also ranked as the world’s third least corrupt country out of 182 countries (and the top-ranked country in the Asia-Pacific region).

Generally, the statistics show that Singapore’s anti-corruption regime continues to be highly robust and effective, both on the legislative and enforcement fronts.

There have not been any recent announcements regarding changes to the relevant legislation or to the CPIB.

However, it can be expected that the CPIB (and, for that matter, other Singapore authorities) will need to assess its practices and protocols, especially given the rapid proliferation of Artificial Intelligence (AI) and related technologies.

The CPIB (and other Singapore authorities) will likely also assess their practices and protocols in relation to other burgeoning technologies such as cryptocurrency and blockchain technology. This is especially likely because transfers of corrupt monies and/or assets through such means will invariably require new and updated skill sets to detect and investigate effectively.