International Trade 2026 Comparisons

Japan is a long-standing and active member of the World Trade Organization (WTO), having joined at its creation in 1995 after four decades under the GATT. Japan participates in all core WTO multilateral agreements and consistently supports the rules-based trading system.

In addition to its multilateral commitments, Japan is party to several WTO plurilateral agreements. Japan is a full signatory to the Government Procurement Agreement (GPA), under which it grants nondiscriminatory access to its central and sub-central government procurement markets and adheres to strict transparency and tendering disciplines. Japan is also a member of the Agreement on Trade in Civil Aircraft, eliminating tariffs on civil aircraft and many related parts. Japan further participates in the Information Technology Agreement (ITA) and the expanded ITA, both of which eliminate tariffs on a broad range of IT goods, including semiconductors, computers and telecommunications equipment.

Although the Trade Facilitation Agreement (TFA) is a multilateral agreement and not a plurilateral one, Japan ratified it early and fully implements its customs-modernisation commitments. Beyond these agreements, Japan is an active participant in several WTO Joint Statement Initiatives, including negotiations on e-commerce, services domestic regulation and investment facilitation.

Collectively, these commitments demonstrate Japan’s substantial engagement in WTO-based co-operation.

As of 1 December 2025, Japan is a member of 20 free trade agreements (FTAs) and economic partnership agreements (EPAs), including:

• the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP);
• the Agreement between the European Union and Japan for an Economic Partnership (the “Japan–EU EPA”);
• the Japan–US Trade Agreement;
• the Japan–US Digital Trade Agreement; and
• the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement (RCEP).

See 1.2 Free Trade Agreements.

As of 1 December 2025, negotiations for several agreements are underway, but the following two negotiations are progressing relatively actively:

• Japan–Bangladesh EPA; and
• Japan–UAE EPA.

In response to the Trump administration’s additional tariffs and sector-specific tariffs, the Japanese and US governments reached a trade agreement in July 2025. In exchange for Japan’s commitment to make large-scale investments in the United States, among other things, the agreement reduced the tariff duties imposed on Japanese products under both the reciprocal tariffs and the sector-specific tariffs.

Japan is pursuing a strategy of actively advancing “multi-layered” economic diplomacy as a response to protectionism. Examples include expanding the CPTPP, expanding EPAs and investment agreements, and strengthening ties with Global South economies.

Customs Act

The core law governing Japan’s customs administration. It regulates:

• import/export declarations;
• customs inspections, inquiries, and investigations;
• anti-smuggling and anti-evasion penalties;
• search, seizure, and detention powers; and
• authorities granted to customs officers.

This Act forms the legal basis for all enforcement and clearance operations.

Customs Tariff Act

This Act defines:

• tariff rates for individual commodities (eg, beef, automobiles, steel); and
• preferential duties and other special tariff treatments.

Temporary Tariff Measures Act

This Act provides:

• temporary or exceptional tariff rates; and
• special measures based on economic or policy needs.

It is amended frequently to reflect policy adjustments.

Customs is a regional branch of the Ministry of Finance, with eight customs offices established in Hakodate, Tokyo, Yokohama, Nagoya, Osaka, Kobe, Moji, and Nagasaki, as well as the Okinawa District Customs Office.

Japan does not maintain a comprehensive unilateral instrument equivalent to Section 301 of the U.S. Trade Act of 1974 or the European Union’s Trade Barriers Regulation. In particular, Japan has not adopted any domestic legislation that authorises the government to impose unilateral retaliatory measures – such as punitive tariffs or other sanctions – on the basis of a finding that another country’s trade policies or practices are unfair or discriminatory.

Japan’s overall trade policy framework is grounded in respect for multilateral disciplines, primarily those established under the WTO Agreements. As a matter of institutional design, Japan has consistently refrained from establishing a mechanism that would permit autonomous countermeasures outside the WTO dispute settlement process or applicable FTA/EPA procedures. Instead, Japan addresses adverse trade practices of other jurisdictions primarily through (i) the WTO dispute settlement system, (ii) bilateral or plurilateral consultations, and (iii) procedures available under the relevant FTAs/EPAs.

Accordingly, Japan does not operate a domestic “petition-based” mechanism analogous to Section 301 or the TBR that would allow private parties – whether domestic or foreign – to request ad hoc investigations into foreign government measures for the purpose of recommending unilateral retaliation. Nor are there regularly scheduled reviews of such matters under a domestic statute. Participation by non-domestic companies is therefore not a meaningful issue in this context, and no investigative reports of the type prepared under Section 301 or the TBR are issued.

Regarding developments in customs legislation, while no major updates were made in 2025, the following amendments were implemented:

• The application period for provisional tariffs on 411 items and certain other items, which was set to expire on 31 March 2025, was extended by one year.
• For special preferential tariffs for Least Developed Countries (LDCs), the period before ineligibility was extended from within one year after LDC graduation (current) to within three years.
• For lithium bis (oxalato) borate (LiBOB), a provisional tariff rate was set, and the tariff was eliminated.

Updates at a more practical and subordinate legislation level include the following:

• Effective October 2025, import declarations must include whether the goods are e-commerce shipments, the name of the e-commerce platform, and the location and name of the destination where the goods will be transported after import approval, for goods concerning fulfilment services,
• Online applications for import confirmation via electronic systems became mandatory for pharmaceuticals starting July 2025.

The Ministry of Finance aims to implement the following revisions in FY2026:

• The exception allowing individuals to calculate import taxes based on 60% of the local price will be abolished.
• Consumption tax will be levied on imports valued at JPY10,000 or less, which are currently exempt.

The primary legislation governing sanctions in Japan is the Foreign Exchange and Foreign Trade Act (FEFTA). Based on this Act, multiple sanctions programmes are implemented under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Finance (MOF), the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA), and the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (METI). Most of Japan’s economic sanctions programmes are based on United Nations sanctions or international co-ordination with other countries such as the United States, although some unilateral sanctions measures are also implemented. The main targets include North Korea, Russia, Belarus, and Iran (unilateral sanctions apply only to North Korea).

Acts regulated by sanctions based on FEFTA include the following:

• import and export of goods;
• payments, etc (eg, payments from Japan to foreign countries, payments between residents and non-residents, including those made via crypto-assets or precious metals);
• capital transactions (eg, money-lending contracts, sales contracts for securities, and transactions related to crypto-assets); and
• service transactions (eg, provision of technology/software including deemed exports, and engineering).

In addition to FEFTA, sanctions based on the following laws also exist:

• Immigration Control and Refugee Recognition Act: Persons subject to UN sanctions are deemed to fall under Article 24, Paragraph 3, Item 3 of the Act (“A person who is required by an international agreement to be prevented from entering Japan”) and appear to be treated as subject to deportation.
• Act on Special Measures Concerning Asset Freezing, etc, of International Terrorists Conducted by Japan Taking into Account United Nations Security Council Resolution 1267, etc: Restrictions are placed on almost all transactions (including domestic transactions) with terrorists listed by the UNSC or the Japanese government, individuals or entities involved in the development of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), or those supporting them.
• Act on Special Measures Concerning the Prohibition of Entry of Specified Ships into Ports: This Act prohibits the entry of ships registered in specified foreign countries into Japanese ports.

The types of sanctions are defined based on FEFTA. Cabinet Orders subordinate to FEFTA, such as the Export Trade Control Order and the Foreign Exchange Order, grant the competent ministers the authority to designate specific regions, entities, individuals, etc, subject to each sanction measure (import/export, payments, etc). Based on these laws and regulations, each competent minister establishes public notices designating the entities, etc, subject to sanctions.

The government agencies responsible for the regulation and enforcement of sanctions differ depending on the type of transaction subject to regulation and the basis for the sanctions.

Sanctions Based on International Co-Ordination, etc

When the MOF or the METI deems it necessary for the “fulfilment of international treaties, etc, (eg, UN Security Council Resolutions)” or for "contribution to international peace (eg, co-ordination with G7 countries)”, sanctions are enforced with the following division of roles:

• The Minister of Finance is responsible for payments, etc., capital transactions, and service transactions.
• The Minister of METI is responsible for trade in goods (import/export) and service transactions.

It should be noted that the authority to designate individuals and entities subject to sanctions regarding these transactions (service transactions, payments, etc, and capital transactions) is delegated from both ministers to the Minister of Foreign Affairs.

Japan’s Unilateral Sanctions (Countermeasures)

When it is determined that unilateral sanctions are necessary to maintain Japan’s peace and safety, they are implemented following a Cabinet Decision and approval by the Diet. In this case as well, actual enforcement is carried out by the Minister of Finance or the Minister of METI depending on the type of transaction.

The obligation to obtain a licence or approval based on FEFTA applies, in principle, to the following “residents” and “non-residents”:

• Residents are defined as natural persons having their domicile or residence in Japan, or juridical persons (corporations) having their principal office in Japan.
• Non-residents are defined as natural persons or juridical persons other than residents.

Specifically, the persons required to obtain a licence in transactions subject to sanctions are as follows, depending on the type of transaction:

• Trade in Goods (Import/Export): Persons intending to export goods from Japan or import goods into Japan must obtain a licence regardless of whether they are residents or non-residents.
• Service Transactions: Residents intending to conduct service transactions with non-residents must obtain a licence.
• Payments, etc: A licence is required in any of the following cases:
1. residents or non-residents intending to make a payment from Japan to a foreign country; and
2. residents intending to make a payment to a non-resident or receive a payment from a non-resident.
• Capital Transactions: Both residents and non-residents must obtain a licence.

The Minister of Foreign Affairs designates individuals and entities subject to sanctions upon delegation from the Minister of Finance or the Minister of METI (see 3.2 Legal or Administrative Authorities Imposing Sanctions). Lists of economic sanction measures and subject persons are published on the websites of the MOF and the METI according to the type of transaction subject to sanctions, and are updated as necessary.

Japan implements a principle ban on imports and exports with North Korea and the self-proclaimed “Republics” of Donetsk and Luhansk, as well as a ban on imports from the Republic of Crimea and the City of Sevastopol. Additionally, Japan implements export bans on a wide range of products to Russia and Belarus (industrial machinery, high-performance semiconductors, and related technologies, etc, that involve a risk of military diversion), and import bans on specific products from Russia (including alcoholic beverages, wood, and crude oil and petroleum products exceeding the price cap (adjusted based on crude oil price trends)). Furthermore, Japan implements export bans centred on products with a high risk of military diversion, such as the ban on the export of products that could be diverted to nuclear technology, like rockets, vacuum pumps, and detonators, to Iran.

As unilateral sanctions, Japan prohibits the entry of North Korean nationals, ships, and aircraft into Japan/Japanese ports.

Japan does not apply secondary sanctions (ie, sanctions applied extraterritorially to persons outside Japan regarding transactions that have no nexus to Japan).

Penalties for violations of sanctions measures defined by FEFTA and related regulations are as follows, depending on the type of transaction. Note that penalties for juridical persons are imposed only when the violation by a natural person was committed in relation to the business or assets of the said juridical person.

Violations Regarding Payments, etc, Capital Transactions, and Service Transactions

• Natural Persons: The penalty is imprisonment for not more than three years, or a fine of not more than JPY1 million or “three times the value of the relevant transaction”, whichever is higher (or both).
• Juridical Persons: The penalty is a fine of not more than JPY1 million or “three times the value of the relevant transaction”, whichever is higher.

Violations Regarding Import/Export

• Natural Persons: The penalty is imprisonment for not more than five years, or a fine of not more than JPY10 million or “five times the value of the exported goods”, whichever is higher (or both).
• Juridical Persons: The penalty is a fine of not more than JPY500 million or “five times the value of the exported goods”, whichever is higher.

While Japanese law provides for obtaining a licence when conducting transactions subject to economic sanctions, such licences are not granted except for limited exceptions such as for humanitarian aid purposes.

As of 28 November 2025, specific compliance guidelines dedicated solely to sanctions do not exist, but the following initiatives regarding compliance systems are in place.

Provision of Guidelines and Inspections

The MOF provides guidelines regarding compliance with FEFTA and the Act on Prevention of Transfer of Criminal Proceeds to financial institutions and specific business operators subject to FEFTA. Furthermore, foreign exchange inspections are conducted to confirm whether these operators are complying with related laws and regulations.

Mandatory Establishment of Internal Systems (From 1 April 2024)

Financial institutions and specific business operators subject to FEFTA are obliged to establish internal systems to appropriately implement asset freezing measures in accordance with the standards prescribed in the Act. Specifically, they are required to conduct risk assessments for violations of asset-freezing measures and maintain lists of subject individuals and entities.

Post-Facto Audit System

FEFTA includes provisions for a post-facto audit system. Regarding payments, service transactions, and imports/exports subject to sanctions, if it is later discovered that approval from the Minister of METI was not obtained and there is a possibility of a violation, the Minister conducts a post-facto audit to determine the cause and prevent recurrence.

In this audit, business operators are required by METI to clarify the facts and, if the case constitutes a FEFTA violation, to formulate measures to prevent recurrence.

The following relevant systems are in place.

FEFTA

Under FEFTA, banks, other financial institutions, and certain other specific business operators (funds transfer service providers, crypto-asset exchange service providers, etc) are prohibited from conducting transactions unless they confirm that the payments or capital transactions subject to sanctions have been authorised by the competent minister.

Act on Prevention of Transfer of Criminal Proceeds

The Act on Prevention of Transfer of Criminal Proceeds obliges financial institutions, etc, to report “suspicious transactions” to the government, including transactions suspected of being related to specific crimes, terrorism, and imports/exports violating economic sanctions.

Japan does not have blocking statutes, anti-boycott regulations, or other regulations prohibiting the observance of sanctions of other countries.

As of 28 November 2025, no particularly significant amendments have been made, except for some modifications to identity verification procedures following the amendment of the Act on Prevention of Transfer of Criminal Proceeds, and continuous updates to lists of persons subject to sanctions related to Russia/Belarus (response to the situation in Ukraine) and North Korea (regarding nuclear development), etc.

As of November 2025, no major changes are planned.

FEFTA is the basis for export controls. The goods and technologies subject to control are prescribed in Cabinet Orders, which are delegated by FEFTA; however, the governing laws and regulations differ depending on whether the subject is “goods” or “technology”.

• Regulations on Controlled Items:
1. Goods are prescribed in Appended Table 1 of the Export Trade Control Order (Export Order).
2. Technology is prescribed in the Appended Table of the Foreign Exchange Order.
3. The specific specifications of the goods and technologies prescribed in the above Cabinet Orders are all identified by the Ministerial Order on Goods and Technologies (Ministerial Order Specifying Goods and Technologies Based on the Provisions of Appended Table 1 of the Export Trade Control Order and the Appended Table of the Foreign Exchange Order).
• Licence Application Procedures:

1. Goods are prescribed in the Export Trade Control Ordinance (Export Ordinance).
2. Technology is prescribed in the Ministerial Order on Trade in Services, etc (Ministerial Order on Trade in Services).

Thus, a characteristic of the system is that while the export of goods and the provision of technology are both based on FEFTA, they are generally prescribed in parallel in the subordinate laws and regulations. Furthermore, since many matters important for understanding the regulations are described in Circular Notices (Tsutatsu), confirmation of related Circular Notices in addition to laws and regulations is indispensable in practice.

Also, regarding export controls, the operation regarding deemed export controls changed in May 2022 and has been tightened. Previously, regarding the provision of technology within Japan, even if the recipient was a foreign national, the provision of technology to a resident was outside the scope of regulation. However, since May 2022, regardless of nationality (ie, even if the person is Japanese), the provision of technology to residents who are strongly influenced by non-residents is also subject to export controls, and a licence is required when providing controlled technology.

Please refer to 4.1 Export Controls.

Juridical persons and individuals intending to export goods or transfer technology subject to export controls must obtain a licence from the Minister of METI.

In Japan, there are two types of export controls for goods and technology: list control and catch-all control. The items subject to these export controls and the persons required to obtain a licence are as follows.

Export Control of Goods

• List Control: Specific goods subject to List Control are detailed in Items 1 through 15 of Appended Table 1 of the Export Order. These basically correspond to goods regulated under international regimes to which Japan is a party (Wassenaar Arrangement, Australia Group, etc). However, there are cases where Japan, the USA, and the Netherlands have independently designated items subject to export control without waiting for agreement in international regimes, such as the advanced semiconductor manufacturing equipment added in July 2023 (the government explained at the time that this was to “complement the Wassenaar Arrangement”). If the goods intended for export fall under controlled goods, a licence is required for export regardless of the destination.
• Catch-All Control (Complementary Export Control): Goods subject to catch-all control are those outside the scope of List Control and falling under any of the chapters of the Customs Tariff Schedule (HS) designated as Item 16 of Appended Table 1 of the Export Order (excluding food products, wood, etc). Following the amendment in October 2025, a licence application became necessary if either of the following “objective condition” or “informed condition” is met (for details, see 4.12 Key Developments Regarding Exports).
1. Objective Condition (When the Exporter Confirms the End Use/End User): A licence is required if the exporter confirms the following concerns based on documents, etc, from the importer:
1. WMD Catch-All: regarding exports to all regions (excluding Group A countries (formerly White Countries)), if there is a risk of use for the development, etc, of weapons of mass destruction; and

1. Conventional Arms Catch-All:
• To UN Arms Embargo Countries: for all items (Item 16 goods), if there is a risk of use for the development, etc, of conventional arms;
• To “General Countries” (Countries Other Than Group A/Arms Embargo Countries): limited to “specified items” (Item 16(1) of Appended Table 1 of the Export Order) such as machine tools and semiconductors, if there is a risk of use for the development, etc, of conventional arms;
2. Informed Condition (When Notified by the Minister of METI): If the Minister of METI determines that goods exported from Japan may be used for the aforementioned concerning uses and notifies (informs) the exporter to that effect, a licence application is required.
3. Expansion of Application to Group A Countries: Previously, exports to Group A countries were outside the scope of catch-all control. However, due to the amendment, the informed condition is now applicable even for exports to Group A countries if there is a risk of circumvention export to countries of concern;
• Persons Subject to Export Licence Requirements: Exporters intending to export controlled goods must obtain a licence regardless of their nationality.

Export Control of Technology

• List Control: Specific technologies (including programs/software) subject to list control are detailed in Items 1 through 15 of the Appended Table of the Foreign Exchange Order, corresponding to technologies regulated under international regimes to which Japan is a party.
• Catch-All Control: Technologies subject to catch-all control are those outside the scope of list control and related to the design, manufacture, or use of items (goods) designated as Item 16 of the Appended Table of the Foreign Exchange Order. Similar to the export of goods, a licence application is required if the transaction falls under the following requirements:
1. Objective Condition (When the Provider Confirms the End Use/End User): when the provider (transferor) confirms the following concerns based on information from the recipient or user of the technology:
1. WMD Catch-All: regarding transfers to all regions (excluding Group A countries), if there is a risk of use for the development, etc, of weapons of mass destruction; and
2. Conventional Arms Catch-all:
• To UN Arms Embargo Countries: regarding technology related to all items, if there is a risk of use for the development, etc, of conventional arms; and
• To General Countries: limited to technology related to “specified items”, if there is a risk of use for the development, etc, of conventional arms;
2. Informed Condition: When the Minister of METI determines that the technology to be provided (transferred) may be used for concerning uses, etc, and notifies the provider (transferor) (even for Group A countries, this applies if there is a circumvention concern).
• Persons Subject to Licence Requirements: The following persons intending to provide (transfer) controlled technology must obtain a licence:
1. residents or non-residents intending to conduct a transaction designed to provide (transfer) controlled technology from Japan to a foreign country;
2. residents intending to conduct a transaction designed to provide (transfer) controlled technology to non-residents; and
3. residents or non-residents intending to export recording media containing controlled technology to a foreign country or transmit information containing controlled technology via electronic means for the purpose of having it received in a foreign country.

METI creates and updates as needed a list of foreign end users who may be involved in the development, manufacture, use, or storage of weapons of mass destruction or conventional arms (“End User List”).

Exporters/technology transferors must confirm whether the end user falls under this End User List when determining whether exports or technology provisions to destinations other than Group A countries are subject to catch-all control. If the end user is listed on the End User List, the exporter/provider must obtain a licence from the Minister of METI, unless it is obvious that the goods or technology will not be used for the development, manufacture, use, or storage of weapons (the “Obvious Guidelines” are also published). For details, please refer to 4.12 Key Developments Regarding Exports.

Please refer to 4.4 Persons Subject to Export Controls. As mentioned in 4.1 Export Controls, the Export Order and the Foreign Exchange Order prescribe export controls and include lists of sensitive exports/technology transfers (list control). These lists are created and updated in accordance with international export control regimes (Nuclear Suppliers Group, Missile Technology Control Regime, Australia Group, and Wassenaar Arrangement), etc; therefore, controlled items are basically identical to those designated by these regimes.

Please refer to 4.4 Persons Subject to Export Controls. In addition to list controls, there are also catch-all controls.

Administrative sanctions and criminal penalties apply to persons who export controlled goods or provide (transfer) controlled technology without obtaining a licence.

Administrative Penalties

Natural persons or juridical persons who violate the export control-related provisions of FEFTA may face administrative sanctions imposed by the Minister of METI prohibiting all (or part) of their exports or technology provisions for up to three years.

Criminal Penalties

Natural persons who violate the export control-related provisions of FEFTA may face criminal penalties, including imprisonment for not more than seven years (not more than ten years for goods/technology related to WMD), and/or a fine of not more than 20 million yen (not more than JPY30 million for goods/technology related to WMD) or five times the value of the exported/provided goods/technology, whichever is higher.

If a natural person (ie, a representative or employee) commits a violation in relation to the business of a juridical person, the juridical person may also be subject to a fine of not more than JPY700 million (not more than JPY1 billion for goods/technology related to WMD) or five times the value of the exported goods or provided technology, whichever is higher.

If goods and technology are subject to export controls, either an individual licence for each transaction or a bulk licence (general licence) is required. Regarding bulk licences, the available types differ depending on the item, export destination, etc.

Parties who repeatedly export goods or provide (transfer) technology controlled under FEFTA are obliged to comply with standards establishing conditions related to internal compliance systems (Exporters’ Compliance Standards). Furthermore, as one of the conditions for obtaining specific bulk licences, parties are required to establish an internal compliance programme (CP) adopting specific processes designated by METI and to file it with METI.

Examples where parties are requested or obliged to report to authorities include the following:

• Reporting Related to Catch-all Control: If a party intending to export goods or provide (transfer) technology becomes aware, based on information from persons other than the importer/recipient, that the subject goods or technology may be used for the development, manufacture, use, or storage of weapons, they are required to report that fact to METI. Upon receiving such a report, the Minister of METI may send a notification (inform) to said party obliging them to apply for a licence.
• Prior Reporting Based on the Public-Private Dialogue Scheme for Enhanced Technology Management: Based on this scheme, which commenced application on 30 December 2024, “Important Management Target Technologies” (specific semiconductor technologies, carbon fibre, etc) – which are outside list control but require enhanced management – are designated. When providing such technologies to foreign countries or non-residents in conjunction with business activities such as investment in foreign corporations or outsourcing, prior reporting to the Minister of METI is obligatory. (For details, please refer to 4.12 Key Developments Regarding Exports).
• Performance Reporting Related to Bulk Licences: If a bulk licence is granted, the exporter of goods or provider of technology is required to make periodic reports (performance reports) according to the type of goods exported, etc.
• General Reporting Requirement Authority: Although a general reporting obligation does not apply to all transactions, the Minister of METI has broad authority to request reports as necessary from parties involved in exports or technology provisions (such as persons intending to conduct or having conducted transactions that may be relevant).

Review of Catch-all Control

Following the amendment enforced on 9 October 2025, a review of catch-all control was conducted for the first time in 12 years since 2013.

Expansion of conventional arms catch-all

Under this amendment proposal, the scope of the conventional arms catch-all was expanded. As an “objective condition”, a new “end user requirement” was established in addition to the existing end use requirement. Furthermore, the end use and end user requirements, which previously applied only to exports to UN arms embargo countries, now apply to exports to “general countries” (countries other than UN arms embargo countries and Group A countries).

• Items Subject to Regulation for General Countries (Specified Items): In relation to UN arms embargo countries, regulations apply to all items listed in Item 16 of Appended Table 1 of the Export Order. In contrast, for general countries, these regulations apply only to “specified items” prescribed in Item 16(1) of the same table. Specifically, machine tools, integrated circuits, spacecraft, etc, are designated on an HS code basis.
• End User Requirement and “Obvious Guidelines”: Under the newly established end user requirement, a licence from the Minister of METI is required for export, etc, if the end user of the goods or technology is found to be conducting or to have conducted development, etc, of conventional arms. However, a licence is not required when it is “obvious” that the said goods/technology will be used for purposes other than the development, etc, of conventional arms. In making this determination, the existing “Obvious Guidelines” (guidelines for determining cases where it is obvious that items will not be used for military purposes) were amended taking into account the “red flags” of the US EAR, etc. Furthermore, a conventional arms version of the End User List was added by the amendment promulgated on 29 September 2025.

Strengthening measures against circumvention exports for exports to Group A countries

Previously, exports, etc, of non-list controlled items (Item 16 goods) destined for Group A countries were uniformly outside the scope of catch-all control. With this amendment proposal, the "Informed" system (notification by the Minister) has become applicable to exports, etc., to Group A countries. Specifically, it was decided that the Minister of METI can oblige exporters to apply for a licence by notifying them, even for exports to Group A countries, if there is a risk of circumvention export to countries of concern.

Creation of the Public-Private Dialogue Scheme for Enhanced Technology Management

This scheme, which commenced application on 30 December 2024, is a system that designates technologies that are outside list control but require particularly enhanced management as “important management target technologies” and requires prior reporting based on FEFTA upon their transfer.

• “Important management target technologies” are designated from among catch-all-control-subject technologies that other countries are interested in acquiring and for which Japan possesses indispensability or superiority; 15 items such as Multilayer Ceramic Capacitors (MLCC), carbon fibre, and semiconductor-related technologies are designated.
• Regarding the transfer of important management target technologies, it is basically envisaged that problem-solving will be undertaken through public-private dialogue initiated by prior reports from companies. However, if concerns regarding technology leakage are not dispelled even through public-private dialogue, the Minister can regulate the transaction by issuing an “informed” notification under the framework of catch-all control.

Rationalisation of Export Regulations

Following the amendment enforced on 15 November 2025, the following temporary removal (export) by government agencies was made licence-free:

• temporary removal by the Cabinet Office or the Ministry of Foreign Affairs for the purpose of disposing of abandoned chemical weapons based on the Chemical Weapons Convention (chemical agent detectors, etc);
• temporary removal by the National Police Agency or the Japan Coast Guard for the purpose of protection (bulletproof vests, etc); and
• temporary removal by the Ministry of Defence to the import source (including persons entrusted by it) for the purpose of repairing accessories or parts of Self-Defence Forces equipment (machine parts, etc).

Amendment of Export Control Items regarding Critical and Emerging Technologies

With the amendment to be enforced on 14 February 2026, the following three items were added as goods subject to export control:

• equipment for performing peptide synthesis;
• powders of high entropy alloys or powders of refractory metals or their alloys; and
• modules, etc, capable of modifying module programs.

Rationalisation of Export Regulations

Also with the amendment to be enforced on 14 February 2026, the export of accessories or parts for the maintenance and repair of defence equipment exported to countries with which a Defence Equipment and Technology Transfer Agreement has been concluded was made subject to the bulk licence system, limited to such accessories or parts.

According to METI, ensuring the maintenance and repair of equipment after transfer is important in addition to the transfer of the equipment itself. Under the old system, when transferring accessories or parts of equipment, it was necessary to apply for an export licence for the parts and quantity to be transferred each time, which could make the rapid transfer of parts difficult. This measure can be said to be part of the promotion of the defence industry by the Japanese government.

Addition of Target Technologies in the Technology Management Scheme via Public-Private Dialogue

While 15 technologies are currently designated as subject to prior reporting under the scheme, the following four technologies will be newly added by the amendment to be enforced on 14 January 2026:

• quantum dots;
• TADF (thermally activated delayed fluorescence) materials;
• retardation film; and
• soft endoscopes.

The main statutory framework for Japan’s trade-remedy measures – anti-dumping duties (AD), countervailing duties (CVD) and safeguard (SG) actions – is set out in the following instruments:

• Anti-Dumping (AD): The legal authority for initiating AD investigations and imposing AD duties is established in Article 8 of the Customs Tariff Act, together with the detailed procedural rules contained in the Cabinet Order on Anti-Dumping Duty. These provisions incorporate Japan’s obligations under the WTO Anti-Dumping Agreement.
• Countervailing Duties (CVD): The rules governing CVD investigations and the imposition of countervailing duties are found in Article 7 of the Customs Tariff Act and further elaborated in the Cabinet Order on Countervailing Duty, which implements the disciplines of the WTO Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures.
• Safeguards (SG): The authority to conduct safeguard investigations and adopt safeguard measures is provided in Article 9 of the Customs Tariff Act, complemented by the Cabinet Order on Emergency Duty, etc. These provisions cover safeguard actions taken pursuant to the WTO Agreement on Safeguards. In addition, Japan may also apply bilateral or FTA/EPA-based safeguard measures under the relevant free trade agreements, which operate alongside the WTO-based regime.

Various government agencies would be involved in the decision-making process – in particular, the Ministers of Finance, METI, MAFF, and any other minister responsible for the specific goods or industry that is subject to the trade remedies.

• Anti-dumping (AD): The legal authority for imposing anti-dumping duties is established in Article 8 of the Customs Tariff Act. Article 8 authorises the imposition of anti-dumping duties on goods exported at dumped prices and causing injury.
• Countervailing Duties (CVD): Article 7 of the Customs Tariff Act provides the authority to impose countervailing duties on subsidised imports causing injury.
• Safeguards (SG): Article 9 of the Customs Tariff Act authorises temporary increases in tariffs in response to import surges causing serious injury.

The initiation of investigations into each trade remedy measure is typically carried out by companies or industry associations handling the relevant goods. However, MOF and METI are also authorised to initiate investigations on their own initiative. Furthermore, under the recently enacted Economic Security Promotion Act (ESPA), it is provided that any relevant responsible government agency may also take the initiative to launch an ex officio investigation regarding, inter alia, specified critical minerals.

In Japan, the review process is launched at the initiative of interested parties; in that sense, there are no regular reviews. For instance, with respect to AD, there are three types of reviews, namely, new shippers review, change of circumstances review and sunset review.

For more details on the review proceedings conducted once trade remedies are imposed, please see 5.9 Frequency of Reviews.

In Japan, non-domestic companies are allowed to participate in the investigation as interested parties. For review proceedings that will be conducted once trade remedies are imposed, please see 5.10 Review Process.

Procedure for Imposing Anti-Dumping (AD) Duties

The standard sequence and approximate timeline for an AD investigation are outlined below.

• Petition Review: After the domestic industry files a petition, the investigating authority examines whether the application contains sufficient evidence to justify opening an investigation. This screening process is normally completed within about two months.
• Questionnaire Stage: Once an investigation is officially opened, questionnaires are distributed to all interested parties. Follow-up questionnaires may be issued if additional information is necessary. As a general rule, questionnaire responses must be submitted within roughly three months of the initiation date.
• Simultaneous Examination (When Requested): If an interested party asks for it, the authority conducts a simultaneous examination session, during which parties may pose questions to each other in a structured meeting. This usually occurs around the fifth month after initiation.
• On-Site Verification: The authority then verifies the accuracy of the information submitted, typically through on-site inspections at the facilities of interested parties. Verification is commonly carried out around six months after initiation.
• Preliminary Determination: A preliminary determination is normally issued about eight months from initiation. Where the evidence warrants, provisional measures may be imposed on the basis of this preliminary finding.
• Disclosure of Essential Facts: The authority provides interested parties with a disclosure of the essential facts that form the basis for the impending final determination. This disclosure is generally made around the tenth month, and parties are permitted to submit written comments.
• Final Determination: In most cases, the authority publishes its final determination within one year of initiating the investigation. However, the deadline may be extended by up to six additional months if necessary.

Procedure for Imposing Countervailing Duties (CVD)

The procedural steps and overall timetable for a CVD investigation generally mirror those used in an AD case, including petition review, questionnaires, verification, preliminary determination, disclosure, and issuance of the final determination.

Procedure for Imposing Safeguard (SG) Measures

The usual steps and indicative timeline for an SG investigation are as follows.

• Questionnaires and Public Hearing: After an SG investigation is initiated, the investigating authority circulates questionnaires to interested parties. Once responses are received and analysed, the authority holds a public hearing to obtain views from stakeholders.
• Preliminary Determination: Where appropriate, the authority may issue a preliminary determination, on the basis of which provisional safeguard measures can be imposed.
• Final Determination: A final determination is normally announced within one year of the initiation date, although the period may be extended when justified.

During a trade-remedy investigation, the investigating authority issues several types of reports.

• Preliminary Findings: These set out the authority’s provisional determination together with the underlying facts supporting the imposition of provisional measures. The preliminary findings are made public through an official notice in the Official Gazette.
• Final Findings: These describe the authority’s conclusive determination and the factual grounds on which any definitive measures are based. Like preliminary findings, they are formally announced by way of an official notice in the Official Gazette.

In addition, during anti-dumping (AD) and countervailing duty (CVD) investigations, the authority must also furnish interested parties with a written disclosure of essential facts – a document summarising the key facts that will serve as the basis for the final determination (see 5.6 Investigation and Imposition of Duties and Safeguards).

This matter is not relevant in this jurisdiction.

The frequency of each review, except for the sunset review, is not specifically defined.

Review of AD

There are several review processes for AD measures, as detailed below.

New shippers review

A new shipper may request initiation of an investigation to calculate their individual dumping margin. The investigation should be completed promptly and within one year but can be extended for up to six months.

Change of circumstances review

Interested parties may request initiation of an investigation to review the AD measure once the measure has been in force for at least one year. The review will examine whether there are any changes in circumstances relating to dumping, injury of domestic industry, and their causation. The investigation should be completed within one year but can be extended.

Sunset review

Domestic industry members may request initiation of a sunset review up to one year before the expiry of the AD measure. The review will examine whether the AD measure should be extended. The investigation should be completed within one year but can be extended.

Review of CVD

There are several review processes for CVD measures, as detailed below.

Review to reflect actual subsidy amount

Exporters not subject to the initial investigation may request initiation of an investigation to calculate their individual duty rate on the ground that the CVD rate differs from the actual amount of subsidies for the subject goods. The investigation should be completed promptly and within one year but can be extended for up to six months.

Change of circumstances review

Interested parties may request initiation of an investigation to review the CVD measure once the measure has been in force for one year. The review will examine whether there are any changes in circumstances relating to subsidies, injury of domestic industry, and their causation. The investigation should be completed within one year but can be extended.

Sunset review

Domestic industry members may request initiation of a sunset review up to one year before the end of the CVD measure. The review will examine whether the CVD measure should be extended. The investigation should be completed within one year but can be extended.

Review of SG

Domestic industry members may request initiation of a review, which will examine whether the SG measure should be extended. The investigation should be completed within one year but can be extended.

Preliminary and final determinations for imposing trade remedies are capable of being appealed to the district court.

This matter is not relevant in this jurisdiction.

The Japanese government is planning to amend its AD legislation to introduce an anti-circumvention system allowing the extension of existing AD measures to imports that circumvent the existing measures. The Ministry of Finance established an expert working group in September 2025 to propose specific system designs. It aims to implement related institutional reforms in FY2026.

In Japan, FEFTA and its subordinate regulations – the Cabinet Order on Inward Direct Investment, etc, and the Ministerial Order on Inward Direct Investment, etc – are the principal regulations governing foreign investment. In outline, when a “foreign investor” undertakes “inward direct investment” (such as acquiring shares in a Japanese company) or a “specified acquisition” (such as acquiring shares in an unlisted Japanese company from another foreign investor), the investor must generally submit either a prior notification or a post-transaction report, depending on whether the investment targets a “designated business”. For details, see 6.3 Transactions Subject to Investment Security Measures and 6.4 Mandated Filings/Notifications. Where a prior notification is submitted under FEFTA, the Minister of Finance and the minister with jurisdiction over the relevant business conduct the review.

The standard waiting (review) period is 30 days, but it may be shortened where there are no concerns. Although the review period can legally be extended to a maximum of five months, in practice, if the review cannot be completed within the initial 30 days, the competent authority for the business often requests that the notification be voluntarily withdrawn and resubmitted; consequently, there are not many cases where the review period is extended pursuant to the statutory provisions. In addition to FEFTA, certain sector-specific laws and regulations – such as the Civil Aeronautics Act, the Broadcast Act and the Radio Act – also regulate particular foreign investments by restricting foreign shareholding ratios.

When a prior notification is submitted under FEFTA, the Minister of Finance and the minister with jurisdiction over the relevant business (eg, the Minister of Economy, Trade and Industry (the Minister of METI)) conduct the review; in practice, the primary reviewing body is the International Investment Management Office of METI. If, as a result of the review, the relevant authorities determine that the investment may impair national security or similar interests, they may recommend modification or discontinuation of the investment and, ultimately, issue an order to that effect. The Bank of Japan serves as the receiving office for notifications.

In general, where a foreign investor undertakes inward direct investment or a specified acquisition in a company engaged in a designated business, the investor must submit a prior notification and a post-implementation report after the investment.

Where the target is a company not engaged in a designated business, prior notification is not required; however, a post-transaction report is required in cases such as the acquisition of shares in an unlisted company.

Foreign investors include, without limitation, the following:

• individuals who are non-residents;
• corporations or other entities incorporated under foreign laws, or corporations or other entities having their principal office abroad;
• Japanese companies in which a majority of the voting rights are directly or indirectly held by non-resident individuals or foreign corporations; and
• partnerships in which non-resident individuals or foreign corporations hold 50% or more of the capital contributions, or in which non-residents constitute a majority of the general partners.

Inward direct investment includes the following acts:

• acquisition of shares or voting rights in a listed company resulting in ownership of 1% or more of the total issued shares or total voting rights of that company;
• acquisition of shares or equity interests in an unlisted company (if acquired from another foreign investor, such acquisition is treated as a specified acquisition);
• consent to a substantial change to a company’s purpose, and consent to proposals to appoint the foreign investor or its affiliates as directors or similar officers;
• proposals for, or consent to, the transfer or discontinuation of a business falling within a sector requiring prior notification;
• certain foreign currency loans of a specified size to corporations having their principal office in Japan; and
• succession to designated business activities from a resident corporation through business transfer, company split (absorption-type), or merger; for designated businesses, see 6.4 Mandated Filings/Notifications.

In general, where a foreign investor undertakes inward direct investment or a specified acquisition in relation to a designated business, prior notification is required. Designated businesses are specified in applicable public notices as relating to national security, the maintenance of public order, and the protection of public safety, and include the sectors listed below. The Ministry of Finance’s website provides the lists of designated businesses and, separately, the “core” businesses referenced below:

• weapons, aircraft, nuclear power, space, and dual-use (military/civilian) technologies;
• manufacture of pharmaceuticals for infectious diseases, and manufacture of specially controlled medical devices;
• activities relating to critical minerals such as metal mining and smelting;
• construction works to develop and maintain port facilities on designated remote islands, etc;
• importation of fertilisers (eg, potassium chloride);
• permanent magnets and their materials;
• machine tools and industrial robots;
• semiconductor manufacturing equipment;
• storage batteries and their materials;
• marine vessel components (eg, engines);
• metal 3D printers and metal powder manufacturing;
• manufacture of information processing-related equipment, parts and software;
• information services;
• infrastructure-related sectors (electricity, gas, telecommunications, water, railways, oil, heat supply, broadcasting, public transport, etc); and
• security services, agriculture, forestry and fisheries, leather manufacturing, air transport, and maritime transport.

The Ministry of Finance has also published, for reference, a list of Japanese listed companies engaged in the following business categories:

• specified core businesses;
• core designated businesses;
• non-core designated businesses; and
• other than designated businesses.

For descriptions of the specified core, core designated and non-core designated businesses, see 6.5 Exemptions and 6.8 Key Developments Regarding Investment Security.

As a general rule, when a foreign investor acquires shares, equity interests, voting rights, etc, the prior notification exemption regime is available if certain conditions are satisfied.

However, the exemption is strictly limited or excluded for investors considered to require particularly careful review, such as newly established “specified foreign investors” and “quasi-specified foreign investors” (see 6.8 Key Developments Regarding Investment Security), persons sanctioned for FEFTA violations, and foreign governmental bodies and state-owned enterprises that are not accredited by the Ministry of Finance. The key exemption conditions for foreign investors not subject to these restrictions are as follows.

Investments in Listed Companies

For Foreign Financial Institutions: Even for investments related to designated businesses, prior notification is exempt if conditions (i)-(iii) below are satisfied:

• (i) Neither the investor nor its affiliates will assume office as officers.
• (ii) The investor will not propose the transfer or discontinuation of a business falling within a designated sector.
• (iii) The investor will not access non-public technical information relating to the designated sector.

Note: Even where the exemption is used, a post-transaction report is required once the shareholding ratio reaches 10% or more.

For General Investors (Non-Financial Institutions): Requirements differ depending on whether the target is engaged in a “core designated business” or a “non-core designated business.”

• Investment in Core Designated Businesses: For investments in “core sectors”, which are closely connected with national security (eg, weapons, nuclear power and cybersecurity, as further described below), the exemption applies only if the share acquisition ratio is less than 10% and, in addition to (i)–(iii) above, conditions (iv) and (v) below are satisfied:
1. (iv) The investor will not attend board meetings or similar bodies where important decisions concerning core sector activities are made.
2. (v) The investor will not submit written proposals in relation to core sector business activities that require responses or action within a specified period.
• Investment in Non-Core Designated Businesses: The exemption applies if conditions (i)–(iii) are satisfied.

Note: Where a general investor relies on the exemption, post-transaction reporting is required upon first reaching 1% and 3% shareholding thresholds, and for each subsequent transaction after reaching 10% or more.

Investments in Unlisted Companies

• Investment in Non-Core Designated Businesses: Prior notification is exempt if conditions (i)–(iii) are satisfied (post-transaction reporting is, however, required).
• Investment in Core Designated Businesses: The exemption is not available; prior notification is mandatory.

Core sectors

Among the designated businesses, those deemed most likely to affect national security are designated as “core sectors”. These include all businesses relating to the following: weapons, aircraft, nuclear facilities, space, dual-use technologies, manufacture of pharmaceuticals for infectious diseases, manufacture of specially controlled medical devices, activities relating to critical minerals such as metal mining and smelting, construction works to develop and maintain port facilities on designated remote islands, importation of fertilisers (eg, potassium chloride), permanent magnets and their materials, machine tools and industrial robots, semiconductor manufacturing equipment, storage batteries and their materials, marine vessel components (eg, engines), and metal 3D printers and metal powder manufacturing. Certain parts of the following businesses are also included: cybersecurity, electricity, gas, telecommunications, water and railways, and oil.

If, during the prior notification review, the Minister of Finance and the minister with jurisdiction over the relevant business determine that the investment may impair national security or similar interests, they may recommend modification or discontinuation of the investment and, ultimately, issue an order to that effect. To date, however, the authorities have publicly disclosed only one such case, involving an investment in J-POWER. Failure to submit a prior notification, provision of false information in a prior notification, violation of the waiting period, and violation of an order to modify or discontinue the investment are punishable by imprisonment for up to three years, a fine of up to the higher of three times the investment amount or JPY 1 million, or both.

Where a foreign investor fails to submit a notification, or submits a false notification, and the case is considered likely to impair national security or similar interests, the investor may be ordered to divest its shareholdings or to take other remedial measures.

There are no fees for submitting notifications required under FEFTA.

Tightening of the Prior Notification Exemption Regime

The following series of amendments to the rules on inward direct investment came into force on 19 May 2025, focusing on foreign investors required to co-operate with intelligence activities of foreign governments.

Under this reform, two new investor categories – “specified foreign investors” and “quasi-specified foreign investors” – were introduced and clarified, and the availability of the prior notification exemption for investments in listed companies engaged in designated businesses was revised, resulting in a stricter approach towards “core” sectors and newly designated “specified core sector operators”.

Specified foreign investors

A specified foreign investor is a foreign investor (entity or individual) who falls under any of the following:

• a person who bears a direct obligation to co-operate in a foreign government’s intelligence activities under foreign laws or pursuant to an agreement with a foreign government; or
• a person controlled by any of the above investors or by a foreign government itself (eg, holding 50% or more of voting rights, appointing one-third or more of officers).

Specified foreign investors are entirely ineligible to rely on the prior notification exemption for any investment in a designated business; where the target is engaged in a designated business, a prior notification is required in all cases.

Quasi-specified foreign investors

Quasi-specified foreign investors are intended as a “backstop” category capturing investors who do not formally meet the criteria for “specified”, but who are subject to similar risks. Examples include:

• persons whose substantive decision-making is controlled by an organisation obliged to co-operate in intelligence activities;
• persons whose substantive head office is in a country other than the jurisdiction of incorporation, causing them to fall under the intelligence-related laws of that other country; and
• persons who, through a chain of contractual relationships, bear obligations to disclose information in support of a foreign government’s intelligence activities.

Quasi-specified foreign investors cannot rely on the exemption when investing in specified core sector operators (see below). For other core sectors, they may rely on the exemption only if additional conditions such as the following are satisfied:

• They do not access non-public information regarding core business activities (excluding ordinary board-level and financial information).
• They do not second employees to the target company or recruit key personnel from the target company.

A “specified core sector operator” is:

• a company designated as a “specified social infrastructure operator” under the Economic Security Promotion Act (eg, certain electricity, railway and telecommunications operators); and
• a company that also engages in a “core” sector under FEFTA.

Practical impact

Japanese authorities interpret Mainland China’s National Intelligence Law – which calls upon organisations and citizens to support and co-operate with the state’s intelligence activities – as imposing an “obligation to co-operate in providing information” upon all organisations and individuals in Mainland China. As a result, many China-related organisations face a risk of being classified as specified or quasi-specified foreign investors based on thresholds of voting rights, rights to appoint officers, or substantive influence over decision-making. Foreign financial institutions would also be unable to rely on the broad “bulk exemption” if they fall within the new “specified” or “quasi-specified” categories.

Expansion of Change-Reporting Obligations

These amendments also expanded the post-transaction (change report) obligations for foreign investors relying on a prior notification exemption. Investors are now required to submit a change report (within 45 days) in circumstances such as:

• appointment of an officer who is a “foreign government-related person”; or
• a change whereby the investor newly falls within:
1. a government-related organisation; or
2. a specified foreign investor or a quasi-specified foreign investor.       

As at 29 November 2025, no major changes have been announced.

The supplementary provisions to the 2020 FEFTA amendments stipulate that, five years after enforcement, the government will consider introducing new regulations as necessary. However, in responses to public comments, the competent ministries have stated that the recent reforms concerning “specified foreign investors”, etc, were not adopted pursuant to those supplementary provisions.

Accordingly, further reforms are widely expected in the near future. In fact, the government appears to be considering establishing an “Inward Direct Investment Review Committee (Japan’s CFIUS)”, and there is a high possibility that a cross-ministerial body will be created to oversee reviews of inward direct investment.

In addition, while only direct investment is currently regulated, there is strong support for extending regulation to indirect investment, and an indirect investment regime may be introduced.

In recent years, the Japanese government has been implementing programmes encouraging domestic production, strengthening supply chains, and reducing import dependence in critical sectors, especially semiconductors, batteries, and industrial equipment. Japan has not adopted classic import-substitution subsidies but has implemented major economic-security-driven industrial support programmes. Those programmes include:

• Under the Economic Security Promotion Act (ESPA), Japan subsidises domestic production of “specified critical materials” (eg, semiconductors, batteries, machine tools).
• ESPA subsidies since 2023 include large packages for storage batteries, semiconductor materials, unmanned aircraft, and industrial robots/machine tools.
• Japan’s Semiconductor Revitalisation Strategy (2021–2024) provides multibillion-yen subsidies for domestic fabs (TSMC/JASM, Rapidus, Micron, Kioxia/WD).
• Total semiconductor-related budgets reached approximately JPY3.9 trillion during the period of FY2021-23. Furthermore, total semiconductor- and AI-related budgets reached approximately JPY1.5 trillion in FY2024.
• A new production-linked tax incentive scheme is being introduced for strategic sectors (chips, EVs, sustainable aviation fuel, and green steel).
• Japan continues to fund Supply-Chain Resilience/Domestic Investment Promotion Subsidies, supporting reshoring and diversification away from concentrated foreign suppliers.
• Battery-sector subsidies (Toyota, Honda and others) reinforce domestic capacity to reduce reliance on imported cells and materials.
• GX-related programmes (including Japan Climate Transition Bonds) finance domestic manufacturing of batteries and semiconductor supply chain components.

There are no standards or other technical requirements in Japan aimed at reducing imports and/or encouraging domestic production. The Japanese government has adopted technical regulations and standards in various fields to ensure the safety and quality of products, including the following:

• The Electrical Appliances and Materials Safety Act establishes technical regulations for certain electrical appliances, in order to maintain the safety of such products.
• The Telecommunications Business Act establishes technical regulations for telecommunications facilities, in order to ensure that telecommunications services are provided smoothly and without connection defects.
• The Radio Act establishes technical regulations for radio equipment, in order to ensure the fair and efficient utilisation of radio waves.
• The Road Transport Vehicles Act and the relevant regulations designate types of automotive equipment and parts, and establish technical requirements in order to ensure the safety of motor vehicles.
• The Act on Japanese Agricultural Standards establishes technical regulations and standards for foods and agricultural products in order to certify the quality and the uniqueness of the products.
• The Industrial Standardisation Act establishes standards for industrial products, in order to ensure quality and interoperability between the products.

There are no sanitary or phytosanitary requirements in Japan aimed at reducing imports and/or encouraging domestic production. The Japanese government has adopted various sanitary and phytosanitary requirements to ensure food safety and to prevent the incursion of animal and plant illnesses caused by imported products, including the following:

• The Food Sanitation Act establishes technical regulations for foods, food additives and food contact materials in order to avoid harm to human health.
• The Act on Securing Quality, Efficacy and Safety of Products Including Pharmaceuticals and Medical Devices establishes technical regulations to secure the safety, efficacy and quality of medicines and medical devices in order to avoid harm to human health.
• The Act on Domestic Animal Infectious Diseases Control stipulates cargo that is prohibited from importation and cargo that must be quarantined in order to prevent the infiltration and spread of infectious livestock diseases.
• The Plant Protection Act stipulates cargo that is prohibited from importation and cargo that must be quarantined in order to prevent the infiltration and spread of invasive animals and plants injurious to native flora.
• The Food Sanitation Act establishes import notification procedures and inspection procedures for imported foods and related products to ensure the safety of those products.

The Japanese government maintains a system supporting domestic production of agricultural and livestock products (dairy products, sugar, rice/grains, processing raw materials, etc) through subsidies, income stabilisation support, and equipment grants. Support is particularly clear in the dairy farming (milk, cheese, etc), processed sugar (sugar, etc), and grain/grain substitute crop sectors. For example, typical measures implemented by the Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries (MAFF) include the Processed Raw Milk Producer Subsidy Programme for dairy farmers and the Farm Income Stabilisation Programme for rice, wheat, soybeans, and other crops.

There are no state trading, state-owned enterprises or privatisation measures in Japan specifically aimed at reducing imports and/or encouraging domestic production. Nevertheless, the Japanese government has adopted state trading systems for the following products:

• leaf tobacco;
• opium (for medical use);
• rice, wheat and barley; and
• dairy products.

Further details on the state trading systems adopted by the Japanese government can be found in the notification made by the Japanese government to the WTO (G/STR/N/18/JPN)..

Japan is a long-standing party to the WTO Agreement on Government Procurement (GPA) and has also put GPA-style rules into its EPAs (EU, UK, CPTPP, etc). These all rest on national treatment and non-discrimination, and explicitly prohibit offsets such as local content or domestic preference requirements in covered procurement.

Thus, basically there is no such “buy local” policy or measures in Japan.

As an exception to this, defence procurement is largely outside GPA coverage or justified under national security exceptions, so this is where Japan most clearly uses procurement to encourage domestic production and reduce reliance on foreign suppliers. The Ministry of Defence’s Basic Policy on Enhancing Defence Production and Technological Bases states that, when acquiring new defence equipment, “procurement of domestic products is pursued” where certain conditions are met (ability to meet requirements, contribution to sustaining the domestic base, etc).

Japan does not employ geographical indication (GI) protection measures for the purpose of reducing imports or promoting domestic production. The Japanese GI framework is designed to protect the names of agricultural, forestry, fishery products, and foodstuffs whose qualities or reputations are attributable to their geographic origin, rather than to function as a trade-restrictive or industrial-policy instrument.

GIs in Japan are protected under the Act on Protection of the Names of Specific Agricultural, Forestry and Fishery Products and Foodstuffs (the “GI Act”). The GI Act provides a registration system that safeguards producers – both domestic and foreign – against misuse or imitation of registered GI names. Its operation is origin-neutral: foreign GIs are eligible for registration, and the number of protected foreign GIs has expanded significantly, particularly in connection with commitments under the Japan–EU Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA) and other trade arrangements.

Consistent with Japan’s international obligations, the GI system is not intended or applied to limit market access or to favour domestic production. Instead, it serves primarily to ensure consumer protection and to preserve the integrity and reputation of region-specific products. Information about the GI Act and the current list of registered GIs is available on the Japan Geographical Indications website.

There are no other significant issues or developments that have not been mentioned.