Cartels 2026 Comparisons

The primary legal basis for regulating cartel behaviour in China is Article 17 of the Anti-Monopoly Law of the People’s Republic of China (AML), which explicitly prohibits undertakings in a competitive relationship from entering into monopoly agreements to fix prices, restrict output, partition markets or jointly refuse to deal; this constitutes the legal definition of “cartel” conduct under Chinese law. In addition, Article 19 of the AML reaches not only cartel participants, but also undertakings that organise a cartel or provide substantial assistance to it. Article 21 of the AML is also relevant, as it prohibits industry associations from organising cartel conduct.

Furthermore, the Provisions on Prohibiting Monopolistic Agreement, issued by the State Administration for Market Regulation (SAMR), set out detailed provisions regarding the identification of monopoly agreements and exemption procedures.

In terms of the legal basis of cartel-related civil litigation, the 2024 Supreme People’s Court Judicial Interpretation on Monopoly Civil Disputes (“2024 Judicial Interpretation”), effective on 1 July 2024, confirms that a claimant may sue either directly under the AML or after an antitrust enforcement decision has been issued. It also recognises cases where a party challenges a contract, association charter, resolution or decision because it violates the AML.

In China, the principal public antitrust enforcer is SAMR, which is responsible for unified enforcement of the AML and may authorise provincial AMRs to handle cases. In practice, this creates a centralised but delegated system: SAMR typically handles nationally significant, cross-provincial, complex or sensitive matters, while provincial authorities handle many local cases. The Anti-Monopoly Commission mainly plays a policy and co-ordination role.

The main exposure for cartel conduct in China remains administrative and civil rather than criminal. Under the AML, where a monopoly agreement is concluded and implemented, the authority may order cessation, confiscate illegal gains, and impose a fine of between 1% and 10% of the undertaking’s sales revenue in the previous year, or up to CNY5 million if there was no such revenue; if the agreement was concluded but not implemented, the fine may be up to CNY3 million. Individuals directly responsible may also be fined up to CNY1 million, with higher multipliers possible in especially serious cases.

China does not have a standalone criminal cartel offence under the AML. Criminal exposure arises mainly where the conduct falls within other offences, most notably bid rigging under Article 223 of the PRC Criminal Law, which may lead to up to three years’ imprisonment or criminal detention, plus fines. In practice, criminal risk is therefore narrower than administrative antitrust risk and is most relevant in collusive tendering cases.

The most important development in 2025 was the more active practical application of the cartel enforcement regime, especially the first public imposition of personal fines in monopoly agreement cases. This marked a shift from a model focused mainly on corporate liability to one imposing parallel liability on both companies and responsible individuals. Public cartel enforcement in 2025 remained focused on classic horizontal cartel conduct, particularly in livelihood-sensitive sectors such as pharmaceuticals, concrete and water supply.

China recognises a private right of action to challenge cartel conduct and its effects. Under the AML, a person or entity that suffers loss from monopolistic conduct may bring a civil action in the people’s courts, and the 2024 Judicial Interpretation confirms that monopoly civil disputes include both damages claims and disputes challenging a contract, association charter, resolution or decision as violating the AML. A claimant may bring either a standalone action or a follow-on action. No prior administrative decision is required, but an effective administrative decision may significantly assist in later civil litigation, and the Supreme People’s Court (SPC) has stated that facts established in such a decision may be presumed unless rebutted.

To succeed, the claimant must generally show standing, identify the challenged conduct as monopolistic conduct under the AML, and prove loss and causation. In cartel cases, this usually means showing that the defendants participated in the agreement or concerted practice, and that the claimant suffered harm as a result. For invalidity claims, the claimant must show that the relevant instrument violates the AML. In hardcore horizontal cartel cases, the plaintiff’s position is now more favourable: Chinese courts have increasingly treated the classic Article 17 forms of horizontal cartel conduct as inherently anticompetitive once the statutory elements are established.

Available remedies include direct loss, lost profits, and reasonable expenses incurred in investigating and stopping the conduct, including reasonable attorneys’ fees and economic analysis costs. Courts may also declare cartel-related contracts, association rules, resolutions or decisions invalid. The most important recent development is the 2024 Judicial Interpretation, which clarified standing, burden of proof, use of administrative decisions, damages methodology, cost recovery and invalidity claims, and further strengthened the link between public enforcement and private litigation. Looking ahead, the trend is toward continued expansion and normalisation of private antitrust enforcement through the courts, particularly in follow-on cases and classic horizontal cartel disputes.

In China, cartel conduct generally refers to horizontal monopoly agreements among competing undertakings under the AML. A “monopoly agreement” includes any agreement, decision or other concerted practice that excludes or restricts competition, so cartel conduct is not limited to express written or oral agreements. Under Article 17 of the AML, the main forms are price fixing, output or sales restriction, market allocation, restrictions on technology or new products, and collective boycotts, as well as other monopoly agreements identified by the enforcement authority.

Chinese law also recognises concerted practices, and the authorities may infer co-ordination from parallel conduct together with communication, information exchange or other evidence of a meeting of minds.

As to exemptions, China does not recognise broad sectoral carve-outs for cartels, including for state-owned enterprises. The main statutory exception is narrow: co-ordinated conduct by agricultural producers and rural economic organisations in relation to agricultural products falls outside the AML.

The limitation period is three years for antitrust damages claims, calculated from knowledge (actual or constructive) of both the harm and the defendant. Interruption/restarting rules apply if the matter is first reported to the antitrust authority. Cessation-type claims are generally not subject to limitation periods.

In China, the limits on jurisdiction in cartel litigation come from the AML, the Civil Procedure Law of the People’s Republic of China (“the Civil Procedure Law”) and the 2024 Judicial Interpretation. Monopoly civil cases are heard by specialised courts, mainly intellectual property courts and designated intermediate people’s courts, rather than by all courts. Territorial jurisdiction is generally based on ordinary civil procedure rules, especially the defendant’s domicile or the place of the tort. In cartel cases, the place of the tort includes both where the conduct occurred and where the harmful effects were felt.

For foreign cartel participants, Chinese courts do not automatically have jurisdiction just because the conduct is anti-competitive: there still needs to be a sufficient connection with China under the Civil Procedure Law. The 2024 Judicial Interpretation specifically provides that, where a defendant has no domicile in China and the alleged monopolistic conduct took place abroad but produced exclusionary or restrictive effects in the Chinese market, jurisdiction is determined under the foreign-related jurisdiction rules of the Civil Procedure Law.

If the conduct occurs entirely in a foreign country, it can still be reached in China. Article 2 of the AML expressly applies to monopolistic conduct outside China if such conduct has the effect of eliminating or restricting competition in the Chinese market. So China follows an effects-based approach: foreign cartel conduct may be pursued by Chinese enforcement authorities or challenged in Chinese courts, but only if there is a sufficient competitive effect in China and the procedural jurisdiction rules are satisfied.

China does not have a separate, codified antitrust comity doctrine as a formal defence or abstention rule. In public enforcement, the AML follows an effects-based approach and applies to conduct outside China if it excludes or restricts competition in the Chinese market, so comity does not expressly limit enforcement as a matter of statute. In practice, however, comity is reflected through cross-border co-ordination: SAMR has stated that it maintains regular co-operation mechanisms with many foreign competition authorities through memoranda, joint statements, FTA competition chapters and multilateral forums. In judicial litigation, comity operates mainly as a prudential consideration rather than a strict rule.

Chinese courts have referred to international comity when considering jurisdiction and measures affecting parallel foreign proceedings, taking into account factors such as timing, the appropriateness of the Chinese forum, and proportionality. However, comity does not automatically require Chinese courts to decline jurisdiction simply because related foreign proceedings exist.

China’s cartel enforcement remains predominantly a domestic, administrative enforcement regime focused on traditional horizontal collusion in sensitive sectors. Recent public cases show a strong concentration in classic price-fixing, market-sharing and similar competitor co-ordination, particularly in pharmaceuticals and other livelihood-related industries.

Bid rigging is also an important part of the enforcement landscape, especially in procurement-related settings, but it is not the sole or even necessarily dominant visible form of cartel enforcement in the most recent public case mix. The more recent published picture suggests continued emphasis on ordinary horizontal cartel conduct, especially price co-ordination and market division.

Between domestic and international cartels, enforcement is still overwhelmingly domestic in practice. Although the AML has extraterritorial reach where foreign conduct has anti-competitive effects in China, the public cartel docket continues to be dominated by domestic firms and domestic markets.

Leniency is available and can be significant, but the overall enforcement pattern still appears to be driven mainly by ex officio investigations, complaints and sector-focused enforcement rather than by a leniency pipeline following the US or EU model. Cartel enforcement in 2025 nevertheless showed that leniency can materially reduce exposure in cartel cases where a party proactively reports the conduct and provides key evidence.

The following governmental written guides relate to cartel conduct and enforcement:

• Provisions on the Prohibition of Monopolistic Agreements;
• Guidelines of the Anti-Monopoly Commission of the State Council on the Application of the Leniency System to Horizontal Monopoly Agreements;
• Anti-Monopoly Compliance Guidelines for Undertakings;
• Anti-Monopoly Guidelines for Industry Associations;
• Anti-Monopoly Guidelines for the Active Pharmaceutical Ingredients Sector; and
• Anti-Monopoly Guidelines for the Platform Economy Sector.

In China, cartel investigations typically begin with a lead generated by a complaint, a report from another authority, a referral from a higher-level authority, a report by a lower-level authority, or a proactive submission by an undertaking itself, including in a leniency context. The enforcement authority will usually conduct a preliminary inquiry first and then decide whether to open a formal case. That sequence is reflected in the monopoly agreement rules and the AML’s investigation chapter.

Once a case is formally opened, the usual initial steps are fairly traditional. The authority will typically issue a case-filing decision, require the parties to co-operate, conduct interviews or inquiries of the undertaking and relevant individuals, request and collect documents and data, and often carry out on-site inspections. In practice, early-stage evidence gathering may focus on communications with competitors, pricing records, meeting materials, bidding documents, sales data and internal files that may show concerted conduct. Chinese court decisions reviewing antitrust penalties expressly describe the authorities as having carried out on-site inspection, case filing, interviews and evidence collection as part of the investigative process.

The AML also gives the authorities broader compulsory tools if needed, including:

• inspecting business premises and other relevant places;
• questioning undertakings and individuals;
• reviewing and copying relevant documents and electronic materials; and
• where appropriate, seizing or detaining relevant evidence.

In more serious cases, this can amount to the Chinese equivalent of a dawn raid, even if the law does not always use that term.

In practical terms, the typical opening sequence is:

• intake of a lead;
• preliminary verification;
• formal filing; then
• rapid evidence preservation through interviews, document requests and often an on-site inspection.

Unannounced on-site inspections are both legally available and well established in Chinese antitrust enforcement. Under the AML, the authority may enter the undertaking’s premises and other relevant places, question companies and individuals, inspect and copy documents and electronic data, seize or detain relevant evidence, and inspect bank accounts. These are administrative inspections, not court-warrant searches: they require internal approval from the head of the antitrust enforcement authority, not a judicial warrant.

The undertaking and its employees must co-operate. In practice, this means allowing entry, preserving documents and data, providing requested materials, making relevant personnel available, and not deleting, concealing, transferring or destroying evidence.

Officers and employees may be required to help locate records and systems, and to attend interviews. Interviews are a standard part of the process; at least two investigators must be present, must show credentials, and must prepare a written record for signature.

There is no general AML equivalent of a broad privilege against self-incrimination in administrative proceedings. Non-cooperation can trigger separate penalties: under Article 62 of the AML, refusing to provide information, providing false statements, concealing, destroying or transferring evidence, or facilitating another obstruction may lead to an order to rectify and a fine of up to 1% of the company’s previous-year turnover, or up to CNY5 million where turnover is absent or hard to calculate; individuals may be fined up to CNY500,000.

Outside counsel may usually assist in practice, but Chinese antitrust law does not expressly recognise US/EU-style attorney-client privilege, so counsel can help manage the response, communicate with inspectors, and monitor scope and procedure, but cannot clearly insist on the exclusion of “privileged” materials on that basis.

The AML allows the authority to review, copy and seize evidence, but does not give the company a clear statutory right to receive a full copy of everything taken; in practice, companies should at least expect formal records of interviews and seized or detained materials.

Searches must remain within the authority’s statutory powers, be internally approved, be conducted by at least two credentialed officers, and respect confidentiality obligations concerning trade secrets, personal privacy and personal information. Personal devices are not categorically excluded if they contain relevant business evidence, since the AML covers electronic data, although the statute does not set out detailed device search protocols.

As for home office or residential searches, the law is broad enough to cover other relevant places, but there is little public evidence that home raids are a routine or frequent feature of Chinese cartel enforcement, and as far as is known there have been no separate antitrust-specific warrant requirements for homes beyond the AML’s general internal approval requirement.

In China, once a cartel investigation has been initiated and the company or relevant individual is aware of it, there is a clear legal obligation to preserve and produce relevant evidence and not to obstruct the investigation. Under the AML, the investigated undertaking, interested parties and other relevant entities or individuals must co-operate with the enforcement authority, and must not:

• refuse to provide relevant materials;
• provide false materials or information;
• conceal, destroy or transfer evidence; or
• otherwise obstruct the investigation.

In practice, this obligation arises no later than when the party becomes aware of formal investigative steps, such as a case filing, information request, interview notice or on-site inspection. From that point, the undertaking concerned and the relevant employees are expected to preserve potentially relevant documents and data, including hard-copy records and electronic materials. A breach may result in a separate obstruction penalty of up to 1% of the previous year’s turnover for undertakings, or up to CNY5 million where turnover is absent or difficult to calculate, or up to CNY500,000 for individuals.

In China’s public antitrust enforcement regime, officers and employees do not have a clearly codified standalone right to counsel during interviews. The AML permits the authority to question undertakings and relevant individuals, and requires investigators to show credentials and prepare an interview record, but it does not expressly guarantee the interviewee the right to have counsel present.

In practice, however, outside counsel – and sometimes company counsel – often do participate, assisting with communications and preparing employees for interviews, although this is based more on practice than on express statutory entitlement.

Counsel should not expect to control the interview: at most, counsel may observe, help ensure procedural regularity, and confer with the interviewee where permitted, but generally cannot interrupt freely, direct the witness not to answer, nor block questions without a specific legal basis. The interviewee remains under a duty to co-operate.

At the outset of the investigation, defence counsel should:

• verify the investigators’ identity and authority;
• understand the scope of the inquiry;
• implement an immediate document-preservation hold;
• centralise communications with the authority;
• identify key employees and data sources;
• prepare relevant personnel for interviews; and
• consider whether any employee may require separate representation in light of potential conflicts and personal liability in monopoly agreement cases.

In China, SAMR or an authorised provincial AMR gathers documentary and testimonial evidence through the AML’s administrative investigation powers. To prove a cartel offence, it may:

• enter business premises or other relevant places for inspection;
• question the undertaking, interested parties and other relevant entities or individuals;
• review and copy agreements, accounting books, business correspondence, electronic data and other materials;
• seize or detain relevant evidence; and
• inspect bank accounts.

In practice, cartel cases are often built from interview transcripts, internal communications, pricing or bidding records, meeting materials, electronic data and admissions made during questioning.

China does not generally recognise a broad standalone privilege that allows a company to withhold lawyer-client communications from an antitrust authority in a cartel investigation. Instead, the system relies more on lawyers’ duties of confidentiality and professional secrecy than on full evidentiary privilege.

This protection is not mainly defined by whether counsel is admitted in China, but in practice communications with external PRC counsel are in a better position than communications with foreign lawyers. Communications with in-house counsel are generally not treated as privileged in any robust sense for Chinese antitrust enforcement purposes.

China also does not recognise a broad privilege against self-incrimination in antitrust administrative investigations. In cartel matters, companies and relevant individuals are generally expected to co-operate, answer questions and provide materials, subject to the authority’s statutory powers and procedural rules.

In China, initial information requests are not often “challenged” in the formal sense, because the AML imposes a clear duty to co-operate with the investigation. What is more common in practice is partial or informal non-cooperation, such as:

• delayed production;
• incomplete responses;
• failure to preserve documents;
• the provision of inaccurate or misleading information; or
• the concealment, destruction or transfer of evidence.

The AML expressly prohibits the refusal or obstruction of an antitrust investigation, and this applies not only to the investigated company but also to interested parties and other relevant entities or individuals.

The consequences can be significant. An order to rectify and a fine of up to 1% of the undertaking’s previous-year turnover can be imposed under Article 62 of the AML, or up to CNY5 million where turnover is absent or difficult to calculate, for:

• refusing to provide relevant materials or information;
• providing false materials or information;
• concealing, destroying or transferring evidence; or
• facilitating other obstructive conduct.

Individuals may be fined up to CNY500,000. Recent practice commentary also indicates that Chinese authorities have treated delay, falsification and evidence destruction as sanctionable obstructions.        

In China, parties in antitrust enforcement proceedings may ask the authority to treat commercially sensitive material as confidential, but the system is based mainly on the authority’s statutory duty of non-disclosure rather than on a detailed formal designation mechanism. The AML requires enforcement authorities and their staff to keep confidential any trade secrets, personal privacy and personal information obtained in the course of enforcement.

That protection is not limited to the investigation target: it also extends in principle to confidential information provided by third parties and witnesses. The protection, however, does not prevent the authority from reviewing or using the material for the investigation itself; it mainly protects against improper disclosure outside the enforcement process.

In China, defence counsel usually raises legal and factual arguments at three points in an antitrust cartel investigation.

• During the investigation itself, counsel may engage with SAMR or the provincial AMR through written submissions, meetings, factual explanations and responses to information requests in an effort to persuade the authority that the facts do not establish a monopoly agreement, that the evidence is incomplete, or that the legal characterisation is too broad.
• Before a penalty decision is issued, the authority must serve a prior notice of the proposed administrative penalty, and the target then has the right to make statements and defences and to request a hearing.
• After a final penalty decision, the target may seek administrative reconsideration or bring administrative litigation, although that is no longer advocacy to dissuade the agency from acting, but rather a challenge to the action already taken.

One of the important formal opportunities to modify a prospective action is the prior-notice stage. Under China’s Administrative Punishments Law, before an administrative penalty decision is made, the authority must notify the party of the proposed penalty, the facts, reasons and legal basis, and the party’s right to make statements and defences, and to request a hearing. China antitrust practice materials confirm that, in monopoly agreement cases, the prior notice typically sets out the facts found, the infringement theory and the proposed fine, after which the undertaking may submit arguments or apply for a hearing, usually within three working days of receipt.

In practice, counsel uses this stage to challenge both law and fact: for example, by disputing the existence of an agreement or concerted practice, contesting market or competitive analysis, arguing that the conduct was not implemented, challenging the turnover base or fine calculation, presenting mitigating factors such as co-operation or a limited role, or seeking leniency where available. Chinese commentary also notes a growing use of softer front-end enforcement tools, such as reminder letters and regulatory interviews, which can give counsel an earlier chance to address concerns before the matter escalates into a formal penalty track.

China has a leniency regime for cartel conduct under Article 56 of the AML, mainly for monopoly agreement cases and most clearly for horizontal cartels. An undertaking may receive immunity or a reduced penalty if it voluntarily reports the cartel, provides important evidence, and continues to co-operate. The regime is discretionary, not automatic, and the authority takes account of the order of application, the value of the evidence, the degree of co-operation, and the applicant’s role.

Under the current rules, the first applicant may receive immunity or at least an 80% reduction; the second 30% to 50%; and the third 20% to 30%, with later applicants potentially receiving smaller reductions. Undertakings that led, coerced or obstructed are in a weaker position. China also has a marker process, allowing an applicant to reserve its place by making a preliminary submission and then perfecting it within the required time. Leniency is clearly used in practice, but there is no comprehensive official public data showing how often it is sought or granted overall.

China does not have a separate “amnesty” regime in name, but it does have a leniency regime under which a cartel participant may obtain full exemption from, or a reduction of, the administrative penalty in a monopoly agreement case. The legal basis is Article 56 of the AML, together with the Guidelines on the Application of the Leniency System to Horizontal Monopoly Agreements and the Provisions on the Prohibition of Monopoly Agreements.

To receive immunity, the undertaking must voluntarily report the cartel, provide important evidence, and continue to co-operate with the investigation. The regime is discretionary, not automatic. Under the current rules, the first applicant may receive full immunity or at least an 80% reduction; the second may receive a 30% to 50% reduction; and the third may receive a 20% to 30% reduction. The regime applies to monopoly agreement cases, especially horizontal cartels, and does not extend generally to other antitrust violations.

China also has a marker system, under which an undertaking may secure its order of application by making an initial submission and then supplementing it within the required period.

In terms of enforcement practice, the authorities do grant leniency in published cases, including substantial reductions. However, there is no comprehensive official public data showing how often immunity is sought or how often full immunity is granted. The available public record therefore supports only a limited conclusion: immunity is legally available and is used in practice, but grant rates are not transparent.

China does not appear to have a unified, standalone cartel whistle-blower regime with a clear nationwide reward framework. The principal formal incentive mechanism in cartel enforcement remains leniency for cartel participants. Available materials suggest that reporting and reward mechanisms have been used in some contexts, particularly in bid-rigging enforcement, but there is no clear SAMR-wide rule establishing generally applicable reward criteria and reward amounts for cartel whistle-blowers across all cartel cases.

In terms of scope, the publicly visible practice appears to be more developed in bid-rigging matters, but there is no reliable basis to say that any reporting mechanism is limited only to public procurement bid rigging. The more accurate view is that the position is not fully standardised at the national level.

China does encourage companies to strengthen antitrust compliance systems, and internal reporting channels may form part of that as a compliance practice. However, there is no antitrust-specific rule requiring companies to maintain a dedicated cartel hotline.

There is also no clearly visible market practice in China of lawyers publicly advertising themselves specifically as counsel for cartel whistle-blowers. On the current public record, cartel enforcement remains centred on agency investigations, complaints and leniency applications by cartel participants.

SAMR has the statutory power to seek information or testimony directly from any “relevant individual”, which includes both current and former employees. During “dawn raids”, investigators may conduct on-site interviews without prior notice and may separate employees to prevent co-ordination. For off-site or former employees, a formal notice of Inquiry may be issued.

There is generally no recognised right to silence in administrative investigations; refusal to co-operate or providing false information may result in administrative penalties, including fines. While counsel may attend, their role is limited to procedural observation.

SAMR has extensive powers to seek documentary evidence directly from target companies. Under Article 47, officials can enter premises to inspect, duplicate or seize accounting books, contracts and electronic data (including WeChat and cloud storage). During “dawn raids”, no prior notice is required; companies must provide immediate access to servers and archives. For non-raid scenarios, SAMR issues a formal Notice of Production, setting a strict deadline for submission.

The primary limitation is Article 49, which requires authorities to protect commercial secrets. However, there is no “legal privilege” for internal documents in China, making almost all corporate records discoverable.

Under Article 2 of the AML, the law applies to conduct outside China that eliminates or restricts competition within the domestic market. SAMR seeks evidence from foreign entities through international co-operation agreements (eg, with the EU or US) or by serving notices to the foreign firm’s PRC subsidiaries. If a company is located within China, it is legally mandated under Article 47 to produce all evidence “available” to it, regardless of the physical server’s location.

The dynamics of cloud storage simplify this reach: if a PRC-based employee can access data via a laptop or mobile device, SAMR deems that data to be “within their control” and subject to immediate seizure. Failure to produce overseas data accessible from China is penalised as “obstruction” under Article 62. Furthermore, under the Data Security Law, critical data generated in China is subject to strict export controls, adding a complex layer of “data sovereignty” to cross-border investigations.

Co-operation between Chinese agencies is highly institutionalised. Following the 2022 amendments, Article 4 of the AML mandates a co-ordinated enforcement mechanism. During “dawn raids”, SAMR may collaborate with the Public Security Bureau (PSB) to maintain order and with the Cyberspace Administration of China (CAC) for digital forensics and data compliance. Information sharing is primarily facilitated through the “National Enterprise Credit Information Publicity System”, where antitrust violations may link with tax, customs and financial data to trigger joint supervision or credit-based constraints.

Limitations focus on confidentiality. Under Article 49, agencies and their staff must protect trade secrets and personal information during evidence exchange. While the People’s Procuratorate may obtain evidence for civil public interest litigation, such access is subject to strict internal protocols to prevent improper disclosure. Furthermore, if a cartel investigation uncovers criminal leads such as bribery or bid rigging, authorities may transfer the case to judicial bodies; there is no “inter-agency privilege” to obstruct such transfers.

SAMR co-operates with foreign agencies (such as the EU Commission and US DOJ/FTC) through MoUs and multilateral mechanisms. Co-operation typically involves exchanging enforcement experience, policy dialogue and appropriate case-specific co-ordination. In practice, cases with cross-border elements may involve international co-ordination, such as aligning the timing of enforcement to minimise impacts on investigative effectiveness. Under Article 10 of the AML, such co-operation is encouraged but generally limited to non-confidential information and competitive analysis methods (eg, theory of harm).

This co-operation enhances enforcement efficiency and indirectly influences domestic cases. However, under Article 49 of the AML, authorities must protect trade secrets and personal information, prohibiting the disclosure of sensitive data. In practice, international co-ordination primarily manifests as procedural interaction. For instance, if a global cartel is investigated or penalised elsewhere, it may increase SAMR’s scrutiny of the conduct. Within legal procedures, SAMR may reference public information or data obtained through legal channels to support its enforcement analysis and evidence collection.

Under the current legal framework, the AML is an administrative law; there is no specific criminal offence for the act of reaching a monopoly agreement itself. However, under specific circumstances, such conduct may violate other provisions of the PRC Criminal Law, such as bid rigging (Article 223) or obstructing official business (Article 277). If SAMR discovers leads of suspected crimes during enforcement, it must transfer the case to the PSB. Subsequently, the People’s Procuratorate reviews and initiates prosecution, and the People’s Court conducts the trial.

Criminal cases are heard by a collegial panel of the People’s Court. The trial centres on courtroom investigation and debate, with the prosecution bearing the burden of proof to meet the statutory standard of “facts are clear, and evidence is reliable and sufficient”. The People’s Court acts as the ultimate finder of fact and law. Defendants enjoy the right to a defence and the right to review or duplicate case files during the review and prosecution stage. Procedurally, a pre-trial conference may be held to handle matters such as the exclusion of illegal evidence to enhance trial efficiency.

In China, civil antitrust complaints can be filed by private entities (individuals or companies) or as public interest litigation by the People’s Procuratorate. The process begins with filing a Statement of Claim at a competent Intermediate People’s Court or a specialised Intellectual Property Court. Under the AML, plaintiffs must generally prove the existence of a monopoly agreement and resulting damages. The burden of proof rests with the plaintiff under the “preponderance of evidence” standard, although judicial interpretations may shift this burden to the defendant under specific circumstances.

Cases are heard by a collegial panel. Evidence is submitted by parties, cross-examined in court, and adjudicated by the People’s Court. While China lacks the broad “discovery” system found in common law jurisdictions, parties may apply for Court-led Investigation or Evidence Preservation to obtain materials held by third parties or relevant agencies. In practice, an effective administrative penalty decision by SAMR can serve as significant evidence in subsequent “follow-on” civil litigation, effectively reducing the plaintiff’s evidentiary burden.

In China’s cartel enforcement and litigation, experts bridge complex economic data with legal analysis frameworks. Economists are the most common experts, responsible for defining relevant markets, analysing competitive effects and providing economic opinions on the exemptions under Article 20 of the AML. Beyond economists, Industry Experts provide technical background for specialised sectors (eg, semiconductors), while Data Forensics Experts assist in extracting and analysing electronic evidence.

During administrative enforcement, expert opinions serve as technical references through reports or analyses. In judicial proceedings, experts may participate as “Expert Assistants” to help the People’s Court understand specialised issues. While expert opinions are significant reference factors for case determination, they do not possess naturally decisive legal authority.        

Multiple or simultaneous enforcement proceedings involving the same facts are possible and are reflected in several scenarios.

• First, administrative and civil parallelism allows private parties (competitors or consumers) to file lawsuits while SAMR investigates. Judicial interpretations permit courts to use effective administrative penalty decisions as significant evidence, easing the plaintiff’s burden.
• Second, multi-defendant cases are typical as cartels involve multiple undertakings; SAMR generally issues separate penalties for each participant. Under the 2022 amendments to the AML, fines can also be imposed on legal representatives and key personnel.
• Third, administrative and criminal co-ordination occurs if conduct involves crimes like bid rigging or obstructing enforcement. In such cases, SAMR must transfer the leads to the PSB for criminal proceedings.

In China, the antitrust enforcement authority may impose sanctions and fines directly by administrative decision; it does not need to commence a separate tribunal proceeding to establish cartel liability. Its powers, however, are limited to the sanctions authorised by the AML: for monopoly agreements, it may order cessation, confiscate illegal gains, and impose fines of between 1% and 10% of the undertaking’s sales revenue in the previous year where the agreement was concluded and implemented, or up to CNY5 million where there was no previous-year sales revenue, and up to CNY3 million where the agreement was concluded but not implemented; directly responsible individuals may also be fined up to CNY1 million. The authority must determine the penalty by reference to factors such as the nature, degree, duration and consequences of the violation.

If the target disagrees, it may seek administrative reconsideration or bring administrative litigation before the courts. If the matter reaches court, it is generally because the target is challenging the agency’s decision, not because prior judicial approval was required. Private civil damages actions are brought separately before the courts under the AML.

There is no reliable official public data showing how often cartel investigations are closed without penalty, terminated without action, or not pursued after an initial inquiry; such outcomes may occur in practice, but their frequency is not publicly quantifiable on the current official record.

China does not have a US-style plea bargaining regime in cartel enforcement. Under the AML, the closest mechanism is the commitment-based suspension of an investigation: where the undertaking under investigation proposes specific measures, within a period accepted by the authority, to eliminate the consequences of the suspected conduct, the authority may suspend the investigation and later terminate it if the commitments are fully performed; if the undertaking fails to perform, if the factual basis materially changes, or if the suspension was obtained on incomplete or inaccurate information, the authority may resume the investigation.

That mechanism is generally not available in the same way for hardcore cartels: in practice, investigations into horizontal monopoly agreements involving price fixing, output restriction or market allocation are usually not eligible for suspension by commitments, so cartel defendants normally look instead to the leniency regime under AML Article 56.

Where commitments are available, they are typically raised during the investigation stage, before a final penalty decision is issued. The undertaking applies in writing, identifies the suspected conduct and its effects, and proposes concrete remedial measures; the authority then decides whether to suspend the investigation and supervises performance. The principal benefit is that the undertaking may avoid a formal infringement finding and administrative penalty. If the matter is not resolved in this way, the case continues through the ordinary AML enforcement process and may result in a formal penalty decision, including fines and the confiscation of illegal gains.

In China, an administrative finding of cartel liability can have collateral effects. Most importantly, under the 2024 Judicial Interpretation, an effective administrative decision finding monopolistic conduct can significantly assist follow-on civil litigation: once the decision has not been challenged within the statutory period or has been confirmed by an effective court judgment, the plaintiff in a related antitrust civil case may rely on the basic facts found in that decision without re-proving them, unless there is sufficient contrary evidence.

In procurement-related collusion cases, additional consequences may arise outside the AML itself. For example, under the Government Procurement Law Implementation Regulation, “malicious collusion” may trigger administrative liability, and published government procurement materials show that suppliers found to have engaged in bid rigging may be entered on a bad-record list and barred from participating in government procurement for one to three years.

Similar collateral restrictions may also arise under broader public resource trading credit and joint sanctions mechanisms for seriously dishonest entities. These effects generally cannot be avoided through “plea bargaining”, because China does not have a US-style plea bargaining regime in AML enforcement. Where the AML commitment-based suspension mechanism is available, it may help avoid a formal infringement decision, but that mechanism is generally not available for hardcore horizontal cartels such as price fixing, output restriction or market allocation. In practice, therefore, the main way to mitigate collateral effects in cartel matters is not settlement in the ordinary sense, but rather avoiding a formal adverse decision in the first place where possible, or seeking leniency and penalty mitigation under the AML.

At present, antitrust cases in China are not subject to criminal proceedings.

The most severe penalty imposed on a company for its involvement in a cartel agreement was an administrative fine equivalent to 10% of its turnover in the previous financial year. Regarding administrative penalties against individuals, in May 2025 the Tianjin Municipal Market Regulation Bureau imposed a personal fine of CNY5 million on Guo Moumou, as the organiser of the cartel agreement. This marked the first time in China that an administrative penalty had been imposed on a natural person for organising a horizontal cartel agreement, and it remains the highest known individual antitrust fine to date. In this case, Guo Moumou organised four active pharmaceutical ingredient (API) manufacturers to conclude and implement a price-fixing cartel agreement; he was identified as the “organiser”, and Article 19 of the AML was applied.

To date, there have been no cases of Chinese citizens being extradited to other countries for participating in cartel activities. Similarly, there have been no instances of Chinese citizens serving prison sentences in other countries for antitrust-related matters.

In China, a company’s effective compliance programme has been explicitly included as a factor in the discretion of antitrust penalties. According to the 2024 revision of the Guide to the Anti-Monopoly Compliance of Undertakings, China has, for the first time, established a “compliance incentive” system in the form of a dedicated chapter. This means that a company’s compliance framework is not only a means of mitigating legal risks but can also serve as an important basis for reducing or exempting penalties following a breach of the law.

Regarding the criterion of effectiveness, authorities will generally conduct a substantive review, focusing on the programme’s comprehensiveness, authenticity and implementation outcomes. This assessment covers the following aspects:

• the comprehensiveness and suitability of the system;
• the authority and independence of the organisational structure;
• the accuracy and dynamism of risk identification;
• full-process coverage of operational mechanisms; and
• the timeliness and effectiveness of response measures.

Under China’s current antitrust legal framework, sanctions imposed through government proceedings cannot be directly extended to mandatory consumer remedies or compensation. Administrative sanctions and consumer remedies are two parallel pathways, with private litigation playing a central and irreplaceable role in this context.       

In China, decisions in governmental antitrust enforcement proceedings may generally be challenged through administrative reconsideration or directly through administrative litigation. The exception is for mergercontrol decisions under AML Articles 34 and 35, whereby the statute provides for reconsideration first and then administrative litigation if the reconsideration decision is challenged. The reviewing court examines the legality of the decision, including whether:

• the facts were correctly found;
• the evidence was sufficient;
• the law was correctly applied;
• the procedure was lawful; and
• the penalty was proportionate.

Recent SPC case materials also show review of issues such as market definition, characterisation of the conduct, and whether the fine level was appropriate. Such reviews are still not especially common in the public record, although they are increasing gradually as antitrust enforcement matures. The public record suggests that affirmance is more common than reversal, and recent published typical cases include antitrust administrative penalty decisions being upheld, but there is no reliable official data showing overall affirmance/reversal rates or how often decisions are overturned in whole or in part.

There is no reliable official public data in China giving an end-to-end average from dawn raid to final appeal in cartel cases, but the administrative investigation stage – from case filing to the issuance of the administrative decision – takes about two years on average, with reported cases ranging from a little over 100 days to more than 2,000 days, depending on complexity and investigatory difficulty.

If the target then challenges the decision, the next stage is usually administrative litigation. Under the Administrative Litigation Law, a first-instance judgment should ordinarily be issued within six months from docketing, and a second-instance appeal should ordinarily be concluded within three months, although extensions are possible. A direct court challenge to the administrative decision must generally be filed within six months from the date the party knew or should have known of the administrative act.

Accordingly, the administrative phase alone averages about two years, and a full court challenge through second instance can add roughly another nine months or more, but there is no authoritative published average for each intermediate stage, nor for the full period from dawn raid to final appellate conclusion.

China recognises a private right of action for both firms and individuals. Under the AML, a person harmed by monopolistic conduct may bring a civil action, and the 2024 Judicial Interpretation confirms that monopoly civil disputes include both damages claims and claims seeking to invalidate a contract, charter, resolution or decision that violates the AML.

The plaintiff does not need a prior administrative penalty decision, so both standalone and follow-on actions are possible. In a damages case, the plaintiff must generally show the monopolistic conduct, loss and causation, while in an invalidity claim it must show that the instrument violates the AML.

These cases are brought before the people’s courts, with first-instance monopoly civil cases heard by IP courts and designated intermediate people’s courts, and appeals centralised in the SPC IP Tribunal. The relief differs from governmental proceedings: courts do not impose administrative fines, but may award civil damages, including direct loss, lost profits and reasonable investigation/enforcement costs, and may declare cartel-related contracts or similar instruments invalid. In practice, the most commonly sought and obtained remedies are damages and invalidity relief.

China does not have typical antitrust class actions but, in principle, collective claims may be brought through the Civil Procedure Law’s representative action mechanism where one side consists of numerous parties with the same or similar claims. In practice, however, antitrust private enforcement is still usually brought as individual or follow-on civil actions rather than as large representative proceedings.

As for public interest standing, the clearest AML-based rule is that where monopolistic conduct harms the social and public interest, a People’s Procuratorate at or above the level of a city with subordinate districts may file a civil public interest action. There is no similarly clear AML-specific basis giving consumer associations or general public interest groups standing to bring antitrust public interest suits in their own name, so the safer view is that Procuratorates are the primary public interest plaintiffs in this area.

China does not currently have a clear statutory or judicially codified rule specifically governing indirect-purchaser claims or a passing-on defence in AML private actions. The safer view is that an indirect purchaser may sue if it can satisfy the ordinary standing and proof requirements for a monopoly civil dispute – namely, that it suffered loss caused by the monopolistic conduct – while the defendant may raise pass-on-type arguments on causation or quantum, but there is no settled, express rule in the current framework either adopting or rejecting a formal passing-on defence.

The 2024 Judicial Interpretation makes monopoly civil suits available as both standalone and follow-on actions, allows plaintiffs to rely on effective administrative decisions for basic facts unless rebutted, permits the consolidation of multiple suits arising from the same conduct, and contemplates the use of expert evidence, market surveys and economic analysis to resolve complex issues of causation and damages. Practitioner commentary on the 2024 Judicial Interpretation also notes that draft provisions dealing expressly with pass-on were not retained in the final text, which reinforces that these issues are currently handled through general civil proof and damages principles rather than a dedicated rule set.

In China, evidence from governmental antitrust investigations or proceedings is admissible in private civil litigation, and this is one of the important features of the 2024 Judicial Interpretation. In particular, where an effective administrative decision has found monopolistic conduct, a plaintiff in a related civil action may rely on the basic facts established in that decision without re-proving them, unless the defendant produces sufficient contrary evidence to rebut them. More generally, materials generated in administrative proceedings may also be submitted and assessed under the ordinary rules of civil evidence, subject to relevance, authenticity and the court’s evaluation of probative weight. So, while an administrative decision is not automatically conclusive on every issue, it can be highly influential and may significantly reduce the plaintiff’s evidentiary burden in follow-on cartel litigation.

In China, there is no official data showing how often private cartel claims proceed all the way to a completed judgment as opposed to dismissal or settlement, but the public picture suggests that cartel cases make up a relatively small share of China’s antitrust civil docket, at less than 20% of antitrust civil cases; no official dismissal/settlement ratio is published.

China also does not have common law-style discovery: the process is evidence-led, with each party submitting its own evidence, while the court may, on application or on its own initiative, order the production of specific evidence or obtain evidence from government authorities, third parties or the opposing party where appropriate. Effective administrative decisions can also materially assist follow-on claims.

In terms of timing, the Civil Procedure Law provides that first instance civil cases are generally to be concluded within six months of acceptance and second instance appeals within three months, although extensions are possible, and practitioner sources note that, in practice, antitrust damages actions may range from a few months to several years, depending on issues such as jurisdictional objections, foreign elements, complexity and evidence.

In China, successful claimants’ attorneys may be compensated, but not through a separate fee-shifting regime of the kind seen in some jurisdictions. Instead, attorneys’ fees may be recovered as part of the claimant’s civil damages to the extent they qualify as reasonable expenses incurred in investigating and stopping the monopolistic conduct. The 2024 Judicial Interpretation expressly recognises reasonable expenses, and the SPC’s official explanation states that these may include reasonable attorneys’ fees, together with market survey and economic analysis costs. The amount is therefore determined by the court on a reasonableness basis, taking account of the circumstances of the case and the evidence supporting the claimed fees, rather than by any automatic tariff or multiplier.

In China, an unsuccessful claimant will usually bear court-related litigation costs to the extent it loses, and cost allocation may be apportioned if the claim succeeds only in part, but Chinese law does not generally require the losing claimant to pay the defendant’s attorneys’ fees. In antitrust civil cases, the 2024 Judicial Interpretation specifically allows a successful claimant to recover its own reasonable expenses, including reasonable attorneys’ fees, as part of damages, but that is different from a general loser-pays rule for defence legal fees. The same general approach would apply in representative or other collective proceedings: there is no special antitrust rule requiring unsuccessful claimants to pay defence counsel’s fees, although court costs may still be allocated according to the outcome.

In China, private antitrust civil judgments may generally be reviewed through an ordinary appeal to the second instance and, after the judgment becomes effective, through the more limited retrial or trial-supervision procedure. First instance monopoly civil cases are heard by IP courts or designated intermediate people’s courts, and appeals are centralised in the SPC Intellectual Property Tribunal nationwide. On appeal, the court reviews both facts and law, including issues such as jurisdiction, market definition, characterisation of the conduct, causation and damages. If the second instance court considers the facts clear, it may decide directly, and if key facts are unclear or the procedure was seriously defective, it may remand. Retrial is not a further ordinary appeal, but an exceptional review mechanism available on limited statutory grounds. Such reviews are not unusual in important private antitrust cases, especially because the appellate route is built into the ordinary civil process.        

In China, the enforcement authority can treat certain information sharing between competitors as part of a cartel offence, but usually not because information exchange is a separate standalone category in the AML. The usual approach is to assess whether the exchange supports the existence of an “agreement, decision or other concerted practice”, especially in classic horizontal cases such as price fixing, market sharing, output restriction or bid coordination. The key standards are, for example:

• whether the parties are competitors;
• whether there was communication or an exchange of competitively sensitive information;
• whether their subsequent conduct was co-ordinated or consistent; and
• whether the conduct falls within one of the prohibited horizontal monopoly agreement categories under the AML.

Chinese courts have also emphasised that the five classic forms of horizontal cartel conduct are inherently serious restraints; once such conduct is proven, anti-competitive effects are generally presumed or readily inferred. At the same time, Chinese case law indicates that information exchange by itself does not automatically prove a cartel: it is evidence that may support a finding of concerted practice, but the authorities still look for a sufficient link between the exchange and co-ordinated market conduct.

In terms of frequency, such cases do occur, but publicly reported Chinese cartel enforcement remains more commonly described by the underlying conduct category – such as price fixing, market allocation or bid rigging – than by “information sharing” as a separate infringement label.

China’s enforcement authority is clearly concerned about the antitrust risks created by AI, algorithms and data-driven pricing tools, especially in the platform economy. SAMR’s Internet-Platform Antitrust Compliance Guidelines, issued on 28 January 2026, specifically identify “algorithmic collusion” as a monopoly risk, and also reference situations in which platforms help third-party vendors reach anti-competitive agreements or engage in unfair pricing. Public reporting on the same draft likewise noted that it encourages internal algorithm oversight and risk reporting.

At the level of enforcement, however, there are no recently published Chinese cartel enforcement decisions centred primarily on algorithmic pricing or AI-driven collusion, although public Chinese materials do reflect increasing regulatory and judicial attention to algorithm-related antitrust risks.

On the evidence-gathering side, the AML already allows SAMR and provincial AMRs to collect and review electronic data in cartel investigations, and China’s broader market regulation system has adopted electronic data evidence standards, which indicates a meaningful digital forensics capability. By contrast, there is no reliable official public source showing that China’s antitrust authority is already using AI as a routine cartel-detection tool; the safer conclusion is that digital forensics is clearly in use, while public evidence of AI-driven cartel detection by the authority remains limited.

If the conduct is determined as monopolisation, the applicable standard in China is the abuse-of-dominance test, not the cartel test. Under the AML and the 2024 Judicial Interpretation, the authority or court generally looks at whether the undertaking has a dominant position in the relevant market, whether it engaged in the challenged conduct, whether that conduct had the effect of excluding or restricting competition, and whether there was a legitimate justification. Typical forms include unfairly high prices, below-cost sales without justification, refusal to deal, exclusive dealing, tying, and discriminatory treatment. The AML also states that a dominant undertaking may not use data, algorithms, technology or platform rules to commit those abuses.

The only area where the concepts may overlap is evidential or factual, not doctrinal. For example, parallel conduct by competitors, hub-and-spoke arrangements or algorithm-enabled co-ordination may still be determined as a monopoly agreement or concerted practice if there is collusion among multiple undertakings, but unilateral monopolisation by a dominant firm remains a separate AML theory and is not treated as a cartel offence.

In recent Chinese cartel enforcement, the sectors that have attracted the most scrutiny are pharmaceuticals, transport- and logistics-related services, public utility/essential service sectors, and certain other livelihood-related markets.

Pharmaceuticals stand out most clearly. At a December 2025 State Council Information Office briefing, SAMR stated that over the previous three years it had handled 12 pharmaceutical monopoly agreement and abuse-of-dominance cases, with aggregate fines and confiscations exceeding CNY2.4 billion, and emphasised continued enforcement against shortages, emergency medicines and commonly used drugs. Public reporting in 2025 also identified the dexamethasone sodium phosphate API cartel case as a major pharmaceutical horizontal cartel matter.

Looking ahead, the sectors most likely to remain or come under scrutiny are pharmaceuticals, internet/platform businesses, public utilities and sectors affected by “involution”-type competition concerns or vertical/distribution restraints. Pharmaceuticals are likely to remain at the front of the line given the sustained official focus. Internet/platform sectors are also likely to remain under close review because SAMR has been developing sector-specific guidance and focusing on platform rules, pricing conduct and algorithm-related risks. Public utilities should remain important because SAMR has continued to refine sector guidance there as well.

In China, the agency’s approach is still based on the AML’s general evidence preservation and obstruction rules, rather than on chat-app-specific rules. The AML allows SAMR and provincial AMRs to inspect premises and other relevant places, question companies and individuals, review and copy documents and electronic data, and seize or detain relevant evidence. In practice, chat-platform evidence is clearly usable, and Chinese court materials have expressly referred to WeChat chat records as evidence in monopoly cases. The more accurate position is that the ordinary preservation duty applies to relevant electronic evidence, including messaging-app and chat-platform communications, once the company or relevant individual becomes aware of an AML investigation or a specific investigative step.

If such evidence is not maintained or produced, the conduct may be treated as refusal to provide materials, the provision of false information, the concealment, destruction or transfer of evidence, or another obstruction. The consequences can be significant: under the AML, obstruction may lead to an order to rectify and a fine of up to 1% of the undertaking’s previous-year turnover, or up to CNY5 million where turnover is absent or difficult to calculate; individuals may be fined up to CNY500,000.

China does not currently treat “no-poach” agreements or labour market allocation as a separately named cartel category under the AML, and as far as is known there is no published Chinese enforcement decision squarely penalising such conduct to date.

However, the better view is that the conduct could be analysed under the existing rules on horizontal monopoly agreements if competing employers are treated as competitors in a labour or input market and the arrangement is viewed as restricting competition for employees. In that case, the likely standards would be the ordinary AML standards for a monopoly agreement or concerted practice: whether there is an agreement, decision or co-ordinated conduct between competitors, and whether it falls within or is analogous to prohibited horizontal restraints such as market allocation or other conduct that excludes or restricts competition. Public practitioner sources note that Chinese competition authorities are paying increasing attention to this issue, but there is still no settled enforcement line or body of cases.

As to prevalence, there is no reliable public data showing how common no-poach or labour allocation agreements are in the Chinese business community outside legitimate commercial arrangements such as joint ventures, M&A transactions or other ancillary restraints. The current public record supports only the more limited conclusion that the issue is on the radar but is not yet a mature enforcement category with clear case frequency.

China’s leniency framework has been in place for several years and remains active. The key official instruments are the Guidelines of the Anti-Monopoly Commission of the State Council on the Application of the Leniency System to Horizontal Monopoly Agreements and the revised Provisions on the Prohibition of Monopoly Agreements. The latter were amended in December 2025 and took effect on 1 February 2026.

China continues to maintain and apply a formal leniency regime. The public materials support only the narrower conclusion that leniency remains available and operational, while overall filing trends and any substitution effect toward ex officio enforcement are not transparently published.

Based on the publicly available information, the overwhelming majority of cartel investigations appear to be domestic in nature – realistically well over 90% – while cross-border cartel cases appear to account for only a small minority. Recent practitioner summaries expressly note that enforcement priorities have been focused on domestic cartels in traditional livelihood-related industries, and the published case record continues to be dominated by local or purely domestic conduct.

At the same time, the AML does apply to foreign conduct that has anti-competitive effects in China, so cross-border cases remain possible. Looking forward, the most likely trend is continuity: domestic cartel enforcement should remain dominant, but cross-border scrutiny may gradually increase in sectors with international supply chains, technology or export control sensitivity.

China has significant ESG-related policy frameworks, but no single unified national ESG statute. The clearest current mandates are in sustainability disclosure for listed companies: the China Securities Regulatory Commission has stated that the stock exchanges introduced sustainability report disclosure rules in 2024, and that the 2025 revisions to listed company disclosure and governance rules require sustainability reporting in accordance with exchange requirements.

By contrast, there is no specific Chinese antitrust guidance from SAMR or other authorities addressing how companies should avoid cartel risk when communicating or co-operating on ESG standards or sustainability initiatives. Therefore, ESG-related co-operation remains subject to the ordinary AML rules: if competitors exchange competitively sensitive information or co-ordinate on prices, output, markets or similar conduct under an ESG label, the conduct would still be assessed under the usual monopoly agreement framework.

In China, post-pandemic inflation is not the main public lens for cartel enforcement. The more relevant current themes are supply chain security, livelihood-sector stability and the regulation of “involution”-type disorderly competition. Official materials in 2025 show continued enforcement attention on pharmaceuticals and other livelihood-sensitive sectors, especially where shortages, essential supply or consumer welfare are affected.

Current market conditions can still be conducive to cartel concerns, but less because of inflation-driven price increases than because weak demand, overcapacity and supply chain pressure may encourage co-ordination in sensitive sectors or other distortions of competition. The overall trend is therefore that Chinese enforcement is focused more on protecting key supply chains and basic livelihoods, and on addressing both cartel-style co-ordination and disorderly price competition, than on “inflation cartels” as a distinct category.