Cartels 2026 Comparisons

The primary legal basis for cartel enforcement in Italy is Article 2 of Law No 287/1990 (the “Italian Competition Law”), which mirrors Article 101 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU). This provision prohibits and renders null and void agreements between undertakings, concerted practices, and decisions by associations of undertakings that have as their object or effect the substantial restriction of competition within the national market or a significant part thereof. Since cartels are typically classified as restrictions of competition “by object”, they rarely satisfy the conditions for exemption under Article 4 of the Italian Competition Law (corresponding to Article 101(3) of the TFEU).

Where anti-competitive conduct is capable of affecting trade between EU member states, the Italian Competition Authority (ICA) may apply Article 101 of the TFEU.

The ICA is the independent administrative authority responsible for enforcing competition law in Italy, including cartel investigations. It is headquartered in Rome, and a dedicated directorate for “cartels, leniency and whistle-blowing” within its competition department is specifically tasked with conducting cartel investigations.

Administrative Liability

Cartels constitute administrative infringements. The ICA may order infringing undertakings to cease the conduct and refrain from repeating it, including by imposing behavioural and structural remedies, and may impose financial penalties of up to 10% of the undertaking’s annual worldwide turnover. Since the adoption of Legislative Decree No 185/2021, the ICA can also impose financial penalties for procedural infringements (eg, failure to co-operate during a dawn raid or failure to provide complete information in reply to a request for information; see 2.2 Dawn Raids/Search Warrants and 2.7 Non-Cooperation).

Civil Liability

Under Directive 2014/104/EU (the “Damages Directive”) and its Italian implementing decree, Legislative Decree No 3/2017 (the “Damages Decree”), cartel participants are jointly and severally liable for damages caused by cartels. Recent legislative developments have also addressed the class actions regime, expanding it to include businesses and public entities (see 6.2 Collective Action).

Criminal Liability

Criminal liability may arise in bid-rigging cases, where individuals may face criminal fines and imprisonment. Undertakings may also be held responsible under Legislative Decree No 231/2001 (as amended by Law No 137/2023), which establishes that undertakings can be liable for offences committed in their interest or for their benefit, including cartel-related offences. A final criminal judgment may result in financial penalties and limitations on contracting with the public administration.

Any person harmed by a cartel has the right to seek damages before national courts. Claims may be brought as:

• follow-on actions, relying on a prior finding of infringement by the ICA, the European Commission or, to a certain extent, other EU national competition authorities; or
• standalone actions, where claimants must additionally establish the infringement itself.

Private cartel enforcement is on the rise in Italy, particularly in follow-on cases.

Recent legislative reforms have concerned class actions and representative actions (see 6.2 Collective Action).

For the purpose of the leniency programme, the Italian Competition Law defines a “secret cartel” as “an agreement or concerted practice between two or more competitors, the existence of which is wholly or partly concealed, aimed at co-ordinating their competitive conduct in the market or at influencing the relevant parameters of competition through practices consisting, inter alia, of setting or co-ordinating purchase or sale prices or other transaction conditions, including in relation to intellectual property rights; allocating production or sales quotas; dividing up markets and customers, including through the manipulation of tenders, restrictions on imports or exports, or anti-competitive actions directed against other competing undertakings”.

Cartel conduct can encompass any type of agreement between undertakings, concerted practices and decisions by associations of undertakings that result in hardcore restrictions of competition, such as price fixing, market sharing, output limitation and bid rigging. Cartel conduct is treated as a restriction “by object”, meaning there is no need to demonstrate actual effects on the market.

The Italian Competition Law does not provide for industry-specific exemptions from antitrust liability. However, the same carve-outs applicable under EU law must be taken into account, such as those relating to the agricultural sector under Article 42 of the TFEU.

Public Enforcement

The ICA’s authority to levy fines for violations of Article 101 of the TFEU and Article 2 of the Italian Competition Law is time-barred after a period of five years from the date on which the infringement was committed or, in the case of a continuing infringement, from the date on which it ceased.

Where another EU national competition authority or the European Commission opens proceedings concerning the same conduct, the running of the limitation period is interrupted and does not resume until those proceedings have been closed.

Although the authority to impose sanctions is subject to a statute of limitations, the power to investigate and issue warnings under Article 15 of the Italian Competition Law is not. This may have significant consequences, given that the ICA’s finding of a violation may give rise to civil litigation by third parties claiming damages, in addition to media and reputational repercussions.

Private Enforcement

Damages actions before the civil courts in respect of harm arising from a competition law infringement are subject to a five-year limitation period. The limitation period begins to run from the date on which the infringement ceases, provided that the claimant knows or can reasonably be presumed to be aware of the following:

• that the conduct in question amounts to an infringement of competition law;
• that the claimant has suffered harm as a result of the infringement; and
• the identity of the undertaking or undertakings responsible for the infringement.

The limitation period is suspended where the ICA or the European Commission commences an investigation into the infringement on which the damages claim is based. The suspension continues for one year after the infringement decision has become final.

Italy follows the EU “effects doctrine”: the ICA may exercise jurisdiction over conduct occurring entirely outside Italy, provided such conduct produces restrictive effects within the Italian market or a substantial part thereof. Physical presence in Italy is not a prerequisite for jurisdiction to be established.

No specific principles of comity are expressly codified under the Italian Competition Law.

Italian law does not impose a formal obligation on the ICA to defer to or take into account enforcement actions by foreign competition authorities when exercising its jurisdiction. However, like all other EU national competition authorities, the ICA is required to comply with the allocation criteria provided in EC Regulation 1/2003, as interpreted by EU case law.

In practice, the ICA engages in extensive co-operation with the European Commission and other national competition authorities within the European Competition Network regarding case allocation, information exchange and co-ordination of parallel proceedings.

In recent years, cartel enforcement in Italy has intensified considerably. Since 2023, the ICA has opened investigations across a wide range of sectors, including traditional manufacturing (copper electrical cables, cast iron), consumer goods (crisps), public tendering (public transport maintenance), pharmaceuticals, digital markets (online ski-pass sales) and labour markets (no poach agreements in packaging).

Looking at enforcement priorities, the ICA is expected to maintain its focus on bid rigging in public procurement, sustainability and consumer-related conduct, labour market issues, and co-ordinated price increases that transfer inflation-driven cost pressures onto consumers – as demonstrated in recent cases in the fuel and cast iron sectors.

While historically few cases have resulted from the leniency programme (since its introduction in 2007, only 11 prohibition decisions have involved leniency applications, representing roughly 10% of cases), the ICA has recently launched a whistle-blowing tool that has been very successful (more than 200 anonymous reports received) and has been filling the void of the leniency programme.

The ICA publishes guidance and policy notices that are publicly accessible on its website (www.agcm.it).

On 25 February 2025, the ICA updated three key notices regarding cartels:

• the Fining Guidelines, setting out criteria for calculating administrative fines for antitrust infringements, including cartels;
• the Revised Leniency Notice, establishing the conditions and procedure for immunity and fine reductions; and
• the Guidelines on antitrust compliance, detailing the conditions under which a compliance programme may be recognised as a mitigating factor.

In addition, on 22 May 2023, the ICA issued a Settlement Notice, setting out the procedural framework for settlement proceedings and the potential fine reductions available (see 5.2 Plea Bargaining/Settlement).

ICA’s investigations may be triggered as follows:

• by leniency applications;
• by whistle-blower complaints submitted via the ICA’s dedicated whistle-blowing platform;
• by complaints from third parties; or
• ex officio by the ICA, based on its own market-monitoring activities.

The ICA has recently strengthened its investigative capacity through the establishment of a Data Science Unit in 2024. Led by the ICA’s Chief Economist, this unit deploys expertise in data analysis, artificial intelligence and algorithmic assessment to improve cartel detection and enhance the efficiency of documentary analysis in investigations.

Pre-Investigation Phase

The ICA’s proceedings start with a pre-investigation phase, in which the ICA has broad discretion as to whether to open a formal investigation following the review of initial evidence.

Typically, the parties have no insight into the pre-investigation phase, unless they have filed a leniency application. The ICA rarely uses requests for information in cartel cases during this phase, in order to preserve the element of surprise. As a general practice, the notification of the decision to open proceedings is accompanied by dawn raids and/or requests for information.

Dawn raids are very common in Italy. They generally follow the same rules as those applicable to dawn raids conducted by the European Commission, with a few exceptions, as highlighted below.

Broad Scope and Private Premises Raids

Contrary to the European Commission, which can conduct a dawn raid based on a mere authorisation, the ICA can conduct raids only on the basis of a formal decision, with which companies must comply.

The ICA can conduct inspections at the premises of entities that are not even formally party to the proceedings, as recently illustrated by Cases I872 (MSC/Moby) and I868 (Byoviz/Mancata commercializzazione).

The Italian Competition Law allows the ICA to inspect the private residences of employees and directors. However, as is the case for the European Commission, the ICA’s searches of private homes require prior judicial authorisation, to ensure proportionality. At the time of writing, there is no public evidence of the ICA having conducted home raids. The ICA recently entered into co-operation agreements with prosecutors’ offices (including that of Milan in January 2025) to streamline the process for obtaining such authorisation.

Failure to Co-Operate

Dawn raids require an immediate, organised and careful response from both in-house and external counsel. Undertakings are advised to establish response protocols in advance. Failure to co-operate (including obstructing access to premises or permitting the destruction of documents) can result in fines of up to 1% of global turnover, daily penalty payments of up to 5% of average daily turnover, and fines on individuals of up to EUR25,823 as well as a penalty payment of up to EUR500 for each day of delay in complying with the ICA’s orders.

Upon Arrival of the Officials

ICA officials typically appear unannounced, accompanied by officers of the Italian Tax Police (Guardia di Finanza). Upon their arrival, the first step is to verify the validity and scope of the inspection order.

Internal and external legal counsel must be notified promptly. In practice, it may be appropriate to request that officials wait briefly for external counsel to arrive; however, the ICA’s officials are under no obligation to wait and usually do not.

Strict attention is required with respect to electronic evidence: IT specialists must be on hand to facilitate access and ensure that only relevant data is extracted. Document destruction routines should be suspended immediately, and a controlled environment should be set up for the inspection, such as a designated meeting room.

During the Inspection

During the inspection, the officials are entitled to:

• enter the premises, land and means of transport;
• examine the business books and records, and obtain access to personal devices if used for business-related purposes;
• make copies of relevant documents;
• ask questions to gather explanations on facts and documents, and record the replies (employees shall avoid self-incrimination, but no right to remain silent applies regarding facts and documents); and
• seal business premises if the inspection could not be completed within one day.

After the Inspection

The officials will draw up the minutes of the dawn raid, which shall be carefully reviewed by the undertakings’ representatives. Contrary to the European Commission, the ICA requests that an undertaking’s representative sign the minutes. The undertaking shall verify the list of copied documents and ensure that it receives a copy of all seized documents.

In cases of dispute over the relevance, legally privileged character or confidential nature of documents, a sealed envelope procedure may be employed: contested materials are placed in a sealed envelope and reviewed later, without immediate disclosure. The ICA often proposes to resolve such disagreements at a later stage at its offices, with input from its legal department.

The obligation to preserve the relevant requested evidence arises immediately upon the arrival of ICA officials in the case of dawn raids, or upon receipt of a request for information. Undertakings are advised to immediately suspend any document destruction processes and maintain relevant materials intact. Destroying, altering or concealing documents can give rise to significant fines and may constitute an aggravating circumstance. The ICA may also issue ad hoc requests requiring undertakings to apply a document preservation hold with respect to specified categories of documents and defined time periods.

Leniency applicants are specifically required to refrain from destroying, altering or concealing any relevant information or documents at any stage of the proceedings.

Employees are entitled to legal representation during interviews conducted by the ICA. Individuals may wish to have separate external counsel, as their interests may differ from those of the undertaking for which they work.

Counsel’s role during an interview is subject to certain limitations. In particular, the counsel:

• shall not respond on behalf of the interviewee where the ICA wishes to hear from the interviewee directly, although counsel may add such clarifications as may be deemed necessary; and
• may seek clarification of questions posed and raise objections to particular lines of questioning (eg, where the ICA’s conduct risks infringing attorney-client privilege or the privilege against self-incrimination).

From the outset of the investigation, the counsel is responsible for:

• monitoring the conduct of the ICA to ensure it acts within the scope of its powers (eg, preventing out-of-scope inspections);
• informing the undertaking and its employees of their rights and obligations in connection with dawn raids, requests for information and interviews; and
• formulating a defence strategy at the earliest opportunity, including evaluating the merits of a potential leniency application or settlement.

The ICA gathers evidence through a combination of investigative tools, including dawn raids, formal requests for information addressed to undertakings and individuals, and hearings with representatives of the investigated parties. It also co-operates with other authorities in the collection of evidence across borders. For instance, in 2024 the ICA requested the assistance of the Dutch and Irish competition authorities to conduct two separate inspections at the premises of undertakings under the ICA’s investigation.

The ICA’s decisional practice regarding attorney-client privilege is aligned with EU case law. Therefore, attorney-client privilege applies to communications between an undertaking and its external legal counsel qualified in the EEA, in which the external counsel provides legal advice. Protection extends to:

• internal preparatory documents produced for the purpose of obtaining such advice; and
• internal memoranda recording the substance of communications with, or advice received from, external counsel.

Where the seizure of such materials is requested, the undertaking is entitled to raise an objection. Communications and notes exchanged between the undertaking and its in-house counsel do not benefit from this protection. The privilege against self-incrimination may likewise be relied upon in the context of the ICA’s requests for information, interviews, dawn raids or hearings.

Failure to provide information, or providing inaccurate, incomplete or misleading information, can lead to severe consequences. Fines for undertakings may amount to up to 1% of global turnover, while daily penalty payments for ongoing non-compliance may reach up to 5% of average daily turnover. The ICA may also impose fines of up to EUR25,823 on individuals who commit procedural infringements, as well as a penalty payment of up to EUR500 for each day of delay in complying with the ICA’s orders.

Undertakings usually comply with the ICA’s requests unless they have objective justifications (eg, attorney-client privilege or avoiding self-incrimination). If the ICA does not accept the undertaking’s explanation for not providing certain information, the undertaking should assess whether to continue withholding the information or provide it and, if appropriate, challenge the ICA’s requests at a later stage.

The ICA’s officials are generally bound by official secrecy under Italian law.

Parties to the proceedings may protect confidential information against disclosure to other parties by filing a reasoned confidentiality request with the ICA. The ICA assesses such requests on a case-by-case basis, balancing confidentiality with the right of other parties to exercise their right of defence. Third parties providing information to the ICA may likewise request confidential treatment of their submissions.

Legal and factual arguments may be raised at any stage of the proceedings, whether in written submissions (advocacy briefs, responses to requests for information) or orally (eg, during hearings with the case team). Once the ICA has notified its statement of objections, the parties are entitled to file their defence briefs and to request an oral hearing before the ICA’s board to put forward any argument.

Italy’s leniency programme was introduced by the ICA in 2007, amended in 2013, and significantly revised in 2021 following the implementation of the ECN+ Directive. The ICA adopted a further Revised Leniency Notice in February 2025, which took effect on 10 March 2025 for proceedings initiated after that date.

Leniency Conditions

To be eligible for full immunity or a fine reduction, applicants must satisfy a number of general conditions, including:

• terminating participation in the cartel no later than immediately upon submission of the application (unless the ICA agrees otherwise);
• co-operating with the ICA genuinely, continuously, fully and expeditiously throughout the entire proceedings; and
• refraining, before formal submission, from destroying, falsifying or concealing relevant evidence, or disclosing the existence of the application to anyone other than other competition authorities.

The ICA must inform the applicant as to whether or not full immunity has been granted (see 3.2 Amnesty/Immunity regarding the conditions to receive full immunity). If the undertaking does not qualify for immunity, the ICA may grant a fine reduction where the undertaking has provided evidence of significant added value. The reduction depends on the order of filing:

• the first undertaking (after the potential immunity recipient) to submit evidence of significant added value may receive a reduction of 30–50%;
• the second undertaking to submit evidence of significant added value may receive a reduction of 20–30%; and
• any subsequent undertaking submitting evidence of significant added value may benefit from a reduction of up to 20%.

Marker

The immunity applicant may request a marker to protect its place in the queue while gathering evidence. The ICA may set a deadline for finalising the submission. A marker request must include at least:

• the name and address of the immunity applicant;
• the names and addresses of the other undertakings involved in the secret cartel;
• a description of the secret cartel, specifying the products and services concerned, the geographic scope and duration of the conduct, and the nature of the cartel activity;
• details of any other immunity applications or requests for fine reductions; and
• a declaration that the undertaking has filed or intends to file with other competition authorities, whether within or outside the EU, in relation to the same cartel.

Practical Use

Historically, the leniency programme has rarely been used: since 2007, only 11 prohibition decisions (approximately 10% of total cases) have involved leniency applications. In the past five years, only two investigations were triggered by leniency: one in radiopharmaceuticals (2022) and one in copper electrical cables (2024). In the crisps sector case, closed in April 2026, two of the three undertakings benefitted from fine reductions (50% and 30%) by providing significant added value to the ICA and extending the timeframe of the conduct.

Full immunity from fines is available only to the first undertaking to apply.

In addition to meeting the general conditions, the immunity applicant must disclose its participation in a secret cartel and provide evidence that either:

• enables the ICA to conduct a targeted inspection where the ICA does not yet hold sufficient evidence for such an inspection; or
• is sufficient in the ICA’s assessment to establish the existence of the cartel where the ICA does not yet have enough evidence to establish the infringement, and no immunity has yet been granted in relation to that cartel.

Undertakings that have coerced other parties to participate in or remain in a cartel are ineligible for full immunity.

Leniency applications may be submitted in writing, orally or, since January 2026, electronically via the new e-Leniency platform.

The ICA’s Fining Guidelines provide for a further 50% reduction of the basic fine if, during the investigation, the undertaking provides information and documentation that, including through a targeted inspection, is deemed decisive for establishing an infringement other than the one under investigation.

Individuals (including current and former directors, managers and employees) connected to an immunity applicant may also benefit from protection against criminal penalties. This is conditional on:

• the submission of a valid immunity application;
• active co-operation by those individuals with the relevant authority and the public prosecutor; and
• the application being submitted before the individual becomes aware that criminal proceedings have been opened in relation to the same facts.

In February 2023, the ICA launched a dedicated whistle-blowing platform enabling anonymous reporting of any activity, including cartels. This platform has contributed directly to the opening of five cartel investigations, and has received more than 200 complaints at the time of writing.

Legislative Decree No 24/2023 implemented the EU Whistleblower Directive (Directive 2019/1937) into Italian law, introducing protections for persons who report breaches of law, including a prohibition on the dismissal of whistle-blowers.

The ICA encourages the adoption of whistle-blowing mechanisms within undertakings, with the establishment of a reporting and/or whistle-blowing tool notably being among the elements of an effective antitrust compliance programme identified in the ICA’s Guidelines.

In Italy, the practice of whistle-blower counsel actively soliciting or seeking prospective clients has not yet emerged as a discernible trend.

The ICA may obtain information and documents from any individual in possession of material relevant to an investigation, through formal requests for information, through hearings or during dawn raids.

Individuals are entitled to the assistance of legal counsel and must co-operate with the ICA; however, they may decline to respond where doing so would constitute an acknowledgment of participation in an infringement.

Failure to comply with the ICA’s requests may result in fines also being imposed on individuals.

Specific Rules for Leniency Applicants

As part of their co-operation obligations, leniency applicants must make their current directors, managers and other employees – and, to the extent practicable, former employees – available to be heard by the ICA.

The ICA has broad powers to request documentary evidence directly from investigated undertakings. Although there is limited case law specifying the limitations of the ICA’s investigative powers, the ICA’s requests for information must concern the scope of the ongoing investigation and be proportionate.

Undertakings must provide all relevant information within the requested timeline and remain available for further requests, unless objective justifications apply (eg, attorney-client privilege).

Since the creation of the Data Science Unit in 2024, information requests have increasingly required that data be submitted in machine-readable format (preferably CSV), imposing an additional technical burden on undertakings responding to ICA requests.

The ICA regularly co-operates with foreign competition authorities to gather evidence from undertakings based outside Italy (see 2.5 Obtaining Evidence/Testimony regarding the assistance of the Dutch and Irish competition authorities). The ICA also routinely exchanges information with the European Commission and other national competition authorities through formal mechanisms under Article 12 of Regulation (EC) No 1/2003 and informal channels. To facilitate this, the ICA often requires undertakings to provide a confidentiality waiver so that information may be shared with other authorities, in order to co-ordinate investigations.

Information requests may extend to evidence held in third countries or maintained in cloud-based systems, provided it remains within the reach of the undertaking. In interim proceedings, EU courts have shown deference to the European Commission’s practice of requesting information from servers outside the EU to assess whether the suspected conduct infringes EU law, holding that this is necessary for effective investigation. Pending a ruling on the merits as to whether the Commission may access data stored outside the EU, the prudent course of action is for the undertaking to object for the record and reserve its rights in the minutes, without restricting access.

The ICA can co-operate with any public administration or body subject to public law. It routinely shares information with financial market regulators such as Banca d’Italia and CONSOB (Securities Exchange Commission), as well as other regulatory authorities, including AGCOM (Communications Authority) and ARERA (Energy Networks and Environment Regulatory Authority). It has also established co-operation agreements with ANAC (the Italian National Anti-Corruption Authority) and the Italian data protection regulator.

Moreover, the ICA has entered into co-operation agreements with Public Prosecutor’s Offices, such as that signed with the Milan Prosecutor’s Office in January 2025, to streamline procedures for obtaining judicial authorisation to conduct inspections at private residences.

At the EU level, the ICA co-operates with the European Commission and other national competition authorities through the European Competition Network (ECN). The ICA actively participates in ECN activities, treating it as a valuable forum for discussing guidelines and exchanging information.

The ICA routinely co-ordinates with the European Commission and other EU authorities on cases involving extraterritorial effects or parallel investigations across multiple member states. In 2023, the ICA provided support to the European Commission on two separate occasions. The ICA also co-operates with other authorities in the cross-border collection of evidence (see 2.5 Obtaining Evidence/Testimony).

At the international level, the ICA regularly participates in international forums, including the OECD, the International Competition Network (ICN) and UNCTAD.

Cartel conduct does not generally constitute a criminal offence under Italian law, with the notable exception of bid rigging in public procurement, which may amount to a criminal offence under the Italian Criminal Code. In those cases, individuals may face criminal sanctions, and criminal proceedings are conducted before the competent criminal courts.

The ICA cannot seek a criminal indictment but will promptly inform the Public Prosecutor’s Office if evidence of criminal activity emerges from the investigations conducted. Such information exchange is expressly provided in the recent renewal of the ICA’s co-operation agreement with the Milan Public Prosecutor’s Office.

The ICA does not exercise civil enforcement powers. Civil proceedings in cartel matters are confined to private litigation brought by injured parties before the competent civil courts pursuant to the Damages Decree and the general tort provisions of the Italian Civil Code. The ICA’s role is limited to providing observations or evidence upon request of the court.

Public Enforcement

The ICA may commission expert opinions and statistical and economic analyses, and seek specialist views on any matter relevant to the investigation. The ICA’s Data Science Unit provides analytical capabilities in data science, artificial intelligence and algorithmic analysis, to support cartel detection and documentary review.

Parties are likewise entitled to appoint their own experts (usually economists) to provide technical support and substantiate their submissions.

Private Enforcement

In private litigation, damages are typically assessed by a court-appointed expert during a dedicated expert phase. Courts retain discretion in the assessment of damages and, whilst they tend to follow court-appointed experts’ conclusions, they may also apply equitable principles – though rarely to the full extent. Courts may request guidance from the ICA on the methodology for quantifying damages, although in practice they prefer to rely on their own appointed experts.       

The ICA is the sole authority responsible for the administrative enforcement of competition law in Italy, and typically opens a single proceeding encompassing all undertakings allegedly involved. There is no specific rule governing the use of evidence obtained in one proceeding in another; in practice, where the ICA intends to transfer evidence between proceedings (which, as noted, is of limited relevance in cartel cases, as all parties are ordinarily investigated within the same proceeding), it will notify the parties and invite any comments or observations. In this regard, objections are of limited practical utility, as the ICA may obtain the same information and documents through separate requests for information, albeit through a lengthier process.

The ICA has direct authority to:

• impose administrative fines on infringing undertakings;
• order the cessation of infringement and prohibit its repetition; and
• impose behavioural and structural remedies.

Not all investigations result in a finding of infringement or, if they do, in the levying of fines. In 2025, the ICA concluded four cartel investigations opened in 2024, in two of which it found insufficient evidence to establish a competition law violation. In certain cases, the ICA may establish an infringement without levying a fine.

Italy’s settlement procedure was introduced in the Italian Competition Law in 2022. On 22 May 2023, the ICA issued a Settlement Notice clarifying the new procedure.

Settlement Procedure

The Settlement Notice sets out a five-step procedure:

• following the expiry of the commitment offer period and prior to the statement of objections, the ICA may invite undertakings to express their willingness to settle (parties may also informally communicate their interest in pursuing the settlement procedure to the ICA absent a formal invitation);
• the ICA holds settlement discussions with willing parties while continuing ordinary proceedings with the others;
• if discussions are productive, the ICA sets a deadline for settlement proposals, which must include an acknowledgment of the infringement and specify the maximum acceptable fine;
• if proposals are accepted, the ICA issues a statement of objections reflecting agreed terms; and
• if confirmed, a settlement decision is issued.

Undertakings do not have an unconditional right to settle, and the ICA may revert to the ordinary procedure at any point, at which stage any admissions of liability are disregarded and may not be used as evidence.

Benefits and Drawbacks of Settling

Benefits for undertakings that opt for settlement include the following:

• a 10% reduction in the administrative fine;
• certainty regarding the maximum fine amount, which may otherwise be difficult to predict in standard adversarial proceedings;
• a faster administrative process that reduces legal costs; and
• more concise and less detailed decisions than those adopted following an adversarial procedure – a feature generally regarded as beneficial where the infringement is likely to attract private litigation.

Until very recently, undertakings appeared reluctant to settle, owing to a number of associated drawbacks, including:

• reputational consequences;
• the risk of triggering parallel investigations in other jurisdictions;
• a reduced likelihood of success in subsequent follow-on damages actions; and
• reduced use of the rights of defence (eg, limited access to the case file and the absence of a final hearing before the ICA’s board).

In April 2026, the ICA’s first settlement decision was published, granting a 10% fine reductio to all three undertakings involved.

Once an ICA infringement decision becomes final, it is binding on national civil courts as to the existence and scope of the infringement, significantly facilitating follow-on damages claims.

Undertakings that have admitted liability as part of an immunity application may face limitations on contesting aspects of the infringement decision before civil courts. However, immunity recipients are shielded from claims by third parties who did not purchase products from them, unless those third parties cannot obtain full compensation from other cartel members.

Moreover, ICA fining decisions may be relevant as grounds for exclusion in public procurement procedures, particularly where the conduct is connected to the same or a similar market/sector as the tender. This will generally not apply where the undertaking has adopted adequate self-cleaning measures.

In cases of bid rigging in public procurement (the only context in which cartel conduct may amount to a criminal offence in Italy), individuals may face criminal fines and imprisonment under the Italian Criminal Code, whilst undertakings may be sanctioned under the framework of Legislative Decree No 231/2001.

Cartel conduct in Italy is sanctioned by administrative fines imposed by the ICA, with the sole exception of bid rigging, which may also constitute a criminal offence.

Administrative Fines

The highest administrative fine on a single undertaking for cartel participation to date is EUR336,214,660, imposed in Case I864: the biofuel price co-ordination case. In the same case, total fines against six oil undertakings reached EUR936,659,087.

In the cast iron foundries case (Case I866), aggregate applicable fines totalled approximately EUR600 million but the ICA reduced the overall penalty to EUR70 million, taking into account the severe economic difficulties facing the Italian foundry industry.

In the last five years, the average overall fine imposed by the ICA in cartel proceedings amounted to approximately EUR248 million per year.

Criminal Sanctions

The ICA has no power to impose criminal penalties, which are imposed by national criminal courts in case of bid rigging conduct violating the Italian Criminal Code, and take the form of financial penalties or imprisonment. As far as is known, no individual is currently imprisoned for bid rigging.

A notable case illustrating the overlap between administrative enforcement and criminal proceedings is Case I808, concerning bid rigging in public tenders managed by Consip. The ICA found that the undertakings had engaged in bid rigging, whilst criminal courts separately ordered the arrest of certain individuals. Those individuals were ultimately acquitted by the criminal courts in first instance.

Extradition

Since cartels are not generally criminal offences under Italian law, extradition to Italy is of limited relevance in practice. Extradition from Italy is possible if the conduct qualifies as a criminal offence elsewhere. In 2019, the Palermo Court of Appeal authorised the extradition of a Dutch national (employed by a US undertaking) to the United States in connection with criminal proceedings in Georgia relating to the jet fuel cartel.

An effective compliance programme may be recognised as a mitigating factor in calculating administrative fines, provided that the programme:

• was adopted prior to the commencement of the investigation;
• is in line with national and European best practices; and
• is not manifestly inadequate.

Compliance programmes may not be relied upon as a mitigating factor in the case of repeat offenders.

The ICA published updated Guidelines on antitrust compliance in February 2025, setting out conditions under which a compliance programme will be taken into account as a mitigating circumstance. The following fine reductions may apply:

• up to 10% for compliance programmes that functioned effectively, enabling timely detection and cessation of the violation prior to the opening of the preliminary investigation, provided that the undertaking submits a leniency application before the ICA has conducted inspections (or before the notice of initiation is served); and
• up to 5% for compliance programmes adopted prior to the preliminary investigation that were not fully effective (ie, failing to enable the timely detection and cessation of the violation before inspections by the ICA) but are not manifestly inadequate, provided that the undertaking adequately supplements the compliance programme and begins to implement it after the opening of the investigation (within six months of notification of the opening of the investigation).

Under Italian competition law, the ICA does not have the power to order mandatory consumer redress or restitution in cartel cases. However, some undertakings willingly adopt restorative measures in the hope of obtaining a fine reduction and/or reducing the potential scope of private litigation.

ICA decisions are subject to administrative judicial review before the TAR Lazio at first instance and the Council of State on appeal. Council of State rulings may be challenged by revocation before the same court and, on jurisdictional grounds only, before the Italian Supreme Court – both procedures are rarely used in practice, and even more rarely upheld.

The courts’ role consists of a legality review, examining whether the ICA committed errors. The grounds of challenge are limited to:

• violations of the law;
• lack of competence; and
• abuse of power.

On these bases, applicants may allege errors regarding, for example, factual findings, compliance with procedural rules, the legal assessment of the case, and the amount of the fine imposed.

Italian administrative courts cannot re-examine the merits through an independent evaluation of the facts, and may only rule within the limits of the applicant’s request. Since they cannot repeat the investigation, courts can either annul the ICA’s decision (in whole or in part) or reject the appeal. However, this legality-based review does not preclude examination of factual questions raised by the applicant, including the evidence gathered by the ICA.

While courts cannot substitute their own assessment for that of the ICA, they may review whether the ICA exercised its discretionary powers appropriately, including by assessing the adequacy and proportionality of the contested decision and its underlying technical assessments.

In addition, Italian administrative courts may carry out a full jurisdictional review regarding the amount of the fine, meaning that they have the power to directly redetermine the amount of the fines originally imposed by the ICA.

Virtually all of the ICA’s fining decisions are subsequently challenged by way of judicial review. In this context, the TAR Lazio tends to uphold such decisions, whereas the Council of State tends to overturn them.

The length of cartel investigations varies considerably, depending on the complexity of the case, the volume of evidence and the number of parties. As a general indication, proceedings before the ICA generally last between one and two years.

Recently, there has been active judicial debate regarding the duration of the ICA’s pre-investigation phase. Article 14(2) of Law 689/1981 requires public authorities to formally notify parties of the alleged infringement within 90 days (extended to 360 days where parties are domiciled abroad) from the date on which the authority becomes aware of the key elements of the suspected violation. Italian administrative courts have reached divergent conclusions on whether this applies to antitrust proceedings. In 2025, following a preliminary reference by the TAR Lazio, the Court of Justice held that this time limit is incompatible with the enforcement of Article 102 of the TFEU, as interpreted in light of the principle of effectiveness. The emerging consensus is that the ICA enjoys discretion in determining when to open formal proceedings, provided the overall duration of the pre-investigation phase remains reasonable. The domestic proceedings from which the preliminary reference originated are still pending before the Council of State, and a separate preliminary reference concerning the compatibility of Article 14(2) with Article 101 of the TFEU likewise remains pending before the Court of Justice.

Where the decision is subsequently challenged, the judicial review process – encompassing both first instance proceedings before TAR Lazio and appellate proceedings before the Council of State – typically adds a further two to four years to the timeline.

Any person damaged by a cartel infringement may bring a damages claim before the Italian civil courts. For follow-on actions, the Damages Decree (Legislative Decree No 3/2017, which implements the EU Damages Directive) provides for specialised jurisdiction before the Courts of Milan, Rome and Naples. Claims may also be grounded in general tort provisions of the Italian Civil Code.

Both follow-on and standalone claims are available. In follow-on actions, plaintiffs need not prove the existence and the material, temporal and geographical scope of the infringement, but must still prove the damage suffered and causation. Standalone plaintiffs must also prove the infringement itself.

Italian law, consistent with the EU framework, requires that damages be compensated in full, covering actual loss, lost profits and interest. Historical damages are typically adjusted for inflation.

While there is no difference in standards of relief between private enforcement and ICA proceedings (as both the ICA and the national courts apply Italian and EU law and case law), the forms of relief may vary: before national courts, parties can obtain not only monetary relief but also injunctions and declaratory judgments.

Collective redress through class actions is available in Italy, and has recently been reformed. The reform expanded eligible claimants from consumers to also include businesses, professionals and public entities, enabling the enforcement of “homogeneous individual rights”. Whether this new framework will in practice be applied to antitrust damages claims remains to be seen, as entities must prove they have a “homogeneous individual right”.

Representative actions for the protection of consumers’ collective interests are also available and can be brought by “qualified entities”, such as recognised consumer associations or independent public bodies. However, the current regime is focused on consumer law violations and does not seem to include antitrust infringements.

At the time of writing, neither class actions nor representative actions for antitrust infringements under the new regimes have been filed before Italian courts.

Litigation funding is also on the rise in Italy, but remains largely unregulated. The only specific regulation concerns representative actions, where the writ of summons must disclose any third-party financing to allow the court to assess conflicts of interest (see Article 140-septies(5) of Legislative Decree No 206/2005, as amended by Legislative Decree No 28/2023).

Any person who has suffered loss from a competition law infringement may claim damages, irrespective of whether they purchased directly or indirectly from the infringer. The right of indirect purchasers is expressly recognised under the Damages Decree, which establishes specific presumptions and burden-of-proof rules for passing on claims.

Where an indirect purchaser establishes the following three elements, a rebuttable presumption arises that the overcharge was passed on to them:

• the defendant committed an infringement of competition law;
• the infringement caused the defendant’s direct purchaser to pay an overcharge; and
• the indirect purchaser purchased goods or services that were the subject of the infringement, or that were derived from or incorporate such goods or services.

The defendant may rebut this presumption by adducing evidence that the overcharge was not passed on to the indirect purchaser, whether in whole or in part.

Unless the claim is brought by an end customer, the defendant may rely on the passing on defence, arguing that the claimant transferred the overcharge down the supply chain. The burden of proof lies with the defendant.

Final ICA infringement decisions are binding on national civil courts as to the nature and scope of the infringement. Similar principles apply to final European Commission decisions. Decisions of foreign national competition authorities constitute prima facie evidence only, to be weighed alongside all other available evidence.

Civil courts may request the ICA to disclose evidence from its investigation file, but only where the parties themselves cannot reasonably provide it. The ICA may submit observations on the proportionality of such requests.

Courts may not order the disclosure of leniency-related declarations or settlement proposals, in accordance with the Damages Decree. Access to leniency applications within the ICA’s file is restricted to other alleged cartel members, following notification of the statement of objections, and solely for defence purposes.

The use of consensual dispute resolution methods in competition damages actions has not increased as a direct result of the implementation of the Damages Directive. Parties typically engage in settlement discussions at the later stages of proceedings, particularly after the court-appointed expert has issued their report, which serves as a crucial reference point in negotiations.

Contingency fees are prohibited under Italian law.

Under Italian civil procedure, the losing party is ordinarily ordered to reimburse the winning party’s costs based on a lump sum determined by the court. However, courts have discretion to apportion costs differently – for instance, ordering each party to bear its own costs in cases where neither party clearly prevails, or where the proceedings concern novel or legally contested issues.

Third-party litigation funding is used in Italy, although it remains largely unregulated and is not necessarily disclosed by plaintiffs (see 6.2 Collective Action).

Decisions in private antitrust litigation are subject to the standard civil appeals process under Italian procedural law, with review available before the competent courts of appeal and, ultimately, the Italian Supreme Court on points of law.

The ICA may consider co-ordinated information exchanges as a central mechanism of cartel conduct. In the biofuel price co-ordination case (Case I864), the ICA found that six major Italian oil operators had co-ordinated pricing through direct and indirect exchanges of commercially sensitive information, facilitated in part by disclosures in the trade publication “Staffetta Quotidiana”. This case resulted in total fines of approximately EUR936 million, and illustrates that information exchanges need not involve direct bilateral contact: intermediary channels, including trade publications and industry platforms, may suffice where they serve as a vehicle for disseminating competitively sensitive data.

In the cast iron foundries case (Case I866), the ICA found that the undertakings and their trade association had developed joint price indexation mechanisms and co-ordinated commercial strategies through the systematic exchange of commercially sensitive information – conduct persisting for approximately two decades.

Use of AI in Cartel Conduct

The ICA has maintained an active focus on pricing algorithms in potential cartel conduct since 2017, when it conducted a sector inquiry into big data.

In 2023, the ICA opened an investigation into alleged price co-ordination in airfares to and from Sicily, in which pricing algorithms were suspected of facilitating collusive conduct. Although the investigation was closed without establishing an infringement, the ICA commenced a market study to assess algorithmic pricing in passenger air transport to and from Sicily and Sardinia.

Use of AI in Public Enforcement

The ICA’s Data Science Unit (established in 2024) uses advanced analytical tools, including AI and algorithmic analysis, to improve cartel detection, enhance analysis of digital platforms’ pricing algorithms, and increase the efficiency of document review. In 2025, the Data Science Unit was deployed in a sector inquiry into the school publishing market, using bespoke Python applications and data analysis libraries to examine supply and demand interactions across six school years.

Under Italian competition law, cartel enforcement and unilateral monopolistic behaviour are governed by distinct provisions: co-ordinated conduct falls within the scope of Article 2 of the Italian Competition Law and Article 101 of the TFEU, whereas unilateral conduct by dominant undertakings is addressed under Article 3 of the Italian Competition Law and Article 102 of the TFEU. The ICA does not treat monopolisation or the acquisition of market dominance through unilateral conduct as a cartel offence.

Cartel investigations in Italy have covered a wide range of industries, with recent cases spanning traditional manufacturing (cast iron, copper electrical cables), consumer goods (crisps), pharmaceuticals (co-ordinated strategies to delay biosimilar market entry), public procurement (public transport maintenance) and fuel (biofuel price coordination). The ICA has also targeted digital markets (online ski-pass sales) and labour markets (no poach agreements in packaging), signalling a broadening of the sectoral scope of cartel enforcement.

Looking ahead, further enforcement focus is anticipated in several areas. Bid rigging in public procurement is expected to remain a priority, given substantial public investment programmes currently underway in Italy. Sustainability-related conduct, labour market issues (including no poach and wage-fixing agreements) and co-ordinated pricing in sectors affected by persistent inflationary pressures are likewise expected to attract heightened scrutiny. The ICA’s enhanced analytical capabilities, including the deployment of its Data Science Unit, may also facilitate the identification of anti-competitive conduct in digital markets.

The ICA has not issued specific guidance on the preservation of evidence involving instant messaging services, encrypted platforms and ephemeral messaging applications, although it has relied on evidence originating from messaging applications and chat platforms on several occasions. Generally, undertakings are expected to preserve and provide all relevant communications available to them during dawn raids and in response to requests for information.

In December 2025, the ICA opened its first investigation into an alleged no poach agreement in the Italian packaging industry. This case illustrates the ICA’s willingness to pursue anti-competitive conduct in labour markets, consistent with a growing international enforcement trend whereby competition authorities around the world are treating labour market restrictions as a priority concern.

The ICA has taken significant steps in recent years to revitalise its leniency programme. Following a consultation in October 2024, the ICA adopted the Revised Leniency Notice in February 2025, introducing fixed reduction bands in place of the broad discretionary approach previously applied. The ICA’s stated objective is to enhance incentives for earlier disclosure, although in practice the new bands may be less generous than reductions historically granted.

To further facilitate applications, the ICA launched its e-Leniency digital platform in January 2026, enabling the online submission of simplified leniency applications, with guarantees of identification and confidentiality equivalent to those applicable to oral submissions.

By contrast, ex officio investigations have significantly increased since 2023, supported by the launch of the whistle-blowing platform, which has already received more than 200 complaints and contributed directly to the opening of five cartel investigations since its launch.

In recent years, the ICA’s cartel enforcement activity has been predominantly domestic: investigations opened in 2024 and 2025 were focused on conduct occurring within and having its restrictive effects on the Italian market.

Whilst the ICA operates within the ECN framework and engages in regular co-operation with the European Commission and other national competition authorities on cross-border cases (including through mutual assistance in dawn raids and information exchange under Article 12 of Regulation (EC) No 1/2003), there is no public evidence of bilateral co-operation with non-EU competition authorities in specific cartel investigations in recent years.       

The ICA has not published dedicated guidelines or safe harbours addressing the circumstances in which sustainability-related co-operation among competitors may be permissible under competition law. In the absence of domestic guidance, undertakings must rely on Article 2 of the Italian Competition Law and Article 101 of the TFEU, as well as the European Commission’s revised Horizontal Guidelines (2023), which include a chapter on sustainability agreements.

Notwithstanding the absence of formal guidance, the ICA’s recent enforcement practice demonstrates a clear willingness to pursue cartel conduct intersecting with sustainability objectives. In Case I838 (co-ordinated restrictions on the purchase of used lead-acid batteries for recycling), the ICA sanctioned conduct that undermined the circular economy by distorting competition in the secondary raw materials market. In Case I864 (the biofuel price co-ordination case), the ICA took action against co-ordinated pricing in a sector central to Italy’s energy transition strategy. These cases signal that the ICA will not accept sustainability-related justifications as a shield for anti-competitive co-ordination, and that conduct impeding environmental policy objectives – whether by restricting recycling markets or distorting pricing in green energy sectors – may attract heightened enforcement scrutiny.

Sustainability-related cartel enforcement is expected to remain a top priority, particularly as ESG commitments become increasingly embedded in corporate strategy and industry-wide initiatives.

Post-pandemic and war-related inflationary pressures are reflected in the ICA’s enforcement agenda, with several high-profile investigations linked to post-COVID market conditions or price shocks from the Russian invasion of Ukraine.

The ICA has demonstrated willingness to investigate co-ordinated conduct through which undertakings pass inflation-driven cost increases onto consumers, particularly involving the alignment of pricing strategies or the exchange of commercially sensitive information. This is illustrated by enforcement actions in the fuel sector (aggregate fines of approximately EUR936 million) and traditional manufacturing (cast iron foundries). Preventing co-ordinated price increases in the context of rising input costs is expected to remain a central enforcement priority.

Notably, the ICA has shown sensitivity to economic circumstances when calibrating sanctions. In the cast iron foundries case (Case I866), the ICA took the severe economic crisis affecting the Italian foundry industry into account, reducing total fines from approximately EUR600 million to EUR70 million. This suggests that, whilst the ICA maintains a firm stance against cartel conduct irrespective of the economic climate, it retains discretion to modulate penalties where sector-specific financial distress is demonstrably acute, balancing effective deterrence with proportionality.