International Fraud & Asset Tracing 2026 Comparisons

There are many judgments in Israeli case law relating to acts of fraud, including serious fraud, bribery, forgery and theft, and less extreme cases such as misrepresentations or breaches of fiduciary duties (of corporate officers, custodians, trustees, etc). Someone who is injured by an act of fraud is entitled to relief under Israeli law, according to the general approach of Israeli law that “where there is a right, there is also a remedy” (ubi ius ibi remedium). The specific cause of action can be found in various statutes, whether general ones such as the Torts Ordinance, the Contracts Law or the Unjust Enrichment Law, or specific legislative frameworks such as the Companies Law, the Securities Law, the Agency Law, the Trust Law, the Mutual Trust Law, etc.

These lawsuits, in which the plaintiff alleges fraud, misrepresentation, malice or undue influence, require a particularly high standard of proof that exceeds the one required in an ordinary civil claim (although not the standard of proof of beyond all reasonable doubt, which is required in criminal proceedings). Therefore, these claims are often filed after the defendant has already been convicted in a criminal proceeding: under Section 42A of the Evidence Ordinance, the findings and conclusions of a final criminal judgment convicting a defendant will be admissible in a civil trial as prima facie evidence of the matters determined. This eliminates the need to re-establish the defendant’s liability. As a rule, and wherever possible, it is recommended that clients who have fallen victim to fraud file civil proceedings before criminal proceedings are commenced in order to secure access to the fraudster’s assets and recover from them before they are seized by law enforcement authorities.

The crime of bribery is regarded as one of the most serious economic crimes and has been described by the Supreme Court as “the worst crime that corrupts the integrity of the civil service.” There are many civil causes of action that are available to a company when one of its officers accepts a bribe: the torts stated in the Torts Ordinance, namely fraud, theft and negligence; breaches of fiduciary duties and statutory duties, and unjust enrichment. According to the case law of the Supreme Court, “It is self-evident that the court will not be sympathetic to someone who takes a bribe, not for personal reasons but for reasons in the public interest and public ethics… It is therefore natural that the courts will also treat someone who gave a bribe severely in a civil proceeding filed against him and make it as easy as possible for the plaintiff to prove his damage” (CA 711/72 Naftali Meyer v Jewish Agency for Israel [1974] IsrSC 28(1) 393, 402).

Moreover, someone who has been injured by a bribe is entitled to sue the person who received a bribe for the amount that they received, even without proving that the plaintiff suffered damage, based on the principle that “no wrongdoer should be allowed to profit from his own wrongdoing.” Thus, for example, in one case, the State filed a civil lawsuit against a person who was convicted of taking bribes in return for information that came into his possession in the course of carrying out his duties (advance information about the making of surprise inspections). In that case, the Supreme Court held that the defendant enriched himself at the State’s expense and therefore could be held liable under unjust enrichment law. However, it was also held that even if the defendant had not enriched himself at the State’s expense, he could be held liable under the principle that no wrongdoer should profit from their own wrongdoing.

Another basis for holding someone who took a bribe liable is the law of fiduciary duties. The law recognises that in certain cases a person has a fiduciary duty towards others. This is the case in the relationship between an agent and their principal, between a manager and the corporation, between a trustee and a beneficiary, and other situations in which the interests of one person have been entrusted to another. When someone breaches a fiduciary duty, they may be deprived of the profit they made by breaching the duty, and the profit may be transferred to the person to whom they owed a fiduciary duty.

Since there are causes of action in tort against the fraudster, there is nothing to prevent suing anyone who aided them in the act of fraud. The liability of the aider is stated in Section 12 of the Torts Ordinance [New Version], according to which “someone who participates in, aids, advises or induces an act or omission that was done or is about to be done by another, or commands, permits or ratifies them, will be liable for them.” The aider’s liability does not derogate from the fraudster’s liability, and they are jointly and severally liable to the injured party. The condition for imposing liability on an aider is that they contributed to the commission of the tort, that they are aware of (or even merely turned a blind eye to) the wrongful conduct, and the aider materially contributed to the commission of the tort.

Anyone who bought or received an asset from someone who obtained the asset fraudulently will be liable to return the property to its lawful owner, since it is a basic principle that no one can pass on to another more rights than they have (nemo dat quod non habet). The exception to this is the “market overt” doctrine, which is stated in various statutes of which the best known is the Sale Law, according to which if anyone buys a tangible asset (but not a right) for consideration from someone who is in the business of selling assets of that type, in the ordinary course of business, received it and acted in good faith, their right will prevail over the right of the person from whom the asset was taken unlawfully (such as by fraud or theft).

The usual limitation period in civil claims is seven years. However, Section 7 of the Prescription Law provides that “the running of limitations for a claim will be suspended as long as the plaintiff does not file a claim because the defendant, or someone acting on his behalf, knowingly misleads the plaintiff, exerts force on him, threatens him or takes advantage of his distress.” This Section was amended in 2015 and expanded the old section that only dealt with a claim based on fraud. The courts tend to construe the law so that claims of fraud are not dismissed because of limitations. Therefore, it was held that in order for the limitation period to start, actual and subjective knowledge of the fraud is required, rather than the objective knowledge of a reasonable person. Only knowledge that can be established by evidence in court will be regarded as actual knowledge, whereas suspicions are insufficient to fulfil the requirement of subjective knowledge. It was further held that “the court should not go out of its way to dismiss a case against a fraudster because of limitations, and any doubt should work against the fraudster” (CA 4683/16 Israel Electric Corporation Ltd v Estate of the late Asher Cohen (23 January 2019)).

Another relevant section is Section 8 of the Prescription Law, which provides that if the facts constituting the cause of action were unknown to the plaintiff, for reasons beyond their control and which could not have been prevented even with reasonable care, the limitations period will begin to run on the date on which the facts became known to the plaintiff. Therefore, as long as the plaintiff does not know the facts that constitute a cause of action of fraud, the limitations period does not begin to run.

The right of tracing is recognised in Israel. As part of the tracing process, a new asset is identified as a potential subject of a lawsuit based on its being a substitute for an original asset that was itself the subject of the lawsuit. The new asset replaces the old one and may therefore be exposed to the same lawsuits. A distinction should be made between “tracing” and “following’: in the “following” process, the goal is physically to locate a specific tangible object that has passed from hand to hand. In such a case, the plaintiff’s goal is to realise their right in relation to the original object. Their right in such a case is based on their property right in the object. On the other hand, in the “tracing” process, the focus is on the substitute asset that came into the hands of the original holder instead of the previous asset, and the plaintiff’s right is based on the laws of unjust enrichment.

One way or another, an order may be obtained to return the asset to the plaintiff whose property was stolen, provided that the original property or the substitute asset is identifiable. Funds can be traced even if they have mixed with other money.

The right of tracing is overridden by someone who bought the asset in market overt, provided the conditions for the acquisition are met, especially the purchase of the asset for consideration and in good faith. Moreover, according to the Unjust Enrichment Law, the court has discretion not to order restitution when the restitution is unjust, but only when the claim is not a proprietary claim. Thus, for example, if A stole an asset from B and sold it to C in conditions that do not constitute market overt, A can sue for the asset, and the court cannot exempt C from restitution. However, if A stole an asset from B, sold it and gave the sale proceeds to C, here too A can sue C for the money, but the court can exempt C from restitution if it is found to be unjust.

Unlike in tort law, which focuses on the damage suffered by the plaintiff, unjust enrichment law focuses on the benefit received by the defendant and provides that it should be returned to the plaintiff. Therefore, in so far as profits accrued from the stolen property before it was returned to the plaintiff, the plaintiff will also be entitled to those profits.

There is no obligation in Israel to conduct preliminary proceedings before filing a fraud claim.

In a fraud claim filed in court, as in any other civil lawsuit, the plaintiff may petition the court for temporary orders that will preserve the status quo. As a rule, a motion for a temporary order should be filed after a statement of claim has been filed (or at the same time that it is filed), but in urgent cases, this can be done even before the lawsuit is filed, provided that the lawsuit is filed within seven days of the date on which the order is given or within any other period ordered by the court.

The customary order for seizing assets is an order for a temporary lien on the defendant’s assets held by them or by a third party. Beyond that, it is possible to obtain:

• a temporary injunction (including a Mareva order);
• a temporary receivership order (in which it is possible to obtain powers to enter premises, seize assets, search computers, etc);
• an order to seize evidence in the defendant’s possession or control; and
• an order preventing the defendant from leaving the country.

Most of these orders do not require the defendant’s co-operation, but if a defendant violates an order made against them, contempt of court proceedings can be filed against them, which allows the imposition of sanctions including a fine or imprisonment.

The application of interim orders is territorial. However, a Mareva order effectively also allows for the seizure of assets outside the jurisdiction, because it is a personal order that prohibits the debtor, who is within the jurisdiction, from disposing of their assets, irrespective of their location.

No fee is payable for filing a motion for a temporary order, but a fee is payable for filing a lawsuit in court. In the case of a pecuniary claim, a fee of 2.5% of the amount claimed (up to approximately NIS28.5 million, and 1% of the amount claimed above that) is payable; half the fee is payable upon filing the claim, and the other half is payable before the trial hearings begin.

A motion for temporary relief filed in court should be accompanied by the applicant’s undertaking to compensate the person against whom the temporary order is made for any damage caused by the granting of the temporary relief if the relief will expire or will be limited in scope, as well as surety at the court’s discretion.

Interim orders can also be obtained in arbitration proceedings, but in this regard, a distinction should be made between ordinary arbitrations and international commercial arbitrations. In ordinary arbitrations, which are litigated under the Arbitration Law, 5728-1968, the court must be petitioned under Section 16 of the Arbitration Law to obtain interim relief. By contrast, international commercial arbitrations are not governed by the general Arbitration Law, but by the International Commercial Arbitration Law, 5784-2024, which authorises the panel of arbitrators to grant interim relief without requiring a petition to the court. This law adopted the model law formulated by the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL).

There is no recognised proceeding in Israel in which the defendant is required to declare their assets so that they can be seized to ensure the enforcement of the judgment. Instead, the plaintiff must locate the defendant’s assets and apply for their freezing to ensure the enforcement of the judgment. In most cases, locating the assets is done before the filing of the statement of claim through investigation firms. When the plaintiff knows of the existence of certain assets owned by the defendant, but does not know where they are located, they can request the appointment of a temporary receiver, who will be authorised, inter alia, to search for and locate the assets, to enter premises to locate and seize them, protect them, manage them, and, where appropriate, improve their value.

Section 123 of the Civil Procedure Regulations, 5779-2018, authorises the court to grant an Anton Piller order to appoint someone to seize evidence for the purpose of conducting a search, copying or seizing evidence in the respondent’s possession or control. Evidence is defined as “a document, including information stored on digital or electronic media, and objects, where there is a reasonable likelihood that they will be used as evidence in a lawsuit or they are necessary for adjudicating it.” The condition for granting the order is that the court is persuaded that there is a real concern that the respondent or someone else acting on their behalf may conceal the evidence, alter it or destroy it, and this will seriously impede the litigation of the proceeding or the discovery of the truth.

Like a temporary receiver, the person appointed to seize the evidence can also receive extensive powers, such as:

• the power to search for and locate the evidence;
• enter premises to locate and seize evidence;
• search computer material, copy documents stored on electronic media; and
• exercise any authority, power or right given to the owner or holder of the assets.

Naturally, the hearing of the motion to grant an order to seize evidence is generally ex parte, and the hearing in the presence of both parties is only held after the seizure of the evidence. Because of this, and because of the violation of privacy that such an order may cause, the courts are cautious in granting the order.

As stated, among the powers that can be given to the person appointed to seize evidence is the power to enter premises. The Regulations establish rules for entering premises, such as giving suitable notice to the person against whom the order was made and informing them of their right to consult a lawyer by telephone. At the request of the person responsible for the premises, the appointee should explain to them in clear language the meaning of the order and that refusing to allow it to be carried out constitutes contempt of court and may be used as evidence in the legal proceedings. Entering the premises should be done in the presence of the person responsible for the premises, as well as two witnesses who do not have a personal or professional relationship with any of the parties (unless the person responsible for the premises does not wish the presence of witnesses or the court orders otherwise for special reasons).

The conditions for conducting a search and the seizure of a computer and computer material are:

• explicit authorisation to perform the search and seizure;
• appointment by the court of an experienced officeholder to perform the search (unless the person responsible for the premises agreed to perform the search themself); and
• ensuring that, during the search, no access is permitted to information from communications between computers (unless the person responsible for the premises is the one who performs the search).

As a rule, a court in Israel will not issue an order against a third party who is not a party to the legal proceedings ordering them to disclose documents and evidence. The usual way of obtaining documents in the possession of a third party is by summoning them to testify through the court, while specifying that they are required to bring the requested documents with them. The court has the power to order a third party to disclose and produce documents and evidence, but it will only use this in special and exceptional cases, and only after it has carefully and meticulously examined the facts of the case and ascertained that the requested disclosure is indeed related to the issues in dispute. The exceptional cases that have been recognised as allowing the use of this power include:

• when a claim is made of a conspiracy between the party to the proceeding and the third party;
• when the third party is owned or controlled by the party to the proceeding;
• when bank documents are requested, and prima facie evidence is presented that the bank account is in fact an account of the party to the proceeding, even though it is not registered in their name, or that the party transferred money to the third party’s account in bad faith and with the aim of concealing this fact, in co-operation with the account holder.

Israel’s Civil Procedure Regulations provide that motions for temporary relief are heard in the presence of both parties, but a court “may, for special reasons, grant temporary relief ex parte, if it is persuaded, based on sufficient evidence, that there is a reasonable concern that the delay caused by holding the hearing in the presence of the parties or serving the motion on the respondent will frustrate the purpose of the temporary relief or cause the applicant serious harm.” This rule, according to which the motion will be heard in the presence of both parties, does not apply to a motion for a temporary lien and a motion for seizing evidence, which will generally be heard ex parte.

In the decision granting provisional temporary relief (ie, relief granted ex parte, before the hearing in the presence of both parties), the court needs to schedule a hearing in the presence of all the parties as soon as possible and no later than 14 days after the provisional order was granted (unless it finds special reasons for ordering a later date). Notwithstanding, when a temporary lien order or seizure order is issued ex parte, the court will not schedule a hearing in the presence of both parties unless the respondent (or the holder) requests the cancellation of the order. A provisional order that is granted ex parte must be served on the other party without delay and no later than three days after the order was granted.

Someone who applies to the court ex parte has a greater duty of good faith, is required to disclose all the relevant details to the court, and if they are in doubt as to whether they should disclose any particular detail, they are required to disclose it. A lack of good faith or a failure to disclose a detail that should have been disclosed may result in the order being set aside.

Naturally, victims of fraud often file a complaint with the police. If an investigation is indeed opened, it often leads to a delay – sometimes for years – of the hearing of civil proceedings (usually at the request of the State Attorney’s Office), for fear of disrupting the investigation and the criminal proceedings. As part of criminal proceedings, the police often seize the suspect’s property. For these reasons, it is often recommended to file civil proceedings and not initiate criminal proceedings, which may delay the civil proceedings and harm the victim’s chances of recovering assets from the fraudster.

When the statement of claim has been properly served on the defendant, and they do not file a statement of defence on time, the court may be petitioned to grant judgment based on the statement of claim. In such a case, the court may require the plaintiff to provide sufficient proof of the claim, in whole or in part, or give judgment based on the statement of claim alone.

The defendant may petition the court to cancel a judgment given in the absence of a defence. Such a motion will be granted if the defendant proves that the statement of claim was not properly served on them. Even if the service was duly effected, the court has discretion to set aside the judgment, especially if the likelihood of success of the defence is high. The courts in Israel “do not like” judgments given in the absence of a defence, and they tend to grant motions to cancel such judgments, while compensating the plaintiff for the damage caused to them by the defendant’s procedural failure by awarding costs.

Moreover, when a statement of defence is filed, and the court finds that the statement of defence does not show any defence, it has the power at a pre-trial hearing to grant judgment accepting the claim. Exercising this power is exceptional and will be done only when there is no doubt that the defence has no chance of success.

As stated in 1.1 General Characteristics of Fraud Claims, lawsuits in which the plaintiff claims fraud, misrepresentation, malice or undue influence require a particularly high standard of proof, which exceeds the standard of proof required in an ordinary civil claim. Such claims – as well as pleadings of conspiracy, deliberate deception, breach of fiduciary duties, illegal withdrawal of money, etc – also require greater factual details in the plaintiff’s written pleadings, including the full details and their dates. The logic of this is that such claims tarnish a person’s reputation, and in some cases, the commission of the alleged act also constitutes a criminal offence. Such claims should not be raised in vague terms, and the party against whom the claim is made should be given the information that will enable them to understand the case against them. Without details, the court may refuse to hear the claim, which means that the claim may be dismissed.

The question of whether it is possible to file a lawsuit in Israel against an anonymous person whose identity is unknown was addressed by the Supreme Court in one case, where anonymous messages defaming someone were published on the internet, and they sought to file a lawsuit under the Prohibition of Defamation Law (LCA 4447/07 Rami Mor v Barak ITC [1995] International Telecommunication Services Ltd. (25 March 2010)). It was held (by a majority) that a lawsuit cannot be filed in Israel against a person whose identity is unknown. Israeli law does not allow this, and even explicitly provides that the plaintiff must state the defendant’s name, as well as their identity number, address and telephone number, if they can be ascertained.

Following this ruling, the Copyright Law was amended by adding a specific arrangement that allows the District Court to order the disclosure of the identity of a person who performs actions that constitute copyright infringement through an electronic communications network. This procedure allows the applicant, who claims a copyright infringement, to petition the court to order a third party (such as an internet service provider) to provide information that will help to identify the infringer, subject to certain conditions such as a real concern of infringement and the likelihood that the claim will be decided in the applicant’s favour.

A witness who is lawfully summoned and fails to appear to testify may be subject to various sanctions. The first of these is a subpoena, which orders the witness to be brought before the court. The order is carried out by the police, who may arrest the witness and bring them before the court. Moreover, the court may fine a recalcitrant witness and even make an imprisonment order against them. If the court has a reason to believe that a person summoned to testify or produce a document will not appear or produce the document, it may order the witness to provide surety or make any order it thinks fit to ensure that they appear, including the deposit of a passport and an order prohibiting them from leaving the country. Failure to appear to testify is also a criminal offence.

Section 47 of the Israeli Companies Law provides that “The actions and intentions of an organ are the actions and intentions of the company.” This adopts the doctrine known as the “doctrine of organs,” according to which human qualities of thought and action may be attributed to a corporation, even though it is not a human being. Therefore, according to the case law of the Supreme Court, when an officer of a company commits an act of fraud, the company can also be found liable (in addition to finding the officer liable), provided that the officer’s act was done in the course of performing their duties and was done for the benefit of the corporation (or at least was not directed against it). The test of whether the act was done in the course of the officer performing their duties is a broad one: whether they acted in their capacity as a “corporate individual” rather than as a private individual.

In addition to liability by virtue of the doctrine of organs, vicarious liability can sometimes be attributed to a company because of the acts of persons who acted on its behalf. Thus, for example, a company may be liable under the Torts Ordinance for a tort that was committed by one of its employees (even if they are not an organ) or by an agent.

A finding that a company is liable does not mean that its organs have no liability for their actions, nor does it grant them immunity in torts. If an officer, in their position in the company, deceives, misleads, misrepresents, conducts negotiations in bad faith, performs a contract in bad faith, etc, they will be personally liable, whether the company is also liable or not. Moreover, Section 6 of the Israeli Companies Law provides the doctrine of raising the veil, according to which a court may attribute a debt of a company to a shareholder if it finds that it is just and right to do so in the circumstances of the case, in the exceptional case where the company’s separate legal personality is used, inter alia, to defraud someone. This section is intended to prevent shareholders from hiding behind the corporate veil in order to avoid being sued by victims of fraud.

By means of a derivative action, a shareholder or director can compel the company to sue its officers when they caused damage to the company. This tool is intended to solve the representative problem, which arises when the directors themselves caused damage to the company. A shareholder (or director) who wishes to file a derivative action is usually required to write first to the company and demand that it enforces its rights by filing a lawsuit. If this demand is refused (or ignored), the court can be petitioned to allow the filing of a derivative action. The court will certify the motion if it is persuaded that the claim and its litigation are in the company’s best interest and the plaintiff is not acting in bad faith.

Usually, even before the motion for a derivative claim is filed, a motion for discovery relating to the process of approving the derivative claim is filed in court. This motion will be approved if the court is persuaded that there is a preliminary basis in evidence regarding the conditions for certifying the derivative claim.

Upon certification of the motion to file a derivative action, the applicant files the claim and litigates it on behalf of the company. At the end of the lawsuit, the court awards attorney’s fees, which are usually paid by the company, as well as remuneration for the plaintiff who took the trouble to file and litigate the derivative claim. These amounts are usually determined as a percentage of the benefit derived by the company from the claim.

Naturally, there is nothing to prevent suing a foreign individual or corporation in Israel, or to join a foreign individual or corporation as a defendant together with Israeli defendants. The jurisdiction over the foreign party is acquired by serving the statement of claim on that party. If the defendant has a representative in Israel, it can simply be served on the representative. If not, the documents must be served outside the jurisdiction. According to the 2018 Regulations, it is no longer necessary to obtain the court’s approval in advance for serving a party outside Israel, but there is a long list of cases where a party may serve a statement of claim outside the jurisdiction. What these cases have in common is the existence of a certain connection to Israel, whether a personal connection of the defendant or a substantive connection relating to the cause of action.

However, it is still necessary to apply to the court to order the way in which service will be performed, and the court has the authority to prevent service of the documents. The court will not prevent service outside the jurisdiction if it finds that the claim satisfies one of the grounds stated in the Regulations as allowing service outside the country, and it is not a frivolous or vexatious claim.

In addition, the court needs to be persuaded that the State of Israel is the proper forum for litigating the proceeding. This last condition gives the court discretion not to assume jurisdiction over the case, if the natural forum for hearing the case is not Israel. The decisive criteria in this context is “the most connections test,” in which the facts indicating a connection between the parties or the subject-matter of the claim and the competing forums are examined. The considerations taken into account include the place where the events occurred, the domicile and business of the parties, access to evidence and witnesses, the law governing the case and the efficiency of the hearing.

Israel, like dozens of other countries, is a signatory to the Convention on the Service Abroad of Judicial and Extrajudicial Documents in Civil or Commercial Matters, which was concluded in The Hague in November 1965. The Convention was ratified and incorporated into Israeli law by means of the Regulations for the Implementation of the Convention, which allow for the service of documents in member states of the Convention (including the United States and all European Union member states). One of the ways listed in the Convention is service by mail. Courts in Israel also recognise service through an international courier company, by personal delivery with confirmation of service, as an alternative to service by mail.

There are several countries that are signatories to the Convention (such as Germany, the Czech Republic, Greece, Lithuania, Poland and Slovakia) that have had reservations about the clause that allows service by mail. In order to serve a statement of claim on a defendant who is in any of these countries, the approval of the Courts Administrator in Israel should be obtained, according to which the service request complies with the provisions of the Convention and the Regulations, and the document should be served through the Courts Administration in Israel to the central authority in the destination country.

Enforcement of a judgment in Israel is done through the Enforcement Office. Usually, 30 days after judgment is given, an enforcement file can be opened against the defendant, and if the defendant does not comply with the judgment within 20 days, enforcement proceedings can be filed against them, such as:

• imposing liens on movable property, real estate, and money held by a third party;
• imposing various restrictions (such as restrictions on passports, leaving Israel and the use of debit cards);
• appointing a receiver; and
• eviction proceedings, and other similar measures.

To enforce an arbitration award, the award must first be approved by the court. This is a simple procedure, which may be lengthened if the defendant files a motion to cancel the arbitration award. In a motion to cancel an arbitration award, the court does not act as an appellate court with respect to the arbitrator, and it only needs to consider whether there were defects, such as that there was no valid arbitration agreement at all, that the arbitrator exceeded his authority, that the content of the award is contrary to public policy, etc. When an arbitration award is approved, it can be enforced at the Enforcement Office.

When the court granted a temporary lien order or a temporary injunction (including a Mareva order), and the plaintiff wins the case, the orders become final and will continue to remain in effect until the judgment is performed (or until a further order of the court), in order to bridge the period of time between the giving of the judgment and the opening of the enforcement file and prevent the concealment of assets at this stage.

Even if temporary orders were not requested or granted, the court may grant relief to ensure the performance of the judgment, when giving the judgment or immediately thereafter. Such a motion, for relief when the judgment is given or shortly thereafter, does not require the deposit of any surety or undertaking by the applicant (unlike in the case of a motion for temporary relief).

A foreign judgment is enforced by filing a lawsuit petitioning the court to declare the foreign judgment enforceable. The conditions for enforcing a foreign judgment are:

• the judgment was given in a country whose laws authorise the courts to give it;
• the judgment cannot be appealed;
• the obligation in the ruling is enforceable according to the laws of Israel and its content is not contrary to public policy; and
• the judgment is enforceable in the country where it was given.

When a judgment is declared enforceable, it can be enforced at the Enforcement Office like any Israeli judgment.

A foreign arbitration award is enforced in Israel according to the provisions of the Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards (the New York Convention), to which Israel is a party. According to this Convention, the award is submitted to the court, which will approve the award unless the respondent proves any of the conditions stated in Article 5 of the Convention, which are:

• the arbitration agreement is invalid or the parties to it were under some incapacity;
• a party was unable to present their case in the arbitration proceeding;
• the award does not fall within the terms of the submission to arbitration, or it contains decisions on matters beyond the scope of the submission to arbitration;
• the award is not in accordance with the arbitration arrangements agreed by the parties, or failing such agreement, is not in accordance with the law of the country where the arbitration took place;
• the award is not valid because it has been set aside or it is not final according to the law in the country where it was given;
• the subject matter of the dispute cannot be decided by arbitration; or
• the recognition or enforcement of the award is contrary to public policy.

The right to remain silent is limited to criminal proceedings – to a suspect in a police investigation and a defendant in an indictment – but not to a party or witness in a civil trial. By contrast, everyone has a right to immunity against self-incrimination, which is enshrined in Section 47 of the Evidence Ordinance, which provides that “a person is not obligated to give evidence if it involves an admission of a fact that it is one of the elements of a criminal offence of which he has been or may be indicted.”

According to the case law of the Supreme Court, immunity from self-incrimination allows a litigant in a civil proceeding to refuse to answer a question asked in interrogatories or to disclose a document that they claim is protected by privilege. In such a case, the other party may object to this by filing a motion petitioning the court to determine whether the privilege does indeed apply, and for this purpose, the court may review the document. If the court orders the question to be answered or the document to be disclosed, it may not be used in a criminal proceeding unless the accused consents.

Even if the right to insist on privilege against self-incrimination is given to a party in a civil proceeding, it is not necessarily advisable for them to insist on this right, since a party’s refusal to answer questions or disclose documents can be taken into account when assessing the credibility and weight of their testimony, because in a civil proceeding, the parties need to “show their cards” (and for the same reason, they need to disclose all the relevant documents to the other party).

Section 48 of the Evidence Ordinance provides the well-known privilege of “statements and documents exchanged between a lawyer and his client or another person on behalf of the client and which have an objective connection to the professional service provided by the lawyer to the client.” This is an absolute privilege, which cannot be set aside even by a court order, but it does not extend to a lawyer’s advice to their client on how to commit a future offence. Such advice has no objective connection to the professional service provided by a lawyer to the client and is not included at all in the scope of the privilege (in the words of the Supreme Court in CrimA 670/80 Baruch Abuhatzeira v State of Israel: “This is a purely criminal and illegal matter, which is very far from what the legislature intended to protect by means of the privilege between a client and a lawyer and his employees”). Certainly, an agreement between a lawyer and their client for the two of them to commit a criminal offence is unrelated to professional services and is not privileged. Information that a client gives to their lawyer about their intentions and plans to commit an offence in the future is also not privileged information. Moreover, if a client tells a lawyer of their intention to commit a felony, and the lawyer does not prevent the commission of the offence, they commit a criminal offence.

The rule is that a person is only liable to pay compensation for the damage they caused. However, there are some specific laws in Israel that give explicit authority to award punitive (or exemplary) damages, ie, compensation that does not have a “remedial” or “corrective” basis but punishes the tortfeasor by requiring them to pay compensation that exceeds the amount of the damage. Thus, for example, the Patent Law entitles the patent owner to punitive damages if the patent was infringed after the infringer was warned of the infringement. The Compensation for Victims of Terrorism (Punitive Damages) Law entitles the heirs of a victim of terrorism to compensation in a sum of NIS10 million, in addition to any other damages awarded, from someone who transferred money to the perpetrator of the terrorist act. The Consumer Protection Law entitles the consumer to punitive damages in a sum of NIS10,000 if the dealer breaches certain consumer obligations.

Moreover, as early as the 1950s, the courts in Israel recognised the possibility of ordering a tortfeasor to pay punitive damages, even without an express provision of statute to this effect. This power is exercised in rare cases involving a particularly severe injury, accompanied by a high degree of fault, when the tortfeasor’s behaviour is abhorrent and reprehensible. Fraud or forgery are obvious cases that satisfy these conditions and in which courts have awarded punitive damages.

A bank owes its customers a duty of confidentiality, according to which it is prohibited from disclosing information about customers to third parties. A distinction should be made between bank confidentiality, which applies outside legal proceedings, and banking privilege, which relates to legal proceedings. This privilege is not determined by statute, but is the product of case law, and it is therefore a relative privilege, ie, it can be removed in certain conditions. The privilege, which also applies after the death of the account holder, derives from the contractual duty of confidentiality that a bank owes its customer, together with the general statutory confidentiality provision determined in the Protection of Privacy Law.

When it determines whether the privilege should be removed, the court will strike a balance between the following considerations:

• the importance of the information to deciding the dispute;
• the existence of evidence that justifies the disclosure;
• the lack of alternative that will not invade privacy; and
• the scope of the disclosure needed to do justice.

When the confidential banking information relates to a party (to the legal proceeding), the starting point is that the interest of disclosure, which is required to hold a proper judicial proceeding, outweighs the privacy interest of the party. This is certainly the case when there are claims of fraud.

By contrast, when the protected information belongs to a third party who is not a party to the proceeding, a disclosure order will only be made in rare and exceptional circumstances. Usually, there is no reason to order the disclosure of bank accounts of someone who is not a party to the proceeding, except in the case of a concern of collusion between the party and the account holder, such as a concern that the account is in the name of a straw man but actually belongs to the party, or that the party is the person depositing the money into the account. Where the party acts in the account of a third party as if it were their own by means of a power of attorney, or in a case where the third party is a company owned or controlled by the party to the proceeding, the court will also tend to order the disclosure of the account. As a rule, a third party who is likely to be harmed by the disclosure order should be allowed to present their case regarding the disclosure.

Crypto-assets, such as wallets and digital currencies, are assets like any other and can be seized, attached and used to recover by a judicial order. The police and prosecuting authorities routinely seize wallets containing digital currencies as part of investigations and criminal proceedings, and there is also no impediment to doing this by means of temporary orders in civil proceedings, and naturally to realising these assets in enforcement proceedings.