Real Estate Litigation 2026 Comparisons

Last Updated March 12, 2026

Contributed By Eversheds Sutherland

Law and Practice

Authors



Eversheds Sutherland has a true partner-led full-service real estate team (the only one of all international firms in the Netherlands), with partner-led practices in real estate (two partners), real estate litigation (three partners), real estate transactions (three partners), real estate finance (three partners), planning and environment (one partner), real estate tax (one partner), real estate notary (one partner), energy (one partner) and corporate real estate (one partner) – altogether, ten partners who cover the full range of real estate and a team of 30+ lawyers overall. The lawyers seamlessly work together, as well as on an international level, having offices all over the globe (70+), especially in Europe, the USA, the Middle East and Asia. The firm represents the full range of international investors, financial institutions, internationally operating corporates, project developers and hyperscalers. As a leading global law firm, Eversheds Sutherland provides legal advice and solutions to an international client base that includes some of the world’s largest multinationals.

Dutch tenancy law distinguishes between residential leases, office space and retail/hospitality commercial space, each governed by a different statutory regime. In practice, most leases – across all property types – are based on the standard forms issued by the Dutch Real Estate Council (Raad voor Onroerende Zaken– ROZ), which add detailed contractual provisions to supplement the statutory framework.

Under the Dutch Civil Code (DCC), a tenant is bound by the statutory duty of good tenancy (Article 7:213 DCC). In addition, Article 7:220 of the DCC obliges tenants to co‑operate with urgent works and renovations. For residential leases based on the 2025 ROZ model agreement, Article 12.1 of the ROZ’s General Provisions also specifically requires the tenant to provide the landlord access for inspections of the premises. The same provision applies for retail leases based on the 2025 ROZ model agreement, as included in Article 27 of the General Provisions. For office leases based on the 2025 ROZ model agreement, this provision is included in Article 16.1 of the General Provisions.

If a tenant unlawfully obstructs access, the landlord may bring summary proceedings (kort geding) seeking:

  • a mandatory injunction ordering access on set dates;
  • a penalty (dwangsom) per day of non‑compliance; and
  • cost orders.

These are standard provisional measures when urgent action is needed.

Regulators have powers to enter a leased premises independently of the landlord based on Article 18.7 of the Environmental Act (Omgevingswet) – for example, to conduct inspections related to building safety or housing standards. However, a regulator or municipal enforcement officer cannot compel access on behalf of the landlord in the landlord–tenant relationship.

In an emergency – such as a gas leak, burst pipe or acute electrical hazard – the tenant’s refusal to grant entry conflicts with:

  • the statutory duty of good tenancy (Article 7:213 DCC); and
  • the obligation to co-operate with urgent works (Article 7:220(1) DCC).

Both provisions require tenants to behave reasonably and to allow access where urgent works cannot be postponed without detriment. For residential leases based on the 2025 ROZ model agreement, Article 12.1 of the General Provisions also specifically requires the tenant to provide the landlord access for inspections of the premises. The same provision applies for retail leases based on the 2025 ROZ model agreement, as included in Article 27 of the General Provisions. For office leases based on the 2025 ROZ model agreement, in the event of an emergency, the landlord is entitled to access the premises without prior consent of the tenant pursuant to Article 16.2 of the General Provisions.

If a landlord cannot access the premises, the landlord may bring summary proceedings (kort geding) to obtain a mandatory access order on short notice. Dutch courts routinely grant such provisional measures.

If a tenant’s refusal to grant access leads to conditions that impede neighbouring units (for example, water damage, hazardous electrics or mould), the following tracks of liability can be pursued:

  • Contractual breach towards the landlord: The refusal will generally constitute a breach of the tenant’s lease obligations. See 1.1.2 Emergency Access for potential breaches.
  • Tort towards neighbours: Independently, the conduct may qualify as an unlawful act under Article 6:162 of the DCC in light of neighbour law: an occupier may not cause unlawful nuisance to neighbours (Article 5:37 DCC).
  • Landlord’s liability to the renting neighbour (defect): If the nuisance from one tenant impairs another tenant’s enjoyment of the leased premises, that impairment may constitute a “defect” for which the landlord may be liable vis‑à‑vis the affected tenant.

See 1.1.1 Remedies for Landlords Denied Access for Repairs for available remedies in summary proceedings.

Tenants have several remedies when their landlord engages in conduct intended to frustrate or impede their tenancy.

Under Dutch tenancy law, a landlord must ensure a tenant’s undisturbed enjoyment of the leased premises. Conduct that disrupts this right may constitute a breach of the landlord’s obligations under the statutory defect regime (Articles 7:204–7:206 DCC), which requires the landlord to remedy defects and refrain from actions that hinder the tenant’s normal use of the property. Harassment may also amount to an unlawful act under Article 6:162 of the DCC, enabling claims for both injunctive relief and damages. Importantly, pursuant to case law and literature, the landlord may not unilaterally suspend the obligation to provide the premises, even if the tenant is allegedly in default.

A tenant facing obstructive behaviour may initiate summary proceedings (kort geding) to seek:

  • a prohibitory injunction preventing further harassment;
  • a mandatory injunction compelling the landlord to comply with statutory or contractual duties;
  • a penalty (dwangsom) to secure compliance; and
  • if needed, a merits action for damages.

Courts regularly use provisional remedies where urgent intervention is needed.

In addition to civil law remedies, residential tenants benefit from public law protections. The Good Landlordship Act (Wet goed verhuurderschap) expressly prohibits harassment, discrimination and improper landlord conduct, allowing tenants to report violations to the municipality, which may issue sanctions or administrative fines.

The legal status of a residential unit – whether regulated (social or mid-rent) or liberalised (see 1.3.1 Statutory Tenancies: Types and Differences) – does not fundamentally alter a tenant’s core remedies against a landlord who impedes their lawful use of the premises. Dutch law provides all residential tenants with a right to undisturbed enjoyment under the statutory defect regime (Articles 7:204–7:206 DCC) and allows them to seek injunctions and damages where the landlord’s conduct interferes with that enjoyment. These private-law remedies apply across all residential categories.

However, the regulatory frameworks that accompany rent‑controlled and mid‑rent units do enhance the tenant’s practical leverage in disputes. In regulated tenancies, the Rent Tribunal (Huurcommissie) can temporarily reduce the rent where serious defects persist, thereby creating direct financial pressure on landlords to remedy issues. The Rent Tribunal’s jurisdiction over defects and rent levels is broader in regulated segments, making it a more accessible recourse for tenants in those units.

A regulatory or municipal determination that a landlord has harassed tenants of a residential unit can lead to significant administrative, financial and legal consequences under Dutch law.

Under the Good Landlordship Act, municipalities are empowered to take enforcement action against landlords who engage in harassment, intimidation, discrimination or other improper rental practices. Following a regulatory finding, the municipality may impose administrative fines, formal warnings and binding compliance orders.

A formal regulatory finding of harassment can significantly strengthen a tenant’s position in civil proceedings. Courts give weight to official findings, particularly where the conduct involves intimidation or deliberate obstruction of essential services or access.

The Netherlands has a statutory system of regulated residential tenancies, commonly referred to as rent-controlled/regulated social or mid-rent units. These statutory tenancies differ primarily from the free sector through mandatory rent regulation, enhanced tenant protections and the application of the Housing Valuation System (Woningwaarderingsstelsel – WWS).

  • Regulated social units: The core category of statutory tenancy is social housing, consisting of houses that fall below the WWS liberalisation threshold of 187 WWS points under the current rules. These units are subject to strict rent caps, where the maximum lawful rent is determined by the WWS points assigned to the house based on size, amenities, energy label, location and municipally assessed property value (WOZ waarde). Social sector rents are tightly regulated, and housing associations must allocate the majority of these units to households within statutory income limits.
  • Regulated mid-rent (middle segment) units: Since the entry into force of the Affordable Rent Act (Wet betaalbare huur) in July 2024, the Netherlands also recognises a mid-rent segment, which – like social housing – is fully regulated. Units in this category fall between 144 and 186 WWS points, with maximum rents likewise capped by the WWS. This regime was introduced to extend rent protection beyond the traditional social sector and applies to a significant share of newer and moderately priced houses.
  • Liberalised (free sector) units: Houses exceeding the liberalisation threshold – 144 WWS points or more – fall into the liberalised or free sector, where landlords may set the initial rent freely.

Key differences between statutory and liberalised tenancies are as follows:

  • Rent regulation: Social and mid-rent units are subject to binding rent caps under the WWS, while free sector units are not.
  • Rent Tribunal jurisdiction: Tenants in regulated units can challenge rent levels, defects and service charges at the Rent Tribunal, which can impose binding rent reductions. Free sector tenants have more limited access to the Rent Tribunal.
  • Allocation rules: Social housing is subject to strict income-based allocation rules and municipal oversight.

In the Netherlands, (statutory) residential tenancies are in principle renewed by default, meaning they continue indefinitely unless the landlord can rely on one of the exhaustive statutory grounds for termination set out in Article 7:274(1) of the DCC. These statutory grounds function as the exceptions to automatic renewal.

A landlord may therefore end a statutory tenancy only in the following situations:

  • Serious tenant misconduct (“not behaving as a good tenant”)
  • Urgent own use by the landlord
  • Refusal by the tenant to accept a reasonable new lease (excluding changes to rent or, in regulated tenancies, the service charges)
  • Implementation of zoning or planning objectives
  • Special cases involving non‑self‑contained units in the landlord’s own home
  • Temporary leases with a valid contractual end date (Diplomatenclausule)

Under Dutch law, there is no mechanism that allows a landlord to convert an existing statutory (regulated) residential tenancy into a free market (liberalised) tenancy while the same tenant remains in occupation. The legal regime that applies to a house – regulated (social or mid‑rent) or liberalised – depends primarily on the WWS points score and on the initial rent at the start of the tenancy, not on a landlord’s unilateral decision. Once a tenancy has begun under a regulated regime (because the initial rent was below the liberalisation threshold), the landlord cannot “opt out” of rent regulation during that tenancy.

A house can enter the free sector only when (i) the most recent tenancy has ended and (ii) the house then scores above the liberalisation threshold (187 WWS points or more), enabling the landlord to set a free market initial rent for the next tenant. In practice, this typically occurs after substantial improvements or renovations that increase the WWS score.

In the Netherlands, statutory (regulated) residential tenancies are monitored and enforced through a combination of national regulatory bodies and municipal authorities.

The Rent Tribunal is the principal specialised body responsible for supervising many aspects of mostly regulated tenancies, including social and mid-rent units. It offers a low-cost, accessible mechanism for resolving disputes. Key supervisory roles include:

  • Rent assessment: The Rent Tribunal determines whether the initial rent or current rent complies with the WWS points system, and may impose rent reductions for regulated units where the rent exceeds the lawful maximum.
  • Maintenance and defects: Tenants within regulated tenancies may request intervention if serious defects persist; the Rent Tribunal may temporarily reduce the rent until repairs are completed. It cannot compel repairs but its decisions create financial incentives for compliance.
  • Service charges: The Rent Tribunal adjudicates disputes regarding service cost settlements in regulated tenancies.

Municipalities have increasingly significant supervisory responsibilities, particularly following the Affordable Rent Act and the Good Landlordship Act:

Affordable Rent Act – Enforcement of Rent Regulation

Municipalities monitor compliance with the WWS-based rent caps applicable to social and mid-rent properties. Municipalities may:

  • enforce correct WWS calculations;
  • impose sanctions on landlords who charge unlawful regulated-sector rents; and
  • ensure landlords provide mandatory WWS point summaries with new leases.

Good Landlordship Act – Conduct Oversight

Under the Good Landlordship Act, municipalities supervise landlord conduct, focusing on:

  • harassment and intimidation;
  • discrimination;
  • excessive deposits and unlawful fees; and
  • transparency obligations in written rental agreements.

Upon finding violations, municipalities may impose compliance orders and administrative fines.

As a starting point, the landlord’s stated cure period is not decisive for the tenant’s obligations. Breaching a landlord’s unilaterally imposed cure period does not, by itself, give the landlord any legal title or authority to take enforcement measures such as eviction. As such, injunctive relief may not be necessary unless the landlord interferes with the tenant’s rights (eg, blocking access to the premises).

If such interference arises, a commercial tenant may initiate summary proceedings (kort geding) before the civil court to seek provisional relief preventing or stopping the landlord’s premature or unlawful actions.

Typical remedies include:

  • a prohibitory injunction preventing the landlord from acting unlawfully;
  • a mandatory injunction extending the cure period;
  • a penalty (dwangsom) to ensure the landlord complies with the court’s order; and
  • a later merits action (bodemprocedure) to confirm that no breach occurred or that the landlord acted unreasonably.

To succeed in summary proceedings, the commercial tenant must satisfy the established elements for preliminary relief under Dutch procedural law:

  • Urgency (spoedeisend belang)
  • A sufficiently plausible underlying right
  • A balancing of interests
  • Limited complexity

The mere fact that a tenant does not obtain injunctive relief before the expiry of a unilaterally imposed cure period does not automatically place the tenant in default. In any event, the length of such a cure period must be reasonable for default to arise, and the expiration of an arbitrary landlord-set deadline is not sufficient on its own.

Even if a reasonable cure period expires, the landlord cannot simply proceed as though termination or eviction automatically follows. A contract may only be dissolved if the breach justifies dissolution under Article 6:265 of the DCC, which requires a substantive assessment of the nature and seriousness of the default. In addition, lease agreements cannot be unilaterally terminated by the landlord without court involvement pursuant to Article 7:231 of the DCC. Thus, failure to obtain an injunction does not give the landlord an automatic title to remove the tenant or treat the lease as ended.

If the landlord nevertheless initiates steps following expiry of the cure period, the commercial tenant still has several meaningful legal options. These include defending the matter in merits proceedings (bodemprocedure). The tenant may also seek court‑ordered protection against eviction in summary proceedings. Parallel to litigation, the tenant may negotiate an extension or a formalised cure plan, particularly where remediation depends on third‑party input or reasonably requires more time than the landlord’s initial notice allowed.

A landlord who repeatedly serves default notices or notices to cure in bad faith – for example, to pressure the tenant, disrupt operations or fabricate grounds for termination – may be acting unlawfully under Dutch law. Tenants have several remedies to stop such conduct and protect the stability of their tenancy. They may pursue a claim based on, among others, the following legal bases:

  • Breach of good landlordship or of reasonableness and fairness: A landlord may be in breach where their conduct violates the standards of good landlordship and the overarching principles of reasonableness and fairness (redelijkheid en billijkheid) that govern contractual relationships. For example, in residential leases, Article 2(2)(b) of the Good Landlordship Act prohibits the landlord from intimidation of a tenant. In addition, standard Dutch case law recognises that both landlord and tenant must act in accordance with reasonableness and fairness in the performance of their contractual obligations.
  • Breach of the duty to ensure undisturbed enjoyment (Articles 7:203–7:204 DCC): A landlord must ensure the tenant’s quiet and undisturbed enjoyment of the premises. Repeated, unjustified cure notices may interfere with that right, particularly when they undermine the tenant’s ability to conduct business. The statutory defect regime – which protects tenants from disruptions attributable to the landlord – can therefore support both injunctive and compensatory claims.

In the Netherlands, both commercial and residential tenancies frequently rely on financial guarantees to secure the tenant’s obligations. The most common forms of guarantees are the bank guarantee, the security deposit, and the parent or corporate guarantee.

Bank Guarantees

A bank guarantee is a widely used form of security in commercial leases. In a bank guarantee, the bank irrevocably undertakes to pay the landlord if the tenant defaults on rent or other obligations. Dutch banks and the ROZ offer standardised rental guarantee formats specifically designed for lease arrangements.

It follows from Dutch case law that, after a tenant’s bankruptcy, a landlord cannot push “vacancy loss” on to the bankrupt estate. The estate only bears what the law allows (eg, rent during the short statutory notice period based on Article 39 of the Insolvency Act (Faillissementswet), so claims for longer‑term vacancy loss cannot be recovered from the estate. Because of this, banks narrowed their rental bank guarantees, and the ROZ updated its model agreement to expressly exclude certain insolvency‑related claims.

In line with this, if the tenant goes bankrupt, the landlord cannot claim vacancy loss from the insolvency estate but may still draw under the bank guarantee – provided that doing so does not prejudice the estate, in accordance with the criteria established in Dutch case law.

Security Deposits

A security deposit is the most common form of guarantee in residential leases and is also used in commercial tenancies. The deposit is typically one to three months’ rent, held by the landlord as security against damages or unpaid rent. Since 1 July 2023, under the Good Landlordship Act, residential landlords may request no more than two months’ basic rent as a security deposit.

Parent or Corporate Guarantees

In commercial leases, landlords often require a parent company guarantee. Although not regulated by statute, these are common contractual instruments in the Dutch market.

When a lease agreement requires a guarantee to be maintained for the duration of the lease, the earlier withdrawal or lapse of that guarantee constitutes a breach of the tenant’s obligations under the lease.

The contractual terms of the bank guarantee or corporate (parent/affiliate) guarantee determine whether, when and how a guarantor may bring their obligations to an end.

Bank Guarantees

In practice, most Dutch rental bank guarantees – particularly those based on the ROZ model agreement – are drafted as irrevocable and on‑demand. These guarantees are intended to remain in force until a clearly defined expiry event occurs.

Under the ROZ model bank guarantee, the guarantee remains effective until six months after the premises have been physically vacated by the tenant. Only after the six‑month period has lapsed does the guarantee terminate automatically. This means that revocation by the guarantor before that point is not possible.

Furthermore, in principle, when the landlord makes a call under an existing bank guarantee, the tenant is required to ensure that a new guarantee is issued to restore the agreed level of security under the lease.

Corporate Guarantees

For corporate guarantees (such as parent company guarantees), revocation also depends strictly on the text of the guarantee. Some corporate guarantees are drafted as continuing guarantees for the entire duration of the lease; others may include a contractual possibility for withdrawal, typically subject to notice requirements and often only taking effect after the landlord has been provided with alternative security.

Commercial vs Residential Tenancies

In commercial leases, guarantees – whether bank guarantees or parent guarantees – tend to be strictly irrevocable during the lease term. In residential tenancies, guarantees are less common, and landlords typically rely on security deposits which will be held by the landlord until the tenant has fulfilled all their obligations.

Bank guarantees, corporate guarantees or security deposits in general do not describe enforcement procedures available to creditors.

  • Bank guarantees used in rental situations are issued by Dutch banks in the form of standardised, irrevocable guarantee instruments, including rental guarantees. These documents describe the bank’s obligation to pay upon a claim. If the guarantor bank refuses to pay, the creditor may pursue summary proceedings (kort geding) to obtain a swift court order compelling payment.
  • Corporate (parent/affiliate) guarantees typically create a direct payment obligation of the guarantor towards the landlord. If the corporate guarantor fails to honour a demand, the creditor may likewise seek expedited relief through summary proceedings.
  • Security deposits are tenant‑funded and do not involve a guarantor. As such, no recovery procedure – expedited or otherwise – is applicable to them.

In the Netherlands, one of the main forms of in rem security rights is the right of mortgage, which can only be established by a notarial deed of mortgage, which should be executed by a civil law notary and registered in the relevant public registry. Once default occurs and any contractual conditions precedent are satisfied, the secured party may proceed with enforcement. Set out below are the three foreclosure processes: public auction, private sale and consensual sale.

Public Auction

A public auction before a civil law notary is the default method for the enforcement of a mortgage right. In this scenario, the security rights must be enforceable as a result of a payment default. In the event of an extension of the credit agreement or standstill, this is not the case.

  • The mortgagee is obliged to initiate the execution by giving notice thereof to the mortgagor, the borrower, and those whose rights or attachments are registered and whose rights will be extinguished or terminated by the execution sale.
  • The public auction itself will take place on a date as set by the notary. This auction date is set by the notary within 14 days after their appointment. The auction date will be determined on the basis of the type of property, relevant circumstances, etc.
  • No sale is permissible without an advance announcement of an auction. The auction must be announced at least 30 days in advance on an official auction website. The announcement will include details about the property, such as valuation, occupancy status and any rental agreements.
  • The creditor (eg, the lender) often retains a right of consideration, meaning they can decide within one to two days after the auction whether to accept the bid and award the property to the buyer.
  • The award (gunning) is recorded by the notary, who will also prepare the documentation for the settlement. The costs, levies and deposit must be paid within five working days after the auction. The purchase price must be paid no later than four to six weeks after the award. The notary will then make payments based on the final settlement statement. The amount received by the auctioning party is deducted from the outstanding claim; any shortfall is administratively converted into a residual claim. This residual claim is communicated to the borrower by letter.

Private Sale

It is, however, possible to deviate from public auction and sell the registered asset in a private sale. A private sale is more common, as it usually generates higher proceeds than a public auction. A private sale can only be initiated by the mortgagor, the mortgagee or the creditor that levied execution attachment(s). In order to initiate a private sale, it is mandatory to have first started with the process of a public auction. This private sale is subsequently initiated as follows:

  • A private offer can be submitted to the notary up to 14 days before the auction date. If accepted, the offer must be approved by the court in summary proceedings. The public auction will be put on hold.
  • The request for approval of the private offer must be submitted no later than seven days before the auction date with the competent court in summary proceedings.
  • Summary proceedings may be initiated with a minimum term for service of court documents of seven days (in exceptional urgent circumstances, this term can be shortened).
  • The hearing on the approval of the private offer will be planned within six weeks after the request thereto, depending on the urgency and availability of the court. During this hearing, the owner of the property and other interested parties such as tenants are heard by the court. In the context of maximising proceeds, interested parties are permitted to submit a higher bid and present it to the court.
  • The court may, at its discretion, approve the request. Judgment will be rendered either orally during the hearing or in writing within two weeks after the hearing. The judgment is final and cannot be appealed.

Consensual Sale

As a sale via public auction or private sale, if not performed with sufficient preparation and not in co-operation with the borrower, may negatively affect the proceeds, the mortgagee may choose not to enforce its right, but instead agree with the mortgagor that the latter will sell the property free of mortgage rights and that the proceeds will be allocated to the mortgagee in the form of a consensual sale. In this scenario, a payment default is not required. This scenario requires consent of all parties involved.

In the Netherlands, shares in a company can be pledged as security and can be enforced if the debtor defaults on its payment obligations, with enforcement generally being non-judicial in nature.

  • The default enforcement method is a public auction under the DCC, which does not require court involvement.
  • However, the parties may opt for a private sale, which requires prior approval from the preliminary relief judge.
  • The pledgee is also able to request “appropriation” (verblijf) of the pledged shares. Appropriation allows the pledgee to retain the shares instead of selling them, but this requires prior approval from the preliminary relief judge, who determines the value or the method of valuation for the appropriation.
  • Deviating from public auction is also possible by an agreement between the pledgor and pledgee after the right of pledge has become enforceable. In this case, no prior approval from the preliminary relief judge is required.

The process typically involves notification to the pledgor and, in the case of registered shares, the company, followed by sale of the shares and application of the proceeds to the secured obligations. While enforcement is primarily non-judicial, judicial involvement may arise only where a private sale is desired without post-default mutual agreement.

In the Netherlands, non-judicial enforcement of a mortgage or pledge requires formal notice to ensure that the debtor and other interested parties are informed.

  • For mortgages, the mortgagee must notify the mortgagor, borrower and any registered right holders at least 14 days before initiating enforcement, and a public auction must be announced at least 30 days in advance on an official auction website. Notice is typically served by a bailiff, with detailed information about the property and auction conditions.
  • For pledged shares, the pledgee must give written notice to the debtor, the pledgor and any subordinate right holders specifying the place, time and manner of sale, as well as the redemption price, at least three calendar days before the sale. Although the law provides no detailed rules on further publicity for a public auction of non-listed shares, case law requires that the notice period and advertising be sufficient to ensure a genuinely public sale and to enable value-maximising bids; very short timelines or minimal publication have been held inadequate. As no prior judicial review is required, the supervising bailiff or notary must verify compliance with these requirements and, in case of doubt about enforcement entitlement or the adequacy of notice, must refuse to act and seek court intervention.

Under Dutch law, a borrower does not have a statutory right of redemption once a foreclosure sale has been completed. The borrower may only avert a foreclosure prior to the public auction or private sale by (i) curing the default by paying all outstanding amounts owed to the mortgagee, (ii) entering into a standstill arrangement, payment plan or other restructuring agreement with the mortgagee or (iii) initiating summary proceedings seeking suspension or postponement of the foreclosure process.

A lender may simultaneously enforce multiple security interests and pursue other claims, provided such actions are permitted under the relevant security documents. This includes enforcing a pledge over the shares in the mortgagor or pursuing other claims against the borrower or its affiliates concurrently with a foreclosure.

A foreclosure conducted by way of a public auction generally takes approximately two months, whereas a private sale generally requires four to five months to complete. A consensual sale is usually faster and can typically be completed within one to two months.

If the proceeds of a foreclosure sale are insufficient to cover the secured debt, the deficiency equals the outstanding amount of the borrower’s obligations (including accrued interest, fees and foreclosure costs) minus the net foreclosure proceeds. The remaining debt constitutes an unsecured claim, which the lender may seek to recover by exercising any rights or remedies available to unsecured creditors under applicable law.

In the Netherlands, the form of entity most often used to facilitate real estate joint ventures is the besloten vennootschap (BV), sometimes also used in a so-called CV/BV structure where the silent partners (CV) only contribute financially (by acting otherwise, their protected position – not being liable – may switch to full exposure).

Joint venture or operating agreements generally require co-operation between partners in a real estate joint venture, but one may deviate.

In Dutch real estate joint ventures that use a BV or NV, participants owe a foundational duty to act towards the company and one another in accordance with reasonableness and fairness (redelijkheid en billijkheid). This standard applies across the corporate organs and to those involved by law or the articles of association, including shareholders and directors, and functions both as a guide to behaviour and as a corrective to formalistic reliance on corporate rules where that would be unacceptable in the circumstances. Contractual governance will usually reinforce this through the implied and limiting effects of reasonableness and fairness on the joint venture documentation, shaping how rights may be exercised and how omissions are judged.

Dutch Supreme Court case law in joint venture settings highlights that in “equality” or 50:50 ventures, the intended equilibrium between partners may entail heightened expectations of due care, consultation and notification to prevent one party from undermining the balance. Alongside these corporate and contractual norms, the general tort regime (onrechtmatige daad) constrains conduct that breaches statutory duties or unwritten standards of proper social conduct and causes loss. This is in line with the Cancun ruling, which stipulates that directors of a joint venture have an increased duty of care towards shareholders. They must act in the interests of the company, but in doing so must take particular care with regard to the interests of (minority) shareholders, specifically in situations involving dilution and the provision of information.

Where the joint venture is structured as a partnership or limited partnership (maatschap/VOF/CV), the relationship is primarily contractual and governed by statutory partnership rules; questions of authority and liability typically dominate, and “shareholder-style” fiduciary analysis gives way to the agreed partnership framework and general tort principles.

Remedies in the Event of Violation

When governance decisions stray beyond what the law or the articles of association allow, corporate resolutions can be null (of no effect) or voidable by the court. Nullity applies to resolutions contrary to law or the articles of association, subject to statutory exceptions and possible ratification of certain defects, while voidability can be pursued where adoption conflicts with decision-making rules, with reasonableness and fairness, or with internal regulations; annulment is sought before the district court within the statutory time limits. Even then, third-party protection may curtail invocation against counterparties who were (and should have been) unaware of the defect, reflecting the system’s concern for transactional certainty.

Beyond setting-aside decisions, parties frequently seek interim relief (kort geding) to compel compliance with the articles of association or restrain voting or execution steps pending judgment on the merits. Such proceedings are commonly paired with arguments from nullity, voidability, and reasonableness and fairness, and may be accompanied by damages claims where the facts support tortious liability. In more structural disputes, the Enterprise Chamber (Ondernemingskamer) offers specialist shareholder owner remedies. The inquiry procedure (enquêteprocedure) can address mismanagement or governance breakdowns and unlock targeted measures, and the statutory dispute resolution mechanism (geschillenregeling) allows shareholders holding (alone or jointly) at least one-third of all shares in qualifying BVs and “closed” NVs to decide that a harmful shareholder must transfer its shares (squeeze-out/uitstoting). This is often a more effective end game than damages where the joint venture relationship has irretrievably broken down; the downside is that it can take quite some time before the procedure is finished.

Where governing documents are silent or vague, or produce stalemate, the Enterprise Chamber focuses on whether there are well-founded reasons to doubt a proper policy or proper course of affairs. The procedure is designed to restore balance and functionality rather than to award money and proceeds in two phases: first, the court decides whether to order an investigation, and second, it determines definitive measures in light of the investigators’ report. Importantly, the court can order immediate measures (onmiddellijke voorzieningen) at any stage, even before an investigation is ordered, if the state of the company or the interests of the investigation so require.

The toolkit used to break deadlock is practical and often decisive in 50:50 real estate ventures: the court may appoint an independent director with a casting vote or representation powers, suspend sitting directors, or otherwise stabilise governance to allow the company to function. Dutch commentary recognises that these provisional measures may depart from the articles of association where proportionate and temporary, reflecting the court’s mandate to resolve dysfunction swiftly. Standing thresholds for shareholders are statutory (commonly 10% in practice for smaller entities), and it is typical to raise written objections before filing; the articles of association and agreements can expand who has standing, so bespoke drafting remains influential on access to the remedy.

Provisions in shareholder agreements or corporate articles allowing for the “automatic entry of judgment” upon certain occurrences (such as a breach or a default event) are generally not directly enforceable in the Netherlands in the same way they might be in common law jurisdictions.

Under Dutch law, the enforcement of a judgment (which should be an adversial judgment) requires judicial authorisation (an exequatur for foreign judgments) or a court-ordered judgment (for domestic matters).

Under Dutch corporate and procedural law, provisions in a contract (such as a shareholders’ agreement) that purport to allow for the automatic entry of an injunction or other provisional remedies are not enforceable.

While Dutch law provides extensive freedom of contract, it does not allow private parties to contractually bypass the court’s role in issuing judicial orders or to predetermine a court’s assessment of urgency and necessity.

Dissolution (ontbinding) ends the joint venture’s life and is typically followed by liquidation (vereffening) where assets or liabilities remain. In the absence of a designated liquidator, directors often act by default, preparing a distribution plan and navigating creditor protection mechanics, including opportunities for objections. In real estate joint ventures, care is needed with “turbo liquidation” (dissolution without liquidation when there are no known assets) because contingent positions are common: warranty and tax exposures, latent defects, service charge reconciliations and ongoing claims can all persist. Using turbo liquidation in the face of such contingencies invites challenge and allegations of impropriety and may, in practice, prompt inquiry or dispute proceedings that are more costly than an orderly liquidation.

For BVs, shareholder distributions are constrained by statutory tests, commonly summarised as preserving mandatory reserves and solvency, subject to board approval, with potential director liability where approval was given imprudently. Shareholders who received distributions while knowing or reasonably foreseeing that the BV could not pay due debts can be required to compensate the shortfall, aligning the end game with creditor protection. In short, a joint venture wind-down should prioritise transparent balance-sheet housekeeping, realistic provisioning for contingent items and a distribution process that can withstand judicial scrutiny, particularly where relations between partners have been strained.

What we see generally is that although lenders sometimes seek to obtain sponsor or parent guarantees, sponsors often manage to avoid having to grant a sponsor guarantee to support the financing of a real estate portfolio. In our experience, in smaller credits, sponsor guarantees and suretyships are more common. Depending on the real estate financing, sponsor or parent guarantees can take different forms including full or limited recourse, principal payment and interest payment. Completion guarantees are more common in real estate development and are often demanded by financing banks. Cost overrun guarantees and standby letters of credit are also common in real estate development financings.

Unlike suretyships, there is no concept of guarantee under Dutch law. Therefore, Dutch contract law generally applies to guarantees, including the principle of freedom of contract, which enables tailoring the relevant guarantee to the specific needs of the client.

In Dutch practice, a completion guarantee (afbouwgarantie) is a contractual or insurance‑based arrangement under which a third party ensures that a construction project will be completed if the contractor fails due to, for example, insolvency or other inability to perform. Residential examples include the well‑known Woningborg and SWK schemes, which provide insured completion protection for new‑build housing projects.

Regardless of the specific guarantee, the following elements are usually central:

  • A claim requires the occurrence of a defined trigger – typically insolvency or non-performance of the contractor.
  • Once the trigger occurs, the guarantor must either arrange completion or pay compensation covering the extra costs needed to complete the project.
  • All completion guarantees contain procedural conditions, such as timely notice, co-operation with investigations, and provision of necessary documents.

Completion guarantees in the Dutch market are typically not unconditional or on-demand guarantees. Schemes such as Woningborg and SWK are conditional, insurance-based mechanisms tied to specific triggers and regulated conditions. Even commercial completion guarantees (outside housing) are generally structured as conditional performance undertakings, not immediate-payment instruments. Coverage and obligations are always limited to what the guarantee text explicitly provides, including exclusions, caps and technical criteria. Thus, they lack the “pay first, argue later” nature of a bank’s on-demand guarantee.

In general Dutch practice, completion guarantees are conditional instruments, meaning performance hinges on satisfaction of the guarantee terms, not on waived defences. Waivers – common in bank guarantees – do not form part of the structure of completion guarantees.

Dutch law provides a well-developed system of summary proceedings (kort geding), which constitutes the primary expedited judicial mechanism for urgent civil matters – including disputes relating to the enforcement of guarantees.

There are no identified statutory restrictions preventing a lender from enforcing a guarantee while also pursuing remedies under the primary agreement.

The Netherlands does not have a common‑law “receiver” system. Instead, similar functions are performed by:

  • a bankruptcy trustee (curator) in insolvency proceedings;
  • an administrator (bewindvoerder) in suspension-of-payments proceedings; or
  • a mortgagee-appointed manager under a management clause (beheersbeding), if authorised by the court.

Each mechanism has its own process, legal basis and method of selecting. These receiver‑like functions are performed by court‑appointed insolvency practitioners. The governing frameworks are the Dutch Bankruptcy Act and Article 3:267 of the DCC, and appointments are made exclusively by courts or, in mortgage cases, delegated by the mortgagee once the court grants the authorisation to do so. Bankruptcy trustees and administrators are chosen from court‑maintained lists of experienced practitioners, while mortgage management appointments involve free selection of a professional manager.

The most common and structurally embedded scenario in which a receiver‑equivalent is appointed in the Netherlands is, when a company is declared bankrupt, the court automatically appoints a bankruptcy trustee to take control of the estate and manage/sell the assets. This is the standard and most frequent situation in which a receiver-like function arises in Dutch practice.

Creditors may also seek a “receiver-like” appointment by invoking a management clause, which allows a mortgagee to apply to the court for the right to take possession of and manage the collateral when the mortgagor commits a significant breach, typically a material payment default. It is common practice to outsource the management to a professional property manager once court approval is obtained.

The Dutch insolvency system does not have a special category or separate statutory regime for “single‑asset bankruptcies” (ie, bankruptcy of an entity that owns only one parcel of real property). Instead, general bankruptcy rules apply to all debtors, regardless of the size or composition of the estate.

The single-asset entity must be generally unable to pay its debts, ie, in a state of cessation of payments. This is a liquidity test, not a balance‑sheet test. Dutch courts require that the debtor has at least two creditors, with at least one claim being due and payable. Bankruptcy can be requested by:

  • the debtor itself; or
  • any creditor with an undisputed claim.

Dutch courts will declare a single-asset real estate SPV bankrupt if the general insolvency criteria are satisfied. There is no prohibition, limitation or special test for such entities.

Impact of Bankruptcy on Mortgage Lender’s Ability to Foreclose of Collect

Under Dutch insolvency law, a mortgagee (secured creditor) maintains its separatist position in bankruptcy. This means the lender can exercise its mortgage rights even after the debtor is declared bankrupt, unaffected by the bankruptcy itself. Two limits to this right apply:

  • The bankruptcy trustee is authorised (but not obligated) to set a reasonable period for the mortgagee to exercise its enforcement right (cooling-off period). If the mortgagee fails to do so, the bankruptcy trustee may proceed to claim and sell the asset. This is without prejudice to the right of the mortgagee to the proceeds, although the mortgagee must accept that (otherwise not incurred) estate costs will be deducted first. The bankruptcy trustee, till the time of sale, may release an asset encumbered with a mortgage through payment of the amount secured by the mortgage.
  • The mortgagee’s right to immediate enforcement cannot be exercised during a cooling-off period ordered at the bankruptcy trustee’s request by the bankruptcy court.

A bankruptcy does not limit the types of foreclosure available; both public auction and private sale (with court approval) remain possible.

Impact of Bankruptcy Against a Guarantor

From a Dutch insolvency law perspective, a bankruptcy filing of the principal debtor generally does not extinguish or suspend remedies against a guarantor. Guarantees are described as independent obligations that remain enforceable as long as they fall within the scope of the guarantee agreement. There is extensive case law on the enforceability of rental bank guarantees in insolvency, particularly regarding the amount that can be paid out. In many cases, the payout ends up being lower than the amount stated in the bank guarantee.

Because Dutch bankruptcy law protects only the debtor and the estate – not guarantors – the lender remains free to demand payment from the guarantor, accelerate the guaranteed obligations and initiate litigation. No cooling-off period or insolvency stay applies to guarantors unless they themselves file for bankruptcy.

In the construction sector, arbitration is standard practice rather than an exception. The Arbitration Board for the Building Industry (RvA) handles over 600 cases annually and operates with a panel of more than 100 arbitrators. Of these, approximately 80 have a technical construction background, while the remaining 20 are legally qualified, almost all with prior experience in the judiciary. (Source: https://www.raadvanarbitrage.nl/)

By contrast, arbitration clauses are not commonly used in Dutch real estate transactions outside the construction sphere. Sale and purchase agreements and leases typically rely on the state courts, meaning arbitration is generally limited to complex, bespoke or cross‑border transactions where parties specifically value specialist expertise, multi‑jurisdictional enforceability and enhanced privacy.

When addressing disputes arising from real estate transactions, it is essential to assess the relative merits of arbitration versus court proceedings. A key advantage of arbitration is the ability to appoint decision-makers with specific sector expertise, whether in construction, valuation, technical matters or post-M&A issues, ensuring that the tribunal understands the commercial and technical context of the dispute. Arbitration may also offer procedural flexibility, enhanced privacy, and reduced exposure to public scrutiny. In many cases, it is faster: for example, arbitration on the merits at the Netherlands Arbitration Institute has an average duration of approximately nine months (2021), whereas comparable court proceedings may take around two years per instance (Source: https://nai.nl/). Arbitral awards are also widely enforceable under the New York Convention.

However, arbitration also has its disadvantages. Establishing the procedural framework and progressing through each phase can be time-consuming, and confidentiality is not absolute, particularly where parties seek to enforce or set aside an award before national courts, and as an increasing number of awards are being published. Although arbitral awards enjoy broad international enforceability, enforcement almost invariably requires court involvement, which may result in parallel litigation. Arbitration also incurs costs that do not arise in state court proceedings, including arbitrators’ fees and institutional administrative charges, which can be significant, especially when leading institutions or multi-member tribunals are involved. In addition, arbitral tribunals may order the losing party to reimburse the prevailing party’s full actual legal costs, whereas Dutch courts typically award only limited fixed costs under a points-based system. Technological infrastructure remains uneven across institutions, with few offering fully electronic filing. Finally, there is generally no appeal mechanism against arbitral awards. In the Netherlands, an award can only be set aside in narrowly defined circumstances, such as an invalid arbitration agreement, a violation of public policy, improper tribunal composition, or an award that fails to state the grounds for the decision.

Mediation is a process in which a neutral mediator helps parties explore solutions and reach their own agreement, rather than handing decision‑making authority to a judge or arbitrator. It is based on self‑determination, voluntary participation and confidentiality.

The use of mediation in the Netherlands continues to grow, reflecting a broader shift towards more collaborative and efficient methods of dispute resolution. According to recent research (2023), 57% of companies viewed mediation as the most effective way to resolve disputes, followed by 41% who preferred a combination of mediation with court proceedings or arbitration. Notably, none of the surveyed companies considered arbitration effective, and only 2% selected court proceedings. Among lawyers, 44% identified a combined mediation/court or mediation/arbitration path as most effective, while 42% chose mediation alone; again, none identified arbitration as effective, and 15% preferred court litigation. (Source: M.A. Simon Thomas, E. Schutte, M. Schonewille & O. Korneeva, PBM Vervolgonderzoek naar kansen en belemmeringen voor zakelijke mediation, Utrecht, April 2024, p71)

Real estate sector‑specific data on mediation usage is not available. Based on practice experience, mediation does occur in real estate transactions, most commonly in joint‑venture disagreements, shareholder conflicts and governance‑related disputes. However, its use remains relatively limited when compared with construction matters (where both mediation and arbitration are common), corporate/commercial disputes, and employment or family cases. According to the MfN Register, there are 354 mediators active in the fields of construction, real estate and leasing. (Source: https://mfnregister.nl/)

A recent Supreme Court judgment, ECLI:NL:HR:2024:1078, confirmed that a mediation clause can impose a binding obligation on parties to attempt mediation before commencing litigation or arbitration, albeit without compelling them to reach a settlement. The Court emphasised that parties may be required to participate sincerely and constructively, but cannot be forced into agreement. Importantly, the Court held that enforceable mediation clauses remain compatible with the right of access to the courts under Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights. Overall, the ruling underscores the Dutch legal system’s support for mediation as an efficient and co-operative step within the dispute resolution process, while preserving parties’ unrestricted access to formal remedies where mediation does not yield a resolution.

Dutch law provides a wide range of provisional remedies (voorlopige voorzieningen) that can be obtained swiftly through summary proceedings (kort geding). These measures play an important role in real estate disputes, where delay can significantly affect property rights, commercial operations or the preservation of value. Measures can include, among others:

1. Preliminary Injunctions

The primary provisional remedies are preliminary injunctions, which may take two forms:

  • Mandatory injunction (gebod in kort geding): orders the opposing party to take immediate action.
  • Prohibitory injunction (verbod in kort geding): orders the opposing party to refrain from certain conduct.

Both forms may be reinforced with a penalty (dwangsom) to ensure compliance.

2. Conservatory Attachment (conservatoir beslag)

Procedural law allows creditors to obtain conservatory attachment on real estate or other assets to secure recovery while litigation is ongoing.

3. Suspension of Execution or Eviction

A party may request a provisional order suspending execution of contractual rights – for example, temporarily stopping an eviction or preventing the enforcement of a disputed lease termination – until the court rules in main proceedings. These forms of interim relief are part of the “short-term measures” available in preliminary relief proceedings.

To obtain a provisional remedy (voorlopige voorziening) in the Netherlands, a party must follow the summary proceedings (kort geding) procedure. Dutch law imposes several well-defined requirements for such relief, and a court order is always required – provisional remedies cannot be obtained without judicial intervention.

  • Urgency (spoedeisend belang): The applicant must demonstrate a pressing and immediate need for judicial intervention – meaning that waiting for a full merits case (bodemprocedure) would cause unacceptable or irreparable harm.
  • A sufficiently plausible underlying right: Summary proceedings are not full trials. The applicant must show that their claim has a reasonable prospect of success on the merits – a standard sometimes referred to as “sufficient plausibility” or a prima facie case.
  • The requested remedy must be suitable as provisional relief: The court will consider whether the requested measure is appropriate, proportionate and reversible, or at least consistent with the provisional nature of summary proceedings.
  • Balancing of interests: The provisional relief judge weighs the interests of both parties, considering:
    1. the harm to the applicant if relief is denied; and
    2. the harm to the respondent if relief is granted.

The use of provisional remedies (voorlopige voorzieningen) in the Netherlands is subject to strict judicial safeguards. When a party seeks such relief improperly, several legal and practical risks may arise:

  • Risk of denial due to lack of urgency, complexity or insufficient evidentiary basis: Dutch courts require a demonstrable urgent interest (spoedeisend belang) to grant provisional measures. If the applicant fails to show genuine urgency – or if urgency has been undermined by delay – the court will deny the remedy outright. In addition, because the standard is one of plausibility, applications that lack sufficient documentation also risk failure. This may leave the applicant without protection and weaken their position in subsequent proceedings.
  • Exposure to adverse cost orders: While Dutch courts apply modest cost awards, an unsuccessful or improperly motivated application may still result in the applicant being ordered to pay the respondent’s legal costs, including costs associated with emergency preparation. This is especially likely when the court finds the claim unnecessary, poorly substantiated, or strategic rather than substantive.
  • Risk of strategic backfire in later proceedings: Because provisional relief decisions are provisional but influential in practice, an improperly sought remedy may damage the applicant’s credibility in later merits proceedings. Judges frequently consider the history of the dispute, including whether a party misused emergency mechanisms.

Dutch courts are highly willing to issue temporary or preliminary injunctions (voorlopige voorzieningen) in real estate-related disputes. The summary proceedings (kort geding) system is specifically designed to provide swift interim relief in urgent civil matters, including those involving property rights, lease enforcement, construction issues and transactional conflicts. The provisional relief judge (voorzieningenrechter) weighs the urgency, the likelihood of success of the claim and the balance of interests, and if satisfied, will issue the requested temporary measure.

To obtain a provisional remedy in Dutch summary proceedings (kort geding), a party must demonstrate not only urgency but also that the matter involves harm that cannot be adequately repaired if relief is denied. Dutch courts do not always use the phrase “irreparable harm” explicitly, but the concept is embedded in the requirements of urgency, proportionality and the need for immediate relief. The primary way to prove irreparable harm is to show that waiting for a full merits case (bodemprocedure) would leave the applicant with a loss that cannot be remedied later – whether because the damage is irreversible or because delayed relief would deprive any eventual judgment of practical value.

Under Dutch law, contractors cannot place a mechanic’s lien on real property in the sense used in common law jurisdictions. There is no statutory mechanic’s lien regime that automatically attaches to the property itself.

Dutch law does recognise the right of retention (retentierecht), which gives a contractor a powerful, self-executing right to withhold possession of work, materials or the construction site until payment is made – and this does not require a court order.

A contractor may invoke this right if several statutory conditions are met:

  • the claim for payment must be due and payable;
  • the non-payment must relate directly to the work performed; and
  • the contractor must have actual control over the object (eg, keys or physical access control).

The contractor must also explicitly declare that the right of retention is being exercised – often by securing the site and adding notice signage. This right is recognised and enforceable against the client, and under certain conditions also against third parties.

Thus, while Dutch law does not permit unilateral registration of a lien against real estate, a contractor can exercise a right of retention without court approval, functioning as a powerful payment pressure tool.

With respect to tax, the following regulations could be relevant relating to purchases and management of residential units. The transfer of new-build residential properties is subject to VAT (21%). Existing residential properties are in principle VAT exempt, unless it qualifies as new construction. If VAT is exempt, investors should in principle instead pay real estate transfer tax (RETT). The standard RETT rate for investors is 10.4%, and 8% for residential properties. This applies to all residential acquisitions not intended for owner-occupation. There are various exemptions from RETT – for example, in relation to internal reorganisations. The leasing of residential property is exempt from VAT. Investors often acquire newly built residential assets through share deals (buying shares in a property-holding company), which could have certain tax benefits. It is advisable to carefully consider the tax structuring.

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Law and Practice in Netherlands

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Eversheds Sutherland has a true partner-led full-service real estate team (the only one of all international firms in the Netherlands), with partner-led practices in real estate (two partners), real estate litigation (three partners), real estate transactions (three partners), real estate finance (three partners), planning and environment (one partner), real estate tax (one partner), real estate notary (one partner), energy (one partner) and corporate real estate (one partner) – altogether, ten partners who cover the full range of real estate and a team of 30+ lawyers overall. The lawyers seamlessly work together, as well as on an international level, having offices all over the globe (70+), especially in Europe, the USA, the Middle East and Asia. The firm represents the full range of international investors, financial institutions, internationally operating corporates, project developers and hyperscalers. As a leading global law firm, Eversheds Sutherland provides legal advice and solutions to an international client base that includes some of the world’s largest multinationals.